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What is the main reason for US military network warfare? //

美军网络战主要干什么？

Source: PLA Daily Author: Chen Hanghui Editor: Yao Yuan

Recently, the US military has been “big move” in the field of cyber warfare. On October 24th, the US Department of Defense announced in a high-profile manner that the network task force directly under the US Cyber Command has the initial operational capability to perform basic cyber warfare tasks. From wielding the “cyber weapon stick” to the announcement of major progress in the construction of network forces, the United States intends to send a message to the outside world – the US military has basically built a network warfare power system and strives for the hegemonic position of the “fifth space.”

Strategic guidance –

Create a network action force system

As the creator of the Internet, the US military was the first to plan the formation of a cyber warfare army. As early as 1995, the US National Defense University trained 16 network warriors who relied on computers for information confrontation. From the development history of the past 20 years, strengthening strategic guidance and doing a good overall planning is a basic experience for the rapid development of the US military’s cyber warfare forces.

In 2002, the then President Bush signed the “National Security Order No. 16” and asked the Ministry of Defense to take the lead in formulating a cyberspace action strategy. In December of the same year, the US Navy took the lead in setting up the Cyber Command, and the Air Force and the Army also quickly followed up to form a service network force. In March 2005, the US Department of Defense issued the “Defense Strategy Report,” which defined the strategic position of cyberspace and characterized it as the fifth-dimensional space that is as important as land, sea, air, and sky. The development of US cyber warfare forces is ushered in. The first wave of climax. In general, in the early stage of development, although the development speed of the US military’s cyber warfare forces was fast, it lacked overall planning, and the various military cyber warfare units were stacked in flames and failed to form a joint force.

After President Obama, who relied on the Internet to win the general election, took the stage, he focused on strengthening the strategic guidance for cyber warfare capacity building from two aspects. On the one hand, in May 2010, the network headquarters of the entire army was established to coordinate the cyber warfare forces of various services and strengthen the command and control of cyberspace operations. On the other hand, in 2011 and 2015, two strategic reports, the Cyberspace Action Strategy and the DoD Network Strategy, were launched. The former explained the five pillars of the US military’s cyberspace operations, and the latter clarified the mission of cyber warfare forces. Mission and construction goals.

At present, the US military cyber warfare power system has basically taken shape. At the heart of the system is a network mission force directly under the US Cyber Command, which plays a key role in the US cyber warfare operations. As of the end of October 2016, the number of US military network task forces has reached 5,000, and all of the 133 network task forces compiled have initial operational capabilities, of which nearly half have full operational capabilities. According to the US Department of Defense program, by September 30, 2018, the number of network missions will increase to 6,187, with full operational capability.

Practical traction –

Conduct cyberspace attack and defense drills

In recent years, as cyber warfare has moved from behind the scenes to the front of the stage as an independent warfare style, the US military’s cyberspace action strategy has shifted from “precaution-based” to “attack and defense”, and improving the cyberspace combat capability has become the focus of the US military. At present, the US military mainly promotes network training under actual combat conditions from four aspects.

Open online courses according to actual needs and lay a solid foundation for cyber warfare skills. In response to the new situation in the field of cyberspace, the US military major military academies have added online courses. In 2012, the US Air Force Ordnance Academy launched its first offensive cyber action course, focusing on how to combine network capabilities with traditional combat methods. In 2014, West Point Military Academy established the Army Cyber Warfare Academy to train network elites. In the past few years, military colleges such as the West Point Military Academy and the Naval Academy have conducted network offensive and defensive drills with the “Red Cell” team composed of experts from the US National Security Agency to cultivate the backbone of future cyber warfare.

Develop a general-purpose network warfare training platform to improve the comprehensive benefits of training. At the Department of Defense, led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the “National Network Shooting Range” was developed to simulate the cyberspace attack and defense operational environment, test network weaponry, and test new operational concepts. At the military level, a virtual environment was developed that could serve as a network range or test platform for testing, planning, and evaluating cyberspace operations. For example, the network virtual city built by the US Air Force can be used to conduct network attack and defense tactics; the naval development of the “tactical network shooting range” can extend network training to the radio frequency physical environment, achieving efficient integration of joint firepower and information advantages.

Conduct integrated network warfare exercises to improve the actual combat capability of network forces. In early 2016, the US Department of Defense’s Office of Combat Test and Evaluation recommended in a report to Congress that, in view of the fact that the US military will perform its tasks under the violent confrontation of cyberspace, it should regularly organize network offensive and defensive units and combat units to jointly conduct operations. drill. Since the beginning of this year, the US Army has conducted a number of exercises using network squadrons such as “Network Exploration” and “Network Flash Battle”, focusing on the actions of network detachments to support combat troops under field conditions. In April of this year, the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division and the 7th Communications Command Network Protection Brigade jointly held a “Network Flash Battle” exercise to test the feasibility of multi-sectoral interdisciplinary collaboration such as communication, network, and firepower.

Organize comprehensive cyber war exercises to strengthen military and network joint network operations capabilities. The US military believes that “the strategic war in the industrial era is a nuclear war, and the strategic war in the information age is mainly a cyber war.” Only by implementing the overall network war of the military and the land can we win the future cyber war. Since 2012, the US Army Network Command has jointly led the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to jointly organize a “Network Guardian” military joint exercise to strengthen information sharing between the US Department of Defense and other federal government agencies and private companies. In the “Network Guardian-2016” exercise held in June this year, more than 100 organizations and more than 800 organizations from government, academia, industry and allies participated in the exercise, focusing on the response to large-scale blackouts, oil refinery oil spills, and ports. Close other network attack scenarios.

Built with one –

Exploring the use of network forces

The United States was the first country to propose the concept of cyber warfare and the first country to use cyber forces for actual combat. As early as 2007, the National Security Agency used computer viruses to infect militants’ mobile phones and laptops, deceiving the enemy by sending false information, and even introducing the enemy into the US ambush to assist the US military in its operations.

After the establishment of the network mission force in 2012, in order to maintain the first-mover advantage in the field of cyberspace, the US military has followed the principle of “building and using, building and integrating” and actively explored and promoted the operational use of network forces. At the end of 2012, the US Army Network Command took the lead in deploying a network mission detachment with full operational capabilities at the Central Command to support US military operations in Syria and Iraq. In October 2015, US Naval Network Task Force Commander Paul Nakaso revealed at the seminar of the Center for Strategic and International Studies that although it had not yet been formed, the network task force had begun to participate in actual military operations. According to reports, from January to October 2015, the US military network task force participated in seven major military operations.

In April this year, under the direction of Defense Minister Carter, the US Cyber Command publicly announced a cyberattack against the “Islamic State” terrorist organization and became the “first show” of the US military network forces. In the course of the operation, the US military network forces focused on the communication network, publicity websites, and social networking websites of the “Islamic State”, and downgraded the information, issued instructions, recruited new people, and paid electronic payments through network downgrades and false orders. ability.

With the increasingly prominent role of cyberspace operations in US military joint operations, the US military has focused on the construction of the network force command and control architecture. After the completion of the US Cyber Command in 2010, the US Army, Sea, and Air Forces established the Service Network Command. In May 2012, the US military formed a “Joint Network Center” at each theater headquarters to serve as a link between the theater command and the US Cyber Command to better use the network mission force to support theater operations. At present, the US military executives are actively promoting the upgrading of the Cyber Command to an independent combatant command. Once this vision becomes a reality, the command relationship of the US military network forces will be clearer and the chain of command will be more efficient.

(Author: Nanjing Army Command Academy)

Picture: Yang Lei

Original Mandarin Chinese:

近段時間，美軍在網絡戰領域“大招”頻出。 10月24日，美國國防部高調宣布，直屬於美國網絡司令部的網絡任務部隊已具備初始作戰能力，能夠執行基本的網絡戰任務。從揮舞“網絡武器大棒”到公佈網絡部隊建設重大進展，美國意在向外界傳遞一個訊息——美軍已基本建成網絡戰力量體系，全力謀求“第五空間”的霸權地位。

戰略引導——

打造網絡行動力量體系

作為互聯網的締造者，美軍是最早籌劃組建網絡戰部隊的軍隊。早在1995年，美國國防大學就培養了16名依托計算機從事信息對抗的網絡戰士。從過去20年的發展歷程看，強化戰略指導、搞好統籌規劃是美軍網絡戰力量快速發展的一條基本經驗。

2002年，時任總統布什簽署“國家安全第16號總統令”，要求國防部牽頭制定網絡空間行動戰略。同年12月，美國海軍率先成立網絡司令部，空軍和陸軍也迅速跟進，組建軍種網絡部隊。 2005年3月，美國國防部出台《國防戰略報告》，明確了網絡空間的戰略地位，將其定性為與陸、海、空、天同等重要的第五維空間，美軍網絡戰力量發展迎來第一波高潮。總體而言，在發展初期，美軍網絡戰力量發展速度雖快，但缺乏統籌規劃，各軍種網絡戰部隊煙囪林立，未能形成合力。

依靠互聯網贏得大選的奧巴馬總統上台後，重點從兩方面強化對網絡戰能力建設的戰略引導。一方面，於2010年5月建成統管全軍的網絡司令部，統籌各軍種網絡戰力量，強化網絡空間行動指揮控制。另一方面，分別於2011年和2015年推出《網絡空間行動戰略》和《國防部網絡戰略》兩份戰略報告，前者闡述了美軍網絡空間行動的五大支柱，後者明確了網絡戰力量的使命任務和建設目標。

目前，美軍網絡戰力量體系已基本成型。位於該體系中心的是直屬於美國網絡司令部的網絡任務部隊，其在美軍網絡戰行動中扮演關鍵角色。截至2016年10月底，美軍網絡任務部隊人數已達5000人，編制的133個網絡任務組全部具備初始作戰能力，其中近一半具備了完全作戰能力。根據美國國防部計劃，到2018年9月30日，網絡任務部隊規模將增至6187人，具備完全作戰能力。

實戰牽引——

開展網絡空間攻防演練

近年來，隨著網絡戰作為獨立作戰樣式從幕後走向台前，美軍網絡空間行動策略由“以防為主”向“攻防兼備”轉變，提升網絡空間實戰能力成為美軍的練兵重點。當前，美軍主要從4方面推進實戰條件下的網絡訓練。

根據實戰需求開設網絡課程，打牢網絡戰技能基礎。為應對網絡空間領域新情況，美軍各大軍事院校紛紛增設網絡課程。 2012年，美國空軍軍械學院首次開設進攻性網絡行動課程，重點講授如何將網絡能力與傳統戰斗方式有機結合；2014年，西點軍校成立了陸軍網絡戰研究院，負責培養網絡精英。過去幾年，西點軍校、海軍軍官學院等軍事院校每年都會與由美國國家安全局專家組成的“紅細胞”隊進行網絡攻防演練，培養未來的網絡戰骨幹力量。

開發通用型網絡戰訓練平台，提高訓練綜合效益。在國防部層面，由國防高級研究項目局牽頭，開發了“國家網絡靶場”，用於模擬網絡空間攻防作戰環境，測試網絡武器裝備，檢驗新型作戰概念。在軍種層面，研發了可作為網絡靶場或測試平台的虛擬環境，用於測試、規劃和評估網絡空間行動。例如，美國空軍打造的網絡虛擬城市，可用於演練網絡攻防戰術；海軍開發的“戰術網絡靶場”可以將網絡訓練拓展到射頻物理環境，實現聯合火力與信息優勢的高效集成。

開展集成性網絡戰演練，提升網絡部隊實戰能力。 2016年初，美國國防部作戰測試與評估辦公室在向國會提交的一份報告中建議，考慮到美軍將在網絡空間領域激烈對抗的條件下執行任務，應定期組織網絡攻防部隊和作戰部隊聯合開展作戰演練。今年以來，美國陸軍已開展“網絡探索”“網絡閃擊戰”等多場運用網絡分隊的演習，重點演練網絡分隊在野戰條件下支援作戰部隊的行動。今年4月，美國陸軍第25步兵師和第7通信司令部網絡防護旅聯合舉行了“網絡閃擊戰”演習，檢驗了通信、網絡、火力等多部門跨專業協同的可行性。

組織綜合性網絡戰演習，強化軍地聯合網絡行動能力。美軍認為，“工業時代的戰略戰是核戰爭，信息時代的戰略戰主要是網絡戰”，只有實施軍地聯合的網絡總體戰，才能打贏未來網絡戰爭。 2012年以來，美軍網絡司令部每年都與國土安全部和聯邦調查局聯合牽頭組織“網絡衛士”軍地聯合演習，以便加強美國國防部與其他聯邦政府機構和私營企業之間的信息共享。在今年6月舉行的“網絡衛士-2016”演習中，來自政府、學界、業界和盟國的100多個組織、800多人參加了演習，重點演練了應對大面積停電、煉油廠漏油、港口關閉等網絡襲擊場景。

建用一體——

探索網絡部隊作戰運用

美國是第一個提出網絡戰概念的國家，也是第一個將網絡部隊用於實戰的國家。早在2007年，美國國家安全局就曾使用電腦病毒感染武裝分子的手機和筆記本電腦，通過發送虛假信息欺騙敵方，甚至將敵引入美軍埋伏圈，協助美軍開展行動。

2012年開始組建網絡任務部隊後，為保持在網絡空間領域的先發優勢，美軍遵循“邊建邊用、建用一體”的原則，積極探索和推進網絡部隊的作戰運用。 2012年底，美軍網絡司令部率先在中央司令部部署擁有完全作戰能力的網絡任務分隊，支持美軍在敘利亞和伊拉克的軍事行動。 2015年10月，美軍網絡任務部隊指揮官保羅·納卡索在參加戰略與國際研究中心研討會時透露，雖然尚未組建完畢，但網絡任務部隊已經開始參與實際軍事行動。據報導，僅2015年1月至10月，美軍網絡任務部隊就參與了7次重大軍事行動。

今年4月，在國防部長卡特的授意下，美國網絡司令部公開宣布對“伊斯蘭國”恐怖組織發動網絡攻擊，成為美軍網絡部隊的“首秀”。行動中，美軍網絡部隊以“伊斯蘭國”組織的通信網絡、宣傳網站、社交網站賬號為主要目標，通過網絡降級、發布虛假指令等方式，削弱其傳遞信息、下達指示、招募新人和電子支付等能力。

隨著網絡空間作戰在美軍聯合作戰中的作用日益突出，美軍重點推進了網絡部隊指揮控制架構建設。 2010年建成美國網絡司令部後，美國陸、海、空三大軍種相繼成立了軍種網絡司令部。 2012年5月，美軍在各戰區總部組建“聯合網絡中心”，作為連接戰區司令部與美國網絡司令部的紐帶，以便更好地使用網絡任務部隊支援戰區作戰。當前，美軍高層正積極推動將網絡司令部升格為獨立的作戰司令部，一旦該設想成為現實，美軍網絡部隊的指揮關係將更加清晰，指揮鏈運轉將更加高效。

（作者單位：南京陸軍指揮學院）

圖片資料：楊磊

Referring URL: http://www.81.cn/jskj/2017-03/

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Cyberspace Adminstration of China 中央網絡安全和信息勇, Strategic Support Forces

China analysis for winning mechanisms of victory on the cyberspace battlefield // 中國對網絡空間戰場胜利機制的分析

09/26/2018 admin Leave a comment

China analysis for winning mechanisms of victory on the cyberspace battlefield //

中國對網絡空間戰場胜利機制的分析

2017年04月17日 15:xx:xx

If the First World War was a chemist’s war and the Second World War was a physicist’s war, then the 21st century war would undoubtedly become a game between informatics. The cyberspace war has moved from the background to the front. From the supporting role to the protagonist, become a new battlefield and combat platform. With the gradual emergence of the cyber warfare deterrent effect, countries have introduced network strategies and formed “cyber warfare forces”. The global network arms race has shown its tempo. At present, more than 20 countries have established “cyber warfare forces”. Committed to the application of network technology to war, the “seismic network” incident and the “hacker door” incident fully proved the remarkable power of cyber warfare in the new generation of war mode.

We must profoundly understand the new forms of war reflected by these events and actively respond to the threats and challenges brought by cyber sovereignty, network defense, network frontiers, and cyber warfare, because whoever masters the new war winning mechanism will be able to Win the initiative in the round of war.

Network Sovereignty: A New Dimension

The world today is moving rapidly toward informationization, and cyberspace has become the “fifth largest territory” beyond land, sea, air and sky. The original sovereignty is the sovereignty of physical space, while the network sovereignty is the sovereign space of network electromagnetic space; national sovereignty is a concept that expands with the expansion of human activity space. Network sovereignty is a new content and an important part of national sovereignty.

(1) Cyber sovereignty has become the “commanding height” of national sovereignty. The network carries a large amount of content such as politics, economy, military, culture, transportation and social, and becomes the basic platform for the efficient operation and accelerated progress of the entire society. Once the cyber sovereignty is lost, the network public opinion orientation will be out of control. The national industrial, transportation, energy and other national economic lifeline industry control systems and military information networks will be out of control, just as sea power challenges land rights and air rights challenges sea power and land rights. The latecomers of cyber sovereignty have become the “commanding heights” of national sovereignty, directly affecting the security and stability of all areas of the country.

(2) The violation of cyber sovereignty will directly affect the “heart” of the country. Compared with traditional physical space, the existence and defense of cyberspace sovereignty is not only easily overlooked, but also vulnerable to violations. The network hinges the information nodes on the earth that are thousands of miles apart. Through it, it can be easily and easily moved from one country to the heart of another country to the heart. A keystroke can surround the Earth for two weeks in a period of 0.3 seconds, and the attack is difficult to locate.

(3) The use of “combination boxing” is required to defend the cyberspace sovereignty. In the Google turmoil in 2010, the Chinese government categorically rejected Google’s request for “freedom” beyond Chinese legal management, which is a firm defense of cyber sovereignty. For any violation of the cyber sovereignty of our network, we must not only resist and counterattack in the cyberspace, but also play a “combination boxing” of politics, economy, and diplomacy to counterattack if necessary.

Network Frontiers – A New Border of National Security

China’s Internet users have reached 731 million. In this context, the network frontier far surpasses the status of the Great Wall in history and has become an important “warning line” for national security in the information age.

(1) Fully recognize the “new situation” of the network frontier. The first is the lack of network protection awareness among the people. Many systems have the same firewall, the network security problem is serious, and the cyber crime is increasing. Secondly, the network security products and security equipment in key areas rely on imports. The mainstream firewall technology and anti-virus technology are mostly from abroad, and they can control themselves independently. The lack of high-tech network security products; the third is that as China is increasingly connected to the world, the introduction of technology and equipment network remote services increases, the foreign party can monitor the operation and production of the equipment in real time, making me “portal opening”; finally In actual network operations, Western network powers monopolize a large number of network resources. For example, most of the world’s online information comes from or passes through the United States.

(2) Accurately define the “new boundary” of cyberspace. On the one hand, we must correctly understand the essential meaning of the network frontier. A country’s network infrastructure, state-specific Internet domain names and their domains, as well as financial, telecommunications, transportation, energy and other national core network systems in the national economy and the people’s livelihood should be regarded as an important part of the national network frontier, and no vandalism is allowed. On the one hand, we must correctly understand the importance of guarding the network frontier. Watching the network frontier is actually an authorization relationship, that is, it must meet the requirements and be allowed to enter. Otherwise, it cannot enter. For example, national financial, power, transportation and other systems of protection measures, firewalls and bank card cryptosystems are the “watchers” of the network frontier.

(3) Focus on creating a “new sword” that guards the frontiers of the network. The frontiers of guarding the network must be supported by powerful technical means. Various firewalls, cryptosystems, etc. are equivalent to building thick lines on the frontiers of the network, but this is not enough to resist external “invasion”, but also requires “patrol sentinels” and “frontier forces” to detect “intrusion” in a timely manner. In 2003, the US Einstein Plan for monitoring abnormal traffic at government agencies and institutional networks was the world’s first intrusion detection system. By the end of 2008, the Einstein system had been deployed in 600 government agency website systems, forming an intrusion detection system that supports dynamic protection.

Network Defense – The New Great Wall of National Defense

Sovereignty without armed protection is a fragile sovereignty, and frontiers without defense and defense are endangered frontiers. Therefore, people have a strong sense of border defense, coastal defense, and air defense.

(1) Firmly establishing a network defense concept is a “premise.” The countries of the world, especially the western developed countries, have not only woke up early, got up early, but also ran fast in the construction of network defense. Among them, the United States is both the creator of the Internet and the country that first paid attention to the construction of network security protection. The United States not only took the lead in formulating a series of policy documents such as the National Strategy for Ensuring Cyberspace Security, but also established a strong “net army” and a strong network defense.

(2) Vigorously building the network’s national defense force is a “trend.” The United States, Britain, Japan, Russia and other countries, as well as Taiwan, have formed cyber warfare units and command agencies. Strengthening the construction of cyber security forces and improving the national cyber defense capabilities are both the general trend and the successful practices of all countries in the world. They are also an urgent task for safeguarding China’s national security.

(III) Overall planning of network defense construction is “key”. The overall strategic concept should be proposed for the current cyberspace struggle, and the “three hands” should be highlighted in the top-level design: that is, to compete as a “flag-bearer” in public opinion, to select “hands-on” in the construction focus, and to stay on the struggle strategy. There is a “backhand”.

Cyber Warfare: A New Battlefield for the Game of Great Powers

In today’s world, the globalization of network battlefields, the normalization of network attack and defense, and the white-hotness of network attacks have made it possible to scientifically and effectively control cyberspace and occupy cyberspace, and become a new battlefield for strategic games of big countries.

The first is to regard the cyberspace situational awareness as the core of the power system. The four capabilities of “network security, situational awareness, network defense, and network deterrence” are the core capabilities for comprehensively promoting the construction of the cyberspace capability system. The war first requires the commander to grasp and understand the enemy’s and his own situation, make correct decisions based on the real-time situation, and the ever-changing characteristics of the network situation determine the success or failure of the network operation. Therefore, network situational awareness has become the primary capability of the cyberspace combat confrontation system.

The second is to use offensive operations as the main way to seize the initiative of cyberspace. The US military has strategically considered the cyberspace attacks as aggression in real space and has been attacked by the military. At present, the US military has built 100 teams to operate in cyberspace. In cyberspace operations, the offensive and defensive subjects have a certain degree of separation, and the offensive and defensive effects have asymmetry. The key to seizing the initiative in cyberspace operations is to use the offensive action to contain enemy attacks and ensure my stability.

The third is to establish a cyberspace defense force system with national co-ordination and military-civilian integration. To attack and defend, not to ignore the defense. Therefore, in accordance with the idea of “optimizing the overall existing strength, developing the gap to fill the gap, and building a new mechanism to protect the forces”, the company will build a professional, support and reserve based on the requirements of “moderate scale, structural optimization, integration of technology and warfare, and complementary functions”. The new cyberspace security defense force system composed of other forces will enhance the national network counterattack capability and form a network deterrent. (Li Yiyang: School of Secondary School Affiliated to Renmin University of China; Li Minghai: Deputy Director, Network Space Research Center, National Defense University)

Original Mandarin Chinese:

如果說第一次世界大戰是化學家的戰爭，第二次世界大戰是物理學家的戰爭，那麼，21世紀的戰爭無疑將成為信息學家之間的博弈，網絡空間戰已從後台走向前台，從配角轉向主角，成為新的戰場和作戰平台隨著網絡戰威懾效果的逐步顯現，各國紛紛出台網絡戰略，組建“網絡戰部隊”，全球網絡軍備競賽呈燎原之勢 – 目前已有20多個國家組建了“網絡戰部隊”，各國都致力於將網絡技術運用於戰爭“震網”事件，“黑客門”事件充分證明了網絡戰在新一代戰爭模式中的顯著威力。

我們必須深刻認識這些事件所折射出來的新的戰爭形態，積極應對網絡主權，網絡國防，網絡邊疆，網絡戰爭帶來的威脅和挑戰，因為，誰掌握新的戰爭制勝機理，誰就能在下一輪戰爭中贏得主動。

網絡主權 – 國家主權的新維度

當今世界正在向著信息化快速邁進，網絡空間成為繼陸，海，空，天之外的“第五大疆域”原有的主權均為物理空間的主權，而網絡主權是網絡電磁空間主權。國家主權是一個隨著人類活動空間的拓展而不斷拓展的概念，網絡主權是國家主權的全新內容和重要組成部分。

（一）網絡主權已成為國家主權的“制高點”。網絡承載了政治，經濟，軍事，文化，交通和社交等大量內容，成為整個社會高效運轉和加速進步的基本平台。一旦喪失網絡主權，網絡輿情導向將會失控，國家工業，交通，能源等國民經濟命脈行業控制系統和軍事信息網絡都將會失控，如同海權挑戰陸權，空權挑戰海權與陸權一樣，網絡主權後來者居上，成為國家主權的“制高點”，直接影響國家各領域的安全穩定。

（二）網絡主權的侵犯將直逼國家的“心臟”。與傳統實體空間相比，網絡空間主權的存在與捍衛不僅易被忽視，而且易遭侵犯。網絡把地球上相距萬里的信息節點鉸鏈為一體，通過它可以悄無聲息，輕而易舉地從一國進入另一國腹地直至心臟部位。一次擊鍵0.3秒時間內即可環繞地球兩週，而且，攻擊很難被定位。

（三）捍衛網絡空間主權需用“組合拳”。2010年谷歌風波中，中國政府斷然拒絕谷歌要求超越中國法律管理的“自由”，就是對網絡主權的堅決捍衛。對於任何侵犯我網絡主權的行為，不僅要在網絡空間予以抵制和反擊，必要時還可打出政治，經濟，外交等“組合拳”給予還擊。

網絡邊疆 – 國家安全的新邊界

中國網民已達7.31億，在這個背景下，網絡邊疆遠超歷史上萬里長城的地位，成為信息時代國家安全的重要“警戒線”。

（一）充分認清網絡邊疆的“新形勢”首先是民眾缺乏網絡防護意識，很多系統的防火牆形同虛設，網絡安全問題嚴重，網絡犯罪日益增加;其次是網絡安全產品和關鍵領域安全設備依賴進口，主流防火牆技術和殺毒技術大都來自國外，自主可控，高技術含量的網絡安全產品匱乏;第三是隨著我國日益與世界接軌，引進技術設備的網絡遠程服務增加，外方能實時監控設備運轉和生產情況，令我自身“門戶洞開”;最後是在實際網絡運營上，西方網絡大國壟斷著大量網絡資源，比如，全球大多數網上信息發自或經過美國。

（二）準確界定網絡空間的“新邊界”。一方面，要正確理解網絡邊疆的本質內涵。一個國家的網絡基礎設施，國家專屬的互聯網域名及其域內以及金融，電信，交通，能源等關係國計民生領域的國家核心網絡系統都應視為國家網絡邊疆的重要組成部分，不允許肆意破壞;另一方面，要正確認識值守網絡邊疆的重要性值守網絡邊疆，其實是一種授權關係，即必須符合要求，得到允許才能進入，否則，不能進入。比如，國家金融，電力，交通等系統的防護措施，防火牆以及銀行卡密碼系統等都是網絡邊疆的“值守者”。

（三）著力打造守護網絡邊疆的“新利劍”。守護網絡邊疆必須以強大的技術手段為支撐。各種防火牆，密碼系統等相當於在網絡邊疆上建起了粗線條的籬笆，但這不足以抵禦外來“入侵”，還需要“巡邏哨兵”和“邊防部隊”及時檢測“入侵”行為。2003年，美國用於監測政府部門和機構網絡關口非正常流量的“愛因斯坦計劃”，就是世界上第一個入侵檢測系統。到2008年年底，愛因斯坦系統已部署在600個政府機構網站系統中，形成了一個支撐動態保護的入侵檢測系統。

網絡國防 – 國家防禦的新長城

沒有武裝保護的主權是脆弱的主權，沒有國防捍衛的邊疆是瀕危的邊疆。因此，人們才產生了強烈的邊防，海防，空防意識。

（一）牢固樹立網絡國防理念是“前提”。世界各國，尤其是西方發達國家在網絡國防建設上，不僅醒得早，起得早，而且跑得快。其中，美國既是互聯網的締造者，也是最早關注網絡安全防護建設的國家。美國不僅率先制定了“確保網絡空間安全的國家戰略”等一系列政策文件，而且建立了強大的“網軍”和強大的網絡國防。

（二）大力建設網絡國防力量是“勢趨”。美國，英國，日本，俄羅斯等國以及中國台灣地區，紛紛組建了網絡戰部隊和指揮機構。加強網絡安全力量建設，提高國家網絡防衛能力，這既是大勢所趨，也是世界各國的成功做法，更是維護我國國家安全的一項緊迫任務。

（三）整體統籌網絡國防建設是“關鍵”應針對當前網絡空間鬥爭實際提出總體戰略構想，並在頂層設計上突出“三手”：即在輿論造勢上爭當“旗手”，在建設重點上選好“抓手”，在鬥爭策略上留有“後手”。

網絡戰爭 – 大國博弈的新戰場

當今世界，網絡戰場的全球化，網絡攻防的常態化，網絡攻心的白熱化等突出特點，使得科學高效地管控網絡空間，佔領網絡空間，成為大國戰略博弈的新戰場。

一是把網絡空間態勢感知能力作為力量體系建設核心。“網絡安全保障，態勢感知，網絡防禦，網絡威懾”四大能力，是全面推進網絡空間能力體系建設的核心能力。戰爭首先需要指揮員能夠掌握和理解敵方，己方態勢，根據實時態勢作出正確決策，網絡態勢瞬息萬變的特點決定了網絡作戰的成敗。因此，網絡態勢感知能力就成為網絡空間作戰對抗體系的首要能力。

二是將攻勢作戰作為奪取網絡空間主動權的主要方式。美軍在戰略上已將網絡空間的攻擊行為視為現實空間的侵略行為，並予以軍事打擊。目前美軍已建成100個小組在網絡空間活動。網絡空間作戰，攻防主體具有一定的分離性，攻防效果具有不對稱性。奪取網絡空間作戰的主動權，關鍵在於以攻勢行動遏制敵攻擊，保證我穩定。

三是建立國家統籌，軍民融合的網絡空間防禦力量體系。以攻助防，不是忽視防禦。因此，需要按照“優化整體現有力量，發展填補空白力量，組建新機理防護力量”的思路，依據“規模適度，結構優化，技戰一體，功能互補”的要求，構建由專業，支援和預備役等力量構成的新型網絡空間安全防禦力量體系，提升國家網絡反擊能力，形成網絡威懾力（李昊洋：中國人民大學附屬中學分校;李明海：國防大學網絡空間研究中心副主任）

Original Referring URL: http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-04/

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Chinese Military Analysis of US Navy Cyber Warfare Efforts // 中國對美國海軍網絡戰爭的軍事分析

09/26/2018 admin Leave a comment

Chinese Military Analysis of US Navy Cyber Warfare Efforts //

中國對美國海軍網絡戰爭的軍事分析

2011/02/15

US Navy’s 10th Fleet. As the naval task force, the US Fleet cyber command is the Navy’s second-level command, which is part of the Naval Combat Command. Its main task is to guide the cyber operations in defense, and to support the combat troops to carry out deterrence, repel violations, and guarantee. Freedom of movement. Our mission is similar to that of other military cyberspace commanders. It is responsible for carrying out combat operations in the fields of network, password, signal intelligence, information warfare, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and space to support sea and land. Combat power. Naval operations require the integration of traditional combat capabilities, the expansion of new capabilities, and the development of capabilities across networks, signal intelligence systems, and electronic warfare systems to achieve the full development of our cyberspace combat capabilities. Similarly, we are also responsible for organizing and commanding the Navy’s global cryptographic operations, integrating information operations and space operations.

History

The Tenth Fleet was established during the Second World War and developed anti-submarine warfare capabilities primarily in the Atlantic. At that time, we were faced with a hostile threat that greatly exceeded the combat capability of World War I, and its ability to change the situation was very strong. The Tenth Fleet without any warships defeated the German submarines through intelligence fusion, innovative tactics, technology, and processes. Today, the rebuilt Tenth Fleet still adheres to these operational concepts. Together with information warfare experts, intelligence specialists, password and electronic warfare experts, and traditional military experts, we command operations to ensure the flexibility of operations and respond to changing hostile threats. The focus of the fleet cyber command is to enable the navy to quickly respond to cyber threats and maintain information superiority. This framework of action requires us to complete the task of cyber operations defense.

To win in modern warfare, we must have the ability to move freely in the full spectrum electromagnetic space, and its defense range has expanded from ordinary electromagnetic interference to advanced network intrusion and malicious attacks. The function of the fleet cyber command is to analyze this threat, innovate tactics, techniques, and processes to protect the network and ensure freedom of movement.

Naval operations are dynamic, and the naval network also has time and space complexity. The Navy must not only be deployed in various oceans, but also support ground operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places. We currently have more than 10,000 naval officers and men involved in these ground operations.

The Fleet Cyber Command is a global command with the ability to maintain network strength and conduct cyber operations worldwide, and to ensure that the operational capabilities of the cyber operations are commanded in a full spectrum electromagnetic space. Since the Commander of the Tenth Fleet is a combat-level commander, our command is also based on the structure of a typical naval mission force. This power structure can assign subordinate missions to regional missions to support specific password requirements. This task force has been designed to take into account the changing intelligence, skills and responsibilities, has the ability to respond quickly to the fleet’s operational missions, and has facilitated local communication and collaboration with the US Cyber Command and the Division. We have been working to develop a robust organizational structure that provides rapid and direct support for a variety of operations.

The Cyber Warfare Command (CTF1010) is responsible for naval cyber operations, and its subordinate units include the Atlantic and Pacific Regional Naval Computer and Telecommunications Ground Master Station (NCTAMS), which provides network guidance, maintenance, and shoreline relay. The Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command (CTF 1020) is responsible for network defense. The unit is responsible for monitoring cyber threats and monitoring network response.

Norfolk’s Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1030) specializes in naval information operations, with its task force located in San Diego and Whidbey Island. Texas Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1040), Georgia Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1050), Maryland Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1060), Colorado Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1080 And its subordinate headquarters around the world to coordinate the fleet and theater operations. The password action is the responsibility of the CTF 1000 power structure.

The Hutland Naval Information Operations Center (CTF 1090) is based on our research and development brigade and its main mission is to provide battlefield preparation techniques for supporting fleet and joint operations missions.

The successful completion of the mission must be based on efficient recruitment and training of personnel who must have a keen technical insight and the ability to apply personal skills to fleet defensive operations. I have checked almost all of the combatant commands, and I can assure the committee that the Navy has a group of outstanding combatants who are ready to conduct cyberspace operations. Due to the dynamic nature of the cyberspace space, we must continue to advance the development of combat forces. We have taken the initiative to set up new expert officers including cyber engineers and warrants. The construction of the National Naval Academy cyber curriculum will also provide new opportunities for student education, and these students will become the backbone of the naval cyber operations command.

Task

As the fleet cyber command is maturing, we are also trying to learn to use the technology of the brother service. As the support command of the National Cyber Command, we also contacted personnel from other service departments to establish a defense system to improve resilience and enhance the robustness and adaptability of global cyber defense. If a service department discovers, analyzes, or destroys a threat, the information is quickly distributed to other services, minimizing the damage and achieving a joint response.

In fact, we have already started to act. Since the establishment in January, we have been involved in supporting the National Pacific Command and Pacific Fleet exercises with the National Cyber Command. We enhance shared situational awareness and collaborative surveillance security capabilities by examining cyber operations. We also work with industry, academia, and the Federal Fund Research and Development Center to learn to leverage their knowledge and capabilities. The business sector is driving the development of the cyberspace sector, and we must get their capabilities and financial support.

Inter-domain coordination and interaction are extremely important. Safeguarding system security or network defense work must be coordinated with preventing our system from unintentionally interfering with work. From navigation systems to network access, from the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft to the shipboard SLQ-32 jammers, the Tenth Fleet quickly integrates with other numbering fleets and regional naval department commanders to meet their mission requirements. The collaboration between the fleet staff is one of the key factors behind the achievements of the Tenth Fleet and one of the reasons for our initial success.

The ability of the staff and commanders at Ft. Meade has improved every month. At present, there are 130 staff officers and commanders in our department, which will increase to about 200 in recent years. This growth rate guarantees that the command will not only increase the number of technical experts, but also increase the number of people with operational experience who can get rid of the numerous challenges related to cyber security.

These challenges include: developing and maintaining the concept of viewing the network as a battle space; providing support across the services to maintain our freedom of movement in the cyberspace; developing cyber operations into a functional area and creating a series of detailed concepts .

As our capabilities continue to grow, we will have better support for fleet and joint exercise capabilities, and through their necessary feedback to improve our combat capabilities in hostile or cyberspace environments. This feedback is very important, and it enables us to assess and improve our capabilities to support freedom of action in the face of stronger threats. These threats will not only affect the Navy or the Department of Defense system, but also civilian users, and they may be sources of non-traditional threats. There is no doubt that the people of non-state entities are also looking for the means and capabilities that affect our networks, so as a country, we must be prepared to deal with these asymmetric challenges and threats.

The US Fleet Cyber Command is also the authoritative operational arm of the Navy in electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum operations. By working with other services, we are working hard to develop a comprehensive joint electromagnetic spectrum operational plan. All radio frequency users have proven that it is not enough to defend against dynamic targeted network attacks. We must also have a network protection network in full-dimensional space. ability.

Every day, my staff are working hard to go beyond the traditional field and apply their expertise to the cyberspace field. I am very proud of it. This is the environment we create to nurture and use future domain experts. The Ministry of Defence is not comparable to the industry in terms of monetary subsidies, but we are able to provide our staff with a wider range of education and training opportunities and help them gain leadership experience that is not available elsewhere.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

美國艦隊賽博司令部和美國海軍第十艦隊司令。作為海軍特遣司令部的美國艦隊賽博司令部，是海軍二級司令部，隸屬於海軍作戰司令部，主要任務是指導防禦中的賽博作戰，支援作戰部隊實施威懾、擊退侵犯、保證行動自由。我部任務與其他軍種賽博特遣司令部類似，擔負有在網絡、密碼、信號情報、信息作戰、賽博空間、電子戰以及太空等領域實施作戰行動的獨特任務，以支援海上、陸上作戰力量。海軍作戰需要通過融合傳統作戰能力，拓展新型能力，發展跨越網絡、信號情報系統和電子戰系統的能力，從而實現我部在賽博空間作戰能力方面的全面發展。同樣，我們也擔負有組織指揮海軍全球範圍的密碼作戰，集成信息作戰和太空作戰的任務。

歷史

第十艦隊成立於二戰期間，主要在大西洋發展實施反潛戰能力。那時，我們面臨的是作戰能力大大超越一戰時期的敵對威脅，其改變戰局能力十分強大。沒有任何軍艦的第十艦隊，通過情報融合，創新戰術、技術、流程戰勝了德軍潛艇。如今，重建的第十艦隊仍恪守這些作戰理念。我們與信息戰專家，情報專家，密碼和電子戰專家，以及傳統軍事專家一起，指揮作戰行動，確保作戰行動的靈活性，應對日益變化的敵對威脅。艦隊賽博司令部作戰重點是使海軍具備快速應對網絡威脅能力，保持信息優勢。這一行動框架要求我們要完成網絡作戰防禦的任務。

在現代戰爭中取勝，我們必須要具備在全譜電磁空間內的自由行動能力，其防禦範圍已從普通的電磁干擾擴展到高級的網絡入侵和惡意攻擊。艦隊賽博司令部職能就是分析這種威脅，創新戰術、技術、流程，來防護網絡並保證自由行動能力。

結構

海軍作戰具有動態性，海軍網絡也具有時空複雜性。海軍不僅要配置在各大洋，還要在阿富汗、伊拉克等其它地方支援地面作戰，我們目前有超過1萬名海軍官兵參與這些地面作戰。

艦隊賽博司令部是一個全球性的司令部，具備在世界範圍內保持網絡優勢、實施網絡作戰的能力，並確保在全譜電磁空間指揮賽博作戰行動能力的發揮。由於第十艦隊指揮官是作戰級指揮官，我們司令部也是基於典型海軍任務力量結構而建立的。此力量結構能夠給下級特遣大隊分派地域性任務，為特定密碼需求提供支援。這種特遣部隊編成考慮了多變的情報通報，技術和職責，具備了保障艦隊作戰任務的快速反應能力，並且推動了與美國賽博司令部和軍種賽博部門在局部的交流協作。我們一直在致力於發展一種健壯的組織結構，能夠對各種作戰行動提供迅速直接的支援。

網絡戰司令部(CTF1010)負責海軍網絡作戰，其下屬單位包括大西洋和太平洋地區性海軍計算機與遠程通信地面主站(NCTAMS)，該主站能夠提供網絡引導、維護和岸艦中繼。海軍賽博防禦作戰司令部(CTF 1020)負責網絡防禦，該單位主要負責監測網絡威脅和監控網絡響應。

諾福克的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1030)專門負責海軍信息作戰，其特遣大隊位於聖地亞哥和惠德貝島。德克薩斯的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1040)，喬治亞州的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1050)，馬里蘭的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1060)，科羅拉多的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1080 )及其覆蓋全球的下屬司令部來負責協同艦隊和戰區作戰。密碼行動由CTF 1000力量結構負責。

休特蘭海軍信息作戰中心（CTF 1090）在我們的研究與開發大隊基礎上建立，其主要任務是為支援艦隊和聯合作戰任務提供戰場準備技術。

外部和內部組織結構圖見下方。

任務的圓滿完成必須要以人員的高效徵募和培訓為基礎，這些人員必須具備敏銳的技術洞察力和將個人技能應用於艦隊網絡防禦行動的能力。我檢查過幾乎所有的作戰司令部，我能夠向委員會保證，海軍擁有一批傑出的作戰人員，他們已經做好準備遂行賽博空間作戰行動。由於賽博空間領域的動態性，我們必須持續推進作戰力量的發展，我們主動設置新的專家官員包括賽博工程師和準尉。國家海軍學院賽博課程的建設也將為學員教育提供新的機遇，這些學員將成為海軍賽博作戰指揮的骨幹力量。

任務

隨著艦隊賽博司令部日趨成熟，我們也在試圖學習利用兄弟軍種的相關技術。作為國家賽博司令部的支援司令部，我們還聯繫了其它軍種部門的人員共同建立深度防禦體系，提高應變能力，增強全球賽博防禦的健壯性和適應性。如果某軍種部門發現、分析、摧毀了某種威脅，該信息將會迅速被分發到其它軍種，使侵入破壞程度最小化並實現聯合響應。

實際上我們已經開始行動了，從一月份成立開始，我們就與國家賽博司令部軍種部門一起，一直在參與支援國家太平洋司令部和太平洋艦隊演習。我們通過考察網絡作戰行動，來增強共享態勢感知能力和協同監督安全能力。我們還與工業界、學術界和聯邦基金研究發展中心開展合作，學習利用他們的知識和能力。商業部門推動著賽博領域的發展，我們必須獲得他們的能力和資金支持。

跨領域間的協調與相互作用是極其重要的。保障系統安全或者網絡防禦工作必須要同阻止我方系統無意干擾工作協調開展。從導航系統到網絡訪問，從EA-18G咆哮者電子戰飛機到艦載SLQ-32干擾機，第十艦隊都迅速集成其它編號艦隊及地區海軍部門指揮官，並滿足其任務需求。艦隊參謀間的協作是第十艦隊成就背後的關鍵因素之一，也是我們取得初始成功的原因之一。

在Ft. Meade的參謀和指揮人員的能力素質每個月都有提高。目前我部指揮參謀人員有130名，在近幾年將會增加到200名左右。這個增長速率保證司令部不僅要增加技術專家型人員，還要增加哪些富有作戰經驗的人員，他們能夠從賽博安全相關的大量挑戰中擺脫出來。

這些挑戰包括：發展與保持將網絡視為一個作戰空間的觀念；跨軍種提供支援，保持我方在賽博空間的行動自由；將賽博作戰發展成一個職能領域，並創建一系列詳實的概念。

隨著我們作戰能力的持續發展，我們將具備更好的支援艦隊和聯合演習能力，並通過他們必要的反饋來提高我們在敵對或對抗賽博環境中的作戰能力。這種反饋是非常重要的，它能夠促使我們評估和改進自身能力，從而支持在面對更強大威脅時的行動自由。這些威脅將來不僅僅會影響海軍或者國防部的系統，也會威脅到平民用戶，並且它們可能是一些非傳統威脅來源。毫無疑問，非國家實體的人員也在尋找影響我們網絡的手段和能力，那麼作為一個國家，我們必須做好準備應對這些非對稱的挑戰與威脅。

美國艦隊賽博司令部也是海軍在電子戰和電磁頻譜作戰方面的權威作戰部門。通過與其它軍種協力合作，我們正在努力製定全面的聯合電磁頻譜作戰計劃，所有的無線電頻率用戶都證明，能夠防禦動態定向的網絡攻擊是不夠的，我們還必須具備在全維空間防護網絡行動的能力。

每天，我部人員都在努力超越傳統領域，並將他們的專業知識應用到賽博領域，我為此深感驕傲。這就是我們為培育和使用將來的領域專家所營造的環境。在金錢補助方面國防部是無法同業界進行比較的，但我們能夠為所屬人員提供更為廣泛的教育和培訓機會，並幫助他們獲得其它地方無法取得的領導經驗。

Original referring 2011 url: http://www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2011-02

Chinese Military Cyber Warfare Capacity Building Achieving Situational Awareness in Cyberspace // 中國軍事網絡戰能力建設在網絡空間實現態勢感知

09/26/2018 admin Leave a comment

Chinese Military Cyber Warfare Capacity Building Achieving Situational Awareness in Cyberspace //

中國軍事網絡戰能力建設在網絡空間實現態勢感知

2017/05/20

Cyberspace has become a new territory alongside land, sea, air and space, and it is also the most extensive territory. Since the birth of the computer, computer and network-based information systems have gradually developed, and the software and resources on it have been continuously enriched, eventually forming a network space.

With the continuous development of the US military’s weapons and equipment and combat theory, the “cyberspace warfare” began to move from reality to reality. Compared with the traditional “platform center warfare”, the role of the command and control system “combat multiplier” in “cyberspace warfare” will be more prominent, and the impact on combat will be even greater. In the future modern war, in cyberspace Command and control should have its own characteristics and concerns.

In theory, cyberspace is synonymous with the digital society of all available electronic information and networks. The United States “National Security Presidential Decree No. 45 and General Homeland Security Order No. 23” defines cyberspace as: information technology infrastructure and interdependent networks, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and processors in key industries. And the controller, usually also includes the information virtual environment and the interaction between people.

Cyberspace has four elements: communication devices and lines; computers; software; data communication and resource sharing. Communication equipment and lines: It is one of the infrastructures of network space, including routing/switching equipment, wired/wireless communication equipment, cables, and so on. Computer: One of the infrastructures of cyberspace with computing, storage, and data processing capabilities. Software: It is the core supporting part of cyberspace, and software systems running various functions in communication devices and computers. Data communication and resource sharing: It is the basic capability of cyberspace, providing the required information for users at all levels.

Commanding operations in the vast new territory of cyberspace will inevitably require the linkage of multiple arms and services. First, it should have security protection capabilities, provide multiple levels of security, and secondly must master the battlefield situation. In addition, it must have resource scheduling capabilities, etc. Provide support for integrated joint operations.

Security protection refers to the protection of data in the hardware, software and systems of network systems by using various technologies and management measures so that they are not damaged, falsified or leaked due to accidental or malicious reasons, so that the system can continue Reliable and normal operation, network services are not interrupted.

In the cyberspace command operation, the whole process of generating, storing, transmitting and using all kinds of allegations is faced with one or the other security threats. The traditional form of conflict has been extended to cyberspace.

Security protection technology and attack technology have been developing together. The contest between “spear” and “shield” has existed since ancient times. Although the US military has consistently expressed its position through various channels, it claims that the “core of the US military’s cyberspace operations is to defend against cyberattacks, and defensive capabilities are the basis of all other combat capabilities.” However, a little analysis shows that the US military must achieve this in cyberspace. The goal is to combine attack and defense, build a network deterrent system, and consolidate its own “networking rights” in the military. US Deputy Defense Secretary Lynn has made it clear that the US will retain the right to respond to serious cyber attacks and will make a commensurate and legitimate military response at the time and place we choose. Former Defense Secretary Panetta has pointed out: “Now we live in a completely different world and face the cyberspace attack that can be compared with Pearl Harbor.” “We must be prepared to deal with it. In cyberspace, we have to Have a good network attack and network defense capabilities.” These speeches fully demonstrate that the US military pays attention to the deterrent effect of cyberspace, emphasizes the combination of attack and defense in cyberspace, and takes the initiative to launch cyberattacks when necessary. Its military goal is not only to ensure its own network security, but to discourage by improving its cyber attack capabilities. And deterrence all cyberattacks that are not conducive to oneself, to achieve its absolute freedom, absolute superiority and absolute security in cyberspace.

In the cyberspace, the offensive and defensive drills between the state and the country have never stopped. In July 2008, Russia used a covert injection of attack software to launch a comprehensive cyberattack against Georgia, causing the network to collapse. In December 2011, Iran declared that its “electronic warfare force” used a “hacker hijacking” method to cause an American RQ-170 stealth drone to leave the route and land in Iran. The “super flame” virus discovered in May 2012 spread widely in the Middle East, hiding in the computer and stealing data. In March 2014, the official website of the Russian president suffered a cyber attack. From the previous cyberattacks, the cyber attack is as good as the fire of conventional weapons. The security of cyberspace is the security of the country, and cyberspace has become a space in the field of national sovereignty.

Security protection in cyberspace should employ multiple levels of security mechanisms. At the national strategic level, it is a national-level network security protection; in key areas, there are network security protections in the military, government, and economic fields; in large enterprises, there are network security protections of state-owned and private enterprises and institutions; There are network security protections for individuals and families. Among them, the national level of security protection mainly includes border network security and backbone network security; enterprise-level (and military) security protection mainly includes border network security and intranet security; personal computer security protection mainly includes computer terminal security, terminal software security and terminal Data Security. At different levels of security, the content of protected information varies from national strategic planning to development routes to personal privacy and bank passwords. The leakage of information will undoubtedly have a blow and negative impact on the survival and development of the country, enterprises and individuals, and even undermine the security and stability of the country.

Situational awareness is the perception, understanding and prediction of environmental factors under certain time and space conditions. In 1988, Endsley divided situational awareness into three levels of information processing: perception, understanding, and prediction. In 1999, TimBass first proposed the concept of network situational awareness, and pointed out that “convergence-based network situational awareness” will become the development direction of network management.

“Know yourself and know each other, there is no war.” In the new battle space of cyberspace, how can we be confidant and know each other? It is necessary to grasp the situation of the battlefield and have the ability to sense the situation, that is, to acquire, understand and present the key factors that can cause changes in the state of the enemy and the enemy, and to predict the future development trend.

The battlefield situation in cyberspace has the characteristics of wide coverage, huge amount of information, and extremely complicated conditions. For all levels of commanders, they hope to clearly understand and master the current cyberspace operations from the situation map, so that they can make decisions quickly and issue correct command orders.

To gain insight into the state and situation of cyberspace battlefield development, it must have the ability to collect, transmit, store, monitor, analyze, and present state data. In the key position of the network space, the detection points are laid, the network running status is detected, and the state data is collected. Based on various state data, network posture, security situation, spectrum situation, etc. are formed. Then, it is transmitted to the node with data analysis and processing capability through various communication means to analyze the situation data, including situational integration, situation assessment and situation prediction. The results of the analysis and processing are transmitted to the command posts at all levels, and the battlefield situation is presented to the commanders at all levels in a layered, multi-dimensional, on-demand manner. The basic process of situational awareness is consistent with the traditional approach, but each process is different.

The battlefield situation of cyberspace should be layered, global, and partial, which puts higher demands on the situation. With the continuous development of rendering technology, simple planar situational maps can no longer meet the operational needs, especially in the cyberspace combat environment, the demand for stereoscopic and multidimensional situations is prominent. Even if you are in the command post, the commander should be able to understand the battlefield situation and face the real opponent through the situation map. In the American war movie, you can often see the stereoscopic, touchable electronic sandbox, and the multi-dimensional display of the real-time battlefield situation enables the commanding function to make quick and accurate decisions and improve command and control capabilities. The battlefield environment of cyberspace is extremely complex, network environment, equipment operation, software operation… Many places need to have clear and intuitive display. In order to improve the user experience and shorten the decision time, the cyberspace situation should have multi-dimensional dynamic characteristics, and can support multi-screen display, multi-screen linkage and so on. From the top-level situation map, you can understand the whole picture of the war. From the local situation map, you can understand the status of the combat units at all levels. The commanders at different levels can view different situation maps as needed based on their own authority.

As a new type of combat space, cyberspace has objective differences with traditional physical space, and there are special requirements for command and control of cyberspace. However, cyberspace command and control still faces many other problems, such as how to integrate cyberspace command and control with traditional physical space command and control systems, and how to conduct cyberspace command and control effectiveness evaluation.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

網絡空間已成為與陸地、海洋、空中、太空並列的一片新疆域，也是覆蓋面最廣的疆域。從計算機誕生之日起，以計算機和網絡為基礎的信息系統就逐漸發展起來，其上的軟件和資源也不斷豐富，最終形成了網絡空間。

隨著美軍武器裝備和作戰理論的不斷發展，“網絡空間戰”從設想開始走向現實。與傳統的“平台中心戰”相比，在“網絡空間戰”中指揮控制系統“戰鬥力倍增器”的作用將更加突出，對作戰的影響也更加巨大’在未來的現代化戰爭中，網絡空間中的指揮控制應有它自身的特點和關注點。

從理論上講，網絡空間是所有可利用的電子信息、網絡構成的數字社會的代名詞。美國《第45號國家安全總統令暨第23號國土安全總令》中將網絡空間定義為：信息技術基礎設施和相互依存的網絡，包括互聯網、電信網、電腦系統以及重要產業中的處理器和控制器，通常還包括信息虛擬環境以及人與人之間的互動。

網絡空間具有四個要素：通信設備和線路；計算機；軟件；數據通信與資源共享。通信設備和線路：是網絡空間的基礎設施之一，具體包括路由/交換設備、有線/無線通信設備、線纜等。計算機：是網絡空間的基礎設施之一，具有計算、存儲和數據處理等能力。軟件：是網絡空間的核心支撐部分，通信設備和計算機中均運行著各種功能的軟件系統。數據通信與資源共享：是網絡空間具備的基本能力，為各類各級用戶提供所需的信息。

在網絡空間這一遼闊的新疆域中指揮作戰，必然需要多個軍兵種聯動，首先應當具備安全防護能力，提供多級安全保障，其次必須掌握戰場態勢，另外還必須具有資源調度能力等，能夠為一體化聯合作戰提供支撐。

安全防護是指通過釆用各種技術和管理措施，保護網絡系統的硬件、軟件及系統中的數據，使其不因偶然的或者惡意的原因而遭受到破壞、篡改、洩露，使得系統能夠連續可靠正常地運行，網絡服務不中斷。

網絡空間指揮作戰中，各類指控信息的產生、存儲、傳輸和使用的全過程，均面臨著這樣或那樣的安全威脅，傳統的衝突形式已擴展到網絡空間。

安全防護技術和攻擊技術一直在共同發展著，“矛”與“盾”的較量自古就有。雖然美軍不斷通過各種渠道表態，宣稱美軍網絡空間行動的“核心是防禦網絡攻擊行為，防禦能力是其他一切作戰能力的基礎”,但稍加分析即可看出，美軍在網絡空間要達成的目標是：攻防結合，構建網絡威懾體系，在軍事上鞏固自己的“製網權”。美國國防部副部長林恩曾明確表示，美方將保留回應嚴重網絡攻擊的權利，會在“我們選擇的時間和地點做出相稱且正當的軍事回應”。前任國防部長帕內塔曾指出：“現在我們生活在一個完全不同的世界裡，要面對可與珍珠港比擬的網絡空間攻擊”，“我們必須做好應對準備，在網絡空間，我們要同時擁有良好的網絡進攻與網絡防禦能力”。這些講話充分顯示了美軍注重網絡空間威懾效應、在網絡空間強調攻防結合、必要時不惜主動發動網絡攻擊的心態，其軍事目標絕不僅僅是保證自身網絡安全，而是要通過提升網絡攻擊能力勸阻和威懾所有不利於己的網絡攻擊行為，實現其在網絡空間的絕對自由、絕對優勢和絕對安全。

在網絡空間中，國家與國家之間的攻防演練也從來沒有停止過。 2008年7月，俄羅斯利用攻擊軟件的隱蔽注入，對格魯吉亞實施了全面的網絡攻擊，導致網絡癱瘓。 2011年12月，伊朗宣稱其“電子戰部隊”用“黑客劫持”的方法使得美國的一架RQ-170隱形無人機脫離航線，降落在伊朗境內。 2012年5月被發現的“超級火焰”病毒在中東大範圍傳播，在計算機內隱蔽駐留、竊取數據。 2014年3月，俄羅斯總統官網遭遇網絡攻擊。從歷次的網絡攻擊事件來看，網絡攻擊效果不亞於常規武器的火力打擊。網絡空間的安全，就是國家的安全，網絡空間已成為國家主權領域空間。

網絡空間中的安全防護應採用多級安全保障機制。在國家戰略層面，是國家級網絡安全防護；在關鍵部位，有軍隊、政府、經濟等領域的網絡安全防護；在大型企業中，有國有、私有等企事業單位的網絡安全防護；在局部，有個人、家庭等範圍的網絡安全防護。其中，國家層面的安全防護主要包括邊界網絡安全和骨幹網絡安全；企業級（及軍隊）安全防護主要包括邊界網絡安全和內網安全；個人計算機安全防護主要包括計算機終端安全、終端軟件安全及終端數據安全。在不同的安全級別上，保護的信息內容各不相同，大到國家戰略規劃、發展路線，小到個人隱私、銀行密碼等。信息的洩漏，無疑會對國家、企業、個人的生存和發展帶來打擊和負面影響，甚至會破壞國家的安全和穩定。

態勢感知是在一定的時間和空間條件下，對環境因素的感知、理解以及對其發展趨勢的預測。 1988年，Endsley把態勢感知分為感知、理解和預測三個層次的信息處理。 1999年，TimBass首次提出了網絡態勢感知的概念，並且指出，“基於融合的網絡態勢感知”必將成為網絡管理的發展方向。

“知己知彼，百戰不殆。”在網絡空間這一新型作戰空間中，如何才能做到知己和知彼？必須掌握戰場態勢，具有態勢感知能力，即對能夠引起敵我狀態發生變化的關鍵因素進行獲取、理解和呈現，並能夠預測未來的發展趨勢。

網絡空間中的戰場態勢具有覆蓋面廣、信息量巨大、情況異常複雜等特點。對於各級指揮員來說，都希望能夠從態勢圖上清晰地了解和掌握當前網絡空間作戰狀況，以便能夠快速地進行決策，下達正確的指揮作戰命令。

要洞察網絡空間戰場發展的狀態和形勢，必須具備狀態數據釆集、傳輸、存儲、監控、分析處理和展現的能力。在網絡空間的關鍵位置，佈設檢測點，對網絡運行狀態進行檢測，並採集狀態數據。基於各類狀態數據，形成網絡態勢、安全態勢、頻譜態勢等。再通過各種通信手段傳輸到具有數據分析處理能力的節點上，進行態勢數據分析，主要包括態勢融合、態勢評估和態勢預測等。分析處理的結果再傳輸到各級指揮所，並以分層、多維、按需等方式將戰場態勢呈現給各級指揮員。態勢感知的基本流程與傳統方式一致，但每個處理環節都有不同之處。

網絡空間的戰場態勢應該是分層的，有全局的，也有局部的，這對態勢呈現效果提出了更高的要求。隨著呈現技術的不斷發展，簡單的平面態勢圖已不能滿足作戰需求，尤其是在網絡空間作戰環境下，立體、多維的態勢呈現需求凸顯。就算身在指揮所內，通過態勢圖，指揮員也應能洞悉戰場態勢，直面真正的對手。在美國戰爭大片中，經常能夠看到立體的、可觸控的電子沙盤，實時的戰場態勢多維展現，使得指揮官能快速準確決策，提高指揮控制能力。網路空間的戰場環境異常複雜，網絡環境、設備運行情況、軟件運行情況……很多地方都需要有清晰直觀的展現。為了提高用戶體驗，縮短決策時間，網絡空間態勢呈現應具有多維動態特性，並能支持多屏顯示，多屏聯動等。從頂層態勢圖能了解戰爭全貌，從局部態勢圖能了解各級作戰部隊的狀態；不同級別的指揮員基於自身的權限，能夠按需查看不同的態勢圖。

網絡空間作為一種新型的作戰空間，存在和傳統物理空間的客觀差異，網絡空間的指揮控制也存在特殊的需求。然而，網絡空間指揮控制還面臨著其他諸多問題，t匕如如何將網絡空間指揮控制與傳統物理空間指揮控制的體系互相融合、以及如何進行網絡空間指揮控制的效能評估等，這些都是有待進.

Referring url: http://www.81.cn/

China’s One Belt One Road Justification for PLA Expeditionary Deployment // 中國解放軍遠征部署的一帶一路理由

09/25/2018 admin Leave a comment

China’s One Belt One Road Justification for PLA Expeditionary Deployment // 中國解放軍遠征部署的一帶一路理由

By National Defense University Professor Lieutenant General Qiao Lang 責任編輯︰姜紫微

“One Belt, One Road” cannot open up safety awareness

The Chinese have a problem, they like to talk about strategy, they don’t like to talk about strategies; they like to talk about goals, they don’t like to talk about indicators, so the final result is big and big. If there is no strategy, there is no possibility that this strategy will be realized. If there are targets and no indicators, then to what extent is this goal achieved? This time, the “One Belt and One Road” was proposed. The most worrying thing is that the thunder is loud and the rain is small. The talk is vigorous and vigorous, and finally it is gone. We have done this kind of thing many times, I hope this time is not. Because if the “Belt and Road” fails, it can be a very heavy blow to the revival of the Chinese economy and even the Chinese nation.

Many officials now talk about the “Belt and Road” without talking about security issues, nor about political issues, and no one talking about military issues. Some officials even emphasized that the “Belt and Road” has no political appeals and no ideological appeals. It is entirely an economic behavior. This kind of statement, if it is propaganda to countries along the line, is ok, because strategic intentions always have to be concealed. You say to others that I came with political intentions, with ideological intentions, who? Still accepting you? This is very necessary from the external publicity. However, if this becomes the consciousness of our officials, it is a big mistake. External propaganda said that we have no political demands, no ideological appeals, no military appeals, no geopolitical demands. Our only consideration is to develop the economy, mutual benefit and win-win. It is not wrong to use it as a propaganda, but it must not become our own consciousness. .

Now I feel that some officials really want to exclude these things. When he says these words, he has already excluded the political demands that are inevitable in the “One Belt, One Road” strategic concept in his own consciousness, especially geopolitics. Appeals, as well as security claims and ideological appeals. In fact, no matter whether you are prepared to “export revolution”, President Xi has repeatedly said that China does not export revolutions, but since we now emphasize Chinese values, there is no doubt that you will export your values through the “Belt and Road”. Then, this value output is actually an ideology output. In addition, in the process of advancing the “Belt and Road”, if you do not have political appeals, you do not have political binding with countries along the route, which will put you in an insecure state. In particular, the “one belt” of the land is accompanied by a very complicated factor, the so-called “Ottoman Wall”. That is, in the 15th century, the Ottoman Empire conquered the Byzantine capital of Constantinople, and its enormous empire became the “Ottoman Wall” that blocked the East and West. 300 years later, with the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, and the “Ottoman Wall” collapsed, but if you follow this path, the places along the way are all Islamic worlds. This means that the implied “Ottoman Wall” is still there. How to break through this invisible wall? Your values are different from those of the Islamic world. Don’t expect that you can completely tie everyone together by simply bundling economic interests. You know, those Islamic countries may just want to make a profit, and then take advantage of it before you open it. What should I do at that time? The biggest lesson for Chinese companies to go out is that after economic cooperation with those countries, people will open us after they have benefited, or they may not open our intentions subjectively, but the objective situation has changed. For example, in Sudan, we invested in it.

The West has to give us trouble. Then there are people in the local area who messed up with us. We bite our heads and start to fail to make a big impact on us. We should earn the money we earned. At this time, the Americans are paying their salaries and turning the Sudan into a North and South Sudan. We are dumbfounded. Your investment is in North Sudan, and the oil field is in South Sudan. At this time, you must suffer losses. However, we Chinese have a very strong ability, which is the ability to “engage” relations. Although the Sudan has split, we have “taken the way” to win South Sudan. It is said that the North and South Sudan will let you take it, should it be able to settle? But the United States has provoked the civil war in South Sudan, and the final goal is to make your investment in this place squander. This is just one example. In fact, our cooperation with all countries, the United States that the United States does not participate in, must oppose. The final outcome is that we have lost in many places, which is why we lacked the necessary security awareness from the beginning.

Original Mandarin Chinese :

“一帶一路”不能甩開安全意識

中國人有一個毛病，喜歡談戰略，不喜歡談策略；喜歡談目標，不喜歡談指標，這樣談來談去最後的結果就都是大而化之。有戰略沒有策略，這個戰略就沒有實現的可能性，有目標沒有指標，那這個目標實現到什麼程度算是實現？這次提出“一帶一路”，最擔心的就是雷聲大、雨點小，談得轟轟烈烈，最後不了了之。這樣的事情我們已經干過多次，但願這次不是。因為如果“一帶一路”失敗的話，那對于中國經濟甚至中華民族的復興都可能是非常沉重的打擊。

現在有很多官員談“一帶一路”都不談安全問題，也不談政治問題，更沒有人談軍事問題。甚至有些官員專門強調，“一帶一路”沒有政治訴求，沒有意識形態訴求，完全是一種經濟行為。這種說法，如果是對沿線國家的宣傳，是可以的，因為戰略意圖總是要有隱蔽性的，你對人家說我是帶著政治意圖來的，帶著意識形態意圖來的，那誰還接受你？這從對外宣傳上講是非常必要的。但是，假如這成了我們官員的自身意識，就大錯特錯了。對外宣傳說我們沒有政治訴求，沒有意識形態訴求，沒有軍事訴求，沒有地緣訴求，我們唯一的考慮就是發展經濟，互利共贏，把它作為一個宣傳口徑沒有錯，但是絕對不能變成我們自身的意識。現在感覺有些官員是真的要排除這些東西，當他說出這些話的時候，就已經在自己的意識中排除“一帶一路”戰略構想中不可避免地內含著的政治訴求，特別是地緣政治訴求，以及安全訴求、意識形態訴求。實際上，不管你準不準備“輸出革命”，習主席多次講到，中國不輸出革命，可是既然我們現在強調中國價值觀，毫無疑問你會通過“一帶一路”輸出自己的價值觀。那麼，這個價值觀輸出其實就是一種意識形態輸出。另外，在推進“一帶一路”的進程中，如果你沒有政治訴求，你沒有與沿線國家的政治綁定，這將使你處于不安全狀態。尤其是陸路的“一帶”，幾乎全程伴有一個非常復雜的因素，就是所謂的“奧斯曼牆”。即15世紀奧斯曼帝國攻克拜佔庭首都君士坦丁堡，使其龐大的帝國之軀成了阻斷東西方的“奧斯曼牆”。300年後，隨著第一次世界大戰的結束，奧斯曼帝國解體，“奧斯曼牆”轟然倒塌，但是如果你沿這條路走下去，沿途所經之地，全都是伊斯蘭世界。這就意味著隱含的“奧斯曼牆”還在。如何去突破這個隱形之牆？你的價值觀和伊斯蘭世界的價值觀不同，不要指望僅僅靠經濟利益的捆綁，就能把大家完全拴在一起。要知道，那些伊斯蘭國家也可能只想獲利，獲了利之後再把你踹開。那個時候怎麼辦？中國企業走出去，我們最大的教訓，就是跟那些國家進行經濟合作之後，人家得利後把我們甩開，或者人家主觀上可能並沒有甩開我們的意圖，但是客觀情況發生了變化。比如蘇丹，我們投資進去了，西方要給我們搗亂，然後當地也有人給我們搞亂，我們硬著頭皮頂住，開始沒給我們造成太大的影響，我們該掙的錢還是掙到了。這時美國人釜底抽薪，把蘇丹變成南北蘇丹，我們傻眼了，你的投資在北蘇丹，而油田在南蘇丹，這個時候，你肯定要受損失。但我們中國人有一項很強的能力，就是攻無不克的“搞關系”的能力，雖然蘇丹分裂了，但是我們“想辦法”把南蘇丹也拿下。按說，南北蘇丹都讓你拿下，應該能擺平了吧？可美國又挑起了南蘇丹的內戰，最後的目標就是讓你在這個地方的投資打水漂。這只是其中一例。實際上我們與所有國家的合作，凡是美國沒有參與的美國都要反對。最後的結局是我們在很多地方都鎩羽而歸，這是我們一開始就缺乏必要的安全意識所致。

“One Belt” is the main one, and “One Road” is the supplement.

Now, we have started a new round of “going out” strategic action. I have suffered so much in the past. Should I accept some lessons?

How to go “One Belt, One Road”? The author believes that we should take a multi-pronged approach, and we should let politics and diplomacy go ahead and the military back. Rather than letting the company go out on its own, it is almost impossible for the company to go out alone.　

From now on, the “Belt and Road” seems to be a two-line attack, both sides. In fact, the “band” is the main one, and the “road” is secondary. Because you want to take the “road” as the main direction, you will die. Because of the sea route, a scholar from the American War College recently wrote an article saying that they have found a way to deal with China, that is, as long as the sea passage is cut off, China will die. Although this statement is somewhat large, it cannot be said that there is absolutely no reason at all, because the United States now has this capability from the military. This also confirms from the opposite side that in the choice of the primary and secondary direction of the “Belt and Road”, we should determine who is the main road and who is the auxiliary road. If the “Belt and Road” is likened to a combat operation, then “all the way” is the auxiliary direction, and the “one belt” is the main direction.

Therefore, for us, what really matters in the future is how to manage the “one area” problem, rather than the “one way” problem. Then, the operation of the “Belt” will first face a relationship with the countries along the route, that is, how to first open up the relationship with the countries along the route. Judging from our current practice, it is obviously not enough to ensure the smooth and smooth operation of the “Belt and Road”. why? We used to always like to deal with the government, like to deal with the ruling party, like to deal with the rich people in this country, who is dealing with who is in position, who has money to deal with who. In this case, it will be difficult to succeed. In fact, what is the work we are going to do? It is necessary to deal with the government, with the ruling party, with the opposition party, and more importantly, with the tribal elders in the entire “Belt”. These tribal elders are often much more influential than the opposition parties and the ruling party. What we can do in the Taliban-occupied areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan is almost always achieved through tribal elders, and basically nothing can be done through the government. Therefore, our foreign ministry and our enterprises cannot ignore the important relationships in these regions.

Why not Latin America and Japan “take in”?

“One Belt, One Road” has another problem that no one has touched until today. It is the question in some people’s hearts. Does China want to use the “Belt and Road” to exclude the United States? There is no doubt that the United States plays a chaotic role in almost all international organizations and international operations in which it does not participate. As long as it doesn’t play a leading role, even if it’s not the initiator, it will give you trouble. Take a look at APEC. Why is there a TPP after APEC? It is because the United States finds itself unable to play a leading role in APEC, it must do another set and start a new stove. If the “Belt and Road” completely excludes the United States, it will make the United States spare no effort to suppress it, and since the United States is not in it, it will not be scrupulous if it is suppressed, because it has no interest in it, so it will be unscrupulous and unscrupulous when it is suppressed. Soft hands.

Therefore, the author believes that China’s “Belt and Road” should skillfully include the United States. It should allow US investment banks, US investment institutions, and American technology to play a role in the “Belt and Road” to complete the “Belt and Road” approach to the United States. Bundle. After completing this bundle, the United States will vote for it when it starts. Take a look at China and the United States to fight for economic shackles and trade, why do they end up every time? It is because the economic interests of China and the United States are very closely tied to each other. Every time the United States wants to impose sanctions or punishment on a certain industry or enterprise in China, there must be a related out-of-hospital system in which the United States and our enterprise are bound together. The group went to Congress to lobby and finally let it die. Therefore, we must let the United States enter this interest bundle. In terms of capital and technology, the “Belt and Road” should not only exclude the United States, but also pull it in and complete the bundling of it.

From this I think that we can’t even exclude Japan. Can’t think that who is not good with us, make trouble with us, I will set aside to open you up. In fact, this is not good for the other side, and it is not good for yourself. Once you open it, it will be unscrupulous when you hit it. Only when its interests are in it, it will only be scrupulous when it hits you, and it will be careful to protect its interests. And if the benefits are completely tied, it can’t be picked up, so I think this is something we must consider.

“One Belt, One Road” to lead the reform of the Chinese army

Up to now, there is no precise strategic positioning for our country, and the national strategy is somewhat vague. As a result, various so-called “strategies” emerge in an endless stream. What is most screaming in 2014 is not the “Belt and Road”. What is it? It is China’s desire to become a major ocean power and to launch China’s marine development strategy. What kind of marine development strategy do you want? Some people say that they have to break through the three island chains and go out to the Pacific. What are you going to the Pacific Ocean? Have we thought about it? Think through it? If you don’t think through it, you shouldn’t put forward a strategy that is extremely hard to burn and has no results. Now that we have proposed the “Belt and Road”, we suddenly discovered that what we need more is the Army’s expeditionary ability. So what is our Army today? The Chinese closed their doors and thought that the Chinese Army was the best in the world. The British military leader Montgomery said that whoever wants to play against the Chinese army on land is a fool. The Americans’ conclusion from the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is that the Chinese must not tolerate the military boots of American soldiers on the land of China. This is no problem. The Chinese Army has no problem with its existing capabilities to protect the country. However, once faced with the “Belt and Road”, the task of the Chinese Army is not to defend the country, which requires you to have the ability to display the land expedition along the way. Because the light is on land, there are 22 countries that can count. This requires us to have to go to the sword. Instead of invading others, we must be able to protect our own national interests across borders.

The last point is how to focus on the development of military power. If we have made it clear that the “one belt” is the main direction, it is not just an effort to develop the navy. The Navy must of course develop according to the needs of the country, and the problem that is now emerging is precisely how to strengthen the Army’s expeditionary capabilities. There are no more problems in China’s more than one million army, and there is no problem in defending the country. Is there any problem in going abroad to fight? Are we now in the right direction for the Army? Is it reasonable? When the world is now abandoning heavy tanks, we are still proud of the heavy tanks we have just produced. In what areas will these things be used in the future? In the entire “one belt” road, heavy tanks have no room for development. The heavy tanks of the former Soviet Union allowed the guerrillas to knock casually in Afghanistan. Why? Where can you go in all the ravines? The tank can’t fly anymore. In the end, the people take the rocket launcher and aim at one. It is all one, and it will kill you all. Therefore, the Army’s combat capability must be re-enhanced, that is, to strengthen its long-range delivery capability and long-range strike capability. In this regard, the author thinks that we are far from realizing it, and it is even more impossible. If the Army does not have the ability to go abroad, in the future, in any “one area”, if there is civil strife or war in any country, China needs support, and we need to protect our facilities and interests along the way, the Army can go, Is it useful? This is a question we must think about today.

So what should the Army do? The author believes that the Chinese Army must fly and must achieve aviation aviation, which means a revolution in the entire Chinese Army. Today, when we talk about the reform of the military system, if you don’t know the country’s strategy at all, don’t know the country’s needs, and close the door to reform, what kind of army will you reform? What is the relationship between this army and national interests? If you don’t start from the national interests and needs, just draw your own scoops like the US military’s gourd, take it for granted that you should be an army, but the country does not need such an army, but needs a development demand with the country. Match the army, what do you do then? Therefore, if we don’t understand what the country’s needs are, and don’t know where the country’s interests are, we will close the door to carry out reforms. What kind of army will this change? The author believes that the “Belt and Road” is a huge drag on the reform of the Chinese military with national interests and needs. It is through the strategic design of the “Belt and Road” that the country has determined its strategic needs for the military. The conclusion is: China must have a stronger army, and a navy and air force that can work together and act in concert, an army, navy, and air force that can cross the country’s expedition, and still have thousands of miles away. With sufficient support and combat capability of the Expeditionary Force, we can make the “Belt and Road” truly secure in terms of security, thus ensuring the ultimate realization of this ambitious goal.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

“一帶”為主，“一路”為輔

現在，我們又開始新一輪的“走出去”戰略行動了，前面吃了那麼多苦頭，總該接受點教訓吧？

“一帶一路”怎麼走？筆者認為應該多管齊下，應該讓政治、外交先行，軍事做後盾。而不是讓企業自己單打獨斗走出去，凡是企業單獨走出去的幾乎就沒有能夠全身而退的。

從現在來看，“一帶一路”好像是兩線出擊，雙路並舉。其實，“帶”是主要的，“路”是次要的。因為你要是以“路”為主攻方向，你就死定了。因為海路這一條，美國戰爭學院的一個學者最近專門撰文，說他們已經找到了對付中國的辦法，就是只要掐斷海上通道，中國就死定了。這話雖然說的有些大，但也不能說完全沒有一點道理，因為美國眼下從軍事上講確有這個能力。這也從反面印證，在“一帶一路”主次方向的選擇上，我們應確定誰為主路，誰為輔路。如果把“一帶一路”比喻成一次作戰行動，那麼，“一路”是輔攻方向，“一帶” 則是主攻方向。

所以說，對于我們來講，將來真正重要的是如何經營“一帶”的問題，而不是經營“一路”的問題。那麼，經營“一帶”首先就面臨一個與沿途國家的關系問題，即如何先把與沿途國家的關系全部打通。從我們現在的做法來看，顯然不足以保證“一帶一路”的順利通暢和成功。為什麼呢？我們習慣上總是喜歡跟政府打交道，喜歡跟執政黨打交道，喜歡跟這個國家的有錢人打交道，誰在位跟誰打交道，誰有錢跟誰打交道。這樣的話，要想成功就很難。實際上我們要做的工作是什麼呢？既要跟政府、跟執政黨打交道，還要跟在野黨打交道，而更重要的是，跟整個“一帶”上的部落長老們打交道。這些部落長老往往比在野黨和執政黨的影響力大得多。我們在阿富汗、巴基斯坦的塔利班佔領地區能辦成什麼事，幾乎都是通過部落長老去實現，通過政府基本上干不成什麼事情。所以，我們的外交部、我們的企業，都不能忽略這些區域內的重要關系。

何不拉美日“入伙”？

“一帶一路”還有一個到今天都沒有人去觸及的問題，就是一些人心中的疑問︰中國是否想用“一帶一路”排斥美國？毫無疑問，美國幾乎在所有它沒能參與的國際組織和國際行動中，都會扮演搗亂的角色。只要它起不了主導作用，甚至只要它不是發起人，它就會給你搗亂。看一看APEC。APEC之後為什麼會出現TPP？就是因為美國發現自己在APEC中不能起主導作用，它就一定要另搞一套，另起爐灶。如果“一帶一路”完全排斥美國，那將使美國不遺余力地打壓它，而且由于美國不在其中，它打壓起來就沒有顧忌，因為它沒有利益在里邊，所以它打壓起來就會無所顧忌、毫不手軟。

所以筆者認為，中國的“一帶一路”應該巧妙地把美國納入進來，應該讓美國的投行、美國的投資機構，以及美國的技術，在“一帶一路”中發揮作用，完成“一帶一路”對美國的捆綁。完成了這個捆綁之後，美國在它下手的時候就會投鼠忌器。看一看中國和美國打經濟仗、打貿易仗，為什麼每一次都無疾而終？就是因為中國和美國的經濟利益互相捆綁得非常緊密，每一次美國要對中國的某一個行業或企業進行制裁或者是懲罰的時候，一定會有美國和我們這個企業綁定在一起的相關的院外集團跑到國會去游說，最後讓其胎死腹中。所以，一定要讓美國進入這個利益捆綁。“一帶一路”在資金上、技術上，不但不應排斥美國，還要把它拉進來，完成對它的捆綁。

由此筆者想到，我們甚至也不能排斥日本。不能認為誰不跟我們好，跟我們鬧，我就另外搞一套把你甩開，其實這于對方不利，對自己同樣不利。你一旦甩開了它，它打你也就無所顧忌，只有當它的利益也在其中的時候，它打你才會有所顧忌，它才會小心翼翼，保護它那一份利益。而如果利益完全捆綁的話，它想摘都摘不清，所以筆者覺得這一點也是我們必須考慮的。

“一帶一路”牽引中國軍隊改革

到現在為止，就是對我們國家沒有精確的戰略定位，國家戰略有些模糊。結果，各種所謂的“戰略”層出不窮。2014年喊得最響的不是“一帶一路”，是什麼呢？是中國要成為海洋大國，要推出中國的海洋發展戰略。你要什麼樣的海洋發展戰略？有人說要突破三條島鏈，走出去，走向太平洋。到太平洋去干什麼？我們想過嗎？想透了嗎？如果沒想透，就不宜提出那些遠水不解近渴的極度燒錢又不見成果的戰略。現在提出“一帶一路”，我們突然發現，我們更需要的是陸軍的遠征能力。那今天我們的陸軍究竟如何？中國人關起門來認為中國陸軍天下第一。英國人蒙哥馬利說，誰要在陸上跟中國的陸軍交手，誰就是傻瓜。而美國人由抗美援朝戰爭得出的結論是︰中國人絕對不能容忍美國大兵的軍靴踏到中國的陸地上。這都沒問題，中國陸軍以它現有的能力保家衛國一點問題都沒有。可是一旦面對“一帶一路”，中國陸軍擔負的任務就不是保家衛國，這就需要你具備在沿途展示陸上遠征的能力。因為光是陸上，能夠數出來的就有22個國家。這就需要我們必須劍到履到。不是去侵略別人，而是要有能力跨境保護我們自己的國家利益。

最後一點，就是如何有側重地發展軍事力量的問題。如果我們明確了以“一帶”為主攻方向，那就不僅僅是要努力發展海軍的問題。海軍當然要根據國家的需求去發展，而現在凸現的問題，恰恰是如何加強陸軍的遠征能力。中國100多萬陸軍，保家守土沒有問題，跨出國門去作戰有沒有問題？我們現在陸軍的發展方向正確嗎？合理嗎？當現在全世界都開始放棄重型坦克的時候，我們卻還在以剛剛生產出來的重型坦克為榮，這些東西將來準備用在什麼地區作戰？在整個“一帶”這條路上，重型坦克根本沒有施展余地。前蘇聯的重型坦克在阿富汗讓游擊隊隨便敲，為什麼？在所有的山溝溝里，你還能往哪走？坦克又不能飛，最後人家拿火箭筒瞄準一輛就是一輛，全部給你干掉。所以說，陸軍的作戰能力必須重新提升，就是加強它的遠程投送能力和遠程打擊能力。這方面，筆者覺得我們遠遠沒有認識到，更不可能做到。如果陸軍沒有能力走出國門，將來在這“一帶”上，任何一個國家發生了內亂或戰爭，需要中國的支援，而且更需要我們出手保護自己在沿途的設施和利益時，陸軍能走得出去、派得上用場嗎？這是我們今天必須思考的問題。

那麼，陸軍要怎麼辦？筆者認為中國陸軍必須飛起來，必須實現陸軍航空化，這意味著整個中國陸軍的一場革命。今天，當我們談軍隊編制體制改革的時候，如果你根本不知道國家的戰略，也不知道國家的需求，關起門來搞改革，你會改革出一支什麼樣的軍隊來？這支軍隊和國家利益有什麼關系？如果你不從國家利益和需求出發，僅僅比照美軍的葫蘆畫自己的瓢，想當然地認為自己應該是怎樣一支軍隊，可是國家不需要這樣一支軍隊，而是需要一支與國家的發展需求相匹配的軍隊，那時你怎麼辦？所以說，不了解國家的需求是什麼，不知道國家的利益在哪里，就關起門來搞改革，這將會改出一支什麼樣的軍隊？筆者認為，“一帶一路”就是國家利益和需求對中國軍隊改革的一個巨大牽引。國家正是通過“一帶一路”的戰略設計，確定了對軍隊的戰略需求。結論是︰中國必須有一支更強大的陸軍，以及一支能與之聯合作戰、協同行動的海軍和空軍，一支能夠跨出國門遠征的陸軍、海軍和空軍，組成在千里萬里之外仍然有足夠的保障和戰斗能力的遠征軍，我們才可能使“一帶一路”真正在安全上獲得可靠的保障，從而確保這一宏偉目標的最終實現。

Referring url: http://www.81.cn/big5/

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

Chinese Military Informationized Warfare – Integrating New Combined Arms // 中國軍事信息化戰爭 – 整合新型聯合武器

09/12/2018 admin Leave a comment

Chinese Military Informationized Warfare – Integrating New Combined Arms // 中國軍事信息化戰爭 – 整合新型聯合武器

While the development of science and technology is promoting the rapid birth of new arms, the cohesiveness of war integration is also affecting the integration of military construction. Under the conditions of informationization, the trend of integration of arms and services is becoming more and more obvious, and there is a tendency to accelerate development. Today’s “Liberation Army Daily” article pointed out that the integration of military services and eventually moving toward integration is the inherent requirement of informationized warfare and the basic law of military construction and development. In seeking the initiative of army building, we should make forward-looking decisions in promoting the integration of the military and plan ahead.

The army has given birth to the military and other military services. With the advent of the information age, the integration of battlefields and combat operations has made the integration of services a new trend and destination for the development of military construction.

Service integration: the general trend of informationized army construction

By – Wang Xueping

The development of things often presents a spiral rising path, following the law of negation of negation. The development of human military activities, especially military construction, is also in line with this law. Before the information age, the army of the army was from one to many. The army had given birth to the sea and air. With the advent of the information age, the rapid development of technology has made the integration of military services a trend and a destination for the development of new military construction.

The future battlefield does not distinguish between land, sea and air

Under the condition of mechanization, the pattern of independent existence of land, sea, air and sky battlefields began to merge under the catalysis of the new military revolution. Multidimensional and multi-war occasions are the basic forms of the future battlefield.

The promotion of rapid development of science and technology. With the continuous development of science and technology and the improvement of mankind’s ability to control the battlefield, it is an inevitable trend that the battlefield will be dispersed from integration to integration. Science and technology are the driving force for the integration of battlefields and unlimited expansion into the air. The development of high-tech such as information technology, positioning and guidance technology has made the performance of weapons and equipment surpass the traditional land, sea and airspace boundaries. Global mobility, global arrival and global strike have become the targets of the development of the military of the world’s military power. The development of space situational awareness technology integrates surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, meteorology, command, control and communication, and integrates the battlefield information network to realize battlefield information sharing. Joint operations and precision strikes become the basic style of future warfare. The rapid development of space technology has made the surface information and the information of the global environment unobstructed. The expansion of the battlefield into space has condensed the traditional land, sea and air battlefields into one, becoming a stepping stone and pedal for the vast innocent space battlefield.

The inevitable evolution of the form of war. With the in-depth development of the new military revolution, the intensity of the war to informationization will further increase. Informatized warfare is not only a “speed war” but also a “precise war” and an “integrated war.” The acceleration of the war integration process is first manifested in the integration of land, sea and airspace, and the integration of the scope of the battlefield as the war develops. This is the basic condition for information warfare. The speed of war and the improvement of precision strike capability require that the military must have global maneuver, global combat and precision strike capability that transcends land, sea and air, cross-border, trans-ocean, and vacant, and battlefield integration is the basic guarantee. The war science and technology contest has intensified, and the requirements for battlefield resource sharing have become more obvious. Military personnel have broken through the geographical and military barriers and broke the boundary between land, sea and airspace. It is an important weight to win the war.

The requirements for quick fixes in combat objectives. Speed and precision are the main thrust of future wars. Eliminating battlefield barriers, integrating land, sea, air, and battlefields is the way to reach a speedy battle. The quickness and determination of the purpose of informatized warfare has promoted the integration of force preparation, equipment and operations. The integration of force preparation, equipment and operations has also promoted the arrival of battlefield integration. The military system is integrated into the arms and services. The scope of action has surpassed the narrow space of a single service. The ability to operate in a wide area and in a large space makes it difficult to divide the battlefield into a land battlefield, a sea battlefield, and an air battlefield. Weapons and equipment combines the performance of land, sea and air weapons. Its combat function surpasses the land, sea and airspace range, providing material conditions and support for battlefield integration. The strategic battle tactical action is integrated into one, the joint operations are divided into groups, the small squad completes the large task, and the informatized war characteristics of the tactical action strategy purpose will inevitably catalyze the dispersed battlefield toward one.

Signs of military integration appear quietly

The theory of integration theory is repeated. The fusion of theory is a prelude to the integration of the military, and it is the magic weapon and sword to win the information war. Under the impact of the new military revolution, theoretical innovations have surpassed the waves, especially the integration of theoretical innovations aimed at joint operations. In order to adapt to the new changes in the form of war and the international pattern, in the 2010 “four-year defense assessment report” of the United States, the theory of joint operations of “sea and air warfare” was clearly put forward. In order to adapt to the requirements of the network-centric warfare, the French military integration theory innovation is at the forefront. The Army proposed the air-to-ground combat bubble theory, and the Navy proposed the theory of joint action from sea to land. The Indian Army has referenced and learned from the US “air-ground integration” and “quick-decisive” operational theories, and put forward the “cold-start” operational theory. The core is to strengthen the cooperation between the army and the sea and air force in order to seek the initiative of the operation and strive for the shortest time. The purpose of the battle is achieved within.

Integrated equipment surfaced. The rapid development of science and technology has continuously enhanced the comprehensive functions of weapons and equipment, and integrated equipment integrating land, sea, air and sky has become a material support and an important driving force for the development of military services. In order to win the initiative of integrated joint operations, the world’s military powers have accelerated the research and development of integrated equipment. The US military “Independence” stealth warship, which was once popular, is a very typical new integrated equipment. The ship integrates anti-submarine, mine-clearing, surveillance, reconnaissance and force deployment functions. It can carry three helicopters, some special forces and armored vehicles, and integrates the “ground and air” equipment. The ship-borne gun can carry out three-dimensional attacks on missiles launched from air, land and underwater targets, which greatly enhances the integrated combat capability of the equipment.

The integrated forces first appeared. The future informationized warfare is an integrated joint warfare operation carried out in multi-dimensional space such as land, sea, air, sky, and information. It is required that the participating troops must be an integrated military system. To meet this requirement, the army of the world’s powerful countries has intensified the construction of integrated forces. Joint expeditionary forces such as the US military include the Army Division, the Naval Aircraft Carrier Combat Group, the Marine Corps Division (sub-) and the Air Force Fighter Wing. The Russian military formed a mobile unit that spanned three services and one independent unit, including the Army’s Mobility Division, tank division, special brigade, rocket brigade, air force fighter, attack aircraft, bomber regiment, naval marine battalion and airborne troops. Airborne division. The rapid reaction force formed by France consists of different types of divisions of five arms. In accordance with operational needs, Germany has directly organized the Defence Forces into three units: the Intervention Force, the Stabilization Force and the Support Force. It can be seen that the integrated forces of multiple arms and services have become the direction of army construction and development in the information age.

Looking into the future, planning the army of today

The integration of the services and the ultimate integration are the inherent requirements of the information war and the basic law of the army’s construction and development. This law does not shift from people’s will. In order to seek the initiative of army building, we should follow this trend and make forward-looking decisions in promoting the integration of the military.

In-depth exploration of the theory of military integration. Theory is the forerunner of action, and it is the reflection on the top of the mountain. Aiming at the trend of the times, accumulating strength and finding countermeasures through theoretical research is the experience and practice of world-class military construction and development. The first is to strengthen the theoretical exploration of integrated construction. We should study the issue of integrated military construction as soon as possible, explore the construction goals, standards, paths, methods, and methods of the integrated military, and build bridges and paved roads for the military integration. The second is to strengthen the exploration of integrated operational theory. The development trend of military integration will inevitably bring about new changes in combat theory. It is necessary to strengthen the study of the characteristics of the integrated military operations, strengthen the study of integrated military operations and command methods, strengthen the study of the basic military tactics of the integrated military, and make forward-looking theories a traction in the development of military construction. The third is to strengthen the theoretical exploration of new talent training. To train new talents that meet the needs of the development of integrated military construction needs to be prepared in theory. The institutional structure, teaching content and teaching methods of colleges and universities need to focus on the law of integrated military construction and development, theoretically research, clear, and even through pilot exploration, so that the training of college personnel can adapt to the general trend of military integration development as soon as possible. For the development of integrated military construction, it is necessary to make a good talent reserve.

Accelerate the development of integrated equipment for the military. Integrated equipment is the material basis for the integration of services. In line with the general trend of the development of integrated military construction, our military should speed up the research and development of military integrated weapons and equipment. The first is the “collection” type of equipment. For example, the aircraft carrier-style “collection” type of equipment, with the hull as the basic platform, fuses fighters, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, missiles, and chariots into one, so that the equipment has the ability to multi-domain and multi-air combat. Our military should develop such “collection” type equipment based on land or sea or air, and promote the development of weapons and equipment to the integration of various arms and services. The second is the “all-round” type of equipment. In the future, the equipment must be able to run on the ground, fly in the air, swim in the water, and operate at high speed on the water, underwater, on land, and in the air, and the “human outfit” is integrated. The combatants follow the operational needs. Become a super equipment that “takes the sea and catches the moon, and picks up the moon.”

Explore the construction of a military united army. Comply with the general trend of the integration and development of the informatized military, actively promote the exploration of the construction of the military-integrated forces, and explore ways to accumulate experience for the development of military integration. Under the current circumstances, it is mainly necessary to build a large article on the integration of hybrid force preparation and create conditions for the integration of the military system. The establishment of a multi-service hybrid pilot unit will be rolled forward in actual combat training. Take the Army as an example, it is to build a hybrid force that integrates rifle, tan, gun, and land. For example, the integrated ground detachment consisting of armored forces, artillery, machine infantry, missile corps, attack and transport helicopter detachments, which was formed by the US Army, foreshadowed the development trend of integrated force formation that broke the arms and even the service line. With the accumulation of experience, the maturity of the conditions, and the improvement of the level of science and technology, the scope of the composition of the force has gradually expanded, and eventually an integrated experimental unit with complete strengths of the arms and services has been established.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

科技發展在推動新軍兵種快速誕生的同時，戰爭一體化的內聚力也在牽動軍隊建設走向融合。信息化條件下，軍兵種一體化的趨勢日漸明顯，大有加速發展之勢。今天的《解放軍報》刊文指出，軍種融合，並最終走向一體，是信息化戰爭的內在要求，是軍隊建設發展的基本規律。謀求軍隊建設的主動性，我們就應該在推進軍隊一體化建設上前瞻決策，未雨綢繆。

陸軍曾孕育了海、空等軍種。信息時代的到來，戰場、作戰行動的一體化，使得軍種融合成為新型軍隊建設發展的走向與歸宿——

軍種融合：信息化軍隊建設大趨勢

事物的發展往往呈現著螺旋式上昇道路，遵循著否定之否定的規律。人類軍事活動發展特別是軍隊建設也暗合著這種規律要求。在信息時代以前，軍隊的軍種是從一到多，陸軍曾孕育了海、空等軍種。而信息時代的到來，技術的迅猛發展使得軍種融合成為新型軍隊建設發展的走向與歸宿。

未來戰場不分陸海空天

機械化條件下，陸、海、空、天戰場獨立存在的格局，在新軍事革命的催化下開始走向融合，多維立體、多戰場合一是未來戰場的基本形態。

科技快速發展的推動。隨著科技的不斷發展和人類對戰場控制能力的提高，戰場由分散走向融合是必然趨勢。而科學技術則是戰場融合一體，並向空天無限擴展的推動力。信息技術、定位與製導技術等高新技術的發展，使武器裝備性能超越了傳統的陸、海、空域界線，全球機動、全球到達、全球打擊成為世界軍事強國軍隊發展的目標。空間態勢感知技術的發展，使監視、偵察、情報、氣象、指揮、控制和通信等融合一體，一體化戰場信息網絡，實現了戰場信息共享，聯合作戰、精確打擊成為未來戰爭的基本樣式。太空技術的快速發展，使地表信息和地球環境信息盡收眼底，戰場向太空的拓展，使傳統的陸海空戰場濃縮為一體，成為廣闊無垠太空戰場的墊腳石與踏板。

戰爭形態演變的必然。隨著新軍事革命的深入發展，戰爭向信息化演變的力度將進一步加大。信息化戰爭，既是“速度戰爭”，又是“精確戰爭”，更是“一體化戰爭”。戰爭一體化進程的加快，首先表現為陸域、海域、空域的融合，以及隨著戰爭發展而不斷拓展的戰場空間範圍的一體化，這是進行信息化戰爭的基本條件。戰爭速度與精準打擊能力的提升，要求軍隊必須具有超越陸海空界線，跨境、跨海、騰空的全球機動、全球作戰和精確打擊能力，而戰場一體化則是基本保障。戰爭科技較量加劇，戰場資源共享的要求更加明顯，軍事人才更衝破了地域、軍種壁壘，打破陸域、海域、空域戰場界線，是贏得戰爭的重要砝碼。

作戰目的速決的要求。速度與精確是未來戰爭的主旨。而消除戰場壁壘，融陸、海、空、天戰場為一體，則是達成戰爭速決的通道。信息化戰爭作戰目的速決性，推動了部隊編制、裝備、行動的融合。而部隊編制、裝備、行動的融合，又促進了戰場一體化的到來。部隊體制編制諸軍兵種融於一體，行動範圍已超越了單一軍種的狹小空間，廣地域、大空間行動的能力，使戰場很難再分為陸戰場、海戰場和空戰場。武器裝備集陸海空天兵器性能於一身，其作戰功能超越了陸域、海域、空域範圍，為戰場一體化提供了物質條件和支撐。戰略戰役戰術行動融於一體，聯合作戰分隊化，小分隊完成大任務，戰術行動戰略目的的信息化戰爭特性，必然催化分散的戰場走向一體。

軍種融合跡象悄然出現

科技發展在推動新軍兵種快速誕生的同時，戰爭一體化的內聚力也在牽動軍隊建設走向融合。信息化條件下，軍兵種一體化的趨勢日漸明顯，大有加速發展之勢。

一體化理論見解迭出。理論融合是軍種融合的前奏，更是打贏信息化戰爭的法寶與利劍。在新軍事革命大潮衝擊下，理論創新一浪高過一浪，特別是瞄準聯合作戰需要的一體化理論創新更是見解迭出。為適應戰爭形態和國際格局的新變化，2010年度美國《四年防務評估報告》中，明確提出了“海空一體戰”聯合作戰理論。為適應網絡中心戰的要求，法國軍隊一體化理論創新更是走在了前列，陸軍提出了空地作戰氣泡理論，海軍提出了由海向陸聯合行動理論。印度陸軍參考和借鑒美軍“空地一體”和“快速決定性”作戰理論，提出了“冷啟動”作戰理論，核心是強化陸軍與海、空軍的配合作戰，以謀求作戰的主動性，爭取在最短時間內達成作戰目的。

一體化裝備浮出水面。科技的快速發展，使武器裝備的綜合功能不斷增強，融陸、海、空、天於一身的一體化裝備不斷問世，成為軍兵種編制向一體化發展的物質支撐和重要推動力。為贏得一體化聯合作戰的主動權，世界軍事強國紛紛加快了一體化裝備的研發力度。曾經熱炒的美軍“獨立號”隱形戰艦，就是非常典型的新型一體化裝備。該艦融反潛、掃雷、監視、偵察和兵力部署綜合功能於一體，可載3架直升機、一些特種部隊和裝甲車，融“地空”裝備於一身。艦載炮可對空中、陸地和水下目標發射導彈進行立體攻擊，使裝備的一體化戰鬥力大大提升。

一體化部隊初見端倪。未來信息化戰爭，是在陸、海、空、天、信息等多維空間進行的一體化聯合作戰行動，要求參戰部隊必須是一體化的軍事系統。適應這一要求，世界強國軍隊紛紛加大了一體化部隊建設的力度。如美軍組建的聯合遠征部隊包括陸軍師、海軍航母戰鬥群、海軍陸戰隊部（分）隊和空軍戰鬥機聯隊。俄軍組建的機動部隊橫跨3個軍種和1個獨立兵種，包括陸軍的摩步師、坦克師、特種旅、火箭旅，空軍的戰鬥機、強擊機、轟炸機團，海軍的陸戰隊營和空降兵的空降師。法國組建的快速反應部隊由5個軍兵種的不同類型師組成。德國則根據作戰需求把國防軍直接編組為乾涉部隊、穩定部隊和支援部隊三種性質部隊。足見，多軍兵種一體化部隊已成為信息時代軍隊建設發展的方向。

放眼未來謀劃今日之軍

軍種融合，並最終走向一體，是信息化戰爭的內在要求，是軍隊建設發展的基本規律。這一規律不以人們的意志為轉移。謀求軍隊建設的主動性，我們就應該順應這一趨勢，在推進軍隊一體化建設上前瞻決策，未雨綢繆。

深入探索軍種一體理論。理論是行動的先導，更是“山頂”上的思考。瞄準時代走向，通過理論研究積蓄力量、尋找對策，是世界一流軍隊建設發展的經驗做法。一是加強一體化建設理論探索。應儘早研究一體化軍隊建設問題，探索一體化軍隊的建設目標、標準、路徑、方式、方法，為軍隊一體化建設從理論上搭好橋樑、鋪好路基。二是加強一體化作戰理論探索。軍隊一體化發展趨勢必然帶來作戰理論的全新變化。要加強一體化軍隊作戰運用的特點規律研究，加強一體化軍隊作戰行動和指揮方法研究，加強一體化軍隊基本戰法研究，讓前瞻性的理論成為軍隊建設發展的牽引。三是加強新型人才培養理論探索。培養適應一體化軍隊建設發展需要的新型人才，需要在理論上早做準備。院校的體制格局、教學內容、教學方法都需要著眼一體化軍隊建設發展規律，從理論上研究透，搞清楚，甚至通過試點探索，使院校人才培養儘早適應軍隊一體化發展的大趨勢，為一體化軍隊建設發展需要做好人才儲備。

加速軍種一體裝備研製。一體化裝備是軍種融合的物質基礎。順應一體化軍隊建設發展的大趨勢，我軍應加快軍種一體武器裝備的研發。一是“集合”型裝備。如航空母艦式的“集合”型裝備，其以艦體為基本平台，融戰機、火砲、高炮、導彈、戰車於一體，使裝備具有海陸空天多域多空作戰的能力。我軍應研發這種以陸或海或空為基本平台的“集合”型裝備，推進武器裝備建設向諸軍兵種融合一體方向發展。二是“全能”型裝備。今後的裝備要達到地上能跑、空中能飛、水中能遊，水上水下、陸上、空天都可高速機動作戰，而且“人裝”一體，戰鬥人員根據作戰需要隨進隨出，真正成為“下海捉鱉，上天摘月”的超能裝備。

進行軍種一體部隊建設探索。順應信息化軍隊一體化建設發展的大勢，積極推進軍種一體部隊建設探索，為軍隊一體化建設發展探索路子、積累經驗。當前情況下，主要應做好建設混合型部隊編制融合的大文章，為軍種體制編制走向一體創造條件。組建多兵種混合一體試點部隊，在實戰訓練中滾動推進。以陸軍為例，就是建設融步、坦、炮、陸航等兵種於一體的混合型部隊。如，美陸軍組建的由裝甲兵、砲兵、機步兵、導彈兵、攻擊與運輸直升機分隊組成的一體化地面分隊，預示了打破兵種甚至軍種界線的一體化部隊編制的發展趨勢。隨著經驗的積累、條件的成熟，以及科技水平的提高，部隊力量構成的範圍逐漸擴大，最終組建成軍兵種力量齊全的一體化試驗部隊。

Original Chinese Military URL: http://www.81.cn

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, 中华人民共和国网络安全法, 中國軍事應用與比特幣在未來戰爭中的應用, 國家網絡空間安全戰略, 美國軍事網絡戰：黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭

Chinese Military Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points // 淺析網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點

05/31/2018 admin Leave a comment

Chinese Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points

淺析網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點

Chinese People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences Yuan Yi

January 04, 2016

Editor’s note: When both opposing parties have the ability to ensure intrusion and damage to the other party’s network, they can bring about two-way network containment, making the two parties obliged to comply with the game rules that do not attack each other’s network under certain conditions, forming an invisible safety valve. Even international conventions or conventions that do not attack each other’s networks will be formed. The cyberspace has thus become a strategic area that can produce a huge deterrent effect. After the deterrence of cyberspace followed by nuclear deterrence, it began to enter the strategic vision of big country politicians and military strategists. Studying the characteristics, types, and points of use of cyberspace deterrence must be taken into consideration and necessary action by the Internet powers and the cyber force.

With the increasing dependence of human society on cyberspace, cyberspace has become the “second type of living space” for human production and life and the “fifth-dimensional combat space” for military confrontation. Countries around the world have fiercely competed for the dominant rights, control rights, and discourse power of cyberspace. The competition in the cyberspace has reached the level of human survival, national destiny, and success or failure of military struggles. Thinking about cyberspace deterrence capacity building has great practical and theoretical value.

First, analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace deterrence

Cyberspace deterrence refers to the actions and actions taken in the cyberspace to demonstrate and control enemy cyberspace, and to control the enemy’s physical space through cross-domain cyberspace, so as to achieve the goal of destroying enemy forces, stopping the enemy, blocking the enemy, and preventing deterrence. A form of strategic deterrence for the enemy’s purpose. Compared with the physical space, the “virtual and real duality” of network space and the uniqueness of network warfare compared with traditional combat styles have determined that the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace deterrence are very obvious.

(A) The advantages of cyberspace deterrence

The advantages of cyberspace deterrence are mainly reflected in the following: First, the deterrence approach has become more civilized and humane. Compared with nuclear, chemical, and chemical weapons based on physical, biological, and chemical killing mechanisms, the direct killing and destructive effects of cyber warfare weapons are much smaller than the former. Normally, they will not cause permanent damage and pollution to the natural environment, nor will they cause large numbers of people. Casualties and humanitarian disasters. Second, deterrence costs are inefficient. The network warfare weapons are dominated by viruses, Trojans and other software. The costs are relatively low, and the technical threshold is low. The destructive effects are rather alarming. The network defense points are multi-faceted, and they are hard to prevent. To increase the level of network security by one level, the input cost will increase exponentially. The contrast between the low cost of cyber offense and the high cost of cyber defense makes the offensive and defensive performance of the network a feature of “spirit shield”, and the cyber warfare weapon is thus called “the atomic bomb of the poor country”. The third is that deterrence methods are diverse and practical. The variety of cyber warfare weapons and the multiple goals of cyber attacks have determined that there are diversified cyberspace deterrent methods to choose from. The effects of cyberattacks are recoverable to a certain extent. As long as the application is properly implemented, the risk of causing war and escalating the war is relatively small. In a sense, the deterrence value of nuclear weapons is far greater than the value of actual combat, and cyber warfare weapons are both practical values and deterrence values. Fourth, the use of repeatability and deterrence is strong. Once the “nuclear threshold” crosses, a full-scale nuclear war will erupt, and the two sides at the nuclear balance will fall into a state of mutual destruction. The easy implementation of nuclear deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear countries, will also be condemned by international public opinion. These factors are all The use of nuclear deterrence is greatly limited. The deterrence of software and hardware and the controllable characteristics of cyberspace deter- mine the flexibility and control of deterrence in light of the changes and needs of the military struggle. It can be used in advance, used throughout, and used repeatedly. It has strong flexibility.

(B) Defects in cyberspace deterrence

The deterrence of cyberspace is mainly reflected in: First, the credibility of the deterrence effect has not been fully verified. The credibility of nuclear deterrence has been verified in actual combat. However, as of now, the real network war has not really exploded. People’s astonishing destructive power over cyber warfare is more of a speculation and worry. The real power of cyber warfare can only be convincing after being tested by actual combat. Second, the reliability of deterrence measures is not very high. Network warfare is a dynamic process of continuous offensive and defensive interaction between the two sides of the enemy and me. The characteristics of network confrontation and technicality determine that the network warfare attack has greater uncertainty and may not achieve the desired operational objectives, which will greatly reduce the effectiveness of deterrence. . For example, when the enemy performs cyberspace deterrence, if the enemy takes various effective defense measures in a timely manner, it will increase the difficulty of its own cyber attack and reduce the damage, and even lead to the failure of the attack. Third, the controllability of deterrence scope needs further improvement. As one of the important weapons of cyber warfare, viral weapons have strong dissemination, poor controllability, and a wide range of influence. It is difficult to launch targeted and targeted attacks on enemy computers and networks. If it can’t control its effective scope, it will spread to third-party neutral countries and even make itself a victim. As a result, the use of virus weapons suffers from the use of “imposed rats.” The fourth is the selective limitation of deterrence objects. Nuclear deterrence is clear and effective for any country, and the effectiveness of cyberspace deterrence has a lot to do with the level of informatization of enemy countries. Cyberspace deterrence is extremely effective for countries with a high degree of informatization, and for those underdeveloped countries with weak information infrastructure and weak network dependence, it is difficult for them to exert results, or even completely ineffective. Fifth, the organization of deterrence is relatively complicated. All nuclear powers in the world implement centralized and unified management of strategic nuclear forces. Command and control powers are highly centralized. When organizations implement nuclear deterrence operations, they can accurately control each combat unit, and the organization is well-executed. The implementation of the deterrence of cyberspace involves many forces such as investigation, control, defense, and control. It has many personnel and large scales and is scattered among different departments and units in the military and the military. It is very complicated to organize and it is difficult to form a synergy.

Second, the main types of cyberspace deterrence

The cyberspace deterrence includes four types: cyberspace technology test deterrence, cyberspace equipment demonstration deterrence, cyberspace operational deterrence deterrence, and cyberspace operational deterrence. Among them, the first three are demonstrative deterrence, and the latter is actual deterrence.

(A) Cyberspace Technology Test Deterrence

The cyberspace technology test deterrence is a field in the field of cyber warfare. It constantly conducts preliminary exploratory experiments on new concepts of warfare, new experiments on the effectiveness of attack mechanisms and tactics, and practical experiments on the weaponization of new technologies. The outside world is disclosed to demonstrate its strong strength in the basic research of information technology and its enormous potential for transforming it into a cyber warfare capability to achieve deterrence. At present, network offensive and defensive technology is still developing rapidly. A breakthrough in a key technology will often have a significant impact on cyberspace security and operations, and even lead to revolutionary changes. Whoever preempts the strategic commanding heights of the network offensive and defensive technology, who will be able to achieve a clear advantage in the future of network warfare.

(B) Cyberspace Equipment Demonstration

The demonstration of cyberspace equipment deterrence is the development of network warfare equipment development planning, technology development, target testing, stereotyped production and other development stages. According to the needs of the appropriate disclosure of network warfare equipment models, performance, characteristics, parameters and development schedule, etc. Reach the purpose of deterring opponents. There are two main ways: one is through public disclosure in official media such as national defense white papers, diplomatic bulletins, and newspapers, periodicals, and large-scale websites; and the other is through online social media or other unofficial. The channel has deliberately leaked equipment-related information and implemented hidden deterrence. The cyber space equipment demonstrates deterrence. On the one hand, it can invent new cyber-warfare equipment with new mechanisms and new concepts and render its unique combat capabilities. On the other hand, it can deliberately exaggerate the operational effectiveness of existing cyber warfare equipment. There are facts in the virtual reality, there is something in the real, and the implementation of fuzzy policies, so that the other party can not understand their true situation and strength, resulting in fear and jealousy. For example, the U.S. military’s “Shuute” on-board network power system has been put into practical use several times and poses a serious threat to the air defense systems of its hostile countries. However, its basic principles, working mechanisms, and combat technical indicators have not been publicly disclosed. It has not been completely mastered by other countries and has remained in a state of secrecy. It is difficult to distinguish between reality and reality and has played a very good deterrent effect.

(3) Deterrence in cyberspace operations exercises

The deterrence of cyberspace operations exercises is to conduct drills in cyberspace through virtual or virtual methods, and use various media channels to show potential war opponents their own cyber warfighting capabilities, strengths and determinations in order to achieve deterrence. Cyberspace operations can be divided into two kinds: actual drills and virtual exercises. The former is usually carried out nationwide or in alliance with allies, and is generally based on the joint exercise of military space and space defense operations. In recent years, the United States and its allies have held “Network Storm” series of cyber warfare exercises and “Shriver” series of space-network space exercises, which have demonstrated the mobilization strength, overall defense level, and the implementation of cyber warfare. Determination. The latter is usually held at the national large-scale network integrated shooting range, and is generally based on the offensive actions of the military professional cyber warfare forces.

(D) Deterrence in cyberspace operations

The deterrence of cyberspace operations is the actual deterrence of attacking specific opponents by deterring opponents with certain attacks. There are two opportunities for its use: First, when one’s own side is aware that the enemy is about to wage a war on one’s own side, one’s own choice of the key cyber targets of the enemy’s key defenses will be targeted to combat them, and preventive and deterrent deterrence will be implemented; When the Party initiates a tentative cyber attack on its own side and implements cyberspace deterrence, it must immediately conduct effective retaliatory and disciplinary deterrence. There are many types of cyber warfare operations that have deterrent effects. For example, infiltrate the enemy’s telecommunications network, send a large number of anti-war messages to the enemy’s citizens, and attack the enemy’s power grid, resulting in a short-term blackout of major cities in the enemy’s power; attacking the enemy’s broadcast television networks and inserting their own broadcasts during prime time. Special video programs; etc.

Third, the use of cyberspace deterrence points

The general requirements for the use of cyberspace deterrence are: combination of wartime and warfare, with strength, actual display capability, and determination, strive to demonstrate deterrence with small battles, ensure deterrence with strikes, and achieve deterrence with a small price. Specifically, the following points should be achieved.

(A) Combination of peacetime and long-term preparation

“Frozen feet, not a cold day.” Successful implementation of cyberspace deterrence requires a combination of peacetime and warfare, and we must fully and carefully prepare for peacetime. The first is to conduct comprehensive and thorough network reconnaissance. Requires the combination of spying, reconnaissance and technical reconnaissance, wireless reconnaissance, and cable reconnaissance. Conduct long-term and continuous network reconnaissance of enemy network targets, gradually understand the basic conditions of the enemy’s network, draw a picture of its network topology, and in particular analyze and find all kinds of soft enemies. Hardware system vulnerabilities. The second is to conduct a large number of effective strategic presets. Using hacking methods, secretive infiltrate all types of networks through the use of system vulnerabilities or password cracking, leaving the back door, setting up a springboard machine, and laying down logic bombs and Trojans to set a breakthrough for launching cyber attacks in the future. The third is to conduct pre-prepared cyber defenses. When deterring cyberspace deterrence against the enemy, one must adjust the deployment of network defenses in advance, make the enemy’s pre-designed attack path, anticipate the use of system loopholes, and plan to implement an attack plan that is difficult to implement, or the effect of implementation is greatly reduced to minimize the enemy’s Losses caused by cyber retaliation.

(B) careful decision-making, control strength

Sun Tzu said: “The Lord must not anger and raise a teacher. Cyberspace deterrence is a strategic game behavior between countries, especially with deterrence and sensitivity. It must be rational, beneficial, and tangible. It must not be abused because of the low threshold of deterrence. Otherwise, its effect may be counter-productive. . Cyberspace deterrence has a high requirement for combat intensity control. On the one hand, if the intensity is too small, the enemy’s government and people will not have fear and will not achieve the deterrent effect they deserve. The other party may also use the same methods to implement anti-deterrence, eventually leading to confrontational escalation and deterring one’s own deterrence. On the other hand, if it is too strong, it will cause huge economic losses and casualties to the enemy countries. This will cause the condemnation of the international community and the hatred of the enemy governments and people. It may trigger the enemy’s use of conventional forces to carry out large-scale revenge. Nuclear countries may even Nuclear power may be used. This will not only stop the war but will also play a role in warfare.

(III) Unified command and careful organization

The implementation of the deterrence of cyberspace requires centralized command, unified planning, and good coordination. The first is meticulous organization of strength. Uniformly organize the four forces of military investigation, attack, defense, and control, and actively coordinate the strength of the cyber warfare forces of all parties to form a joint force. In particular, it is necessary to organize and coordinate the strength of civil non-professional cyber warfare, especially patriotic hacking, so that there can be no phenomenon of “blindness” so as to avoid triggering friction, escalating fire, causing an escalation of cyber warfare, or prematurely exposing attack intentions and giving people a handle. , leading to uncontrollable situations or failure of operations. The second is to select the target. Should choose a wide range of influence, easy to produce a clear deterrent effect of the goal. For example, broadcast television channels with the highest ratings, portals with a large number of visitors, and wireless communication networks with numerous users. It is not possible to choose attacks that are irrelevant, insignificant, and indifferent to the target. They can easily be mistaken for cybersecurity incidents created by ordinary hackers and do not achieve the desired deterrent effect. In addition, we must also consider the constraints of international law and war laws. We must not choose targets that are easy to cause humanitarian disasters. We should try our best not to select the network goals of railways, aviation, finance, and medical departments so as not to arouse condemnation and resentment from the international community and the people of the other side. The third is the precise control of the process. Prior to the deterrent strikes in cyberspace, it is necessary to publicize the momentum through extensive public opinion, issue warnings to the enemy countries, and declare the justice of their actions to the world in order to gain the understanding and support of international public opinion. In order to highlight the deterrent effect, one can highly announce the target of the enemy’s network to be attacked, break through the enemy’s layered network defenses, and implement a resolute and effective cyber attack. If necessary, the network attack effect can be resumed regularly to show its superiority. The cyber attack technology and means make the enemy’s decision makers and the public have a sense of frustration that is hard to defend and difficult to parry, thus forming a strong shock effect.

(4) Combining actual situation with actual situation, focusing on strategy

The grandson said that “it is not possible to show and not to use it,” and it is used to deter online space. Its main points are summarized as “showing without propaganda, advocating without showing.” “Indicating nothing” means that it is difficult to track and locate using cyber attacks and conduct cyber attacks on specific targets. However, it is not done for others to announce that they are doing their own thing. It not only demonstrates their own capabilities, but also makes the enemy’s suspicion of doing their own thing. However, there is no evidence and it cannot be pursued. “Proclaiming but not showing” is the publicity or inadvertent disclosure of the type, performance, and characteristics of the advanced cyber warfare equipment developed or fabricated by the company, deliberately exaggerating its combat effectiveness, falsifying facts, and integrating facts and facts, so that the enemy can’t understand its true strength. , resulting in a deterrent effect. The cyber warfare operations have the characteristics of difficulty in tracking and traceability and complexity in forensics. The initiating party can either admit or deny it, or push the responsibility to civil hacker organizations. (Source: China Information Security).

Original Communist Mandarin Chinese:

編者按：當敵對雙方都具有確保侵入破壞對方網絡的能力時，就可以帶來雙向網絡遏制，使得雙方不得不在一定條件下，遵守互不攻擊對方網絡的遊戲規則，形成一個無形的安全閥，甚至國際上也會形成互不攻擊對方網絡的慣例協議或公約，網絡空間由此成為可以產生巨大威懾效應的戰略領域。網絡空間威懾繼核威懾之後，開始進入大國政治家和軍事家的戰略視野。研究網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點，成為網絡強國、網絡強軍的必須考量和必要行動。

隨著人類社會對網絡空間依賴程度的不斷加深，網絡空間成為人類生產生活的“第二類生存空間”和軍事對抗的“第五維作戰空間”。世界各國圍繞網絡空間的主導權、控制權、話語權展開了激烈的爭奪，網絡空間的競爭已達到與人類生存、國家命運和軍事鬥爭成敗休戚相關的程度。思考網絡空間威懾能力建設，具有重大現實和理論價值。

一、網絡空間威懾的優劣分析

網絡空間威懾，是指在網絡空間採取各種行動，展示癱瘓控制敵方網絡空間，並通過網絡空間跨域控制敵方實體空間的決心和實力，從而達到懾敵、止敵、阻敵、遏敵目的的一種戰略威懾形式。網絡空間與實體空間相比所具有的“虛實二相性”，網絡戰與傳統作戰樣式相比所具有的獨特性，決定了網絡空間威懾的優缺點都非常明顯。

（一）網絡空間威懾的優點

網絡空間威懾的優點，主要體現在：一是威懾方式更趨文明和人道。與基於物理、生物、化學殺傷機理的核生化武器相比，網絡戰武器的直接殺傷和破壞效應要遠小於前者，通常不會對自然環境造成永久性破壞和污染，也不會造成大量的人員傷亡，並引發人道主義災難。二是威懾成本低效費比高。網絡戰武器以病毒、木馬等軟件為主，成本相對低廉，技術門檻較低，而造成的破壞效果卻相當驚人。網絡防禦點多面廣，防不勝防，要網絡安全程度每提高一個等級，投入成本會呈指數級增加。網絡進攻的低成本與網絡防禦的高成本對比鮮明，使得網絡攻防呈現“矛尖盾薄”的特點，網絡戰武器因而被稱為“窮國的原子彈”。三是威懾手段多樣實用性強。網絡戰武器多種多樣，網絡攻擊目標多元，決定了有多樣化的網絡空間威懾手段可供選擇。網絡攻擊效果在一定程度上是可恢復的，只要運用實施得當，引發戰爭和促使戰爭升級的風險相對較小。從某種意義上講，核武器的威懾價值遠大於實戰價值，而網絡戰武器則是實戰價值與威懾價值兼具。四是威懾運用可重複靈活性強。 “核門檻”一旦跨過就會爆發全面核戰爭，處於核均勢的雙方將陷入相互摧毀狀態，輕易實施核威懾特別是對無核國家進行核威懾，還會招致國際輿論的譴責，這些因素都極大地限制了核威懾手段的使用。而網絡空間威懾軟硬結合、威力可控的特點，決定了其可根據軍事鬥爭形勢的變化和需要，適時調控威懾強度，先期使用、全程使用、反複使用，具有很強的靈活性。

（二）網絡空間威懾的不足

網絡空間威懾的不足，主要體現在：一是威懾效果的可信性未得到充分驗證。核威懾的可信度已在實戰中得到了驗證。然而，截止目前，真正意義上的網絡大戰還沒有真正爆發過。人們對網絡戰驚人的破壞力，更多的只是一種猜測和擔憂，網絡戰的真實威力只有經過實戰檢驗後，才能真正令人信服。二是威懾手段的可靠性不太高。網絡戰是敵我雙方網絡攻防持續互動的動態過程，網絡對抗複雜、技術性強的特點，決定了網絡戰攻擊效果具有較大的不確定性，有可能達不到預期作戰目的，使威懾效果大打折扣。例如，對敵實施網絡空間實戰威懾時，敵方若及時採取各種有效防御手段，就會增加己方網絡攻擊的難度和降低破壞效果，甚至導致攻擊行動的失敗。三是威懾範圍的可控性需進一步改善。病毒武器作為網絡戰的重要武器之一，其傳播性強、可控性較差、影響範圍比較廣，很難針對敵國計算機和網絡發動專門性、針對性極強的攻擊。如果不能控制其有效作用範圍，就會波及第三方中立國家，甚至使自身也成為受害者，因而病毒武器的使用有“投鼠忌器”之患。四是威懾對象的可選擇性受限。核威懾對任何國家都是明確而有效的，而網絡空間威懾的效果與敵國的信息化程度有很大關係。網絡空間威懾對信息化程度高的國家極為有效，而對那些信息基礎設施薄弱，網絡依賴性不強的不發達國家，則很難發揮效果，甚至完全不起作用。五是威懾實施的組織相對複雜。世界各個核國家無不對戰略核力量實施集中統管，指揮控制權高度集中，組織實施核威懾行動時可以準確控製到每一個作戰單元，組織實施十分周密。而網絡空間威懾的組織實施，要涉及偵、控、防、控等多支力量，人員多、規模大，且分散在軍地不同部門和單位，組織起來非常複雜，形成合力不易。

二、網絡空間威懾的主要類型

網絡空間威懾主要有網絡空間技術試驗威懾、網絡空間裝備展示威懾、網絡空間作戰演習威懾和網絡空間作戰行動威懾四種類型。其中，前三種是示形威懾，後一種是實戰威懾。

（一）網絡空間技術試驗威懾

網絡空間技術試驗威懾，是在網絡戰領域，經常性地進行新作戰概念的先期探索性試驗、新攻擊機理和戰術的效果印證性試驗、新技術的實用化武器化試驗等，並通過媒體向外界披露，以展現本國雄厚的信息技術基礎研究實力，以及轉化為網絡戰能力的巨大潛力，以達到威懾對手的目的。當前，網絡攻防技術仍在快速發展，一項關鍵性技術的突破，往往會對網絡空間安全和作戰產生重大影響，甚至引發革命性變化。誰搶先佔領了網絡攻防技術的戰略制高點，誰就能在未來網絡戰中取得明顯優勢。

（二）網絡空間裝備展示威懾

網絡空間裝備展示威懾，是在網絡戰裝備發展規劃制定、技術開發、打靶試驗、定型生產等各個發展階段，根據需要適當披露網絡戰裝備的型號、性能、特點、參數以及研製進度等情況，以達到威懾對手的目的。其方式主要有兩種：一種是通過在國防白皮書、外交公報以及報紙、期刊、大型網站等權威媒體從官方渠道公開披露，實施顯性威懾；另一種是通過網絡社交媒體或其他非官方渠道，刻意洩露裝備相關情況，實施隱性威懾。網絡空間裝備展示威懾，一方面可以虛構新機理、新概念的新型網絡戰裝備，並渲染其獨特的作戰能力；另一方面可以刻意誇大已有網絡戰裝備的作戰效能。虛中有實、實中有虛，實施模糊政策，使對方摸不清己方真實情況和實力，產生恐懼和忌憚心理。例如，美軍的“舒特”機載網電一體攻擊系統已多次投入實戰使用，對其敵對國家的防空體系構成了嚴重威脅，但其基本原理、工作機制、戰技指標既沒有公開披露，也沒有被他國完全掌握破解，一直處於保密狀態，令人虛實難辨，起到了很好的威懾作用。

（三）網絡空間作戰演習威懾

網絡空間作戰演習威懾，是以實兵或虛擬的方式在網絡空間展開演習活動，並藉助各種媒體渠道，向潛在作戰對手展現本國網絡戰能力、實力與決心，以達到威懾對手的目的。網絡空間作戰演習可分為實兵演習和虛擬演習兩種。前者通常在全國范圍內或與盟國聯合進行，一般以演練軍地聯合網絡空間防禦行動為主。近幾年來，美國及盟國多次舉行“網絡風暴”系列網絡戰演習，以及“施里弗”系列太空-網絡空間演習，很好展現了網絡戰的動員實力、整體防禦水平，以及實施網絡戰的決心。後者通常在國家大型網絡綜合靶場舉行，一般以演練軍隊專業網絡戰力量的進攻行動為主。

（四）網絡空間作戰行動威懾

網絡空間作戰行動威懾，是指對特定的網絡目標實施攻擊，以確信的攻擊效果來威懾作戰對手的一種實戰性威懾。其運用的時機有兩個：一是當己方覺察敵方即將對己方發動戰爭時，己方選擇敵方重點防禦的關鍵性網絡目標進行針對性打擊，進行預防性、遏制性威懾；二是當敵方通過對己方發起試探性網絡攻擊，實施網絡空間威懾時，己方應立即進行有效的報復性、懲戒性威懾。具有威懾效果的網絡戰行動有多種。例如，對敵電信網滲透破壞，向敵國民眾手機大量發送宣傳反戰短信；對敵電力網進行攻擊，造成敵重要城市短時間的大面積停電；對敵廣播電視網進行攻擊，在黃金時段插播己方特製的視頻節目；等等。

三、網絡空間威懾的運用要點

網絡空間威懾總的運用要求是：懾戰結合，以實力、實戰展示能力和決心，力求以小戰體現威懾、以精打確保威懾，以較小的代價實現威懾目的。具體說來，應做到以下幾點。

（一）平戰結合，長期準備

“冰凍三尺，非一日之寒”。成功實施網絡空間威懾，需要平戰結合，在平時就要進行充分細緻的準備。一是要進行全面周密的網絡偵察。要求諜報偵察與技術偵察、無線偵察與有線偵察相結合，對敵網絡目標進行長期持續的網絡偵察，逐步摸清敵網絡基本情況，繪製其網絡拓撲結構圖，尤其是分析查找出敵各種軟硬件系統的漏洞。二是要進行大量有效的戰略預置。採用黑客手段，通過利用系統漏洞或口令破譯等辦法，秘密滲透進入敵各類網絡，留下後門，設置跳板機，埋設邏輯炸彈和木馬，為未來發動網絡攻擊預留突破口。三是進行預有準備的網絡防禦。在對敵實施網絡空間威懾時，己方應提前調整網絡防禦部署，使敵預先設計的攻擊路徑，預期利用的系統漏洞，預定執行的攻擊方案難以實施，或實施效果大打折扣，最大限度地降低敵網絡報復造成的損失。

（二）慎重決策，控制強度

孫子曰：“主不可以怒而興師，將不可以慍而致戰”。網絡空間威懾是國家之間的戰略博弈行為，尤其是實戰威懾，敏感性強，必須做到有理、有利、有節，決不能因為威懾“門檻”較低而濫用亂用，否則其效果可能會適得其反。網絡空間實戰威懾對作戰強度控制的要求很高。一方面，若強度太小，敵國政府和民眾不會產生畏懼心理，起不到應有的威懾效果，對方還可能採取同樣的手段實施反威懾，最終導致對抗升級，使己方威懾失效。另一方面，若強度過大，給敵國造成巨大的經濟損失和人員傷亡，引起國際社會的譴責和敵國政府、民眾的仇恨心理，就可能引發敵國運用常規力量進行大規模報復，有核國家甚至可能會動用核力量，這樣不但不能懾止戰爭，反而會起到戰爭導火索的作用。

（三）統一指揮，周密組織

網絡空間威懾的組織實施，要集中指揮，統一籌劃，搞好協同。一是精心組織力量。統一組織軍隊偵、攻、防、控四支力量，積極協調軍地各方網絡戰力量形成合力。尤其是要組織和協調好民間非專業網絡戰力量特別是愛國黑客，不能出現“盲動”現象，以免引發磨擦，擦槍走火，引起網絡戰的升級，或過早暴露攻擊意圖，授人以柄，導致局勢不可控或行動失敗。二是精當選擇目標。應選擇影響面廣，易產生明顯威懾效果的目標。例如，收視率排名靠前的廣播電視頻道、訪問量巨大的門戶網站、用戶眾多的無線通信網絡等。不能選擇無關痛癢、影響面小、民眾漠不關心的目標進行攻擊，易被誤認為是普通黑客製造的網絡安全事件，起不到應有的威懾效果。此外，還要考慮國際法和戰爭法約束，不能選擇易造成人道主義災難的目標，盡量不選取鐵路、航空、金融、醫療等部門的網絡目標，以免激起國際社會和對方民眾的譴責和反感。三是精確控制進程。實施網絡空間威懾性打擊之前，要通過廣泛的輿論宣傳造勢，向敵國發出打擊警告，並向全世界宣告己方行動的正義性，以爭取國際輿論的理解和支持。為突出威懾效果，己方可以高調宣布要攻擊的敵國網絡目標，再突破敵方層層網絡防禦，實施堅決有效的網絡攻擊，必要時最後還可對網絡攻擊效果進行定時恢復，以展現己方高超的網絡攻擊技術和手段，讓敵方決策者和民眾產生防不勝防、難以招架的心理挫折感，從而形成強烈的震懾效果。

（四）虛實結合，注重謀略

孫子所說的“能而示之不能，用而示之不用”，運用到網絡空間威懾，其要點概括起來就是“示而不宣、宣而不示”。 “示而不宣”，就是利用網絡攻擊難以追踪定位這一點，對特定目標實施網絡攻擊，但不對外宣布是己方所為，既展示了己方能力，又使得敵方雖然懷疑是己方所為，但沒有證據，無法追究。 “宣而不示”，就是公開宣傳或不經意透露己方研製或虛構的先進網絡戰裝備的型號、性能、特點，刻意誇大其作戰效能，虛虛實實，虛實結合，使敵摸不清己方真實實力，從而產生威懾效果。網絡戰行動具有追踪溯源困難、取證複雜的特點，發起方既可以承認，也可以矢口否認，或把責任推給民間黑客組織。（來源：中國信息安全）

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Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

05/07/2018 admin Leave a comment

Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

For a long time, in order to solve the A2/AD dilemma and achieve a new offset strategy, the U.S. has launched combat operations such as open space/air-sea warfare, cyber-centric warfare, distributed killing, multi-domain warfare, and mixed warfare. With new ideas, we constantly seek military advantages such as missile offensive and defense, cyber-electromagnetics, and multi-domain space. Today, the electromagnetic spectrum war has become the new darling of leading a new round of military theory and technological innovation. Researching and analyzing the status quo and characteristics of the development of the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum combat has important practical significance for our military’s success in defeating the enemy in the information battlefield.

1 Development of Electromagnetic Spectrum Warfare

In 1956, Admiral Sergei Gorschkov, the former Soviet naval commander, pointed out: “Who controls the electromagnetic spectrum, who will win the next war.” Sixty years later, the electromagnetic spectrum has become one of the key battlefields of modern warfare. In order to compete for the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum in the battlefield, the US military conducted in-depth explorations from combat theory to equipment technology and developed rapidly.

1.1 Evolution of theory

Electromagnetic spectrum control has a long history. In the early 1970s, Thomas H, chairman of the US Senate Association. Moorer said that the winner of World War III will be a party that can highly control and manage the electromagnetic spectrum. The United States “Old Ravens” Association first proposed the use of electromagnetic control (EMC) as the fourth component of the concept of electronic warfare. In 2009, Strategic Command launched the early concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare (EMSW), and added tasks such as electromagnetic spectrum management (EMSM), electromagnetic spectrum control (EMSC), and electromagnetic battle control (EMBC) on the basis of electronic warfare [1]. In 2012, the Strategic Command established the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center (JEMSCC) to achieve full integration of electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum management, and each of the units also established corresponding organizational coordination agencies and detachments [2]. In the same year, the US Navy proposed the concept of Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMMW) [3], and in March 2015 released the “21st Century Maritime Force Cooperation Strategy,” which outlines the goals, components, technology projects, and implementation paths of the electromagnetic maneuver warfare [4]. In December 2015, Terry Halvorsen, chief information officer of the US Department of Defense, pointed out that the electromagnetic spectrum is expected to be considered as the sixth battlefield following land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace [5]; in the same month, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Defining Electromagnetic Waves: Regaining U.S. Dominance in the Electromagnetic Spectrum Field[6] The report proposes the concept of “low-zero-power” electromagnetic spectrum warfare, expounding concept ideas, trend features, capabilities and technical requirements and current obstacles, and presenting views, concepts, Procurement, technical, verification, etc. At the end of November 2016, the 53rd International Conference of the “Old Ravens” Association of the United States took the theme “Global Vision of Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” as the theme to demonstrate the new concepts and technical achievements of electronic warfare, spectrum sensing and conflict resolution, and explored the electromagnetic spectrum operational environment. Policy regulations, equipment procurement, joint training and combat capabilities, etc. [7]. In January 2017, the new Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter signed the first “Electronic Warfare Strategy” document, officially establishing the electromagnetic spectrum as an independent operational domain and elaborating on how to conduct operations [8].

1.2 Policies and Orders

Strategic policies and military doctrines reflect the development of the US military’s combat theory. From 2006 to 2014, the US Department of Defense updated the “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy” to focus on advancing strategic objectives such as development of spectrum equipment, flexibility of spectrum operations, spectrum management, and improvement of policy response capabilities [9]; Strategic Command released in August 2010. Winning the 21st Century Economic and Security Advantage: Strategic Framework for Electromagnetic Spectrum Control, building an electromagnetic spectrum control system architecture from multiple perspectives including objectives, requirements, strategic development, etc. [10]; the Joint Venture Association has promulgated JP6-01 “Joint” in March 2012. “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Action” joint publication [11], signed in December 2012 CJCSM3320.01C “Chairman’s Handbook of Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations in Electromagnetic Operation Environment” [12], issued CJCSI3320.01D “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum” in January 2013 Operational Instructions [13] and CJCSM 3320.04 “Electronic Warfare Supporting Combined Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” Manual [14]. In March 2015, the “Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Joint Concept” document [15] was signed, which systematically stated that the Joint Forces launched electromagnetic spectrum combat operations. Strategic vision, organizational structure and functions, command and management relationships, plan formulation and operational implementation, operational integration and action synergy, and gradually Tactical, technical, and program (TTP) refinement of control, interference cancellation, spectrum management, and electronic warfare reprogramming, etc.; US Army released TRADOC P525-7-16, “The US Army’s Future Modular Force Conceptual Capability in December 2007 Plan 2015-2024 – Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation Manual [16]. Field regulations FM6-02.70 “Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” [17] were issued in May 2010. Field Manual FM3-38 “Network Electromagnetic Actions” was issued in January 2014. [18] Published in December 2015, ATP6-02. 70 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Combat Operations Skills” [19], updated in February 2016 AR525-15 “Network Reconfiguration of Electromagnetic Action Software” provisions [20], US Air Force updated 2017 AFI10-703 “electronic warfare integrated reprogramming” instructions [21] Define the concept of electromagnetic spectrum operations under the guidance of joint directives, and elaborate on issues such as organization and responsibilities, operational architecture, plan development and coordination control, task list and decision process, action team and management tools, and DOTMLPF, and promote electromagnetics. The integration of spectrum operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace warfare. In addition, Kevin D, head of the United States Joint Force Development Department. In October 2016, Scott signed the JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation” bulletin[22], standardized terminology and operational framework standards, and made a procedural description of the functional roles, organization, planning, operational implementation, and evaluation. It was awarded the Joint Spectrum Interference Cancellation Program CJCSM3320.02D signed in January and March 2013 by the Joint Committee, CJCSI3320.02F Joint Spectrum Interference Cancellation, and CJCSI3320.02E-1 Joint Spectrum Interference in February 2014. The three major regulations [23][24][25] to eliminate the confidentiality of the program were the important operational support and became the latest guidance for the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare.

1.3 Equipment and Technology

Military technology leads and supports advanced operational concepts. To transform the concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare from concept to capability, the U.S. military is striving to develop technological innovation and equipment development, and to develop new systems featuring networking, dexterity, multifunction, miniaturization, and adaptability.

On the spectrum management and control system[19][26], the US Department of Defense has developed and deployed the Allied Nations Joint Spectrum Management Planning Tool (CJSMPT) and the Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS) since 2005, followed by the Spectrum XXI and the Modified Spectrum XXIO, Spectrum. Perception Management and Planning System (SSC-SSMPS), Spectrum Situational Sensing System (S2AS), Maritime Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Action Project (AESOP), Joint Automatic Communication Electronic Action Instruction System (JACS), Host Country Global Online Spectrum Database, etc., with real-time spectrum Measurement and online analysis, spectrum planning and deduction and frequency allocation, electromagnetic interference analysis and conflict elimination, electromagnetic warfare environment modeling simulation, electromagnetic situation sharing and frequency efficiency evaluation, spectrum resource access and database functions and capabilities.

In combat equipment and technology projects [3][26][27], in 2011, the DARPA began to initiate behavioral learning adaptive electronic warfare (BLADE), adaptive radar confrontation (ARC), extreme radio frequency spectrum CommEx, Active Electronic Scan Array (AESA) technology, Near Zero-Power Radio Frequency and Sensor Operation (N-ZERO), under the conditions of the project, through the development of new technologies such as real-time evaluation of countermeasures, autonomous generation of measures, immediate feedback of effects, etc. Unknown waveform and behavioral electromagnetic spectrum threats Real-time tactical confrontation new capabilities; In 2010, the Air Force launched a Cognitive Jammer and HiPERDAC project based on Networked Software Defined Architecture (SDA) and passive RF PRIDE, SWEATER, and CHAMP (Eliminate High-Power Microwave Advanced Missiles) to develop active and passive target threat automatic recognition, real-time assessment and adaptive confrontation technologies and capabilities The US Navy conducts a maritime electronic warfare improvement (SEWIP-Block I/II/III) SLQ-32 shipboard electronic warfare system and ship signalling Equipment (SSEE), electromagnetic command and control (EMC2), integrated mast (InTop) shipborne antenna, next-generation jamming machine (NGJ) and other projects to improve real-time threat assessment and situational awareness, mission program modeling simulation, automatic distribution of electromagnetic spectrum , Combat Operations Analysis and other capabilities; the US Army launched the Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool (EWPMT) and Multi-Functional Electronic Warfare (MFEW), Defensive Electronic Assault (DEA) and Silencer Electronics scheduled for September 2016 Warfare and other systems enhance the electronic support for the perception of radio signals and the ability to send electronic signals that interfere with or deceive signals. Earlier this year, the Strategic Command Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) initiated research on new technologies that provide improved electromagnetic battle management capabilities for electromagnetic spectrum situational awareness and command and control, and plans to implement real-time strategy-based spectrum control and advanced electromagnetic battle sequences (EOB) within five years. ) Characterization and action plan modeling, simulation, analysis, and other capabilities and achieve 7-8 level of technology maturity [28]. Driven by cognitive EW and artificial intelligence technologies, DARPA launched the Radio Frequency Machine Learning System (RFMLS) and Spectrum Joint Challenge Program on August 11, 2017 to develop automatic identification and characterization of target signals from a large number of complex spectrum signals. New technology [29].

2 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Theory

The electromagnetic spectrum warfare is the latest theory of information warfare of the US military in the 21st century. As research and understanding continue to deepen, the U.S. military will gradually place new strategic ideas as tactics and tactical measures. In order to unify the battlefield electromagnetic spectrum utilization and control actions, the U.S. military issued a series of directives, regulations, regulations, and other documents to publish a summary of the JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation” regulations, and standardized the operational concept, mission category, organization, and combat planning and implementation. Evaluation and so on.

2.1 Basic concepts

Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) is the conceptual starting point for the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare theory. It is based on electronic warfare and spectrum management and is based on joint electromagnetic spectrum operations. The goal is to achieve electromagnetic spectrum advantages in electromagnetic operating environment (EMOE), involving spectrum management operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO) and joint electromagnetic spectrum. Management actions and other concepts. According to the US military regulations JP1-02 “Defense Ministry Military Terms Glossary” [30], JP6-01 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Action”, JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” and ATP6-02.70 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Combat Operations Skills” , United electromagnetic spectrum operations are coordinated military operations carried out by two or more units for use, attacks, protection and management of operational electromagnetic environment. The electromagnetic spectrum management action refers to the interaction between the spectrum management, frequency allocation, host country coordination, policy compliance, and conflict resolution in the entire phase of military operations to jointly promote the planning, management, and implementation of operations within the electromagnetic operations environment. The relationship between various concepts and categories is shown in Figure 1.

Fig. 1 Diagram of related concepts of electromagnetic spectrum operations [19]

2.2 Task Domain Positioning

The U.S. military believes that the joint electromagnetic spectrum combat mission domain is composed of four-dimensional missions of electromagnetic spectrum utilization, management, attack, and protection. Among them, missions include signal intelligence gathering, distribution, and electronic warfare support. Management tasks include electromagnetic spectrum management and electromagnetic battle management. Missions have electronic attacks and navigation warfare, protection tasks have electronic protection and joint spectrum interference cancellation. The operational concept aims to operationally integrate the electromagnetic spectrum operations of the joint forces in the electromagnetic operating environment, establish key priorities, organize action coordination, and eliminate conflicts. Through the full integration of electromagnetic maneuvering schemes, strength and action to strengthen coordination and unification, the electromagnetic spectrum of the battlefield is realized. control. It plays a key role in the formation of joint operational capability in all operational areas, and has a profound impact on the joint forces’ command and control, intelligence, firepower strikes, adjustment and mobility, protection, and maintenance of operational capabilities.

2.3 Organizational Framework

The organization of the joint electromagnetic spectrum operations is responsible for the formulation and publication of policy directives and operational guidelines for commanders and commanders, and for combat planning, operational implementation, coordination of operations, and operational evaluation. The person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control assigned by the Joint Force Commander shall assume the overall responsibility for the joint electromagnetic spectrum operations. The Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit (JEMSOC) is the chief staff of the Joint Force, and the person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control assigns a supervisor to direct the command. Each service set up an electromagnetic spectrum operations division, each of which administers an electromagnetic spectrum operational unit, and assumes the functions of integrated network operations, electronic warfare, and spectrum management operations. They are the Army’s electronic warfare officer’s network of electromagnetic action units and the Navy’s maritime operations. The operational center electromagnetic spectrum operational unit, the Air Force air operations center electronic warfare coordination unit, the Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration Command’s cyberspace and electronic warfare coordination unit, and the Multinational Force Joint Staff Operations Department’s contracted electronic warfare coordination unit. The Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Organization of the Joint Force is shown in Figure 2. The joint electromagnetic spectrum combat unit architecture is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 2 Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Organization

Figure 3 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit Architecture

2.4 Combat Planning Process

Joint electromagnetic spectrum combat planning is jointly completed by all levels of joint electromagnetic spectrum combat units. During task analysis, the combat plan development team develops a staff assessment plan to determine the electromagnetic spectrum support degree in the formulation and analysis of the action plan as a strategic basis for achieving the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum; after the action plan is selected, joint electromagnetics are developed. The spectrum operations appendix describes mission tasks, priorities, policy strategies, process steps, and implementation procedures for the entire operational phase, establishing coordination measures, specific procedures, and engagement rules for the use of electromagnetic battle management and control systems in the joint operations domain; The Ministry submits its own electromagnetic spectrum operations plan and integrates it into this appendix. During the planning and implementation of the plan, the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit strengthens the electromagnetic spectrum operations plans of each division and participates in the development of various divisions, establishment of priorities, establishment of operational integration and operational coordination, and the creation of an electromagnetic spectrum control plan. Then, the updated electromagnetic spectrum control plan is adjusted to start the joint electromagnetic spectrum combat implementation cycle to generate an electromagnetic spectrum control sequence that guides the use of the electromagnetic spectrum of the joint force. The combat planning process is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Combat Plan Development Process

2.5 Operational methods

The joint electromagnetic spectrum operations implementation process is a continuous cycle of planning, implementation and evaluation. The united electromagnetic spectrum combat unit completes the formulation of the electromagnetic spectrum control plan and the electromagnetic spectrum control sequence, and establishes the combat cycle for combat operations. After the approval of the person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control, it publishes and organizes the implementation to each branch’s combat unit and unit. The electromagnetic spectrum combat unit fully participates in the key combat flow of the joint force and adjusts the update plan and sequence in time according to the user needs of the subunits and the electromagnetic spectrum of the battlefield during the operation period to ensure that each electromagnetic spectrum control sequence is effectively generated and efficiently Released and executed. The basic processes are: Formulation and release of control plans, update of control plans for each division, preparation of operational plans, generation and distribution of control sequences, execution and adjustment of operational implementation plans and control sequences, and monitoring and guidance of operational processes. The operational implementation cycle is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Implementation Cycle

3 Electromagnetic Spectrum Combat Development Characteristics

New military capabilities cannot be separated from the new system. As an operational concept that responds to new military challenges in the era of information networks, big data, and artificial intelligence, electromagnetic spectrum warfare has become a new direction for the development of the combat effectiveness of the US military. In order to deepen understanding and be efficient and practical, the U.S. military has pushed the new concept to the battlefield from many dimensions, including the development of policy directives, organization and force adjustment, equipment systems and new technology research and development.

3.1 Reinforce basic concepts and theoretical understanding based on policy directives, promote operational concepts and implement operations

Thought leads action. The U.S. military is good at innovative operational concepts and the concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare is no exception. The first is to focus on clarifying the concept core and uniting the concept. During the early years of the development of the electromagnetic spectrum warfare, new concepts for the new combat domain were always being demonstrated. The military led high-level forums such as the “Old Ravens” and other professional military and military forums to analyze the related theories involved in the concept, exchange technology development and application methods, and promote deeper understanding. At the same time, in the strategic documents and top-level regulations, the relevant old and new policies were gradually sorted out. The links and distinctions between concepts, and the analysis of their categories and task areas, are increasingly contributing to the clear definition of concepts and the formation of theoretical systems. The second is to use operations on the battlefield, and refine the rules step by step. The U.S. military has always attached importance to the concept of combat to the implementation of warfare and technical measures. It took only about three years from the conception of the electromagnetic spectrum to the entry directives and from the joint directive to the arms and military operational manuals and the TTP. The US Army even established a concept blueprint for the use of battlefields before the Joint Staff. Joint operational and operational guidance for systemic operations at the level of the joint level to the unit level.

3.2 Establish an efficient and integrated force structure based on intrinsic power, and strive to use the full cycle of coordination and order in the battlefield

The troops are the carrier of operations. The U.S. military attaches great importance to the optimization and integration of new concept combat forces and existing capabilities. The first is to focus on the overall planning of the capability system. The trajectory of the capabilities of the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare and cyberspace operations is similar. From the Joint Staff Headquarters, the Joint Forces Command to the military arms, set up combat seats and corresponding implementation teams, and establish a full-flow operation mechanism for operational planning, accusation, implementation, and evaluation to form an efficient and smooth capability integration system. The second is to emphasize the coordination and integration of existing institutions and new forces. Through the clarification of the responsibilities and interrelationships of institutions and forces involved in new capabilities in a timely manner, action-oriented operational procedures and implementation procedures are formulated, and even the relevant regulatory templates for coordination activities are promoted to facilitate the whole-system action coordination of electromagnetic spectrum operations and other mission domains. Orderly. The third is relying on actual drills to verify their capabilities in a timely manner. Based on the new concepts of combat and capability goals, the practice of offensive and defensive battles in the field of electromagnetic spectrum is rapidly promoted, and corrections are made during operational trials. The U.S. Army formed an independent electromagnetic spectrum warfare unit of the 1st battlefield network warfare group from February to May last year and plans to participate in an exercise organized by a regional battle commander at the end of the year [31]; the U.S. Air Force is in the “battle shield” exercise. In response to the “Spectrum Interference Elimination Project”, radar EW system evaluation [5] was implemented.

3.3 Promote the pre-research of the new concept equipment system with the support of scientific and technological strength, transform the high technology into the advantage of combat effectiveness

Strong army must have weapon. High-tech equipment is an important way to give birth to newcomer warfare capabilities. The first is to excavate new battlefield changes and assess new demands. The US Department of Defense’s “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy” in 2014 pointed out that it is necessary to quantify spectrum requirements and develop the equipment and technologies needed for the electromagnetic environment to enhance real-time spectrum operation and electromagnetic spectrum system real-time identification, prediction and interference cancellation capabilities [9]. From the bottom up to the top, the U.S. military has established a demand collection and integration mechanism for the deployment and deployment of equipment systems and applications. It collects and sorts regularly and conducts special investigations and demonstrations with the aid of the government audit department, Rand Corporation, and a special panel of institutes. The analysis results can be Directly providing decision support for the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Staff Association, it forms an unobstructed demand management evaluation system, and injects activators for the development of electromagnetic spectrum warfare equipment and the development of new combat capabilities. The second is to pay attention to the integration of pre-research technology to equipment system applications. The U.S. military equipment system development will be based on national defense information architecture standards. It will have system processes and capabilities such as simulation modeling, pre-research, technology integration, and application verification. It will focus on the simultaneous improvement of existing models and the development of new research and development of smart technology and equipment systems. “Determining Electromagnetic Waves” pointed out that the important features of the electromagnetic spectrum warfare in the new phase are passive sensor applications and the use of “low-zero-power” capabilities to counteract the enemy’s anti-electromagnetic confrontation, and intelligent technologies and equipment are the future dominant [6]. The pre-research and integration of electromagnetic spectrum warfare technology and equipment will also be able to achieve a more optimal way to upgrade military capabilities to technological capabilities, integrate cutting-edge technologies with mature methods, and integrate specialized systems into integrated platforms, thus achieving a seamless leap in combat effectiveness.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

电磁频谱技术决定未来战争赢家 美军发展现状需警惕

長期以來，為破解反進入/區域拒止（A2 / AD）困局，達成新的抵消戰略，美軍先後推出空地/空海一體戰，網絡中心戰，分佈式殺傷，多域戰和混合戰爭等作戰新思想，不斷謀求導彈攻防，網絡電磁和多域空間等軍事優勢。如今，電磁頻譜戰成為引領新一輪軍事理論和技術創新的新寵。研究和剖析美軍電磁頻譜作戰發展現狀與特點，對於我軍在信息戰場禦敵制勝具有重要現實意義。

1電磁頻譜戰發展現狀

1956年，前蘇聯海軍司令Sergei Gorschkov上將指出：“誰控制了電磁頻譜，誰將贏得下一場戰爭”。六十年後，電磁頻譜成為現代戰爭的關鍵作戰域之一。為爭奪戰場電磁頻譜優勢，美軍從作戰理論到裝備技術進行深入探索，發展迅猛。

1.1理論發展沿革

電磁頻譜控制由來已久。上世紀70年代初，美參聯會主席Thomas H. Moorer稱，第三次世界大戰的勝利者將是能高度控制和管理電磁頻譜的一方。美國“老鴇鴉”協會最早提出將電磁控制（EMC）作為電子戰概念的第四組成部分。2009年，戰略司令部推出電磁頻譜戰（EMSW）早期概念，在電子戰基礎上增加電磁頻譜管理（EMSM），電磁頻譜控制（EMSC），電磁戰鬥控制（EMBC）等任務內容[1]。2012年，戰略司令部建立聯合電磁頻譜控制中心（JEMSCC），旨在實現電子戰和電磁頻譜管理全面集成，各部隊也分別建立相應的組織協調機構和分隊[2]。美海軍同年提出電磁機動戰（EMMW）概念[3]，並在2015年3月發布“21世紀海上力量合作戰略”，概要闡述了電磁機動戰目標，構成，技術項目和實現路徑[4]。2015年12月，美國防部首席信息官TerryHalvorsen指出，電磁頻譜有望被視作繼，海，空，天，賽博空間之後第六作戰域[5];同月，戰略與預算評估中心在“決勝電磁波：重拾美國電磁頻譜領域主宰地位”[6]報告中提出“低 – 零功率“電磁頻譜戰概念，闡述了概念思想，趨勢特點，能力和技術需求及當前障礙並提出視圖，概念，採辦，技術，驗證等方面建議。2016年11月底，美國”老鴇鴉“協會第53屆國際研討會以“電磁頻譜作戰全球視野”為主題，展示電子戰，頻譜感知與衝突消除的新概念與技術成果，探討電磁頻譜作戰環境，政策條令，裝備採辦，聯合訓練與作戰能力等[ 7]。2017年1月新任國防部長Ashton Carter簽署首部“電子戰戰略”文件，正式確立電磁頻譜為獨立作戰域並闡述如何實施作戰[8]。

1.2政策與條令

戰略政策與軍事條令集中體現美軍作戰理論發展。美國防部2006年至2014年多版更新“電磁頻譜戰略”，聚焦推進頻譜裝備發展，頻譜行動靈活性，頻譜管理和政策響應能力提升等戰略目標[ 9];戰略司令部2010年8月發布“贏得21世紀經濟與安全優勢：電磁頻譜控制戰略框架”，從目標，需求，戰略開發等多角度構建電磁頻譜控制體系架構[10];參聯會先後於2012年3月頒布JP6-01“聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”聯合出版物[11]，2012年12月簽頒CJCSM3320.01C“電磁作戰環境中聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”主席手冊[12]， 2013年1月簽發CJCSI3320.01D“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”指示[13]和CJCSM3320.04“電子戰支援聯合電磁頻譜作戰”手冊[14]，2015年3月簽署“電磁頻譜作戰聯合概念”文件[ 15，系統闡明聯合部隊開展電磁頻譜作戰行動的戰略願景，組織機構與職能，指揮與管理關係，計劃制定與作實施，作戰集成與行動協同等內容，並逐步向電磁控制，干擾消除，頻譜管理和電子戰重編程等操作層的戰術，技術與程序（TTP）細化;美陸軍於2007年12月發布TRADOC P525-7-16“美陸軍未來模塊化部隊概念能力計劃2015-2024–電磁頻譜作戰”手冊[16]，2010年5月頒布野戰條令FM6-02.70“陸軍電磁頻譜作戰”[17]，2014年1月頒布野戰手冊FM3-38“網絡電磁行動”[18]，2015年12月發布出版物ATP6-02.70“電磁頻譜管理作戰行動技能”[19]，2016年2月更新AR525-15“網絡電磁行動軟件重編程“規定[20]，美空軍2017年更新AFI10-703”電子戰集成重編程“指示[21]，在聯合條令指導下界定電磁頻譜作戰概念範疇，深度闡述機構與職責，作戰架構，計劃制定與協調控制，任務清單與決策流程，行動分隊與管理工具及DOTMLPF等問題，並促進電磁頻譜作戰，電子戰與網絡空間戰的融合。此外，美聯合部隊開發部主管Kevin D. Scott於2016年10月簽署JDN3-16“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”條令紀要[22]，規範了術語和作戰框架標準，對職能角色，組織機構，計劃制定，作戰實施和評估作了程序性描述，它以參聯會2013年1月和3月簽頒的CJCSM3320.02D“聯合頻譜干擾消除程序”，CJCSI3320.02F“聯合頻譜干擾消除”和2014年2月的CJCSI3320.02E-1“聯合頻譜干擾消除程序保密增本”三大條令[23] [24] [25]為重要操作支撐，成為美軍電磁頻譜戰最新指導。

1.3裝備與技術

軍事技術引領和支撐先進作戰理念。為將電磁頻譜戰從概念轉化為能力，美軍極力開展技術創新和裝備研發，發展具有網絡化，靈巧化，多功能，小型化和自適應等特徵的新系統。

在頻譜管控系統上[19] [26]，美國防部自2005年開發部署同盟國聯合頻譜管理規劃工具（CJSMPT）與全球電磁頻譜信息系統（GEMSIS），隨後的頻譜XXI與改進型頻譜XXIO，頻譜感知管理與規劃系統（SSC-SSMPS），頻譜態勢感知系統（S2AS），海上電磁頻譜作戰行動項目（伊索），聯合自動通信電子行動指令系統（JACS），東道國全球在線頻譜數據庫等，具備實時頻譜測量與在線分析，頻譜籌劃推演與頻率分配，電磁干擾分析與衝突消除，電磁作戰環境建模仿真，電磁態勢共享與用頻效能評估，頻譜資源接入與數據庫等功能與能力。

在作戰裝備與技術項目上[3] [26] [27]，2011年，預先研究計劃局（DARPA）開始啟動行為學習自適應電子戰（刀片），自適應雷達對抗（ARC），極端射頻頻譜條件下通信（CommEx），主動電子掃描陣列（AESA）技術，近零功耗射頻和傳感器運行（N-ZERO）等項目，通過對抗行為實時評估，措施自主生成，效果即時反饋等新技術開發針對未知波形和行為的電磁頻譜威脅實時戰術對抗新能力; 2010年，空軍啟動基於網絡化軟件定義架構（SDA）的認知干擾機與大功率高效射頻數模轉換器（HiPERDAC）項目以及無源射頻識別環境（PRIDE），頻譜戰評估技術工程研究（衫），反電子高功率微波先進導彈（CHAMP）等項目，發展有源和無源目標威脅自動感知識別，實時評估和自適應對抗技術與能力;美海軍開展海上電子戰改進（SEWIP-塊1 / II / III）SLQ-32艦載電子戰系統，艦船信號探裝備（SSEE），電磁指揮與控制（EMC2），集成桅杆（InTop）艦載天線，下一代干擾機（NGJ）等項目，提升實時威脅評估與態勢感知，任務方案建模仿真，電磁頻譜自動分配，作戰行動分析等能力;美陸軍啟動計劃在2016年9月投入使用的電子戰規劃與管理工具（EWPMT）和多功能電子戰（MFEW），防禦性電子攻擊（DEA）和“消音器”電子戰等系統，增強射頻信號感知的電子支援和發送干擾或欺騙信號的電子攻擊能力。今年初，戰略司令部聯合電子戰中心（JEWC）啟動面向電磁頻譜態勢感知與指揮控制提供改進電磁戰鬥管理能力的新技術研究，計劃5年內實現基於策略的實時頻譜管控，先進電磁戰鬥序列（EOB）表徵和行動方案建模仿真分析等能力並達到7-8級技術成熟度[28]。在認知電子戰和人工智能技術推動下，DARPA在2017年8月11日又啟動了射頻機器學習系統（RFM LS）和頻譜聯合挑戰項目，開發從大量複雜頻譜信號中自動區分和表徵目標信號的新技術[29]。

2聯合電磁頻譜作戰理論

電磁頻譜戰是美軍21世紀信息作戰最新理論。隨著研究和認識的不斷深化，美軍逐步將新的戰略思想落地為戰法和戰術措施。為統一戰場電磁頻譜利用與控制行動，美軍綜合一系列指示，條令，規程等文件出版JDN3-16“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”條令紀要，規範了作戰概念，任務範疇，組織機構，作戰籌劃與實施及評估等。

2.1基本概念

電磁頻譜作戰（EMSO）是美軍電磁頻譜戰理論的概念基點。它以電子戰和頻譜管理為基礎，以聯合電磁頻譜作戰為實現方式，目標是在電磁作戰環境（EMOE）中達成電磁頻譜優勢，涉及頻譜管理行動，聯合電磁頻譜作戰（JEMSO）和聯合電磁頻譜管理行動等概念。根據美軍條令JP1-02“國防部軍事術語詞典”[30]，JP6-01“聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”，JDN3 -16“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”和ATP6-02.70“電磁頻譜管理作戰行動技能”界定，聯合電磁頻譜作戰是由兩個或兩個以上部隊開展的用於利用，攻擊，防護和管理電磁作戰環境的協同軍事行動。電磁頻譜管理行動是指在軍事行動全階段共同促成計劃，管理和實施電磁作戰環境內作戰行動的頻譜管理，頻率分配，東道國協調，政策遵循，衝突消除等相互聯繫的功能。各概念間關係與範疇如圖1。

圖1電磁頻譜作戰相關概念關係圖[19]圖1電磁頻譜作戰相關概念關係圖[19]

2.2任務域定位

美軍認為，聯合電磁頻譜作戰任務域由電磁頻譜利用，管理，攻擊和防護四維度任務構成，其中，利用任務有信號情報蒐集分發和電子戰支援，管理任務有電磁頻譜管理和電磁戰鬥管理，攻擊任務有電子攻擊和導航戰，防護任務有電子防護和聯合頻譜干擾消除。該作戰概念旨在對電磁作戰環境中的聯合部隊電磁頻譜行動進行作戰集成，確立重點優先事項，組織行動協同和衝突消除，通過充分集成電磁機動方案，力量和行動強化協調統一，實現戰場電磁頻譜控制。它在各作戰域的聯合作戰行動能力形成中扮演著關鍵角色，對聯合部隊的指揮控制，情報，火力打擊，調整與機動，防護，行動能力維持等職能作用發揮產生深刻影響。

2.3組織機構框架

聯合電磁頻譜作戰的組織機構負責為指揮官和司令部制定和發布政策指示與行動指南，進行作戰計劃制定，作戰實施，行動協調和作戰評估。由聯合部隊指揮官指派電磁頻譜控制負責人承擔聯合電磁頻譜作戰總職責。聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元（JEMSOC）是聯合部隊的主要參謀部，由電磁頻譜控制負責人委派一名主管統一指揮。各軍種設立電磁頻譜作戰分部，各下轄一個電磁頻譜作戰分隊，承擔集成網電作戰，電子戰和頻譜管理行動的職能，分別為陸軍的電子戰軍官所轄網絡電磁行動分隊，海軍的海上作戰中心電磁頻譜作戰分隊，空軍的空中作戰中心電子戰協調單元，海軍陸戰隊的戰鬥開發與集成司令部下屬網絡空間與電子戰協調單元，多國部隊聯合參謀部作戰處所屬合同電子戰協調單元。聯合部隊所屬聯合電磁頻譜作戰組織機構如圖2，聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元架構如圖3。

圖2電磁頻譜作戰組織機構圖2電磁頻譜作戰組織機構

圖3聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元架構圖3聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元架構

2.4作戰籌劃流程

聯合電磁頻譜作戰籌劃工作由各級聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元共同完成。在任務分析時，作戰計劃制定隊伍制定一份參謀部評估方案，用於在制定和分析行動方案中確定電磁頻譜支持度，作為達成電磁頻譜優勢的戰略基礎;行動方案選定後，制定聯合電磁頻譜作戰附錄，描述作戰全階段的使命任務，優先事項，政策策略，流程步驟和實施程序，為在聯合作戰域使用電磁戰鬥管控系統建立協調措施，具體程序和交戰規則;同時，聯合部隊各分部報送各自電磁頻譜作戰計劃並集成到該附錄在計劃制定與行動實施期間，聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元加強各分部電磁頻譜作戰計劃並參與各分部需求制定，優先事項確立，作戰集成與行動協同，並生成一份電磁頻譜控制計劃。隨後，調整更新後的電磁頻譜控制計劃啟動聯合電磁頻譜作戰實施週期環，生成指導聯合部隊磁頻譜使用的電磁頻譜控制序列。作戰籌劃流程如圖4。

圖4聯合電磁頻譜作戰計劃制定流程圖4聯合電磁頻譜作戰計劃制定

2.5作戰實施方式

聯合電磁頻譜作戰實施過程是一個計劃，實施和評估的連續循環週期。聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元完成電磁頻譜控制計劃和電磁頻譜控制序列的制定，確立作戰行動的戰鬥週期，經電磁頻譜控制負責人批准，向各分部作戰單元和分隊發布並組織實施。電磁頻譜作戰單元全週期完整參與聯合部隊關鍵戰鬥流程，並根據作戰時段內各分部所屬分隊的用戶需求和戰場電磁頻譜態勢及時調整更新計劃與序列，確保每份電磁頻譜控制序列有效生成，高效下達和執行基本過程為：制定與發布控制計劃，更新各分部控制計劃，準備作戰計劃，生成和分發控制序列，執行和調整作戰實施計劃與控制序列，監測和指導作戰進程，作戰實施週期如圖5。

圖5聯合電磁頻譜作戰實施週期圖5聯合電磁頻譜作戰實施週期

3電磁頻譜作戰發展特點

軍事新能力離不開新體系支撐。作為應對信息網絡，大數據和人工智能時代軍事新挑戰的作戰理念，電磁頻譜戰一經提出就成為美軍戰鬥力發展新方向。為力求深化認識且高效實用，美軍從政策條令建設，組織機構與部隊調整，裝備系統與新技術研發等多個維度將新概念推向戰場。

3.1以政策條令為依據強化基本概念與理論認知，推動作戰理念向執行操作落地

思想引領行動。美軍擅長創新作戰理念，電磁頻譜戰概念也不例外。一是注重釐清概念核心，統一理念認知。電磁頻譜戰發展的早期數年，始終在論證面向新作戰域的新概念。軍方主導“老鴇鴉”等專業性軍地高層論壇，分析概念所涉及的相關理論，交流技術發展和應用方式，推動認識深化，同時，在戰略性文件和頂層條令中，逐步梳理相關聯新舊概念間的聯繫與區別，剖析其範疇與任務域，以此日益促成概念的清晰界定和理論體系成型。二是面向戰場運用操作，逐層細化條令。美軍歷來重視將作戰概念向執行層戰，技術措施細化落地。電磁頻譜戰從概念提出到進入條令和從聯合條令到軍兵種配套行動手冊及戰技術規程（TTP）僅用三年左右的時間，美陸軍甚至在聯合參謀部之前建立戰場運用概念藍圖，形成從聯合層面到分隊層面層層銜接，逐項落的系統性作戰運用與操作指南。

3.2以固有力量為基礎建立高效集成的部隊架構，力求戰場運用全週期協調有序

部隊是行動載體。美軍非常重視新概念作戰力量與現有能力的優化集成。一是注重能力體系整體規劃。美軍電磁頻譜戰與網絡空間作戰的能力發展軌跡相似。從聯合參謀部，聯合部隊司令部到軍兵種部隊，設置作戰席位和相應實施分隊，建立作戰計劃，指控，實施和評估的全流程運行機制，形成高效流暢的能力集成體系。二是重視現有機構與新力量協調互融。通過及時明確新能力所涉及機構與力量的職責和相互關係，制定面向作戰的行動流程和實施程序，甚至規定有關協調活動中的制式模板，促成電磁頻譜作戰與其他任務域的全體系全程行動協同有序。三是依托實戰演練及時驗證能力。基於作戰新概念和能力目標迅速推進電磁頻譜領域戰場攻防研練實踐，在作戰試驗中邊驗證邊修正。美陸軍在去年2至5月成立第1戰場網電戰小組的電磁頻譜戰獨立分並計劃年底參加某一地域戰鬥司令部組織的演習[31];美空軍在“戰鬥護盾”演習中為響應“頻譜干擾消除項目”實施了雷達電子戰系統測評[5]。

3.3以科技實力為支撐推進新概念裝備系統預研，將高新技術向戰鬥力優勢轉化

強軍必需利器。高新技術裝備是催生新生作戰能力的重要途徑。一是善於發掘戰場新變化並評估新需求。美國防部2014年“電磁頻譜戰略”指出，要量化頻譜需求，發展電磁環境所需裝備和技術，增強實時頻譜操作和電磁頻譜系統實時識別，預測及干擾消除等能力[9]。美軍由底至頂建立了面向裝備系統研建與作戰部署應用的需求採集與集成機構，在定期蒐集梳理的同時借助政府審計署，蘭德公司和院所專題小組進行專項調研論證，分析結果可直接為國防部和參聯會提供決策支持，形成了暢通有力的需求管理評估體系，為研建電磁頻譜戰裝備和開發新型戰鬥力注入激活劑。二是注重預研技術向裝備系統集成應用。美軍裝備系統研建都會基於國防信息體系結構標準展開，具備仿真建模，預先研究，技術集成，應用驗證等系統流程和完善能力，注重同步進行原有型號改進和新研智能技術裝備系統開發“決勝電磁波”指出，新階段電磁頻譜戰重要特徵是無源傳感器應用和採用“低 – 零功率”。能力對敵進行反電磁對抗，智能化技術和裝備是未來主導[6]。電磁頻譜戰技術裝備預研與集成也將能夠以更優方式實現軍事問題向技術能力升級，前沿技術與成熟方法互融，專用系統向綜合平台集成，進而完成戰鬥力優勢無縫躍升。

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Analysis on the Establishment of the Joint Operation Command System by the PLA 中國軍方聯合作戰指揮中心解放軍建構聯合作戰指揮體制評析國防

05/04/2018 admin Leave a comment

Analysis on the Establishment of the Joint Operation Command System by the PLA

中國軍方聯合作戰指揮中心解放軍建構聯合作戰指揮體制評析國防

1 六、解放軍建構聯合作戰指揮體制評析國防大學政治系馬振坤教授 ■ 習近平在去（2015）年 11 月下旬召開中央軍委改革工作會議，強調要組建戰區聯合作戰指揮機構和健全軍委聯合作戰指揮機制，以強化軍隊聯合作戰能力。

■ 改革重點在建立一套能夠上下銜接、起承轉合之聯合作戰指揮中樞機制，在中央軍委層級是將現有總參謀部改組成為直屬中央軍委之聯合參謀部，對上能讓軍委主席有效行使最高軍令指揮權；對下則能夠銜接整合各戰區聯合作戰指揮系統。

■ 解放軍在理順組織結構及權力運作模式後，將在組織編制、軍種功能、武器裝備以及作戰指揮各個面向趨向成熟，可望提升其作戰能力。

（一）前言中共於去（2015）年 11 月下旬召開中央軍委改革工作會議，正式揭開軍隊組織變革之序幕。中央軍委深化國防和軍隊改革領導小組組長習近平在會中發表重要講話，直指解放軍「必須在 2020 年前在領導管理體制、聯合作戰指揮體制改革上取得突破性進展、在優化規模結構、完善政策制度、推動軍民融合發展等方面改革上取得重要成果，努力構建能夠打贏信息化戰爭、有效履行使命任務的中國特色現代軍事力量體系，完善中國特色社會主義軍事制度」。

（二）解放軍作戰指揮體系的變革在習近平揭櫫的軍隊改革具體內容上，他強調要組建戰區聯合作戰指揮機構和健全軍委聯合作戰指揮機制。透過中央軍委組織職能調整之頂層設計，習近平要建構「軍委→戰區→部隊」的作戰指揮體系以強化軍隊聯合作戰能力。解放軍原本並無聯合作戰指揮體制，其既有之作戰指揮體制係以從事境內地面持久作戰為主之設計，具體表徵有二，一是解放軍並無 2 陸軍司令部，但海空軍及二炮部隊則自其組建時即成立軍種司令部；二是中共將全中國大陸劃為七大軍區，作戰時以軍區為基礎轉換為戰區，採取誘敵深入之戰略遂行地面持久消耗戰。解放軍僅有海空二炮司令部卻無陸軍司令部並非獨特設計，而是歷史發展的結果。中共自 1927 年創立紅軍成為其首支武裝力量，至 1949 年組建海軍和空軍之前，其軍隊皆以地面部隊為主，在國共內戰期間，為方便作戰指揮，堅持以黨領軍以及強化後勤保障，中共在軍事領導上，採取總部形式作為其軍隊領導管理和作戰指揮機構。而中共在建政後仍然延續此總參謀部、總政治部、總後勤部之架構，作為其軍隊領導體制，即便陸續組建海空軍及二炮部隊，並未改變此架構，反而是將新組建的軍兵種納入此架構中，成為支援地面部隊作戰的輔助性軍兵種。因此中共傳統的四大總部領導機制，係以陸軍為主、海空軍及二炮部隊為輔、適合從事傳統單一軍種地面作戰的軍隊領導機制。此機制無法適應現代戰爭係屬遠程投射、立體攻防、不同軍兵種聯合作戰之特性，共軍內部早有變更之議。尤其近年來中共與周邊國家在陸地領土主權爭議逐漸經由雙邊協商談判獲得解決、陸地邊界之緊張情勢明顯降低之際，在東海及南海之島礁領土主權及海域劃界爭端卻日形嚴重。而對應此等緊張情勢者，是海空二炮等軍兵種而非陸軍，爭端發生之東海、南海區域，亦非南京、廣州軍區戰備任務指向之處。若依中央軍委賦予兩大軍區之任務，南京軍區是「主管江蘇、安徽、浙江、江西、福建、上海五省一市軍事事務的大軍區，主要作戰使命是保衛南京、上海、杭州、福州等東南沿海發達的特大城市和工業區的安全」。依此內容視之，南京軍區主要作戰範圍並不包括東海及釣魚臺。再依共軍廣州軍區之主要任務內容視之，該軍區是解放軍「主管廣東、廣西、湖北、湖南、海南五省區軍事事務的大軍區，戰時使命為保衛中國南部，尤其防止越南和東海沿海的攻擊，防衛廣州、深圳等特大城市。此外，當需要時也負責增援香港和澳門」。同樣地，廣州軍區防務亦不包括南海諸島礁。 3 除大軍區主要戰略方向係向陸而非向海，大軍區指揮職位的設計上也是以陸軍為主，七大軍區司令員均由陸軍將領出任，各軍區海空軍司令員在編制上僅為大軍區之副司令員，故軍區海空軍主要作戰任務係以支援軍區地面部隊作戰為主，而非遂行境外海空域獨立作戰。但依據中共公布之「2015 中國的軍事戰略報告書」，共軍要「加快轉變戰鬥力生成模式，運用信息系統把各種作戰力量、作戰單元、作戰要素融合集成為整體作戰能力，逐步構建作戰要素無縫鏈接、作戰平台自主協同的一體化聯合作戰體系」，另要「按照權威、精幹、靈便、高效的要求，建立健全軍委聯合作戰指揮機構和戰區聯合作戰指揮體制」。顯見中共領導階層深知既有中央軍委與各總部、軍種司令部間職能區分，以及大軍區制度等，皆無法因應未來戰爭聯合作戰型態之需求，因而藉由中央軍委組織調整的時機，對於軍隊領導管理體制和聯合作戰指揮體制進行一體化設計。（三）現行聯合作戰指揮機構的組建依據「意見」，為適應一體化聯合作戰指揮要求，應「建立健全軍委、戰區兩級聯合作戰指揮體制，構建平戰一體、常態運行、專司主營、精幹高效的戰略戰役指揮體系」，且要「重新調整劃設戰區」。在軍隊作戰指揮體系上，則要「按照聯合作戰、聯合指揮的要求，調整規範軍委聯指、各軍種、戰區聯指和戰區軍種的作戰指揮職能」，部隊訓練則要求必須「與聯合作戰指揮體制相適應，完善聯合訓練體制」。在具體組建聯合作戰指揮機構方面，在中央軍委層級是將現有總參謀部改組成為直屬中央軍委之聯合參謀部，此新成立之「聯參」只負責中央軍委之聯合作戰指揮事宜，與過去的「總參」總攬對軍隊的作戰指揮權和領導管理權有很大的差異。更重要者，新的聯合參謀長不再擁有過去總參謀長對軍隊之最高軍令權，此最高軍令權在中央軍委職能調整之後，已回歸到中央軍委主席之手，以落實軍委主席負責制之精神。此聯合參謀部只是一個直屬中央軍委常態存在之作戰指揮 4 機構，故聯合參謀長不論在平時或戰時，都扮演軍委主席在行使軍隊作戰指揮最高軍令權之幕僚長，而不再是過去總參謀長名為幕僚長，實際上卻擁有等同陸軍司令員之權力。將總參謀部改編成為聯合參謀部在具體實踐上確實可行，因為目前總參謀部除陸軍出身之總參謀長、副總參謀長外，海、空、二炮皆有擔任副總參謀長，其實已具備聯合作戰指揮機制之雛型。此海空二炮擔任副總參謀長之將領在原本制度運作下，即是未來接任海空二炮司令員之必然人選，其在副總參謀長任內，可獲得與其它軍種副總參謀長溝通協調之經驗，並可在此過程中了解其它軍種之特性以及在執行作戰任務時必須考量之諸種條件。當此將領擔任軍種司令員後，在落實中央軍委「一體化聯合作戰」政策要求下，自當能夠與其它軍種溝通協調，降低軍種本位主義色彩。海空二炮將領出任總參副總參謀長始於江澤民在 2004 年將中央軍委主席職務交棒給胡錦濤時，同步將海空二炮司令員納入中央軍委成員起。原本海空二炮司令員之級別等同大軍區正職，僅同陸軍之大軍區司令員。江澤民將其納入中央軍委後，海空二炮司令員級別提升，但是在司令員以下各階則無變動，尤其各大軍區空軍司令員以及瀕海大軍區海軍司令員，在級別上仍屬大軍區副職，編制上為軍區副司令員。為求幹部梯隊之完整性和連續性，並且符合不同軍兵種聯合作戰之時代發展趨勢，乃在總參謀部原本由陸軍壟斷之副總參謀長職務，分由陸、海、空軍和二炮之將領分別擔任，以連接海空二炮軍兵種高階將領在成為軍兵種司令員之前最後階段職務歷練。除副總參謀長層級外，總參謀部所屬各部例如情報部、作戰部等，亦早已納入海空二炮各軍兵種幹部擔任高階參謀，各自負擔與本身軍兵種相關之情報、作戰等參謀業務。換言之，總參謀部在過去十年來即是以滿足不同軍兵種聯合作戰之需求作為主要發展方向，且實際上已發展出成熟的聯合作戰指揮參謀機制。因此將總參謀部調整為聯合參謀部，就實質運作面而言，並非是全盤的改變，反而是將實質上已初步具備的聯合作戰機制加以制度化與正名化。 5 因此將總參謀部調整為聯合參謀部之重點並不在總參謀長、副總參謀長等領導層級職務由不同軍種將領擔任，亦不是整合不同軍種作戰參謀業務，而是建立一套能夠上下銜接、起承轉合之聯合作戰指揮中樞機制。對上能夠落實中央軍委主席負責制之精神，讓中央軍委主席得以透過聯合參謀部之機制，有效行使最高軍令指揮權；對下則能夠銜接整合各戰區聯合作戰指揮系統，讓一體化聯合作戰指揮體制成為一個「有機的整體」，在作戰指揮上不會出現「斷鏈」甚至「無鏈結」的情況。建立聯合作戰指揮機制在大軍區層級，即是取消現有的七大軍區，另成立東西南北四大戰略方向之戰區，以及保障北京安全之中部戰區。傳統上，大軍區是中共軍隊體制上的主要建制，自毛澤東時期強調誘敵深入境內決戰的戰略思維下，大軍區制度即扮演最重要之分區屯兵固守防衛角色。事實上，大軍區是真正掌握軍隊、集軍隊之軍令軍政權於一身的體制，舉凡軍隊之建設、教育訓練、乃至作戰指揮權，皆由大軍區司令員掌握。另外中共政權在國防動員體制和軍地制度，也都依托在大軍區體制之下，與維護內部安全秩序相關之武警部隊之建制與指揮，也都在大軍區管轄範圍內。由於大軍區制度是以屯兵和境內決戰為前提，在體制運作上自然以陸軍為主，海空軍及二炮僅扮演支援陸軍作戰的角色。隨著中共軍事現代化成果日顯，海空二炮遠距投射力量不斷強化，共軍向海方向的活動範圍不斷擴張，軍事戰略思維已改採邊境和境外作戰，不再以誘敵深入境內決戰為主。而境外作戰自然以能夠從事遠距投射之海空軍和二炮作戰力量為主，陸軍反而僅能扮演預備隊之角色。因此將以陸軍為主之大軍區體制改為以不同軍兵種遂行聯合作戰為主之戰區指揮體制，方能整合不同軍兵種之作戰力量，即時且有效發揮海空二炮遠距投射火力之優勢。另外，將大軍區改為戰區，亦可消除原本大軍區司令員壟斷軍隊領導及指揮權，形同分地割據之軍閥的現象。戰區將僅負責聯合作戰指揮，戰區司令員僅擁有對其戰區之聯合作戰指揮權，並不擁有對軍隊之領導管理權。軍隊領導管理權由各軍種司令部掌握，如此可以將 6 軍令權和軍政權在戰區層級完全切割，就不會再出現軍區司令員形同地方軍閥的權力膨脹問題。

（四）結語習近平在此次中共中央軍委組織調整中，展現對軍隊完全的領導權威。誠然外界多認為習近平通過這次軍改刻意打亂軍中既有的權力結構，清洗原本在軍隊裡根深蒂固的江澤民派系將領，全面掌握軍權。但是平心而論，從中央軍委公布的「意見」對中央軍委層級、軍種司令部層級、以及戰區層級的組織調整內容看來，這次的變動若能落實，的確可以讓解放軍的組織架構及權力運作機制脫胎換骨。解放軍在理順組織結構及權力運作模式後，將在組織編制、軍種功能、武器裝備以及作戰指揮各個面向趨向成熟，符合現代化軍隊的標準，而這也將讓解放軍的作戰能力在可預見的未來呈現出跳躍式之進步。

English Translation

Analysis on the Establishment of the Joint Operation Command System by the PLA

China National Defense University

■ Xi Jinping held a meeting to reform the Central Military Commission in late November (2015).

Emphasizing the need to establish a joint combat command organization in the theater and a joint combat command of a sound military commission

Mechanism to strengthen the joint combat capabilities of the military.

■ The focus of the reform is to establish a set of joint operations that can be linked up and down.

The central mechanism, at the Central Military Commission level, is to reorganize the existing general staff into straight the Joint Chief of Staff of the Central Military Commission is able to effectively exercise the highest authority for the chairman of the Central Military Commission Military command structure; to the next can be integrated with all theater joint warfare command systems.

■ After the People’s Liberation Army clarifies its organizational structure and power operation mode, it will organize

The military services, weapons and equipment, as well as operational commanders, tend to be mature.

Improve its combat capabilities.

(I). Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party held a meeting to reform the Central Military Commission in late November (2015).

Reveal the prelude to the reform of the military organization. The Central Military Commission Deepens the Leading Group for National Defense and Army Reform

President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the conference, pointing to the People’s Liberation Army “must be in the lead by 2020

Led to breakthroughs in the reform of the management system and joint operations command system, and the optimization of scale major achievements have been made in reforming the structure, improving policies and systems, and promoting the integration of military and civilian development.

As a result, efforts will be made to build Chinese characteristics that can win informatized warfare and effectively fulfill its mission.

On behalf of the military strength system, improve the socialist military system with Chinese characteristics.”

(II) The reform of the PLA command system

In Xi Jinping’s disclosure of the specific contents of the military reform, he emphasized the need to establish a joint cooperation.

The joint command and command mechanism of the war command organization and the sound military commission. Through the Central Military Commission organizational functions

With the entire top-level design, Xi Jinping must build a combat command system of “military committee, theater, and troops”.

In order to strengthen the joint combat capabilities of the military.

The People’s Liberation Army originally did not have a joint operational command system. Its existing operational command system was engaged in the design of long-term operations on the ground in the Mainland, and there are two specific characterizations. One is that the PLA did not the Army Command, but the Hainan Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps established the Service Command since its establishment;

Second, the Chinese Communist Party has designated the entire Chinese mainland as the seven major military regions and converted to combat based on the military region.

District, adopting a strategy to lure the enemy into a long-lasting war of attrition.

The People’s Liberation Army’s only air and sea artillery headquarters but no army headquarters are not uniquely designed, but the result of historical development. The Chinese Communists founded the Red Army as its first armed force since 1927.

Prior to the formation of the Navy and the Air Force in 1949, its troops were mainly based on ground forces within the KMT.

During the war, in order to facilitate combat operations, adhere to the leadership of the party and strengthen logistics support, the Chinese Communist Party

In terms of military leadership, it takes the form of headquarters as its military leadership management and operational command organization. And after the establishment of the government, the Chinese Communist Party continued the structure of the General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department, and the General Logistics Department.

For its military leadership system, even if the navy, air force, and second artillery units were successively formed, they did not change this plane.

Instead, the newly-formed military units are included in this structure and become support for ground forces operations.

Combines & Auxiliary arms.

Therefore, the four traditional leadership mechanisms of the Chinese Communist Party are based on the Army, the Hainan Air Force and the Second Supplementary to the artillery force, it is suitable for the army leadership mechanism for traditional single-army ground operations. This machine system cannot adapt to modern warfare, long-range projection, three-dimensional offensive and defensive, joint operations of different types of arms

The characteristics of the Communist Army have long been changed. In particular, the CCP and its neighboring countries have been on land in recent years.

Territorial sovereignty disputes are gradually resolved through bilateral negotiation and tension on the land boundary.

At a time of marked decline, disputes over the territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation of the islands and reefs in the East China Sea and the South China Sea were observed.

serious. The counterparts to these tense situations are the Hainan Second Artillery Corps and not the Army.

The East China Sea and South China Sea areas that occurred were also not directed by the combat readiness tasks of the Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions.

If the tasks assigned to the two military regions are assigned by the Central Military Commission, the Nanjing Military Region is “supervising Jiangsu and An.

Military areas of the five provinces and one city of Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian and Shanghai

The mission is to defend the developed mega cities and workers in the southeast coasts of Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou and Fuzhou.

Industry Zone Security”. According to this content, the main battle area of the Nanjing Military Region does not include the East China Sea.

Diaoyutai. According to the main tasks of the Communist Army of the Guangzhou Military Region, the military region is the People’s Liberation Army.

“In charge of military affairs in the five provinces and regions of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hubei, Hunan and Hainan

Mission to defend southern China, in particular to prevent attacks on the coasts of Vietnam and the East China Sea.

State, Shenzhen and other megacities. In addition, it is also responsible for the reinforcement of Hong Kong and Macao when necessary.” with

In the sample plot, the defense of the Guangzhou Military Region does not include the South China Sea Islands.

In addition to the major strategic directions of the military region, the design of command posts in the large military region is directed toward the land instead of to the sea.

The Army is also the main force, and the commanders of the seven military regions are all served by army generals.

The military commander is only the deputy commander of the military area in the preparation, so the main combat operations of the Hainan Air Force in the military region

The Department is mainly to support the ground forces of the military region, instead of independently operating in the offshore airspace.

However, according to the “2015 China Military Strategy Report” announced by the Chinese Communist Party, the Communists must “add

Rapidly change the combat power generation mode and use information systems to put various combat forces and units of combat

Combine operational elements into integrated combat capabilities, and gradually build combat elements to make seamless links.

The integrated joint combat system where the platform is autonomously coordinated with each other” must also be “according to authority, capable, and effortlessly and efficiently required to establish and improve joint operations of the Central Military Commission and joint operations in the theater

Command system.” It is evident that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is fully aware of the existence of both the Central Military Commission and headquarters and the Military Services Division.

The division of functions among different ministries, and the military area system, etc., cannot meet the requirements of future warfare joint operations.

The demand of the type, and therefore the time for the adjustment of the Central Military Commission, for the leadership of the military

The system and the joint operational command system are designed in an integrated manner.

(3) Establishment of the current joint operations command organization

According to “opinions,” it is necessary to “establish and improve the

The two-level joint combat command system of the Central Military Commission and the theater establishes an integrated peacetime operation, normal operation, and

Main, lean and effective strategic battle command system, and “re-adjust the planning of the theater.”

In the military operational command system, it is necessary to “adjust the requirements of joint operations and joint efforts to standardize the operational command functions of the Central Military Commission, the Military Services, the Joint League Forces, and the regional military services.”

The training of troops requires that “it must be adapted to the joint combat command system and improve the joint training body system”.

In the specific formation of a joint combat command organization, at the Central Military Commission level will be the existing total the Staff Department was reorganized into a joint staff department directly under the Central Military Commission. This newly established “joint participation” is only

Responsible for the Joint Combat Command of the Central Military Commission, and the “Gan Sen General” of the past there is a big difference between operational command and leadership. More importantly, the new Joint Chief of Staff

No longer has the highest military commander of the general staff in the past. The highest military authority is in the Central Army.

After the adjustment of the committee’s functions, it has returned to the chairman of the Central Military Commission to implement the responsibility of the chairman of the Central Military Commission.

The spirit of the system. This Joint Staff is just a direct command of the Central Military Commission.

Institutions, so the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both in peacetime and in wartime, plays the role of the chairman of the Central Military Commission in the exercise of the military.

The commander of the highest military command of the combat commander is no longer the chief of general staff of the past.

In fact, it has the same power as the army commander.

The restructuring of the General Staff Headquarters into the Joint Staff Department is indeed feasible in the specific practice because in addition to the chief of the general staff and deputy chief of the general staff of the former general staff of the former general staff, the sea, air, and the second gun are all

As the deputy chief of the general staff, in fact, he already has the prototype of joint operations command mechanism. This sea and air two the commander of the deputy chief of the general staff of the cannon, under the operation of the original system, is to take over the sea and air artillery.

The commander is an inevitably elected candidate who can be obtained as a deputy chief of the general staff and can be used as a deputy general secretary of other services.

Communicate the experience of communication and coordination, and understand the characteristics and the conditions that must be considered when performing combat missions. After this general served as commander of the military,

Implementing the Central Military Commission’s “integrated joint operations” policy requires that it be able to cooperate with other service communicate and coordinate, reducing the service-oriented nature.

The Hainan Second Artillery general served as deputy chief of general staff of the General Staff and began with Jiang Zemin in 2004.

When the chairman of the Central Military Commission delivered the post to Hu Jintao, he simultaneously incorporated the commander of the Hainan Second Artillery into the Central Military Commission.

Members from. The level of the original commander of the Haikong Second Artillery was equal to that of the Great Military Region, which was only equal to that of the Army.

Commander of the Military District. After Jiang Zemin incorporated it in the Central Military Commission, the commander of the Second Air and Sea Artillery ranks but there are no changes in the order of the commander, especially the commanders of the air forces of the major military regions.

The naval commander of the Bohai Sea Military Area Command is still a deputy chief of the military region at the rank, and the military commander is assigned to the military region.

Commander. In order to achieve the integrity and continuity of the cadre echelon, and to meet the requirements of different military units

The trend of development in the era of warfare is that of the deputy chief of the general staff who was originally monopolized by the Army in the General Staff Department.

The service is divided into the positions of generals of land, sea, air force, and second artillery to connect the Hainan Second Artillery Corps.

The high-ranking generals took the final stage of career training before becoming military commanders.

In addition to the rank of deputy chief of the general staff, all departments under the general staff department such as the intelligence department and the warfare department

And so on, they have long been included in the cadres of the sea, air, and the Second Artillery, serving as high-level staff, and their respective burdens.

Armed Forces related intelligence, operations and other staff officers. In other words, the General Staff in the past ten years and in recent years, it is to meet the needs of joint operations of different types of arms as the main direction of development.

At the same time, a mature joint combat command staff mechanism has been developed. So it must adjust the General Staff to The Joint Staff, in terms of substantive operations, is not a complete change, but instead it will

The joint warfare mechanism that has been initially established has been institutionalized and renamed.

Therefore, the focus of adjusting the General Staff Department to the Joint Staff Department is not the chief of the general staff and vice president.

Chiefs of Staff such as the Chief of Staff are served by generals of different services and are not integrated into different military services.

Instead of consulting staff, establish a set of joint operations command that can be linked up and down, inherited from each other the central mechanism. In order to implement the spirit of the responsibility system of the chairman of the Central Military Commission, the Central Military Commission should be

Can effectively exercise the highest military command authority through the mechanism of the Joint Staff Headquarters; enough to integrate and integrate the joint operations command systems of all theaters and make the integrated joint operations commander

As an “organic whole,” there will be no “broken chain” or even “no chain” in combat command Results”.

The establishment of a joint combat command mechanism at the rank of the military region is to cancel the existing seven major military units.

District, the establishment of a four-strategic direction of the East, West, South and North, and the security of Beijing Theater. Traditionally, the large military area is the main organizational system of the Chinese Communist Army, since Mao Zedong’s time under the strategic thinking of emphasizing the lure of the enemy’s deep defensive battles in the country, the major military region system plays the most important role.

District soldiers stick to the defensive role. In fact, the military area is the army that truly controls the army and sets up the army.

The system of the military regime, which includes the construction of the army, education and training, and even combat command

The power is controlled by the commander of the military area. In addition, the Chinese Communist regime’s national defense mobilization system and military and land system

Degree, also relying on the system of the great military region, and related to the maintenance of the internal security order of the armed police department

The formation and command of the team are also within the jurisdiction of the military area.

Since the military region’s system is based on the premise of setting up troops and a decisive battle in the country, it is natural to operate the system.

Mainly based on the Army, the Hainan Air Force and the Second Artillery only played the role of supporting the Army. With the Chinese Communists the achievements of modernization have become increasingly apparent.

The scope of activities has continued to expand, and military strategic thinking has shifted to border and foreign operations.

Luring the enemy into the depths of the domestic decisive battle. However, it is natural for overseas operations to be able to engage in distant projections.

The Army and the Second Artillery are the main combat forces, but the Army can only play the role of reserve force. So will the army-based major military zone system was changed to a combat zone based on joint operations between different types of military units.

The command system can only integrate the combat forces of different military units, and immediately and efficiently this weapons combination has the advantage of projecting firepower from a distance.

In addition, changing the military area into a theater can also eliminate the original military commander’s monopoly of the military.

Leadership and command rights are similar to the phenomenon of the warlords split by land. The theater will only be responsible for joint operations commanding, the commander of the theater has only joint warfighting command over the theater and does not possess military command.

The leadership of the team. The leadership of the army is controlled by the various service commands so that the military commander and the military regime are completely cut at the theater level, and military commanders will no longer appear.

The issue of the expansion of power of local warlords.

(4) Conclusion

Xi Jinping demonstrated complete leadership over the army during the restructuring of the Central Military Commission of the CPC authority. It is true that the outside world thinks that Xi Jinping deliberately disrupted the existing power in the military through this military reform.

Structure, cleansing Jiang Zemin faction generals deeply rooted in the army and fully grasping the military right. But in all fairness, the “opinions” announced by the Central Military Commission of the Central Military Commission ranks and forces.

The level of organizational adjustment at the command level and the theater level suggests that if this change can implementation can indeed make the PLA’s organizational structure and power operation mechanism reborn.

People’s Liberation Army

After the military has straightened out the organizational structure and power operation mode, it will organize the organization, military services, and military operations.

Equipment and combat operations are oriented toward maturity and meet the standards of modern military forces.

This will also allow the PLA’s combat capabilities to show a leap forward in the foreseeable future.

Chairman Xi inspects the CMC’s joint operations command center and has aroused strong reaction in the entire army and the armed police force

Comprehensively improve the ability to prepare for fighting in the new era and provide strategic support for the realization of the Chinese dream

“To realize the party’s goal of strengthening the army in the new era and building the people’s army into a world-class army, we must grasp the key to fighting wars and defeating warlords. We have a major step forward in preparation for war.” On the 3rd, Chairman Xi Jinping inspected the Central Military Commission. The Operation Command Center led a group of CMC members to study the construction of the CMC Central Committee, and talked with the officers and men of the relevant task forces stationed at the Frontier Defense and Coastal Defence, inspected the Djibouti Security Base through the video, listened to the report of the PLA’s military preparation for war preparations, and delivered an important speech. It caused strong repercussions in the entire army and the armed police forces.

The officers and men all said that this inspection fully embodies President Xi’s high attention to the issue of military preparations for fighting warfare. This shows that the new military committee has implemented the spirit of the party’s Nineteenth Congress and promoted the work of the entire military to fight and win. A clear-cut attitude. They said that we must conscientiously study and implement the spirit of the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, adhere to the guidance of the military ideology of Xi Jinping, implement the military strategy under the new situation, strengthen the mission, strengthen reforms and innovations, intensify work implementation, and comprehensively improve preparations for fighting in the new era. The ability to provide strategic support for the realization of the “two hundred years” goal and the Chinese dream of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Tighten the string of war preparations and strengthen war preparations.

On the morning of the 3rd, the coldness hit people outside the window, but the joint military command center of the Central Military Commission was warm and strong. President Xi once went to the Central Building of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the Central Military Commission, and led a group of people in the Central Military Commission to study the construction of the Central Committee of the Central Military Commission.

“When Xi Chairman made an inspection, he delivered an important speech and profoundly clarified the strategic significance and practical requirements for comprehensively improving the ability to prepare for fighting in the new era.” Zhou Shangping, deputy director of the Joint Operations Department of the Central Military Commission of the Central Military Commission who inspected the entire process, said, “This is the leader of the party. The commander of our army piloted the People’s Army to implement the party’s strong military objectives in the new era, to build a world-class army, and to send political mobilization and epoch orders to the entire army.”

The military is preparing to fight. The fundamental focus of the people’s army in carrying out missions in the new era is combat effectiveness.

The officers and men of the various theaters, services, and agencies of the Central Military Commission said in their discussions that the officers and men of the entire army must only tighten the war preparedness string, strengthen war preparations for war preparations, and always focus on preparing for battles and continuously improve their ability to win. Situation, control crisis, curb war and win war.

“If you want peace, then you have to prepare for war.” The party’s 19th representative Wang Jinlong served as an instructor. A certain army brigade in the central theater “does a great deal”. In the war years, he played in the name of He Huwei. In the new era, the company has a long history. The brigade is responsible for the mission of the brigade for emergency combat readiness. It always maintains a state of readiness for action on the string. He believes that the state is uneasy and that it will be dangerous to forget. Things in the world are always the same. If you are not ready, the enemy will come. You are ready. The enemy does not dare to come. The dialectic of war and peace tells us that if we can fight, we will not be able to fight unless we are ready to fight.

“We must engrave the word ‘war’ in our hearts and continue to strengthen our sense of responsibility for ‘ready to go on the battlefield’. We will deeply engrave our duty to prepare for war and become a conscious action,” said Cui Jiabin, a brigade commander of the Army Aviation Corps. Once something can be quickly responded, resolutely fulfill the tasks entrusted by the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission and President Xi, and resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

Pay close attention to actual combat military training and improve the ability to win

Socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, and national defense and army building have also entered a new era.

The officers and men believe that the new era requires that the military must have new capabilities, but to have new capabilities, it is necessary to take substantive training.

“When Xi inspected the Central Committee of the Central Military Commission, Xi pointed out that we must focus on deepening military training in actual combat, stick to how to train soldiers on how to train, and what to do if we need to fight, and inspire the enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity of the officers and men. The military has risen vigorously in the military training upsurge,” said Liu Rui, the 19th Party Congress representative and head of the Air Force’s aviation regiment. “I’m most impressed by this. The military is only holding on to actual combat military training and improving their ability to win. Only in this way can we shoulder the mission of the mission of the new era given by the party and the people.”

Liu Rui is the first air force of the Air Force to modify the H-6K air force and is an important force in the air force’s long-range offensive operations. At this time after the closing of the 19th National Party Congress, he not only preached the spirit of the Nineteenth Party Congress, but also spent all his time on the training ground. A few days ago, he organized and implemented the largest cross-regional mobile combat training in the team’s history. From dawn to late at night, from combat to ultra-low altitude, from land to sea, all the way to the road, across multiple strange areas. And several airports, lasting more than 9 hours, with a range of nearly 5,000 kilometers…

A synthetic brigade of “Huangcailing Mountain” of the 74th Army Group of the Southern Theater Army is currently training hard soldiers to welcome the coming year-end assessment of the group army. Instructor Chen Yuwen believes that President Xi inspects the Central Military Commission’s Central Committee, sets the baton ready for warfare from the level of the Central Military Commission, and pays close attention to actual combat military training from the level of the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Grassroots officers and soldiers have no reason not to do a good job. We must unify our thoughts and actions to the important instructions of President Xi to prepare for war, and strive to forge an elite force that can be called, come to war, and win in battle.

Adhere to problem-oriented and make preparations for work

The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is by no means an easy task. It can be achieved by banging and playing drums. The ambitious goal of building a world-class army is also facing severe challenges.

Li Keliang, political commissar of a central information and communications brigade in the Central Theater, believes that we must strictly follow the requirements of Chairman Xi’s important directives, stick to the problem-oriented approach, grasp the end, and promote implementation of the preparations for combating one practical problem. It is necessary to establish a strict responsibility system, strengthen supervision and accountability, and grasp first-level, first-level and first-level levels, and stringently prepare for war preparations.

“The battlefield is a real contest, and the fight is a hard-fought duel.” The party’s 19th representative and Navy carrier-based fighter pilot Cao Jianjian created 419 days after serious injuries and only after 70 days of go-around, the F-15 fighters succeeded in their operations. The ship’s miracle, “In the past few years, the entire army took the training winds to test the wind and declared war on the “peace and evil” in military training. During the exercises, they dared to expose problems and dare to dissect themselves. They introduced a series of hard measures and effective. Promote the building of the combat effectiveness of the troops.”

After seriously studying Xi’s speech, a brigade commander of the 80th Armed Forces believed that we must follow the example of President Xi’s entrustment to strengthen the sense of crisis, awareness of crisis, and awareness of snoring. We must focus all our efforts on fighting and focus on each other’s work. We must make preparations as soon as possible. Snoring ability to engage in.

Experts and scholars of the Academy of Military Sciences, National Defense University, and National University of Defense Technology, according to the future situation and task, believe that we must use the important instructions given by President Xi’s visit to the joint operations command center of the Central Military Commission as guidelines, and focus on innovating wars and combat planning, closely following the evolution of war formations and combat methods. , Adhering to the combat missions, operational opponents, and operational environment, Daxing’s research on warfare issues.

President Xi’s strong mission, clear preparations for fighting, and inspiring the majority of officers and soldiers of the entire army and armed police forces. The officers and men said that we must firmly establish the only basic standard of combat effectiveness. All our thoughts must be focused and focused on. All tasks should be used to fight hard, and we must successfully accomplish the mission of the new era entrusted by the party and the people!

Original Mandarin Chinese:

习主席视察军委联合作战指挥中心在全军和武警部队引起强烈反响

全面提高新时代备战打仗能力，为实现中国梦提供战略支撑

　　“实现党在新时代的强军目标、把人民军队全面建成世界一流军队，必须扭住能打仗、打胜仗这个关键，在备战打仗上有一个大的加强。”3日，习近平主席视察军委联合作战指挥中心，带领军委一班人研究军委联指中心建设情况，同驻守边防海防的有关任务部队官兵通话，通过视频察看了驻吉布提保障基地，听取了全军练兵备战工作汇报，并发表重要讲话，在全军和武警部队引起强烈反响。

　　官兵们纷纷表示，这次视察充分体现了习主席对军队备战打仗问题的高度重视，表明了新一届军委贯彻落实党的十九大精神、推动全军各项工作向能打仗、打胜仗聚焦的鲜明态度。大家表示，一定要认真学习贯彻党的十九大精神，坚持以习近平强军思想为指导，贯彻新形势下军事战略方针，强化使命担当，强化改革创新，强化工作落实，全面提高新时代备战打仗能力，为实现“两个一百年”奋斗目标、实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦提供战略支撑。

　　时刻绷紧战备这根弦，强化备战打仗导向

　　3日上午，窗外寒气袭人，但军委联合作战指挥中心却暖意浓浓。习主席一身戎装来到军委联指中心大楼，带领军委一班人研究军委联指中心建设情况。

　　“习主席视察时发表重要讲话，深刻阐明全面提高新时代备战打仗能力的战略意义和实践要求。”亲历视察全过程的中央军委联合参谋部作战局副局长周尚平说，“这是党的领袖、我军统帅领航人民军队为实现党在新时代的强军目标、全面建成世界一流军队，向全军官兵发出的政治动员和时代号令。”

　　军队是要准备打仗的，人民军队担负新时代使命任务的根本着力点在于战斗力。

　　各战区、各军种、军委机关各部门的官兵们在学习讨论中认为，全军官兵只有时刻绷紧战备这根弦，强化备战打仗导向，始终聚焦备战打仗，不断提升打赢能力，才能有效塑造态势、管控危机、遏制战争、打赢战争。

　　“如果你想要和平，那就要做好打仗的准备。”党的十九大代表王金龙担任指导员的中部战区陆军某旅“大功三连”，战争年代打出了赫赫威名，新时期，连队常年担负旅应急战备值班任务，始终保持箭在弦上、引而待发的战备状态。他认为，邦境不安，忘战必危。世界上的事情总是那样，你准备不好，敌人就来了；你准备好了，敌人反而不敢来。战争与和平的辩证法告诉我们，能战方能止战，准备打才可能不必打，越不能打越可能挨打。

　　“要把‘战’字刻在心头，持续强化‘随时准备上战场’的责任意识，将练兵备战的职责深深刻入脑海、成为自觉行动。”陆军航空兵某旅旅长崔佳彬说，真正做到一旦有事能快速反应，坚决完成党中央、中央军委和习主席赋予的任务，坚决维护国家主权、安全、发展利益。

　　狠抓实战化军事训练，提高打赢本领

　　中国特色社会主义进入了新时代，国防和军队建设也进入了新时代。

　　官兵们认为，新时代要求军队必须具备新的能力，而要具备新的能力，就必须大抓实战化训练。

　　“习主席在视察军委联指中心时指出，要着力深化实战化军事训练，坚持仗怎么打兵就怎么练，打仗需要什么就苦练什么，把官兵积极性、主动性、创造性充分激发出来，在全军兴起大抓军事训练热潮。”党的十九大代表、空军航空兵某团团长刘锐说，“这一点令我印象最为深刻，军队只有狠抓实战化军事训练，提高打赢本领，才能担负起党和人民赋予的新时代使命任务。”

　　刘锐所在团是空军首支改装轰—6K的航空兵部队，是空军远程进攻作战的重要力量。党的十九大闭幕之后的这一段时间，他除了宣讲党的十九大精神，其他所有时间都铆在训练场。几天前，他组织实施了团队历史上最大规模的跨区域机动作战训练，从昼间到后半夜，从战斗起飞到超低空，从陆上到海上，一路走一路打，跨越多个陌生区域和多个机场，持续9个多小时，航程近5000公里……

　　南部战区陆军第74集团军某合成旅“黄草岭功臣连”目前正在苦练精兵，迎接即将到来的集团军年终考核。指导员陈骁文认为，习主席视察军委联指中心，从军委这一层把备战打仗的指挥棒立起来，从军委主席这一级亮明狠抓实战化军事训练，提高打赢本领的鲜明态度，我们基层官兵没有理由不做好。我们一定要把思想和行动统一到习主席备战打仗的重要指示上来，努力锻造召之即来、来之能战、战之必胜的精兵劲旅。

　　坚持问题导向，抓实备战工作

　　中华民族伟大复兴绝不是轻轻松松、敲锣打鼓就能实现的，建设世界一流军队的宏伟目标同样面临十分严峻的挑战。

　　中部战区某信息通信旅政委李克亮认为，我们要严格按照习主席重要指示要求，坚持问题导向，一抓到底，在解决一个一个实际问题中推动备战工作落实。要建立严格的责任制，强化督导问责，一级抓一级，一级带一级，把备战打仗工作严起来。

　　“战场是实打实的较量，打仗是硬碰硬的对决。”党的十九大代表、海军舰载战斗机飞行员曹先建创造了身负重伤419天后、术后复飞仅仅70天，驾驶歼—15战机成功着舰的奇迹，“这几年，全军大抓训风演风考风，向军事训练中的‘和平积弊’宣战，在演习中敢于暴露问题、敢于自我解剖，出台了一系列硬性措施，有效推进部队战斗力建设。”

　　第80集团军某旅官兵在认真学习习主席的讲话后认为，我们一定要按照习主席嘱托，强化忧患意识、危机意识、打仗意识，全部心思向打仗聚焦，各项工作向打仗用劲，尽快把备战打仗能力搞上去。

　　结合未来形势任务，军事科学院、国防大学、国防科技大学的专家学者认为，要以习主席视察军委联合作战指挥中心的重要指示为指引，着力创新战争和作战筹划，紧跟战争形态和作战方式演变，紧贴作战任务、作战对手、作战环境，大兴作战问题研究之风。

　　习主席强烈的使命担当，鲜明的备战打仗态度，鼓舞着全军和武警部队的广大官兵。官兵们表示，一定要牢固树立战斗力这个唯一的根本的标准，全部心思向打仗聚焦，各项工作向打仗用劲，圆满完成党和人民赋予的新时代使命任务！

Reference (1) Www.xinhuanet.com/2017-11/04/c_1121906230.htm

Reference (2) http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1105/c1011-29627206.html

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信息安全技術-個人信息安全規範 – China’s “Information Security Technology Personal Information Security Specification” in Four Aspects

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信息安全技術-個人信息安全規範 –

China’s “Information Security Technology Personal Information Security Specification” in Four Aspects

On December 11th, 2017, there were two kinds of mobile phone APPs, Baidu and Baidu, which were owned by Baidu. They included “listening phone”, “reading short MMS”, “reading contacts”, etc. involving consumer personal information. In the case of security related rights and refusal to rectify the situation, the Jiangsu Provincial Consumer Protection Committee initiated a consumer civil public interest litigation concerning suspected illegal access to consumer personal information and related issues by Beijing Baidu.com, which was held on January 2 of this year in Nanjing. The Intermediate People’s Court has formally opened the case. On January 6th, with the fermentation of Alipay’s annual billing event, the State Administration of Cybernetics Network Security Coordination Bureau interviewed relevant persons in charge of Alipay (China) Network Technology Co., Ltd. and Sesame Credit Management Co., Ltd. and pointed out that Alipay, The way in which sesame credits collect personal information does not conform to the spirit of the National Standard for Information Security Technology and Personal Information Security. It violates the promise of the Personal Information Protection Initiative that it signed shortly and should strictly follow the Cyber Security Law. The following is called the “net security law” requirements, strengthen the comprehensive investigation of the platform, carry out special rectification, and take effective measures to prevent similar incidents from happening again. Since the official implementation of the “Network Security Law”, the National People’s Congress, Industry and Information Technology, Internet Information, Internet Security, and Consumers’ Association systems have launched a series of special inspections and rectifications of personal information throughout the country. At the same time, they have also strengthened punishments for violations of laws and regulations. The public’s emphasis on the protection of personal information.

　　However, because of the principle, fuzziness and fragmentation of legal norms and local regulatory policies, many articles lack detailed rules for landing, which brings great confusion to many network operators’ personal information compliance work. On December 29 last year, the China National Standardization Administration officially issued the “Information Security Technology Personal Information Security Specification” (hereinafter referred to as the “Safety Code”). On January 24, the national standard full-text publication system officially announced the full text of the specification, and It will be implemented on May 1, 2018. The “Safety Code” clarifies the compliance requirements for the collection, preservation, use, and sharing of personal information in the form of national standards, and provides guidelines for network operators to formulate privacy policies and improve internal controls.

　　”Safety Regulations”

　　Related legal concepts

　　Based on the existing principles and provisions of the “Net Security Law”, the “Safety Regulations” specifies the specific definitions of relevant legal concepts in light of the specific issues that network operators are concerned about in practice.

　　First, regarding personal sensitive information, the “Guide to the Protection of Personal Information in Information and Security Technology Public and Commercial Service Information Systems” implemented in 2013 defined personal sensitive information as personal information that would adversely affect the personal information subject after being exposed or modified. At the same time, it is recommended that the specific content of personal sensitive information in various industries be determined based on the willingness of the personal information subject to the service and their respective business characteristics. The “Safety Regulations” further emphasizes in the definition that the disclosure of personal sensitive information, illegal provision or misuse may endanger the safety of people and property, cause personal reputation, physical and mental health damage or discriminatory treatment and other serious consequences, and in Appendix B A specific example of personal sensitive information was drawn up, linking up with the data classification obligations stipulated in Article 21 of the “Network Security Law”.

　　Secondly, regarding the collection of personal information, the “Safety Regulations” defines three types of “collection” as the provision of personal information subjects, automatic collection by network operators, and indirect acquisition from third parties. At the same time, exceptions are stipulated and individuals are acquired at terminals. Information not returned to the operator’s server does not belong to “collection.”

　　Finally, with respect to the anonymization and de-identification of personal information, the “Safety Code” distinguishes the two. The anonymized information cannot be restored and is no longer part of personal information; de-identification processing guarantees Personal information can’t identify the main body of information without relying on additional information, but it still retains the granularity of the individual and uses pseudonyms, encryption, hash functions, etc. instead of the original personal information. In addition, on August 15 last year, the “Information Security Technology Personal Information De-identification Guide” was released for solicitation of public opinions. The contents involved the process of de-identification and technical applications. Currently, the network operators are implementing the personal information during the review stage. Marking work is worth learning from.

　　Collection of personal information

　　The “Safety Regulations” stipulates that the collection of personal information should comply with the requirements of legality and minimization. Among them, the requirements for authorization to obtain personal information indirectly and the explicit consent requirements for collecting personal sensitive information are worthy of attention.

　　When obtaining personal information indirectly, the company as the recipient is obliged to require the provider to explain the source of the relevant personal information and confirm its legitimacy. At the same time, it should also understand the scope of the personal information subject’s authorization to the provider, including the purpose of use and the individual. Whether the information subject is authorized to consent to the transfer, sharing, public disclosure, etc. If the recipient handles personal information beyond the above-mentioned range, it shall also obtain the explicit consent of the personal information subject within a reasonable time limit. Establishing an authorization consent model for indirect collection of personal information is one of the highlights of the Personal Information Collection section of the “Safety Code”. This model reinforces the review obligation of information receivers and increases the corresponding compliance costs.

　　In the collection of personal sensitive information, first of all, the “Safety Code” further requires the express consent of the personal information subject on the basis of the “Net Security Law” to be a voluntary, concrete, clear and clear wish given by the individual on the basis of full knowledge. Representation; Second, if the personal information controller collects personal sensitive information for the core business functions of its products or services, it shall explicitly inform the information subject of the core business functions it provides, the personal sensitive information it needs to collect, and the personal information subject. Three choices of rights; Finally, if personal information controllers collect personal sensitive information for other additional functions, they should clearly inform specific additional functions and the right to choose personal information, but refuse personal sensitive information required for additional functions. It does not mean that the core business functions have stopped providing.

　　Sharing of personal information

　　When entrusting a third party to process personal information, apart from the fact that the commissioning itself must not exceed the scope of the authorized consent of the personal information subject, the “Safety Code” also stipulates that the personal information controller should carry out personal information security impact assessment and take the responsibility of the contract. Obligation, auditing, etc. supervise the trustee and ensure accurate recording and preservation of the trustee’s handling of personal information.

　　With respect to the sharing and transfer of personal information, the “Safety Code” also stipulates the obligations of the personal information controller on the security impact assessment. At the same time, the personal information controller shall notify the personal information subject of the purpose of sharing, transferring the personal information, and the type of the data receiver. In the case of personal sensitive information, the type of sensitive information, the identity of the recipient of the data, and the security capabilities should also be notified, and sharing or transfer may be made only after obtaining the explicit consent of the personal information subject. In addition, personal information controllers need to accurately record and preserve the sharing and transfer of personal information, and bear the legal responsibility for the harm caused by sharing and transferring personal information to the legitimate rights and interests of the information subject. Where changes in the controlling body occur due to mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, etc., they shall individually notify the subject of personal information.

　　With regard to the cross-border transmission of personal information, the “Safety Code” requires that personal information controllers should conduct security assessments in accordance with the standards set by the Network Information Office and relevant departments. According to the “Personal Information and Important Data Outbound Security Assessment Methodology (Exposure Draft)” published in April last year, network operators should organize their own data outbound security assessment before leaving the country and be responsible for the results if they contain or accumulate 500,000. If the personal information above the person or the personal information provided by the key information infrastructure is provided to the outside, it shall also be reported to the industry supervisor or the supervisory authority for organizing the safety assessment. The Guidelines for Outbound Security Assessment of Information Security Technology Data (Draft for Solicitation of Comments) (hereinafter referred to as the “Evaluation Guide”) issued by the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee on August 30 last year are also worthy of attention. The Assessment Guide clearly indicates the data. The use scope and exceptions of outbound security assessments are to refine the types of personal information and important data, increase the disclosure obligation of network operators for personal information, distinguish security self-assessment and assessment processes of competent authorities, and implement personal information for personal information controllers. Cross-border transmission provides a reference.

　　Safety management requirements

　　Since its implementation, NetEase has given network operators many security protection obligations. One of them is the development of internal security management systems and operational procedures to implement the network security protection responsibilities. Specifically, the “security regulations” include three. Aspects. First, the responsible departments and personnel should be clarified. According to the “Safety Regulations”, personal information controllers that meet certain conditions in terms of business, personnel scale, and personal information processing volume should establish full-time personal information protection managers and work agencies so that The specific implementation of personal information security work prevents personal information from being leaked, damaged or lost. Second, a personnel management and training system should be established. According to the “Safety Regulations”, personal information controllers should sign confidentiality agreements with employees engaged in personal information processing positions and conduct background checks to clarify the safety responsibilities of related positions and the occurrence of security incidents. Penalty mechanism, while conducting regular professional training and assessment, to ensure that relevant employees have the privacy policy and regulatory processes. Third, a personal information security impact assessment and audit system should be developed to assess potential risks and adverse impacts in the processing of personal information, form an assessment report for inspection by relevant parties, and establish an automated auditing system to monitor and record personal information processing activities. Handle the illegal use and abuse of personal information in the audit process in a timely manner.

　　Conclusion

　　The formal issuance of the “Safety Code” ended the situation in which there were many personal information protection principles and the lack of specific measures since the implementation of the “Net Security Law.” This answer the confusion of the Internet companies, and in the appendix, it is the subject of personal information. The agreed-upon functional interface and privacy policy templates have provided a complete compliance and risk control policy for the provision of network products and services. Although the “Safety Code” number is displayed as a national recommendation, in practice, the review of the privacy policy conducted by the four departments of the Network Information Office, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the Ministry of Public Security last year was mainly based on the “Safety Regulations” solicitation opinion draft. When the Information Office interviewed Alipay about the annual billing event, it also emphasized the validity of the “Safety Regulations.” These events all reflected the importance of the “Safety Rules” for improving the personal information protection system. The majority of network operators should make efforts to collect, save, use, and share personal information, improve internal management and privacy policy formulation to cope with the rigorous regulatory situation.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

2017年12月11日，就百度旗下“手機百度”、“百度瀏覽器”等兩款手機APP存在“監聽電話”、“讀取短彩信”、“讀取聯繫人”等涉及消費者個人信息安全的相關權限且拒不整改的情形，江蘇省消費者權益保護委員會就北京百度網訊科技有限公司涉嫌違法獲取消費者個人信息及相關問題提起消費民事公益訴訟，今年1月2日，南京市中級人民法院已正式立案。 1月6日，隨著“支付寶年度賬單事件”的發酵，國家網信辦網絡安全協調局約談了支付寶（中國）網絡技術有限公司、芝麻信用管理有限公司的有關負責人並指出，支付寶、芝麻信用收集使用個人信息的方式，不符合《信息安全技術個人信息安全規範》國家標準的精神，違背了其前不久簽署的《個人信息保護倡議》的承諾，應嚴格按照《網絡安全法》（以下稱“《網安法》”）的要求，加強對平台的全面排查，進行專項整頓，切實採取有效措施，防止類似事件再次發生。自《網安法》正式實施以來，人大、工信、網信、網安以及消協系統，在全國各地掀起了一系列個人信息專項檢查、整治行動，處罰違法違規行為的同時，也加強了社會公眾對個人信息保護的重視程度。

然而，由於法律規範及各地監管政策的原則性、模糊化及碎片化，很多條文缺乏落地的細則，這就給很多網絡運營者個人信息合規工作帶來極大的困惑。去年12月29日，中國國家標準化管理委員會正式發布《信息安全技術個人信息安全規範》（以下稱“《安全規範》”），1月24日，國家標準全文公開系統正式對外公佈規範全文，並將於2018年5月1日起實施。《安全規範》以國家標準的形式，明確了個人信息的收集、保存、使用、共享的合規要求，為網絡運營者制定隱私政策及完善內控提供了指引。

《安全規範》的具體規定

相關法律概念

《安全規範》在《網安法》已有的原則性規定的基礎上針對網絡運營者在實踐中關注的具體問題，明確了相關法律概念的具體定義。

首先，關於個人敏感信息，2013年實施的《信息安全技術公共及商用服務信息系統個人信息保護指南》將個人敏感信息定義為在遭受洩露或修改後會對個人信息主體造成不良影響的個人信息，同時建議各行業個人敏感信息的具體內容根據接受服務的個人信息主體意願和各自業務特點確定。《安全規範》則在定義中進一步強調了個人敏感信息被洩露、非法提供或濫用可能危害人身、財產安全，致使個人名譽、身心健康受到損害或歧視性待遇等嚴重後果，並在附錄B中給出了個人敏感信息的具體示例，銜接了《網安法》第二十一條規定的數據分類義務。

其次，關於個人信息的收集，《安全規範》將個人信息主體主動提供、網絡運營者自動採集以及從第三方間接獲取等三種方式定義為“收集”，同時規定了例外情形，在終端獲取個人信息但不回傳至運營者服務器的，不屬於“收集”。

最後，關於個人信息的匿名化與去標識化，《安全規範》將兩者區別開來，經匿名化處理後的信息無法復原，也不再屬於個人信息之列；而去標識化處理則保證了個人信息在不借助額外信息的情況下，無法識別信息主體，但依舊保留了個人顆粒度，採用假名、加密、哈希函數等手段替代了原有個人信息的標識。此外，去年8月15日，《信息安全技術個人信息去標識化指南》徵求意見稿發布，內容涉及去標識化的過程及技術應用等，目前已在送審階段，網絡運營者在落實個人信息去標識化工作時值得借鑒。

個人信息的收集

《安全規範》規定個人信息收集應遵循合法性要求和最小化要求，其中，間接獲取個人信息的授權同意要求和收集個人敏感信息的明示同意要求值得關注。

在間接獲取個人信息時，作為接收方的企業有義務要求提供方對相關個人信息的來源進行說明並確認其合法性，同時還應當了解個人信息主體對於提供方的授權範圍，包括使用目的、個人信息主體是否授權同意轉讓、共享、公開披露等內容，若接收方處理個人信息超出上述範圍的，還應在合理期限內另行徵得個人信息主體的明示同意。確立間接收集個人信息的授權同意模式是《安全規範》有關個人信息收集部分的亮點之一，這一模式強化了信息接收方的審查義務，增加了相應的合規成本。

在收集個人敏感信息方面，首先，《安全規範》在《網安法》的基礎上進一步要求個人信息主體的明示同意是其在完全知情的基礎上自願給出的、具體的、清晰明確的願望表示；其次，若個人信息控制者收集個人敏感信息用於其產品或服務的核心業務功能，則應當明確告知信息主體其所提供的核心業務功能、所需收集的個人敏感信息和個人信息主體的選擇權三項內容；最後，若個人信息控制者收集個人敏感信息用於其他附加功能的，則應當明確告知具體的附加功能和個人信息主體的選擇權，但拒絕附加功能所需的個人敏感信息並不意味著核心業務功能的停止提供。

個人信息的分享

在委託第三方處理個人信息時，除委託行為本身不得超出個人信息主體授權同意的範圍之外，《安全規範》還明確規定，個人信息控制者應當開展個人信息安全影響評估，並採取合同約定責任義務、審計等方式對受託者進行監督，保證準確記錄和保存受託者處理個人信息的情況。

關於個人信息的共享與轉讓，《安全規範》同樣規定了個人信息控制者的安全影響評估義務，同時個人信息控制者應當向個人信息主體告知共享、轉讓個人信息的目的、數據接收方類型，涉及個人敏感信息的，還應當告知敏感信息的類型、數據接收方的身份和安全能力等，在事先徵得個人信息主體明示同意後方可共享或轉讓。此外，個人信息控制者需準確記錄和保存個人信息共享和轉讓情況，承擔因共享、轉讓個人信息對信息主體合法權益造成損害的法律責任。因併購、重組等發生控制主體變更的，應當單獨向個人信息主體告知有關情況。

關於個人信息的跨境傳輸，《安全規範》要求個人信息控制者應按照網信辦會同相關部門製定的標准進行安全評估。根據去年4月發布的《個人信息和重要數據出境安全評估辦法（徵求意見稿）》，網絡運營者在數據出境前應自行組織數據出境安全評估，並對結果負責，若含有或累計含有50萬人以上個人信息以及由關鍵信息基礎設施對外提供個人信息的，還應報請行業主管或監管部門組織安全評估。去年8月30日由全國信息安全標準化技術委員會公佈的《信息安全技術數據出境安全評估指南（徵求意見稿）》（以下稱“《評估指南》”）同樣值得關注，《評估指南》明示了數據出境安全評估的使用範圍及例外，細化個人信息及重要數據的類型，增加了網絡運營者個人信息出境的告知義務，區分安全自評估與主管部門評估流程，為個人信息控制者俱體落實個人信息跨境傳輸提供了參考依據。

安全管理要求

《網安法》自實施以來，賦予了網絡運營者諸多安全保護義務，其中之一便是製定內部安全管理制度和操作規程，落實網絡安全保護責任，具體到《安全規範》中，主要包括三個方面。第一，應當明確責任部門與人員，根據《安全規範》，在業務、人員規模、個人信息處理量等方面滿足特定條件的個人信息控制者，應設立專職的個人信息保護負責人和工作機構以便個人信息安全工作的具體實施，防止個人信息的洩露、損毀、丟失。第二，應當構建人員管理與培訓制度，根據《安全規範》，個人信息控制者應當與從事個人信息處理崗位的員工簽署保密協議並進行背景審查，明確相關崗位的安全職責和發生安全事件後的處罰機制，同時定期開展專業化培訓和考核，確保相關員工掌握隱私政策和規章流程。第三，應當開展個人信息安全影響評估與審計製度，評估個人信息處理過程中可能產生的風險與不利影響，形成評估報告以供相關方查閱，同時建立自動化審計系統，監測記錄個人信息處理活動，及時處理審計過程中個人信息違規使用、濫用等情況。

結語

《安全規範》的正式發布結束了《網安法》實施以來個人信息保護原則性規定較多而具體措施欠缺的局面，解答了廣大互聯網企業的困惑，其在附錄部分更是製作了個人信息主體授權同意的功能界面和隱私政策的模板，使得網絡產品和服務的提供有了完備的合規和風控政策。雖然《安全規範》編號顯示為國家推薦標準，但在實踐中，去年網信辦、工信部、公安部等四部門開展的隱私政策評審工作主要以《安全規範》徵求意見稿為依據，今年年初網信辦就年度賬單事件約談支付寶時，也再次強調了《安全規範》的準據效力，上述事件均從側面反映了《安全規範》對於完善個人信息保護製度的重要性。廣大網絡運營者應發力個人信息的收集、保存、使用、分享等多個方面，完善內部管理與隱私政策制定，以應對趨於嚴格的監管形勢。

Source: http://new.qq.com/omn/20180201/20180201B07GLP.htm

Red Dragon 1949 / 紅龍1949

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信息安全技術-個人信息安全規範 – China’s “Information Security Technology Personal Information Security Specification” in Four Aspects

信息安全技術-個人信息安全規範 –

中國網絡衝突討論，信息與研究 // Chinese Cyber Conflict Discussions, Information & Research