中國軍隊分析北韓軍隊朝鲜先军时代军事战略问题研究 // Chinese Military Analysis of North Korean Army

中國軍隊分析北韓軍隊朝鲜先军时代军事战略问题研究 //

Chinese Military Analysis of North Korean Army

The first part of the preface

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the drastic changes in the Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp suffered great setbacks. In the mid-1990s, the Korean economy suddenly plunged into recession. In July 1994, Kim Il Sung died. At that time, people generally believe that North Korea is facing a serious crisis, the development prospects of North Korea is quite worrying. Nevertheless, North Korea has experienced three years of “mourning mourning”, and continue to missile test and nuclear test activities, and constantly strengthen its military power.

Into 2000, the DPRK has provoked the second, third Western war, carried out two nuclear tests, and the implementation of several missile test firing. In 2010, the DPRK in the West Sea (Korean Peninsula in the western waters) to create a “Cheonan ship incident” and “Yin Ping Island shelling incident.” North Korea’s military provocation, not only to South Korea, back to the surrounding countries to bring unease, but also to the security situation in Northeast Asia has brought great variables, and become an important factor in the regional arms competition.

September 1998, Kim Jong Il in the introduction of its regime, held high the banner of building a “strong power”, put forward a new political slogan – “first army politics.” To December 17, 2011 Kim Jong-il died, he had a long-17 years of strong rule of the DPRK. Kim Jong Il’s “first army politics” refers to all military work as the first, all military work as the most important, under the principle of military advance, to solve all the problems in the revolution and national construction, the people’s army as a pillar of the revolution , The political way of advancing the whole of socialism. It can be said that the first army politics is Kim Jong-Japanese political way. Its core content is that under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, the DPRK’s army actively responded to economic difficulties, social problems and security crisis, and strive to maintain the Korean-style socialist system. “Military strategy” is the DPRK in order to “first army politics” rooted in the Korean society, all to give priority to the development of national defense forces for all purposes, to give priority to the protection of national defense for the purpose of Kim Jong-Japanese military forces use.

In this paper, after the death of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong-il system under the Korean military strategy development changes in the study, in particular, the DPRK in spite of the strong opposition from the international community, is still nuclear development and has a certain nuclear weapons after the strategic changes as a study Focus.

The second part of the Korean military strategy

First, the formation of the Korean military strategy background

The military strategy of the DPRK is gradually formed on the basis of Kim Il Sung’s military strategic thinking. Kim Il Sung’s military strategic thinking can be said to be the integration of formal warfare and guerrilla warfare. In the process of anti-Japanese activities in China and the former Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung accumulated a wealth of practical experience, which laid a solid foundation for the formation of its military strategic thinking. On the basis of these military experiences, Kim Il Sung put forward the “main tactics”, and stressed that “the main tactics” is the DPRK’s unique military strategy. In order to fully understand the DPRK’s military strategy, the study of Kim Il Sung’s military experience is very important.

In 1928, Kim Il Sung joined the Communist Youth League of China. Later, Kim Il Sung as a member of the Communist Party of China, in the East Manchuria, coastal state area carried out anti-Japanese activities behind enemy lines. Through the small Wangqing, the old Montenegro, Putian Fort fighting and other guerrilla warfare, Kim Il Sung from Mao Zedong’s military thinking to draw a wealth of wisdom and nutrition, and gradually realize the penetration war, guerrilla warfare, night war, behind enemy lines, large forces and small forces With the importance of tactics. Kim Il Sung was led behind the enemy’s anti-Japanese activities, the main fighting style for the ambush, raid, etc., but belong to the tactical category of guerrilla warfare. However, the DPRK will be these guerrilla warfare style exaggerated, propaganda into a large-scale battle, that is, a typical war in the revolutionary war. Because of this, today’s North Korean army still attaches great importance to guerrilla warfare.

In the late 1940s, Kim Il Sung had to flee to the former Soviet Union and was incorporated into the Red Army of the Soviet Union due to the encroachment of the Japanese Kwantung Army. At that time, Kim Il-sheng by learning Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukachevsky (1893 – 1939) prepared by the Marshal of the “workers and peasants Red Army field”, the military-style military organization , With the mobile combat-based battle compiled, the fire as the center of the weapons and equipment system and other content of the Soviet army’s regular war thinking has a certain understanding. Kim Il Sung’s military struggle in China and the former Soviet Union has played a very important role in the development of the military-based military forces in North Korea and the formation of military tactics such as speed warfare, raid warfare and cooperation. Through the Korean War, the DPRK in its military strategy to increase the annihilation of enemy forces surrounded by war, to promote political work, to ensure that the contents of war materials and so on. Through local conflicts, North Korea recognizes the need to strengthen the ability to cooperate with the war, strengthen the mechanized forces and air force. Based on the above, the DPRK continued to carry out the war to supplement and improve the method.

Figure 1: The formation of the Korean military strategy.

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Figure 1: The formation of the Korean military strategy. [Save to album]

Source: Park Jung Pao, “North Korea’s Military Strategy Research”, “Korean Studies” Volume 6 (Seoul: Dongguo University, 2010), p.123.

Second, Kim Il Sung military strategy

1, preemptive attack strategy

Preemptive strategy is to choose the enemy completely unpredictable, or even if it can be expected but there is no time to respond to the timing, places and methods to attack each other’s strategy. Preemptive attack strategy can maximize the play to a sudden, fast, secret, camouflage, etc.. Often, the implementation of surprise operations, you can at the lowest cost, get the maximum combat effect. Kim Il Sung has repeatedly stressed that to do surprise success, usually must maintain a good fighting situation. Not only that, the combat troops have to really have the ability to completely destroy each other’s combat capability. This means that the purpose of pre-emptive surprise strategy is through the efficient and fast combat operations, in a short time focus on fighting forces, the complete destruction of enemy combat forces.

In order to implement pre-emptive surprise attacks, North Korea will be the deployment of most of the military forces in the front area. In the structure of the troops, but also highlights the rapid response, flexible and flexible features. It is particularly worth mentioning that North Korea will be about 70% of the military forces deployed in Pyongyang – Yuan Shan line south, if the DPRK made surprise attack decision, then the North Korean troops do not have another combat deployment, you can directly to South Korea to take military action.

2, with the strategy

“Coordination strategy” refers to a battle, two or more combat forms of mutual cooperation, mutual coordination strategy. On the basis of Mao Zedong ‘s guerrilla war ideas, summed up the experience of the Vietnam War, and fully considered the characteristics of the Korean Peninsula after the so – called “main tactics. The core of the war is in the large-scale regular warfare and guerrilla warfare, large forces and small forces with the launch of various forms of attack operations, such a battlefield will be no front and rear, making the other completely into a state of chaos.

In order to implement the war, North Korea has established the world’s largest special forces, and has AN-2 machine, hovercraft, submarines and other sea, air penetration means. In addition, the North Korean Navy, the Air Force also set up a sniper brigade, taking into account the characteristics of different services, and constantly strengthen the combat capability building. North Korea may take the type of war with a combination of regular warfare and guerrilla warfare, cooperation between large forces and small forces, cooperation between different services (land and sea air force), between different arms (arms), military and people force (Military and folk resources) and so on.

3, quick fix strategy

In the traditional military strategy theory, quick fix strategy has been highly valued by all parties. Quick tactical strategy is to focus on superior forces, each break the other main force, in a short time, with rapid tactical victory, the end of the war strategy. To this end, North Korea attaches great importance to the rapid development strategy, from the 20th century, 80 years, North Korea focused on the construction of armored forces, mechanized forces. In order to achieve the speed of war, North Korea’s military structure is also fully highlighted the rapid response, flexible and flexible features. The main combat forces of the warlords are tanks, armored vehicles, fighters, standing forces, compared with South Korea, in addition to armored vehicles, the DPRK in the number of obvious dominant. Therefore, if the DPRK launched a speed war on South Korea, then within a few days, the Korean army may sweep the whole of South Korea, and block the US military reinforcements involved.

Third, the evaluation of Kim Il Sung’s military strategy

Kim Il Sung’s military strategy is to sum up Kim Il Sung’s experience of military struggle in China and the former Soviet Union, taking into account the terrain characteristics of the Korean Peninsula and the gradual formation of local warfare. It can be said that Kim Il Sung’s military strategy is offensive offensive strategy. It is particularly worth emphasizing that the use of conventional combat power to occupy the number of advantages, the attack on South Korea launched a surprise attack, and then master the war dominance, and in the external reinforcements arrived in the Korean Peninsula before the end of the war speed strategy is Kim Il Sung’s military strategy core.

At present, the local war style is changing from long-term war, war of attrition, ground warfare to ground combat, maritime combat, air combat, space operations, network operations and other integrated all-round, multi-level modern three-dimensional operations. In addition, with the development of science and technology, the destruction of weapons and equipment, remote precision strike capability increased significantly, making the war style is developing into a rapid focus on precision strike style. In the past, the focus of the war was to use conventional military forces to win the victory of war and compete for the dominance of war. The focus of modern warfare is based on cutting-edge weapons and equipment system, to achieve the battlefield digital, efficient play the overall effectiveness of combat effectiveness. However, Kim Il Sung’s military strategy only embodies the conventional combat power of the implementation of the war, North Korea’s nuclear and missile areas are not included. Obviously, Kim Il Sung’s military strategy is very obvious, can not adapt to the needs of modern warfare. The army is an effective means for the DPRK to maintain its regime and to combat the threat of the system. Therefore, in order to give full play to the role of the military, Kim had to put forward a new military strategic concept.

The third part of the military era of military strategy and military strength construction

First, the military strategy

Kim Jong-il pointed out that the modern war was a new form of war, characterized by a highly expanded three-dimensional warfare, information warfare (reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, psychological warfare) Non-symmetrical warfare, non-contact warfare, precision strike, short time war decisive battle. In addition, Kim Jong Il also stressed that to do a good job in preparing for the new battle. It can be seen that Kim Jong-il has fully recognized that the modern war style is subject to qualitative changes, and that continue to use the existing conventional war tactics, can not guarantee the victory of future war. Therefore, in full consideration of the modern war style at the same time, in order to develop can cope with the United States and South Korea joint military forces, Kim Jong Il conceived the “large-scale destruction strategy”, “quick decision strategy”, “network strategy.”

(A), large-scale destruction strategy

Large-scale destruction strategy is to bring a huge destructive strategy to each other, is a “serious retaliation strategy” of a. To achieve a large-scale destruction strategy, need to have beyond the other side of the military power or have to give each other a decisive loss of military means. North Korea for large-scale destruction of the strategic forces, including nuclear weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and artillery units.

The massive destruction strategy is a strategy developed by the DPRK in order to protect the “victorious” battle of victory. In 1994, the DPRK was facing a major crisis because of the US threat to military attacks on North Korea’s nuclear facilities. It can be said that the emergence of this crisis directly promoted Kim Jong Il from the containment level to develop large-scale destruction of the military strategy.

The massive destruction strategy is the most representative strategy adopted by countries with nuclear weapons. In order to make up for the “blockade strategy” deficiencies, the former US President Eisenhower has proposed a “large-scale revenge strategy.” The United States, on the basis of its absolute nuclear superiority, pursued a large-scale retaliation strategy, reduced defense spending and established military hegemony in the international community. Former Soviet leader Khrushchev argues that the Soviet Union had failed in the “Cuban Missile Crisis” in 1962, mainly because the Soviet Union was at a disadvantage in terms of nuclear warfare compared with the United States. Therefore, Khrushchev actively promote nuclear weapons as the main force of large-scale retaliation strategy, trying to have the military strength with the United States. In 1964, China’s first atomic bomb after the success of China’s international influence, political status has been significantly improved. It can be said that through the nuclear development, to take a deterrent revenge strategy, China protects the security of its own country and establishes the status of the Asian military power based on it.

As mentioned above, countries with nuclear weapons, as a military power, can occupy a dominant position in the international community. Not only that, but also nuclear weapons as a primary means to promote large-scale retaliation strategy, in order to ensure their own national security. Therefore, the DPRK may be through the possession of nuclear weapons to promote large-scale destruction strategy. In other words, large-scale destruction strategy can not only make North Korea effective response to a variety of external threats, but also in the “something” to ensure that North Korea to win. 6.25 After the war, North Korea and the United States has maintained a truce. In recent years, the DPRK-US relations, due to nuclear problems, human rights issues, counterfeiting problems and other contradictions, the contest continued. In this context, the DPRK that at any time possible with the United States outbreak of war. Therefore, the DPRK’s massive destruction strategy is likely to play an important role in the future DPRK-US relations.

In 2006, the DPRK Labor Party Propaganda Department Deputy Minister has said that once the war broke out, the whole of Seoul will be 30 minutes into a flames, 100,000 US troops, 70% of South Korean residents face death, South Korea’s economic 90% Above into ashes. July 24, 2010, the DPRK National Defense Commission has also issued a threat that will be necessary when the start of nuclear-based North Korean retaliation “jihad”. This means that “something” when North Korea will use weapons of mass destruction to launch attacks.

(2) quick fix strategy

Kim Jong Il’s “quick fix strategy” is in the external forces reinforce the Korean Peninsula before the end of the war strategy, is Kim Il Sung’s strategy of succession, continuation and development. The Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the “quick fix strategy” has been widely used. Obviously, through the “quick fix strategy”, you can focus on attack and destroy hostile country command facilities and the main force, to master the war dominance, and in a very short time to end the war victory. The reason why North Korea will use quick fix strategy, the main reasons are as follows:

1, North Korea has a considerable scale can start the speed of combat forces

North Korea’s armored forces and mechanized forces with a high degree of mobility, can give each other a strong impact and deterrence, artillery forces can focus on the enemy’s core targets, can cause great losses and damage to each other. North Korea’s main battle of the speed of war – armored forces is 1.7 times the Han Jun, artillery units are Han Jun 2.5 times.

2, North Korea’s military system as a whole is conducive to maneuver

Despite North Korea’s economic difficulties, North Korea has been building military power. In recent years, not only the strength of military forces and equipment continued to increase, the army structure adaptation, also pay great attention to the construction of mobile combat capability. According to South Korea’s defense paper published in 2010, in order to improve the combat effectiveness of the troops, the DPRK reorganized part of the army, the two mechanized army reorganized as mechanized division, a tank army reorganized as armored division, an artillery army reorganized as artillery division. In addition, the DPRK has also strengthened the front forces of firepower building capacity. These changes in the Korean army provide a reliable guarantee for its speed warfare.

3, the Korean army most of the combat effectiveness deployed in the front area

North Korea has deployed more than 10 troops and more than 60 divisions / brigades in Pyongyang – south of Wonsan Line, accounting for about 70% of the overall combat effectiveness of the Korean army. In this way, as long as the North Korean leadership determined, then the North Korean troops do not have to re-adjust the deployment, you can always put into the South invasion. In November 2009, after the third naval battle in the Western Seas (Korean Peninsula), the Korean army deployed a 240-mm rocket launcher on its west coast, posing a direct threat to the South West and the capitals. It can be said that North Korea in front of the deployment of a large number of troops in order to focus on the early war to launch attacks, through the speed of war hit the Korean army.

North Korea stressed that with the traditional war style changes, non-linear combat, non-contact operations and other new combat methods are emerging, modern war may be in front and rear at the same time start. This means that the DPRK regular forces in front of a positive attack at the same time, the Korean special forces may be to the south of the region to launch interference operations. Undeniably, the battlefield before and after the start at the same time, the war will be quick to play a decisive role.

4, network strategy

Network attack refers to the use of computer networks exist loopholes and security flaws, the enemy military, administrative, personnel and other major systems and resources to attack, usually also known as “no gunfire.” With the rapid development of computer technology and the concept of network-centric warfare, the center of modern warfare is moving from the traditional combat platform to the network. From recent years, the local war style can also be seen, network combat is as one of the main forms of war, played a very important role.

In 2009, Kim Jong Il held a speech at the senior parliamentary conference of the Korean army that the war of the twentieth century was a war of oil and shells, and that war in the twenty-first century was an information war. It can also be seen that North Korea attaches great importance to cyber warfare.

There are two main ways to network attacks. The first for the illegal invasion of each other’s information systems, steal the system confidential information, damage to the target system data. The second is not invade the other side of the information system, the external destruction of the other information system, so that its function can not play a role.

From the 90s of the 20th century, North Korea in Pyongyang command automation university, computer technology university, Jinze Industrial University, and so vigorously cultivate professional network warfare talent. Pyongyang command automation university under the People’s Army General Staff, is North Korea’s most representative network warfare personnel training institutions, each year for the army to train more than 100 computer professional and technical personnel. It is speculated that the Korean army has a professional hacker scale of 500 to 600.

The military strategy of the United States, South Korea and other developed countries is heavily dependent on the computer network. If North Korea launched a network attack, it is easy to lead to South Korea’s network system confusion, affecting the transmission and sharing of information. At the crucial moment, and even may paralyze the entire network, so that South Korea missed the opportunity to deal with, so as to bring a fatal blow to South Korea. Before the outbreak of the war, the DPRK may attack the government of the Korean government at home or abroad through hacking. During the war, the DPRK may also interfere with the destruction of Han Jun’s computer network, leading to the entire computer network data transmission interruption and system paralysis.

North Korea’s network strategy will also have a positive impact on the psychological warfare. With regard to the war in Iraq, the DPRK believes that the US imperialists have been able to win in the war in Iraq, not so much the role of high-tech weapons, as it is the psychological warfare in the role, and from the ideological collapse of Iraq results. It can be seen that North Korea attaches great importance to the psychological warfare, and that in the future war conditions, the psychological war will run through the whole process of war. North Korea through the network to carry out the psychological warfare style mainly includes: in hostile countries or support the national network spread to the DPRK is conducive to the spread of information and gossip, and even false information (bacterial warfare, chemical warfare, the use of nuclear weapons, large casualties) Thus bringing panic to the public in hostile countries and weakening the will of the hostile countries. For the support of the country, through the efforts to create anti-war public opinion, forcing the support of the state to stop the reinforcements, and the early withdrawal of troops have been invested.

Figure 2: Military strategy of the army.

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Figure 2: Military strategy of the army. [Save to album]

The main feature of the military strategy of the army is based on Kim Il Sung’s aggressive strategy, in order to maintain the regime, increase the content of the protective strategy. In other words, Kim Jong Il through the army to establish a military strategy, will be his successor Kim Jong-un faithfully inheritance, continuation and carry forward.

Although Kim Il Sung’s military strategy – pre-emptive attack strategy, with the strategy, quick fix strategy is based on conventional combat power to develop, but taking into account the status of North Korea’s weapons and equipment system and changes in modern war style, these military strategy will Will continue to continue. Based on the pre-emptive strike strategy, most of the troops of the Korean army are deployed in the front area. This will reduce the time required for the deployment, movement and take-over of the troops, thereby increasing the mobility of the force. Based on the strategy of cooperation, we can realize the effective cooperation between the Korean troops and the regular combat forces. This can improve operational effectiveness, weaken the other side of the military power, and then achieve the purpose of quick fix.

Second, the military characteristics of the military strategy: the pursuit of military adventurism

After the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s biggest change in the military field is that North Korea has carried out nuclear development. North Korea, despite the strong opposition from the international community, is still engaged in nuclear development, its purpose is to the United States, the relationship between Korea, through the pursuit of military adventurism to take the initiative.

In December 2010, the Democratic People’s Armed Forces Minister Kim Yong-chun pointed out that the Korean Revolutionary Armed Forces had been prepared to launch the “nuclear-based jihad-based jihad” when necessary. North Korea’s revolutionary armed forces not only to resist aggression, but also sweep the enemy base camp, to eliminate the root causes of war, and then realize the reunification of the motherland history. In addition, the DPRK in 2009 set up a new reconnaissance General Administration, to further strengthen the role of external intelligence departments and functions. As can be seen from these initiatives in the DPRK, North Korea is strengthening military adventurism on the Korean Peninsula, based on the evolving military power.

North Korea’s pursuit of military adventurism, mainly for the following reasons: First, the historical experience to tell North Korea, the pursuit of military adventurism is very necessary. North Korea believes that the late 20th century, the late 60s to capture the US armed spy ship “Pueblo” incident and shot down the US EC-121 reconnaissance plane incident, North Korea and the United States confrontation made a major victory. Therefore, it can be said that these two events have become North Korea continue to promote the main cause of military adventurism. Second, trying to urge the international community to recognize North Korea as a military power. The DPRK believes that public military demonstrations or military provocation can be carried out to demonstrate to the international community its military power. In other words, North Korea in advocates, have a strong military strength in order to attract people’s attention, building a strong army is the power of the country. Thirdly, a powerful army can be used as an effective means of strengthening internal unity within its system. North Korea believes that a military provocation in the vicinity of the northern limit line or the armistice can create a military crisis within the DPRK, and this sense of crisis can effectively enhance unity within North Korea.

In the following circumstances, North Korea is likely to take military adventurism action: First, the North-South exchange is interrupted, further escalation of military tensions. Second, the DPRK nuclear issue has not progressed, the DPRK-US relations have stalled and the relationship has deteriorated seriously. Third, Kim Jong-un system is unstable. Military adventurist actions include: the implementation of nuclear tests, the launch of long-range missiles, in the West Sea (South Korea’s western waters) and near the stop line to launch local provocation. North Korea believes that through these provocative activities, can enhance the unity of the people, consolidate and improve the Kim Jong-un system.

Third, the military strength of the military construction

(A) to maintain the military superiority of South Korea

Although North Korea is facing serious economic difficulties, it is still actively promoting the modernization of weapons and equipment, vigorously developing nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, and strive to build a strategic weapon system, and promote a strong military power based on the construction of a strong power. Into 2000, North Korea not only to strengthen the standing forces, artillery units, armored forces, special operations forces have also been rapid development. According to South Korea’s 2010 Defense White Paper, compared with 2008, North Korea ground forces added four divisions and one motor brigade, an increase of more than 200 tanks.

Table 1: Comparison of North and South Military Forces.

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Table 1: Comparison of North and South Military Forces. [Save to album]

* In order to facilitate the comparison of military forces between the North and the South, the Marine Corps equipment into the Army troops equipment project was calculated.

Source: Defense Department, Defense White Paper 2010 (Seoul: Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, 2010) p.271.

North Korea believes that as long as the US military to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula, South Korea to maintain military superiority in the case, the DPRK can achieve the “unity of the South.” There is no doubt that North Korea has strengthened its military power and provided a reliable guarantee for its large-scale destruction and speed warfare. In addition, the DPRK also believes that the collapse of the former Soviet Union and China’s reform and opening up, resulting in North Korea’s back-up forces weakened. Based on this judgment, the DPRK began to strengthen the military building for the South Triangular Military Relations (Korea, the United States and Japan) to enhance its autonomous military response capability.

(B) to strengthen the containment strategy

1, nuclear development

North Korea received 10 kilograms to 15 kilograms of plutonium from the start of the 5 MWe nuclear reactor in Ningxia before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification in June 1992. According to the analysis, North Korea has been using these plutonium to promote nuclear weapons research and development program. At present, North Korea has about 40 kilograms to 50 kilograms of plutonium, which can produce 6 to 9 nuclear weapons (the manufacture of a nuclear weapon requires 6 kg to 8 kg of plutonium). In addition, North Korea’s uranium (for the manufacture of atomic reactor nuclear fuel) reserves are very rich, the total burial of about 26 million tons, of which the amount of 4 million tons.

With regard to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the former head of the US National Nuclear Institute, Dr. Heck, wrote in the article “North Korea’s Lessons Learned in the Core Crisis” that North Korea has nuclear weapons manufacturing that is as powerful as the United States in Nagasaki, Japan ability. From the current situation, the DPRK is likely to have 4-8 pieces of primary nuclear weapons. On April 9, 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a speech titled “Nuclear Nonproliferation” at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, that North Korea has six thousand nuclear weapons. This is the first time that US government officials have formally addressed the number of nuclear weapons owned by the DPRK in public. In March 2010, when he participated in political studies, political instructors pointed out that “North Korea is a country with nuclear weapons, although the United States is the world,” the Korean People’s Army in South Korea, in March 2010, Power, but not provoke North Korea, entirely because North Korea has nuclear weapons. ”

Therefore, North Korea can be considered independent of nuclear weapons manufacturing capacity, with the number of nuclear weapons for the 1-8. But so far, it is not clear to the extent to which the DPRK will carry nuclear weapons on its missiles to launch nuclear weapons technology to what extent.

On the issue of highly enriched uranium (HEU), on September 3, 2009, the former representative of the DPRK in the United States, Park Ji-yuan, pointed out that North Korea has successfully pilot uranium enrichment, the test has entered the final stage. If uranium enrichment is successful, it means that it can be produced with less, continuous mass production, and is not easily perceived by the outside world. The use of uranium in comparison with the way in which plutonium is used to make nuclear weapons is relatively simple and easy to achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons. In order to be able to carry nuclear weapons on field artillery or short-range missiles as tactical nuclear weapons to use, many nuclear-owned countries often choose to use uranium to create nuclear weapons. Compared with the development of conventional combat power, the development of nuclear weapons investment costs less, and can effectively compensate for the military power of the disadvantages. Therefore, the more weak national defense forces, in order to have the means to contain the war, with the military to carry out military confrontation, the more vigorously develop nuclear weapons.

It is not difficult to predict that North Korea will strive to improve its ability to strike short-range military targets by developing small-scale nuclear weapons. Han Peninsula battlefield lack of depth, so in the Korean Peninsula battlefield environment, compared with the long-range nuclear weapons, can be close combat tactical nuclear weapons can play a full role. In addition, the DPRK will also build a large-scale nuclear weapons production system, trying to establish its military power status.

2, chemical and biological weapons

From the 20th century, 80 years, the DPRK independent production of gas bombs and bacteriological weapons, with a certain degree of chemical and biological weapons attack capability. Since the 1990s, the DPRK has started to develop, produce and stockpile the chemical and biological (radioactive) weapons and materials, and has the capability of biochemical radiative warfare. At present, North Korea will 2,500 tons to 5,000 tons of chemical agents dispersed in six storage facilities, chemical weapons, the average annual production capacity of 4,500 tons. In addition, North Korea can also cultivate and produce 13 kinds of biological weapons such as anthrax, smallpox, cholera, typhoid, plague and so on. It is reported that these biological weapons training about 10 days, you can directly put into use.

North Korea’s biochemical weapons will use artillery, missiles, aircraft and other delivery tools. At the beginning of the war, the DPRK is likely to focus on the use of chemical weapons in the area, in order to destroy Han Jun’s defensive positions, to create favorable conditions for its attack. North Korea is also likely to use chemical and biological weapons to South Korea’s capitals, large cities and other densely populated areas to launch indiscriminate attacks, by triggering public panic to interfere with military operations.

3, missile development

In 1985, the DPRK experimented with an improved Scud-B missile with a range of 320 km to 340 km. In 1989, the Scout-500 missile with a range of 500 km was tested. In May 1993, the shooting range was 1,300 km Of the missile No. 1, in August 1998, a test of a 1,600 km to 2,500 km Dapu dong 1 missile, in July 2006 and April 2009 test of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) level of the Taipu hole 2 Missiles.

In 2004, North Korea successfully developed a range of 120 km KN-02-type short-range missiles, and carried out a combat deployment. In 2007, North Korea also deployed a medium-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a range of more than 3,000 km using a mobile launcher. In 2010, the DPRK created a “new IRBM division”, the division under the People’s Army General Staff Missile Guidance Bureau. The reason why North Korea continues to develop a range of 3,000 km or more medium-range missiles, is to “something” to fight against the Korean Peninsula reinforcements, to prevent the US military and the Pacific region in the external combat power to the Korean Peninsula. Although the Korean missile range has increased significantly, but the accuracy is not high. As a result, the DPRK had to increase the number of missiles in order to strike the target effectively.

Table 2: North Korean missile development status quo.

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Table 2: North Korean missile development status quo. [Save to album]

Source: Ministry of Defense, “Encyclopedia of weapons of mass destruction” (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, 2004), p.35; reference to “Defense White Paper 2010”.

North Korea’s ballistic missiles, not only able to attack South Korea, Japan, and even the United States are under its threat. North Korea in accelerating the development of the missile at the same time, but also actively promote nuclear development, which has aroused great concern of the international community. Because the DPRK once the ability to carry nuclear weapons on the missile, the threat range and destructive power will be greatly increased. In other words, if North Korea to achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons, that is, to create a nuclear weapons below 1 ton, it means that North Korea can be equipped with nuclear weapons in the use of ballistic missiles.

North Korea’s missile production capacity in the former Soviet Union and China’s technical guidance, through independent research and development has reached a considerable level. It is widely believed that North Korea’s missile manufacturing capacity ranks sixth in the world.

(C) to enhance the speed of quick fix

North Korea from the 20th century, 80 years, in order to implement the speed war, focus on strengthening the armored forces, mechanized troops. The late 1980s, the DPRK began to produce the former Soviet Union T-62 tank imitation – “Tianma” tank, this tank in the water depth of 5.5 meters can also successfully wading river. In addition, the DPRK also introduced, produced, deployed a 23 mm air gun. In 2009, North Korea successfully developed “Tianma” tank improved – “storm” tank, and the actual deployment of two “storm” tank brigade. The reason why North Korea attaches importance to the construction of mechanized forces, mainly in order to use the mechanized forces of the motor power and the impact of the speed of war. Over the past decade, North Korea has increased the deployment of more than 2,000 rockets (more than 3,100 doors to more than 5,100 doors) and more than 300 long-range artillery deployments in the vicinity of the Armed Forces (DME). The reason why the DPRK forward deployment of rockets and long-range artillery, is to the beginning of the war on the South Korean capital to focus on the fight.

The North Korean Navy is equipped with more than 810 ships, including combat ships, submarines, support ships and so on. Among them, about 60% of the ships deployed in front of the base. There are more than 290 ships, such as the ship’s combat ship, the missile boat, the torpedo boat, the fire support boat and so on. The support ship has more than 290 ships such as landing craft and hovercraft. The submarine has more than 70 vessels such as Romeo class submarine, shark class submarine and south class submarine The

With the technical support of Russia, the Korean Air Force assembled the MIG-29 fighter from the early 1990s. Since 1999, North Korea has introduced more than 40 MIG-21s from Kazakhstan. In addition, the DPRK has also introduced a new MI-8 helicopter from Russia. Including the main models MIG-19/21, IL-28, SU-7/25 and other 470 aircraft, including the Korean Air Force has a total of 1,650 aircraft.

Into 2000, the DPRK created a light infantry division, light infantry division under the front army. In addition, the former division of the light infantry brigade expansion for the light infantry regiment. In this way, the strength of the special forces of the DPRK significantly enhanced, the number of more than 20 million. The reason why North Korea strengthened the construction of special forces was to make a decision after taking full account of the reality of the Korean-American Joint Forces and the lessons learned from the war in Iraq. Most of the Korean special forces were deployed in Pyongyang and south of the mountain, so they could be used immediately in the early stages of the war. In order to train officers and men of the special combat capability, the DPRK in the division, military forces set up a special combat training ground. According to the Korean Peninsula combat environment continue to strengthen the night war, mountain warfare, street fighting and other special subjects training, making the troops of the special combat capability has been significantly improved. It is not difficult to predict that in the early days of the war, the DPRK will be through the tunnel, air, sea and other infiltration, the special forces focused on the rear area of ​​Korea. In this way, through the active match, the war developed into a speed war.

North Korean troops to the front of the troops as the center, to strengthen the ground forces fire configuration. In addition, special forces are created or expanded. Through these efforts, the army’s first echelon of combat power can be greatly enhanced. This laid the groundwork for the Korean army to focus on the fighting in the early stages of the war.

After the death of Kim Il Sung, the DPRK in the development of nuclear weapons, missiles and other strategic weapons at the same time, the number and level of conventional combat power has also improved. It is widely believed that North Korea’s military power has grown rapidly. The DPRK has provided the necessary military capabilities and means to realize its military strategy by vigorously strengthening the quantity and quality of military forces.

The fourth part of the DPRK military action outlook

First, the Korean crisis situation evaluation

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe changed drastically. Today, the democratization of anti-dictatorship is spreading and spreading. In this complex international environment, has always been to maintain the dictatorship of the DPRK unprecedented unprecedented difficulties and pressure. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and China’s reform and opening up began to let North Korea doubt its powerful host country. 2011 in Egypt and Libya and other Middle East jasmine revolution occurred, so that North Korea’s sense of crisis further aggravated. At present, North Korea is building the hereditary system of the Jinjia dynasty, but also faces a series of internal and external crises.

Table 3: North Korea may face the crisis index may occur.
Table 3: North Korea may face the crisis index may occur. [Save to album]

From the perspective of the internal crisis of the DPRK, as long as the Kim Jong-un regime is unstable, then around the control of the regime, at any time there may be internal fighting. In addition, economic difficulties, food shortages and other issues may also lead to the discontent of the DPRK residents, leading to distraught inside the DPRK, social unrest.

From the DPRK’s external crisis level, the DPRK nuclear crisis worsened, the international community to increase sanctions against North Korea, will inevitably lead to North Korea’s economy is facing more serious difficulties. North Korea’s military provocation to South Korea has led to further tension in North-South relations, disruption of North-South exchanges and the possible occurrence of new North-South military conflicts. In addition, the communist circle, the collapse of long-term dictatorship, etc., at any time may spread to North Korea, and affect the stability of the Korean system.

When North Korea faces a crisis index, North Korea is more likely to take military action in order to maintain its institutional security. On the other hand, when North Korea faces a relatively low crisis index, North Korea is more likely to focus on strengthening its internal solidarity than military action. In other words, when the internal and external crisis is serious, North Korea will be through military action to strengthen internal control, to resist external threats and pressures, and strive to maintain its political stability. When the internal and external crises are moderate, North Korea will put the army into economic activity in order to get rid of serious economic difficulties. When the external crisis is serious, but the internal crisis is moderate, North Korea will take concrete military action to deal with external threats, and thus strengthen internal solidarity. When the external crisis is eased and the internal crisis is serious, the DPRK will use the army to strengthen its control over the population and ensure its stability.

Second, the military action outlook

If the DPRK launched a military provocation based on weapons of mass destruction, the DPRK’s crisis index would determine North Korea’s military operations. North Korea may take the military action can be divided into four types.

Figure 3: Military operations in North Korea in different crisis situations.

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Figure 3: Military operations in North Korea in different crisis situations. [Save to album]

In the “situation I”, the DPRK will launch a comprehensive war. In this situation, the DPRK’s internal and external environment is extremely bad, in addition to launching a comprehensive war, there is no other way to choose. In other words, because of the issue of power inheritance, food problems, North Korea into a serious chaos, the North Korean system is facing a crisis of collapse. In addition, the DPRK-US relations are stalled by the DPRK nuclear issue, and there is no room for maneuver. In this case, the DPRK is likely to choose a comprehensive war that extreme behavior. At this time, North Korea will use strategic weapons – nuclear weapons and missiles threat to South Korea and the United States, and the use of conventional combat power to South Korea launched a large-scale destruction war and speed war. For North Korea, it is necessary to have a prerequisite for launching a comprehensive war, that is, the need for pre-approval and active assistance from China and Russia.

In the “situation II”, the DPRK will launch a local provocation to South Korea. In this situation, North Korea, although facing external and internal crises, but the external crisis is not very serious. In other words, although the DPRK faces external pressures due to nuclear problems, but this external crisis has not intensified. From the internal situation of the DPRK, the DPRK residents due to food difficulties and other issues, dissatisfaction. The whole regime was controlled by Kim Jong-un, but there was a trace of power struggle. At that time, the DPRK launched a military provocation in the area of ​​the Armistice Line and the North Boundary Line (NLL), attempting to divert domestic contradictions, strengthen internal solidarity and further consolidate the Kim Jong-un system. 2010 “Cheonan ship incident” and “Yin Ping Island shelling incident”, is two typical examples. At that time, Kim Jong Il in order to establish its power inheritance system, launched a military provocation to South Korea.

Under “situation III”, the DPRK will take measures to ease military tension. In this situation, both the external crisis, or the internal crisis is not serious, tensions tend to ease. In other words, speaking abroad, the DPRK nuclear issue is moving in the direction of favoring the DPRK, and the economic problem has been solved to a certain extent. On the inside, Kim Jong-un system has been established and consolidated, political stability in North Korea, social stability, there is no power struggle. At this time, North Korea will promote similar to China’s reform and opening up the line, while taking measures to reduce armaments and other positive measures to establish a new relationship between Korea and the United States.

Under “condition IV”, the DPRK will carry out military force demonstrations. In this situation, North Korea’s external crisis is serious, and the internal crisis is not obvious. In other words, despite the existence of food problems within North Korea, but its internal control is very successful. To the outside world, the international community has intensified its pressure on the DPRK due to the nuclear issue, the export of illegal arms and human rights. The DPRK’s friendly forces – China and Russia, have stopped their support for North Korea or taken careless measures. Will be through nuclear tests and missile test to seek foreign political consultation approach. In addition, in order to highlight the role of Kim Jong-un, internal and external display of strong achievements in the construction of a strong country, North Korea may also continue to carry out nuclear tests or missile test activities.

From the above four conditions, the most likely to happen is the “situation II”, that is, North Korea launched a local provocation. At present, North-South relations are stalled. After the death of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong-un system is full of instability and uncertainty. In order to alleviate the internal contradictions, North Korea is likely to launch a provocation to South Korea. In particular, if there is a power struggle within North Korea or the Kim Jong-un system is provocative or shocked, Kim Jong-un is likely to launch a provocative activity against South Korea in order to demonstrate his strong leadership while eradicating opposition. North Korea may choose to provoke the main way: the peninsula in the western waters or eastern waters using submarines to attack; occupation or shelling the West Sea (South Korea Sea) five islands; in the armistice zone manufacturing military conflict; the implementation of terrorist activities to create chaos in South Korea society Wait.

The most unlikely is “situation I”, that is, North Korea launched a comprehensive war. North Korea is very clear to launch a comprehensive war, means that joint efforts with the ROK and the United States to combat. Obviously, the level of combat effectiveness of the Korean army compared with the United States and South Korea, compared with the absolute disadvantage. Therefore, if the DPRK wants to launch a comprehensive war, is bound to need China and Russia’s full support and help. However, from the reality of the situation, Russia and China will not easily intervene in the Korean Peninsula war. After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the Russian national power injury, has not recovered. Therefore, it is difficult for Russia to carry out effective assistance to the DPRK. Although China stressed that North Korea and China are close neighbors, but China is unswervingly promoting reform and opening up, and actively promote economic growth. In this context, China is clearly reluctant to oppose the United States, involved in the Korean Peninsula war, destroy the hard-won peace and stability of the development environment.

Part 5 concluding remarks

Kim Jong Il regime in order to maintain the advantages of the military field of Korea, focusing on the development of nuclear weapons, missiles and other asymmetric combat capability. It can be said that the construction of military forces in North Korea fully embodies the large-scale destruction strategy, quick fix strategy, network strategy.

The “mass destruction strategy” is a strategy established to ensure that “something” is victorious. In 1994, the United States threatened to bomb North Korea’s nuclear facilities. This crisis has prompted the DPRK to establish a “mass destruction strategy” from the containment level has played a decisive role. “Quick war strategy” is based on Kim Il Sung’s military strategy established, the North Korean aviation forces, armored forces, mechanized forces, etc. will play a full role in the speed of war, the military structure is also around the military is conducive to maneuver And the preparation of the. Taking into account these factors, the DPRK will continue to maintain a quick strategy in the future for a long time. “Network strategy” is also the DPRK may adopt the military strategy. At present, North Korea has a considerable number of professional hackers, coupled with the United States, South Korea and other developed countries, military strategy is heavily dependent on computer networks. If North Korea’s “network strategy” can play a role, will directly affect the Korean-American joint forces to play.

The military strategy of the army is based on the military strategy of Kim Il Sung’s offensive concept, adding the military strategy of Kim Jong Il’s defense concept. That is, the military strategy of the army is Kim Jong-il in order to maintain its political stability and socialist system security made a specific choice. Kim Jong-il has repeatedly stressed that the modern war is a new form of war, which is characterized by a highly expanded three-dimensional warfare, information warfare, asymmetric warfare, non-contact warfare, precision combat, short time and decisive battle, and asked the troops to adapt Modern warfare ready to fight. It can be seen that Kim Jong-il has recognized the need to change the conventional tactics of the past and argues that it is possible to win in the future war only if he has adopted a new tactic that can deal with modern warfare. Therefore, it can be said that the DPRK’s military strategy fully reflects the Kim Jong-il military ideology of the war to carry out the method.

From the DPRK’s military strategic changes and the direction of the development of military forces, the DPRK’s most likely future military action is to launch a local provocation to South Korea. In the case of the instability of the Kim Jung-en regime and the stalemate in North-South relations, it is possible for the DPRK to launch local provocations in the vicinity of the Western Seas (South Korea’s western waters) or near the armistice, as well as possible long-range missile tests, nuclear tests, etc. To seek institutional security. Through these military and military actions, the DPRK tried to divert internal contradictions, strengthen internal solidarity and consolidate the regime. As South Korea, in the face of various threats and complex situations, the need to develop a specific, effective and practical response to the program.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

第一部分 前 言

20世纪八十年代末90年代初,东欧剧变,苏联解体,社会主义阵营遭受巨大挫折。20世纪90年代中期,朝鲜经济突然陷入衰退。1994年7月,金日成逝世。当时,人们普遍认为朝鲜面临着严重危机,对朝鲜发展前景颇为堪忧。尽管如此,朝鲜经历了三年“苦难的行军”,并继续进行导弹试射与核试验等活动,不断强化其军事力量。

进入2000年后,朝鲜先后挑起了第2次、第3次西海交战,进行了两次核试验,并实施了数次导弹试射。2010年,朝鲜又在西海(韩半岛西部海域)制造了“天安舰事件”和“延坪岛炮击事件”。朝鲜的这些军事挑衅行动,不但给韩国,还给周边国家带来不安,同时也给东北亚的安全形势带来了很大的变数,并成为引发地区军备竞争的重要因素。

1998年9月,金正日在其政权出台之际,高举建设“强盛大国”的旗帜,提出了新的政治口号-“先军政治”。至2011年12月17日金正日去世为止,他对朝鲜进行了长达17年的强权统治。金正日提出的“先军政治”是指一切以军事工作为先,一切以军事工作为重,在军事先行的原则下,解决革命和国家建设中的所有问题,把人民军队作为革命的栋梁,推进整个社会主义伟业的政治方式 。可以说,先军政治是金正日式的政治方式。其核心内容为,在金正日的领导下,朝鲜的军队积极应对经济困难、社会问题和安全危机,努力维护朝鲜式社会主义体制。“先军军事战略”是朝鲜为了让“先军政治”植根于朝鲜社会,一切以优先发展国防力量为目的,一切以优先保障国防建设为目的的金正日式的军事力量运用方法。

本文针对金日成去世后,金正日体制下的朝鲜军事战略发展变化情况展开研究,特别是将朝鲜不顾国际社会的强烈反对,依然进行核开发并拥有一定的核武器后的战略变化作为研究的重点。

第二部分 朝鲜军事战略

一、朝鲜军事战略的形成背景

朝鲜的军事战略是在金日成的军事战略思想基础上逐渐形成的。金日成军事战略思想可以说是正规战思想和游击战思想的融合。在中国和前苏联的抗日活动过程中,金日成积累了丰富的实践经验,这些为其军事战略思想的形成奠定了坚实的基础。在这些军事经验的基础上,金日成提出了“主体战法 ”,并强调“主体战法”是朝鲜特有的军事战略。为了充分理解朝鲜的军事战略,研究金日成的军事经历是非常重要的。

1928年,金日成加入中国共产党青年同盟。之后,金日成作为中国共产党的一员,在东满洲、沿海州一带开展了敌后抗日活动。通过小汪清、老黑山、普天堡战斗等游击战,金日成从毛泽东军事思想中汲取了丰富的智慧和营养,逐步认识到渗透战、游击战、夜间战、敌后抗日活动、大部队和小部队间配合战术的重要性。金日成当时领导的敌后抗日活动,主要战斗样式为设伏、突袭等,只是属于战术范畴的游击战。但是,朝鲜将这些游击战样式一味夸大,宣传成大规模的战斗,即革命战争中的典型战例。正因为如此,今天的朝鲜军队依然非常重视游击战 。

20世纪40年代后期,迫于日本关东军的围剿扫荡,金日成不得不逃往前苏联,并被编入苏联红军。当时,金日成通过学习米哈伊尔•尼古拉耶维奇•图哈切夫斯基(1893年-1939年)元帅编写的《工农红军野外条令》,对统合军式的军事组织结构、以机动作战为主的战斗编成、火力为中心的武器装备体系等内容的苏联军队的正规战思想有了一定的认识。金日成在中国及前苏联的军事斗争经历,对于朝鲜发展以数量为主的军事力量,形成实施速度战、突袭战、配合战等的军事战略起到了非常重要的作用。通过韩国战争,朝鲜在其军事战略中增加了歼灭敌有生力量 的包围战,推进政治工作,确保战争物资等内容。通过局部冲突,朝鲜认识至增强配合战执行能力,强化机械化部队及空军力量的必要性。基于上述内容,朝鲜不断对遂行战争的方法加以补充与完善。

图-1:朝鲜军事战略的形成。

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图-1:朝鲜军事战略的形成。 [保存到相册]

出处:朴容丸,“朝鲜军事战略问题研究”,《朝鲜学研究》第6卷1号(首尔:东国大学,2010), p.123。

二、金日成军事战略

1、先发制人奇袭战略

先发制人奇袭战略是指选择敌人完全无法预料,或者即便可以预料但是也没有时间做出反应的时机、场所和方法,向对方发动攻击的战略。先发制人奇袭战略可以最大限度地发挥突然性,以快速、秘密、伪装等方式进行。通常,实施奇袭作战,可以以最小的代价,获得最大的作战效果 。金日成曾多次强调,要做到奇袭成功,平时必须保持良好的战斗态势。不但如此,作战部队还要真正具备能够完全摧毁对方的作战能力。这意味着先发制人奇袭战略的目的是通过高效、快速的作战行动,在短时间内集中战斗力量,彻底摧毁敌作战力量。

为了实施先发制人的奇袭战,朝鲜将大部分的军事力量部署在前方地区。在部队编制结构上,也突出了快速反应、机动灵活的特点。特别值得一提的是,朝鲜将约70%的军事力量部署在平壤-元山线以南,如果朝鲜做出奇袭战的决定,那么朝鲜军队不用另外进行作战部署,就可以直接对韩国采取军事行动。

2、配合战略

“配合战略”是指在一次战斗中,两个以上的作战形态相互配合、相互协同的战略。配合战是金日成在毛泽东的游击战争思想基础上,总结越南战争的经验教训,并充分考虑韩半岛地形特点后,提出的所谓“主体战法”。配合战的核心是在大规模的正规战与游击战,大部队与小部队配合下,发动多种形式的攻击作战,这样的战场将无前后方可言,使得对方完全陷入混乱状态。

为了实施配合战,朝鲜建立了世界上最大规模的特种部队,并拥有AN-2机、气垫船、潜艇等多种海上、空中渗透手段。另外,朝鲜海军、空军还分别成立了狙击旅,考虑到不同军种的特点,不断加强配合战能力建设。朝鲜可能采取的配合战类型有正规战与游击战的配合,大部队与小部队间的配合,不同军种间的配合(陆海空军),不同兵种间的配合(兵种间),军队与人民武力间的配合(军队和民间资源)等。

3、速战速决战略

在传统的军事战略理论中,速战速决战略一直受到各方面的高度重视。速战速决战略是集中优势兵力,各个击破对方主力部队,在短时间内,以快速的战术取得胜利、结束战局的战略 。为此,朝鲜非常重视速战速决战略的发展,从20世纪80年代起,朝鲜集中力量建设装甲部队、机械化部队。为了实现速度战,朝鲜的部队结构编制也充分突出了快速反应、机动灵活的特点。朝军发动速度战的主要战力有坦克、装甲车、战斗机、常备兵力,与韩国相比,除了装甲车外,朝鲜在数量上明显占据优势。因此,如果朝鲜对韩国发动速度战,那么在数日内,朝鲜军队就可能席卷整个韩国,并阻断美军增援部队的介入。

三、对金日成军事战略的评价

金日成的军事战略是总结金日成在中国及前苏联的军事斗争经验基础上,综合考虑韩半岛的地形特征及局部战争作战样式后逐渐形成的。可以说,金日成的军事战略是攻势的进攻战略。特别值得强调的是,利用占据数量优势的常规战力,对韩国发动突袭攻击,进而掌握战争主导权,并在外部增援兵力抵达韩半岛之前结束战争的速战速决战略是金日成军事战略的核心。

目前,局部战争样式正在由长期战、消耗战、地面战为主转变为地面作战、海上作战、空中作战、太空作战、网络作战等一体化的全方位、多层次现代立体作战。另外,随着科学技术的发展,武器装备的破坏能力、远程精确打击能力大幅提升,使得战争样式正在发展成为快速集中精确打击样式。过去,战争的重点是利用常规军事力量赢得战争的胜利,争夺战争的主导权。而现代战争的重点是基于尖端的武器装备体系,实现战场数字化,高效发挥战斗力的整体效能。但是,金日成时期的军事战略只体现了常规战力的战争执行方式,朝鲜的核及导弹领域未被纳入其中。显然,金日成军事战略的局限性非常明显,无法适应现代战争的需要。军队是朝鲜维持政权,打击体制威胁势力的有效手段。因此,为了充分发挥军队的作用,金正日不得不提出全新的军事战略构想。

第三部分 先军时代的军事战略和军事力量建设

一、先军军事战略

金正日在向人民军下达的《学习提纲》中指出,现代战争是新的形态的战争,其特征为高度扩大的立体战、信息战(侦察战、电子战、网络战、心理战)、非对称战、非接触战、精确打击战、短时间速决战 。此外,金正日还强调,要做好新的战斗准备。从中可以看出,金正日已经充分认识到现代战争样式正在发生质的变化,并认为继续采用现有的常规战战法,无法保证未来战争的胜利。因此,在充分考虑现代战争样式的同时,为了发展可以应对韩美联合战力的军事力量,金正日构想了“大规模破坏战略”、“速战速决战略”、“网络战略”。

(一)、大规模破坏战略

大规模破坏战略是给对方带来巨大破坏力的战略,是“严惩报复战略”的一种。实现大规模破坏战略,需要具备超出对方的军事力量或者是具备能给对方带来决定性损失的军事手段。朝鲜用于大规模破坏战略的战力包括核武器在内的大规模杀伤性武器和炮兵部队。

大规模破坏战略是朝鲜为了保障“有事时”的作战胜利而制定的战略。1994年,朝鲜曾因美国威胁要对朝鲜的核设施进行军事打击而面临重大危机。可以说,这次危机的出现直接推动了金正日从遏制层面上制订大规模破坏的军事战略。

大规模破坏战略是拥有核武器的国家采取的最具代表性的战略。为了弥补“封锁战略”的不足,美国前总统艾森豪威尔曾提出了“大规模报复战略”。美国在拥有绝对核优势的基础上推行大规模报复战略,减少了国防开支,并在国际社会中确立了军事霸权地位。前苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫认为,在1962年的“古巴导弹危机”中,前苏联之所以遭到失败,主要原因是苏联与美国相比在核战力方面处于劣势。因此,赫鲁晓夫积极推进以核武器为主要战力的大规模报复战略,试图拥有与美国对等的军事实力。1964年,中国的第一颗原子弹爆炸成功后,中国的国际影响力、政治地位得到明显提升。可以说,通过核开发,采取遏制的报复战略,中国保护了自己国家的安全,并基于此确立了亚洲军事强国的地位。

如上所述,拥有核武器的国家,作为军事强国,可以在国际社会中占据优势地位。不但如此,还可以将核武器作为主要手段来推进大规模报复战略,以此来保证自己国家的安全。因此,朝鲜有可能会通过拥有核武器来推进大规模破坏战略。也就是说,大规模破坏战略不但可以使朝鲜有效应对各种外部威胁,还可以在“有事时”确保朝鲜取得胜利。6.25战争结束后,朝鲜与美国一直保持着停战状态。近几年,朝美关系因核问题、人权问题、伪钞问题等矛盾迭出、较量不断。在这种背景下,朝鲜认为随时都有可能与美国爆发战争。因此,朝鲜的大规模破坏战略极有可能在未来的朝美关系中发挥重要作用。

2006年,朝鲜劳动党宣传部副部长曾发表谈话称,一旦战争爆发,整个首尔将在30分钟内变成一片火海,10万名美军、70%的南朝鲜居民面临死亡,韩国经济的90%以上化为灰烬 。2010年7月24日,朝鲜国防委员会也曾发出威胁称,将在必要的时候启动基于核遏制力的朝鲜式的报复“圣战”。这意味着,“有事时”朝鲜将会利用大规模杀伤性武器来发动攻击。

(二)速战速决战略

金正日时期的“速战速决战略”是在外部势力增援韩半岛前结束战争的战略,是金日成战略的继承、延续与发展。海湾战争、阿富汗战争、伊拉克战争中,“速战速决战略”曾被广泛使用。很明显,通过“速战速决战略”,可以集中攻击并摧毁敌对国家的指挥设施及主力部队,掌握战争主导权,并在很短时间内胜利结束战争。之所以认为朝鲜将采用速战速决战略,主要理由如下:

1、朝鲜拥有相当规模的可以发动速度战的作战力量

朝鲜的装甲部队和机械化部队具备高度的机动能力,能够给对方造成强烈的冲击力与威慑力,炮兵部队可以集中打击敌核心目标,能够给对方造成极大的损失和破坏。朝鲜速度战的主要战力—装甲部队是韩军的1.7倍,炮兵部队是韩军的2.5倍。

2、朝鲜的部队编制整体上有利于机动作战

尽管朝鲜经济上面临诸多困境,但是朝鲜一直在加强军事力量建设。近年来,不但朝军的兵力规模和装备持续增加,部队结构改编时,也非常注重机动作战能力的建设。据韩国2010年发表的国防白皮书称,为提高部队战斗力,朝鲜整编部分军队,将两个机械化军整编为机械化师,将1个坦克军整编为装甲师,将1个炮兵军整编为炮兵师。此外,朝鲜还加强了前方部队的火力打击能力建设 。朝鲜军队的这些变化,为其实施速度战提供了可靠的保证。

3、朝鲜军队的大部分战斗力部署在前方地区

朝鲜在平壤-元山线以南地区前进部署了10多个军、60多个师/旅,约占朝鲜军队总体战斗力的70%。这样,只要朝鲜领导层下定决心,那么朝鲜军队不用重新调整部署,就可以随时投入到南侵作战中。2009年11月,第三次西海(韩半岛西部海域)海战发生后,朝鲜军队在其西海岸集中部署了240毫米火箭炮,对韩国西海及首都圈构成了直接威胁。可以说,朝鲜在前方部署大量军队的目的是为了在开战初期集中发动攻击,通过速度战重创韩国军队。

朝鲜强调,随着传统战争样式的变化,非线性作战、非接触作战等新的作战方式正在出现,现代战争可能会在前方和后方同时展开。这意味着朝鲜正规部队在前方发动正面攻击的同时,朝鲜特种部队可能向韩国后方地区发动干扰作战。不可否认,战场前后方同时展开,将对战争的速战速决起到决定性的作用。

4、网络战略

网络攻击是指利用计算机网络存在的漏洞和安全缺陷,对敌方军事、行政、人事等主要系统和资源发动的攻击,通常也被称为“没有枪声的战争”。随着计算机技术的快速发展及网络中心战概念的提出,现代战争的中心正在由传统的作战平台转向网络。从近几年的局部战争样式中也可以看出,网络作战正在作为战争的主要形态之一,起到了非常重要的作用。

2009年,金正日在朝鲜军队高级将领演讲会上发表谈话称,二十世纪的战争是油和炮弹的战争,二十一世纪的战争是信息战争。由此也可以看出,朝鲜非常重视网络战争。

网络攻击主要有两种方式 。第一种为非法侵入对方的信息系统,窃取系统保密信息、破坏目标系统数据的方式。第二种为不侵入对方信息系统,在外部破坏对方信息系统,使其功能无法发挥作用的方式。

从20世纪90年代起,朝鲜在平壤指挥自动化大学、计算机技术大学、金策工业综合大学等大力培养专业网络战人才。平壤指挥自动化大学隶属于人民军总参谋部,是朝鲜最具代表性的网络战人才培训机构,每年为军队培养出100多名计算机专业技术人员。据推测,朝鲜军队拥有的专业黑客规模达500名至600名。

美国、韩国等发达国家的军事战略严重依赖计算机网络。如果朝鲜发动网络攻击,就很容易导致韩国的网络系统出现混乱,影响到信息的传递与共享。在关键时刻,甚至还可能瘫痪整个网络,使韩国错过应对时机,从而给韩国带来致命的打击。在战争爆发前,朝鲜可能会在国内或海外,通过黑客入侵方式攻击韩国政府机关的网络。在战争期间,朝鲜还有可能干扰、破坏韩军的计算机网络,导致军队的整个计算机网络数据传输中断和系统瘫痪。

朝鲜的网络战略同样会对心理战产生积极影响。关于伊拉克战争,朝鲜认为,美帝之所以能够在伊拉克战争中取得胜利,与其说是高新技术武器发挥作用,不如说是心理战在发挥作用,并从思想上瓦解伊拉克导致的结果。从中可以看出,朝鲜非常重视心理战,并认为在未来战争条件下,心理战将贯穿于战争的全过程。朝鲜通过网络展开的心理战样式主要包括:在敌对国家或者支援国家网络上散布有利于朝鲜的信息及流言蜚语,甚至是假情报(细菌战、化学战、使用核武器、出现大规模伤亡)等,从而给敌对国家的公众带来恐慌,削弱敌对国家的战争意志。对于支援国家,通过大力制造反战舆论,迫使支援国家中止兵力增援,并尽早撤出已投入的兵力。

图-2:先军军事战略。

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图-2:先军军事战略。 [保存到相册]

先军军事战略的主要特征是在金日成攻击性战略的基础上,为了维持政权,增加了防护性战略的内容。也就是说,金正日通过先军政治建立起来的先军军事战略,将由他的继承人金正恩去忠实地传承、延续和发扬。

虽然金日成时期的军事战略—先发制人奇袭战略、配合战略、速战速决战略是在常规战力基础上制定的,但是考虑到朝鲜武器装备体系的现状以及现代战争样式的变化,这些军事战略将会继续维持下去。基于先发制人奇袭战略,朝鲜军队的大部分兵力部署在前方地区。这样可以缩短部队部署、移动及接敌需要的时间,从而提高部队的机动性。基于配合战略,可以实现朝鲜军队正规战兵力与非正规战兵力的有效配合。这样可以提高作战效能,弱化对方军事力量,进而达成速战速决的目的。

二、先军军事战略的特征:追求军事冒险主义

金日成去世后,朝鲜在军事领域的最大变化是朝鲜进行了核开发。朝鲜不顾国际社会的强烈反对依然进行核开发,其目的就是在对美、对韩关系中,通过追求军事冒险主义来占据主动地位。

2010年12月,朝鲜人民武力部部长金永春指出,朝鲜革命武装已做好各种准备,在必要的时候将展开“基于核遏制力的朝鲜式圣战”。朝鲜革命武装不但要抵御侵略,还要扫荡敌大本营,消除战争根源,进而实现祖国统一的历史伟业 。此外,朝鲜在2009年新组建了侦察总局 ,进一步强化对外谍报部门的作用和职能。从朝鲜的这些举措中可以看出,朝鲜基于不断发展的军事力量,正在强化在韩半岛的军事冒险主义。

朝鲜之所以追求军事冒险主义,主要有如下原因:第一、历史的经验告诉朝鲜,追求军事冒险主义是非常必要的。朝鲜认为,20世纪60年代后期发生的捕获美国武装间谍船“普韦布洛”号事件和击落美国EC-121侦察机事件,是朝鲜与美国对峙中取得的重大胜利。因此,可以说,这两起事件成为朝鲜继续推进军事冒险主义的主要动因。第二、试图促使国际社会承认朝鲜是军事强国。朝鲜认为,公开进行军事武力示威或者发动军事挑衅活动,可以向国际社会展示其军事力量。也就是说,朝鲜在主张,拥有强大的军事实力才能引起人们的重视,建设强大的军队才是强国之本。第三、强大的军队可以用作强化其体制内部团结的有效手段。朝鲜认为,在北方限界线或者停战线附近发动军事挑衅,可以在朝鲜内部营造军事危机局面,而这种危机意识可以有效增强朝鲜内部的团结。

在如下情况下,朝鲜有可能采取军事冒险主义行动:第一、南北交流中断,军事紧张局势进一步升级。第二、朝鲜核问题毫无进展,朝美关系陷入僵局,关系严重恶化。第三、金正恩体制不稳定。军事冒险主义行动包括:实施核试验、发射远程导弹、在西海(韩国西部海域)及停战线附近发动局部挑衅。朝鲜认为,通过这些挑衅活动,可以增进人民内部团结,巩固与完善金正恩体制。

三、先军时代军事力量建设

(一)维持对韩国的军事优势

尽管朝鲜面临严重的经济困难,但是依然积极推进武器装备现代化建设,大力发展核武器、化学武器、导弹等大规模杀伤性武器,努力构建战略武器体系,推进基于强大军事力量的强盛大国建设。进入2000年后,朝鲜不但加强常备兵力建设,炮兵部队、装甲部队、特种作战部队等也得到了快速发展。据韩国2010年国防白皮书称,与2008年相比,朝鲜地面部队新增了4个师和1个机动旅,增加200多辆坦克。

表-1:南北军事力量比较。

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表-1:南北军事力量比较。 [保存到相册]

*为了方便南北军事力量比较,将海军陆战队装备纳入陆军部队装备项目中进行了计算。

出处:国防部,《国防白皮书2010》(首尔:大韩民国国防部,2010)p.271.

朝鲜认为,只要美军撤出韩半岛 ,在保持对韩军事优势的情况下,朝鲜就可以实现“对南赤化统一”。无疑,朝鲜强化军事力量,为其实施大规模破坏战和速度战提供了可靠的保证。另外,朝鲜还认为前苏联崩溃和中国的改革开放,造成朝鲜的后援势力变弱。基于这种判断,朝鲜开始针对南方三角军事关系(韩国、美国、日本)大力加强军备建设,以提高其自主的军事应对能力。

(二)强化遏制战略

1、核开发

朝鲜从启动宁边5MWe核反应堆,到1992年6月接受国际原子能机构(IAEA)核查前,共获得了10 公斤至15 公斤的钚 。据分析,朝鲜一直利用这些钚来推进核武器研发计划。目前,朝鲜大约拥有40 公斤至50 公斤的钚,这些可以生产6枚至9枚核武器(制造1枚核武器需要 6 公斤至8 公斤的钚)。另外,朝鲜的铀(用于制造原子反应堆核燃料)储量非常丰富,整个埋藏量约2,600万吨,其中可采量为400万吨。

关于朝鲜的核能力,美国前国立核研究所所长赫克博士在《朝鲜在核心危机中学到的教训》一文中指出,朝鲜具备与美国在日本长崎投放的那颗原子弹相同威力的核武器制造能力。从目前的情形来看,朝鲜极有可能拥有初级核武器4-8枚。2010年4月9日,时任美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿在肯塔基州路易斯维尔大学发表题为《核不扩散》的演讲中称,据判断,朝鲜拥有 1-6枚核武器。这是美国政府官员首次在公开场合正式论及朝鲜拥有的核武器数量。2010年3月,通过东部战线归顺韩国的朝鲜人民军***在证词中称,2010年1月,他在参加政治学习时,政治教官曾指出“朝鲜是拥有核武器的国家,美国虽然是世界强国,但是不敢招惹朝鲜,完全是因为朝鲜拥有核武器”。

因此,可以认为朝鲜具备自主的核武器制造能力,拥有的核武器数量为1-8枚。但是,到目前为止,尚不清楚朝鲜将核武器搭载于导弹上进行发射的核武器小型化技术究竟发展到什么程度。

关于高浓缩铀(HEU)问题,2009年9月3日,朝鲜驻联合国前任代表朴吉渊曾指出,朝鲜已成功进行试验性铀浓缩,试验已进入最后阶段。铀浓缩若取得成功,意味着可以以较少的投入,连续进行大量生产,而且还不易被外界察觉 。与使用钚制造核武器的方式相比,使用铀的话,核武器的起爆装置制造起来会相对简单,而且还便于实现核武器小型化。为了能够将核武器搭载于野战炮或短程导弹上作为战术核武器来使用,很多核拥有国往往会选择使用铀来制造核武器。与发展常规战力相比,发展核武器投入的费用较少,并且能够有效弥补军事力量上的劣势。因此,越是国防力量薄弱的国家,为了具备遏制战争的手段,能够与大国进行军事对抗,越会大力发展核武器。

不难预计,朝鲜今后将努力通过发展小型化核武器,来提升对近距离军事目标的打击能力。韩半岛战场缺乏纵深,因此在韩半岛战场环境下,与远程核武器相比,能够进行近距离打击的战术核武器更能充分发挥作用 。另外,朝鲜还将通过构筑大规模的核武器生产体系,试图确立其军事强国的地位。

2、生化武器

从20世纪80年代起,朝鲜自主生产毒气弹和细菌武器,具备了一定程度的生化武器攻击能力。20世纪90年代起,朝鲜开始研发、生产及储备化生放(化学、生物、放射性) 武器和物资,具备了生物化学放射战执行能力。目前,朝鲜将2,500吨到5,000吨的化学作用剂分散保管在6个储藏设施中 ,化学武器的年均生产能力为4,500吨。另外,朝鲜还能够培养和生产炭疽菌、天花、霍乱、伤寒、瘟疫等13种生物武器。据悉,这些生物武器培养10天左右,就能直接投入使用。

朝鲜的生化武器将使用火炮、导弹、飞机等各种投放工具。开战初期,朝鲜极有可能在停战线一带集中使用化学武器,以此来摧毁韩军的防御阵地,为其发动攻击创造有利条件。朝鲜还有可能使用生化武器对韩国的首都圈、大城市等人口密集区发动无差别攻击,通过引发公众的恐慌心理来干扰军事作战。

3、导弹开发

朝鲜于1985年试射了射程为320公里至340公里的改进型飞毛腿-B型导弹,1989年试射了射程为500公里的飞毛腿-C型导弹,1993年5月试射了射程为1,300公里的劳动1号导弹,1998年8月试射了射程为1,800公里至2,500公里的大浦洞1号导弹,2006年7月和2009年4月试射了洲际弹道导弹(ICBM)水平的大浦洞2号导弹。

2004年,朝鲜成功研发射程为120公里的KN-02型地对舰短程导弹,并进行了实战部署。2007年,朝鲜又实战部署了利用移动式发射架发射的射程超过3,000公里的中程弹道导弹(IRBM)。2010年,朝军创建了“新型IRBM师”,该师隶属于人民军总参谋部导弹指导局。朝鲜之所以持续研发射程3,000公里以上的中程导弹,就是为了“有事时”打击向韩半岛增援的兵力,阻止美军及在太平洋地区活动的外部战力向韩半岛移动。虽然朝鲜的导弹射程有了明显增加,但是精确度并不高。因此,朝鲜为了对目标实施有效打击,不得不增加导弹的拥有数量。

表-2:朝鲜导弹开发现状。

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表-2:朝鲜导弹开发现状。 [保存到相册]

出处:国防部,《大规模杀伤性武器问答百科》(首尔:国防部,2004年), p.35;参考《国防白皮书2010》。

朝鲜的弹道导弹,不但能够攻击韩国、日本,甚至包括美本土都在其威胁之下。朝鲜在加快导弹开发的同时,还积极推进核开发,这已引起了国际社会的高度关注。因为朝鲜一旦有能力在导弹上搭载核武器,其威胁范围及破坏力将会大幅增加。也就是说,朝鲜若能实现核武器小型化,即制造出1吨以下的核武器时,那就意味着朝鲜可以将核武器搭载在弹道导弹上来使用。

朝鲜的导弹生产能力在前苏联和中国的技术指导下,通过自主研发已达到相当的水平。普遍认为,朝鲜的导弹制造能力位居世界第六位。

(三)提升速战速决能力

朝鲜从20世纪80年代起,为了实施速度战,集中加强装甲部队、机械化部队建设。20世纪80年代末期,朝鲜开始生产前苏联T-62型坦克的仿制型-“天马号”坦克,这种坦克在水下5.5米深度也能够成功涉水渡河。此外,朝鲜还引进、生产、部署了23毫米对空火炮。2009年,朝鲜成功研制“天马号”坦克的改进型-“暴风号”坦克,并实战部署了2个“暴风号”坦克大队。朝鲜之所以重视机械化部队建设,主要是为了利用机械化部队的机动力和冲击力展开速度战。最近十年,朝鲜又增加部署了2,000多门火箭炮(从3,100多门增加到5,100多门),另外还在非武装地带(DME)附近地区部署了300多门远程火炮。朝鲜之所以前进部署火箭炮和远程火炮,就是为了在开战初期对韩国的首都圈进行集中打击 。

朝鲜海军装备有810多艘舰艇,包括战斗舰、潜艇、支援舰等。其中,约60%的舰艇部署在前方基地。水面战斗舰有警备舰、导弹艇、鱼雷艇、火力支援艇等420多艘,支援舰有登陆舰、气垫船等290多艘,潜艇有罗密欧级潜艇、鲨鱼级潜艇、南联级潜艇等70多艘。

在俄罗斯的技术支援下,朝鲜空军从20世纪90年代初起组装生产MIG-29最新式战斗机。1999年起,朝鲜从哈萨克斯坦引进了40多架MIG-21。另外,朝鲜还从俄罗斯引进了新型MI-8直升机。包括主力机种MIG-19/21, IL-28,SU-7/25等470多架飞机在内,朝鲜空军共拥有1,650架飞机。

进入2000年后,朝鲜创建了轻步兵师,轻步兵师隶属于前方军。另外,前方师的轻步兵大队扩编为轻步兵团。这样,朝鲜的特种部队实力明显增强,人数达20多万名。朝鲜之所以加强特种部队建设,是在充分考虑韩美联合部队战力优势现实及吸取伊拉克战争教训后,做出的决定。朝鲜特种部队大部分部署在平壤和元山以南地区,因此在开战初期就能马上投入使用。为了训练官兵的特种作战能力,朝军在师、军级部队设立了特种作战训练场。朝军根据韩半岛作战环境不断加强夜战、山岳战、巷战等特种科目的训练,使得部队的特种作战能力得到了明显提升。不难预计,在战争初期,朝鲜将通过地道、空中、海上等渗透方式,把特种兵力集中投放到韩国后方地区。这样,通过积极的配合战,使战争发展为速度战。

朝鲜军队以前方部队为中心,加强地面部队火力配置。另外,还创建或扩建特种部队。通过这些努力,朝军第一梯队的作战力量得以大幅增强。这为朝鲜军队在战争初期集中战斗力实施速度战打下了基础。

金日成去世后,朝鲜在发展核武器、导弹等战略武器的同时,常规战力的数量和水平也有所提升。普遍认为,朝鲜的军事力量得到了快速增长 。朝鲜通过大力加强军事力量的数量、质量建设,为实现其先军军事战略提供了必要的军事能力和手段。

第四部分 朝鲜军事行动展望

一、朝鲜危机状况评价

20世纪80年代末90年代初,东欧社会主义国家发生剧变。今天,反独裁政权的民主化抵抗运动正在蔓延和扩散。在这种复杂的国际环境下,一直以来维持独裁政权的朝鲜空前感到了巨大的困难和压力。前苏联的崩溃和中国的改革开放,开始让朝鲜怀疑其强大的后援国。2011年在埃及和利比亚等中东地区发生的茉莉花革命 ,使朝鲜的危机感进一步加重。目前,朝鲜正在构建金家王朝的世袭体制,但也面临着一系列的内外危机。

表-3:朝鲜面临的危机指数 可能出现的情况。
表-3:朝鲜面临的危机指数 可能出现的情况。 [保存到相册]

从朝鲜的内部危机层面来看,只要金正恩政权不稳定,那么围绕控制政权,随时都有可能发生内部争斗。另外,经济困难、粮食短缺等问题还可能引发朝鲜居民的不满情绪,从而导致朝鲜内部人心涣散、社会动荡不安。

从朝鲜的外部危机层面来看,朝鲜核危机恶化,国际社会加大对朝鲜的制裁力度,必将导致朝鲜经济面临更加严重的困难。朝鲜对韩发动军事挑衅活动,导致南北关系进一步紧张,南北交流中断,并可能发生新的南北军事冲突。另外,共产圈国家、长期独裁国家的崩溃等,随时都有可能波及朝鲜,并影响到朝鲜体制的稳定。

当朝鲜面临的危机指数升高时,为了维持其体制安全,朝鲜更有可能采取军事行动。与此相反,当朝鲜面临的危机指数相对较低时,比起采取军事行动,朝鲜更可能将精力放在加强其内部团结上。也就是说,当内部、外部危机严重时,朝鲜将会通过军事行动来加强内部管制,抵御外部威胁及压力,努力维护其政权稳定。当内部、外部危机出现缓和时,朝鲜将会把军队投入到经济活动中去,以期摆脱严重的经济困境。当外部危机严重,但是内部危机缓和时,朝鲜将会采取具体的军事行动来应对外部威胁,并以此加强内部团结。当外部危机出现缓和,内部危机严重时,朝鲜将会利用军队加强对居民的管制,并确保其体制稳定。

二、军事行动展望

如果朝鲜基于大规模杀伤性武器发动军事挑衅的话,朝鲜的危机指数将决定朝鲜的军事行动类型。朝鲜可能采取的军事行动大体上可分为四种类型。

图-3:朝鲜不同危机状况下的军事行动。

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图-3:朝鲜不同危机状况下的军事行动。 [保存到相册]

在“状况I”下,朝鲜将发动全面战争。在这种状况下,朝鲜的对内、对外环境极度恶化,除了发动全面战争之外,别无其他方法可以选择。也就是说,因权力继承问题、粮食问题等,朝鲜陷入严重混乱,朝鲜体制面临崩溃的危机。另外,朝美关系因朝核问题陷入僵局,无回旋余地。这种情形下,朝鲜极有可能会选择全面战这种极端的行为。这时,朝鲜将利用战略武器—核武器和导弹威胁韩国和美国,并使用常规战力对韩国发动大规模破坏战和速度战。对于朝鲜而言,若要发动全面战还需要一个前提条件,即需要获得中国和俄罗斯的事前同意和积极援助。

在“状况II”下,朝鲜将对韩国发动局部挑衅。在这种状况下,朝鲜虽面临外部及内部危机,但是外部危机情况并非十分严峻。也就是说,尽管朝鲜因核问题等面临外部压力,但是这种外部危机并没有激化。从朝鲜的内部情况来看,朝鲜居民因粮食困难等问题,不满情绪高涨。政权整体上虽由金正恩所控制,但是出现了权力斗争的迹向。这时,朝鲜在停战线和北方限界线(NLL)一带发动军事挑衅,试图转移国内矛盾,加强内部团结,进一步巩固金正恩体制。2010年的“天安舰事件”和“延坪岛炮击事件”,就是两个典型的例子。当时,金正日为了确立其权力继承体制,发动了对韩军事挑衅活动。

在“状况III”下,朝鲜将采取缓解军事紧张的措施。在这种状况下,无论是外部危机,还是内部危机均不严重,紧张局势趋于缓和。也就是说,对外来讲,朝核问题朝着有利于朝鲜的方向发展,经济问题得到了一定程度的解决。对内来讲,金正恩体制得到了确立及巩固,朝鲜政治稳定,社会安定,内部没有权力斗争。这时,朝鲜将会推进类似于中国的改革开放路线,同时采取裁减军备等积极措施,以确立新的对韩、对美关系。

在“状况Ⅳ”下,朝鲜将进行军事武力示威。在这种状况下,朝鲜的外部危机严重,而内部危机不明显。也就是说,尽管朝鲜内部存在着粮食困难等问题,但是其内部管制非常成功。对外来讲,国际社会因核问题、非法武器出口问题、人权问题等加大了对朝鲜的施压力度,朝鲜的友好势力—中国和俄罗斯中止对朝鲜的支援或采取不理睬措施时,朝鲜将会通过核试验及导弹试射来寻求对外政治协商的途径。另外,为了凸显金正恩的作用,对内对外展示强盛大国建设的辉煌成就,朝鲜也有可能会继续进行核试验或导弹试射活动。

从以上四种状况来看,最有可能发生的是“状况II”,即朝鲜发动局部挑衅活动。目前,南北韩关系陷入僵局。金正日去世后,金正恩体制充满了不稳定性和不确定性。为了缓解内部矛盾,朝鲜很有可能发动对韩挑衅活动。特别地,如果朝鲜内部出现权力斗争,或者金正恩体制受到挑衅或冲击,金正恩为了展示其强大的领导力,在铲除反对势力的同时,极有可能会发动对韩国的挑衅活动。朝鲜可能选择的挑衅方式主要有:在半岛西部海域或东部海域利用潜艇发动攻击;占领或炮击西海(韩国西部海域)五岛;在停战线一带制造军事冲突;实施恐怖活动,给韩国社会制造混乱等。

最不可能发生的是“状况I”,即朝鲜发动全面战争。朝鲜很清楚发动全面战争,意味着与韩美联合战力进行作战。显然,朝鲜军队的战斗力水平与韩美联合战力相比,处于绝对劣势。因此,朝鲜若想发动全面战争,势必需要得到中国和俄罗斯的全力支持和大力帮助。但是,从现实的情况来看,俄罗斯和中国都不会轻易介入韩半岛战争。前苏联解体后,俄罗斯国力大伤, 一直没有恢复元气。因此,俄罗斯很难对朝鲜进行有效的援助。中国虽然强调朝鲜与中国是唇齿相依的友好邻邦,但是中国正在坚定不移地推进改革开放,积极促进经济增长。在这种背景下,中国显然不愿意与美国对立,介入韩半岛战争,破坏来之不易的和平稳定发展环境。

第五部分 结束语

金正日政权为了保持对韩军事领域的优势,重点发展核武器、导弹等非对称战力。可以说,朝鲜的军事力量建设充分体现了大规模破坏战略、速战速决战略、网络战略。

“大规模破坏战略”是为了确保“有事时”作战胜利确立起的战略。1994年,美国威胁要对朝鲜的核设施进行轰炸。这一危机,促使朝鲜从遏制层面确立“大规模破坏战略”起到了决定性的作用。“速战速决战略”是在金日成军事战略的基础上确立的,朝鲜的航空部队、装甲部队、机械化部队等将在速度战时充分发挥作用,朝军的部队结构也是围绕有利于机动作战而编制的。综合考虑这些因素,朝军将在今后相当长的时间内,继续维持速战速决战略。“网络战略”同样是朝鲜可能会采用的军事战略。目前,朝鲜拥有相当数量的专业黑客,再加上美国、韩国等发达国家的军事战略严重依赖计算机网络。如果朝鲜的“网络战略”能够发挥作用,将会直接影响韩美联合部队作战力的发挥。

先军军事战略是在金日成攻势概念的军事战略基础上,增添了金正日防御概念的军事战略。即,先军军事战略是金正日为了维护其政权稳定和社会主义体制安全做出的具体选择。金正日曾多次强调,现代战争是新的形态的战争,其特征是高度扩大的立体战、信息战、非对称战、非接触战、精确打击战、短时间速决战,并要求部队为适应现代战争做好战斗准备。从中可以看出,金正日已认识到改变过去那种常规战法的必要性,认为只有采取能够应对现代战争的新的战法,才有可能在未来战争中取得胜利。因此,可以说,朝鲜的先军军事战略充分反映了金正日军事思想的战争遂行方法。

从朝鲜的军事战略变化和军事力量发展方向来看,朝鲜今后最有可能采取的军事行动是发动对韩国的局部挑衅。在金正恩政权不稳定、南北关系陷入僵局的情况下,朝鲜有可能在西海(韩国西部海域)或者停战线附近发动局部挑衅活动,也有可能进行远程导弹试射、核试验等来展示武力,以此来谋求体制安全。朝鲜通过这些军事武力行动,试图转移内部矛盾,加强内部团结,巩固金正恩政权。作为韩国,面对各种威胁及复杂情况,需制订具体的、有效的、切实可行的应对方案。

Original URL:

http://mil.sohu.com/20130701/

美國軍事網絡戰:黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭 // American military network warfare: hackers attack and defense creating a war without smoke

美國軍事網絡戰:黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭

American military network warfare: hackers attack and defense creating a war without smoke

Hackers may also be soldiers. Recently, the US Internet security company and the government issued a series of reports that “the Chinese military to participate in hacking.” With the “China hacker threat theory”, the US government immediately announced the latest anti-hacking strategy, although the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in a timely manner to make a refutation, but for a time, hacker news from the army or aroused everyone’s interest. In fact, the United States is the world’s largest Internet hacker location, has a huge network of troops.

As the daily consumption from the physical store to the transfer of electricity, and now the war has also moved from the line to the line. Not only the United States, Europe and the United States and Asia, many countries have begun to set up their own “network forces” – hackers is to become a frequent visitor to this service. And how these countries are leading the “formal” network of the army.

In 007 “skyfall” in the lovely Mr. Q is a network war master.

In May 2010, the US Department of Defense set up a network warfare headquarters officially launched, the US military strategic headquarters in September 1, 2010 before the development of a network warfare philosophy and plans, and plans in the next few years to expand the network security forces to 4900 people. This marks the United States intends to military hegemony from the land, sea, sky and space to the so-called “fifth field” of the network space extension.

It is reported that the United States is currently recruiting 2,000 to 4,000 soldiers, set up a “network special forces.” This unit not only to assume the task of network defense, but also to other countries of the computer network and electronic systems for secret attacks. According to Xinhua reported that a former US Air Force Major John Bradley at a meeting in 2002, said the United States spent on network attacks on the study than the network defense much more, because the senior staff of the former more Interested. And, the US military network attack time may be much earlier than we imagined.

In the Iraq war that began in 2003, the US military used the cyber warfare more widely. Before the war, thousands of Iraqi military and political officials in their e-mail mailbox received the US military sent the “persuade the letter”, resulting in a great psychological impact. Less than four hours after the war, Al Jazeera English website will be the US military “ban”, can not function properly.

In addition, the United States also in 2006 and 2008 has held two code-named “network storm” large-scale network war exercises.

Japan and South Korea: already set up a “network army”

At the end of 2009, the Ministry of Defense of Japan decided to establish a special “cyber space defense team” in 2011 to guard against hacker attacks and strengthen the ability to protect confidential information. According to the Japanese “Yomiuri Shimbun” reported on May 1, 2011, “cyberspace defense team” plan is set in the SDF command communications system under the initial number of about 60 people. This “network force” is responsible for collecting and analyzing the latest virus information, and anti-hacker attack training.

Japan’s network warfare is through the master “system of network” to paralyze the enemy combat system. Japan in the construction of network combat system, emphasizing the “offensive and defensive”, allocated large sums of money into the network hardware and “network warfare” construction, respectively, the establishment of the “defense information communication platform” and “computer system common platform”, to achieve the SDF Organs, forces network system of mutual exchange and resource sharing. And set up by the 5000 people of the “cyberspace defense team”, developed the network operations “offensive weapons” and network defense system, now has a strong network attack combat strength.

The DPRK this “enemy”, South Korea in 1999 put forward the overall vision of the future information construction, announced in 2009 will be the formation of “network command”, and officially launched in 2010. At present, South Korea already has about 20 million received professional training of the huge personnel, and 5% of annual defense funds are used to develop and improve the implementation of the core technology of network warfare.

Britain and Russia: enlisted hackers

Network forces hackers preferred, as early as 1998, because of the successful invasion of the US Pentagon computer system, Israel’s 18-year-old boy hacker Tenenbaum put on uniforms to become an Israeli soldier. Subsequently, the British government also in 2009, including former hackers, including network elite to defend the network security. They are young, diverse in background, some have been hackers, and even minor cybercrime.

On June 25, 2009, the UK government introduced its first national cybersecurity strategy and announced the establishment of two new departments of cybersecurity, the Network Security Office and the Network Security Operations Center, which are responsible for coordinating government security and coordination of government and government The security of the main computer system of civil society.

India in 2007 formed a land, sea and air armed forces joint emergency team, and enlisted hackers. At the same time, by absorbing the civil master enlisted and the cadet students “hacker” technical training, etc., and gradually complete the future network war talent pool.

Military power Russia in the 1990s on the establishment of the Information Security Committee, specifically responsible for network information security, launched in 2002, “Russian Federal Information Security Theory”, the network information warfare compared to the future “sixth generation of war.” Russia already has a large number of network elite, anti-virus technology is walking in the forefront of the world, in the event of a threat or need, these talents and technology will soon be transferred to military use.

“Black door”: ridiculous blame

Although there is no factual basis, but the US Internet security companies and the government is still often create “hacker door”, directed at China, not only involving colleges and universities, enterprises, as well as technical schools such as Shandong Lan Xiang, there are network individuals, now point to the Chinese military, Even to provide “hacker headquarters building” photos. However, the relationship between the IP address alone, “the source of the attack from China,” highlighting the ignorance of the relevant US people.

How do hackers use their own computer to attack? How can I leave a registered IP address? They usually through the springboard control of third-party computer to form a botnet and then attack. Take the initiative to expose the IP address left traces, is it a professional hacker!

China’s Ministry of Defense International Bureau of Communications Deputy Director Meng Yan wrote that the United States in the transformation of the way to render the Chinese hacker attack trick, even ignore itself is the network virtual space “rule makers.” 2012, 73,000 foreign IP addresses as Trojans and botnet control server to participate in the control of more than 1,400 million hosts in China, 32,000 IP through the implantation of the back door of China’s nearly 38,000 sites in the implementation of remote control, which originated in the United States The number of network attacks ranked first.

Hacker attack and defense: no smoke of the war

Only a few minutes, the domestic password experts, Tsinghua University Distinguished Professor Wang Xiaoyun and her research team with ordinary personal computers, will be able to crack MD5 password algorithm. Before her, even with the fastest giant computer, but also to calculate more than 1 million years to crack.

If this is a war, you can not hear the sound and can not see the smoke. Hackers often through the acquisition of passwords, place Trojan horse program, e-mail attacks, node attacks, network monitoring, find system vulnerabilities, steal privileges and so on, and the use of WWW spoofing technology, the use of account attacks, etc. to launch network attacks.

Reporters learned that the current “hanging horse” (that is, in the page to load Trojan virus), “phishing” (forged WEB site or e-mail, etc.) and other ways to become the mainstream of hacker attacks.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

 

黑客也可能是戰士。近日,美國網絡安全公司和政府接連發布報告稱“中國軍方參與黑客攻擊”。借助“中國黑客威脅論”,美國政府隨即公佈最新反黑客戰略,儘管中國外交部和國防部及時對此做出駁斥,但一時間,黑客從軍的消息還是激起大家的興趣。其實,美國才是世界上最大的網絡黑客所在地,擁有龐大的網絡大軍。

如同日常消費從實體店向電商轉移,如今戰爭也已經從線下搬到線上。不僅是美國,歐美亞等洲許多國家都已經著手建立本國的“網絡部隊”——黑客更是成為此軍種的常客。而這些國家又是如何領導這批“正規”的網絡大軍。

在007《skyfall》中可愛的Q先生就是一名網絡戰的高手。

2010年5月,美國國防部組建網絡戰司令部正式啟動,美軍戰略司令部要求在2010年9月1日前製訂出網絡戰作戰理念和計劃,併計劃在隨後幾年把網絡安全部隊擴編到4900人。這標誌著美國打算將軍事霸權從陸地、海洋、天空和太空向號稱“第五領域”的網絡空間延伸。

據悉,美國目前正在招募2000至4000名士兵,組建一支“網絡特種部隊”。這支部隊不僅要承擔網絡防禦的任務,還將對他國的電腦網絡和電子系統進行秘密攻擊。據新華網報導,一位前美國空軍少校約翰·布萊德利在參加2002年一次會議時就表示,美國花在網絡攻擊上的研究比網絡防禦上要多得多,因為高層人員對前者更感興趣。並且,美軍實施網絡攻擊的時間可能比大家想像的要早得多。

而在2003年開始的伊拉克戰爭中,美軍更為廣泛地使用網絡戰手段。戰前,數千名伊拉克軍政要員在他們的電子郵件信箱中收到美軍發來的“勸降信”,造成很大的心理影響。開戰後不到4個小時,半島電視台英語網站便被美軍“封殺”,不能正常運作。

另外,美國還於2006年和2008年先後舉行了兩次代號為“網絡風暴”的大規模網絡戰演習。

日韓:早已組建“網絡軍隊”

2009年底日本防衛省即決定,在2011年度建立一支專門的“網絡空間防衛隊”,以防備黑客攻擊,加強保護機密信息的能力。據日本《讀賣新聞》2011年5月1日報導,“網絡空間防衛隊”計劃設置於自衛隊指揮通信系統部之下,初期人數約60人。這支“網絡部隊”負責收集和分析研究最新的病毒信息,並進行反黑客攻擊訓練。

日本網絡戰是通過掌握“製網權”達到癱瘓敵人作戰系統。日本在構建網絡作戰系統中強調“攻守兼備”,撥付大筆經費投入網絡硬件及“網戰部隊”建設,分別建立了“防衛信息通信平台”和“計算機系統通用平台”,實現了自衛隊各機關、部隊網絡系統的相互交流和資源共享。並成立由5000人組成的“網絡空間防衛隊”,研製開發的網絡作戰“進攻武器”和網絡防禦系統,目前已經具備了較強的網絡進攻作戰實力。

而對朝鮮這個“敵人”,韓國在1999年提出了未來信息建設的總體設想,2009年宣布將組建“網絡司令部”,並於2010年正式啟動。目前,韓國已經擁有了約20萬接受過專業訓練的龐大的人才隊伍,而且每年國防經費的5%被用來研發和改進實施網絡戰的核心技術。

英俄:徵召黑客入伍

網絡部隊黑客優先,早在1998年,因為成功入侵美國五角大樓電腦系統,以色列18歲的少年黑客Tenenbaum穿上軍裝成為一名以色列士兵。隨後,英國政府也於2009年徵召包括前黑客在內的網絡精英保衛網絡安全。他們年輕,背景多樣,有的曾經是黑客,甚至有輕度網絡犯罪行為。

在2009年6月25日,英國政府出台首個國家網絡安全戰略,並宣布成立兩個網絡安全新部門,即網絡安全辦公室和網絡安全行動中心,分別負責協調政府各部門網絡安全和協調政府與民間機構主要電腦系統安全保護工作。

印度則在2007年組建了陸、海、空三軍聯合計算機應急分隊,並徵召黑客入伍。同時,通過吸納民間高手入伍和對軍校學員進行“黑客”技術培訓等方式,逐步完成未來網絡戰的人才儲備。

軍事大國俄羅斯上世紀90年代就設立了信息安全委員會,專門負責網絡信息安全,2002年推出《俄聯邦信息安全學說》,將網絡信息戰比作未來的“第六代戰爭”。俄羅斯已經擁有了眾多的網絡精英,反病毒技術更是走在了世界的前列,在遇到威脅或有需要時,這些人才和技術將能很快地轉入軍事用途。

“黑客門”:可笑的指責

雖然沒有事實依據,但美國網絡安全公司和政府仍然屢屢製造“黑客門”,矛頭直指中國,不僅涉及高校、企業,還有技校如山東藍翔,也有網絡個體,如今則指向中國軍方,甚至提供“黑客總部大樓”照片。然而,僅憑IP地址的關係就得出“攻擊源頭來自中國”,凸顯美國相關人士的無知。

黑客怎麼用自己的電腦發動攻擊?又怎麼會留下註冊IP地址?他們通常是通過跳板控制第三方電腦形成殭屍網絡再展開攻擊。主動暴露IP地址留下痕跡,豈是專業黑客所為!

中國國防部國際傳播局副局長孟彥日前撰文稱,美國各界在變換手法渲染中國黑客攻擊把戲時,竟然無視自身才是網絡虛擬空間的“規則制定者”。 2012年,7.3萬個境外IP地址作為木馬和殭屍網絡控制服務器參與控制中國境內1400餘萬台主機,3.2萬個IP通過植入後門對中國境內近3.8萬個網站實施遠程控制,其中源自美國的網絡攻擊數量名列第一。

黑客攻防:無硝煙的戰爭

只需要幾分鐘,國內密碼專家、清華大學特聘教授王小雲和她的研究小組用普通的個人電腦,就能破解MD5密碼算法。在她之前,即使採用最快的巨型計算機,也要運算100萬年以上才能破解。

如果這是戰爭,則聽不到聲音看不到硝煙。黑客往往通過獲取口令、放置特洛伊木馬程序、電子郵件攻擊、節點攻擊、網絡監聽、尋找系統漏洞、偷取特權等以及利用WWW欺騙技術、利用賬號攻擊等方式發起網絡攻擊。

記者了解到,目前“網頁掛馬”(即在網頁中加載木馬病毒)、“網絡釣魚”(偽造WEB站點或電子郵件等)等方式成為黑客攻擊的主流行為。

Russian Ministry of Defense set up information operations forces to deal with Western networks – psychological attacks // 俄國防部組建信息作戰部隊 應對西方網絡-心理攻擊

Russian Ministry of Defense set up information operations forces to deal with Western networks – psychological attacks // 俄國防部組建信息作戰部隊 應對西方網絡-心理攻擊

With the Russian and Western cyber space in the game is becoming increasingly fierce, especially in the 2018 Russian presidential election near the background, the Western countries for Russia’s network and information / psychological attacks increasing. To this end, Russia to strengthen the network and information security construction. At the end of 2016, the revision of the new edition of the Russian Federation Information Security Theory. February 27, 2017, Russian Defense Minister Shaoyou announced the formation of information operations forces, accelerate the construction of information combat forces, clear its functional mission.

First, the new theory clearly set up the purpose of information combat forces and their functions

December 6, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the new version of “Russian Federation information security theory.” It points out that the main objectives of information security in the field of defense include the implementation of strategic containment and prevention of military conflicts caused by information technology, the improvement of the Russian armed forces information security system, the development of information confrontation forces and equipment, the forecasting, inspection and evaluation of the Russian armed forces Threats in the field of information; elimination of information / psychological effects aimed at destabilizing national history and patriotic traditions.

The formation of information combat forces is one of Russia’s important initiatives to achieve these goals. First of all, the Russian information combat forces is to contain and prevent the field of network information conflict or the main force of war. Second, the formation of information combat forces is the Russian armed forces information security system construction and the Russian new military reform an important step, will take into account the strength of construction and equipment development. Once again, the information warfare forces ensure that Russian armed forces are protected from cyber attacks and information security threats, ensuring wartime command and control and operational capability. Finally, the information warfare forces will also confront and counter the Western countries of the anti-Russian information penetration and psychological impact, to maintain the fighting morale and national stability.

Second, the troops named on the network attack and information penetration of the “two-handedly”

Russian Defense Minister Shao Yigu pointed out that the main functions of the information combatants include: centralized management of network operations; protection of Russian military networks and nodes, military command systems and communications systems from hackers; to ensure reliable access to information; Russian military capacity to expand its ability to act in cyberspace; against the Western anti-Russian information / psychological propaganda and penetration.

Russian military experts believe that the future of military struggle in the information combat objectives not only include the armed forces allegation system, the government administrative system and the financial system and other hard targets, more strategic is the soldiers and public psychology and other soft targets. An attack on the implementation of soft targets such as soldiers and people can lead to dislocation and disintegration. Information combat forces should not only have to protect their own side and attack each other hard targets and other capabilities, but also have to confront and oppose the enemy information / psychological attack and penetration. At present, countries with network dominance use different means to implement information operations against different objectives. For the use of special information weapons, such as computer viruses, information bombs, logic bombs, computer chips that are given special missions, explosive devices that generate electromagnetic pulses, UHF generators, and electronic biological weapons. And for the soldiers and the public psychological and other soft targets, create provocative or intimidating false information and spread through the information media to achieve military and political purposes.

Therefore, Russia will be named the “information combat forces” rather than the network combat forces fully embodies the scope of its combat both soft and hard targets.

Third, the integration of active elite forces and the recruitment of new forces simultaneously

The force will integrate the existing Russian armed forces network operations, electronic reconnaissance and electronic confrontation and other departments and functions, while absorbing the Ministry of Internal Affairs and security system of network information security and related experts, including mathematicians, programmers, engineers, cryptographers , Communications experts, electronic confrontation experts, translators and so on.

Russian military arms and institutions in 2013 has set up a “technology even”, and from college graduates in the recruitment of professionals, which is the key components of the military system / unit reserves and training professionals specializing in technology research and development and information security team. According to statistics, this force mainly includes the Air Force’s second science and technology even the space and defense forces of the third technology even under the Army’s fifth technology even, under the Military Academy of Sciences, the seventh technology even Wait. Each with 2 to 3 rows, each with about 20 people. To the air days of military science and technology, for example, the troops regularly recruit college graduates, give priority to the use of computer security, communications systems, information security, special radio systems, cryptography, electronic optoelectronic special equipment and other professionals, by the Air Force Academy of Military Academy training and education The center is responsible for training new people.

Fourth, the force commander has not yet determined, Gracimov is the most likely candidate

Russian Defense Minister Shaoyou clear, information warfare force commander will be general rank. Western countries believe that the Russian armed forces, the current chief of staff, Mr. Grazimov served as the commander of the information operations the possibility of the largest. He has proposed the Russian version of the “mixed war” concept, and received the approval of President Putin. He pointed out that “the current principle of war itself has undergone substantial changes, the realization of political and strategic objectives of the non-military means of the status of a series of events show that the effect of non-military means sometimes more than the use of weapons.” In his description of the “civil war in Ukraine” and “the spring of Arabia”, he pointed out that the information / psychological warfare could “turn a peaceful and prosperous country into a brutal armed struggle in months or even days”. March 4, 2017, Grazimov in military academy, asked the Russian Academy of Military Sciences to intensify the study of the new model of confrontation between countries and effective counter-measures. In addition, the West speculated that Gerasimov’s another reason is that he has served as the Russian armed forces network information warfare the highest commander. In 2010, the Russian Armed Forces commanded a powerful message / psychological offensive, and it was Gracimov who had recaptured the Crimea.

Five, conclusion

At present, the Russian Defense Ministry official website has not yet put information warfare troops, and the existing army, air force, navy and strategic missile soldiers, airborne soldiers of these five arms tied. The forces become separate forces or scattered in the existing five arms and key sectors are not yet known. However, the formation of information combat forces is not only a key step in the construction of Russian network information security forces, but also an important step in the reform of the Russian army in the context of the increasingly fierce network security of information security and the increasingly complex environment of security. Information operations forces will defend Russia’s cyberspace and information in the field of soft and hard targets, to achieve their own attack and defense functions, maintaining national network security and political and military security.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

隨著俄羅斯與西方在網絡空間的博弈日趨激烈,特別在2018年俄總統大選臨近的大背景下,西方國家針對俄羅斯的網絡和信息/心理攻擊日益增多。為此,俄羅斯加強網絡和信息安全建設。 2016年底,修訂頒布新版《俄羅斯聯邦信息安全學說》。 2017年2月27日,俄國防部長紹伊古宣布組建信息作戰部隊,加快推進信息作戰力量建設,明確其職能使命。

一、新版學說明確組建信息作戰部隊的目的及其職能

2016年12月6日,俄總統普京批准新版《俄羅斯聯邦信息安全學說》。其中指出,國防領域信息安全保障的主要目標包括:對利用信息技術導致的軍事衝突實施戰略遏制和預防;完善俄武裝力量信息保障體系,發展信息對抗力量和裝備;預測、檢查和評估俄武裝力量在信息領域的威脅;消除旨在動搖國家歷史觀念和愛國傳統的信息/心理影響等。

組建信息作戰部隊是俄實現上述目標的重要舉措之一。首先,俄羅斯信息作戰部隊是遏制和預防網絡信息領域衝突或戰爭的主要力量。其次,組建信息作戰部隊是俄武裝力量信息保障體系建設和俄羅斯新軍事改革的重要步驟,將兼顧力量建設和裝備發展。再次,信息作戰部隊確保俄武裝力量免受網絡攻擊和信息安全威脅,保證戰時指揮控制和作戰行動能力。最後,信息作戰部隊還將對抗和反制西方國家的反俄信息滲透和心理影響,保持士兵鬥志和國民思想穩定。

二、部隊命名體現對網絡攻擊和信息滲透的“兩手抓”

俄國防部長紹伊古指出,信息作戰部隊主要職能包括:對網絡作戰行動進行集中統一管理;保護俄羅斯軍用網絡和節點、軍事指揮系統和通信系統免受黑客攻擊;確保實現可靠的信息傳遞通道;檢驗俄軍的網絡能力,拓展其在網絡空間的行動能力;對抗西方的反俄信息/心理宣傳和滲透等。

俄軍事專家認為,未來軍事鬥爭中的信息作戰目標不僅包括武裝力量指控系統、政府行政管理系統和金融系統等硬目標,更具戰略意義的是士兵和民眾心理等軟目標。對士兵和民眾等軟目標實施的信息攻擊,可導致人心渙散和瓦解。信息作戰部隊不僅要具備保護己方和攻擊對方硬目標等能力,還要具備對抗和反制敵方信息/心理的攻擊與滲透。當前,擁有網絡主導權的國家針對不同目標運用不同手段實施信息作戰。針對硬目標使用特殊的信息武器,如計算機病毒、信息炸彈、邏輯炸彈、被賦予特殊使命的計算機芯片、能產生電磁脈衝的爆炸裝置、超高頻發生器、電子生物武器等。而針對士兵和民眾心理等軟目標,製造煽動性或恐嚇性的虛假消息並通過信息媒介傳播,以達到軍事政治目的。

因此,俄將該部隊命名為“信息作戰部隊”而非網絡作戰部隊充分體現了其作戰範圍兼顧軟硬兩類目標。

三、整合現役精銳力量和招募高校新生力量並舉

該部隊將整合現有俄羅斯武裝力量網絡作戰、電子偵察和電子對抗等部門人員和職能,同時吸收內務部和安全系統的網絡信息安全及相關專家,包括數學家、程序員、工程師、密碼學家、通信專家、電子對抗專家、翻譯人員等。

俄各軍兵種和機關在2013年先後組建“科技連”,並從高校畢業生中招募專業人才,這是軍隊系統各關鍵部門/單位儲備和培養的專門從事技術研發和信息安全保障的隊伍。據資料顯示,這支力量主要包括隸屬於空天軍的空軍第二科技連和空天防禦部隊的第三科技連、隸屬於陸軍的第五科技連、隸屬於軍事通訊科學院的第七科技連等。每個連有2~3個排,每個排約20人。以空天軍“科技連”為例,部隊定期招收高校畢業生,優先錄用計算機安全、通訊系統信息安全、特種無線電系統、密碼學、電子光電特種設備等專業人員,並由空軍軍事科學院培訓教育中心負責培養新人。

四、部隊司令尚未確定,格拉西莫夫是最大可能人選

俄國防部長紹伊古明確,信息作戰部隊司令將是大將軍銜。西方國家認為,俄武裝力量現任總參謀長格拉西莫夫大出任信息作戰部隊司令的可能性最大。他曾提出俄版“混合戰爭”概念,並得到普京總統的認同。他指出,“目前的戰爭原則本身已發生實質性改變,實現政治和戰略目標的非軍事手段的地位在上升。一系列事件表明,非軍事手段的效果有時超過了使用武器”。他在對“烏克蘭內戰”和“阿拉伯之春”等事件的描述中指出,信息/心理戰能夠將“一個祥和繁榮的國家在幾個月甚至幾天之內變成殘酷武裝鬥爭的戰場”。 2017年3月4日,格拉西莫夫在參加軍事學術會議時,要求俄軍事科學院加緊研究國家間對抗的新模式及有效反製手段。此外,西方推測格拉西莫夫的另一原因是,他此前一直擔任俄武裝力量網絡信息作戰的最高指揮官。 2014年指揮俄武裝力量發動強大信息/心理攻勢,兵不血刃收復克里米亞的正是格拉西莫夫。

五、結語

目前,俄國防部官方網站還沒有將信息作戰部隊,與現有的陸軍、空天軍、海軍和戰略導彈兵、空降兵這五大軍兵種並列放置。該部隊成為單列軍兵種亦或散佈於現有五大軍兵種和關鍵部門還未可知。但信息作戰部隊的組建不僅是俄羅斯網絡信息安全力量建設的關鍵舉措,更是在大國網絡信息安全博弈日益激烈和安全環境日益複雜的大背景下俄軍改革的重要步驟。信息作戰部隊將保衛俄羅斯網絡空間和信息領域的軟、硬目標,實現自身的攻、防職能,維護國家網絡信息安全和政治軍事安全。

 

作者:易鑫磊 來源:中國日報網

http://world.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-06/19/content_29801583.htm

網絡空間治理的力量博弈、理念演變與中國戰略 // Power Game of Network Space Governance, Evolution of Ideas & China’s Strategy

網絡空間治理的力量博弈、理念演變與中國戰略

Power Game of Network Space Governance, Evolution of Ideas & China’s Strategy

Introduction
The global cyberspace governance process involves not only the complex game of information developed countries and information developing countries in the fields of Internet key resources, network power and network security, but also the mutual game between government, private sector and civil society. “Prism door incident” in the intensification of cyberspace governance game at the same time, but also to promote the policy position of the parties continue to adjust to increase the possibility of governance cooperation. At the same time, the cyberspace game also reflects the Internet governance and cyberspace governance and other related governance concepts of mutual conflict and integration trend. At present, China’s participation in global cyberspace governance still faces many challenges. China needs to be based on the development trend of network space game and the evolution of governance concept. Combining with the strategy of network power in the “13th Five-Year Plan”, this paper constructs long-term, complete and comprehensive aspects of international mechanism shaping, talent cultivation and technology development as the core Participation strategy.
In June 2013, former US National Security Agency (NSA) former employee Edward Snowden disclosed the council’s “prism” monitoring program. The event [1] made cyberspace governance in the international agenda in the priority of the re-ascension, but also exacerbated the differences in the position of the parties, leading to cyberspace governance in trouble, for the network space management system to create a great challenge The In addition, the international community on the complexity of cyberspace and its governance lack of clear, unified awareness, resulting in one-sided position and a single policy to further exacerbate the governance dilemma. In the face of the complex situation, Joseph Nye tries to explain the practice of cyberspace governance by referring to the theory of mechanism complex in the field of environmental governance, and analyzes the cyberspace management through the loosely coupled complex composed of many different governance mechanisms The [2] This provides a useful perspective for the analysis of cyberspace governance, that is, cyberspace governance is composed of multiple rather than a single governance mechanism, the interaction between the various mechanisms have an impact on governance. This paper intends to examine the development of cyberspace governance from a more macro perspective, and try to explore the evolution of the concept behind cyberspace game, and analyze the complex relationship between government, private sector and civil society in international and domestic levels The On this basis, to explore China’s response measures and participate in cyberspace governance strategy.

First, the power of cyberspace governance Game

network space management process with the government between the game process. According to the situation of network technology, network capacity and network utilization, governments can be divided into three categories: information developed countries, information developing countries and information undeveloped countries. [③] There are also international organizations to use the network readiness (Readiness) as an indicator to measure the degree of information technology. This ranking basically overlaps with the traditional developed, developing and underdeveloped countries, and of course there is also the level of informationization in individual developing countries rising to the ranks of developed countries, or the level of information in some developing countries The level of the developed countries. Therefore, in accordance with the information developed countries, developing countries and underdeveloped countries to divide the three points in the academic more accurate. There are three aspects of the power game of cyberspace governance: one is the game between the developed countries and the information developing countries in the network ownership, the network resource allocation; the second is the non-governmental actors and the government on the Internet key resource control, network security And freedom and other issues of the game; Third, as the dominant space in cyberspace, the US government in its own private sector, civil society and other countries in the Internet between the key resources and other issues on the game (Figure 1).

First of all, information between developed countries and information-developing countries around the network space between the key infrastructure and network technology between the game. According to the behavior, the topic and the characteristic of the power game in cyberspace management, it can be divided into three stages.
The first stage is the early period of Internet governance, which is roughly from the beginning of the formation of the Internet to the United Nations World Summit on Information Society (World Summit on Information Society, WSIS), which is divided into two phases: the Geneva Conference in 2003 and the Tunis Agenda in 2005. The World Summit on the Information Society appears to be a struggle between governments and the private sector and civil society, in essence, the game between the United States and other countries on Internet control.
This period is the stage of rapid development of the Internet, a large number of new technical and technical standards have been created, the US government took the opportunity to vigorously promote the development of information technology, and developed a series of international technical standards, industry and industry norms. And information developing countries are still in the study, learn from the stage, which makes the United States and other developed countries in the field in an absolute strong position. [4] This stage of Internet governance mainly around the Internet domain name registration and analysis and its corresponding 13 root server control, Internet Protocol (IP) address allocation and other key resources to compete. The United States has almost controlled all international organizations and core businesses that have developed and managed Internet standards and refused to internationalize the relevant management functions or to the United Nations specialized agencies. [⑤] Therefore, at the World Summit on the Information Society, despite the pressure from the United Nations, the developing countries and even the European countries, the United States still refused to hand over the Internet management rights. Into the 21st century, the information represented by China’s developing countries to enhance the network technology, they have the domain name, users and other Internet resources have exceeded the information developed countries, but the representation in the Internet governance is far from enough, So the existing Internet governance reflects the legitimacy of the questioned.
The second stage is the stage of political competition and sovereignty competition of cyberspace governance, which is called the “return” stage of the government in cyberspace. This stage from the Information Society World Summit to 2011. In 2011, China, Russia and other countries to the 66th session of the General Assembly to submit the “International Code of Conduct for Information Security”, advocated the United Nations in cyberspace governance play a leading role. In the same year, the United States and Britain and other governments dominated the global network space management conference (Global Cyberspace Conference), also known as the London process (London Process) was held. <A The network space has become the “fifth strategic space” of human society. With the continuous breakthrough of network technology and its disruptive transformation of real society, cyberspace has become the fifth strategic space of human society. The distribution of order, power and wealth in cyberspace, the developed countries and information developing countries have serious differences on the following issues: whether the cyberspace attribute is “global public domain” or “sovereignty”; governance is government-led “Multilateral governance”, or a multi-stakeholder model dominated by non-governmental actors; governance culture is a “multicultural” or “multicultural” that is dominated by the West. [⑥] The focus of this period is also reflected in the free flow of information content in the field, when Hillary Clinton took the US Secretary of State, the Internet for the freedom of many speeches, advocating the US Internet freedom strategy. The role of the US government and social media sites in the wake of the turbulence in North Africa, which began at the end of 2010, has aroused widespread concern in the developing countries and strengthened the management of the Internet. [⑦] The third stage from the “Prism Gate incident” until now, this stage of the competition more focused on cyberspace security governance. “Prism door incident” to the United States in the field of cyberspace governance moral high ground questioned, leadership decline, forcing it to promote cyberspace governance in the low posture. At the same time, cyberspace security situation is further deteriorating, and the security threats facing countries are further increased. After experiencing the fierce confrontation of the “prism gate incident”, the developed countries and the information developing countries are aware that the maintenance of cyberspace requires the participation of all countries, and no country can lead the cyberspace governance process alone. Information developed countries and information development countries in the cognitive level of the gap gradually narrowed, the reduction of confrontational initiatives, cooperation began to grow space. Second, the “prism gate incident” caused the government and the private sector, civil society between the network security, privacy and other issues on the fierce game. Former US National Security Agency former employee Edward Snow led to expose a including “prism”, “X key points” (X-Keyscore), “Fair” (Fairview), “core” (Main Core) and other monitoring systems, including 10 monitoring systems, the monitoring system by the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence agencies to participate in almost cover the cyberspace of social networks, e-mail, instant messaging, Web pages, videos, photos, and so on. [8] National Security Agency requires Microsoft, Google, Facebook and other nine major global Internet companies to open the database to monitor the project to carry out data monitoring. In the “Prism Gate incident” exposure, Microsoft, Google, Facebook and other companies to the court to prosecute the federal government. [⑨] civil society have also acted against large-scale data monitoring. The American Civil Society Alliance launched a “Stop Watch Us” action on the Internet, putting pressure on the US government to get tens of thousands of Internet users’ signatures, messages and responses from hundreds of civic groups by organizing parades Demonstrations, petition to Congress, launch network initiatives, etc. to cooperate with the action. [⑩] In the “prism door incident” triggered the other countries with the US government to carry out monitoring projects ICT enterprises dissatisfaction, countries have taken new measures to protect cyberspace security. For example, the Chinese government has accelerated the process of legalization of cyberspace and began to discuss the guiding ideology of cybersecurity equipment, and formulated the network security review method. After the introduction of the “national security law”, “anti-terrorism law” “Network Security Law (Draft)” and “Criminal Law Amendment (9)” have significantly increased the terms involved in network security. These initiatives have aroused serious concern about US ICT companies and lobbyed the US government to put pressure on China to require the Chinese government to cancel the relevant provisions, such as Article 18 of the Anti-Terrorism Act provides that “telecom operators, Internet services Providers should be for the public security organs, the state security organs in accordance with the law to prevent and investigate terrorist activities to provide technical interface and decryption technical support and assistance. [11] Although from the government point of view, these initiatives help to maintain network security and national security, but in the private sector, the above-mentioned initiatives will not only increase the technical input, but also a substantial increase in costs. As long as cyberspace governance does not achieve a breakthrough, the government and the private sector, civil society between the game will continue to exist, and to a certain extent, will evolve into a national game. <A Finally, the US government and its private sector, civil society alliance with other countries in the Internet key resources on the issue of the game. Internet key resources include: IP address allocation, protocol parameter registration, gTLD system management, ccTLD system management and root server system management and time zone database management. Some scholars use the “cyberspace” in cyberspace to describe the status of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in cyberspace governance. [12] For historical reasons, these resources have been by the National

Telecommunications and Information Administration (National Telecommunication and Information Administration, NTIA) under the Internet Digital Distribution Agency (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IANA) is responsible for managing, and NTIA authorizes its management of IANA functions through regular engagement with ICANN. Therefore, it can be argued that the US government controls the key resources of the Internet. The United Nations-appointed Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) noted in its report that the US government unilaterally controls the Internet’s key resources, such as root zone documents. [13] The international community has been dissatisfied with this situation, and the WGIG report has proposed four options to replace the existing structure, hoping to take over the Internet’s critical resources through intergovernmental organizations or global institutions. [14] For ICANN, although it has been seeking independence from the US government and has repeatedly contested it, it is more concerned with how to avoid other intergovernmental organizations or institutions to take over or replace their status. Milton Muller described the phenomenon as “some network liberals even eventually turned into secret supporters of nationalism, because as long as the challenged countries were their motherland, they turned to defend the United States, allowing Its control, leading the Internet. “[15] Thus, in some cases, ICANN chooses to” align “with the US government to prevent other countries or intergovernmental organizations from influencing their governance structures. In ICANN’s organizational structure and decision-making system, the Government Advisory Committee (Government Advisory Committee, GAC) is eligible to nominate a liaison who does not have the right to vote. Information developing countries believe that as an international mechanism for Internet governance, the lack of representation in ICANN from information developing countries should reflect government responsibilities and powers in their future management structures and increase the authority of the Governmental Advisory Committee The But ICANN has repeatedly said it will not accept this change. In this case, the US government representatives are highly consistent with ICANN’s official position, both in the government advisory committee and at ICANN’s plenary meetings. Until the “Prism Gate Event” broke out, the US government was forced to restart the process of internationalization of ICANN’s efforts to guide the cyberspace governance game to a new stage. Second, the future development of cyberspace management trend With the advancement of the network space management process, the parties to the understanding of the spatial properties of the network gradually reached a consensus, and thus in the governance approach, the path of the differences narrow. Especially at the cognitive level, the cognition of cyberspace from various countries is based on different political, economic and cultural backgrounds, emphasizing their uniqueness to objective properties and laws based on cyberspace, emphasizing the integration between different views. [16] Internet space interconnection, sharing attributes determine the zero-sum game does not apply to cyberspace, cyberspace security, development, freedom is the government, the private sector and civil society to pursue the common goal. At the same time, the mutual restraint of the three issues of security, development and freedom makes it impossible for either party to ignore the interests of other actors and pursue their own absolute interests. As President Xi Jinping on December 16, 2015 at the Second World Internet Conference (World Internet Conference, WIC) said: “There is no double standard in the field of information, countries have the right to maintain their own information security, not a national security while other countries are not safe, part of the national security and another part of the country is not safe, but not Sacrifice the security of other countries to seek their own so-called absolute security. ” [17] This position reflects the above special properties of cyberspace governance. As a result, the international community has gradually realized that no one can dominate the process of cyberspace governance. First, the US cyberspace strategy adjustment and ICANN internationalization will drive a major transformation of the cyberspace governance architecture. Facing the pressure, the United States by part of the Internet to give up the key resources of direct control, for its network space to adjust the international strategy to prepare. [18] On March 14, 2014, NTIA, a subsidiary of the US Department of Commerce, announced that it would give up control of ICANN and pointed out in its transfer statement that ICANN’s management would organize global multi-stakeholder discussions on receiving issues, but explicitly United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations. [19] ICANN has been seeking its own independent position since its inception, and ICANN’s internationalization goal is not only to get rid of the constraints of the US government, but also to ensure that the US government will not be taken over by other countries and intergovernmental organizations. Therefore, ICANN needs to reach an agreement with the US government to ensure their independence, but also with other governments to start a game, to avoid its internationalization was strongly opposed. Second, the role of the United Nations in cyberspace governance continues to improve, will effectively promote the network space management structure and norms of the pace of construction. Through the efforts of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security (GGE), the international community has also made important breakthroughs in cyberspace codes of conduct and confidence-building measures. In June 2013, the United Nations published a report of the Group of Experts, composed of representatives of 15 countries. The report clarifies for the first time that “national sovereignty and sovereign international norms and principles apply to national communications technology activities and the jurisdiction of the State in its territory for communications technology infrastructure.” At the same time, the report further recognizes the Charter of the United Nations In the applicability of cyberspace “. [20] “While efforts to address the security of communications technology, States must respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.” [21] Compared with the 2010 expert group report, the above contents were presented as sections 20 and 21 of the 2013 report, which is a significant improvement in the compatibility of information developed countries and information developing countries in cyberspace governance Sex continues to improve.
In July 2015, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on the Development of Information and Telecommunications from the Perspective of International Security published a third report on the Code of Conduct for Cyberspace. This report has reached a consensus on the protection of cyberspace-critical infrastructure, confidence-building measures, and international cooperation. The network sovereignty of the developing countries is further clarified, and the application of international law, especially the law of armed conflict, which is advocated by the developed countries, is also included in the application of cyberspace. [22] Finally, the competition and cooperation model between government and non-state actors in cyberspace governance will undergo a major change, and multi-level game will become the “new normal” of cyberspace governance. In terms of governance and path, countries’ policy positions in cyberspace governance also place greater emphasis on reality, especially in dealing with the relationship between government and other actors. All parties are aware that the responsibilities of the government and other actors should be divided according to the problems in cyberspace governance. For the multi-stakeholder governance model, the information developed countries and information development countries gradually unified awareness, the government and the private sector, civil society according to their respective functions to participate in cyberspace governance. The narrowing of cognition means that one party is more aware of the concerns of the other party. The game between the developed countries and the developing countries in cyberspace governance will be more targeted, and competition and cooperation will be carried out synchronously to promote cooperation through competition. Of course, this has increased the investment in cyberspace, and the increase in the right to speak on cyberspace governance. Brazil, China has established a network space multi-stakeholder meeting (NetMundial) and the World Internet Conference mechanism to explore the network and national security, network sovereignty and other core issues, the voice of developing countries will be more and more, more and more Big. Third, the evolution of the concept of cyberspace governance <a In the information developed countries and information development countries, governments, the private sector and civil society around the network space governance game from conflict to integration behind, reflecting the continuous evolution of the concept of cyberspace governance. Although the game around cyberspace governance is mainly to compete for the power and wealth of cyberspace, the different cognition of actors, objects and methods of governance has had an important influence on the conflict and fusion of governance. Craig Mundie, Microsoft’s chief research and strategy officer, pointed out at the 7th China-US Internet forum that “the misunderstanding of cyberspace in both China and the United States is largely due to ‘Internet governance’ and ‘ ‘Cyberspace governance’ caused by the confusion of the two concepts. [23] Similarly, cyberspace governance game and conflict also reflect the conflict between the two governance concepts. Internet governance is considered to be a multi-stakeholder governance model that is dominated by non-governmental actors, but cyberspace governance also requires the participation and coordination of government and intergovernmental organizations. Internet Governance Project (Internet Governance Project, IGP) defines Internet governance as a network-related decision that is linked by an Internet protocol, including the establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism for policies, rules, and technical standards that are common to the owner, operator, developer, and user. Distribution and global Internet standards of human behavior. “[24] The above definition includes three aspects, namely the acceptance and recognition of technical standards and agreements, the allocation of Internet resources such as domain names and IP addresses, spam generated by human Internet behavior, Cybercrime, copyright and trademark disputes, consumer protection issues, public sector and private security issues, rules and policies. Laura DeNardis (Laura DeNardis) proposed to be in accordance with the Internet transmission TCP / IP protocol level, and according to different levels of different functions to build Internet mode, based on the function, tasks and actors were discussed Internet resource control, standard settings , Network access, network security management, information flow, intellectual property protection and other six levels of Internet governance content. [25] Cyberspace governance has shifted from the professional and technical fields that have been emphasized by the original Internet governance to a wider range of political, security and economic sectors, and the importance of government and intergovernmental organizations in cyberspace governance has become increasingly prominent. Cyberspace is a broader field that includes not only the Internet, but also the data that is transmitted in the network, the users of the network, and the interaction between real society and virtual society. The corresponding cyberspace governance is a broader concept, which is “a category of cyberspace infrastructure, standards, law, social culture, economy, development and so on.” [26] It contains more diverse governance issues and challenges that are increasing. Such as the “Prism Gate Incident”, the government’s high-level threat (APT) due to network action in cyberspace, the Digital Divide and Data Poverty ), Cyber ​​terrorism, online business theft and more and more governance issues have gone beyond the scope of the traditional concept of Internet governance. <A The conflict between “global public domain” and “network sovereignty”, “network autonomy” and “state dominance” in cyberspace governance game reflects that people can not understand “Internet governance” and “network Space governance “between the different governance subjects, objects and methods, trying to use a single governance approach to solve the multiple issues. The bottom-up, open and transparent governance model, which is advocated by the Internet governance subject represented by ICANN, is concerned with the high risk of cyber warfare, large-scale data monitoring and theft, and cyber terrorism. Lack of effectiveness and relevance. At the same time, the state-centered, top-down cyberspace governance philosophy can not effectively deal with the real problems of the current Internet governance and can not replace the dominance of Internet international organizations in the field. With the advance of the network space management process, the two governance ideas and methods in the collision also began to integrate. Joseph Chennai believes that cyberspace is composed of multiple governance mechanisms, in which Internet governance focuses on the technical level and is a subset of cyberspace governance. Should be based on different governance issues, to build a different governance mechanism, so that different actors to play a leading role. [27] The integration of governance concepts is also reflected in the increasing consensus among the parties on the multi-stakeholder governance model. ICANN uses a bottom-up, consensus-based decision-making process that advocates a governance model that limits the role of government. [28] Many developing countries initially opposed the multi-stakeholder governance model, stressing that government-led multilateral governance models should be adopted. With the deepening of the governance process, the information-developing countries have gradually accepted the multi-stakeholder governance model, which is gaining more and more consensus in the private sector and civil society as long as the role of the government is well reflected. The government, the private sector and the civil society participate in the decision-making process according to their respective functions and responsibilities, do not deliberately exclude other actors, nor deliberately pursue the leadership of individual actors, reflecting a more objective and balanced approach to cyberspace governance. Fourth, China’s strategic response <a The Chinese government has put forward the two goals of global governance of cyberspace, namely, to build a peaceful, safe, open and cooperative cyberspace and to establish a multilateral, democratic and transparent international Internet governance system. Important strategic objectives into the “thirteen five” plan recommendations. The former advocates foreign participation in the international network space management process, in order to establish a favorable international governance system; the latter advocates the development of network technology, nurture the network industry, enhance the national network strength. The mutual support and mutual promotion between the two requires an international strategy that can co-ordinate internal and external situations in response to complex cyberspace. Although the Chinese government has not published a specific international cyberspace strategy document, but by analyzing the existing relevant policies, can still be found in China’s international strategy of cyberspace is still in the exploratory stage. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze and discuss the international strategy of cyberspace in China according to the characteristics of cyberspace power game and the strategy of network power. (A) China’s cyberspace international policy practice Since 1994 access to the Internet, China has developed a variety of forms of international network policy into the international network space system. This aspect is to expand the needs of opening up, hope that through international cooperation in learning, the introduction of foreign advanced technical standards; the other is the driving force of information technology, integration into the globalization must be all-round participation in the international system. [29] In addition, with China’s growing influence in international affairs and increased dependence on the network, active participation in cyberspace governance is also an important way to maintain national interests and ways. China’s network policy is largely influenced by the situation of international cyberspace governance and developed and promoted in the interaction with the international cyberspace management system, showing the characteristics of multi-domain, multi-level and multi-subject. <A First, the international policy of the Chinese government network covers international cooperation in international technical standards, information and communication technology industry cooperation, global Internet governance, combating cybercrime, network economy, digital divide and other fields, and the development trend of global network governance Generally consistent. First of all, from the early technology, industry and Internet standards to gradually expand the cooperation to a wider range of network-related policy cooperation, many policy areas in fact beyond the scope of the Internet itself, and international economic, political and security. Secondly, after the “prism door incident”, with the cyberspace security governance become the main issue in governance, the focus of China’s network policy is also focused on the network security governance, and based on the establishment of national security, political security, Safety and social security. China not only vigorously oppose large-scale network monitoring in the international arena, advocate the maintenance of national network sovereignty, but also pay more attention to the legislative work related to cybersecurity in domestic policy and maintain national security and sovereignty in practice. Second, China’s cyberspace international policy covers bilateral, regional, multilateral and international levels. From the bilateral level, China has established intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation mechanisms with countries such as South Korea, Britain and Australia. These cooperation not only covers the contents of network security, digital economy and development, but also become an important content and support for bilateral diplomatic relations. In addition, China and the United States, between China and Russia in the field of network security to carry out a different degree of confidence-building measures (Confidence Building Measures, CBMs). [30] At the regional level, China and ASEAN, the SCO, the European Union, the Arab League and other regional organizations and countries to establish a variety of forms of network dialogue and cooperation mechanism. In 2009, the Chinese government signed the Cooperation Framework of the China-ASEAN Telecommunications Regulatory Commission on Network Security and the Intergovernmental Agreement on Safeguarding International Information Security of Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN Member States. [31] China also actively participated in the work of the ASEAN Regional Network Security Working Group, and in September 2013 held in Beijing, the ASEAN Regional Forum “to strengthen the network security measures seminar – legal and cultural perspective.” Conference development The development of the Internet requires the guidance of legal rules and the need to promote and respect cultural diversity. All parties should strengthen exchanges in the field of cybersecurity, promote mutual trust, promote cooperation and jointly build peace, security, openness and cooperation. [32] Finally, China is also actively involved in the multilateral and international level of cyberspace governance mechanisms, both within the United Nations Framework for Information Security, the International Telecommunication Union, the World Summit on the Information Society, the Internet Governance Forum, or the United Nations Framework London process, cyberspace multi-stakeholder meetings and other mechanisms, China is the main participant; in addition, China also through the World Internet Conference to carry out cyber space home diplomacy. China has also submitted two versions of the International Code of Conduct for Information Security to the United Nations General Assembly, together with representatives of OECD countries such as Russia and Uzbekistan. [33] China is also a major participant in the Global Internet Governance Consortium, where the head of the National Internet Information Office (NYSE), Lu Wei and Alibaba Group Chairman Ma, was elected as a member of the Alliance. <A Third, with the cyberspace governance covered by more and more widely, China’s cyberspace international policy to participate in the main body from the traditional Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry and further expanded to the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Finance and the new The establishment of the network letter Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a “network affairs office” to deal with cyberspace of foreign affairs. Among them, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mainly responsible for bilateral, regional, multilateral and international level of network diplomacy, it is China’s docking under the framework of the United Nations network governance mechanism of the main forces, especially from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs arms control officials throughout the four United Nations information security Working Group of Experts. Net letter office as the central network security and information leading group of permanent institutions, China is to co-ordinate the network security and information management of the newly established important institutions. Since the role of network management as a co-ordination and coordination of China’s network affairs is becoming more and more important in the international policy of the network, it has not only carried out multi-level international network security and digital economic cooperation, but also established the governance mechanism of the World Internet Conference.
In addition, the Ministry of Public Security in the fight against cyber security crime, network anti-terrorism, the Ministry of Commerce in the information and communication technology market access, the Ministry of Finance in the network infrastructure external assistance and other areas of work will be China’s future implementation of cyberspace international strategy a solid foundation. It can be seen that China has formed a more comprehensive and in-depth international strategic framework of cyberspace, including pluralistic participant, wide-ranging problem coverage and multi-level participation path, which laid a good foundation for the international strategic construction of cyberspace governance basis. With the development of China from the network power to the network power, China will establish a comprehensive and perfect international strategy of cyberspace. (2) Challenges in the international strategy of cyberspace The evolution of cyberspace governance has brought many challenges to China’s cyberspace international strategy: First, the information developed countries will continue to dominate the network space governance game, which is the network of China The international strategy of space poses a challenge; the second is due to the lack of advanced Internet governance talent, leading to China’s Internet international organization in the serious shortage of the third is the network space governance game to emphasize capacity building (Capacity Building), best practice (Best Practice) And so on, will bring competitive pressure to China. These issues and challenges will have a greater impact on China’s cyberspace international strategy, if handled properly, will have a negative impact on the implementation of the network strategy. <A I = 35> First, the information developed countries continue to dominate the network space governance game direction on China’s international strategic challenges. The global governance of cyberspace is played through various forms of governance, and the construction of the mechanism depends on the negotiation between the actors. The bargaining of the negotiations depends not only on the size of the powers of the actors, but also on the global governance of cyberspace In the agenda set the ability to be closely related. [34] According to Joseph Nye’s definition, the former can be called “hard power”, the latter is “soft power”. [35] The advantages of the developed countries in these two areas are obvious, especially in the mechanism of selective or prioritizing the discussion of cyberspace governance. For example, in cybersecurity governance, the United States relies on its agenda setting capacity to prevent the international community from making large-scale data monitoring a governance agenda, while setting its network economy to focus on priority agendas. In addition, the information developed countries in the establishment of the network of human rights agenda, will focus on the field of freedom, and democracy (one country one vote), equality (the size of the country has the same discourse) and other equally important issues are excluded from the agenda. Not only that, for countries in the “prism door incident” after the request to strengthen the exercise of network sovereignty trend, the United States put forward the “data localization” (Data Localization) this agenda to circumvent the global governance mechanism to discuss network sovereignty. Compared with the information developed countries, information development countries in the agenda setting capacity there is still a big gap, the lack of initiative to set the agenda. In recent years, with China, Brazil, India and other countries have established a variety of cyberspace governance mechanism, emerging powers in the global management of cyberspace in the agenda set the ability to continue to increase. But in general, the gap between China and the information developed countries in governance capacity still exists, and will affect China through international mechanisms to safeguard their own national interests, as well as express their concerns. <
Secondly, due to the lack of advanced cyberspace governance talent, leading to China in the Internet international organizations in the representation of a serious shortage. The trend of cyberspace governance game shows that the control of Internet key resources by international organizations such as ICANN, IETF and other international organizations will not be challenged by government and intergovernmental organizations. As the US government abandons its control over ICANN, the latter will have greater independence. Network space is built on the basis of the Internet, the basis of cyberspace governance is also Internet governance. Therefore, China’s cyberspace international strategy must be in the field of Internet governance to achieve a breakthrough, while enhancing the international organizations in the Internet in the influence and representation. For the majority of developing countries, including China, it is necessary to increase the representation in international organizations such as ICANN, so that more voices from China and other developing countries appear in ICANN. Third, the network space governance game to emphasize the ability to build, best practice and other direction, which will bring China’s severe competitive pressure. The convergence of the cyberspace governance game concept has led to the international community’s focus on cyberspace governance to operational and enforceable areas such as capacity building, best practices, including the provision of network infrastructure to information developing countries and underdeveloped countries; Training in technology, law, and policy related to cyberspace governance; and providing best practices for solving specific problems in cyberspace governance. This is China’s participation in cyberspace governance of the international strategy put forward higher requirements, information developed countries in the field of resources, talent advantage is difficult to shake in the short term, which not only requires the Chinese government to invest more resources, but also China’s Internet companies , Industry associations, legal experts of the common and active participation. (C) China’s strategic thinking of cyberspace governance The basic path of China’s cyberspace international strategy is consistent with the overall macro strategy of China’s integration into the international system and the reform of the international system. [36] In response to the complex cyberspace governance game, China on the one hand to strengthen capacity-building, and focus on the ability to participate in the global control of cyberspace influence; the other hand, between the network security and openness to seek a balance, International cyberspace to establish their own legitimate rights and interests, to avoid the negative impact of excessive security; and strengthen the network strategy and cyberspace international strategy between the strategic interaction, the formation of mutually supportive cyberspace strategy system. <A I = 40> First, combined with the new and future development of cyberspace governance, to strengthen the shaping of international mechanisms. In the cyber space global governance level, the struggle around the governance platform is becoming increasingly fierce. Including the Internet forum, the International Telecommunication Union, the London process, the Brazilian cyberspace multi-stakeholder meeting and China’s World Internet Congress, all platforms have their dominant forces, actors involved in the subject matter and the impact of the play Are not the same. China should explore ways to enhance its own capacity-building programs to the international community in the areas of cybersecurity, cybercrime, capacity building, network economy, cyber culture and the digital divide, in conjunction with the World Internet Forum and other cyberspace governance mechanisms involved. Good practice and solutions such as the ability of public goods. Second, focus on training to participate in cyberspace governance of international talent.
Internet governance organizations are mostly non-governmental organizations, and their multi-stakeholder governance model usually requires the selection of senior management personnel from the Internet community, and the corresponding high-level management, based on the contribution of the selection object to Internet technology and governance Management positions, rather than a traditional intergovernmental organization of a country or vote in accordance with the population, economic ratio to allocate places. In the case of ICANN, its existing management structure is comprised of the Board of Directors and three support organizations, three advisory committees and two technical advisory bodies. The Board consists of 16 voting members and 5 non-voting liaison officers, with the exception of the ICANN President, the remaining 15 places from the Supporting Organizations, the General Members Advisory Committee, the Regional General Membership Organization and the Nominating Committee. To be elected as a member of the voting, must pass the bottom-up nomination and election. Therefore, China should rationalize the system and mechanism, and actively to ICANN and other international non-governmental organizations to transport talent to encourage Internet companies, industry organizations and academic institutions to actively participate in ICANN, IETF, Internet Architecture Board (Internet Architecture Board, IAB) and other institutions to select the talent in order to enhance the international organizations in the Internet in the representation and voice, and to improve China’s influence on Internet governance. Third, to strengthen the network strategy and cyberspace international strategy between the strategic interaction. China has put forward the strategy of strengthening the network power in the “13th Five-Year Plan”, and proceeded from five aspects: technological innovation, network culture, network infrastructure, network security and information construction and international cooperation. [37] Network power strategy has repeatedly referred to the opening up, and actively participate in the Internet governance, and even international cooperation as a separate chapter. This shows that the international strategy of cyberspace and network power strategy between the integration of mutual support. The effective interaction between the two is related to China’s openness to cyberspace, the relationship between security and development. From the perspective of the two-tier game, any country’s strategy is faced with the external situation and the internal interests of the double constraints, excessive emphasis on openness or security are not conducive to the overall national security and interests. Strengthening the interaction between the network strategy and the international strategy of cyberspace helps to improve the awareness of the decision-makers on the security and opening of cyberspace, the security of cyberspace, the development and the relationship between opening and breaking, Consistent with the objective laws of the policy. From a technical level, the network strategy can better support China’s participation in global cyberspace governance. The main competition in the current cyberspace governance has shifted from the cognitive, conceptual level of the game to the provision of solutions, best practices, capacity building and other specific areas of cooperation. Lack of effective support, cyberspace international strategy is difficult to sustain, and won the recognition of the international community. At the same time, cyberspace international strategy will also help to create a favorable external environment for the network power strategy, providing external advanced experience and lessons to the domestic ICT enterprises to provide a broad international market. Finally, we can learn from the field of foreign aid experience, through foreign aid in the field of ICT to ease or even eliminate the digital divide in cyberspace governance issues, on the one hand can contribute to the network space management of Chinese power, on the other hand also contribute to China’s ICT enterprises Internationalization strategy. At the technical level, the network strategy can better support China’s participation in global cyberspace governance. The main competition in the current cyberspace governance has shifted from the cognitive, conceptual level of the game to the provision of solutions, best practices, capacity building and other specific areas of cooperation. Lack of effective support, cyberspace international strategy is difficult to sustain, and won the recognition of the international community. At the same time, cyberspace international strategy will also help to create a favorable external environment for the network power strategy, providing external advanced experience and lessons to the domestic ICT enterprises to provide a broad international market. Finally, we can learn from the field of foreign aid experience, through foreign aid in the field of ICT to ease or even eliminate the digital divide in cyberspace governance issues, on the one hand can contribute to the network space management of Chinese power, on the other hand also contribute to China’s ICT enterprises Internationalization strategy. At the technical level, the network strategy can better support China’s participation in global cyberspace governance. The main competition in the current cyberspace governance has shifted from the cognitive, conceptual level of the game to the provision of solutions, best practices, capacity building and other specific areas of cooperation. Lack of effective support, cyberspace international strategy is difficult to sustain, and won the recognition of the international community. At the same time, cyberspace international strategy will also help to create a favorable external environment for the network power strategy, providing external advanced experience and lessons to the domestic ICT enterprises to provide a broad international market. Finally, we can learn from the field of foreign aid experience, through foreign aid in the field of ICT to ease or even eliminate the digital divide in cyberspace governance issues, on the one hand can contribute to the network space management of Chinese power, on the other hand also contribute to China’s ICT enterprises Internationalization strategy. At the technical level, the network strategy can better support China’s participation in global cyberspace governance. The main competition in the current cyberspace governance has shifted from the cognitive, conceptual level of the game to the provision of solutions, best practices, capacity building and other specific areas of cooperation. Lack of effective support, cyberspace international strategy is difficult to sustain, and won the recognition of the international community. At the same time, cyberspace international strategy will also help to create a favorable external environment for the network power strategy, providing external advanced experience and lessons to the domestic ICT enterprises to provide a broad international market. Finally, we can learn from the field of foreign aid experience, through foreign aid in the field of ICT to ease or even eliminate the digital divide in cyberspace governance issues, on the one hand can contribute to the network space management of Chinese power, on the other hand also contribute to China’s ICT enterprises Internationalization strategy. At the technical level, the network strategy can better support China’s participation in global cyberspace governance. The main competition in the current cyberspace governance has shifted from the cognitive, conceptual level of the game to the provision of solutions, best practices, capacity building and other specific areas of cooperation. Lack of effective support, cyberspace international strategy is difficult to sustain, and won the recognition of the international community. At the same time, cyberspace international strategy will also help to create a favorable external environment for the network power strategy, providing external advanced experience and lessons to the domestic ICT enterprises to provide a broad international market. Finally, we can learn from the field of foreign aid experience, through foreign aid in the field of ICT to ease or even eliminate the digital divide in cyberspace governance issues, on the one hand can contribute to the network space management of Chinese power, on the other hand also contribute to China’s ICT enterprises Internationalization strategy.
At the technical level, the network strategy can better support China’s participation in global cyberspace governance. The main competition in the current cyberspace governance has shifted from the cognitive, conceptual level of the game to the provision of solutions, best practices, capacity building and other specific areas of cooperation. Lack of effective support, cyberspace international strategy is difficult to sustain, and won the recognition of the international community. At the same time, cyberspace international strategy will also help to create a favorable external environment for the network power strategy, providing external advanced experience and lessons to the domestic ICT enterprises to provide a broad international market. Finally, we can learn from the field of foreign aid experience, through foreign aid in the field of ICT to ease or even eliminate the digital divide in cyberspace governance issues, on the one hand can contribute to the network space management of Chinese power, on the other hand also contribute to China’s ICT enterprises Internationalization strategy. At the technical level, the network strategy can better support China’s participation in global cyberspace governance. The main competition in the current cyberspace governance has shifted from the cognitive, conceptual level of the game to the provision of solutions, best practices, capacity building and other specific areas of cooperation. Lack of effective support, cyberspace international strategy is difficult to sustain, and won the recognition of the international community. At the same time, cyberspace international strategy will also help to create a favorable external environment for the network power strategy, providing external advanced experience and lessons to the domestic ICT enterprises to provide a broad international market. Finally, we can learn from the field of foreign aid experience, through foreign aid in the field of ICT to ease or even eliminate the digital divide in cyberspace governance issues, on the one hand can contribute to the network space management of Chinese power, on the other hand also contribute to China’s ICT enterprises Internationalization strategy.

 

Original Mandarin Chinese:

簡介
全球網絡空間治理進程不僅涉及信息發達國家與信息發展中國家在互聯網關鍵資源、網絡權力和網絡安全等領域的複雜博弈,還包括政府、私營部門和市民社會等行為體之間的相互博弈。 “棱鏡門事件”在加劇網絡空間治理博弈的同時,也推動各方政策立場持續調整,增加了治理合作的可能性。與此同時,網絡空間領域的博弈也反映出互聯網治理與網絡空間治理等相關治理理念的相互衝突與相互融合趨勢。目前,中國在全球網絡空間治理上的參與仍面臨諸多挑戰。中國需要以網絡空間博弈的發展趨勢和治理理念的演進為基礎,結合“十三五”規劃提出的網絡強國戰略,以國際機制塑造、人才培養及技術發展等為核心建構長遠、完備和全面的參與戰略。
正文
2013年6月,美國國家安全局(NSA)前僱員愛德華·斯諾登披露了該局的“棱鏡”監聽項目。該事件[①] 使網絡空間治理在國際議程中的優先次序再度提升,但也加劇了各方立場的分化,導致網絡空間治理陷入困境,為網絡空間治理的建章立制帶來極大挑戰。另外,國際社會對網絡空間及其治理的複雜性缺乏清晰、統一的認知,由此而造成的片面立場和單一政策進一步加劇了治理困境。面對上述複雜情勢,約瑟夫·奈(Joseph Nye)試圖通過借鑒環境治理領域的機制複合體理論來解釋網絡空間治理的實踐,通過多個不同的治理機制組成的鬆散耦合複合體來分析網絡空間治理。 [②] 這為分析網絡空間治理形勢提供了一個有益的視角,即網絡空間治理是由多個而非單一的治理機制組成,各種機制之間的相互作用對治理產生影響。本文擬從更加宏觀的視角來審視網絡空間治理髮展的進程,並試圖探索網絡空間博弈背後的理念演變,同時分析政府、私營部門、公民社會等治理行為體在國際、國內兩個層面的複雜關係。在此基礎之上,探討中國的應對措施和參與網絡空間治理的戰略。

一、網絡空間治理的力量博弈

網絡空間治理的進程伴隨著各國政府之間的博弈過程。根據各國政府在網絡技術、網絡能力和網絡使用度等方面的情況,可以將其劃分為信息發達國家、信息發展中國家和信息不發達國家三類。 [③] 也有國際組織以網絡就緒度(Readiness)為指標衡量各國的信息化程度。這種排名基本上與傳統的發達、發展中以及不發達國家的三分法相重疊,當然也存在個別發展中國家的信息化水平上升到發達國家行列,或部分發展中國家的信息化水平跌落到不發達國家的水平。因此,按照信息發達國家、發展中國家和不發達國家的三分法來劃分在學術上更加精確。網絡空間治理的力量博弈主要有三個方面:一是信息發達國家與信息發展中國家在網絡權歸屬、網絡資源分配方面的博弈;二是非政府行為體與政府之間就互聯網關鍵資源控制、網絡安全與自由等問題的博弈;三是作為網絡空間中的主導國家,美國政府聯合其境內的私營部門、市民社會與其他國家之間在互聯網關鍵資源歸屬等問題上的博弈(圖1)。

首先,信息發達國家與信息發展中國家圍繞著網絡空間的關鍵基礎設施和網絡技術之間的博弈。根據網絡空間治理領域力量博弈的行為體、議題和特點,可以將其劃分為三個階段。
第一階段是早期的互聯網治理時期,這大致從國際互聯網的形成初期到聯合國召開信息社會世界峰會(World Summit on Information Society, WSIS)為止;該峰會分為2003年日內瓦會議和2005年突尼斯議程兩個階段。信息社會世界峰會表面上表現為各國政府與私營部門和市民社會之間的鬥爭,實質上則是美國與其他國家就互聯網控制權而展開的博弈。
這一時期是互聯網快速發展的階段,大量新的技術及技術標準被創造出來,美國政府藉機大力推動信息技術發展,並製定了一系列國際技術標準、行業和產業規範。而信息發展中國家還處於學習、借鑒階段,這使美國等發達國家在該領域處於絕對強勢地位。 [④] 這一階段的互聯網治理主要圍繞互聯網域名註冊與解析及其相應的13台根服務器控制權、互聯網協議(IP)地址分配等關鍵資源展開爭奪。美國幾乎控制了互聯網標準制定和管理的所有國際組織和核心企業,並拒絕將相關管理職能國際化或交由聯合國專門機構管理。 [⑤] 因此,在信息社會世界峰會上,儘管面臨來自聯合國、信息發展中國家甚至歐洲國家的壓力,美國依然拒絕交出國際互聯網管理權。進入21世紀後,以中國為代表的信息發展中國家的網絡科技力量不斷提升,它們所擁有的域名、用戶等互聯網資源已經超過了信息發達國家,但在互聯網治理中的代表性遠遠不足,因此對現有互聯網治理體現的合法性提出了質疑。
第二階段是網絡空間治理的政治競爭和主權競爭階段,有人稱之為政府在網絡空間的“回歸”階段。這一階段從信息社會世界峰會到2011年。 2011年,中國、俄羅斯等國向第66屆聯大提交了“信息安全國際行為準則”,主張聯合國在網絡空間治理中發揮主導作用。同年,美英等國政府主導的全球網絡空間治理大會(Global Cyber​​space Conference),又稱倫敦進程(London Process)正式召開。
這一階段網絡空間治理博弈的特點是,隨著網絡技術的不斷突破及其對現實社會的顛覆性變革,網絡空間已經成為人類社會的“第五戰略空間”。圍繞網絡空間中秩序、權力與財富的分配,信息發達國家與信息發展中國家在下列問題上產生了嚴重分歧:網絡空間屬性是“全球公域”還是“主權領域”;治理手段是政府主導的“多邊治理”,還是非政府行為體主導的多利益攸關方(Multi-stakeholder)模式;治理文化是西方主導的“一元文化”,還是平等協商的“多元文化”。 [⑥] 這一時期的矛盾焦點還集中體現在信息內容的自由流通領域,希拉里·克林頓就任美國國務卿時,針對互聯網自由發表了多次講話,鼓吹美國的互聯網自由戰略。在始於2010年年底的西亞北非動蕩之中,美國政府與社交媒體網站在背後所扮演的角色引起了信息發展中國家的廣泛關注,並加強了對互聯網的管理。 [⑦]
第三階段從“棱鏡門事件”之後一直到現在,這一階段的競爭更加聚焦網絡空間的安全治理。 “棱鏡門事件”使美國在網絡空間治理領域的道德製高點遭受質疑、領導力下降,迫使其在推動網絡空間治理中放低姿態。與此同時,網絡空間安全形勢進一步惡化,各國面臨的安全威脅進一步加大。在經歷了“棱鏡門事件”初期的激烈對抗之後,信息發達國家與信息發展中國家均意識到維護網絡空間的安全需要各國的共同參與,沒有任何國家可以單獨主導網絡空間治理進程。信息發達國家與信息發展中國家在認知層面的差距逐漸縮小,對抗性舉措減少,合作的空間開始增長。
其次,“棱鏡門事件”引起了政府與私營部門、市民社會之間在網絡安全、公民隱私等問題上的激烈博弈。美國國家安全局前僱員愛德華·斯諾登揭露了一個包括“棱鏡”、“X關鍵分”(X-Keyscore)、“美景”(Fairview)、“核心”(Main core)等近10個監控項目在內的監控體系,該監控體係由國家安全局、中央情報局、聯邦調查局等多個情報機構參與,幾乎覆蓋了網絡空間的社交網絡、郵件、即時通訊、網頁、影片、照片等所有信息。 [⑧] 國家安全局要求微軟、谷歌、臉譜等9家主要全球互聯網企業向監控項目開放數據庫以便開展數據監控。在“棱鏡門事件”曝光後,微軟、谷歌、臉譜等企業向法院公開起訴聯邦政府。 [⑨] 市民社會也紛紛行動起來,反對大規模數據監控。美國市民社會聯盟在網上發起“停止監視我們”(Stop Watch Us)的行動,向美國政府施加壓力,得到數万網民在網站上的簽名、留言及數百個公民團體的響應,他們通過組織遊行示威、向國會請願、發起網絡倡議等方式配合該行動。 [⑩]
在“棱鏡門事件”引發了其他國家對與美國政府合作開展監控項目ICT企業的不滿,各國紛紛採取新的措施保障網絡空間安全。例如,中國政府加快了網絡空間的法制化進程,並開始討論網絡安全設備自主可控的指導思想、制定了網絡安全審查辦法,在先後出台的《國家安全法》、《反恐怖主義法》、 《網絡安全法(草案)》和《刑法修正案(九)》中都大幅增加了涉及網絡安全的條款。這些舉措引起了美國信息通信技術企業的嚴重關切,並遊說美國政府對中國施壓,要求中國政府取消相關規定,如《反恐怖主義法》第十八條中規定“電信業務經營者、互聯網服務提供者應當為公安機關、國家安全機關依法進行防範、調查恐怖活動提供技術接口和解密技術支持和協助”。 [11] 儘管從政府角度看,這些舉措有助於維護網絡安全和國家安全,但在私營部門看來,上述規定的舉措不僅將增加技術上的投入,也會大幅度增加成本。只要網絡空間治理未實現突破,政府與私營部門、市民社會之間的博弈會繼續存在,並在一定程度上將演變為國家間博弈。
最後,美國政府與其境內的私營部門、市民社會之間結盟與其他國家在互聯網關鍵資源歸屬問題上的博弈。互聯網關鍵資源包括:IP地址分配、協議參數註冊、通用頂級域名(gTLD)系統管理,國家和地區頂級域名(ccTLD)系統的管理及根服務器系統的管理和時區數據庫管理等。有學者形像地用掌握網絡空間中的“封疆權”來形容互聯網名稱與數字地址分配機構(Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN)在網絡空間治理中的地位。 [12]

由於歷史的原因,這些資源一直由美國國家通信與信息管理局(National Telecommunication and Information Administration, NTIA)下屬的互聯網數字分配機構(Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IANA)負責管理,NTIA通過定期與ICANN簽訂合同,授權其管理IANA的職能。因此,可以認為美國政府控制著互聯網的關鍵資源。聯合國任命的互聯網治理工作組(WGIG)在報告中指出,美國政府單方面控制著如根區文件在內的互聯網關鍵資源。 [13] 國際社會對這種情況一直不滿,WGIG報告中提出了四種方案以取代既有架構,希望通過政府間組織或全球性機構來接管互聯網關鍵資源。 [14] 對於ICANN來說,雖然一直尋求獨立於美國政府之外並與之開展了多次爭奪,但它更關注的是如何避免其他政府間組織或機構接管或取代其地位。彌爾頓·穆勒將這種現象描述為“一些網絡自由主義者甚而最終轉變成了國家主義的秘密支持者,因為只要被挑戰的國家是他們的祖國,他們就轉而為美國辯護,允許其控制、主導互聯網。”[15]
因此,在一些情況下,ICANN選擇與美國政府“結盟”共同阻止其他國家或政府間組織影響其治理結構。在ICANN的組織架構和決策體制中,各國政府代表所在的政府諮詢委員會(Government Advisory Committee, GAC)只有資格提名一名不具有表決權的聯絡員。信息發展中國家認為,作為一種互聯網治理的國際機制,在ICANN中來自信息發展中國家的代表性不足,在其未來的管理架構中,應當體現政府的職責和權力,增加政府諮詢委員會的權限。但ICANN多次表示不會接受這種改變。對於這種情況,無論是在政府諮詢委員會中,還是在ICANN的全體會議上,美國政府代表與ICANN的官方立場高度一致。直到“棱鏡門事件”爆發,美國政府才迫於多方面壓力宣布重啟ICANN的國際化進程,這將網絡空間治理博弈導向了新的階段。

二、網絡空間治理未來的發展態勢

隨著網絡空間治理進程的推進,各方對網絡空間屬性的認知逐漸達成共識,並由此使其在治理方法、路徑上的分歧縮小​​。特別是在認知層面,各國對網絡空間的認知由基於不同的政治、經濟、文化背景,強調各自的獨特性轉向基於網絡空間的客觀屬性和規律,強調不同觀點之間的融合。 [16] 網絡空間的互聯、共享屬性決定了零和博弈不適用於網絡空間,網絡空間的安全、發展、自由是政府、私營部門和市民社會所追求的共同目標。同時,安全、發展、自由這三個議題的相互制約關係,使得任何一方都不能忽視其他行為體的利益,而追求自身的絕對利益。正如習近平主席2015年12月16日在第二屆世界互聯網大會(World Internet Conference, WIC)開幕式的主題演講中指出:“在信息領域沒有雙重標準,各國都有權維護自己的信息安全,不能一個國家安全而其他國家不安全,一部分國家安全而另一部分國家不安全,更不能犧牲別國安全謀求自身所謂絕對安全”。 [17] 這一立場反映了網絡空間治理的上述特殊屬性。由此,國際社會也逐步意識到,沒有任何一方可以主導網絡空間治理進程。
首先,美國的網絡空間戰略調整與ICANN國際化進程將推動網絡空間治理架構的重大轉型。面臨重重壓力,美國通過部分放棄互聯網關鍵資源的直接控制權,為其網絡空間國際戰略的調整做準備。 [18] 2014年3月14日,美國商務部下屬的NTIA宣布將放棄對ICANN的控制,並在移交聲明中指出,將由ICANN管理層組織全球多利益攸關方討論接收問題,但明確拒絕由聯合國或其他政府間組織接管。 [19] ICANN自成立以來一直在尋求自己的獨立地位,ICANN國際化的目標不僅是要擺脫美國政府的製約,同時還要確保在美國政府放權後,不會被其他國家和政府間組織接管。因此,ICANN既需要與美國政府達成協議以保證自己的獨立性,也要與其他國家政府展開博弈,避免其國際化遭到強烈反對。
其次,聯合國在網絡空間治理中的作用持續提升,將有力地推動網絡空間治理架構和規範的建設步伐。通過聯合國信息安全政府專家組(GGE)的努力,國際社會在網絡空間的行為規範和建立信任措施等方面也取得了重要突破。 2013年6月,聯合國發表了一份由15個國家的代表組成的專家組的報告。報告首次明確了“國家主權和源自主權的國際規範及原則適用於國家進行的通信技術活動,以及國家在其領土內對通信技術基礎設施的管轄權。”同時,報告進一步認可了“聯合國憲章在網絡空間中的適用性”。 [20] “各國在努力處理通信技術安全問題的同時,必須尊重《世界人權宣言》和其他國際文書所載的人權和基本自由。”[21] 與2010年的專家組報告相比,上述內容分別作為2013年報告的第20和21條款出現,這是一個巨大的進步,表明信息發達國家和信息發展中國家在網絡空間治理認知理念的兼容性不斷提高。 2015年7月,聯合國關於從國際安全的角度看信息和電信領域的發展政府專家組公佈了第三份關於網絡空間國家行為準則的報告。這份報告在保護網絡空間關鍵基礎設施、建立信任措施、國際合作等領域達成了原則性共識。信息發展中國家關心的網絡主權進一步得到明確,信息發達國家主張的國際法特別是武裝衝突法在網絡空間中的適用也寫入其中。 [22]
最後,政府與非國家行為體在網絡空間治理中的競爭與合作模式將發生重大轉變,多層次博弈將成為網絡空間治理的“新常態”。在治理方式和路徑方面,各國在網絡空間治理中的政策立場也更強調從實際出發,特別是在處理政府與其他行為體的關係上。各方都意識到應當根據網絡空間治理中的問題來劃分政府與其他行為體的職責。對於多利益攸關方治理模式,信息發達國家與信息發展中國家的認知逐步統一,政府與私營部門、市民社會根據各自的職能參與網絡空間治理。認知縮小意味著一方對另一方的關切更加了解,信息發達國家與信息發展中國家在網絡空間治理中的博弈將更具針對性,表現為競爭與合作同步進行,以競爭促進合作。當然,這與信息發展中國家加大了對網絡空間建章立制的投入,在網絡空間治理的話語權上的增長有關。巴西、中國先後建立了網絡空間多利益攸關方會議(NetMundial)和世界互聯網大會機制,探討網絡與國家安全、網絡主權等核心問題,信息發展中國家的聲音將越來越多、越來越大。

三、網絡空間治理的理念演變

在信息發達國家與信息發展中國家,政府、私營部門和市民社會等圍繞網絡空間治理的博弈從衝突轉向融合的背後,反映了網絡空間治理理念的持續演變。儘管圍繞網絡空間治理的博弈主要是為了爭奪網絡空間的權力與財富,但行為體對治理的主體、客體和方法的不同認知對治理的衝突與融合產生了重要影響。微軟首席研究及戰略官克瑞格·蒙迪(Craig Mundie)在第七屆中美互聯網論壇上就曾指出,“中美雙方在網絡空間的誤解很大程度上是由於對’互聯網治理’和’網絡空間治理’兩個概念的混淆所導致”。 [23] 同樣,網絡空間治理博弈和衝突也反映了上述兩種治理概念之間的衝突。
互聯網治理被認為屬於一種由非政府行為體主導的多利益攸關方治理模式,但網絡空間治理也需要政府和政府間組織的參與和協調。互聯網治理項目(Internet Governance Project, IGP)將互聯網治理定義為“所有者、運營商、開發者和用戶共同參與的一個由互聯網協議所聯接起來的與網絡相關的決策,包括確立政策、規則和技術標準的爭端解決機制,制定資源分配和全球互聯網中人類行為的標準。”[24] 上述定義包括三個方面,即技術標準和協議的接受和認可,域名和IP地址等互聯網資源的分配,人類的互聯網行為產生的垃圾郵件、網絡犯罪、版權和商標爭議、消費者保護問題、公共部門和私人的安全問題等相關的規定、規則和政策等。勞拉·迪娜尼斯(Laura DeNardis)提出要按照互聯網傳輸的TCP/IP協議的層級,並根據不同層級的不同功能構建互聯網模式,依據功能、任務和行為體分別討論互聯網資源控制、標准設定、網絡接入、網絡安全治理、信息流動、知識產權保護等六個層面的互聯網治理內容。 [25]
網絡空間治理從原先互聯網治理所強調的專業性、技術性領域轉向更廣泛的政治、安全和經濟範疇,政府和政府間組織在網絡空間治理中的重要性也日益凸顯。網絡空間是一個更廣泛的領域,它不僅包括互聯網,還包括網絡中傳輸的數據,網絡的用戶以及現實社會與虛擬社會的交互等。相對應的網絡空間治理則是一個更加寬泛的概念,它是“包括網絡空間基礎設施、標準、法律、社會文化、經濟、發展等多方面內容的一個範疇”。 [26] 它所包含的治理議題更加多元,面臨的挑戰也在不斷增加。如“棱鏡門事件”引發的對大規模數據監控的關注、政府在網絡空間開展的網絡行動導致的高持續性威脅(APT)、全球範圍內的數字鴻溝(Digital Divide)與數據貧困(Data Poverty )、網絡恐怖主義、網絡商業竊密等越來越多的治理議題已經超越了傳統的互聯網治理理念的範疇。
網絡空間治理博弈中涉及的“全球公域”與“網絡主權”、“網絡自治”與“國家主導”等衝突反映出人們未能客觀、正確地理解“互聯網治理”與“網絡空間治理”之間不同的治理主體、客體和方法,試圖用單一的治理方法去解決其中的多元議題。以ICANN為代表的互聯網治理主體所推崇的自下而上、公開透明的治理模式,對於國家在應對網絡戰、大規模數據監控、竊密等高可持續性威脅、網絡恐怖主義等問題而言,缺乏有效性和針對性。與此同時,以國家為中心、自上而下的網絡空間治理理念也無法有效應對當前國際互聯網治理的現實問題,不能取代互聯網國際組織在該領域的主導地位。
隨著網絡空間治理進程的推進,上述兩種治理理念和方法在碰撞中也開始不斷融合。約瑟夫·奈認為,網絡空間是由多個治理機制組成,其中互聯網治理聚焦於技術層面,是網絡空間治理的一個子集。應當根據不同的治理議題,構建不同的治理機制,讓不同的行為體來發揮主導作用。 [27] 治理觀念的融合還表現在各方對多利益攸關方治理模式共識的增加。 ICANN採用的是一種自下而上、基於共識基礎的決策過程,並主張限制政府作用的治理模式。 [28] 很多信息發展中國家最初對多利益攸關方治理模式持反對態度,強調應當採用政府主導的多邊治理模式。隨著治理進程的深入,信息發展中國家逐步接受多利益攸關方治理模式,只要政府的作用得到合理體現,這種觀點也在私營部門和市民社會代表中獲得越來越多的共識。政府、私營部門和市民社會根據各自的功能與責任來參與決策過程,不刻意將其他行為體排除在外,也不刻意追求個別行為體的領導權,體現出更加客觀和平衡的網絡空間治理理念。

四、中國的戰略應對

中國政府提出了網絡空間全球治理的兩大目標,即共同構建和平、安全、開放、合作的網絡空間和建立多邊、民主、透明的國際互聯網治理體系,同時還將網絡強國戰略作為重要戰略目標納入“十三五”規劃建議中。前者主張對外參與國際網絡空間治理進程,以此來建立有利的國際治理體系;後者主張發展網絡技術力量,培育網絡產業,增強國家網絡實力。兩者之間的相互支持和相互促進需要有一個能夠統籌內外、應對複雜網絡空間形勢的國際戰略。儘管中國政府並未公佈具體的網絡空間國際戰略文件,但通過分析現有的相關政策,仍可以發現中國的網絡空間國際戰略還處於摸索階段。因此,有必要對照網絡空間力量博弈的特點和網絡強國戰略來分析和探討中國的網絡空間國際戰略。
(一)中國網絡空間國際政策實踐
自1994年接入國際互聯網起,中國就制定了各種形式的網絡國際政策融入國際網絡空間體系。這一方面是擴大開放的需要,希望通過國際合作學習、引進國外先進的技術標準;另一方面是信息技術的驅動,融入全球化必須要全方位參與國際體系。 [29] 此外,隨著中國在國際事務中的影響力越來越大以及對網絡的依存度上升,主動參與網絡空間治理也是維護國家利益的重要路徑和方式。中國的網絡政策在很大程度上受到國際網絡空間治理形勢的影響,並在與國際網絡空間治理制度的互動中得到發展和提升,呈現出多領域、多層次和多主體的特點。
第一,中國政府網絡國際政策覆蓋了國際技術標準合作、信息通信技術產業合作、全球互聯網治理、打擊網絡犯罪、網絡經濟、數字鴻溝等多個領域,與全球網絡治理的發展趨勢總體上保持一致。首先,從早期的技術、產業和互聯網標準的合作逐步拓展至更加廣泛的網絡相關政策合作,很多政策領域實際上已經超出了互聯網本身的範疇,與國際經濟、政治、安全相結合。其次,“棱鏡門事件”之後,隨著網絡空間安全治理成為治理中的主要議題,中國網絡政策的關注點也相應聚焦於網絡安全治理,及建立在此基礎上的國家安全、政治安全、經濟安全和社會安全。中國不僅在國際上大力反對大規模網絡監控,提倡維護國家網絡主權,而且在國內政策上也更加註重與網絡安全相關的立法工作,在實踐中維護國家安全和主權。
第二,中國的網絡空間國際政策覆蓋了雙邊、地區、多邊和國際等多個層級。從雙邊層面來看,中國與韓國、英國、澳大利亞等國家建立了政府間對話合作機制,這些合作不僅覆蓋網絡安全、數字經濟和發展等內容,還成為雙邊外交關係的重要內容和支撐。此外,中美、中俄之間在網絡安全領域開展了不同程度的建立信任措施(Confidence Building Measures, CBMs)。 [30] 在地區層面,中國與東盟、上合組織、歐盟、阿盟等地區組織和國家之間建立了多種形式的網絡對話合作機制。 2009年中國政府分別與東盟和上合組織成員國簽訂了《中國—東盟電信監管理事會關於網絡安全問題的合作框架》和《上合組織成員國保障國際信息安全政府間合作協定》。 [31] 中國還積極參與東盟地區論壇網絡安全工作組的工作,並於2013年9月在北京召開了東盟地區論壇“加強網絡安全措施研討會——法律和文化視角”。會議倡議互聯網的發展需要法律規則的引領,也需要促進和尊重文化多樣性,各方應在網絡安全領域加強交流、增進互信、推進合作,共同構建和平、安全、開放、合作的網絡空間。 [32] 最後,中國還積極參與多邊和國際層面的網絡空間治理機制,無論是聯合國框架下的信息安全政府專家組、國際電信聯盟、信息社會世界峰會、互聯網治理論壇,還是聯合國框架之外的倫敦進程、網絡空間多利益攸關方會議等機制,中國都是主要參與者;此外,中國還通過召開世界互聯網大會來開展網絡空間的主場外交。中國還與俄羅斯、烏茲別克斯坦等上合組織成員國共同向聯合國大會提交了兩個版本的“信息安全國際行為準則”。 [33] 中國也是全球互聯網治理聯盟的主要參與方,國家互聯網信息辦公室(網信辦)主任魯煒和阿里巴巴集團董事局主席馬雲當選為該聯盟的委員。
第三,隨著網絡空間治理所覆蓋的內容越來越廣泛,中國網絡空間國際政策參與的主體也從傳統的外交部、工信部進一步擴展到公安部、商務部、財政部以及新成立的網信辦,外交部專門設立了“網絡事務辦公室”來應對網絡空間的外交事務。其中,外交部主要負責雙邊、地區、多邊和國際層面的網絡外交工作,它還是中國對接聯合國框架下網絡治理機制的主要力量,特別是來自外交部軍控司的官員全程參與四屆聯合國信息安全專家組的工作。網信辦作為中央網絡安全與信息化領導小組的常設機構,是中國為了統籌應對網絡安全與信息化新設立的重要機構。網信辦作為統籌、協調中國網絡事務的機構在網絡國際政策中的角色越來越重要,不僅開展了多層級的國際網絡安全與數字經濟合作,還建立了世界互聯網大會治理機制。此外,公安部在打擊網絡安全犯罪、網絡反恐,商務部在信息通信技術市場准入,財政部在網絡基礎設施對外援助等領域的工作都將是中國今後實施網絡空間國際戰略的堅實基礎。
由此可見,中國已經形成了一個較為全面、深入的網絡空間國際戰略架構,包括多元的參與主體、寬領域的議題覆蓋和多層級的參與路徑,這為網絡空間治理的國際戰略構建奠定了良好基礎。伴隨著中國從網絡大國向網絡強國的發展,中國將會建立一個全面、完善的網絡空間國際戰略。
(二)網絡空間國際戰略面臨的挑戰
網絡空間治理的力量博弈變化給中國的網絡空間國際戰略帶來了多重挑戰:一是信息發達國家將繼續主導網絡空間治理博弈的方向,這對中國的網絡空間國際戰略構成挑戰;二是由於缺乏高級互聯網治理人才,導致中國在互聯網國際組織中的代表性嚴重不足;三是網絡空間治理博弈轉向強調能力建設(Capacity Building)、最佳實踐(Best Practice)等方向,將給中國帶來競爭壓力。這些問題和挑戰對中國網絡空間國際戰略將產生較大衝擊,若處理不當,會對網絡強國戰略的實施造成負面影響。
第一,信息發達國家繼續主導網絡空間治理博弈方向對中國國際戰略構成的挑戰。網絡空間全球治理是通過各種形式的治理機制發揮作用,機制的構建取決於各行為體之間的談判,談判的籌碼不僅取決於各行為體的權力大小,還與各方在網絡空間全球治理中的議程設置能力息息相關。 [34] 按照約瑟夫·奈的定義,前者可稱之為“硬權力”,後者是“軟權力”。 [35] 信息發達國家在這兩個領域的優勢明顯,特別是在通過選擇性或者優先設置議程左右網絡空間治理的機制構建。比如在網絡安全治理中,美國依靠其議程設置能力阻止國際社會將大規模數據監控列為治理議程,同時將其重點關切的網絡經濟竊密設置為優先議程。此外,信息發達國家在設置網絡人權議程時,將重點置於自由領域,而民主(一國一票)、平等(大小國家擁有同等話語權)等同樣重要的議題則被排除在議程之外。不僅如此,對於各國在“棱鏡門事件”後要求加強行使網絡主權的趨勢,美國則提出“數據本地化”(Data Localization)這一議程以規避在全球治理機制中討論網絡主權。與信息發達國家相比,信息發展中國家在議程設置能力上還存在較大差距,缺乏主動設置議程的能力。近年來,隨著中國、巴西、印度等國先後建立了各種網絡空間治理機制,新興大國在網絡空間全球治理中的議程設置能力不斷增強。但總體而言,中國與信息發達國家在治理能力方面的差距依舊存在,並將影響中國通過國際機制維護自身國家利益,以及表達自身關切。

第二,由于缺乏高级网络空间治理人才,导致中国在互联网国际组织中的代表性严重不足。网络空间治理博弈的趋势表明,ICANN、IETF等国际组织对互联网关键资源的控制权不会受到政府和政府间组织的挑战。随着美国政府放弃对ICANN的控制权,后者将具有更大的独立性。网络空间建立在互联网基础之上,网络空间治理的基础也是互联网治理。因此,中国的网络空间国际战略必须要在互联网治理领域实现突破,同时提升在互联网国际组织中的影响力和代表性。对包括中国在内的广大信息发展中国家而言,必须增加在ICANN等国际组织中的代表性,让更多来自中国和其他发展中国家的声音出现在ICANN中。
第三,网络空间治理博弈转向强调能力建设、最佳实践等方向,这将给中国带来严峻的竞争压力。网络空间治理博弈理念的融合使得国际社会对网络空间治理的焦点转向了能力建设、最佳实践等可操作和可落实的领域,包括向信息发展中国家和信息不发达国家提供网络基础设施;提供与网络空间治理相关的技术、法律、政策等人才的培训;提供网络空间治理中遇到的解决各种具体问题的最佳实践。这对于中国参与网络空间治理的国际战略提出了更高的要求,信息发达国家在上述领域的资源优势、人才优势短期内难以撼动,这不仅需要中国政府投入更多资源,也需要中国的互联网企业、行业协会、法律专家的共同和积极参与。
(三)中国参与网络空间治理的战略思路
确立中国网络空间国际战略的基本路径与中国整体对外战略强调的融入国际体系,并推动改革国际体系的宏观目标相一致。[36] 为应对复杂的网络空间治理博弈,中国一方面要加强能力建设,并注重将能力转化为参与网络空间全球治理的影响力;另一方面在网络安全与开放之间寻求平衡,通过参与国际网络空间建章立制来维护自己的合法权益,避免过度安全化带来的负面影响;并加强网络强国战略与网络空间国际战略之间的战略互动,形成相互支持的网络空间战略体系。
第一,结合网络空间治理的新近和未来发展态势,强化对国际机制的塑造能力。在网络空间全球治理层面,围绕治理平台的斗争日趋激烈。包括互联网论坛、国际电信联盟、伦敦进程、巴西网络空间多利益攸关方会议以及中国的世界互联网大会在内,各个平台都有其主导力量,参与的行为体所关注的议题和发挥的影响力均不相同。中国应结合世界互联网论坛以及参与的其他网络空间治理机制,在网络安全、网络犯罪、能力建设、网络经济、网络文化、数字鸿沟等议题中,探索如何提升自身向国际社会提供能力建设方案、最佳实践和解决方案等公共产品的能力。
第二,着重培养参与网络空间治理的国际化人才。国际互联网治理组织多为非政府组织,其采用的多利益攸关方治理模式通常要求从互联网社群中选拔高级管理人才,根据选拔对象对互联网技术、治理所作出的贡献来来担任相应的高级管理职务,而非传统政府间组织的一国一票或按照人口、经济比例来分配名额。以ICANN为例,其现有的管理架构是由董事会和3个支持组织、3个咨询委员会及2个技术咨询机构组成。董事会由16名具有表决权的成员和5名不具有表决权的联络员组成,除ICANN总裁之外,其余15个名额分别来自支持组织、一般会员咨询委员会、区域一般会员组织和提名委员会。要想当选为有投票权的委员,必须要通过自下而上的提名和选举。因此,中国应当理顺体制和机制,积极向ICANN等国际非政府组织输送人才,鼓励互联网企业、行业组织和学术机构积极参与ICANN、IETF、互联网架构委员会(Internet Architecture Board, IAB)等机构的人才选拔,以此来提升在互联网国际组织中的代表性和发言权,并提高中国对互联网治理的影响力。
第三,加强网络强国战略与网络空间国际战略之间的战略互动。中国在“十三五”规划建议中正式提出网络强国战略,并从技术创新、网络文化、网络基础设施、网络安全和信息化建设、国际合作五个方面着手,推进网络强国建设。[37] 网络强国战略中多次提到了对外开放、积极参与国际互联网治理,甚至将国际合作作为单独一章。由此可见,网络空间国际战略与网络强国战略之间相互融合、相互支撑。两者的有效互动,关系到中国对网络空间的开放、安全与发展关系的处理。从双层博弈的角度来看,任何一个国家的战略都面临外部形势和内部利益集团的双重约束,过度强调开放或者安全都不利于整体国家安全和利益。强化网络强国战略与网络空间国际战略之间的互动,有助于提高决策者对于网络空间的安全与开放,网络空间的安全、发展、与开放之间关系的认知,打破双重约束,制定更加符合客观规律的政策。
从技术层面来说,网络强国战略可以更好地为中国参与全球网络空间治理提供支撑。当前网络空间治理的主要竞争已经从认知、理念层面的博弈,转向提供解决方案、最佳实践、能力建设等具体的议题合作领域。缺乏有效的支撑,网络空间国际战略难以持续,并赢得国际社会的认可。与此同时,网络空间国际战略也有助于为网络强国战略营造有利的外部环境、提供外部先进的经验和教训,向国内的ICT企业提供广阔的国际市场。最后,还可借鉴对外援助领域的经验,通过ICT领域的对外援助缓解甚至消除网络空间治理中的数字鸿沟问题,一方面可以为网络空间治理贡献中国力量,另一方面也有助于中国ICT企业的国际化战略.

Original URL: http://www.siis.org.cn/Research/Info/629

 

中央網信辦發布《國家網絡安全事件應急預案》Communist Chinese Party issues National Network Security Incident Contingency Plans

中央網信辦發布《國家網絡安全事件應急預案》

Communist Chinese Party issues National Network Security Incident Contingency Plans

2017年06月27日 17:16中国网信网

Notice of the Central Network Office on Printing and Distributing the Emergency Plan for National Network Security Incidents

China Network Office issued a document [2017] No. 4

Provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Committee Network Security and Information Leading Group, the central and state organs of the ministries, the people’s organizations:

“National network security incident contingency plans” has been the central network security and information leading group agreed, is now issued to you, please carefully organize the implementation.

Central Network Security and Information Leading Group Office

January 10, 2017

National network security incident contingency plans

table of Contents

1 General

1.1 Purpose of preparation

1.2 Preparation basis

1.3 Scope of application

1.4 Event rating

1.5 working principle

Organizational Structure and Responsibilities

2.1 Leadership and Responsibilities

2.2 offices and responsibilities

2.3 Responsibilities of various departments

2.4 duties of provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities)

3 monitoring and early warning

3.1 Early warning classification

3.2 Early warning monitoring

3.3 Early warning judgment and release

3.4 Early warning response

3.5 warning release

4 emergency treatment

4.1 Event report

4.2 Emergency response

4.3 Emergency end

5 Investigation and evaluation

6 to prevent work

6.1 Daily management

6.2 Walkthrough

6.3 Advocacy

6.4 Training

Precautions during important events

7 safeguards

7.1 Institutions and personnel

7.2 technical support team

7.3 expert team

7.4 Social resources

7.5 base platform

7.6 Technology research and development and industry promotion

7.7 International cooperation

7.8 material security

7.9 Funds protection

7.10 Responsibility and rewards and punishments

8 Annex

8.1 Project Management

8.2 Explanation of the plan

8.3 Implementation time of the plan

1 General

1.1 Purpose of preparation

Establish and improve the national network security incident emergency mechanism to improve the ability to deal with network security events, prevent and reduce network security incidents caused by the loss and harm, protect the public interest, safeguard national security, public safety and social order.

1.2 Preparation basis

“People’s Republic of China Incident Response Law”, “People’s Republic of China Network Security Law”, “National General Public Emergency Plan”, “Emergency Emergency Plan Management Measures” and “Information Security Technology Information Security Event Classification Classification Guide “(GB / Z 20986-2007) and other relevant provisions.

1.3 Scope of application

The cybersecurity incident referred to in this plan refers to events that cause adverse effects to the society due to human causes, hardware and software defects or failures, natural disasters, etc., which cause harm to the network and the information system or the data in it, Network attack events, information corruption events, information content security incidents, device facility failures, catastrophic events, and other events.

This plan applies to the work of network security events. Among them, the information content security incident response, to develop a special plan.

1.4 Event rating

Network security events are divided into four levels: particularly significant network security events, major network security incidents, larger network security events, and general network security events.

(1) meets one of the following scenarios for a particularly significant cyber security incident:

① Significant network and information systems suffer from particularly serious system losses, resulting in large paralysis of the system and loss of business processing capacity.

② State secret information, important sensitive information and key data loss or theft, tampering, counterfeiting, constitute a particularly serious threat to national security and social stability.

③ other network security incidents that pose a particularly serious threat to national security, social order, economic construction and public interest, causing particularly serious impact.

(2) meets one of the following scenarios and does not meet significant network security incidents for significant network security incidents:

① important network and information systems suffered serious system losses, resulting in a long time the system interrupted or partial paralysis, business processing capacity has been greatly affected.

② State secret information, important sensitive information and key data loss or theft, tampering, counterfeiting, posing a serious threat to national security and social stability.

③ other serious threats to national security, social order, economic construction and public interest, causing serious impact on network security incidents.

(3) meet one of the following conditions and does not meet significant network security incidents for larger network security events:

① important network and information systems suffer from greater system loss, resulting in system interruption, significantly affect the system efficiency, business processing capacity is affected.

② State secret information, important sensitive information and key data loss or theft, tampering, counterfeiting, posing a serious threat to national security and social stability.

③ other on the national security, social order, economic construction and public interests constitute a more serious threat, resulting in more serious impact of network security incidents.

(4) In addition to the above, the national security, social order, economic construction and public interests constitute a certain threat, resulting in a certain impact on the network security incidents for the general network security incidents.

1.5 working principle

Adhere to the unified leadership, grading responsibility; adhere to the unified command, close coordination, rapid response, scientific treatment; adhere to the prevention of prevention, prevention and emergency combination; adhere to who is responsible for who, who is responsible for running, give full play to all forces together Prevention and disposal of network security incidents.

Organizational Structure and Responsibilities

2.1 Leadership and Responsibilities

Under the leadership of the Central Network Security and Information Leading Group (hereinafter referred to as the “Leading Group”), the Office of the Central Network Security and Information Leading Group (hereinafter referred to as the “Central Network Office”) coordinates the organization of national network security incident response, Establish and improve the cross-sectoral linkage mechanism, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Secrecy Bureau and other relevant departments in accordance with the division of responsibilities responsible for the relevant network security incident response. If necessary, the establishment of national network security incident emergency headquarters (hereinafter referred to as “the headquarters”), responsible for the special major network security incident handling organization and coordination and coordination.

2.2 offices and responsibilities

National Network Security Emergency Office (hereinafter referred to as “emergency office”) is located in the central network letter office, the specific work by the central network letter to do Network Security Coordination Bureau. Emergency Office is responsible for the network security emergency cross-sectoral, cross-regional coordination of the work and the headquarters of the transactional work, organization and guidance of national network security emergency technical support team to do emergency technical support work. The relevant departments are responsible for the relevant work of the Secretary-level comrades as liaison officers, contact emergency office work.

2.3 Responsibilities of various departments

The central and state departments and departments in accordance with their duties and authority, responsible for the sector, the industry network and information systems network security incident prevention, monitoring, reporting and emergency response.

2.4 duties of provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities)

The administrative departments of the provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) shall coordinate and organize the prevention, monitoring, reporting and emergency handling of network security incidents in the regional network and information systems under the unified leadership of the Party Committee’s Network Safety and Information Leading Group.

3 monitoring and early warning

3.1 Early warning classification

The network security event warning level is divided into four levels: from high to low, followed by red, orange, yellow and blue, respectively, corresponding to occur or may occur particularly significant, significant, large and general network security events.

3.2 Early warning monitoring

The units in accordance with the “who is responsible for who is responsible for who who is responsible for” the requirements of the organization of the unit construction and operation of the network and information systems to carry out network security monitoring. Focus on industry executives or regulatory organizations to guide the organization to do the work of network security monitoring. The provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) network letter department with the actual situation in the region, the organization of the region to carry out the network and information systems security monitoring. Provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), the departments will be important monitoring information reported to be urgent, emergency office to carry out inter-provincial (district, city), cross-sectoral network security information sharing.

3.3 Early warning judgment and release

Provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, departments of the monitoring of information on the judge, that the need for immediate preventive measures, should promptly notify the relevant departments and units, may occur on major and above network security incidents in a timely manner to the emergency response report. Provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), the departments can be based on monitoring and judging the situation, the release of the region, the industry’s orange and the following warning.

Emergency organization to determine, determine and publish red warning and involving multi-province (district, city), multi-sectoral, multi-industry early warning.

Early warning information includes the category of the event, the level of the alert, the starting time, the possible scope, the warning, the measures and time limits that should be taken, the issuing authority, and so on.

3.4 Early warning response

3.4.1 Red warning response

(1) the emergency response organization organization early warning response work, contact experts and relevant agencies, organizations to track the development of the situation to study and formulate preventive measures and emergency work program, coordination of resource scheduling and departmental linkage of the preparatory work.

(2) the relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), the Department of network security incident emergency command agencies to implement 24 hours on duty, the relevant personnel to maintain communication links. Strengthen the network security incident monitoring and development of information collection work, organize and guide the emergency support team, the relevant operating units to carry out emergency treatment or preparation, risk assessment and control work, the important situation retribution urgent.

(3) the national network security emergency technical support team into the standby state, for the early warning information research to develop a response program, check emergency vehicles, equipment, software tools, to ensure a good condition.

3.4.2 Orange warning response

(1) the relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departmental network security incident emergency command agencies to start the corresponding contingency plans, organize early warning response, do risk assessment, emergency preparedness and risk control.

(2) the relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments in a timely manner to the situation of the situation reported to the emergency response. The Emergency Office is closely following the development of the matter and timely notification of the relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) and departments.

(3) the national network security emergency technical support team to keep in touch, check emergency vehicles, equipment, software tools, to ensure that in good condition.

3.4.3 yellow, blue warning response

The relevant regional and departmental network security incident emergency command agencies to start the corresponding contingency plans to guide the organization to carry out early warning response.

3.5 warning release

Early warning release departments or regions according to the actual situation, to determine whether to lift the warning, timely release warning release information.

4 emergency treatment

4.1 Event report

After the network security incident occurs, the incident unit should immediately start the emergency plan, the implementation of disposal and timely submission of information. The relevant regions and departments immediately organize the early disposal, control the situation, eliminate hidden dangers, at the same time organization and judgment, pay attention to save the evidence, do a good job of information communication. For the primary judgment is particularly significant, major network security incidents, and immediately report to the emergency office.

4.2 Emergency response

The network security incident emergency response is divided into four levels, corresponding to particularly significant, significant, large and general network security events. Level I is the highest response level.

4.2.1 Class I response

Is a particularly important network security incidents, timely start I-level response, the establishment of the headquarters, the implementation of emergency response to the unified leadership, command and coordination responsibilities. Emergency Office 24 hours on duty.

The relevant departments (district, city), the department emergency response agencies into the emergency state, in the command of the unified leadership, command and coordination, responsible for the province (district, city), the department emergency work or support security work, 24 hours on duty, And sent to participate in emergency office work.

The relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments to track the development of the situation, check the scope of the impact of the situation in time to change the situation, the progress of the report retribution. The headquarters of the response to the work of the decision-making arrangements, the relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) and departments responsible for the organization and implementation.

4.2.2 Class II response

The level response of the network security incident is determined by the relevant province (district, city) and the department according to the nature and circumstances of the incident.

(1) the incident occurred in the province (district, city) or department of the emergency command agencies into the emergency state, in accordance with the relevant emergency plans to do emergency work.

(2) the incident occurred in the province (district, city) or departments in a timely manner to change the situation developments. The emergency office will keep the relevant matters and the relevant departments and departments in a timely manner.

(3) the disposal of the need for other relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments and national network security emergency technical support team with the support and business emergency response to be coordinated. Relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments and national network security emergency technical support team should be based on their respective responsibilities, and actively cooperate to provide support.

(4) The relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) and departments shall, in accordance with the notification of the emergency office, strengthen the prevention and prevent the greater impact and losses on the basis of their actual and targeted efforts.

4.2.3 Class Ⅲ, Ⅳ level response

Event areas and departments in accordance with the relevant plans for emergency response.

4.3 Emergency end

4.3.1 End of class I response

Emergency Office to make recommendations, reported to the headquarters after approval, timely notification of the relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) and departments.

4.3.2 Level II response ends

(Autonomous regions and municipalities) or departments, the emergency response, emergency response to the relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) and departments.

5 Investigation and evaluation

Special major network security incidents by the emergency branch of the relevant departments and provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) to investigate and summarize the assessment, according to the procedures reported. Significant and the following network security incidents are organized by the event area or department to organize their own investigation and summary assessment, including the major network security incident related to the summary report of the report retribution. Summary of the investigation report should be the cause of the event, nature, impact, responsibility analysis and evaluation, put forward the views and improvement measures.

The investigation and summary of the incident is carried out in principle within 30 days after the end of the emergency response.

6 to prevent work

6.1 Daily management

All localities and departments should do a good job in the day-to-day prevention of network security incidents, formulate and improve relevant emergency plans, do a good job of network security inspection, risk investigation, risk assessment and disaster recovery, improve the network security information notification mechanism, take timely and effective measures, Reduce and avoid the occurrence and harm of network security incidents, improve the ability to deal with network security incidents.

6.2 Walkthrough

Central Network letter to coordinate the relevant departments to organize regular exercises, test and improve the plan to improve the actual combat capability.

The provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments at least once a year to organize a plan exercise, and the exercise situation reported to the central network letter to do.

6.3 Advocacy

All localities and departments should make full use of various media and other effective propaganda forms to strengthen the publicity and disposal of relevant laws, regulations and policies for the prevention and disposal of sudden network security incidents and carry out propaganda activities on basic knowledge and skills of network security.

6.4 Training

All localities and departments should regard the emergency knowledge of cyber security incidents as the training content of leading cadres and relevant personnel, strengthen the training of network security, especially network security contingency plans, and improve awareness and skills.

Precautions during important events

In the national important activities, during the meeting, the provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), various departments to strengthen the network security incidents to prevent and emergency response to ensure network security. Emergency Office to coordinate the work of network security, according to the requirements of the relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments to start the red warning response. The relevant provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments to strengthen network security monitoring and analysis of judgments, timely warning may cause significant impact on the risks and risks, key departments, key positions to maintain 24 hours on duty, timely detection and disposal of network security incidents.

7 safeguards

7.1 Institutions and personnel

All localities and departments, units to implement the network security emergency work responsibility system, the responsibility to implement specific departments, specific positions and individuals, and establish a sound emergency working mechanism.

7.2 technical support team

Strengthen the network security emergency technical support team building, do a good job of network security incident monitoring and early warning, prevention and protection, emergency response, emergency technical support work. Support network security enterprises to improve emergency response capabilities, to provide emergency technical support. The central network to do assessment of the development of accreditation standards, organizational assessment and identification of national network security emergency technical support team. All provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments should be equipped with the necessary network security professional and technical personnel, and strengthen the national network security related technical units of communication, coordination, the establishment of the necessary network security information sharing mechanism.

7.3 expert team

The establishment of national network security emergency expert group, for the network security incident prevention and disposal of technical advice and decision-making recommendations. All regions and departments to strengthen their own team of experts, give full play to the role of experts in the emergency response.

7.4 Social resources

From the educational research institutions, enterprises and institutions, associations in the selection of network security personnel, pooling technology and data resources, the establishment of network security incident emergency service system to improve the response to particularly significant, major network security incidents.

7.5 base platform

All regions and departments to strengthen the network security platform and management platform for emergency management, so early detection, early warning, early response, improve emergency response capability.

7.6 Technology research and development and industry promotion

Relevant departments to strengthen network security technology research, and constantly improve the technical equipment, emergency response to provide technical support. Strengthen the policy guidance, focus on supporting network security monitoring and early warning, prevention and protection, disposal of rescue, emergency services and other directions to enhance the overall level of network security industry and core competitiveness, and enhance the prevention and disposal of network security event industry support capabilities.

7.7 International cooperation

Relevant departments to establish international cooperation channels, signed a cooperation agreement, if necessary, through international cooperation to deal with sudden network security incidents.

7.8 material security

Strengthen the network security emergency equipment, tools, reserves, timely adjustment, upgrade software hardware tools, and constantly enhance the emergency technical support capabilities.

7.9 Funds protection

The financial department provides the necessary financial guarantee for the emergency disposal of the network security incident. Relevant departments to use the existing policies and funding channels to support the network security emergency technical support team building, expert team building, basic platform construction, technology research and development, planning exercises, material security and other work carried out. All regions and departments for the network security emergency work to provide the necessary financial protection.

7.10 Responsibility and rewards and punishments

Implementation of Responsibility System for Emergency Work of Network Security Incident.

The central network letter office and the relevant regional and departmental network security incident emergency management work to make outstanding contributions to the advanced collective and individuals to commend and reward.

The central network and the relevant departments and departments do not follow the provisions of the formulation of plans and organizations to carry out exercises, late, false, concealed and owe the network security incidents important or emergency management work in other misconduct, dereliction of duty, in accordance with the relevant Provides for the responsible person to be punished; constitute a crime, shall be held criminally responsible.

8 Annex

8.1 Project Management

The plan is evaluated in principle once a year and revised in a timely manner according to the actual situation. The revision work is handled by the central network.

All provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities), departments and units shall, according to the plan, formulate or revise the contingency plans for the network security incidents in the region, the department, the industry and the unit.

8.2 Explanation of the plan

The plan is interpreted by the central network letter office.

8.3 Implementation time of the plan

The plan has been implemented since the date of issuance.

Attachment:

1. Network security event classification

2. Terminology

3. Network and information system loss degree description

attachment1

Network Security Event Classification

Network security events are classified as unwanted program events, network attack events, information corruption events, information content security incidents, device facility failures, catastrophic events, and other network security incidents.

(1) Harmful program events are classified into computer virus events, worm events, Trojan events, botnet events, mixed program attack events, web embedded malicious code events, and other unwanted program events.

(2) network attacks are divided into denial of service attacks, backdoor attacks, vulnerability attacks, network scanning eavesdropping events, phishing events, interference events and other network attacks.

(3) information destruction events are classified as information tampering events, information fake events, information disclosure incidents, information theft events, information loss events and other information destruction events.

(4) Information content security incidents refer to the dissemination of laws and regulations through the Internet to prohibit information, organize illegal series, incite rallies or hype sensitive issues and endanger national security, social stability and public interest events.

(5) equipment and equipment failure is divided into hardware and software failure, peripheral protection facilities failure, man-made damage and other equipment and equipment failure.

(6) Disastrous events refer to network security incidents caused by other emergencies such as natural disasters.

(7) Other events refer to network security events that can not be classified as above.

Annex 2

Terminology

First, the important network and information systems

The network and information systems that are closely related to national security, social order, economic construction and public interest.

(Reference: “Information Security Technology Information Security Event Classification and Classification Guide” (GB / Z 20986-2007))

Second, the important sensitive information

Information that is not related to national secrets but is closely related to national security, economic development, social stability and corporate and public interest, which, once unauthorized, is disclosed, lost, misused, tampered with or destroyed, may have the following consequences:

A) damage to national defense, international relations;

B) damage to State property, public interest and personal property or personal safety;

C) affect the state to prevent and combat economic and military spies, political infiltration, organized crime;

D) affect the administrative organs to investigate and deal with illegal, dereliction of duty, or suspected of illegal, dereliction of duty;

E) interfere with government departments to carry out administrative activities such as supervision, management, inspection and auditing impartially, hinder government departments from performing their duties;

F) endanger the national key infrastructure, government information system security;

G) affect the market order, resulting in unfair competition, undermining the laws of the market;

H) can be inferred from the state secret matter;

I) infringement of personal privacy, corporate trade secrets and intellectual property rights;

J) damage to the country, business, personal other interests and reputation.

(Reference: “Information Security Technology Cloud Computing Service Security Guide” (GB / T31167-2014))

Annex 3

Network and Information System Losses

Network and information system loss refers to the network security incidents due to network hardware and software, functions and data damage, resulting in system business interruption, so as to the loss caused by the organization, the size of the main consideration to restore the normal operation of the system and eliminate security incidents Negative effects are deducted as particularly serious system losses, severe system losses, greater system losses, and minor system losses, as follows:

A) Particularly serious systemic damage: a large area of ​​paralysis of the system, loss of business processing capacity, or confidentiality, integrity, availability of critical data, serious damage to the system, normal operation of the system and elimination of the negative impact of security incidents The price paid is very great, for the incident is unbearable;

B) Serious system loss: causing the system to be interrupted for a long time or partially paralyzed, greatly compromising its business processing capacity, or the confidentiality, integrity, availability of the critical data, the recovery of the system and the elimination of security incidents Negative effects are huge, but are affordable for the organization;

C) Larger system losses: causing system outages, significantly affecting system efficiency, affecting the operational capacity of important information systems or general information systems, or the confidentiality, integrity, availability of system critical data, and the restoration of the system The cost of running and eliminating the negative effects of security incidents is greater, but it is entirely affordable for the organization;

D) Smaller system losses: causing system interruption, affecting system efficiency, affecting system operational capacity, or confidentiality, integrity, availability of system critical data, restoring system uptime and eliminating security incidents The cost of the impact is less.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

中央網信辦關於印發《國家網絡安全事件應急預案》的通知

中網辦發文〔2017〕4號

各省、自治區、直轄市、新疆生產建設兵團黨委網絡安全和信息化領導小組,中央和國家機關各部委、各人民團體:

《國家網絡安全事件應急預案》已經中央網絡安全和信息化領導小組同意,現印發給你們,請認真組織實施。

中央網絡安全和信息化領導小組辦公室

2017年1月10日

國家網絡安全事件應急預案

目 錄

1 總則

1.1 編制目的

1.2 編制依據

1.3 適用範圍

1.4 事件分級

1.5 工作原則

2 組織機構與職責

2.1 領導機構與職責

2.2 辦事機構與職責

2.3 各部門職責

2.4 各省(區、市)職責

3 監測與預警

3.1 預警分級

3.2 預警監測

3.3 預警研判和發布

3.4 預警響應

3.5 預警解除

4 應急處置

4.1 事件報告

4.2 應急響應

4.3 應急結束

5 調查與評估

6 預防工作

6.1 日常管理

6.2 演練

6.3 宣傳

6.4 培訓

6.5 重要活動期間的預防措施

7 保障措施

7.1 機構和人員

7.2 技術支撐隊伍

7.3 專家隊伍

7.4 社會資源

7.5 基礎平台

7.6 技術研發和產業促進

7.7 國際合作

7.8 物資保障

7.9 經費保障

7.10 責任與獎懲

8 附則

8.1 預案管理

8.2 預案解釋

8.3 預案實施時間

1 總則

1.1 編制目的

建立健全國家網絡安全事件應急工作機制,提高應對網絡安全事件能力,預防和減少網絡安全事件造成的損失和危害,保護公眾利益,維護國家安全、公共安全和社會秩序。

1.2 編制依據

《中華人民共和國突發事件應對法》、《中華人民共和國網絡安全法》、《國家突發公共事件總體應急預案》、《突發事件應急預案管理辦法》和《信息安全技術信息安全事件分類分級指南》(GB/Z 20986-2007)等相關規定。

1.3 適用範圍

本預案所指網絡安全事件是指由於人為原因、軟硬件缺陷或故障、自然災害等,對網絡和信息系統或者其中的數據造成危害,對社會造成負面影響的事件,可分為有害程序事件、網絡攻擊事件、信息破壞事件、信息內容安全事件、設備設施故障、災害性事件和其他事件。

本預案適用於網絡安全事件的應對工作。其中,有關信息內容安全事件的應對,另行製定專項預案。

1.4 事件分級

網絡安全事件分為四級:特別重大網絡安全事件、重大網絡安全事件、較大網絡安全事件、一般網絡安全事件。

(1)符合下列情形之一的,為特別重大網絡安全事件:

①重要網絡和信息系統遭受特別嚴重的系統損失,造成系統大面積癱瘓,喪失業務處理能力。

②國家秘密信息、重要敏感信息和關鍵數據丟失或被竊取、篡改、假冒,對國家安全和社會穩定構成特別嚴重威脅。

③其他對國家安全、社會秩序、經濟建設和公眾利益構成特別嚴重威脅、造成特別嚴重影響的網絡安全事件。

(2)符合下列情形之一且未達到特別重大網絡安全事件的,為重大網絡安全事件:

①重要網絡和信息系統遭受嚴重的系統損失,造成系統長時間中斷或局部癱瘓,業務處理能力受到極大影響。

②國家秘密信息、重要敏感信息和關鍵數據丟失或被竊取、篡改、假冒,對國家安全和社會穩定構成嚴重威脅。

③其他對國家安全、社會秩序、經濟建設和公眾利益構成嚴重威脅、造成嚴重影響的網絡安全事件。

(3)符合下列情形之一且未達到重大網絡安全事件的,為較大網絡安全事件:

①重要網絡和信息系統遭受較大的系統損失,造成系統中斷,明顯影響系統效率,業務處理能力受到影響。

②國家秘密信息、重要敏感信息和關鍵數據丟失或被竊取、篡改、假冒,對國家安全和社會穩定構成較嚴重威脅。

③其他對國家安全、社會秩序、經濟建設和公眾利益構成較嚴重威脅、造成較嚴重影響的網絡安全事件。

(4)除上述情形外,對國家安全、社會秩序、經濟建設和公眾利益構成一定威脅、造成一定影響的網絡安全事件,為一般網絡安全事件。

1.5 工作原則

堅持統一領導、分級負責;堅持統一指揮、密切協同、快速反應、科學處置;堅持預防為主,預防與應急相結合;堅持誰主管誰負責、誰運行誰負責,充分發揮各方面力量共同做好網絡安全事件的預防和處置工作。

2 組織機構與職責

2.1 領導機構與職責

在中央網絡安全和信息化領導小組(以下簡稱“領導小組”)的領導下,中央網絡安全和信息化領導小組辦公室(以下簡稱“中央網信辦”)統籌協調組織國家網絡安全事件應對工作,建立健全跨部門聯動處置機制,工業和信息化部、公安部、國家保密局等相關部門按照職責分工負責相關網絡安全事件應對工作。必要時成立國家網絡安全事件應急指揮部(以下簡稱“指揮部”),負責特別重大網絡安全事件處置的組織指揮和協調。

2.2 辦事機構與職責

國家網絡安全應急辦公室(以下簡稱“應急辦”)設在中央網信辦,具體工作由中央網信辦網絡安全協調局承擔。應急辦負責網絡安全應急跨部門、跨地區協調工作和指揮部的事務性工作,組織指導國家網絡安全應急技術支撐隊伍做好應急處置的技術支撐工作。有關部門派負責相關工作的司局級同志為聯絡員,聯絡應急辦工作。

2.3 各部門職責

中央和國家機關各部門按照職責和權限,負責本部門、本行業網絡和信息系統網絡安全事件的預防、監測、報告和應急處置工作。

2.4 各省(區、市)職責

各省(區、市)網信部門在本地區黨委網絡安全和信息化領導小組統一領導下,統籌協調組織本地區網絡和信息系統網絡安全事件的預防、監測、報告和應急處置工作。

3 監測與預警

3.1 預警分級

網絡安全事件預警等級分為四級:由高到低依次用紅色、橙色、黃色和藍色表示,分別對應發生或可能發生特別重大、重大、較大和一般網絡安全事件。

3.2 預警監測

各單位按照“誰主管誰負責、誰運行誰負責”的要求,組織對本單位建設運行的網絡和信息系統開展網絡安全監測工作。重點行業主管或監管部門組織指導做好本行業網絡安全監測工作。各省(區、市)網信部門結合本地區實際,統籌組織開展對本地區網絡和信息系統的安全監測工作。各省(區、市)、各部門將重要監測信息報應急辦,應急辦組織開展跨省(區、市)、跨部門的網絡安全信息共享。

3.3 預警研判和發布

各省(區、市)、各部門組織對監測信息進行研判,認為需要立即採取防範措施的,應當及時通知有關部門和單位,對可能發生重大及以上網絡安全事件的信息及時向應急辦報告。各省(區、市)、各部門可根據監測研判情況,發布本地區、本行業的橙色及以下預警。

應急辦組織研判,確定和發布紅色預警和涉及多省(區、市)、多部門、多行業的預警。

預警信息包括事件的類別、預警級別、起始時間、可能影響範圍、警示事項、應採取的措施和時限要求、發布機關等。

3.4 預警響應

3.4.1 紅色預警響應

(1)應急辦組織預警響應工作,聯繫專家和有關機構,組織對事態發展情況進行跟踪研判,研究制定防範措施和應急工作方案,協調組織資源調度和部門聯動的各項準備工作。

(2)有關省(區、市)、部門網絡安全事件應急指揮機構實行24小時值班,相關人員保持通信聯絡暢通。加強網絡安全事件監測和事態發展信息蒐集工作,組織指導應急支撐隊伍、相關運行單位開展應急處置或準備、風險評估和控制工作,重要情況報應急辦。

(3)國家網絡安全應急技術支撐隊伍進入待命狀態,針對預警信息研究制定應對方案,檢查應急車輛、設備、軟件工具等,確保處於良好狀態。

3.4.2 橙色預警響應

(1)有關省(區、市)、部門網絡安全事件應急指揮機構啟動相應應急預案,組織開展預警響應工作,做好風險評估、應急準備和風險控制工作。

(2)有關省(區、市)、部門及時將事態發展情況報應急辦。應急辦密切關注事態發展,有關重大事項及時通報相關省(區、市)和部門。

(3)國家網絡安全應急技術支撐隊伍保持聯絡暢通,檢查應急車輛、設備、軟件工具等,確保處於良好狀態。

3.4.3 黃色、藍色預警響應

有關地區、部門網絡安全事件應急指揮機構啟動相應應急預案,指導組織開展預警響應。

3.5 預警解除

預警發布部門或地區根據實際情況,確定是否解除預警,及時發布預警解除信息。

4 應急處置

4.1 事件報告

網絡安全事件發生後,事發單位應立即啟動應急預案,實施處置並及時報送信息。各有關地區、部門立即組織先期處置,控制事態,消除隱患,同時組織研判,注意保存證據,做好信息通報工作。對於初判為特別重大、重大網絡安全事件的,立即報告應急辦。

4.2 應急響應

網絡安全事件應急響應分為四級,分別對應特別重大、重大、較大和一般網絡安全事件。 I級為最高響應級別。

4.2.1 Ⅰ級響應

屬特別重大網絡安全事件的,及時啟動I級響應,成立指揮部,履行應急處置工作的統一領導、指揮、協調職責。應急辦24小時值班。

有關省(區、市)、部門應急指揮機構進入應急狀態,在指揮部的統一領導、指揮、協調下,負責本省(區、市)、本部門應急處置工作或支援保障工作,24小時值班,並派員參加應急辦工作。

有關省(區、市)、部門跟踪事態發展,檢查影響範圍,及時將事態發展變化情況、處置進展情況報應急辦。指揮部對應對工作進行決策部署,有關省(區、市)和部門負責組織實施。

4.2.2 Ⅱ級響應

網絡安全事件的Ⅱ級響應,由有關省(區、市)和部門根據事件的性質和情況確定。

(1)事件發生省(區、市)或部門的應急指揮機構進入應急狀態,按照相關應急預案做好應急處置工作。

(2)事件發生省(區、市)或部門及時將事態發展變化情況報應急辦。應急辦將有關重大事項及時通報相關地區和部門。

(3)處置中需要其他有關省(區、市)、部門和國家網絡安全應急技術支撐隊伍配合和支持的,商應急辦予以協調。相關省(區、市)、部門和國家網絡安全應急技術支撐隊伍應根據各自職責,積極配合、提供支持。

(4)有關省(區、市)和部門根據應急辦的通報,結合各自實際有針對性地加強防範,防止造成更大範圍影響和損失。

4.2.3 Ⅲ級、Ⅳ級響應

事件發生地區和部門按相關預案進行應急響應。

4.3 應急結束

4.3.1 Ⅰ級響應結束

應急辦提出建議,報指揮部批准後,及時通報有關省(區、市)和部門。

4.3.2 Ⅱ級響應結束

由事件發生省(區、市)或部門決定,報應急辦,應急辦通報相關省(區、市)和部門。

5 調查與評估

特別重大網絡安全事件由應急辦組織有關部門和省(區、市)進行調查處理和總結評估,並按程序上報。重大及以下網絡安全事件由事件發生地區或部門自行組織調查處理和總結評估,其中重大網絡安全事件相關總結調查報告報應急辦。總結調查報告應對事件的起因、性質、影響、責任等進行分析評估,提出處理意見和改進措施。

事件的調查處理和總結評估工作原則上在應急響應結束後30天內完成。

6 預防工作

6.1 日常管理

各地區、各部門按職責做好網絡安全事件日常預防工作,制定完善相關應急預案,做好網絡安全檢查、隱患排查、風險評估和容災備份,健全網絡安全信息通報機制,及時採取有效措施,減少和避免網絡安全事件的發生及危害,提高應對網絡安全事件的能力。

6.2 演練

中央網信辦協調有關部門定期組織演練,檢驗和完善預案,提高實戰能力。

各省(區、市)、各部門每年至少組織一次預案

,並將演練情況報中央網信辦。

6.3 宣傳

各地區、各部門應充分利用各種傳播媒介及其他有效的宣傳形式,加強突發網絡安全事件預防和處置的有關法律、法規和政策的宣傳,開展網絡安全基本知識和技能的宣傳活動。

6.4 培訓

各地區、各部門要將網絡安全事件的應急知識列為領導幹部和有關人員的培訓內容,加強網絡安全特別是網絡安全應急預案的培訓,提高防範意識及技能。

6.5 重要活動期間的預防措施

在國家重要活動、會議期間,各省(區、市)、各部門要加強網絡安全事件的防範和應急響應,確保網絡安全。應急辦統籌協調網絡安全保障工作,根據需要要求有關省(區、市)、部門啟動紅色預警響應。有關省(區、市)、部門加強網絡安全監測和分析研判,及時預警可能造成重大影響的風險和隱患,重點部門、重點崗位保持24小時值班,及時發現和處置網絡安全事件隱患。

7 保障措施

7.1 機構和人員

各地區、各部門、各單位要落實網絡安全應急工作責任制,把責任落實到具體部門、具體崗位和個人,並建立健全應急工作機制。

7.2 技術支撐隊伍

加強網絡安全應急技術支撐隊伍建設,做好網絡安全事件的監測預警、預防防護、應急處置、應急技術支援工作。支持網絡安全企業提升應急處置能力,提供應急技術支援。中央網信辦製定評估認定標準,組織評估和認定國家網絡安全應急技術支撐隊伍。各省(區、市)、各部門應配備必要的網絡安全專業技術人才,並加強與國家網絡安全相關技術單位的溝通、協調,建立必要的網絡安全信息共享機制。

7.3 專家隊伍

建立國家網絡安全應急專家組,為網絡安全事件的預防和處置提供技術諮詢和決策建議。各地區、各部門加強各自的專家隊伍建設,充分發揮專家在應急處置工作中的作用。

7.4 社會資源

從教育科研機構、企事業單位、協會中選拔網絡安全人才,匯集技術與數據資源,建立網絡安全事件應急服務體系,提高應對特別重大、重大網絡安全事件的能力。

7.5 基礎平台

各地區、各部門加強網絡安全應急基礎平台和管理平台建設,做到早發現、早預警、早響應,提高應急處置能力。

7.6 技術研發和產業促進

有關部門加強網絡安全防範技術研究,不斷改進技術裝備,為應急響應工作提供技術支撐。加強政策引導,重點支持網絡安全監測預警、預防防護、處置救援、應急服務等方向,提升網絡安全應急產業整體水平與核心競爭力,增強防範和處置網絡安全事件的產業支撐能力。

7.7 國際合作

有關部門建立國際合作渠道,簽訂合作協定,必要時通過國際合作共同應對突發網絡安全事件。

7.8 物資保障

加強對網絡安全應急裝備、工具的儲備,及時調整、升級軟件硬件工具,不斷增強應急技術支撐能力。

7.9 經費保障

財政部門為網絡安全事件應急處置提供必要的資金保障。有關部門利用現有政策和資金渠道,支持網絡安全應急技術支撐隊伍建設、專家隊伍建設、基礎平台建設、技術研發、預案演練、物資保障等工作開展。各地區、各部門為網絡安全應急工作提供必要的經費保障。

7.10 責任與獎懲

網絡安全事件應急處置工作實行責任追究制。

中央網信辦及有關地區和部門對網絡安全事件應急管理工作中作出突出貢獻的先進集體和個人給予表彰和獎勵。

中央網信辦及有關地區和部門對不按照規定制定預案和組織開展演練,遲報、謊報、瞞報和漏報網絡安全事件重要情況或者應急管理工作中有其他失職、瀆職行為的,依照相關規定對有關責任人給予處分;構成犯罪的,依法追究刑事責任。

8 附則

8.1 預案管理

本預案原則上每年評估一次,根據實際情況適時修訂。修訂工作由中央網信辦負責。

各省(區、市)、各部門、各單位要根據本預案製定或修訂本地區、本部門、本行業、本單位網絡安全事件應急預案。

8.2 預案解釋

本預案由中央網信辦負責解釋。

8.3 預案實施時間

本預案自印發之日起實施。

附件:

1. 網絡安全事件分類

2. 名詞術語

3. 網絡和信息系統損失程度劃分說明

附件1

網絡安全事件分類

網絡安全事件分為有害程序事件、網絡攻擊事件、信息破壞事件、信息內容安全事件、設備設施故障、災害性事件和其他網絡安全事件等。

(1)有害程序事件分為計算機病毒事件、蠕蟲事件、特洛伊木馬事件、殭屍網絡事件、混合程序攻擊事件、網頁內嵌惡意代碼事件和其他有害程序事件。

(2)網絡攻擊事件分為拒絕服務攻擊事件、後門攻擊事件、漏洞攻擊事件、網絡掃描竊聽事件、網絡釣魚事件、干擾事件和其他網絡攻擊事件。

(3)信息破壞事件分為信息篡改事件、信息假冒事件、信息洩露事件、信息竊取事件、信息丟失事件和其他信息破壞事件。

(4)信息內容安全事件是指通過網絡傳播法律法規禁止信息,組織非法串聯、煽動集會遊行或炒作敏感問題並危害國家安全、社會穩定和公眾利益的事件。

(5)設備設施故障分為軟硬件自身故障、外圍保障設施故障、人為破壞事故和其他設備設施故障。

(6)災害性事件是指由自然災害等其他突發事件導致的網絡安全事件。

(7)其他事件是指不能歸為以上分類的網絡安全事件。

附件2

名詞術語

一、重要網絡與信息系統

所承載的業務與國家安全、社會秩序、經濟建設、公眾利益密切相關的網絡和信息系統。

(參考依據:《信息安全技術信息安全事件分類分級指南》(GB/Z 20986-2007))

二、重要敏感信息

不涉及國家秘密,但與國家安全、經濟發展、社會穩定以及企業和公眾利益密切相關的信息,這些信息一旦未經授權披露、丟失、濫用、篡改或銷毀,可能造成以下後果:

a) 損害國防、國際關係;

b) 損害國家財產、公共利益以及個人財產或人身安全;

c) 影響國家預防和打擊經濟與軍事間諜、政治滲透、有組織犯罪等;

d) 影響行政機關依法調查處理違法、瀆職行為,或涉嫌違法、瀆職行為;

e) 干擾政府部門依法公正地開展監督、管理、檢查、審計等行政活動,妨礙政府部門履行職責;

f) 危害國家關鍵基礎設施、政府信息系統安全;

g) 影響市場秩序,造成不公平競爭,破壞市場規律;

h) 可推論出國家秘密事項;

i) 侵犯個人隱私、企業商業秘密和知識產權;

j) 損害國家、企業、個人的其他利益和聲譽。

(參考依據:《信息安全技術雲計算服務安全指南》(GB/T31167-2014))

附件3

網絡和信息系統損失程度劃分說明

網絡和信息系統損失是指由於網絡安全事件對系統的軟硬件、功能及數據的破壞,導致系統業務中斷,從而給事發組織所造成的損失,其大小主要考慮恢復系統正常運行和消除安全事件負面影響所需付出的代價,劃分為特別嚴重的系統損失、嚴重的系統損失、較大的系統損失和較小的系統損失,說明如下:

a) 特別嚴重的系統損失:造成系統大面積癱瘓,使其喪失業務處理能力,或系統關鍵數據的保密性、完整性、可用性遭到嚴重破壞,恢復系統正常運行和消除安全事件負面影響所需付出的代價十分巨大,對於事發組織是不可承受的;

b) 嚴重的系統損失:造成系統長時間中斷或局部癱瘓,使其業務處理能力受到極大影響,或系統關鍵數據的保密性、完整性、可用性遭到破壞,恢復系統正常運行和消除安全事件負面影響所需付出的代價巨大,但對於事發組織是可承受的;

c) 較大的系統損失:造成系統中斷,明顯影響系統效率,使重要信息系統或一般信息系統業務處理能力受到影響,或系統重要數據的保密性、完整性、可用性遭到破壞,恢復系統正常運行和消除安全事件負面影響所需付出的代價較大,但對於事發組織是完全可以承受的;

d) 較小的系統損失:造成系統短暫中斷,影響系統效率,使系統業務處理能力受到影響,或系統重要數據的保密性、完整性、可用性遭到影響,恢復系統正常運行和消除安全事件負面影響所需付出的代價較小。

Original referring URL:

http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-06/27/c_1121220113.htm

 

中國網絡安全防禦將是量子計算…未來將面臨這些網絡攻擊威脅 // China network security defense will be quantum computing… The future will face these cyber-attack threats

中國網絡安全防禦將是量子計算…未來將面臨這些網絡攻擊威脅

China network security defense will be quantum computing… The future will face these cyber-attack threats

 

Quantum computers can give attackers the ability to crack the current encryption standard overnight and steal personal data. Imagine, if you wake up and lose all the important information, what kind of helpless?

Experts predict that by 2026, commercial quantum computers can crack the code we now rely on. “IEEE Spectrum” magazine reported last year that quantum computers were fast enough to crack the level of RSA encryption.

The nine years from 2026 are not long and the consequences of failing to update the security technology through quantum security solutions are not yet clear. In order to ensure that the arrival of quantum computers to protect data security, need to upgrade from now on to quantum security needs.

What is a quantum computer?

Quantum computer (quantum computer) is a class of quantum mechanics to follow the law of high-speed mathematical and logical operations, storage and processing of quantum information, physical devices. When a device processes and computes quantum information, it is a quantum computer when it runs a quantum algorithm.

It can be achieved for each superposition of the transformation of the equivalent of a classic calculation, all of these classic calculations at the same time, and according to a certain probability amplitude superimposed, given the output of quantum computers. This calculation is called quantum parallel computing, but also the most important advantages of quantum computers. (Source Baidu)

Quantum computer can invade daily network activities

If an attacker uses a quantum computer to successfully crack the encryption technology that we currently trust and rely on, then sensitive data may be vented, giving serious consequences to users and organizations. As a technical user, people may perform the following common activities on any day:

Send an e-mail: The user logs on to the laptop and sends several e-mails, whose information may be read by the attacker and published publicly for everyone to read.

Check the online banking account: the user login bank account and transfer, the financial data will be attacked by the attacker, and the account balance looted.

Update the social media account information: user login microblogging and other social media publishing dynamic, share family photos, etc., if the user only choose to share these dynamic friends, the attacker can all photos and personal information “everyone visible”, and in addition to The user himself, others can arbitrarily tamper with.

Updating software on the smartphone: If the user receives a software update notification and accepts the update, it is not aware that the verification process from a trusted source (such as Google or Apple’s official download) will also be compromised. Malware may enter the smartphone, disguised as a trusted update, so that the attacker gets the application’s login credentials and data.

Driving the network car: the network will automatically accept the software update. These updates may come from an attacker, the user without the knowledge of the circumstances, may allow third parties to control the car’s embedded system, undermine navigation, cut off the car power and so on.

In addition, many other day-to-day transactions may be vulnerable to attack.E.g:

Use the original security of the Internet equipment: thermostat, home security system or baby monitor;

Transfer funds to public transport as prepaid expenses;

Use VPN to log on to the corporate network.

Public transport, security systems, and physical access systems can also have many public safety risks.

As the networking equipment provides more attack surface, data leakage events are frequent. As companies and governments continue to prevent cyber security attacks through technological advances, quantum computing may make cybercriminals more arbitrary and unscrupulous.

The key to quantum secure encryption solutions will be to update the vulnerable quantum solution in a timely manner, which means that it is now necessary to understand which systems will be affected by quantum risk and plan to migrate to quantum security solutions (including appropriate testing and test).

This transition can be done from a hybrid solution, enabling flexible encryption, and the classic encryption technology used today.

Quantum computers or will change the pattern of artificial intelligence research

Source: Artificial Intelligenceologist

Summary: Chinese scientists have built quantum computers that are “natural photonics” by reviewers called “ENIAC in Quantum Computers”.

Chinese scientists have built quantum computers that are “natural photonics” by reviewers called “ENIAC in Quantum Computers.” Quantum computer of this achievement and the subsequent development, it is possible to change the current pattern of artificial intelligence research.

First, it may mean strong, weak artificial intelligence, and “quantum” approach of the three technical paradigm of confluence. Second, it is possible to open up the traditional Chinese culture “programming” approach, as well as more to explore the Chinese and Eastern traditions and pre-traditional culture of resources. Third, in the human cognitive structure can not keep up with the pace of technological development, the quantum computer may help the human hand, set up from the original understanding of the future of the world bridge.

Although all this can not change the fate of mankind will eventually be replaced by “singularity”, but may change in the singularity of the continuation of the “human” connotation.

Competition and confluence of three paradigms

Artificial intelligence The current research mainly exists strong artificial intelligence, weak artificial intelligence two kinds of technical paradigm.

The strong artificial intelligence paradigm follows the development of technology along the form of movement from low to high order, by the first industrial revolution in the basic physical movement (mechanical, thermal and electromagnetic motion), by the second industrial revolution of chemical movement (organic synthesis ), The end of the 20th century high-tech life movement (genetic engineering, gene editing), and then into the human brain and consciousness of the field; technology step by step, all the way to follow the natural to the human footprint. The human brain is the highest achievement of the evolution of nature, the nature of consciousness is far from being revealed.Artificial intelligence will continue to follow this trajectory, there is no reason to leave this path of success.

In this journey, “physical and mental” relationship is an insurmountable peak. Polanyi’s knowledge of congregation is well known, and IQ and EQ are inseparable. “Artificial intelligence is no more intelligent and only emotionally.”

Weak artificial intelligence paradigm is taking the “smart is intelligent” path. Science and technology may not follow the people as a whole, emotional intelligence and IQ, heart and brain synchronization of the path of evolution, but can take the path of heart and brain separation. Artificial intelligence is only “wisdom”, is the “cylinder in the brain” (“three body” as the envoy of the earth Cheng Tianming), rather than “love” non-human; because of this, artificial intelligence beyond the situation ( Including all kinds of ideological struggle) the trapped people’s intelligence, regardless of “emotional” when things do better, more absolutely. Through the repeated game and the evolution of the game, the development of in-depth learning, step by step, migration learning, learn by analogy, and even into the rules and boundaries across the “Texas poker” to achieve a major breakthrough in artificial intelligence.

The achievement of these results follows the pace of the West since Descartes. “Epistemological turn”, “brain” debut, “head to the ground.”Intelligence is intelligent, do not care about the heart; one to do, do not do all-around champion; step by step to do, do not think people are people. Why should artificial intelligence be based on human beings as a reference system?Get rid of anthropocentrism.

The development of artificial intelligence will eventually go beyond the basic weakness of human nature: people are self-interested, people are limited.The development of artificial intelligence has nothing to do with dignity, but to follow the law. Not to overcome, but to bypass the weakness of human nature.No self-consciousness, means that does not matter “self-interest”, for all the emotions “do not feel”; and in time and space endless large data and extraordinary computing power is beyond the “limited.”

Strong artificial intelligence and weak artificial intelligence combination model, perhaps “God’s return to God, Caesar’s return to Caesar”. Please take care of the soul of God, and I take care of the flesh of men. People, take care of their own souls, make decisions; machine, artificial intelligence in the calculation, to provide decision-making basis and options. “Mind machine brain”.

“Quantum paradigm” can be said to be strong, weak artificial intelligence outside the two paradigms of the third paradigm, related to the relationship between consciousness or free will and quantum entanglement, and quantum computer. “From this point of view, not to quantum up before, that is less than the era of quantum artificial intelligence, I was not worried about artificial intelligence will replace humans.” Pan Jianwei said. Ma Zhaoyuan holds the same view, before understanding by the nano-scale consciousness, “artificial intelligence at least three hundred years there is no chance to go beyond the human brain.”

From the perspective of quantum cut, there may be more than other ways to approach the nature of consciousness, which is “strong artificial intelligence” paradigm of the pursuit of the goal. At this point these two paradigms came together. However, even if this paradigm is a breakthrough, from the current trend, “quantum paradigm” hardware is not “complete life form”, may lead to “strong artificial intelligence” paradigm of dissatisfaction.

This breakthrough in the quantum computer highlights the strength of the artificial intelligence technology paradigm outside the third paradigm. On the one hand it is possible in a sense to set up a bridge between the two paradigms.If you can manipulate more than 1000 quantum, you may be able to study the generation of consciousness. Pan Jianwei predicted that quantum computers will eventually expand into the field of quantum artificial intelligence.

On the other hand, the purpose of studying quantum computers is not to replace existing computers. Quantum computing is suitable for discrete optimization, and high performance computing systems (HPC) perform better in large-scale numerical simulations. Need to determine what problems are suitable for quantum computing, the two complement each other. There are many examples of quantum computer assisting high performance computing systems. In a certain sense, the classic computer with universal, quantum computer may be “earmarked.”From the standard computing power, the D-Wave quantum computer is still much slower than the traditional computer, but in solving some specific engineering problems, the quantum computer is several thousand times faster than the existing supercomputer.

China ‘s Resources and Opportunities

With the development of the Internet, a virtual world has been generated and is continuing to develop and improve. Everything in the real world is constantly moving to the virtual world. From the center, intervene, embedding, blurring, conferencing, going to the center, non-embedding, precision and coding; real world in virtual world reconstruction. As the real world moves to the virtual world, the weight of the virtual world is growing, and non-participants will be marginalized.

From the real to the virtual link is the core of programming. Virtual world is not a real world simple mapping, projection, but selective reconstruction.Not everything in the real world can move to the virtual world. Any programming language written by the instructions on the current computer must be accurate without any ambiguity to ensure that under the same conditions, this code is executed in accordance with established procedures. This is what the so-called software defines everything. All kinds of software, defined the data, the model, the function, the machine, the definition of the process, the rules, the network, the definition can define everything [1].

“People are the sum of social relations.” When the social relations continue to move from the real world to the virtual world, and even the latter as the most important, the status of people in the real world will be affected. Stay in the real world is only a personal secret of the faith, can not be part of the software definition [2]. Can not be moved to the virtual world, can not be mapped, but can not operate the real world, there may be dismissed in the virtual world “ball”, and even come back to the real world can not interact with others. The rapid development of the block chain further highlights the importance of being virtual and real. Human beings continue to enter the orderly degree of machine and society [3]. In society, the order of the carrier is also more and more by the machine to complete. When the basic contract of mankind, such as education, economy and law, its normal operation is carried by the machine, the mission of human beings as an orderly transfer has been completed.The society of machines will replace the real society that can not be moved.

The so-called “programming”, in other words is the code, through programming, the real world projection to the virtual world.

In a sense it can be said that Western culture is “coding culture”. Science and technology, industrial revolution, market economy, universal value, contractual relationship, and so on, all without coding. It is important to note that the first day of computer birth, the development of computer language is infiltrated in the Western coding culture. Computer language is the most basic statement is if-else, as the switchcase statement can be replaced with if else statement, in the if-else behind that is either: 0, or 1, orthogonal. Thus, relatively speaking, the already “encoded” Western society easier to “programming” into the virtual world, and in turn accept the virtual world of the real world norms and constraints.

In contrast, Chinese culture is clearly “conception culture”. Road to Road, very Avenue. “Road”, how to encode? TOEFL IELTS, 20,000 words; Chinese, 5000 words is enough, the word polysemy. So the United Nations documents can not prevail in Chinese, even if the feelings of the Chinese people hurt. Words made up of words are more ambiguous. Winter, how much can wear to wear how much; summer, how much can wear to wear how much. Contextual correlation. In the face of such Chinese examinations, foreign candidates can only be “kneeling”. China’s various levels of documents must be “in principle” three words, the back is endless and not for example and case handling. The highest state is simply: “do not say”. Such a society and its operation process, not if-else, also far from the switchcase can be included, can be exhausted. Can not be programmed, does it mean that China’s traditional culture and social operation can not be mapped to the virtual world?

Quantum computer may be the traditional Chinese culture, the way for the operation of Chinese society programming.

The key to quantum computers is the essential nature of quantum mechanics, such as the superposition and coherence of quantum states. Superposition, coherence, entanglement, so that some concepts and the meaning of knowledge have the same place. The input and output states of the quantum computer are generally superimposed states of multiple states between 0 and 1, which are usually not orthogonal to each other. The quantum computer transforms each superimposed component, where each “component” can be considered to correspond to one of the “cases” in Chinese society.

But in real life these cases are difficult to compare with the same standard, and in the quantum computer, all of these transformations at the same time, and according to a certain probability of superposition, give the results.Quantum computers are probabilistic rather than deterministic, and return to the user may be multiple sets of values, not only to provide the system to find the best solution, but also provide other alternative alternatives. The user can specify the number of systems that the system sends to itself.

The classic way of solving a problem by a classic computer is similar to trying to escape a maze – try all possible aisle, on the way will encounter a dead end until the final find the exit. The magic of the superposition state is that it allows the quantum computer to try all the paths at the same time, that is, it will quickly find a shortcut. In a sense, it can be said that the quantum computer not only contains the highly complex and “conception” characteristics of Chinese traditional culture and real society, but also gives the possibility of coding and programming. The former retains the particularity of China to a certain extent , Which makes this particularity compatible with the universality of human society.

In turn, China has special resources, such as hieroglyphics, language, and traditional culture, which may be another way for the development of quantum computers.

Quantum computers operate in much the same way as classic computers, and now quantum computing is very early, and even specialized programming languages ​​are not [4]. Since non-orthogonal, or if-else? When the need to compare the more things, or a lot of other control process, with if else statement control will be very cumbersome, and poor readability, and the switch statement is more simple and intuitive, more readable and more. But if it is further fragmented, embedded in the infinite number of specific contexts? Quantum computer is completely different from today’s CPU mechanism, nor is the if-else mechanism, can not use the current computer language for its programming. Otherwise it may be as Sokal triggered the science war in the “post-modern text generator”, with a series of contradictory words superimposed together, so that the reader in the fog, no solution.

“The scientific revolution in the 21st century will show two main themes, one is” the convergence of physics and life sciences “; the second is” the confluence of modern science and Chinese philosophy ” The Quantum computer development, it is possible to let the latter “confluence” down the philosophy of the altar, to a certain extent, into the operational level. The advent of quantum computers suggests that it is possible to look at Chinese words and grammar from a new perspective. Perhaps, the ancient “Book of Changes”, River map book, there may be in the dialogue with the quantum computer complement each other.

3 Human reversion and continuation

In the Qiwen “decarburization into the silicon”, the author of the Czech Republic, there are four sets of human cognitive system: the original reptile cognitive system, 50,000 years ago when the language developed, 5000 years ago, after the development of the text, And 500 years ago after the rise of science and development. Each set is more than the previous set of “natural”, more energy consumption, slower. So people tend to use low-level cognitive systems.Every time the cognitive system is advanced, some people are thrown off. Here you can also add the fifth set of cognitive systems, 50 years ago the rise of programming + computing + learning +.

Everyone is a combination of multiple cognitive methods, the difference is the proportion of a variety of cognitive methods. The overall population, in 90% of the human brain “machine”, is that the original cognition at work. The majority of the population as a whole tends to “do not mind” in most of the time. Analysis, symbols and rationality are enemies of the brain, and must be used to fight them all the time.

In this sense, Bao Jie to “stupid” under a definition. Stupid is a human inertia of inertia, the individual is more inclined to use 50,000 years ago mature set of thinking system, rather than 5000 years ago, and five years ago after the development of science and development of these two sets of thinking system, more Not 50 years ago programming. This is the advertising and other means of marketing and election canvassing and so the effectiveness of the human nature of the foundation. Artificial intelligence goes beyond human intelligence and does not need to be smarter than people, just to avoid people’s stupid enough. The machine is just stupid and people are stupid. Stupid can rule, stupid from the human physiological basis, no medicine to save.

The advent of quantum computers, it is possible for humans to open the “sixth set of cognitive systems.” The new cognitive system may emerge within five years if the fifth set of 50-year rhythms are added in the “decarburization of silicon” in the range of 50,000 to 5,000 to 500, and by the experts, Five years, the computing power of quantum computers may catch up with the current supercomputer). The classical computer is linear, and all input states are orthogonal to each other. And thinking is often parallel, pluralistic, and even jumping. With quantum computers, it is possible to understand the human behavior based on the first and second sets of cognitive systems, changes in mind, and even emotional changes.

What is the “cognitive system” of the so-called “first and second sets of cognitive systems”? Levi’s “original thinking” and Levi-Strauss’s “wild thinking” made a profound study of this.

Levi – Boulei stressed that the original thinking of the “mutual infiltration”, both specific to trivial, natives can recognize the footprints of each acquaintance, after the rain, the pit of water retained the longest; and by mutual penetration and care of the whole The For example, call a name or name, also implicated it or he embedded everything. Embedded in every detail, all have the object of all the information. The original logical thinking is essentially a comprehensive thinking, different from the logical thinking of the synthesis, does not require pre-analysis. “The logical thinking of the original logic is broader than our thinking, if we do not say it’s better than our rich.” The idea of ​​D-Wave America’s president, BoEwald, is that “the traditional computer will always get the same answer, and the answer to the quantum computer Is a probability, just like the principles of the universe, “says David Mermin, a physicist at Cornell University, in a related argument:” Close your mouth and calculate your mind! ”

Levi-Strauss argues that [5] that the concrete thinking of uncivilized people and the enlightening thinking of the enlightened people are not different from those of “primitive” and “modern” or “primary” and “advanced” Thinking mode, but the history of mankind has always been the existence of two parallel development, the Secretary of different cultural functions, complement each other to infiltrate the way of thinking. As the plants have “wild” and “garden” two categories, the way of thinking can be divided into “wild” (or “wild”) and “civilized” two categories.

It seems that the human “stupid” may not be really stupid, but there is no corresponding means and means to understand the original and wild cognitive system, when not yet. The advent of quantum computers may indicate that time has arrived.

The knowledge of the traditional society is the starting point of human knowledge, both the object of non-embedded coding knowledge denial, and the goal of dialectical reversion of the 21st century. In the original state of knowledge, is the source of human knowledge inexhaustible, which contains the endless treasure to be excavated.

Primitive thinking or wild thinking, human first and second sets of cognitive systems, although the rise of words and technology, especially the “fifth set” of cognitive system after the rise of such as the clogs, but also may be 21 The Object of Dialectical Return of Human Cognitive System in the Century. Fundamentally, Bao Jie’s view of four sets of cognitive systems implied a certain linear implication. Similarly, Kevin Kelly thinks [6] that the most common misconception about artificial intelligence is that natural intelligence is a single dimension that does not have a smart ladder to say. The different parts of the mind, or the interdependence of the “five sets” of cognitive methods, are thus proposed.

 

Original Mandarin Chinese:

量子計算機能賦予攻擊者能力,一夜之間破解當前加密標準,並竊取個人數據。想像一下,如果一覺醒來丟失了所有重要信息,這將是一種怎樣的無助?

專家預計,到2026年,商用量子計算機能破解我們如今依賴的密碼。 《IEEE Spectrum》雜誌去年報告稱,量子計算機快達到可以破解RSA加密的水平。
距離2026年的9年時間並不算長,無法通過量子安全解決方案更新安全技術所帶來的後果目前尚不明確。為了確保量子計算機到來時能保護數據安全,需要從現在開始升級到量子安全需。
什麼是量子計算機?
量子計算機(quantum computer)是一類遵循量子力學規律進行高速數學和邏輯運算、存儲及處理量子信息的物理裝置。當某個裝置處理和計算的是量子信息,運行的是量子算法時,它就是量子計算機。
它能對每一個疊加分量實現的變換相當於一種經典計算,所有這些經典計算同時完成,並按一定的概率振幅疊加起來,給出量子計算機的輸出結果。這種計算稱為量子並行計算,也是量子計算機最重要的優越性。 (來源百度)

量子計算機能入侵日常網絡活動
如果攻擊者利用量子計算機成功破解當前我們所信任和依賴的加密技術,那麼敏感數據可能會被洩,從而給用戶和機構帶來嚴重後果。作為技術用戶,人們可能會在任何一天執行以下常見活動:
發送電子郵件:用戶登錄筆記本電腦,發送幾封電子郵件,其信息可能會被攻擊者讀取,並公開發布供所有人閱讀。
查看網銀賬號:用戶登錄銀行賬號並轉賬,財務數據會被攻擊者獲取,並將賬戶餘額洗劫一空。
更新社交媒體賬戶信息:用戶登錄微博等社交媒體發布動態,分享家人的照片等,如果用戶僅選擇將這些動態分享給好友,攻擊者可以將所有照片和個人信息“所有人可見”,且除了用戶自己,其它人可以任意篡改。
更新智能手機上的軟件:如果用戶收到軟件更新通知,並接受更新,而並未意識到是否來自可信源(例如Google或Apple官方下載)的驗證過程也會被入侵。惡意軟件可能會進入智能手機,偽裝成可信任的更新,從而使攻擊者獲取應用程序的登錄憑證以及數據。
駕駛聯網汽車:聯網汽車會自動接受軟件更新。這些更新可能來自攻擊者,用戶在不知情的情況下,可能會允許第三方控制車內的嵌入式系統、破壞導航、切斷汽車動力等。
此外,許多其它日常交易可能易於遭受攻擊。例如:
使用原本安全的物聯網設備:恆溫器、家庭安全系統或嬰兒監視器;
將資金轉入公共交通系統作為預付費用;
使用VPN登錄公司網絡等。
公共交通工具、安全系統和物理訪問系統遭遇攻擊也會帶來許多公共安全風險。
由於聯網設備提供了更多的攻擊面,因此,數據洩露事件頻發。隨著公司和政府不斷通過技術進步防範網絡安全攻擊,量子計算可能會讓網絡犯罪分子更加隨心所欲,肆無忌憚。
量子安全加密解決方案的關鍵將是及時更新易受攻擊的量子解決方案,這就意味著,現在要理解哪些系統將會受到量子風險影響,併計劃遷移到量子安全解決方案(包括適當的測試和試驗)。
這種過渡可以從混合解決方案開始,實現靈活加密,強化如今使用的經典加密技術。
量子計算機或將改變人工智能的研究格局
來源: 人工智能學家

概要:中國科學家建造出了被《自然·光子學》的審稿人稱之為“量子計算機中的ENIAC”的量子計算機。
中國科學家建造出了被《自然·光子學》的審稿人稱之為“量子計算機中的ENIAC”的量子計算機。量子計算機的這一成果及而後的發展,有可能改變當下人工智能的研究格局。
其一,可能意味著強、弱人工智能,以及“量子”途徑三種技術範式的合流。其二,有可能開拓將中國傳統文化“編程”的途徑,以及更多發掘中國與東方的傳統和前傳統文化中的資源。其三,在人類認知結構跟不上科技發展的腳步之時,量子計算機有可能助人類一臂之力,架起由原始認知到未來世界的橋樑。
這一切雖然不能改變人類終將被“奇點人”所取代的命運,但可能改變在奇點人中所延續下來的“人類”的內涵。
1三種範式的競爭與合流
人工智能目前的研究主要存在強人工智能、弱人工智能兩種技術範式。
強人工智能範式沿襲技術的發展沿運動形式由低到高的次序,由第一次工業革命中的基本物理運動(機械、熱和電磁運動),經第二次工業革命的化學運動(有機合成),20世紀末高技術中的生命運動(基因工程、基因編輯),接著進入人腦和意識的領域;技術亦步亦趨,一路跟隨由自然到人的足跡。人腦是自然界演化的最高成果,意識的本質遠未揭示。人工智能將繼續追隨這一軌跡,沒有理由脫離這一成功的路徑。
在這一征途上,“身心”關係是難以逾越的高峰。波蘭尼關於意會知識的研究廣為人知,智商與情商不可分割。 “人工智能再聰明也沒有情感,只是機器而已。”
弱人工智能範式走的是“智能就是智能”路徑。科學技術未必沿著人作為整體,情商與智商,心腦同步進化的路徑,而是可以走心腦分離的路徑。人工智能之所求原本只是“智”,是“缸中大腦”(《三體》中作為地球人使節的程天明),而非“情”非人;正因為此,人工智能超越為情(包括形形色色的意識形態之爭)所困的人的智能,在不顧及“情感”之時把事情做得更好,更絕。通過重複博弈而演進博弈,開發深度學習,步步為營,遷移學習,舉一反三,乃至進入跨越規則與邊界的“德州撲克”,實現人工智能的重大突破。
這些成果的取得沿襲了西方自笛卡爾以來的步點。 “認識論轉向”,“腦”登場,“以頭立地”。智能就是智能,不在乎心;一項一項去做,不做全能冠軍;一步一步去做,不去想人之為人。人工智能為什麼一定要以人類為參照系,為追趕的目標?擺脫人類中心主義的思路。
人工智能的發展將最終超越人性的基本弱點:人是自利的,人是有限的。人工智能的發展無關尊嚴,而是遵循規律。不是克服,而是繞過人性的弱點。沒有自我意識,意味著無所謂“自利”,對於所有的情感“沒感覺”;而在時空上無窮無盡的大數據和超凡脫俗的計算能力則超越人之“有限”。
強人工智能與弱人工智能結合的模式,或許是“上帝的歸上帝,凱撒的歸凱撒”。請上帝照看人的靈魂,我來照看人的肉體。人,照看自己的靈魂,做出決策;機,人工智能從事計算,提供決策的依據和選項。 “人心機腦”。
“量子範式”可以說是強、弱人工智能這兩種範式之外的第三種範式,關係到意識或自由意志與量子糾纏的關係,以及量子計算機。 “從這個角度上來講,沒有到量子用上去之前,即不到量子人工智能的時代,我是一點兒不擔心人工智能會取代人類。”潘建偉說道。馬兆遠持同樣的觀點,在由納米尺度理解意識之前,“人工智能至少在三百年內還沒什麼機會超越人腦”。
由量子的角度切入,有可能較之其他途徑更加逼近意識的本質,這也是“強人工智能”範式所追求的目標。在這一點這兩種範式走到了一起。然而,即使這一範式獲得某種突破,從目前趨勢來看,“量子範式”的硬件並非“完整的生命形態”,可能招致“強人工智能”範式的不滿。
這次量子計算機的突破凸現了強弱人工智能技術範式之外的第三種範式。一方面有可能在某種意義上架起強弱兩種範式的橋樑。如果能操縱1000個量子以上,或許可以研究意識的產生。潘建偉預測,量子計算機最終將拓展到量子人工智能領域。
另一方面,研究量子計算機的目的不是要取代現有的計算機。量子計算適合離散優化,高性能計算系統(HPC) 則在大規模數值模擬中表現更好。需要判斷哪些問題適合量子計算,二者相互補充。有很多量子計算機協助高性能計算系統的例子。在一定意義上,經典計算機具有普適性,量子計算機可能是“專款專用”。從標準的計算能力來看,D-Wave量子計算機還是會比傳統計算機慢得多,但在解決某些特定的工程問題方面,量子計算機要比現有超級計算機快幾千倍。
2中國的資源與機遇
隨著互聯網的發展,一個虛擬世界已經生成並正在繼續發展和完善。現實世界的一切正在不斷遷移到虛擬世界。從中心、干預、嵌入、模糊、意會,到去中心化、非嵌入、精確和編碼;現實世界在虛擬世界重構。隨著越來越大的現實世界移到虛擬世界,虛擬世界的權重越來越大,不參加者將自我邊緣化。
由實到虛的轉換環節的核心是編程。虛擬世界不是現實世界簡單的映射、投射,而是選擇性重構。不是現實世界的一切都可以移到虛擬世界。任何編程語言寫好的指令,對目前的計算機必須準確無誤沒有歧義,以保證在同樣的條件下,這段代碼按既定步驟執行。這就是所謂軟件定義一切。形形色色、大大小小、不同用途的軟件,定義了數據、模型、功能、機器,定義了過程、規則、網絡,定義了可以定義的一切[1]。
“人是社會關係的總和”。當社會關係不斷由現實世界遷移到虛擬世界,乃至以後者為重,人在現實世界的地位就受到影響。留在現實世界的只是個人隱秘的信仰,是不能被軟件定義的部分[2]。沒法移到虛擬世界,不能映射,更不能操作的現實世界,有可能被開除在虛擬世界的“球籍”,以至回過頭來沒法在現實世界與他人交往。區塊鏈的快速發展進一步凸現了由實到虛,以虛馭實的重要性。人類源源不斷地把有序度輸入機器和社會[3]。在社會中,有序度的載體也越來越多的由機器來完成。當人類的基礎契約,如教育、經濟和法律,其正常運作都是由機器來承載時,人類作為有序度轉移者的使命已經完成了。機器構成的社會將取代移不過去的現實社會。
所謂“編程”,換言之就是編碼,經由編程,把現實世界投射到虛擬世界。
在某種意義上可以說,西方文化就是“編碼文化”。科學技術、工業革命、市場經濟、普適價值、契約關係等等,無一不編碼。有必要指出,從計算機誕生的第一天起,計算機語言的發展就浸潤在西方的編碼文化之中。計算機語言最基本的語句是if-else,至於switchcase語句完全可以用if else語句來替換掉,在if-else的背後即非此即彼:0,或1,正交。由此可見,相對而言,本已“編碼”的西方社會較容易“編程”而進入虛擬世界,以及反過來接受虛擬世界對現實世界的規範與製約。
相比之下,中國文化顯然是“意會文化”。道可道非常道。 “道”,如何編碼?考托福雅思,2萬單詞;漢語,5000單詞足矣,一詞多義。所以聯合國文件不能以中文為準,即使傷害了中國人民的感情。由單詞組成的語句更多歧義。冬天,能穿多少就穿多少;夏天,能穿多少就穿多少。語境相關。面對這樣的中文考題,外國考生也只能是“跪了”。中國的各級文件中必有“原則上”三個字,其背後是無窮無盡的下不為例和個案處理。最高境界乾脆是:“盡在不言中”。這樣的社會及其運作過程,絕非if-else,亦遠非switchcase可以囊括,可以窮盡。不能編程,是否意味著中國的傳統文化與社會運行不能映射到虛擬世界?
量子計算機有可能為中國傳統文化,為中國社會的運行方式編程。
量子計算機的關鍵是用到量子力學的本質特性,如量子態的疊加性和相干性。疊加、相干、糾纏,這樣一些概念與意會知識有相通之處。量子計算機的輸入態和輸出態為一般為0到1之間的多個狀態的疊加態,相互之間通常不正交。量子計算機對每一個疊加分量進行變換,這裡的每一個“分量”或可認為對應於中國社會中的一個個“個案”。
但在現實生活中這些個案難以以同一標準相互比較,而在量子計算機,所有這些變換同時完成,並按一定的概率幅疊加起來,給出結果。量子計算機是概率性的而非確定性的,返回給用戶的可能是多組數值,不僅能提供系統尋找到的最佳解決方案,同時也提供其他可供選擇的優秀替代方案。用戶可以指定係統向自己發送解決方案的數量。
經典計算機解決一個問題的方式就類似於試圖逃離一個迷宮——嘗試所有可能的走道,途中會遇到死路,直到最終找到出口。而疊加態的魔力則在於,允許量子計算機在同一時間嘗試所有的路徑,也就是說,它會迅速的找到一條捷徑。在某種意義上可以說,量子計算機既包容中國傳統文化與現實社會的高度複雜性和“意會”特徵,又賦予其編碼和編程的可能性;前者在一定程度上保留了中國的特殊性,後者使這種特殊性與人類社會的普遍性兼容。
反過來,中國所具有的特殊資源,如像形文字、語言以及傳統文化有可能為量子計算機的發展另闢蹊徑。
量子計算機的運行方式與經典計算機大為不同,現在的量子計算還非常早期,甚至連專門的編程語言都沒有[4]。既然非正交,還是if-else嗎?當需要比較的事項較多,或者很多其他控制流程的時候,用if else語句控制起來就會很麻煩,且可讀性太差,而用switcase可以囊括,可以窮盡。不能編程,是否意味著中國的傳統文化與社會運行不能映射到虛擬世界?
量子計算機有可能為中國傳統文化,為中國社會的運行方式編程。
量子計算機的關鍵是用到量子力學的本質特性,如量子態的疊加性和相干性。疊加、相干、糾纏,這樣一些概念與意會知識有相通之處。量子計算機的輸入態和輸出態為一般為0到1之間的多個狀態的疊加態,相互之間通常不正交。量子計算機對每一個疊加分量進行變換,這裡的每一個“分量”或可認為對應於中國社會中的一個個“個案”。
但在現實生活中這些個案難以以同一標準相互比較,而在量子計算機,所有這些變換同時完成,並按一定的概率幅疊加起來,給出結果。量子計算機是概率性的而非確定性的,返回給用戶的可能是多組數值,不僅能提供系統尋找到的最佳解決方案,同時也提供其他可供選擇的優秀替代方案。用戶可以指定係統向自己發送解決方案的數量。
經典計算機解決一個問題的方式就類似於試圖逃離一個迷宮——嘗試所有可能的走道,途中會遇到死路,直到最終找到出口。而疊加態的魔力則在於,允許量子計算機在同一時間嘗試所有的路徑,也就是說,它會迅速的找到一條捷徑。在某種意義上可以說,量子計算機既包容中國傳統文化與現實社會的高度複雜性和“意會”特徵,又賦予其編碼和編程的可能性;前者在一定程度上保留了中國的特殊性,後者使這種特殊性與人類社會的普遍性兼容。
反過來,中國所具有的特殊資源,如像形文字、語言以及傳統文化有可能為量子計算機的發展另闢蹊徑。
量子計算機的運行方式與經典計算機大為不同,現在的量子計算還非常早期,甚至連專門的編程語言都沒有[4]。既然非正交,還是if-else嗎?當需要比較的事項較多,或者很多其他控制流程的時候,用if else語句控制起來就會很麻煩,且可讀性太差,而用switch語句就更加簡潔直觀,可讀性也更強。但要是進一步碎片化,嵌入於不可勝數的特定語境之中呢?量子計算機完全不同於今天的CPU機理,也不是if-else機理,沒法用現在的計算機語言為其編程。否則很可能如索卡爾引發的科學大戰中的“後現代文本發生器”,用一連串互相矛盾的詞彙疊加在一起,讓讀者云裡霧裡,不得其解。
中國科學院大學已故數學教授牛實為先生認為,21世紀的科學革命將呈現出兩個主旋律,其一是“物理學與生命科​​學的合流”;其二是“現代科學與中國哲學的合流” 。量子計算機的發展,有可能讓後一個“合流”走下哲學的聖壇,在一定程度上步入操作的層面。量子計算機的問世提示,或許可以從一個新的視角審視中文的單詞和語法。或許,古老的《易經》,河圖洛書,有可能在與量子計算機的對話中相得益彰。
3人類的複歸與延續
在奇文“脫碳入矽”中,作者鮑捷提出人類有四套認知系統:原始的爬行動物認知系統,5萬年前語言成熟時發展的,5000年前文字發明後發展的,和500年前科學興起後發展的。每一套都比前一套更不“自然”,更耗費能量,速度更慢。所以人總是傾向於用低層次的認知系統。認知系統的每一次進階,都甩下一部分人。在這裡還可以再加上第五套認知系統,50年前興起的編程+計算+學習+。
每個人都是多種認知方式的綜合,區別是多種認知方式的比例不同。而人群的總體,在90%的人腦“機時”裡,是那些原始的認知在起作用。總體人群的大多數在大多數時間傾向於“不動腦子”。分析、符號和理性都是大腦的敵人,必須無時無刻不和本能做鬥爭才能運用它們。
在此意義上,鮑捷給“愚蠢”下了一個定義。愚蠢是人類的一種認知的惰性,個體比較偏向於使用5萬年前成熟的那套思維繫統,而不是5000年前文字發明和500年前科學發展後發展的這兩套思維繫統,更不是50年前的編程。這是廣告之類營銷手段和選舉拉票等之所以奏效的人性基礎。人工智能超越人的智能,並不需要比人聰明,只需要避免人的愚蠢就夠了。機器只是笨,人是愚蠢。笨可以治,蠢源於人的生理基礎,無藥可救。
量子計算機的問世,有可能為人類開啟“第六套認知系統”。如果按“脫碳入矽”中5萬-5千-5百,以及筆者加上的第五套50年的節奏,新的認知系統可能在5年內出現(順便說,有專家指出,在五年之內,量子計算機的計算能力就可能赶超當前的超級計算機)。經典計算機是線性的,所有的輸入態均相互正交。而思維往往是並行、多元、甚至跳躍。借助量子計算機,以人類思考方式進行超高速計算,有可能理解人類基於第一、二套認知系統的群體性行為、思想變化,甚至情緒變化。
所謂“第一、二套認知系統”究竟是什麼樣的“認知系統”?列維-布留爾的《原始思維》和列維-斯特勞斯的《野性的思維》對此作了深刻的研究。
列維-布留爾強調了原始思維的“互滲”,既具體到瑣碎,土人能認出每個熟人的足跡,雨後,那個坑里的水留存最久;又經由互滲而關照整體。譬如呼喚一個名稱或名字,也就牽連它或他所嵌入的一切。嵌入的每一個細節,都擁有對象的全部信息。原邏輯思維本質上是綜合的思維,不同於邏輯思維的綜合,不要求預先的分析。原邏輯思維“比我們的思維廣闊,如果不說比我們的豐富。”D-Wave美國區總裁BoEwald的觀點是:“傳統計算機求解相同問題總會得到相同的答案,而量子計算機得到的答案卻是一種概率,就像宇宙的運行原理。”康奈爾大學物理學家David Mermin在一次相關的爭論中說:“閉上你的嘴,用心作計算吧!”
列維-斯特勞斯認為[5],未開化人的具體性思維與開化人的抽象性思維不是分屬“原始”與“現代”或“初級”與“高級”這兩種等級不同的思維方式,而是人類歷史上始終存在的兩種互相平行發展、各司不同文化職能、互相補充互相滲透的思維方式。正如植物有“野生”和“園植”兩大類一樣,思維方式也可分為“野性的”(或“野生的”)和“文明的”兩大類。
由此看來,人類的“蠢”,未必就是真的蠢,而是沒有相應的手段和途徑來理解原始及野性的認知系統,時候未到。量子計算機的問世,可能預示,時候已到。
前傳統社會的知識是人類知識的起點,既是而後非嵌入編碼知識否定的對象,也是21世紀的知識辯證復歸的目標。處於原始狀態的知識,是人類知識取之不盡的源泉,其中蘊藏了有待挖掘的無窮無盡的寶藏。
原始思維或野性的思維,人類的第一和第二套認知系統,雖然在文字與科技興起,特別是“第五套”認知系統興起後被棄之如敝屐,卻同樣可能是21世紀人類認知系統辯證復歸的對象。從根本上說,鮑捷關於四套認知系統的觀點隱含了某種線性的意味。類似的,凱文凱利認為[6],關於人工智能最常見的誤解是,自然智能是一個單一的維度,沒有智能階梯之說。思維的不同組成部分,或者說人猿相揖別以來的“五套”認知方式之間相互依賴,是共同創造的。

Original URL: http://wemedia.ifeng.com/17222299/wemedia.shtml

美軍方憂慮中國信息戰 稱之為毛式網絡人民戰 // US Military Anxious & Worried About China’s Information Warfare – Mao-Style Network War is the People’s Warfare

美軍方憂慮中國信息戰 稱之為毛式網絡人民戰 //

US Military Anxious & Worried About China’s Information Warfare – Mao-Style Network War is the People’s Warfare

This article was originally published in the US Army “Military Intelligence” magazine July 7-9 months. The author Timothy Thomas is the US Army Lieutenant Colonel, now an analyst at the US Foreign Military Research Office (FMSO). The author graduated from the famous West Point military academy, served as the US military 82th Airborne Division unit commander, the information warfare, psychological warfare, low-intensity conflict in-depth study. This paper reflects the American military’s worries and alertness in the theory and construction of China’s information warfare. This article is specially translated for reference only.

In the past few years, the Chinese military and civil experts set off a wave of information warfare. After reading their works, it is not difficult to find that China’s theory of information warfare has several obvious characteristics: First, China is eager to develop its own theory of information warfare, which is related to its own security threats; secondly, China’s information War theory is influenced by its traditional military command art. Whether it is the ancient “Art of War” and “thirty-six”, or Mao Zedong’s people’s war thinking in the theory of information war laid a deep imprint; Third, China’s information warfare awareness and classification, obviously different In the beginning of the information warfare originator – the United States, although similar to the Russian information war theory, but only the shape and God is not.

Wai Wei save Zhao

The advent of the information age prompted people to rethink the way in which war was conducted. China is aware of its conventional armed forces and the superpower compared to the strength of disparity, in the near future, whether conventional or nuclear weapons, China can not constitute a strong deterrent to the United States. However, the ambitious Oriental dragon that: with the advent of the information age, the war form, the military structure, combat methods and command means will have a new change, the information will replace people full of future battlefield. As long as the focus of strategic research into the information warfare war form, grasp the trend of development of the times, it is not difficult to shorten the distance, and further lead.

Ancient China has a military order called “thirty-six dollars”, one of which “Wai Wei save Zhao” pointed out that if the enemy is too strong front power, should avoid the virtual, hit its weakness. For example, if you can not launch a direct attack (nuclear strike), then the information warfare, the weak financial, power, etc., to the West, and so on.

Network system to start. Although the conventional armed forces can not compete with the United States, however, China’s information warfare forces in theory is a real threat to the US political and economic security, the Americans can not afford the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq Stock Exchange in an instant collapse. The global accessibility of information warfare, the speed of light transmission is not a feature of nuclear war, the Chinese people want is the speed of information warfare, accuracy and continuity to beat the opponent.

Information warfare can make up for the lack of conventional armed forces. The establishment of various battlefield information networks can not only improve the management level of traditional warfare, enhance the overall combat effectiveness of the troops, but also to a certain extent make up for the lack of conventional forces. In the eyes of the Chinese people, information warfare is even more powerful, is the power of conventional armed forces multiplier.

Information warfare

In 1996, China’s earliest information warfare expert Shen Weiguang to the information war under the definition is: “warring parties through the control of information and intelligence resources to compete for battlefield initiative of the war.” With the United States “to protect friendly information system, attack enemy information System “compared to the definition of Shen Weiguang more emphasis on” control “the enemy.

In 1998, the Chinese military information warfare Wei Wang Wang save major general classification of information warfare: according to time is divided into normal, crisis, wartime; by nature is divided into attack, defense; by level into the country, strategy, theater, tactics ; Divided by the scale of the battlefield, theater, local war. The characteristics of information warfare include directive and control warfare, intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, space control war, hacker warfare, virtual warfare, economic warfare and so on. Information warfare in principle to take cut, blinded, transparent, fast and improve the viability and other measures. General Wang’s understanding of the information war is closer to the West, with emphasis on the confrontation of advanced technology.

In 1999, Chinese experts discussed the information warfare. Shen Weiguang at this time to expand the scope of information warfare, he believes that “information war, broadly refers to the confrontation of the military (including political, economic, science and technology and all areas of society) to seize the information space and information resources for the war, narrowly refers to the war Which is one of the essential characteristics of modern warfare.The essence of information war lies in the fact that by acquiring the right to information to achieve ‘no war and subdue the soldiers’. ”

The military another information warfare expert general general Wang Pufeng information warfare have a very deep understanding, in 2000, he information warfare and information warfare distinction. According to his explanation, the information war refers to a form of war, which contains information warfare, and information warfare refers to a combat activity. He believes that “information warfare includes all combat activities, including a series of intrusion and computer virus attacks on the theft, tampering, deception, deception, disruption, obstruction, interference, paralysis of information and information systems, and finally the enemy computer Network does not work. “He advocated China’s information warfare theory in drawing on foreign advanced combat ideas at the same time, should have China’s own characteristics.

“Mao-style network people’s war”

China’s knowledge of information warfare is very traditional. Many military theorists believe that the information age has given Mao Zedong a new connotation of the people’s war thinking, therefore, advocates rely on and mobilize the broad masses of people to carry out online war. It is conceivable that no matter which same family, with 1.3 billion people playing network warfare is daunting.

Mao Zedong’s network The most important feature of the people’s war theory is that it breaks the boundaries between the army and the people. Blurred the traditional boundaries of military installations and civilian facilities, military technology and civilian technology. The sharing of information technology in military and civilian use has created the conditions for the widespread use of civil technology for military purposes. For example, the use of civil electronic information equipment for information interception and transmission can use the civilian communication network for war mobilization; can use the private computer network attack and defense. Second, the difference between military personnel and non-military personnel is gradually disappearing. With the development of network technology and the expansion of application areas, a large number of network technology talent come to the fore. These have the special ability of the network elite will become the future network of people in the war of Gladiator. At the same time, communication, transportation, financial systems and other information networks and international networking, for China to carry out the people’s war provides the necessary conditions.

Nowadays, the idea of ​​people’s war has been established as the fundamental guiding principle of China’s network information warfare. A Chinese military writer wrote: “The flexible tactical and tactical principle is still the soul of the network information warfare.The broad masses of people actively participate in the war, especially technical support and online warfare, is to win the network information war victory of the masses and strength Source. ”

The power of the people’s war is so terrible, perhaps, we can understand why the Chinese are willing to cut the size of their armed forces – imagine that once the war broke out, China could launch a large number of people involved in war, information engineers and civilians will be organized through the home Computer attack on the US network information system, then why should we maintain a large combat force?

Information warfare

Over the past few years, China has held several major information warfare military exercises to test the theory of information warfare. The first “special war” (information warfare) exercise took place in October 1997. A military army of a military army was designed to paralyze its system of virus attacks, the group of military anti-virus software for defense. The exercise is called “invasion and anti-intrusion exercise”. The exercise also used ground logistics, medical and air forces.

In October 1998, China held a high-tech comprehensive exercise jointly conducted by the three military regions. The first use of the “military information superhighway” was used in the joint defense operations. The information network system in the command automation system is composed of digital, dialing, command network and secret channel. The other parts of the command automation system are subsystems such as command warfare, audio and graphics processing, control and data encryption.

In October 1999, the People’s Liberation Army for the first time between the two groups of war-level computer online confrontation exercises. Conducted reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance, interference and anti-interference, blockade and anti-blockade, air strikes and anti-air raid and other subjects. In the software environment, resource sharing, combat command, situation display, auxiliary evaluation, signal transmission and intelligence warfare and other six types of operations. The computer evaluation system conducts data and quality analysis of the performance of both parties.

In July 2000, a military area also conducted an online confrontation exercise. The three training tasks related to the exercise are: organizing and planning the campaign, seizing air power and making information, implementing breakthroughs and breaking down. There are more than 100 terminal networking involved in the exercise.

Militia unit

China’s people’s war has a complete system, its overall development direction is “elite standing army and powerful reserve forces combined”, this defense system is conducive to play the overall effectiveness of the people’s war and “network tactics” advantage.

China 1.5 million reserve forces are very keen to play the network of people’s war. In some areas, the PLA has prepared the reserve forces into small information warfare forces. For example, in Yichang City, Hubei Province, the military division organized 20 municipal departments (electricity, finance, television, medical, etc.) technical staff set up a reserve information warfare. The Department has a network of war camps, electronic war camps, intelligence war camps and 35 technical units. The department has also established the first training base in China to accommodate 500 people.

Yichang is not the only area where the organization’s reserve and militia are engaged in information warfare training. December 1999 in Xiamen, Fujian held a reserve and militia meeting. During the subsequent exercise, the militia units with high-tech equipment carried out electronic countermeasures, cyber attacks and protection, radar reconnaissance performances. The goal of the fake attack is an encircled island, so it is easy for outsiders to think about being against Taiwan. Xiamen is a special economic zone, bringing together a large number of high-tech talent, so there are advantages of the implementation of information warfare.

In an exercise conducted by the Jinan Military Region, the Xi’an People’s Armed Forces Information Warfare team played the blue side of the attack, and they developed 10 kinds of information warfare measures, including information mine, information reconnaissance, change of network information, release of information bombs, dumping Network spam, distribute web leaflets, information spoofing, spread false information, organize information defense, and establish web spy stations. From these network information warfare can be seen that their research on the network information war has been quite specific and in-depth.

China’s military experts also suggested that all levels of militia organizations should set up network technology professional units, in order to facilitate the coordination of command, militia network technology professional units should be provincial or regional units for the implementation of the group, vertical management. Reserve forces to participate in the future war in the “network attack and defense” and “network technology security”, its actions should be organized by the military organization and unified coordination.

Training base

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has developed its own set of information warfare education methods, the steps are: first to teach the basic knowledge of network information warfare; secondly through the military’s advanced military thinking to improve the level of information warfare knowledge; and then improve the use of information technology skills, Electronic technology, psychological warfare technology and information attack and defense technology; Finally, through the exercise of knowledge into practical ability. In China, mainly by the People’s Liberation Army institutions to foster information warfare high-tech talent responsibility:

People ‘s Liberation Army Communications Command College, located in Wuhan. In 1998, the hospital published two books, namely, “information combat command and control” and “information combat technology”, these two books is China’s information warfare education the most important teaching materials. The college has a high reputation for its excellent information warfare tutorials, which analyze the information, operational requirements of strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

People’s Liberation Army Information Engineering University, located in Zhengzhou, by the original PLA Information Engineering Institute, Institute of Electronic Technology and Surveying Institute merged. The main research areas of the school are information security, modern communication technology and space technology, and in some cutting-edge disciplines to explore, such as remote sensing information technology, satellite navigation and positioning technology, geographic information database technology.

People’s Liberation Army Polytechnic University, located in Nanjing, by the former People’s Liberation Army Communications Engineering College, Engineering Engineering College, Air Force Meteorological Institute and the General Association of 63 Institute merged. The school is responsible for training information warfare, commanding automation and other new disciplines of military talent. There are nearly 400 experts and professors in the university engaged in information war theory and technology research.

People’s Liberation Army National Defense Science and Technology University, located in Changsha, the school directly under the Central Military Commission. Has developed the famous “Galaxy” series of supercomputers. During the Kosovo war in April-June 1999, nearly 60 senior officers gathered in this study of high-tech wars.

People’s Liberation Army Naval Engineering University, located in Wuhan, is the only naval study of information warfare institutions. The purpose of the school’s information warfare is to apply information technology to naval equipment so that the Chinese navy can adapt to the information war.

in conclusion

What conclusions can we get from the study of information warfare in China? What can the American army get from it?

First of all, China’s military theorists have found a cheap and effective information warfare method, which makes China in the strategic military and international status to obtain the same position with the West, so that China in Asia to play a more important strategic role.

Secondly, China’s attention to the new information warfare forces is extraordinary. It may be possible to develop various forms of information warfare forces, such as: network forces (independent arms), “cyber warriors” raid units, information protection forces, information corps, electronic police and joint networks of people’s war institutions. It is interesting to note that Western countries, not China, have the ability to put these ideas into practice at this stage.

Thirdly, China’s information warfare theory reflects the combination of Western and Chinese ideas, and the influence of the former is getting weaker. Due to some common origins of military command art (Marxist dialectical thinking), China’s information warfare thought is more similar to that of Russia. However, in terms of its essence, China’s information war theory and Russia and the West are different. China’s information war theory emphasizes control, computerized warfare, cyber warfare, intellectual warfare and system of information rights.

Fourth, in the field of information warfare, China has spanned a number of technological developments and has used the Quartet’s technology to save time and save money. However, China does not fully follow the foreign, but the use of creative information war strategy. But no matter what, China is worthy of attention is different from other countries, the power of information.

For the US military, the study of China’s information war theory is not just to give the military a few opinions. “Art of War” called “know that know, victorious”. From the perspective of foreign information warfare theory to analyze the ability of the US information warfare in order to find the fatal flaws of the US information warfare system.

As the Chinese say, the losers of the information warfare are not necessarily behind the technology, and those who lack the art of command and strategic ability are the most likely to be losers. The United States to the reflection of their own information war thinking, and to study the information war strategy and tactical time. (Fan Shengqiu compilation) (“International Outlook”)

China and the latitude and longitude network February 11, 2004

 

Original Mandarin Chinese:

本文原載於美國陸軍《軍事情報》雜誌2003年7-9月號。作者蒂莫西·托馬斯是美國陸軍中校,現為美國外國軍事研究辦公室(FMSO)分析員。作者畢業於著名的西點軍校,曾任美軍第82空降師分隊指揮官,對信息戰、心理戰、低強度衝突有深入的研究。本文反映了美國軍方對中國信息戰理論和建設的憂慮與戒備心理。本刊特編譯此文,僅供讀者參考。
在過去幾年裡,中國軍方與民間專家們掀起了研究信息戰的熱潮。閱讀他們的作品後不難發現,中國的信息戰理論研究具有幾個明顯的特徵:首先,中國正迫不及待地發展自己的信息戰理論,這與其對自身安全威脅的判斷有關;其次,中國的信息戰理論受其傳統軍事指揮藝術影響頗深。無論是古代的《孫子兵法》和《三十六計》,還是毛澤東的人民戰爭思想都在信息戰理論中打下了深深的烙印;第三,中國對信息戰的認知與分類,顯然不同於信息戰的開山鼻祖——美國,雖近似於俄國的信息戰理論,卻也只是形似而神不是。

圍魏救趙
信息時代的到來促使人們對戰爭的進行方式重新進行思索。中國意識到其常規武裝力量與超級大國相比實力懸殊,近期內無論是常規力量還是核武器,中國都無法對美國構成強大威懾。但是,雄心勃勃的東方巨龍認為:隨著信息時代的來臨,戰爭形態、軍隊結構、作戰方式和指揮手段都會有嶄新的變化,信息將取代人充斥於未來戰場。只要把戰略研究的著眼點放到信息戰這一戰爭形態上,把握時代發展潮流,就不難縮短距離,並進一步取得領先地位。
中國古代有部兵書叫《三十六計》,其中的一計“圍魏救趙”就指出,如果敵人正面力量過於強大,應當避實就虛,擊其薄弱之處。中國人古為今用,把這個計謀應用到當前國家間鬥爭——如果你不能發動直接攻擊(核打擊),那就打信息戰,向西方薄弱的金融、電力等

網絡系統下手。常規武裝力量雖然無法與美國抗衡,然而,中國的信息戰部隊在理論上卻實實在在威脅到美國的政治及經濟安全,美國人無法承受紐約股票交易所和納斯達克股票交易所在瞬間崩潰。信息戰的全球可及性、光速傳播性是核戰爭所不具有的特性,中國人要的就是以信息戰的速度、準確性和持續性擊敗對手。
信息戰力量可彌補常規武裝力量的不足。各種戰場信息網絡的建立,不僅可以提高對傳統戰爭的管理水平,增強部隊的整體戰鬥力,還可以在一定程度上彌補常規力量的不足。在中國人眼中,信息戰好似如虎添翼,是常規武裝部隊的力量倍增器。
信息戰智囊
1996年,中國最早提出信息戰的專家沈偉光給信息戰下的定義是:“交戰雙方通過控制信息與情報資源來爭奪戰場主動權的戰爭。”與美國“保護友方信息系統,攻擊敵方信息系統”的定義相比,沈偉光更強調“控制”敵人。
1998年,中國軍方信息戰權威王保存少將對信息戰進行了分類:按時間分為平時、危機時、戰時;按性質分為進攻、防禦;按層次分為國家、戰略、戰區、戰術;按規模分為戰場、戰區、局部戰爭。信息戰表現的特徵包括指揮與控制戰、情報戰、電子戰、心理戰、空間控制戰、黑客戰、虛擬戰、經濟戰等方面的較量。信息戰原則上採取切斷、蒙蔽、透明、快速和提高生存力等措施。王將軍對信息戰的認識與西方較為接近,都把重點放在先進技術的對抗上。
1999年,中國專家對信息戰展開了大討論。沈偉光此時把信息戰的範圍擴大,他認為“信息戰,廣義地指對壘的軍事(也包括政治、經濟、科技及社會一切領域)集團搶占信息空間和爭奪信息資源的戰爭,狹義地指戰爭中交戰雙方在信息領域的對抗。它是現代戰爭的本質特徵之一。信息戰的本質在於通過奪取制信息權達到’不戰而屈人之兵’。”
軍方另一位信息戰專家王普豐少將對信息戰有很深入的理解,2000年,他把信息戰和信息戰爭區別開。根據他的解釋,信息戰爭指的是一種戰爭形態,它包含了信息戰,而信息戰指的是一種作戰活動。他認為“信息戰包括所有作戰活動,其中有對敵信息及信息系統實施信息竊取、篡改、刪除、欺騙、擾亂、阻塞、干擾、癱瘓等一系列的入侵活動和計算機病毒攻擊,最終使敵計算機網絡無法正常工作。”他主張中國的信息戰理論在藉鑒國外先進作戰思想的同時,應具有中國自己的特色。
“毛式網絡人民戰爭”
中國對信息戰的認知非常具有傳統特色。許多軍事理論家認為信息時代賦予了毛澤東人民戰爭思想新的內涵,因此,主張依靠和發動廣大人民群眾進行網上戰爭。可以想像,無論是哪個同家,與13億人打網絡戰都是令人生畏的。
毛澤東式網絡人民戰爭理論的最重要特徵是它打破了軍與民的界限。模糊了軍用設施與民用設施、軍用技術與民用技術的傳統分界線。信息技術在軍用和民用上的共享,為廣泛利用民間技術達成軍事目的創造了條件。例如,可以利用民間的電子信息設備進行情報截獲和傳輸可以利用民間的通信網絡進行戰爭動員;可以利用民間的計算機進行網絡進攻和防禦等。其次,軍事人員與非軍事人員的區別也在逐漸消失。隨著網絡技術的發展和應用領域的擴大,大批的網絡技術人才脫穎而出。這些具備特殊能力的網絡精英將成為未來網絡人民戰爭中的角斗士。與此同時,通信、交通、金融系統等信息網絡與國際聯網,為中國開展人民戰爭提供了必要條件。
如今,人民戰爭思想已經被確立為中國網絡信息戰的根本指導原則。一個中國軍方作者寫道:“靈活機動的戰略戰術原則,仍然是網絡信息戰的靈魂。廣大人民群眾積極參戰,特別是技術支援和網上參戰,則是奪取網絡信息戰勝利的群眾基礎和力量源泉。”
網絡人民戰爭的威力是如此可怕,或許,我們可以明白為何中國人願意削減其武裝部隊規模了——設想一旦戰爭爆發,中國可以發動大量民眾參戰,信息工程師和平民將被組織起來,通過家中的電腦攻擊美國的網絡信息系統,那又何必要維持規模龐大的作戰部隊呢?
信息戰演練
過去幾年裡,中國舉行過數次重大信息戰軍事演習對信息戰理論進行檢驗。首次“特種戰”(信息戰)演練於1997年10月進行。某軍區的一個集團軍遭到旨在癱瘓其係統的病毒攻擊,該集團軍用殺毒軟件進行了防衛。該演練被稱為“入侵與反入侵演練”。演習時還動用了地面後勤、醫療和空軍部隊。
1998年10月,中國舉行了一場由三大軍區聯合進行的高科技綜合演練。聯合防禦作戰演練中首次使用了“軍事信息高速公路”。指揮自動化系統中的信息網絡系統由數字、撥號、指揮網和保密信道組成。指揮自動化系統的其他部分是指揮作戰、音頻和圖形處理、控制和數據加密等子系統。
1999年10月,解放軍首次進行了兩個集團軍之間的戰役級計算機網上對抗演習。演練了偵察與反偵察、干擾與反干擾、封鎖與反封鎖、空襲與反空襲等科目。在軟件環境下進行了資源共享、作戰指揮、態勢顯示、輔助評估、信號傳輸和情報戰等6類作業。計算機評估系統對演習雙方的表現進行數據與質量分析。
2000年7月,某軍區也進行了網上對抗演練。與此次演練有關的3項訓練任務是:組織和計劃戰役、奪取制空權和製信息權、實施突破和反突破。有100多台終端聯網參與了演練。
民兵分隊
中國的人民戰爭有一套完備的體制,其總體發展方向是“精幹的常備軍與強大的後備力量相結合”,這種國防體制有利於發揮人民戰爭的整體效能和“網海戰術”優勢。
中國150萬預備役部隊十分熱衷於打網絡人民戰爭。在一些地區,解放軍已經把預備役部隊編成小型信息戰部隊。例如,在湖北省宜昌市,軍分區組織了20個市政部門(電力、財政、電視、醫療等)的技術人員成立了預備役信息戰團。該部擁有網絡戰營、電子戰營、情報心理戰營及35個技術分隊。該部還建立了中國第一個能容納500人的預備役信息戰訓練基地。
宜昌並不是組織預備役和民兵進行信息戰訓練的唯一地區。 1999年12月在福建廈門召開了預備役和民兵會議。在隨後進行的演習中,擁有高技術裝備的民兵分隊進行了電子對抗、網絡攻擊和防護、雷達偵察表演。山於假想攻擊的目標是一座被包圍的島嶼,因此很容易讓外人聯想到是針對台灣。廈門是經濟特區,匯集了大量高科技人才,因此有實施信息戰的優越條件。
在一次由濟南軍區舉行的演習中,西安人武部信息戰分隊扮演負責攻擊的藍方,他們制定了10種信息戰措施,其中有安放信息地雷、信息偵察、改動網絡資料、釋放信息炸彈、傾倒網絡垃圾、分發網絡傳單、信息欺騙、散佈虛假信息、組織信息防禦、建立網絡間諜站。從這些網絡信息戰法可以看出,他們對網絡信息戰的研究已相當具體、深入。
中國的軍事專家還建議,各級民兵組織都應成立網絡技術專業分隊,為便於指揮協調,民兵網絡技術專業分隊應以省或者地區為單位實行條條編組,垂直管理。後備力量參與未來戰爭中的“網絡攻防”和“網絡技術保障”,其行動要由軍隊組織實施和統一協調。
培養基地
中國人民解放軍發展出自己的一套信息戰教育方法,其步驟是:首先傳授網絡信息戰基礎知識;其次通過講述外軍的先進軍事思想提高信息戰知識水平;然後提高信息戰使用技能,特別是電子技術、心理戰技術和信息攻防技術;最後,通過演習把知識轉化為實際操作能力。在中國,主要由解放軍院校擔負培養信息戰高技術人才的責任:
解放軍通信指揮學院,位於武漢。 1998年,該院出版了兩部書籍,分別是《信息作戰指揮控制學》和《信息作戰技術學》,這兩部書籍是中國信息戰教育最重要的教材。該學院以其優良的信息戰教程設置而享有很高的聲譽,這些教程分析了戰略、戰役、戰術層次的信息作戰要求。
解放軍信息工程大學,位於鄭州,由原解放軍信息工程學院、電子技術學院和測繪學院合併而成。該校目前主要研究領域是信息安全,現代通信技術和空間技術,並且在一些尖端學科領域進行探索,如遙感信息技術、衛星導航與定位技術、地理信息數據庫技術。
解放軍理工大學,位於南京,由原解放軍通信工程學院、工程兵工程學院、空軍氣象學院和總參第63研究所合併而成。該校專門負責訓練信息戰、指揮自動化和其它新學科的軍事人才。有近400名專家教授在該大學從事信息戰理論與技術研究。
解放軍國防科技大學,位於長沙,該校直接隸屬於中央軍委。曾開發了著名的“銀河”系列超級計算機。 1999年4月到6月科索沃戰爭期間,近60名高級軍官匯集在此研究高科技戰爭。
解放軍海軍工程大學,位於武漢,是海軍唯一研究信息戰的院校。該校研究信息戰的目的是把信息技術應用到海軍裝備,使中國海軍能適應信息化戰爭。
結論
我們從中國的信息戰研究中能得到什麼結論呢?美國軍隊又能從中得到什麼啟示呢?
首先,中國的軍事理論家找到了一廉價而有效的信息戰方法,它使中國在戰略軍事和國際地位上取得與西方相等的位置,從而使中國在亞人地區發揮更重要的戰略角色。
其次,中國對新型信息戰部隊的重視非同尋常。因此可能會發展形式各樣的信息戰部隊,例如:網絡部隊(獨立兵種)、“網絡勇士”突襲分隊、信息保護部隊、信息兵團,電子警察和聯合網絡人民戰爭機構。有意思的是,就現階段的能力而言,西方國家,而不是中國,更具有把這些設想付諸實施的能力。
第三,中國的信息戰理論反映了西方和中國思想的結合,而且前者的影響力越來越弱。由於軍事指揮藝術的一些共同淵源(馬克思主義辯證思想),中國的信息戰思想更類似於俄國。但是,就其本質而言,中國的信息戰理論與俄國和西方都不同。中國的信息戰理論強調控制、電腦化戰爭、網絡戰、知識戰和製信息權。
第四,在信息戰領域,中國跨越了若干技術發展階段,利用四方的技術,不僅節省了時間而且還節省了金錢。不過,中國沒有完全仿效外國,而是採用創造性的信息戰策略。但不管怎麼樣,中國都是值得關注的一支不同於其他國家的信息戰力量。
對美軍而言,研究中國的信息戰理論絕非僅僅為了給軍方提供幾條意見。 《孫子兵法》稱“知彼知已,百戰百勝”。從外國信息戰理論的角度來分析美國的信息戰能力,才能發現美國信息戰系統的致命缺陷。
正如中國人所言,信息戰的失敗者不一定是技術落後方,那些缺乏指揮藝術和戰略能力的人才最可能是失敗者。美國到了該反省自己的信息戰思想,並研究信息戰戰略和戰術的時候了。 (範胜球編譯)(《國際展望》)
華夏經緯網 2004年02月11日

 

國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 // Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 //

Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

In recent years, information warfare has become a hot spot all over the world.China’s military strategists have not neglected their importance as a tool of war, and are accelerating the development of information warfare theory. They are not only exploring theoretical issues, but also training troops.

Information warfare with Chinese characteristics

Chinese military theorists believe that information warfare can give Mao Zedong’s people’s war ideas into the omission. This view by the Chinese information warfare expert Wang Pufeng (transliteration) generals in 1995 for the first time. Some people think that electronics, computer and information engineering experts, like the past soldiers on the battlefield, can become the main force in the new people’s war. Obviously they want to use the people’s war ideas to fight the information war – a war with a home computer, when necessary to mobilize thousands of people, attack foreign computer systems. China has a number of outstanding software experts, in the field of information war has great potential. The question is how to seek greater information space and equipment for the huge population.

“The whole society will replace the traditional battlefield,” said Shen Weiguang, an information warfare expert. “Different classes and social groups will participate in political activities in their own country or other countries.” He advocates the establishment of a scientist, police, Other experts to form the information protection forces to defend the security of the national information field, to counter the invasion of information launched by other countries.

The idea of ​​combining the people’s war with the information war is being carried out in China’s 1.5 million strong reserve army. The People’s Liberation Army is turning the reserve forces of certain military sub-divisions into small-scale information warfare. In Hubei, a military division, the People’s Armed Forces Department has 20 towns of the armed forces to form a reserve / militia information warfare. The Department has a network of war camps, electronic war camps, intelligence and psychological camps, and 35 technical units (classes to camp). The department has also established the first training base for information services that can accommodate 500 people.

The above-mentioned military division is not the only military division of the organization’s reserve and militia for information warfare. “Liberation Army Daily” has reported that in December 1999 a city along the southeast coast held a meeting of the reserve and militia forces, during the electronic interference, network attack and defense and radar reconnaissance and other red. There are also reports of information warfare activities organized by the People’s Armed Forces and the Armed Forces in other regions.

In the information war era, China is also affected by another important tactics, that is, China’s “thirty-six dollars.” About 300 years ago, an unnamed scholar collected 36 Chinese tactics, and compiled a book, named “thirty-six dollars.” The book focuses on deception as a military art that achieves military goals. In the information age, due to the unknown uncertainty of the attacker’s origin (the program’s listening to the source of the virus and the presence of the back door increases the vulnerability of the system), some tactics may be reusable, thirty-six may find new Meaning and new use.

Some critics argue that in today’s high-tech era, these ancient strategies are hard to do. However, just look at a few of them, then it is another situation: the first plan “deceive”, meaning by resorting to deceit and camouflage means to hide their true intentions, in order to achieve the purpose of loosening the enemy vigilance. Applying to information wartime is the use of regular e-mail and commercial lines on the Internet to cover the purpose of sending dangerous code and viruses. The fourth meter “to wait and see”. Meaning that when fighting their own recharge your batteries, until the enemy fatigue chaos, take the opportunity to win. Application to the information wartime is the use of people’s war theory, extensive mobilization of the masses to attack, until all the Western computer to meet the difficulty of self-propelled when the implementation of large-scale attack.

At present, China is considering the establishment of future high-tech operations of the “network army.” It will protect the network sovereignty, network warfare and technology and knowledge-intensive operations. Network technology will include: can decipher the password, steal data and restore data browsing technology; can attack on the network and attack counterattack technology; can fake fake identity from the network to steal the license of camouflage technology; to avoid attacks, Prevent internal leaks, and defensive techniques that prevent random action like electronic police.

Definition of information warfare

China’s famous author of the issue of information warfare at home and abroad is Dr. Shen Weiguang, Major General Wang Pufeng, Wang Baoji University and Yuan Bangji General (both sound Ze). In 1996, Dr. Shen first proposed the definition of information warfare: information war is a two sides through the control of information and intelligence to try to master the battlefield initiative of the war. As the United States defined, Dr. Shen stressed that “save yourself, fight against the enemy” into “to protect themselves, control the enemy.” Wang generals also believe that the key to information warfare is to control the information.
In 1997, Wang Baoji University from the perspective of China’s military science and Marxism-Leninism to elaborate on the word information warfare. This article covers the form, nature, hierarchy, characteristics, characteristics and principles of information warfare. He believes that the form of information warfare is divided into normal, crisis and wartime three; nature is attack and defense of the contest; level is divided into national, strategic, theater and tactical four; features include command and control warfare, intelligence war Such as electronic warfare, psychological warfare, space control warfare, hacking warfare, virtual warfare, economic warfare, strategic and precise contest, etc .; features complex, transparent, limited target, short duration, small damage, large combat space, Comprehensive, strong command capability, etc .; in principle, to take cut, blinded, transparent, fast melon and improve the viability and other measures. His office and analysis of information warfare help people gain a deeper understanding of China’s information warfare.

Another author of China’s definition of information war is the General Staff of the PLA General Staff, he wrote in the 1999 book that: “Information war is a capture and maintain the control of information and struggle between the hostile parties Compete for access to control and use of information initiative, they use and protect their own information and resources and information systems at the same time, will use and destroy the enemy’s information resources, information systems and information-based weapons systems.

In 2000, General Wang Pufeng made a more thorough and thorough explanation of the “information warfare” than he used to be “information war”. Wang believes that the information war refers to a war and a war mode; information warfare refers to a kind of combat and a combat mode. The new mode of action refers to the action that is carried out in the computer network. Information warfare includes information detection systems, information transmission systems, information and weapons attack systems, and information processing and application systems. Information warfare contains information warfare, which combines information and ability to use information networks based on the battlefield as their place of activity.

Information warfare training

In February 1999, an interesting article on information warfare training defined information warfare as a knowledge war, a special contest for the power of high intelligence. The definition stems from the fact that high-tech warfare requires commanders and operators to have a high level of knowledge, strong mental, command and operational skills.
Chinese military leaders, after recognizing the gap between the above and the more developed countries, decided to carry out training activities at all levels. The staff will be divided into three categories by age:

The first category for the support of talent, the main goal is more than 40 years of age at all levels of leading cadres. The aim is to eliminate their blind spots by training (from mechanization concepts to simulated computer fights) to change their minds and apply them to future wars. Training content includes: information technology foundation, information warfare theory, information warfare weapons universal knowledge. Training methods of color training courses and other auxiliary methods.

The second category is a transitional talent, training goal is 30-40 year old cadres. As the future leaders of the Chinese army, they must focus on improving the commanding ability in the information warfare environment.

The third category for the regeneration of talent, training for the 30-year-old cadres. These people have long been adapted to the information society, with a good foundation of modern information technology theory, focusing on improving their commanding ability and skills.

The training of various age groups includes: basic theory (computer foundation and application, communication network technology, information highway, digital force); electronic warfare; radar technology; information war rules and rules; information strategy and tactics; theater and strategic information warfare Information systems (including the collection of letters, processing, information and use of information warfare); monitoring, decision-making and control systems; information weapons (soft and hard destruction of the concept and principles, how to use information weapons, analog information warfare); information system protection; Computer virus attack and defense, as well as communication network interference and anti-interference.

The article shows that China is preparing a first-class information warfare course. However, subsequent reports indicate that this is not the case. In July 1999, a “Liberation Army Daily” pointed out: “training content, system and structure of the rationality of the information warfare training can not really become the mainstream of our military training.Currently, information warfare training in a state of arbitrary. System, operation is not standardized, the lack of assessment standards and management regulations.

Information warfare

Over the past three years, China has held several major information warfare military exercises, every time it is important, because it is a test of information war theory. The first “special war” (information warfare) exercise was conducted in October 1997; a military army in a military area was subjected to a computer attack aimed at paralyzing its system, and the group’s military antivirus software was defended. The exercise is called “invasion and anti-intrusion exercise”. The exercise used ground logistics, medical and air forces.

In October 1998, China held a high-tech comprehensive exercise with several national military zones. The first use of the “military information superhighway” was used for joint defense operations. The information network subsystem in the command automation system is composed of digital, dialing, command network and secret channel. The other parts of the command automation system are subsystems such as command warfare, audio and graphics processing, control and data encryption. Military information highway in addition to the trend map, but also send graphics, characters and audio data.

In October 1999, the People’s Liberation Army for the first time between the two groups of war-level computer online confrontation exercise. Conducted reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance, interference and anti-interference, blockade and anti-blockade, air strikes and anti-air raid and other subjects. In the software environment, resource sharing, combat command, situation display, auxiliary evaluation, signal transmission and intelligence warfare and other six types of operations. The computer evaluation system conducts mathematical and qualitative analysis of the performance of the participant.
In July 2000, a military area in southwest China also conducted an online confrontation exercise. The three training tasks related to the exercise are: organizing and planning the campaign, seizing air power and making information, implementing breakthroughs and breaking down. There are more than 100 terminal networking involved in the exercise. Three weeks later, another military area also opened a high-tech exercise curtain, and issued to the subordinate units began to control the communication line command.

China ‘s Information Warfare Ability

Chinese military theorists have found a voluntary, very economical and obedient partner in information warfare. This partner will enable China to catch up with the West in strategic, military and international status. Which will enable China to play an important strategic role in the future Asia-Pacific region. China may gradually pay close attention to economic competitors.

China attaches great importance to the role played by the new information warfare forces, including the network forces (independent arms), the network warriors commando, the information protection forces, the information corps, the electronic police and the joint people’s war network. The latter is particularly concerned by foreign analysts because of its unique nature and potential. Chinese military theorists believe that the victory of information warfare will belong to the one who can mobilize the most computer experts to participate in the “information family war”, they will use such as cyber war strategy, trying to cut off important information nodes and contacts.

At present, China’s information warfare combines Western, Russian and Chinese ideas. However, information wars with Chinese characteristics, which are different from Russia and the West, are gradually forming. China’s information warfare should look for answers to the questions from today’s military history, such as the nature and characteristics of information warfare.

However, there are still many shortcomings in China’s information warfare methods, not just quantitative aspects. The core of the information warfare theory also involves maintaining the integrity and stability of the infrastructure. In the information age, infrastructure stability is as important as troop survivability. China’s biggest weakness is just in terms of infrastructure. At present, China is accelerating the development of electronic information industry, its purpose is nothing more than for the military and civilian information base for the use of infrastructure.

China is good at drawing lessons from others, may soon be able to set up a compelling information warfare force. Information war has forced China to cross a number of technological development stages, the use of Western technology, not only save time but also save money. However, China may not fully follow the example of others, but will take a creative or indirect information war strategy. But no matter what, China is worthy of attention is different from other countries, the power of information.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

近些年來,信息戰已經成為全世界的熱點。中國的軍事家們也沒有忽視其作為戰爭工具的重要意義,正在加速發展信息戰理論。他們不僅正在探索理論方面的課題,而且也在據此訓練部隊。

中國特色的信息戰

中國軍事理論家認為,信息戰可以給毛澤東的人民戰爭思想注入省略。此觀點由中國信息戰專家王普峰(音譯)將軍於1995年首次提出。有人認為,電子、計算機和信息工程專家如同過去戰場上的將士一樣,可以成為新人民戰爭中的主力軍。顯然他們是希望用人民戰爭思想打信息戰--一種用家用微機即可進行的戰爭,需要時動員成千上萬人,攻擊外國計算機系統。中國擁有一批傑出的軟件專家,在信息戰領域有巨大潛力。問題是如何為龐大的人口尋求更大的信息空間和設備。

信息戰專家沈偉光在文章中寫道:“整個社會將取代傳統戰場。不同階層和社會團體將參與本國或其他國家的政治活動。”他主張建立一支由精通信息戰的科學家、警察、士兵和其他專家組成的信息保護部隊,以捍衛國家信息領域的安全,反擊其他國家發動的信息入侵。

將人民戰爭和信息戰相結合的思想正在貫徹到中國150萬強大後備軍中。人民解放軍正將某些軍分區的後備役部隊變成小型信息戰團。在湖北某軍分區,人民武裝部已將20個城鎮的武裝部組成一個後備役/民兵信息戰團。該部擁有網絡戰營、電子戰營、情報和心理戰營,以及35支技術分隊(班到營)。該部還建立了第一個可容納500人的後備役信息戰訓練基地。

上述軍分區並非是組織後備役和民兵進行信息戰訓練的唯一軍分區。 《解放軍報》曾報導說,1999年12月東南沿海某城市舉行了一次運用後備役和民兵部隊的會議,期間進行了電子乾擾,網絡攻防和雷達偵察等演紅。同樣還有其他地區人武部和軍分區組織信息戰活動的報導。

在信息戰時代,中國還受到另一個重要戰法的影響,即中國的“三十六計”。大約300年前,一位無名學者蒐集到中國的36個計謀,並彙編成書,取名為《三十六計》。該書著重將欺騙作為達成軍事目標的軍事藝術。在信息時代,因攻擊者來歷不明的情況不確定性(程序聽病毒源和存在的後門增大了系統的易損性),有些計謀可能會重新有用武之地,三十六計可能會找到新含義和新用途。

一些評論家認為,在當今的高技術時代,這些古代計策難有作為。然而,只需看看其中的幾計,則又是另一番情況:第一計“瞞天過海”,意思是通過採取欺騙和偽裝的手段隱藏自己的真實意圖,以達到鬆懈敵人警惕性的目的。應用到信息戰時就是使用互聯網上的正規電子郵件和商業線路來掩蓋發送危險代碼和病毒的目的。第四計“以逸待勞”。意思是作戰時自己養精蓄銳,待敵疲勞混亂時,乘機出擊取勝。應用到信息戰時就是利用人民戰爭理論,廣泛發動群眾進行攻擊,待所有西方計算機應爭反應小級難以自拔時再實施大規模進攻。

目前中國正考慮建立未來高科技作戰的“網絡軍”。它將保護網絡主權,進行網絡戰以及技術和知識密集型作戰。網絡技術將包括:能破譯密碼、偷取數據和恢復數據的瀏覽技術;能在網絡上發起攻擊和乾擾的反擊技術;能通過偽造假身份從網絡竊取許可權的偽裝技術;能避開攻擊、防止內部洩密以及像電子警察那樣阻止隨意行動的防禦技術。

信息戰的定義

中國探討國內外信息戰問題的著名作者是沈偉光博士、王普鋒少將、王保存大校和袁邦概將軍(均為音澤)。 1996年,沈博士首次提出信息戰定義:信息戰是一場雙方通過控制信息和情報輿來設法掌握戰場主動權的戰爭。正如美國界定的那樣,沈博士強調把“保存自己,打擊敵人”變為“保護自己,控制敵人”。王將軍也認為信息戰取勝的關鍵是控制信息。
1997年,王保存大校從中國軍事科學和馬列主義的角度精闢地闡述字信息戰問題。該文涵蓋信息戰的形式、性質、層次、特徵、特點和原則。他認為:形式上信息戰分為平時、危機時和戰時三種;性質上是攻與防的較量;層次分為國家、戰略、戰區和戰術四級;特徵包括指揮與控制戰、情報戰、電子戰、心理戰、空間控制戰、黑客戰、虛擬戰、經濟戰、戰略和精確的較量等;特點有復雜、透明、目標有限、持續時間短、毀傷小、戰鬥空間大、部隊疏散、綜合性強、指揮能力要求強等;原則上採取切斷、蒙蔽、透明、快速瓜和提高生存力等措施。他對信息戰的辦公室和分析有助於人們更深入了解中國的信息戰。

中國另一位界定信息戰的作者是解放軍總參謀部的袁將軍,他在1999年撰寫的書中認為:“信息戰是一場奪取和保持信息控制權而進行的鬥爭,是敵對雙方之間爭奪獲取控制和使用信息主動權的鬥爭,他們在使用和保護己方各種信息戰資源和信息系統的同時,會利用和破壞敵方的信息資源、信息系統和基於信息的武器系統。

2000年,王普鋒將軍對“信息戰爭”作了比以往更深入透徹的解釋,以別於“信息戰”。王將軍認為,信息戰爭指的是一種戰爭和一種戰爭模式;信息戰指的是一種作戰和一種作戰模式。之種新作戰模式指的是在計算機網絡窨進行的行動。信息戰包括信息探測系統、信息傳輸系統、信息和武器攻擊系統以及信息處理和應用系統。信息戰爭包含信息戰,兩者將信息和能力融為一體,使用以信息網絡為基礎的戰場作為他們的活動場所。

信息戰訓練

1999年2月,一篇關於信息戰訓練的有趣文章將信息戰界定為知識型戰爭,是高智能人才之間力量的特殊較量。該定義源於這樣一個事實:高技術戰爭需要指揮員和操作員有很高的知識、很強的心理素質、指揮能力和作戰技術。
中國軍方領導人在認識到上述幾方面與較發達國家存在的差距後,決定在各級開展訓練活動。將人員按年齡分為3類:

第一類為支撐型人才,主要目標是40多歲以上的各級領導幹部。目的是通過訓練(從機械化概念到模擬計算機戰鬥)消除他們的信息盲區,轉變他們的觀念,使其將新思維應用到未來戰爭中去。訓練內容包括:信息技術基礎、信息戰理論、信息戰武器普及知識。訓練方法彩短訓班和其他輔助方法。

第二類為過渡型人才,培養目標是30-40歲的干部。作為中國軍隊的未來領導者,他們必須著重提高信息戰環境下的指揮能力。

第三類為再生型人才,培養對象為30歲以下的干部。這些人早已適應信息社會,擁有現代信息技術理論的良好根基,重點是提高他們的指揮能力和技藝。

各個年齡組的訓練包括:基礎理論(計算機基礎和應用、通信網絡技術、信息高速公路、數字化部隊);電子對抗;雷達技術;信息戰規律與規則;信息戰略與戰術;戰區與戰略信息戰的信息系統(包括收信紙、處理、輿和使用信息戰指令);監測、決策和控制系統;信息武器(軟、硬破壞的概念和原則、如何應用信息武器、模擬信息戰);信息系統保護;計算機病毒攻與防,以及通信網絡的干擾與反干擾。

該文章表明中國正在編制第一流的信息戰課程。然而,後來的報導表明情況並非如此。 1999年7月的一份《解放軍報》指出:“訓練內容、體制和結構的無理性使信息戰訓練不能真正成為我軍訓練的主流。目前,信息戰訓練處於一種隨心所欲的狀態。內容不系統,運作不規範,缺乏評估標準和管理規章”。

信息戰演練

過去3年,中國舉行過數次重大信息戰軍事演習,每次都很重要,因為那是對信息戰理論的一次檢驗。首次“特種戰”(信息戰)演練於1997年10月進行;某軍區的一個集團軍遭到旨在癱瘓其係統的計算機攻擊,該集團軍用殺毒軟件進行了防衛。該演練被稱為“入侵與反入侵演練”。演習時運用了地面後勤、醫療和空軍部隊。

1998年10月,中國舉行了一場有全國數個軍區聯合進行的高科技綜合演練。聯合防禦作戰演練時首次使用了“軍事信息高速公路”。指揮自動化系統中的信息網絡子系統由數字、撥號、指揮網和保密信道組成。指揮自動化系統的其他部分是指揮作戰、音頻和圖形處理、控制和數據加密等子系統。軍事信息高速公路除傳勢圖外,還發發送圖形、字符和音頻數據。

1999年10月,解放軍首次進行了兩個集團軍之間的戰役級計算機網上對抗演練。演練了偵察與反偵察、干擾與反干擾、封鎖與反封鎖、空襲與反空襲等科目。在軟件環境下進行了資源共享、作戰指揮、態勢顯示、輔助評估、信號傳輸和情報戰等6類作業。計算機評估系統對參演者的表現進行數理與質量分析。
2000年7月,西南某軍區也進行了網上對抗演練。與此次演練有關的3項訓練任務是:組織和計劃戰役、奪取制空權和製信息權、實施突破和反突破。有100多台終端聯網參與了演練。三週後,另一個軍區也拉開了高技術演練的帷幕,並向下屬部隊下達開始控制通信線路的命令。

中國的信息戰能力

中國軍事理論家已在信息戰方面找到一個自願、非常經濟和順從的伙伴。這個夥伴將使中國在戰略、軍事和國際地位上趕上西方。這將使中國在未來亞太地區發揮重要的戰略作用。中國可能會逐步引起經濟競爭者的密切關注。

中國異常重視新信息戰部隊所表現出的作用,這方面的各種組織包括:網絡部隊(獨立兵種)、網絡勇士突擊隊、信息保護部隊、信息兵團、電子警察和聯合的人民戰爭網絡機構。後者因其獨特的性質和潛力引起外國分析家格外關注。中國軍事理論家認為,信息戰的勝利將屬於能夠動員最多的計算機專家參加“信息家庭戰”的那一方,他們將採用諸如網點戰那樣的戰略,設法切斷重要的信息節點和接點。

目前,中國的信息戰融合了西方、俄羅斯和中國的思想,然而,有別於俄羅斯和西方的具有中國特色的信息戰詞彙正在逐步形成。中國信息戰應從中國軍事歷史中尋找解決當今問題的答案,如36計、信息戰的性質和特點看來非常適合這些計策。

但是,中國的信息戰方法還存在許多不足,還不僅僅是數量方面的問題。信息戰作戰理論的核心還涉及到保持基礎設施的完整性和穩定性。在信息時代,基礎設施穩定性與部隊生存能力同等重要。中國的最大弱點恰恰就在基礎設施方面。目前中國正在加速發展電子信息產業,其目的不外乎是為軍民聯用的信息基礎設施打基礎。

中國善於吸取別人的前車之鑑,可能很快就可以組建一支令人刮目相看的信息戰力量。信息戰已迫使中國跨越了若干技術發展階段,利用西方的技術,不僅節省了時間而且還節省了金錢。然而,中國可能不會完全仿效別人,而將採取創造性的或間接的信息戰策略。但不管怎麼樣,中國都是值得關注的一支不同於其他國家的信息戰力量.

Original Date: 新華網 ( 2003-06-12 16:0x:xx )

Original Source:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2003-06/12/content_916888.htm

中國新的網絡安全法 // Internet Security Law of the People ‘s Republic of China

中國新的網絡安全法 // Internet Security Law of the People ‘s Republic of China

Table of Contents

    Chapter 1 General Provisions

Chapter 2 Network Security Support and Promotion

Chapter 3 Network Operation Safety

Section 1 General Provisions

SECTION 2: Operational safety of key information infrastructures

Chapter 4 Network Information Security

Chapter 5 Monitoring Early Warning and Emergency Handling

Chapter VI Legal Liability

Chapter VII Supplementary Provisions

Chapter 1 General Provisions

The first order to protect network security , safeguard cyberspace sovereignty and national security , public interests , protection of citizens , legal persons and other organizations , to promote the healthy development of economic and social information , this law is enacted .

Article in the territory of People’s Republic of China construction , operation , maintenance and use of the network , as well as supervision and management of network security , this Law shall apply .

Third countries adhere to both network security and information technology development , follow the active use , scientific development , according to management , to ensure the safety policy , promote the network infrastructure construction and interoperability , to encourage innovation and application of network technology , to support the development of network security personnel , Establish and improve the network security system , improve network security protection .

Article 4 The State shall formulate and continuously improve the network security strategy , clearly define the basic requirements and main objectives of the network security , and put forward the network security policies , tasks and measures in the key areas .

Article 5 The State shall take measures to monitor , defend and dispose of network security risks and threats arising from the territory of the People’s Republic of China , protect the critical information infrastructure from attack , intrusion , interference and destruction , punish the network for criminal activities and maintain the network Space security and order .

Article 6 The State shall promote the network behavior of honesty and trustworthiness , health and civilization , promote the dissemination of socialist core values , and take measures to raise the awareness and level of cybersecurity in the whole society and form a favorable environment for the whole society to participate in promoting network security .

Article VII countries active in cyberspace governance , network technology research and standards development , the fight against international exchange and cooperation network and other crimes , to promote the building of peace , security , open , cooperative cyberspace , multilateral , democratic , transparent network Governance system .

Article VIII of the National Network Information Department is responsible for co-ordination network security and related supervision and administration . State Council department in charge of telecommunications , public security departments and other relevant authorities in accordance with this Law and other relevant laws , administrative regulations , responsible for network security and supervision and administration within their respective areas of responsibility .

Local people’s governments above the county level of network security and regulatory functions , determined in accordance with relevant state regulations .

Article IX network and service operators to carry out business activities , must abide by laws , administrative regulations , respect social ethics , abide by business ethics , honesty and credit , fulfill the obligation to protect network security , and accept the supervision of government and society , social responsibility .

Article X build , operate or provide network services through a network , it should be in accordance with laws , regulations and national standards and administrative regulations of mandatory requirements , technical measures and other necessary measures , to ensure network security , stable operation , to effectively deal with network security incidents , Prevent cyber criminal activities , maintain the integrity of network data , confidentiality and usability .

Article XI  network-related industry organizations accordance with the constitution , strengthen self-discipline , to develop guidelines for network security behavior , guide members to strengthen network security , increase network security levels , and promote the healthy development of the industry .

Article XII of  the State protection of citizens , legal persons and other organizations the right to use the network in accordance with law , the promotion of universal access network , improve network service levels , and provide safe , convenient network services , to protect the free flow of network information according to law and orderly .

Any person and organization using the network should abide by the constitutional law , abide by the public order , respect social morality , not endanger the network security , shall not use the network to endanger national security , honor and interests , incite subversion of state power , overthrow the socialist system , incitement to split the country , The destruction of national unity , the promotion of terrorism , extremism , the promotion of national hatred , ethnic discrimination , the dissemination of violence , obscene pornography , fabricating and disseminating false information to disrupt economic order and social order , and infringe upon the reputation , privacy , intellectual property and other legitimate rights and interests of others And other activities .

Article XIII  countries to support research and development is conducive to healthy growth of minors networking products and services , punishing minors using the Internet to endanger physical and mental health activities according to law , to provide security for minors , healthy network environment .

Article 14  Any individual or organization shall have the right to report to the network , telecommunications , public security and other departments that are harmful to the safety of the Internet . The department that receives the report shall handle it in a timely manner and if it does not belong to the duties of the department , it shall promptly transfer the department to be handled .

The relevant departments shall keep the relevant information of the whistleblower and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the whistleblower .

Chapter 2 Network Security Support and Promotion

Article 15 The  State shall establish and improve the network security standard system . The department in charge of standardization of the State Council and other relevant departments under the State Council shall, in accordance with their respective duties , organize and formulate and revise the national standards and industry standards for network security management and network products , services and operation safety .

National support enterprises , research institutions , colleges and universities , network-related industry organizations to participate in network security national standards , industry standards .

Article 16 The   State Council and the people’s governments of provinces , autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government shall make overall plans , increase investment , support key network security technology industries and projects , support the research and development and application of network security technology , promote safe and reliable network products and services , Protection of network technology intellectual property rights , support enterprises , research institutions and colleges and universities to participate in national network security technology innovation projects .

Article 17 The   State shall promote the construction of a social security service system for network security and encourage the relevant enterprises and institutions to carry out safety services such as network security certification , testing and risk assessment .

Article 18 The   State encourages the development of network data security protection and utilization technology to promote the opening of public data resources and promote technological innovation and economic and social development .

State support innovative network security management , the use of new network technologies , enhance network security level .

Article XIX   governments at all levels and relevant departments should organize regular network security education , and guidance , and urge the relevant units to do network safety publicity and education work .

The mass media should be targeted to the community for network security publicity and education .

Article 20 The  State shall support enterprises and institutions of higher education , vocational schools and other educational and training institutions to carry out network safety-related education and training , and adopt a variety of ways to train network security personnel and promote the exchange of network security personnel .

Chapter 3 Network Operation Safety

Section 1 General Provisions

Article 21 The  State shall implement a system of network security protection . Network operators should be in accordance with the requirements of the network security level protection system , perform the following security obligations , to protect networks from interference , damage or unauthorized access , preventing data leakage or stolen , tampered with :

( 1 ) to formulate internal safety management systems and operating procedures , to determine the network security responsible person , the implementation of network security protection responsibility ;

( 2 ) to take precautions against computer viruses and network attacks , network intrusion and other hazards of network security behavior of technical measures ;

( 3 ) to take technical measures to monitor and record the operation status of the network and the network security incident , and to keep the relevant network log in accordance with the regulations for not less than six months ;

( D ) to take data classification , important data backup and encryption and other measures ;

( 5 ) other obligations stipulated by laws and administrative regulations .

Article 22 The  network products and services shall conform to the mandatory requirements of the relevant national standards . Network products , service providers may not set up malicious programs ; found their network products , services, security defects , loopholes and other risks , should immediately take remedial measures , in accordance with the provisions of the timely notification of the user and report to the relevant authorities .

The providers of network products and services shall provide continuous maintenance of their products and services ; they shall not terminate the provision of safety maintenance within the time limit prescribed by the parties or the parties .

Network products , services with the collection of user information function , the provider should be clear to the user and obtain consent ; involving the user’s personal information , but also should comply with this law and the relevant laws and administrative regulations on personal information protection requirements .

Article 23 The  network of key equipment and network security specific products should be in accordance with national standards of mandatory requirements , qualified by the agency safety certification or qualified safety testing to meet the requirements after , before they sell or provide . The State Network letter department in conjunction with the relevant departments of the State Council to develop and publish network key equipment and network security products directory , and promote safety certification and safety testing results mutual recognition , to avoid duplication of certification , testing .

Article 24 The  network operator shall handle the services such as network access , domain name registration service , fixed telephone and mobile telephone , or provide services such as information release and instant messaging , and enter into an agreement with the user or confirm the service when , should be required to provide true user identity information . If the user does not provide the true identity information , the network operator shall not provide the relevant service .

National implementation trusted identity network strategy , to support research and development of safe , convenient electronic authentication technology , to promote mutual recognition between different electronic authentication .

Article 25  network operators shall develop network security emergency response plan , timely disposal system vulnerabilities , computer viruses , network attacks , security risks and other network intrusions ; in the event of the occurrence of the harm network security , immediately launched the emergency plan , take the appropriate remedial measures , and report to the relevant authorities in accordance with the provisions .

Article 26   to carry out certification of network security , detection , risk assessment and other activities , released to the public system vulnerabilities , computer viruses , network attacks , network intrusions and other network information security , should comply with the relevant provisions of the State .

Article 27   No individual or organization may not engage in illegal intrusion into networks of others , interfere with the normal function of the network of others , active network data theft and other hazards network security ; not provide specifically for the network in the invasion , interfere with the normal function of the network and protective measures , theft Network data and other activities that endanger the network security activities , tools ; knowing that others engaged in activities that endanger network security , not to provide technical support , advertising , payment and settlement help .

Article 28 The   network operators shall provide technical support and assistance to the public security organs and the state security organs to safeguard the national security and the investigation of crimes according to law .

Article 29 The   State supports between network operators to collect information on network security , analysis , reporting and emergency response and other aspects of cooperation , to improve the security capabilities of network operators .

Relevant industry organizations to establish and improve network security norms and mechanisms for cooperation in this sector , to strengthen the analysis and evaluation of network security risks , regularly risk warning to the members , to support , to assist members to deal with network security risks .

Article 30   Network and Information Department and relevant information acquired in the performance of network security protection responsibilities , only for the need to maintain network security , shall not be used for other purposes .

SECTION 2: Operational safety of key information infrastructures

Article 31 The   state public communication and information services , energy , transportation , water conservancy , finance , public services , e-government and other important industries and fields , as well as other once destroyed , the loss of functionality or data leakage , could seriously endanger national security , people’s livelihood , the critical information infrastructure of public interest , on the basis of network security protection system on , special protection . The specific scope and safety protection of key information infrastructure shall be formulated by the State Council .

The country encourages network operators outside key information infrastructures to participate voluntarily in critical information infrastructure protection systems .

Article 32  in accordance with the division of duties prescribed by the State Council , responsible for the protection of critical information infrastructure security departments are working to formulate and implement the industry , the art of critical information infrastructure security planning , guidance and supervision of the safe operation of critical information infrastructure protection Work .

Article 33 The   construction of the critical information infrastructure to support business should ensure it has a stable , continuous operation performance , and technical measures to ensure the safety synchronized planning , simultaneous construction , simultaneous use .

Article 34   In addition to the provisions of Article 21 of this Law , critical information infrastructure operators shall perform the following security obligations :

( A ) set up a special safety management and safety management agency in charge of people , and the negative security background screening of responsibility and the key staff positions ;

( 2 ) regularly carry out network security education , technical training and skills assessment for employees ;

( Iii ) disaster recovery of critical systems and databases ;

( D ) the development of network security incident contingency plans , and regular exercise ;

( 5 ) other obligations stipulated by laws and administrative regulations .

Article 35 Where  a operator of a key information infrastructure purchases a network of products and services that may affect the safety of the State , it shall pass the national security review organized by the State Network Department in conjunction with the relevant departments of the State Council .

Article 36 of   the critical information infrastructure of network operators purchasing products and services , shall sign a confidentiality agreement with the security provider in accordance with the provisions , clear security and confidentiality obligations and responsibilities .

Article 37  Personal information and important data collected and produced by operators of key information infrastructure operators in the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall be stored in the territory . Due to business needs , do need to provide to the outside , should be in accordance with the State Network letter department in conjunction with the relevant departments of the State Council to develop a safety assessment ; laws and administrative regulations otherwise provided , in accordance with its provisions .

Article 38   critical information infrastructure operator shall himself or entrust their network security services and the possible risk of network security test and evaluation carried out at least once a year , and will assess the situation and improve the detection measures submitted to the responsible Key information Infrastructure Security protection work .

Article 39 The   State Network Letters shall coordinate the relevant departments to take the following measures for the protection of key information infrastructures :

( A ) the security risk of critical information infrastructure will be random testing , suggest improvements , can be entrusted network security services when necessary for the existence of network security risk assessment to detect ;

( 2 ) to organize the operators of key information infrastructures on a regular basis to conduct network security emergency drills to improve the level and coordination capability of responding to network security incidents ;

( 3 ) to promote the sharing of network security information between the relevant departments and operators of key information infrastructures and relevant research institutions and network security services ;

( Four ) emergency response network security incidents and recovery network functions, etc. , to provide technical support and assistance .

Chapter 4 Network Information Security

Article 40  network operators should collect information on its users strictly confidential , and establish and improve the user information protection system .

Article 41 Where a  network operator collects or uses personal information , it shall follow the principles of lawfulness , reason and necessity , publicly collect and use the rules , expressly collect and use the purpose , manner and scope of the information and agree with the collectors .

Services unrelated to the personal information of the network operator shall not collect its offer , shall not violate laws , administrative regulations and bilateral agreements to collect , use of personal information , and shall be in accordance with laws , administrative regulations and the agreement with the user , process save Of personal information .

Article 42   network operators shall not be disclosed , tampering , destruction of personal information it collects ; without the consent of the collectors , may not provide personal information to others . However , except that processing does not recognize a particular person and can not be recovered .

The network operator shall take technical measures and other necessary measures to ensure that the personal information collected by it is safe to prevent leakage , damage and loss of information . Or may occur in the event of leakage of personal information , damage , time lost the case , it should take immediate remedial measures , in accordance with the provisions promptly inform the user to the relevant competent authorities report .

Article 43   personal discovery network operators violate laws , administrative regulations or bilateral agreements to collect , use their personal information , the right to require network operators to delete their personal information ; find network operators to collect , store their personal The information is wrong , the right to require the network operator to be corrected . The network operator should take action to remove or correct it .

Article 44   No individual or organization may steal or acquire personal information in any other illegal manner and may not illegally sell or illegally provide personal information to others .

Article 45 The   departments and their staff members with network security supervision and administration according to law , must be aware of personal information in carrying out their duties , privacy and trade secrets strictly confidential , shall not disclose , sell or illegally available to others .

Article 46   No individual or organization shall be responsible for the use of network behavior , not set up to commit fraud , to teach criminal methods , production or sale of prohibited items , sites illegal and criminal activities of controlled items, etc. , communication groups , should not be used Internet publishing involves the implementation of fraud , the production or sale of prohibited items , control of goods and other criminal activities of the information .

Article 47   network operators should strengthen the management of information published by its users , we found that laws , administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer of information , should immediately stop the transmission of the information , to take measures to eliminate the disposal, etc. , to prevent the diffusion of information , save The relevant records and report to the relevant authorities .

Article 48  electronic information sent by any individual and organization , application software provided , shall set up a malicious program , shall not contain laws , administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer of information .

Send electronic information service providers and application software download service provider , shall perform the safety management obligations , know that the user is under the aforesaid acts , it should stop providing services , to take measures to eliminate the disposal, etc. , keep the relevant records , and the relevant authorities Report .

Article 49 The  network operators shall establish information such as complaints and reporting systems for network information security , announce complaints and report methods, and promptly accept and handle complaints and reports on the security of network information .

Supervision and inspection network operators to network and Information Department and relevant departments according to law , shall cooperate .

Article 50   National Grid and other departments concerned to fulfill the letter of network information security supervision and administration according to law , found legal , information and administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer , should be required to stop the transmission network operator , to take measures to eliminate the disposal, etc. , keep the relevant records ; the above information comes from outside the People’s Republic of China , it shall notify the relevant agencies to take technical measures and other necessary measures to interrupt transmission .

Chapter 5 Monitoring Early Warning and Emergency Handling

Article 51 The   State shall establish a network security monitoring and early warning and information communication system . The national network letter department should coordinate the relevant departments to strengthen the network security information collection , analysis and notification work , in accordance with the provisions of unified release of network security monitoring and early warning information .

Article 52   is responsible for critical information infrastructure security affairs , shall establish and improve the industry , network security monitoring and early warning and communications systems in the art , and network security monitoring and early warning information submitted in accordance with the provisions .

Article 53   National Grid and Information Department to coordinate relevant departments to establish and improve network security risk assessment and emergency response mechanisms , the development of network security emergency response plan , and regular exercise .

Responsible for key information infrastructure security work departments should develop the industry , the field of network security incident contingency plans , and regularly organize exercises .

Network security emergency response plan should be in accordance with the degree of harm after the incident , the network security incidents were graded sphere of influence and other factors , and provides the appropriate emergency measures .

Article 54   of network security event that occurs when the risk increases , the provincial people’s governments shall, in accordance with statutory authorities and procedures , and the characteristics of the network security risks and possible harm , take the following measures :

( A ) asked the relevant authorities , institutions and personnel timely collection , reporting information , strengthening the monitoring of network security risks ;

( Two ) organizational departments , agencies and professionals , network security risk assessment information for analysis , predicting the likelihood of events , the scope and extent of harm ;

( C ) to the community release network security risk early warning , release to avoid , reduce the harm measures .

Article 55   of network security incidents , should immediately start emergency response plan network security , network security incident investigation and assessment , require network operators to take technical measures and other necessary measures , to eliminate safety hazards , prevent harm to expand , and in a timely manner Publish public-related warning messages to the community .

Article 56  above the provincial level people’s governments in the implementation of network safety supervision and management responsibilities , found that there is a big security risk or network security incidents , be in accordance with the authority and procedures of the legal representative of the network operator’s Person or main person in charge . The network operator shall take measures as required and carry out rectification and rectification to eliminate the hidden danger .

Article 57  because of network security incidents , the occurrence of unexpected events or production safety accidents , should be in accordance with the ” Emergency Response Law of People’s Republic of China “, ” Production Safety Law of People’s Republic of China ,” the relevant laws and so on , disposal and administrative regulations The

Article 58 for the maintenance of national security and public order , require major emergency incidents disposal of social security , the State Council decision or approval , can take temporary measures such as limiting network traffic in a particular area .

Chapter VI Legal Liability

Article 59 Where the   network operator fails to perform the obligations of the network security protection stipulated in Article 21 and Article 25 of this Law , the relevant competent department shall order it to make corrections and give a warning ; refusing to correct or cause harm to the network security and other consequences of , at 100,000 yuan fine of $ 10,000 or more , the person directly responsible for the 50,000 yuan fine of $ 5,000 or more .

If the operator of the key information infrastructure fails to perform the obligations of the network security protection as prescribed in Article 33 , Article 34 , Article 36 and Article 38 of this Law , the relevant competent department shall order it to make corrections and give a warning ; refuse to correct or cause harm network security consequences , at 1,000,000 yuan fine of $ 100,000 or more , the person directly responsible for at 100,000 yuan fine of $ 10,000 or more .

Article 60   in violation of the first paragraph of Article 22 of this Law , (2) and the first paragraph Article 48 , any of the following acts , ordered by the competent department of corrections , give a warning ; refuse to correct Or cause harm to the network security and other consequences , at 50,000 yuan to more than 500,000 yuan fine , the person in charge directly responsible for more than 10,000 yuan more than 100,000 yuan fine :

( A ) set up malicious programs ;

( Two ) of their products , security flaws services , risk exposure and other remedial measures are not taken immediately , or failing to promptly inform the user of the report to the relevant authorities ;

( 3 ) to terminate the security of its products and services .

Article 61   network operators who violate the provisions of Article 24 first paragraph , did not require users to provide real identity information , or provide related services for the user does not provide real identity information , by the competent authorities ordered to make corrections ; or refuse to correct the circumstances are serious , at five hundred thousand fine of $ 50,000 or more , and may be ordered by the competent authorities to suspend the relevant business , ordered to stop , to close the site , revoke the relevant business license or business license revoked , directly responsible for The person in charge and other directly responsible persons shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan .

Article 62  in violation of Article 26 of this Law , to carry out certification of network security , detection , risk assessment and other activities , or to the public distribution system vulnerability , computer viruses , network attacks , network intrusions and other network security information , by the relevant the competent department shall order correction , given a warning ; refuse to correct or circumstances are serious , at 100,000 yuan fine of $ 10,000 or more , and may be ordered by the competent authorities to suspend the relevant business , ordered to stop , to close the site , revoked or related business license revoke the business license , the persons in charge and other directly responsible personnel directly responsible for 50,000 yuan fine of $ 5,000 or more .

Article 63   violation of Article 27 of this Law , engaged in activities that endanger network security , or to provide dedicated program to endanger network security activities , tools , technical support, or to endanger the security of network activity for others , advertising , payment settlement and other help , not constitute a crime , the public security authorities confiscate the illegal income , 5 days detention , can fine of over 50,000 yuan to 500,000 yuan fine ; the circumstances are serious , at least five days 15 days of detention , and may impose a fine of not less than 100,000 yuan but not more than one million yuan .

Units with the conduct of , the public security authorities confiscate the illegal income , at a fine of one million yuan more than 100,000 yuan , and directly in charge and other directly responsible personnel shall be punished in accordance with the preceding paragraph .

Violation of Article 27 of this Law , subject to administrative penalties for public security personnel , shall not engage in network security management and network operators work in key positions within five years ; people subject to criminal punishment , he may not engage in key positions in operations and network security management network Work .

Article 64 A  provider of a network operator , a network product or service shall , in violation of the provisions of Article 22 , paragraph 3 , and Article 41 to Article 43 of this Law , violate the right of the personal information to be protected according to law , ordered to make corrections by the competent authorities , can be a warning or a fine according to the seriousness single office , confiscate the illegal income , illegal income more than doubled a fine of ten times , there is no illegal income , at a fine of one million yuan , directly responsible Supervisors and other directly responsible persons shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan ; if the circumstances are serious , they may order to suspend the relevant business , suspend business for rectification , close the website , revoke the relevant business license or revoke the business license .

Violation of the provisions of Article 44 of this Law , theft or other illegal means to obtain , illegally sell or illegally provide personal information to others , does not constitute a crime , the public security organs confiscated the illegal income , and more than double the illegal income ten times If there is no illegal income , a fine of not more than one million yuan shall be imposed .

Article 65 of the   critical information infrastructure of operators in violation of the provisions of Article 35 of this Law , used without safety review or not to review the security of the network through a product or service , by the competent authorities ordered to stop using , at the purchase amount More than ten times the fine ; the person directly in charge and other directly responsible persons shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan .

Article 66   critical information infrastructure operators in violation of the provisions of Article 37 of this Law , outside the network data storage , or network data provided to the outside , ordered to make corrections by the competent authorities , be given a warning , confiscate the illegal income , of fifty yuan fine of $ 50,000 or more , and may be ordered to suspend the business , ordered to stop , to close the site , revoke the relevant business license or revoke the business license ; in charge and other directly responsible personnel directly responsible yuan and not Fine of not more than 100,000 yuan .

Article 67   in violation of the provisions of Article 46 of this Law , the website set up for the implementation of criminal activities , distribution group , or use the Internet release of information related to the implementation of criminal activities , does not constitute a crime , the public security organs 5 days detention , can impose a fine of 100,000 yuan ; the circumstances are serious , at least five days custody for 15 days or less , you can fine of over 50,000 yuan to 500,000 yuan fine . Close the website for the implementation of criminal activities , communication groups .

If the unit has the preceding paragraph , the public security organ shall be fined not less than 100,000 yuan but not more than 500,000 yuan , and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph for the person directly in charge and other directly responsible persons .

Article 68  network operators in violation of the provisions of Article 47 of this Law , legal , administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer of information transmission is not stopped , to take measures to eliminate the disposal, etc. , keep the relevant records , ordered by the competent department of corrections , given a warning , confiscation of illegal gains ; refuse to correct or circumstances are serious , at 500,000 yuan more than 100,000 yuan , and can be ordered to suspend the relevant business , ordered to stop , to close the site , revoke the relevant business license or business license revoked , A fine of not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan shall be imposed on the person directly in charge and other directly responsible persons .

Electronic messaging services provider , application software download service providers , non-compliance and safety management obligations specified in the second paragraph of Article 48 of this Law , in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be punished .

Article 69   network operators in violation of the provisions of this Act , any of the following acts , by the competent authorities shall order rectification ; refuse to correct or circumstances are serious , at 500,000 Yuan more than 50,000 yuan , directly responsible for the charge and other directly responsible personnel , at one million yuan to 100,000 yuan fine :

( A ) not in accordance with the requirements of the relevant departments of the law , administrative regulations prohibit the release or the information’s transmission , taken to stop transmission , disposal measures to eliminate such ;

( 2 ) refusing or hindering the supervision and inspection carried out by the relevant departments according to law ;

( 3 ) refusing to provide technical support and assistance to the public security organs and the state security organs .

Article 70  issued or transmitted in Article 12 (2) and other laws , administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer of information , in accordance with relevant laws , penalties and administrative regulations .

Article 71   of this Law prescribed offenses , in accordance with relevant laws , administrative regulations credited to the credit files , and to be publicized .

Article 72 Where  an operator of a government organ of a state organ fails to perform its obligations under the provisions of this Law , it shall be ordered by its superior organ or the relevant organ to make corrections , and the directly responsible person in charge and other directly responsible persons shall be punished according to law .

Article 73  Network and Information Department and relevant departments in violation of the provisions of Article 30 of this Law , the information acquired in the performance of network security protection responsibilities for other purposes , given to the persons in charge and other directly responsible personnel directly responsible according to law Punish .

The network department and the relevant departments of the staff neglected duty , abuse of power , favoritism , does not constitute a crime , according to the law to give punishment .

Article 74 Whoever , in violation of the   provisions of this Law , causes damage to others , shall bear civil liability according to law .

Violation of the provisions of this Law , constitute a violation of public security management behavior , according to the law to give security management punishment ; constitute a crime , shall be held criminally responsible .

Article 75   The organs , organizations and individuals engaged in activities , such as attack , intrusion , interference or destruction , which violate the key information infrastructure of the People’s Republic of China , cause serious consequences, and shall hold legal liabilities according to law ; the public security departments and relevant departments of the State Council the institution may decide , organize , to freeze property or other necessary personal sanctions .

Chapter VII Supplementary Provisions

Article 76   The meaning of the following terms in this Law :

( A ) network , refers to a computer or other information terminals and associated equipment consisting of the information collected in accordance with certain rules and procedures , storage , transmission , switching , the system processing .

( Two ) network security , refers to taking the necessary measures , to prevent attacks on the network , intrusion , interference , destruction and illegal use and accidents , the network is in a state of stable and reliable operation , integrity, and protect network data , privacy , The ability to be available .

( C ) network operators , refers to the network of owners , managers and network service providers .

( D ) network data , refers to the network through the collection , storage , transmission , processing and production of various electronic data .

( Five ) personal information , refer to various identification information can be used alone or in combination with other natural personal identity information electronically recorded or otherwise , including but not limited to a natural person’s name , date of birth , ID number , personal biometric information , Address , telephone number and so on .

Article 77 The   storage , processing network information involving state secrets operational security , in addition shall comply with this Act , shall also comply with privacy laws , administrative regulations .

Article 78   security protection of military networks , otherwise provided by the Central Military Commission .

Article 79   of this Law since 2017  6 June 1 from the date of implementation .

Original mandarin Chinese:

目    录

    第一章  总    则

第二章  网络安全支持与促进

第三章  网络运行安全

第一节  一般规定

第二节  关键信息基础设施的运行安全

第四章  网络信息安全

第五章  监测预警与应急处置

第六章  法律责任

第七章  附    则

第一章  总    则

第一条  为了保障网络安全,维护网络空间主权和国家安全、社会公共利益,保护公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益,促进经济社会信息化健康发展,制定本法。

第二条  在中华人民共和国境内建设、运营、维护和使用网络,以及网络安全的监督管理,适用本法。

第三条  国家坚持网络安全与信息化发展并重,遵循积极利用、科学发展、依法管理、确保安全的方针,推进网络基础设施建设和互联互通,鼓励网络技术创新和应用,支持培养网络安全人才,建立健全网络安全保障体系,提高网络安全保护能力。

第四条  国家制定并不断完善网络安全战略,明确保障网络安全的基本要求和主要目标,提出重点领域的网络安全政策、工作任务和措施。

第五条  国家采取措施,监测、防御、处置来源于中华人民共和国境内外的网络安全风险和威胁,保护关键信息基础设施免受攻击、侵入、干扰和破坏,依法惩治网络违法犯罪活动,维护网络空间安全和秩序。

第六条  国家倡导诚实守信、健康文明的网络行为,推动传播社会主义核心价值观,采取措施提高全社会的网络安全意识和水平,形成全社会共同参与促进网络安全的良好环境。

第七条  国家积极开展网络空间治理、网络技术研发和标准制定、打击网络违法犯罪等方面的国际交流与合作,推动构建和平、安全、开放、合作的网络空间,建立多边、民主、透明的网络治理体系。

第八条  国家网信部门负责统筹协调网络安全工作和相关监督管理工作。国务院电信主管部门、公安部门和其他有关机关依照本法和有关法律、行政法规的规定,在各自职责范围内负责网络安全保护和监督管理工作。

县级以上地方人民政府有关部门的网络安全保护和监督管理职责,按照国家有关规定确定。

第九条  网络运营者开展经营和服务活动,必须遵守法律、行政法规,尊重社会公德,遵守商业道德,诚实信用,履行网络安全保护义务,接受政府和社会的监督,承担社会责任。

第十条  建设、运营网络或者通过网络提供服务,应当依照法律、行政法规的规定和国家标准的强制性要求,采取技术措施和其他必要措施,保障网络安全、稳定运行,有效应对网络安全事件,防范网络违法犯罪活动,维护网络数据的完整性、保密性和可用性。

第十一条  网络相关行业组织按照章程,加强行业自律,制定网络安全行为规范,指导会员加强网络安全保护,提高网络安全保护水平,促进行业健康发展。

第十二条  国家保护公民、法人和其他组织依法使用网络的权利,促进网络接入普及,提升网络服务水平,为社会提供安全、便利的网络服务,保障网络信息依法有序自由流动。

任何个人和组织使用网络应当遵守宪法法律,遵守公共秩序,尊重社会公德,不得危害网络安全,不得利用网络从事危害国家安全、荣誉和利益,煽动颠覆国家政权、推翻社会主义制度,煽动分裂国家、破坏国家统一,宣扬恐怖主义、极端主义,宣扬民族仇恨、民族歧视,传播暴力、淫秽色情信息,编造、传播虚假信息扰乱经济秩序和社会秩序,以及侵害他人名誉、隐私、知识产权和其他合法权益等活动。

第十三条  国家支持研究开发有利于未成年人健康成长的网络产品和服务,依法惩治利用网络从事危害未成年人身心健康的活动,为未成年人提供安全、健康的网络环境。

第十四条  任何个人和组织有权对危害网络安全的行为向网信、电信、公安等部门举报。收到举报的部门应当及时依法作出处理;不属于本部门职责的,应当及时移送有权处理的部门。

有关部门应当对举报人的相关信息予以保密,保护举报人的合法权益。

第二章  网络安全支持与促进

第十五条  国家建立和完善网络安全标准体系。国务院标准化行政主管部门和国务院其他有关部门根据各自的职责,组织制定并适时修订有关网络安全管理以及网络产品、服务和运行安全的国家标准、行业标准。

国家支持企业、研究机构、高等学校、网络相关行业组织参与网络安全国家标准、行业标准的制定。

第十六条  国务院和省、自治区、直辖市人民政府应当统筹规划,加大投入,扶持重点网络安全技术产业和项目,支持网络安全技术的研究开发和应用,推广安全可信的网络产品和服务,保护网络技术知识产权,支持企业、研究机构和高等学校等参与国家网络安全技术创新项目。

第十七条  国家推进网络安全社会化服务体系建设,鼓励有关企业、机构开展网络安全认证、检测和风险评估等安全服务。

第十八条  国家鼓励开发网络数据安全保护和利用技术,促进公共数据资源开放,推动技术创新和经济社会发展。

国家支持创新网络安全管理方式,运用网络新技术,提升网络安全保护水平。

第十九条  各级人民政府及其有关部门应当组织开展经常性的网络安全宣传教育,并指导、督促有关单位做好网络安全宣传教育工作。

大众传播媒介应当有针对性地面向社会进行网络安全宣传教育。

第二十条  国家支持企业和高等学校、职业学校等教育培训机构开展网络安全相关教育与培训,采取多种方式培养网络安全人才,促进网络安全人才交流。

第三章  网络运行安全

第一节 一般规定

第二十一条  国家实行网络安全等级保护制度。网络运营者应当按照网络安全等级保护制度的要求,履行下列安全保护义务,保障网络免受干扰、破坏或者未经授权的访问,防止网络数据泄露或者被窃取、篡改:

(一)制定内部安全管理制度和操作规程,确定网络安全负责人,落实网络安全保护责任;

(二)采取防范计算机病毒和网络攻击、网络侵入等危害网络安全行为的技术措施;

(三)采取监测、记录网络运行状态、网络安全事件的技术措施,并按照规定留存相关的网络日志不少于六个月;

(四)采取数据分类、重要数据备份和加密等措施;

(五)法律、行政法规规定的其他义务。

第二十二条  网络产品、服务应当符合相关国家标准的强制性要求。网络产品、服务的提供者不得设置恶意程序;发现其网络产品、服务存在安全缺陷、漏洞等风险时,应当立即采取补救措施,按照规定及时告知用户并向有关主管部门报告。

网络产品、服务的提供者应当为其产品、服务持续提供安全维护;在规定或者当事人约定的期限内,不得终止提供安全维护。

网络产品、服务具有收集用户信息功能的,其提供者应当向用户明示并取得同意;涉及用户个人信息的,还应当遵守本法和有关法律、行政法规关于个人信息保护的规定。

第二十三条  网络关键设备和网络安全专用产品应当按照相关国家标准的强制性要求,由具备资格的机构安全认证合格或者安全检测符合要求后,方可销售或者提供。国家网信部门会同国务院有关部门制定、公布网络关键设备和网络安全专用产品目录,并推动安全认证和安全检测结果互认,避免重复认证、检测。

第二十四条  网络运营者为用户办理网络接入、域名注册服务,办理固定电话、移动电话等入网手续,或者为用户提供信息发布、即时通讯等服务,在与用户签订协议或者确认提供服务时,应当要求用户提供真实身份信息。用户不提供真实身份信息的,网络运营者不得为其提供相关服务。

国家实施网络可信身份战略,支持研究开发安全、方便的电子身份认证技术,推动不同电子身份认证之间的互认。

第二十五条  网络运营者应当制定网络安全事件应急预案,及时处置系统漏洞、计算机病毒、网络攻击、网络侵入等安全风险;在发生危害网络安全的事件时,立即启动应急预案,采取相应的补救措施,并按照规定向有关主管部门报告。

第二十六条  开展网络安全认证、检测、风险评估等活动,向社会发布系统漏洞、计算机病毒、网络攻击、网络侵入等网络安全信息,应当遵守国家有关规定。

第二十七条  任何个人和组织不得从事非法侵入他人网络、干扰他人网络正常功能、窃取网络数据等危害网络安全的活动;不得提供专门用于从事侵入网络、干扰网络正常功能及防护措施、窃取网络数据等危害网络安全活动的程序、工具;明知他人从事危害网络安全的活动的,不得为其提供技术支持、广告推广、支付结算等帮助。

第二十八条  网络运营者应当为公安机关、国家安全机关依法维护国家安全和侦查犯罪的活动提供技术支持和协助。

第二十九条  国家支持网络运营者之间在网络安全信息收集、分析、通报和应急处置等方面进行合作,提高网络运营者的安全保障能力。

有关行业组织建立健全本行业的网络安全保护规范和协作机制,加强对网络安全风险的分析评估,定期向会员进行风险警示,支持、协助会员应对网络安全风险。

第三十条  网信部门和有关部门在履行网络安全保护职责中获取的信息,只能用于维护网络安全的需要,不得用于其他用途。

第二节 关键信息基础设施的运行安全

第三十一条  国家对公共通信和信息服务、能源、交通、水利、金融、公共服务、电子政务等重要行业和领域,以及其他一旦遭到破坏、丧失功能或者数据泄露,可能严重危害国家安全、国计民生、公共利益的关键信息基础设施,在网络安全等级保护制度的基础上,实行重点保护。关键信息基础设施的具体范围和安全保护办法由国务院制定。

国家鼓励关键信息基础设施以外的网络运营者自愿参与关键信息基础设施保护体系。

第三十二条  按照国务院规定的职责分工,负责关键信息基础设施安全保护工作的部门分别编制并组织实施本行业、本领域的关键信息基础设施安全规划,指导和监督关键信息基础设施运行安全保护工作。

第三十三条  建设关键信息基础设施应当确保其具有支持业务稳定、持续运行的性能,并保证安全技术措施同步规划、同步建设、同步使用。

第三十四条  除本法第二十一条的规定外,关键信息基础设施的运营者还应当履行下列安全保护义务:

(一)设置专门安全管理机构和安全管理负责人,并对该负责人和关键岗位的人员进行安全背景审查;

(二)定期对从业人员进行网络安全教育、技术培训和技能考核;

(三)对重要系统和数据库进行容灾备份;

(四)制定网络安全事件应急预案,并定期进行演练;

(五)法律、行政法规规定的其他义务。

第三十五条  关键信息基础设施的运营者采购网络产品和服务,可能影响国家安全的,应当通过国家网信部门会同国务院有关部门组织的国家安全审查。

第三十六条  关键信息基础设施的运营者采购网络产品和服务,应当按照规定与提供者签订安全保密协议,明确安全和保密义务与责任。

第三十七条  关键信息基础设施的运营者在中华人民共和国境内运营中收集和产生的个人信息和重要数据应当在境内存储。因业务需要,确需向境外提供的,应当按照国家网信部门会同国务院有关部门制定的办法进行安全评估;法律、行政法规另有规定的,依照其规定。

第三十八条  关键信息基础设施的运营者应当自行或者委托网络安全服务机构对其网络的安全性和可能存在的风险每年至少进行一次检测评估,并将检测评估情况和改进措施报送相关负责关键信息基础设施安全保护工作的部门。

第三十九条  国家网信部门应当统筹协调有关部门对关键信息基础设施的安全保护采取下列措施:

(一)对关键信息基础设施的安全风险进行抽查检测,提出改进措施,必要时可以委托网络安全服务机构对网络存在的安全风险进行检测评估;

(二)定期组织关键信息基础设施的运营者进行网络安全应急演练,提高应对网络安全事件的水平和协同配合能力;

(三)促进有关部门、关键信息基础设施的运营者以及有关研究机构、网络安全服务机构等之间的网络安全信息共享;

(四)对网络安全事件的应急处置与网络功能的恢复等,提供技术支持和协助。

第四章  网络信息安全

第四十条  网络运营者应当对其收集的用户信息严格保密,并建立健全用户信息保护制度。

第四十一条  网络运营者收集、使用个人信息,应当遵循合法、正当、必要的原则,公开收集、使用规则,明示收集、使用信息的目的、方式和范围,并经被收集者同意。

网络运营者不得收集与其提供的服务无关的个人信息,不得违反法律、行政法规的规定和双方的约定收集、使用个人信息,并应当依照法律、行政法规的规定和与用户的约定,处理其保存的个人信息。

第四十二条  网络运营者不得泄露、篡改、毁损其收集的个人信息;未经被收集者同意,不得向他人提供个人信息。但是,经过处理无法识别特定个人且不能复原的除外。

网络运营者应当采取技术措施和其他必要措施,确保其收集的个人信息安全,防止信息泄露、毁损、丢失。在发生或者可能发生个人信息泄露、毁损、丢失的情况时,应当立即采取补救措施,按照规定及时告知用户并向有关主管部门报告。

第四十三条  个人发现网络运营者违反法律、行政法规的规定或者双方的约定收集、使用其个人信息的,有权要求网络运营者删除其个人信息;发现网络运营者收集、存储的其个人信息有错误的,有权要求网络运营者予以更正。网络运营者应当采取措施予以删除或者更正。

第四十四条  任何个人和组织不得窃取或者以其他非法方式获取个人信息,不得非法出售或者非法向他人提供个人信息。

第四十五条  依法负有网络安全监督管理职责的部门及其工作人员,必须对在履行职责中知悉的个人信息、隐私和商业秘密严格保密,不得泄露、出售或者非法向他人提供。

第四十六条  任何个人和组织应当对其使用网络的行为负责,不得设立用于实施诈骗,传授犯罪方法,制作或者销售违禁物品、管制物品等违法犯罪活动的网站、通讯群组,不得利用网络发布涉及实施诈骗,制作或者销售违禁物品、管制物品以及其他违法犯罪活动的信息。

第四十七条  网络运营者应当加强对其用户发布的信息的管理,发现法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息的,应当立即停止传输该信息,采取消除等处置措施,防止信息扩散,保存有关记录,并向有关主管部门报告。

第四十八条  任何个人和组织发送的电子信息、提供的应用软件,不得设置恶意程序,不得含有法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息。

电子信息发送服务提供者和应用软件下载服务提供者,应当履行安全管理义务,知道其用户有前款规定行为的,应当停止提供服务,采取消除等处置措施,保存有关记录,并向有关主管部门报告。

第四十九条  网络运营者应当建立网络信息安全投诉、举报制度,公布投诉、举报方式等信息,及时受理并处理有关网络信息安全的投诉和举报。

网络运营者对网信部门和有关部门依法实施的监督检查,应当予以配合。

第五十条  国家网信部门和有关部门依法履行网络信息安全监督管理职责,发现法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息的,应当要求网络运营者停止传输,采取消除等处置措施,保存有关记录;对来源于中华人民共和国境外的上述信息,应当通知有关机构采取技术措施和其他必要措施阻断传播。

第五章  监测预警与应急处置

第五十一条  国家建立网络安全监测预警和信息通报制度。国家网信部门应当统筹协调有关部门加强网络安全信息收集、分析和通报工作,按照规定统一发布网络安全监测预警信息。

第五十二条  负责关键信息基础设施安全保护工作的部门,应当建立健全本行业、本领域的网络安全监测预警和信息通报制度,并按照规定报送网络安全监测预警信息。

第五十三条  国家网信部门协调有关部门建立健全网络安全风险评估和应急工作机制,制定网络安全事件应急预案,并定期组织演练。

负责关键信息基础设施安全保护工作的部门应当制定本行业、本领域的网络安全事件应急预案,并定期组织演练。

网络安全事件应急预案应当按照事件发生后的危害程度、影响范围等因素对网络安全事件进行分级,并规定相应的应急处置措施。

第五十四条  网络安全事件发生的风险增大时,省级以上人民政府有关部门应当按照规定的权限和程序,并根据网络安全风险的特点和可能造成的危害,采取下列措施:

(一)要求有关部门、机构和人员及时收集、报告有关信息,加强对网络安全风险的监测;

(二)组织有关部门、机构和专业人员,对网络安全风险信息进行分析评估,预测事件发生的可能性、影响范围和危害程度;

(三)向社会发布网络安全风险预警,发布避免、减轻危害的措施。

第五十五条  发生网络安全事件,应当立即启动网络安全事件应急预案,对网络安全事件进行调查和评估,要求网络运营者采取技术措施和其他必要措施,消除安全隐患,防止危害扩大,并及时向社会发布与公众有关的警示信息。

第五十六条  省级以上人民政府有关部门在履行网络安全监督管理职责中,发现网络存在较大安全风险或者发生安全事件的,可以按照规定的权限和程序对该网络的运营者的法定代表人或者主要负责人进行约谈。网络运营者应当按照要求采取措施,进行整改,消除隐患。

第五十七条  因网络安全事件,发生突发事件或者生产安全事故的,应当依照《中华人民共和国突发事件应对法》、《中华人民共和国安全生产法》等有关法律、行政法规的规定处置。

第五十八条 因维护国家安全和社会公共秩序,处置重大突发社会安全事件的需要,经国务院决定或者批准,可以在特定区域对网络通信采取限制等临时措施。

第六章  法律责任

第五十九条  网络运营者不履行本法第二十一条、第二十五条规定的网络安全保护义务的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告;拒不改正或者导致危害网络安全等后果的,处一万元以上十万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员处五千元以上五万元以下罚款。

关键信息基础设施的运营者不履行本法第三十三条、第三十四条、第三十六条、第三十八条规定的网络安全保护义务的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告;拒不改正或者导致危害网络安全等后果的,处十万元以上一百万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

第六十条  违反本法第二十二条第一款、第二款和第四十八条第一款规定,有下列行为之一的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告;拒不改正或者导致危害网络安全等后果的,处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款:

(一)设置恶意程序的;

(二)对其产品、服务存在的安全缺陷、漏洞等风险未立即采取补救措施,或者未按照规定及时告知用户并向有关主管部门报告的;

(三)擅自终止为其产品、服务提供安全维护的。

第六十一条  网络运营者违反本法第二十四条第一款规定,未要求用户提供真实身份信息,或者对不提供真实身份信息的用户提供相关服务的,由有关主管部门责令改正;拒不改正或者情节严重的,处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款,并可以由有关主管部门责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

第六十二条  违反本法第二十六条规定,开展网络安全认证、检测、风险评估等活动,或者向社会发布系统漏洞、计算机病毒、网络攻击、网络侵入等网络安全信息的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告;拒不改正或者情节严重的,处一万元以上十万元以下罚款,并可以由有关主管部门责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处五千元以上五万元以下罚款。

第六十三条  违反本法第二十七条规定,从事危害网络安全的活动,或者提供专门用于从事危害网络安全活动的程序、工具,或者为他人从事危害网络安全的活动提供技术支持、广告推广、支付结算等帮助,尚不构成犯罪的,由公安机关没收违法所得,处五日以下拘留,可以并处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款;情节较重的,处五日以上十五日以下拘留,可以并处十万元以上一百万元以下罚款。

单位有前款行为的,由公安机关没收违法所得,处十万元以上一百万元以下罚款,并对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依照前款规定处罚。

违反本法第二十七条规定,受到治安管理处罚的人员,五年内不得从事网络安全管理和网络运营关键岗位的工作;受到刑事处罚的人员,终身不得从事网络安全管理和网络运营关键岗位的工作。

第六十四条  网络运营者、网络产品或者服务的提供者违反本法第二十二条第三款、第四十一条至第四十三条规定,侵害个人信息依法得到保护的权利的,由有关主管部门责令改正,可以根据情节单处或者并处警告、没收违法所得、处违法所得一倍以上十倍以下罚款,没有违法所得的,处一百万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款;情节严重的,并可以责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照。

违反本法第四十四条规定,窃取或者以其他非法方式获取、非法出售或者非法向他人提供个人信息,尚不构成犯罪的,由公安机关没收违法所得,并处违法所得一倍以上十倍以下罚款,没有违法所得的,处一百万元以下罚款。

第六十五条  关键信息基础设施的运营者违反本法第三十五条规定,使用未经安全审查或者安全审查未通过的网络产品或者服务的,由有关主管部门责令停止使用,处采购金额一倍以上十倍以下罚款;对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

第六十六条  关键信息基础设施的运营者违反本法第三十七条规定,在境外存储网络数据,或者向境外提供网络数据的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告,没收违法所得,处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款,并可以责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照;对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

第六十七条  违反本法第四十六条规定,设立用于实施违法犯罪活动的网站、通讯群组,或者利用网络发布涉及实施违法犯罪活动的信息,尚不构成犯罪的,由公安机关处五日以下拘留,可以并处一万元以上十万元以下罚款;情节较重的,处五日以上十五日以下拘留,可以并处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款。关闭用于实施违法犯罪活动的网站、通讯群组。

单位有前款行为的,由公安机关处十万元以上五十万元以下罚款,并对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依照前款规定处罚。

第六十八条  网络运营者违反本法第四十七条规定,对法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息未停止传输、采取消除等处置措施、保存有关记录的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告,没收违法所得;拒不改正或者情节严重的,处十万元以上五十万元以下罚款,并可以责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

电子信息发送服务提供者、应用软件下载服务提供者,不履行本法第四十八条第二款规定的安全管理义务的,依照前款规定处罚。

第六十九条  网络运营者违反本法规定,有下列行为之一的,由有关主管部门责令改正;拒不改正或者情节严重的,处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员,处一万元以上十万元以下罚款:

(一)不按照有关部门的要求对法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息,采取停止传输、消除等处置措施的;

(二)拒绝、阻碍有关部门依法实施的监督检查的;

(三)拒不向公安机关、国家安全机关提供技术支持和协助的。

第七十条  发布或者传输本法第十二条第二款和其他法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息的,依照有关法律、行政法规的规定处罚。

第七十一条  有本法规定的违法行为的,依照有关法律、行政法规的规定记入信用档案,并予以公示。

第七十二条  国家机关政务网络的运营者不履行本法规定的网络安全保护义务的,由其上级机关或者有关机关责令改正;对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依法给予处分。

第七十三条  网信部门和有关部门违反本法第三十条规定,将在履行网络安全保护职责中获取的信息用于其他用途的,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依法给予处分。

网信部门和有关部门的工作人员玩忽职守、滥用职权、徇私舞弊,尚不构成犯罪的,依法给予处分。

第七十四条  违反本法规定,给他人造成损害的,依法承担民事责任。

违反本法规定,构成违反治安管理行为的,依法给予治安管理处罚;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。

第七十五条  境外的机构、组织、个人从事攻击、侵入、干扰、破坏等危害中华人民共和国的关键信息基础设施的活动,造成严重后果的,依法追究法律责任;国务院公安部门和有关部门并可以决定对该机构、组织、个人采取冻结财产或者其他必要的制裁措施。

第七章  附    则

第七十六条  本法下列用语的含义:

(一)网络,是指由计算机或者其他信息终端及相关设备组成的按照一定的规则和程序对信息进行收集、存储、传输、交换、处理的系统。

(二)网络安全,是指通过采取必要措施,防范对网络的攻击、侵入、干扰、破坏和非法使用以及意外事故,使网络处于稳定可靠运行的状态,以及保障网络数据的完整性、保密性、可用性的能力。

(三)网络运营者,是指网络的所有者、管理者和网络服务提供者。

(四)网络数据,是指通过网络收集、存储、传输、处理和产生的各种电子数据。

(五)个人信息,是指以电子或者其他方式记录的能够单独或者与其他信息结合识别自然人个人身份的各种信息,包括但不限于自然人的姓名、出生日期、身份证件号码、个人生物识别信息、住址、电话号码等。

第七十七条  存储、处理涉及国家秘密信息的网络的运行安全保护,除应当遵守本法外,还应当遵守保密法律、行政法规的规定。

第七十八条  军事网络的安全保护,由中央军事委员会另行规定。

第七十九条  本法自2017年6月1日起施行。

Communist Party of China referring URL:

http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2016-11/07/content_2001605.htm

 

中華人民共和國國家信息與情報法草案 // People’s Republic of China DRAFT National Information & Intelligence Law

中華人民共和國國家信息與情報法草案

People’s Republic of China DRAFT National Information & Intelligence Law

A Note on the “National Information Law of the People ‘s Republic of China (Draft)”

First, the general idea of ​​legislation
First, under the guidance of the overall national security concept, adhere to the principle of socialist rule of law, focus on strengthening and safeguarding national intelligence work, respecting and safeguarding human rights, providing basic legal principles and legal basis for national intelligence work.
The second is to sum up the successful experience of China’s national intelligence work, based on the current and future period to carry out the actual needs of national intelligence work, provides the national intelligence work system mechanism, the national intelligence work agency’s authority and national intelligence work and so on.
The third is to deal with the national security law, anti-espionage law, anti-terrorism law and other legal relations, do with these laws convergence.

Second, the main content of the draft
(A) clear the national intelligence work tasks and institutional mechanisms. The draft stipulates that the national intelligence work should adhere to the overall national security concept and provide information for the major national decision-making, provide intelligence support for the prevention and mitigation of the risks that endanger national security, safeguard national power, sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity, people’s well-being and economy Social sustainable development and other significant national interests (Article 2). Establish a sound national reunification, division of labor, scientific and efficient national intelligence system (Article 3). National security organs and public security organs intelligence agencies, military intelligence agencies in accordance with the division of responsibilities, with each other, do intelligence work, carry out intelligence action (Article 5).
(2) to clarify the powers of the State Intelligence Working Party. The drafting regulations stipulate that the national intelligence work agencies shall collect and deal with the organs of foreign institutions, organizations, individuals or implement or direct the financing of others, or the harm that the domestic institutions, organizations and individuals collusion with the overseas institutions, organizations and individuals of the People’s Republic of China Information on interests (Article 10). The national intelligence work agency shall provide information reference or basis (Article 11) for the prevention, suppression and punishment of foreign institutions, organizations and individuals in China to carry out acts that endanger our national security and interests in China. When the staff of the State Intelligence Working Party carry out their tasks according to law, they may go to the relevant authorities, organizations, enterprises and organizations and individuals to understand and inquire about the relevant circumstances, inspect or retrieve the relevant files, materials and articles; enter the relevant areas and places that restrict access; Enjoy the convenience of accommodation (Article 15, Article 16).
(3) to clarify the protection of national intelligence work. The drafting stipulates that the state shall strengthen the construction of the national intelligence work organization and carry out special management of its institutions, personnel, establishment, funds and assets; establish a management system for personnel recruitment, selection, assessment, training, treatment and withdrawal of personnel Nineteen). (Article 21) shall be protected by the staff of the national intelligence working agency and the personnel of the cooperative relationship and their close relatives. For those who contribute to the national intelligence work and need to be resettled, the relevant departments shall assist the national intelligence work agencies to properly resettle (Article 22). The draft also provides for the support and cooperation of citizens and organizations (Article 6, Article 13). Provides for the imposition of national intelligence work, disclosure of legal responsibility for state secrets related to national intelligence work (Article 25, Article 26).
(4) to clarify the norms and supervision of national intelligence work. The draft stipulates that national intelligence work should be carried out in accordance with the law, respect and protect human rights (Article VII). The national intelligence working agencies and their staff shall not go beyond their powers, abuse their power and engage in malpractices for personal gains, and shall not violate the lawful rights and interests of citizens and organizations and shall not disclose state secrets, trade secrets and personal privacy (Article 18). The State Intelligence Working Party shall abide by the relevant provisions of the State when using the necessary means, means and channels (Article 14, Article 15, Article 16 and Article 17). The national intelligence working agency shall establish a supervision and safety review system (Article 23). The draft also stipulates that any individual and organization shall have the right to report to the higher authorities or relevant departments for the violation of the powers, abuse of power, malpractice for personal gains and other offenses against the national intelligence working agencies and their staff members (Article 24).

Original Mandarin Chinese:

關於《中華人民共和國國家情報法(草案)》的說明

一、立法的總體思路
一是以總體國家安全觀為指導,堅持社會主義法治原則,著眼於加強和保障國家情報工作,尊重和保障人權,為國家情報工作提供基本的法律原則和法律依據。
二是總結我國國家情報工作的成功經驗,立足於當前和今後一段時期開展國家情報工作的實際需要,規定了國家情報工作的體制機制、國家情報工作機構的職權以及國家情報工作保障等內容。
三是處理好與國家安全法、反間諜法、反恐怖主義法等法律的關係,做好與這些法律的銜接。
二、草案的主要內容
(一)明確國家情報工作的任務和體制機制。草案規定,國家情報工作堅持總體國家安全觀,為國家重大決策提供情報參考,為防範和化解危害國家安全的風險提供情報支持,維護國家政權、主權、統一、獨立和領土完整、人民福祉、經濟社會可持續發展和國家其他重大利益(第二條)。建立健全集中統一、分工協作、科學高效的國家情報體制(第三條)。國家安全機關和公安機關情報機構、軍隊情報機構按照職責分工,相互配合,做好情報工作、開展情報行動(第五條)。
(二)明確國家情報工作機構的職權。草案規定,國家情報工作機構應當依法蒐集、處理境外機構、組織、個人實施或者指使、資助他人實施,或者境內機構、組織、個人與境外機構、組織、個人相勾結實施的危害中華人民共和國國家安全、利益的相關信息(第十條)。國家情報工作機構應當為防範、制止和懲治境外機構、組織、個人在中國境內實施的危害我國國家安全、利益的行為提供情報參考或依據(第十一條)。國家情報工作機構工作人員依法執行任務時,可以向有關機關、團體、企業事業組織和個人了解、詢問有關情況,查閱或者調取有關的檔案、資料、物品;進入限制進入的有關地區、場所;享受通行便利等(第十五條、第十六條)。
(三)明確國家情報工作保障。草案規定,國家加強國家情報工作機構建設,對其機構設置、人員、編制、經費、資產實行特殊管理;建立適應情報工作需要的人員錄用、選調、考核、培訓、待遇、退出等管理制度(第十九條)。對國家情報工作機構工作人員和有合作關係人員及其近親屬人身安全予以保護(第二十一條)。對為國家情報工作作出貢獻並需要安置的人員,有關部門應當協助國家情報工作機構妥善安置(第二十二條)。草案還規定了公民和組織的支持、配合義務(第六條、第十三條)。規定了阻礙國家情報工作、洩露與國家情報工作有關的國家秘密的法律責任(第二十五條、第二十六條)。
(四)明確對國家情報工作的規範和監督。草案規定,國家情報工作應當依法進行,尊重和保障人權(第七條)。國家情報工作機構及其工作人員不得超越職權、濫用職權、徇私舞弊,不得侵犯公民和組織的合法權益,不得洩露國家秘密、商業秘密和個人隱私(第十八條)。國家情報工作機構使用必要的方式、手段和渠道開展工作時,應當遵守國家有關規定(第十四條、第十五條、第十六條、第十七條)。國家情報工作機構應當建立監督和安全審查制度(第二十三條)。草案還規定了任何個人和組織對國家情報工作機構及其工作人員超越職權、濫用職權、徇私舞弊和其他違法行為,有權向上級機關或者有關部門檢舉、控告(第二十四條)。

 

Original Communist Chinese Government Source:

http://www.npc.gov.cn/COBRS_LFYJNEW/user/UserIndex.jsp?ID=8289337

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