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China’s One Belt One Road Justification for PLA Expeditionary Deployment // 中國解放軍遠征部署的一帶一路理由

09/25/2018 admin Leave a comment

China’s One Belt One Road Justification for PLA Expeditionary Deployment // 中國解放軍遠征部署的一帶一路理由

By National Defense University Professor Lieutenant General Qiao Lang 責任編輯︰姜紫微

“One Belt, One Road” cannot open up safety awareness

The Chinese have a problem, they like to talk about strategy, they don’t like to talk about strategies; they like to talk about goals, they don’t like to talk about indicators, so the final result is big and big. If there is no strategy, there is no possibility that this strategy will be realized. If there are targets and no indicators, then to what extent is this goal achieved? This time, the “One Belt and One Road” was proposed. The most worrying thing is that the thunder is loud and the rain is small. The talk is vigorous and vigorous, and finally it is gone. We have done this kind of thing many times, I hope this time is not. Because if the “Belt and Road” fails, it can be a very heavy blow to the revival of the Chinese economy and even the Chinese nation.

Many officials now talk about the “Belt and Road” without talking about security issues, nor about political issues, and no one talking about military issues. Some officials even emphasized that the “Belt and Road” has no political appeals and no ideological appeals. It is entirely an economic behavior. This kind of statement, if it is propaganda to countries along the line, is ok, because strategic intentions always have to be concealed. You say to others that I came with political intentions, with ideological intentions, who? Still accepting you? This is very necessary from the external publicity. However, if this becomes the consciousness of our officials, it is a big mistake. External propaganda said that we have no political demands, no ideological appeals, no military appeals, no geopolitical demands. Our only consideration is to develop the economy, mutual benefit and win-win. It is not wrong to use it as a propaganda, but it must not become our own consciousness. .

Now I feel that some officials really want to exclude these things. When he says these words, he has already excluded the political demands that are inevitable in the “One Belt, One Road” strategic concept in his own consciousness, especially geopolitics. Appeals, as well as security claims and ideological appeals. In fact, no matter whether you are prepared to “export revolution”, President Xi has repeatedly said that China does not export revolutions, but since we now emphasize Chinese values, there is no doubt that you will export your values through the “Belt and Road”. Then, this value output is actually an ideology output. In addition, in the process of advancing the “Belt and Road”, if you do not have political appeals, you do not have political binding with countries along the route, which will put you in an insecure state. In particular, the “one belt” of the land is accompanied by a very complicated factor, the so-called “Ottoman Wall”. That is, in the 15th century, the Ottoman Empire conquered the Byzantine capital of Constantinople, and its enormous empire became the “Ottoman Wall” that blocked the East and West. 300 years later, with the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, and the “Ottoman Wall” collapsed, but if you follow this path, the places along the way are all Islamic worlds. This means that the implied “Ottoman Wall” is still there. How to break through this invisible wall? Your values are different from those of the Islamic world. Don’t expect that you can completely tie everyone together by simply bundling economic interests. You know, those Islamic countries may just want to make a profit, and then take advantage of it before you open it. What should I do at that time? The biggest lesson for Chinese companies to go out is that after economic cooperation with those countries, people will open us after they have benefited, or they may not open our intentions subjectively, but the objective situation has changed. For example, in Sudan, we invested in it.

The West has to give us trouble. Then there are people in the local area who messed up with us. We bite our heads and start to fail to make a big impact on us. We should earn the money we earned. At this time, the Americans are paying their salaries and turning the Sudan into a North and South Sudan. We are dumbfounded. Your investment is in North Sudan, and the oil field is in South Sudan. At this time, you must suffer losses. However, we Chinese have a very strong ability, which is the ability to “engage” relations. Although the Sudan has split, we have “taken the way” to win South Sudan. It is said that the North and South Sudan will let you take it, should it be able to settle? But the United States has provoked the civil war in South Sudan, and the final goal is to make your investment in this place squander. This is just one example. In fact, our cooperation with all countries, the United States that the United States does not participate in, must oppose. The final outcome is that we have lost in many places, which is why we lacked the necessary security awareness from the beginning.

Original Mandarin Chinese :

“一帶一路”不能甩開安全意識

中國人有一個毛病，喜歡談戰略，不喜歡談策略；喜歡談目標，不喜歡談指標，這樣談來談去最後的結果就都是大而化之。有戰略沒有策略，這個戰略就沒有實現的可能性，有目標沒有指標，那這個目標實現到什麼程度算是實現？這次提出“一帶一路”，最擔心的就是雷聲大、雨點小，談得轟轟烈烈，最後不了了之。這樣的事情我們已經干過多次，但願這次不是。因為如果“一帶一路”失敗的話，那對于中國經濟甚至中華民族的復興都可能是非常沉重的打擊。

現在有很多官員談“一帶一路”都不談安全問題，也不談政治問題，更沒有人談軍事問題。甚至有些官員專門強調，“一帶一路”沒有政治訴求，沒有意識形態訴求，完全是一種經濟行為。這種說法，如果是對沿線國家的宣傳，是可以的，因為戰略意圖總是要有隱蔽性的，你對人家說我是帶著政治意圖來的，帶著意識形態意圖來的，那誰還接受你？這從對外宣傳上講是非常必要的。但是，假如這成了我們官員的自身意識，就大錯特錯了。對外宣傳說我們沒有政治訴求，沒有意識形態訴求，沒有軍事訴求，沒有地緣訴求，我們唯一的考慮就是發展經濟，互利共贏，把它作為一個宣傳口徑沒有錯，但是絕對不能變成我們自身的意識。現在感覺有些官員是真的要排除這些東西，當他說出這些話的時候，就已經在自己的意識中排除“一帶一路”戰略構想中不可避免地內含著的政治訴求，特別是地緣政治訴求，以及安全訴求、意識形態訴求。實際上，不管你準不準備“輸出革命”，習主席多次講到，中國不輸出革命，可是既然我們現在強調中國價值觀，毫無疑問你會通過“一帶一路”輸出自己的價值觀。那麼，這個價值觀輸出其實就是一種意識形態輸出。另外，在推進“一帶一路”的進程中，如果你沒有政治訴求，你沒有與沿線國家的政治綁定，這將使你處于不安全狀態。尤其是陸路的“一帶”，幾乎全程伴有一個非常復雜的因素，就是所謂的“奧斯曼牆”。即15世紀奧斯曼帝國攻克拜佔庭首都君士坦丁堡，使其龐大的帝國之軀成了阻斷東西方的“奧斯曼牆”。300年後，隨著第一次世界大戰的結束，奧斯曼帝國解體，“奧斯曼牆”轟然倒塌，但是如果你沿這條路走下去，沿途所經之地，全都是伊斯蘭世界。這就意味著隱含的“奧斯曼牆”還在。如何去突破這個隱形之牆？你的價值觀和伊斯蘭世界的價值觀不同，不要指望僅僅靠經濟利益的捆綁，就能把大家完全拴在一起。要知道，那些伊斯蘭國家也可能只想獲利，獲了利之後再把你踹開。那個時候怎麼辦？中國企業走出去，我們最大的教訓，就是跟那些國家進行經濟合作之後，人家得利後把我們甩開，或者人家主觀上可能並沒有甩開我們的意圖，但是客觀情況發生了變化。比如蘇丹，我們投資進去了，西方要給我們搗亂，然後當地也有人給我們搞亂，我們硬著頭皮頂住，開始沒給我們造成太大的影響，我們該掙的錢還是掙到了。這時美國人釜底抽薪，把蘇丹變成南北蘇丹，我們傻眼了，你的投資在北蘇丹，而油田在南蘇丹，這個時候，你肯定要受損失。但我們中國人有一項很強的能力，就是攻無不克的“搞關系”的能力，雖然蘇丹分裂了，但是我們“想辦法”把南蘇丹也拿下。按說，南北蘇丹都讓你拿下，應該能擺平了吧？可美國又挑起了南蘇丹的內戰，最後的目標就是讓你在這個地方的投資打水漂。這只是其中一例。實際上我們與所有國家的合作，凡是美國沒有參與的美國都要反對。最後的結局是我們在很多地方都鎩羽而歸，這是我們一開始就缺乏必要的安全意識所致。

“One Belt” is the main one, and “One Road” is the supplement.

Now, we have started a new round of “going out” strategic action. I have suffered so much in the past. Should I accept some lessons?

How to go “One Belt, One Road”? The author believes that we should take a multi-pronged approach, and we should let politics and diplomacy go ahead and the military back. Rather than letting the company go out on its own, it is almost impossible for the company to go out alone.　

From now on, the “Belt and Road” seems to be a two-line attack, both sides. In fact, the “band” is the main one, and the “road” is secondary. Because you want to take the “road” as the main direction, you will die. Because of the sea route, a scholar from the American War College recently wrote an article saying that they have found a way to deal with China, that is, as long as the sea passage is cut off, China will die. Although this statement is somewhat large, it cannot be said that there is absolutely no reason at all, because the United States now has this capability from the military. This also confirms from the opposite side that in the choice of the primary and secondary direction of the “Belt and Road”, we should determine who is the main road and who is the auxiliary road. If the “Belt and Road” is likened to a combat operation, then “all the way” is the auxiliary direction, and the “one belt” is the main direction.

Therefore, for us, what really matters in the future is how to manage the “one area” problem, rather than the “one way” problem. Then, the operation of the “Belt” will first face a relationship with the countries along the route, that is, how to first open up the relationship with the countries along the route. Judging from our current practice, it is obviously not enough to ensure the smooth and smooth operation of the “Belt and Road”. why? We used to always like to deal with the government, like to deal with the ruling party, like to deal with the rich people in this country, who is dealing with who is in position, who has money to deal with who. In this case, it will be difficult to succeed. In fact, what is the work we are going to do? It is necessary to deal with the government, with the ruling party, with the opposition party, and more importantly, with the tribal elders in the entire “Belt”. These tribal elders are often much more influential than the opposition parties and the ruling party. What we can do in the Taliban-occupied areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan is almost always achieved through tribal elders, and basically nothing can be done through the government. Therefore, our foreign ministry and our enterprises cannot ignore the important relationships in these regions.

Why not Latin America and Japan “take in”?

“One Belt, One Road” has another problem that no one has touched until today. It is the question in some people’s hearts. Does China want to use the “Belt and Road” to exclude the United States? There is no doubt that the United States plays a chaotic role in almost all international organizations and international operations in which it does not participate. As long as it doesn’t play a leading role, even if it’s not the initiator, it will give you trouble. Take a look at APEC. Why is there a TPP after APEC? It is because the United States finds itself unable to play a leading role in APEC, it must do another set and start a new stove. If the “Belt and Road” completely excludes the United States, it will make the United States spare no effort to suppress it, and since the United States is not in it, it will not be scrupulous if it is suppressed, because it has no interest in it, so it will be unscrupulous and unscrupulous when it is suppressed. Soft hands.

Therefore, the author believes that China’s “Belt and Road” should skillfully include the United States. It should allow US investment banks, US investment institutions, and American technology to play a role in the “Belt and Road” to complete the “Belt and Road” approach to the United States. Bundle. After completing this bundle, the United States will vote for it when it starts. Take a look at China and the United States to fight for economic shackles and trade, why do they end up every time? It is because the economic interests of China and the United States are very closely tied to each other. Every time the United States wants to impose sanctions or punishment on a certain industry or enterprise in China, there must be a related out-of-hospital system in which the United States and our enterprise are bound together. The group went to Congress to lobby and finally let it die. Therefore, we must let the United States enter this interest bundle. In terms of capital and technology, the “Belt and Road” should not only exclude the United States, but also pull it in and complete the bundling of it.

From this I think that we can’t even exclude Japan. Can’t think that who is not good with us, make trouble with us, I will set aside to open you up. In fact, this is not good for the other side, and it is not good for yourself. Once you open it, it will be unscrupulous when you hit it. Only when its interests are in it, it will only be scrupulous when it hits you, and it will be careful to protect its interests. And if the benefits are completely tied, it can’t be picked up, so I think this is something we must consider.

“One Belt, One Road” to lead the reform of the Chinese army

Up to now, there is no precise strategic positioning for our country, and the national strategy is somewhat vague. As a result, various so-called “strategies” emerge in an endless stream. What is most screaming in 2014 is not the “Belt and Road”. What is it? It is China’s desire to become a major ocean power and to launch China’s marine development strategy. What kind of marine development strategy do you want? Some people say that they have to break through the three island chains and go out to the Pacific. What are you going to the Pacific Ocean? Have we thought about it? Think through it? If you don’t think through it, you shouldn’t put forward a strategy that is extremely hard to burn and has no results. Now that we have proposed the “Belt and Road”, we suddenly discovered that what we need more is the Army’s expeditionary ability. So what is our Army today? The Chinese closed their doors and thought that the Chinese Army was the best in the world. The British military leader Montgomery said that whoever wants to play against the Chinese army on land is a fool. The Americans’ conclusion from the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is that the Chinese must not tolerate the military boots of American soldiers on the land of China. This is no problem. The Chinese Army has no problem with its existing capabilities to protect the country. However, once faced with the “Belt and Road”, the task of the Chinese Army is not to defend the country, which requires you to have the ability to display the land expedition along the way. Because the light is on land, there are 22 countries that can count. This requires us to have to go to the sword. Instead of invading others, we must be able to protect our own national interests across borders.

The last point is how to focus on the development of military power. If we have made it clear that the “one belt” is the main direction, it is not just an effort to develop the navy. The Navy must of course develop according to the needs of the country, and the problem that is now emerging is precisely how to strengthen the Army’s expeditionary capabilities. There are no more problems in China’s more than one million army, and there is no problem in defending the country. Is there any problem in going abroad to fight? Are we now in the right direction for the Army? Is it reasonable? When the world is now abandoning heavy tanks, we are still proud of the heavy tanks we have just produced. In what areas will these things be used in the future? In the entire “one belt” road, heavy tanks have no room for development. The heavy tanks of the former Soviet Union allowed the guerrillas to knock casually in Afghanistan. Why? Where can you go in all the ravines? The tank can’t fly anymore. In the end, the people take the rocket launcher and aim at one. It is all one, and it will kill you all. Therefore, the Army’s combat capability must be re-enhanced, that is, to strengthen its long-range delivery capability and long-range strike capability. In this regard, the author thinks that we are far from realizing it, and it is even more impossible. If the Army does not have the ability to go abroad, in the future, in any “one area”, if there is civil strife or war in any country, China needs support, and we need to protect our facilities and interests along the way, the Army can go, Is it useful? This is a question we must think about today.

So what should the Army do? The author believes that the Chinese Army must fly and must achieve aviation aviation, which means a revolution in the entire Chinese Army. Today, when we talk about the reform of the military system, if you don’t know the country’s strategy at all, don’t know the country’s needs, and close the door to reform, what kind of army will you reform? What is the relationship between this army and national interests? If you don’t start from the national interests and needs, just draw your own scoops like the US military’s gourd, take it for granted that you should be an army, but the country does not need such an army, but needs a development demand with the country. Match the army, what do you do then? Therefore, if we don’t understand what the country’s needs are, and don’t know where the country’s interests are, we will close the door to carry out reforms. What kind of army will this change? The author believes that the “Belt and Road” is a huge drag on the reform of the Chinese military with national interests and needs. It is through the strategic design of the “Belt and Road” that the country has determined its strategic needs for the military. The conclusion is: China must have a stronger army, and a navy and air force that can work together and act in concert, an army, navy, and air force that can cross the country’s expedition, and still have thousands of miles away. With sufficient support and combat capability of the Expeditionary Force, we can make the “Belt and Road” truly secure in terms of security, thus ensuring the ultimate realization of this ambitious goal.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

“一帶”為主，“一路”為輔

現在，我們又開始新一輪的“走出去”戰略行動了，前面吃了那麼多苦頭，總該接受點教訓吧？

“一帶一路”怎麼走？筆者認為應該多管齊下，應該讓政治、外交先行，軍事做後盾。而不是讓企業自己單打獨斗走出去，凡是企業單獨走出去的幾乎就沒有能夠全身而退的。

從現在來看，“一帶一路”好像是兩線出擊，雙路並舉。其實，“帶”是主要的，“路”是次要的。因為你要是以“路”為主攻方向，你就死定了。因為海路這一條，美國戰爭學院的一個學者最近專門撰文，說他們已經找到了對付中國的辦法，就是只要掐斷海上通道，中國就死定了。這話雖然說的有些大，但也不能說完全沒有一點道理，因為美國眼下從軍事上講確有這個能力。這也從反面印證，在“一帶一路”主次方向的選擇上，我們應確定誰為主路，誰為輔路。如果把“一帶一路”比喻成一次作戰行動，那麼，“一路”是輔攻方向，“一帶” 則是主攻方向。

所以說，對于我們來講，將來真正重要的是如何經營“一帶”的問題，而不是經營“一路”的問題。那麼，經營“一帶”首先就面臨一個與沿途國家的關系問題，即如何先把與沿途國家的關系全部打通。從我們現在的做法來看，顯然不足以保證“一帶一路”的順利通暢和成功。為什麼呢？我們習慣上總是喜歡跟政府打交道，喜歡跟執政黨打交道，喜歡跟這個國家的有錢人打交道，誰在位跟誰打交道，誰有錢跟誰打交道。這樣的話，要想成功就很難。實際上我們要做的工作是什麼呢？既要跟政府、跟執政黨打交道，還要跟在野黨打交道，而更重要的是，跟整個“一帶”上的部落長老們打交道。這些部落長老往往比在野黨和執政黨的影響力大得多。我們在阿富汗、巴基斯坦的塔利班佔領地區能辦成什麼事，幾乎都是通過部落長老去實現，通過政府基本上干不成什麼事情。所以，我們的外交部、我們的企業，都不能忽略這些區域內的重要關系。

何不拉美日“入伙”？

“一帶一路”還有一個到今天都沒有人去觸及的問題，就是一些人心中的疑問︰中國是否想用“一帶一路”排斥美國？毫無疑問，美國幾乎在所有它沒能參與的國際組織和國際行動中，都會扮演搗亂的角色。只要它起不了主導作用，甚至只要它不是發起人，它就會給你搗亂。看一看APEC。APEC之後為什麼會出現TPP？就是因為美國發現自己在APEC中不能起主導作用，它就一定要另搞一套，另起爐灶。如果“一帶一路”完全排斥美國，那將使美國不遺余力地打壓它，而且由于美國不在其中，它打壓起來就沒有顧忌，因為它沒有利益在里邊，所以它打壓起來就會無所顧忌、毫不手軟。

所以筆者認為，中國的“一帶一路”應該巧妙地把美國納入進來，應該讓美國的投行、美國的投資機構，以及美國的技術，在“一帶一路”中發揮作用，完成“一帶一路”對美國的捆綁。完成了這個捆綁之後，美國在它下手的時候就會投鼠忌器。看一看中國和美國打經濟仗、打貿易仗，為什麼每一次都無疾而終？就是因為中國和美國的經濟利益互相捆綁得非常緊密，每一次美國要對中國的某一個行業或企業進行制裁或者是懲罰的時候，一定會有美國和我們這個企業綁定在一起的相關的院外集團跑到國會去游說，最後讓其胎死腹中。所以，一定要讓美國進入這個利益捆綁。“一帶一路”在資金上、技術上，不但不應排斥美國，還要把它拉進來，完成對它的捆綁。

由此筆者想到，我們甚至也不能排斥日本。不能認為誰不跟我們好，跟我們鬧，我就另外搞一套把你甩開，其實這于對方不利，對自己同樣不利。你一旦甩開了它，它打你也就無所顧忌，只有當它的利益也在其中的時候，它打你才會有所顧忌，它才會小心翼翼，保護它那一份利益。而如果利益完全捆綁的話，它想摘都摘不清，所以筆者覺得這一點也是我們必須考慮的。

“一帶一路”牽引中國軍隊改革

到現在為止，就是對我們國家沒有精確的戰略定位，國家戰略有些模糊。結果，各種所謂的“戰略”層出不窮。2014年喊得最響的不是“一帶一路”，是什麼呢？是中國要成為海洋大國，要推出中國的海洋發展戰略。你要什麼樣的海洋發展戰略？有人說要突破三條島鏈，走出去，走向太平洋。到太平洋去干什麼？我們想過嗎？想透了嗎？如果沒想透，就不宜提出那些遠水不解近渴的極度燒錢又不見成果的戰略。現在提出“一帶一路”，我們突然發現，我們更需要的是陸軍的遠征能力。那今天我們的陸軍究竟如何？中國人關起門來認為中國陸軍天下第一。英國人蒙哥馬利說，誰要在陸上跟中國的陸軍交手，誰就是傻瓜。而美國人由抗美援朝戰爭得出的結論是︰中國人絕對不能容忍美國大兵的軍靴踏到中國的陸地上。這都沒問題，中國陸軍以它現有的能力保家衛國一點問題都沒有。可是一旦面對“一帶一路”，中國陸軍擔負的任務就不是保家衛國，這就需要你具備在沿途展示陸上遠征的能力。因為光是陸上，能夠數出來的就有22個國家。這就需要我們必須劍到履到。不是去侵略別人，而是要有能力跨境保護我們自己的國家利益。

最後一點，就是如何有側重地發展軍事力量的問題。如果我們明確了以“一帶”為主攻方向，那就不僅僅是要努力發展海軍的問題。海軍當然要根據國家的需求去發展，而現在凸現的問題，恰恰是如何加強陸軍的遠征能力。中國100多萬陸軍，保家守土沒有問題，跨出國門去作戰有沒有問題？我們現在陸軍的發展方向正確嗎？合理嗎？當現在全世界都開始放棄重型坦克的時候，我們卻還在以剛剛生產出來的重型坦克為榮，這些東西將來準備用在什麼地區作戰？在整個“一帶”這條路上，重型坦克根本沒有施展余地。前蘇聯的重型坦克在阿富汗讓游擊隊隨便敲，為什麼？在所有的山溝溝里，你還能往哪走？坦克又不能飛，最後人家拿火箭筒瞄準一輛就是一輛，全部給你干掉。所以說，陸軍的作戰能力必須重新提升，就是加強它的遠程投送能力和遠程打擊能力。這方面，筆者覺得我們遠遠沒有認識到，更不可能做到。如果陸軍沒有能力走出國門，將來在這“一帶”上，任何一個國家發生了內亂或戰爭，需要中國的支援，而且更需要我們出手保護自己在沿途的設施和利益時，陸軍能走得出去、派得上用場嗎？這是我們今天必須思考的問題。

那麼，陸軍要怎麼辦？筆者認為中國陸軍必須飛起來，必須實現陸軍航空化，這意味著整個中國陸軍的一場革命。今天，當我們談軍隊編制體制改革的時候，如果你根本不知道國家的戰略，也不知道國家的需求，關起門來搞改革，你會改革出一支什麼樣的軍隊來？這支軍隊和國家利益有什麼關系？如果你不從國家利益和需求出發，僅僅比照美軍的葫蘆畫自己的瓢，想當然地認為自己應該是怎樣一支軍隊，可是國家不需要這樣一支軍隊，而是需要一支與國家的發展需求相匹配的軍隊，那時你怎麼辦？所以說，不了解國家的需求是什麼，不知道國家的利益在哪里，就關起門來搞改革，這將會改出一支什麼樣的軍隊？筆者認為，“一帶一路”就是國家利益和需求對中國軍隊改革的一個巨大牽引。國家正是通過“一帶一路”的戰略設計，確定了對軍隊的戰略需求。結論是︰中國必須有一支更強大的陸軍，以及一支能與之聯合作戰、協同行動的海軍和空軍，一支能夠跨出國門遠征的陸軍、海軍和空軍，組成在千里萬里之外仍然有足夠的保障和戰斗能力的遠征軍，我們才可能使“一帶一路”真正在安全上獲得可靠的保障，從而確保這一宏偉目標的最終實現。

Referring url: http://www.81.cn/big5/

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, 中华人民共和国网络安全法, 中國軍事應用與比特幣在未來戰爭中的應用, 國家網絡空間安全戰略, 美國軍事網絡戰：黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭

Chinese Military Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points // 淺析網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點

05/31/2018 admin Leave a comment

Chinese Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points

淺析網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點

Chinese People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences Yuan Yi

January 04, 2016

Editor’s note: When both opposing parties have the ability to ensure intrusion and damage to the other party’s network, they can bring about two-way network containment, making the two parties obliged to comply with the game rules that do not attack each other’s network under certain conditions, forming an invisible safety valve. Even international conventions or conventions that do not attack each other’s networks will be formed. The cyberspace has thus become a strategic area that can produce a huge deterrent effect. After the deterrence of cyberspace followed by nuclear deterrence, it began to enter the strategic vision of big country politicians and military strategists. Studying the characteristics, types, and points of use of cyberspace deterrence must be taken into consideration and necessary action by the Internet powers and the cyber force.

With the increasing dependence of human society on cyberspace, cyberspace has become the “second type of living space” for human production and life and the “fifth-dimensional combat space” for military confrontation. Countries around the world have fiercely competed for the dominant rights, control rights, and discourse power of cyberspace. The competition in the cyberspace has reached the level of human survival, national destiny, and success or failure of military struggles. Thinking about cyberspace deterrence capacity building has great practical and theoretical value.

First, analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace deterrence

Cyberspace deterrence refers to the actions and actions taken in the cyberspace to demonstrate and control enemy cyberspace, and to control the enemy’s physical space through cross-domain cyberspace, so as to achieve the goal of destroying enemy forces, stopping the enemy, blocking the enemy, and preventing deterrence. A form of strategic deterrence for the enemy’s purpose. Compared with the physical space, the “virtual and real duality” of network space and the uniqueness of network warfare compared with traditional combat styles have determined that the advantages and disadvantages of cyberspace deterrence are very obvious.

(A) The advantages of cyberspace deterrence

The advantages of cyberspace deterrence are mainly reflected in the following: First, the deterrence approach has become more civilized and humane. Compared with nuclear, chemical, and chemical weapons based on physical, biological, and chemical killing mechanisms, the direct killing and destructive effects of cyber warfare weapons are much smaller than the former. Normally, they will not cause permanent damage and pollution to the natural environment, nor will they cause large numbers of people. Casualties and humanitarian disasters. Second, deterrence costs are inefficient. The network warfare weapons are dominated by viruses, Trojans and other software. The costs are relatively low, and the technical threshold is low. The destructive effects are rather alarming. The network defense points are multi-faceted, and they are hard to prevent. To increase the level of network security by one level, the input cost will increase exponentially. The contrast between the low cost of cyber offense and the high cost of cyber defense makes the offensive and defensive performance of the network a feature of “spirit shield”, and the cyber warfare weapon is thus called “the atomic bomb of the poor country”. The third is that deterrence methods are diverse and practical. The variety of cyber warfare weapons and the multiple goals of cyber attacks have determined that there are diversified cyberspace deterrent methods to choose from. The effects of cyberattacks are recoverable to a certain extent. As long as the application is properly implemented, the risk of causing war and escalating the war is relatively small. In a sense, the deterrence value of nuclear weapons is far greater than the value of actual combat, and cyber warfare weapons are both practical values and deterrence values. Fourth, the use of repeatability and deterrence is strong. Once the “nuclear threshold” crosses, a full-scale nuclear war will erupt, and the two sides at the nuclear balance will fall into a state of mutual destruction. The easy implementation of nuclear deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear countries, will also be condemned by international public opinion. These factors are all The use of nuclear deterrence is greatly limited. The deterrence of software and hardware and the controllable characteristics of cyberspace deter- mine the flexibility and control of deterrence in light of the changes and needs of the military struggle. It can be used in advance, used throughout, and used repeatedly. It has strong flexibility.

(B) Defects in cyberspace deterrence

The deterrence of cyberspace is mainly reflected in: First, the credibility of the deterrence effect has not been fully verified. The credibility of nuclear deterrence has been verified in actual combat. However, as of now, the real network war has not really exploded. People’s astonishing destructive power over cyber warfare is more of a speculation and worry. The real power of cyber warfare can only be convincing after being tested by actual combat. Second, the reliability of deterrence measures is not very high. Network warfare is a dynamic process of continuous offensive and defensive interaction between the two sides of the enemy and me. The characteristics of network confrontation and technicality determine that the network warfare attack has greater uncertainty and may not achieve the desired operational objectives, which will greatly reduce the effectiveness of deterrence. . For example, when the enemy performs cyberspace deterrence, if the enemy takes various effective defense measures in a timely manner, it will increase the difficulty of its own cyber attack and reduce the damage, and even lead to the failure of the attack. Third, the controllability of deterrence scope needs further improvement. As one of the important weapons of cyber warfare, viral weapons have strong dissemination, poor controllability, and a wide range of influence. It is difficult to launch targeted and targeted attacks on enemy computers and networks. If it can’t control its effective scope, it will spread to third-party neutral countries and even make itself a victim. As a result, the use of virus weapons suffers from the use of “imposed rats.” The fourth is the selective limitation of deterrence objects. Nuclear deterrence is clear and effective for any country, and the effectiveness of cyberspace deterrence has a lot to do with the level of informatization of enemy countries. Cyberspace deterrence is extremely effective for countries with a high degree of informatization, and for those underdeveloped countries with weak information infrastructure and weak network dependence, it is difficult for them to exert results, or even completely ineffective. Fifth, the organization of deterrence is relatively complicated. All nuclear powers in the world implement centralized and unified management of strategic nuclear forces. Command and control powers are highly centralized. When organizations implement nuclear deterrence operations, they can accurately control each combat unit, and the organization is well-executed. The implementation of the deterrence of cyberspace involves many forces such as investigation, control, defense, and control. It has many personnel and large scales and is scattered among different departments and units in the military and the military. It is very complicated to organize and it is difficult to form a synergy.

Second, the main types of cyberspace deterrence

The cyberspace deterrence includes four types: cyberspace technology test deterrence, cyberspace equipment demonstration deterrence, cyberspace operational deterrence deterrence, and cyberspace operational deterrence. Among them, the first three are demonstrative deterrence, and the latter is actual deterrence.

(A) Cyberspace Technology Test Deterrence

The cyberspace technology test deterrence is a field in the field of cyber warfare. It constantly conducts preliminary exploratory experiments on new concepts of warfare, new experiments on the effectiveness of attack mechanisms and tactics, and practical experiments on the weaponization of new technologies. The outside world is disclosed to demonstrate its strong strength in the basic research of information technology and its enormous potential for transforming it into a cyber warfare capability to achieve deterrence. At present, network offensive and defensive technology is still developing rapidly. A breakthrough in a key technology will often have a significant impact on cyberspace security and operations, and even lead to revolutionary changes. Whoever preempts the strategic commanding heights of the network offensive and defensive technology, who will be able to achieve a clear advantage in the future of network warfare.

(B) Cyberspace Equipment Demonstration

The demonstration of cyberspace equipment deterrence is the development of network warfare equipment development planning, technology development, target testing, stereotyped production and other development stages. According to the needs of the appropriate disclosure of network warfare equipment models, performance, characteristics, parameters and development schedule, etc. Reach the purpose of deterring opponents. There are two main ways: one is through public disclosure in official media such as national defense white papers, diplomatic bulletins, and newspapers, periodicals, and large-scale websites; and the other is through online social media or other unofficial. The channel has deliberately leaked equipment-related information and implemented hidden deterrence. The cyber space equipment demonstrates deterrence. On the one hand, it can invent new cyber-warfare equipment with new mechanisms and new concepts and render its unique combat capabilities. On the other hand, it can deliberately exaggerate the operational effectiveness of existing cyber warfare equipment. There are facts in the virtual reality, there is something in the real, and the implementation of fuzzy policies, so that the other party can not understand their true situation and strength, resulting in fear and jealousy. For example, the U.S. military’s “Shuute” on-board network power system has been put into practical use several times and poses a serious threat to the air defense systems of its hostile countries. However, its basic principles, working mechanisms, and combat technical indicators have not been publicly disclosed. It has not been completely mastered by other countries and has remained in a state of secrecy. It is difficult to distinguish between reality and reality and has played a very good deterrent effect.

(3) Deterrence in cyberspace operations exercises

The deterrence of cyberspace operations exercises is to conduct drills in cyberspace through virtual or virtual methods, and use various media channels to show potential war opponents their own cyber warfighting capabilities, strengths and determinations in order to achieve deterrence. Cyberspace operations can be divided into two kinds: actual drills and virtual exercises. The former is usually carried out nationwide or in alliance with allies, and is generally based on the joint exercise of military space and space defense operations. In recent years, the United States and its allies have held “Network Storm” series of cyber warfare exercises and “Shriver” series of space-network space exercises, which have demonstrated the mobilization strength, overall defense level, and the implementation of cyber warfare. Determination. The latter is usually held at the national large-scale network integrated shooting range, and is generally based on the offensive actions of the military professional cyber warfare forces.

(D) Deterrence in cyberspace operations

The deterrence of cyberspace operations is the actual deterrence of attacking specific opponents by deterring opponents with certain attacks. There are two opportunities for its use: First, when one’s own side is aware that the enemy is about to wage a war on one’s own side, one’s own choice of the key cyber targets of the enemy’s key defenses will be targeted to combat them, and preventive and deterrent deterrence will be implemented; When the Party initiates a tentative cyber attack on its own side and implements cyberspace deterrence, it must immediately conduct effective retaliatory and disciplinary deterrence. There are many types of cyber warfare operations that have deterrent effects. For example, infiltrate the enemy’s telecommunications network, send a large number of anti-war messages to the enemy’s citizens, and attack the enemy’s power grid, resulting in a short-term blackout of major cities in the enemy’s power; attacking the enemy’s broadcast television networks and inserting their own broadcasts during prime time. Special video programs; etc.

Third, the use of cyberspace deterrence points

The general requirements for the use of cyberspace deterrence are: combination of wartime and warfare, with strength, actual display capability, and determination, strive to demonstrate deterrence with small battles, ensure deterrence with strikes, and achieve deterrence with a small price. Specifically, the following points should be achieved.

(A) Combination of peacetime and long-term preparation

“Frozen feet, not a cold day.” Successful implementation of cyberspace deterrence requires a combination of peacetime and warfare, and we must fully and carefully prepare for peacetime. The first is to conduct comprehensive and thorough network reconnaissance. Requires the combination of spying, reconnaissance and technical reconnaissance, wireless reconnaissance, and cable reconnaissance. Conduct long-term and continuous network reconnaissance of enemy network targets, gradually understand the basic conditions of the enemy’s network, draw a picture of its network topology, and in particular analyze and find all kinds of soft enemies. Hardware system vulnerabilities. The second is to conduct a large number of effective strategic presets. Using hacking methods, secretive infiltrate all types of networks through the use of system vulnerabilities or password cracking, leaving the back door, setting up a springboard machine, and laying down logic bombs and Trojans to set a breakthrough for launching cyber attacks in the future. The third is to conduct pre-prepared cyber defenses. When deterring cyberspace deterrence against the enemy, one must adjust the deployment of network defenses in advance, make the enemy’s pre-designed attack path, anticipate the use of system loopholes, and plan to implement an attack plan that is difficult to implement, or the effect of implementation is greatly reduced to minimize the enemy’s Losses caused by cyber retaliation.

(B) careful decision-making, control strength

Sun Tzu said: “The Lord must not anger and raise a teacher. Cyberspace deterrence is a strategic game behavior between countries, especially with deterrence and sensitivity. It must be rational, beneficial, and tangible. It must not be abused because of the low threshold of deterrence. Otherwise, its effect may be counter-productive. . Cyberspace deterrence has a high requirement for combat intensity control. On the one hand, if the intensity is too small, the enemy’s government and people will not have fear and will not achieve the deterrent effect they deserve. The other party may also use the same methods to implement anti-deterrence, eventually leading to confrontational escalation and deterring one’s own deterrence. On the other hand, if it is too strong, it will cause huge economic losses and casualties to the enemy countries. This will cause the condemnation of the international community and the hatred of the enemy governments and people. It may trigger the enemy’s use of conventional forces to carry out large-scale revenge. Nuclear countries may even Nuclear power may be used. This will not only stop the war but will also play a role in warfare.

(III) Unified command and careful organization

The implementation of the deterrence of cyberspace requires centralized command, unified planning, and good coordination. The first is meticulous organization of strength. Uniformly organize the four forces of military investigation, attack, defense, and control, and actively coordinate the strength of the cyber warfare forces of all parties to form a joint force. In particular, it is necessary to organize and coordinate the strength of civil non-professional cyber warfare, especially patriotic hacking, so that there can be no phenomenon of “blindness” so as to avoid triggering friction, escalating fire, causing an escalation of cyber warfare, or prematurely exposing attack intentions and giving people a handle. , leading to uncontrollable situations or failure of operations. The second is to select the target. Should choose a wide range of influence, easy to produce a clear deterrent effect of the goal. For example, broadcast television channels with the highest ratings, portals with a large number of visitors, and wireless communication networks with numerous users. It is not possible to choose attacks that are irrelevant, insignificant, and indifferent to the target. They can easily be mistaken for cybersecurity incidents created by ordinary hackers and do not achieve the desired deterrent effect. In addition, we must also consider the constraints of international law and war laws. We must not choose targets that are easy to cause humanitarian disasters. We should try our best not to select the network goals of railways, aviation, finance, and medical departments so as not to arouse condemnation and resentment from the international community and the people of the other side. The third is the precise control of the process. Prior to the deterrent strikes in cyberspace, it is necessary to publicize the momentum through extensive public opinion, issue warnings to the enemy countries, and declare the justice of their actions to the world in order to gain the understanding and support of international public opinion. In order to highlight the deterrent effect, one can highly announce the target of the enemy’s network to be attacked, break through the enemy’s layered network defenses, and implement a resolute and effective cyber attack. If necessary, the network attack effect can be resumed regularly to show its superiority. The cyber attack technology and means make the enemy’s decision makers and the public have a sense of frustration that is hard to defend and difficult to parry, thus forming a strong shock effect.

(4) Combining actual situation with actual situation, focusing on strategy

The grandson said that “it is not possible to show and not to use it,” and it is used to deter online space. Its main points are summarized as “showing without propaganda, advocating without showing.” “Indicating nothing” means that it is difficult to track and locate using cyber attacks and conduct cyber attacks on specific targets. However, it is not done for others to announce that they are doing their own thing. It not only demonstrates their own capabilities, but also makes the enemy’s suspicion of doing their own thing. However, there is no evidence and it cannot be pursued. “Proclaiming but not showing” is the publicity or inadvertent disclosure of the type, performance, and characteristics of the advanced cyber warfare equipment developed or fabricated by the company, deliberately exaggerating its combat effectiveness, falsifying facts, and integrating facts and facts, so that the enemy can’t understand its true strength. , resulting in a deterrent effect. The cyber warfare operations have the characteristics of difficulty in tracking and traceability and complexity in forensics. The initiating party can either admit or deny it, or push the responsibility to civil hacker organizations. (Source: China Information Security).

Original Communist Mandarin Chinese:

編者按：當敵對雙方都具有確保侵入破壞對方網絡的能力時，就可以帶來雙向網絡遏制，使得雙方不得不在一定條件下，遵守互不攻擊對方網絡的遊戲規則，形成一個無形的安全閥，甚至國際上也會形成互不攻擊對方網絡的慣例協議或公約，網絡空間由此成為可以產生巨大威懾效應的戰略領域。網絡空間威懾繼核威懾之後，開始進入大國政治家和軍事家的戰略視野。研究網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點，成為網絡強國、網絡強軍的必須考量和必要行動。

隨著人類社會對網絡空間依賴程度的不斷加深，網絡空間成為人類生產生活的“第二類生存空間”和軍事對抗的“第五維作戰空間”。世界各國圍繞網絡空間的主導權、控制權、話語權展開了激烈的爭奪，網絡空間的競爭已達到與人類生存、國家命運和軍事鬥爭成敗休戚相關的程度。思考網絡空間威懾能力建設，具有重大現實和理論價值。

一、網絡空間威懾的優劣分析

網絡空間威懾，是指在網絡空間採取各種行動，展示癱瘓控制敵方網絡空間，並通過網絡空間跨域控制敵方實體空間的決心和實力，從而達到懾敵、止敵、阻敵、遏敵目的的一種戰略威懾形式。網絡空間與實體空間相比所具有的“虛實二相性”，網絡戰與傳統作戰樣式相比所具有的獨特性，決定了網絡空間威懾的優缺點都非常明顯。

（一）網絡空間威懾的優點

網絡空間威懾的優點，主要體現在：一是威懾方式更趨文明和人道。與基於物理、生物、化學殺傷機理的核生化武器相比，網絡戰武器的直接殺傷和破壞效應要遠小於前者，通常不會對自然環境造成永久性破壞和污染，也不會造成大量的人員傷亡，並引發人道主義災難。二是威懾成本低效費比高。網絡戰武器以病毒、木馬等軟件為主，成本相對低廉，技術門檻較低，而造成的破壞效果卻相當驚人。網絡防禦點多面廣，防不勝防，要網絡安全程度每提高一個等級，投入成本會呈指數級增加。網絡進攻的低成本與網絡防禦的高成本對比鮮明，使得網絡攻防呈現“矛尖盾薄”的特點，網絡戰武器因而被稱為“窮國的原子彈”。三是威懾手段多樣實用性強。網絡戰武器多種多樣，網絡攻擊目標多元，決定了有多樣化的網絡空間威懾手段可供選擇。網絡攻擊效果在一定程度上是可恢復的，只要運用實施得當，引發戰爭和促使戰爭升級的風險相對較小。從某種意義上講，核武器的威懾價值遠大於實戰價值，而網絡戰武器則是實戰價值與威懾價值兼具。四是威懾運用可重複靈活性強。 “核門檻”一旦跨過就會爆發全面核戰爭，處於核均勢的雙方將陷入相互摧毀狀態，輕易實施核威懾特別是對無核國家進行核威懾，還會招致國際輿論的譴責，這些因素都極大地限制了核威懾手段的使用。而網絡空間威懾軟硬結合、威力可控的特點，決定了其可根據軍事鬥爭形勢的變化和需要，適時調控威懾強度，先期使用、全程使用、反複使用，具有很強的靈活性。

（二）網絡空間威懾的不足

網絡空間威懾的不足，主要體現在：一是威懾效果的可信性未得到充分驗證。核威懾的可信度已在實戰中得到了驗證。然而，截止目前，真正意義上的網絡大戰還沒有真正爆發過。人們對網絡戰驚人的破壞力，更多的只是一種猜測和擔憂，網絡戰的真實威力只有經過實戰檢驗後，才能真正令人信服。二是威懾手段的可靠性不太高。網絡戰是敵我雙方網絡攻防持續互動的動態過程，網絡對抗複雜、技術性強的特點，決定了網絡戰攻擊效果具有較大的不確定性，有可能達不到預期作戰目的，使威懾效果大打折扣。例如，對敵實施網絡空間實戰威懾時，敵方若及時採取各種有效防御手段，就會增加己方網絡攻擊的難度和降低破壞效果，甚至導致攻擊行動的失敗。三是威懾範圍的可控性需進一步改善。病毒武器作為網絡戰的重要武器之一，其傳播性強、可控性較差、影響範圍比較廣，很難針對敵國計算機和網絡發動專門性、針對性極強的攻擊。如果不能控制其有效作用範圍，就會波及第三方中立國家，甚至使自身也成為受害者，因而病毒武器的使用有“投鼠忌器”之患。四是威懾對象的可選擇性受限。核威懾對任何國家都是明確而有效的，而網絡空間威懾的效果與敵國的信息化程度有很大關係。網絡空間威懾對信息化程度高的國家極為有效，而對那些信息基礎設施薄弱，網絡依賴性不強的不發達國家，則很難發揮效果，甚至完全不起作用。五是威懾實施的組織相對複雜。世界各個核國家無不對戰略核力量實施集中統管，指揮控制權高度集中，組織實施核威懾行動時可以準確控製到每一個作戰單元，組織實施十分周密。而網絡空間威懾的組織實施，要涉及偵、控、防、控等多支力量，人員多、規模大，且分散在軍地不同部門和單位，組織起來非常複雜，形成合力不易。

二、網絡空間威懾的主要類型

網絡空間威懾主要有網絡空間技術試驗威懾、網絡空間裝備展示威懾、網絡空間作戰演習威懾和網絡空間作戰行動威懾四種類型。其中，前三種是示形威懾，後一種是實戰威懾。

（一）網絡空間技術試驗威懾

網絡空間技術試驗威懾，是在網絡戰領域，經常性地進行新作戰概念的先期探索性試驗、新攻擊機理和戰術的效果印證性試驗、新技術的實用化武器化試驗等，並通過媒體向外界披露，以展現本國雄厚的信息技術基礎研究實力，以及轉化為網絡戰能力的巨大潛力，以達到威懾對手的目的。當前，網絡攻防技術仍在快速發展，一項關鍵性技術的突破，往往會對網絡空間安全和作戰產生重大影響，甚至引發革命性變化。誰搶先佔領了網絡攻防技術的戰略制高點，誰就能在未來網絡戰中取得明顯優勢。

（二）網絡空間裝備展示威懾

網絡空間裝備展示威懾，是在網絡戰裝備發展規劃制定、技術開發、打靶試驗、定型生產等各個發展階段，根據需要適當披露網絡戰裝備的型號、性能、特點、參數以及研製進度等情況，以達到威懾對手的目的。其方式主要有兩種：一種是通過在國防白皮書、外交公報以及報紙、期刊、大型網站等權威媒體從官方渠道公開披露，實施顯性威懾；另一種是通過網絡社交媒體或其他非官方渠道，刻意洩露裝備相關情況，實施隱性威懾。網絡空間裝備展示威懾，一方面可以虛構新機理、新概念的新型網絡戰裝備，並渲染其獨特的作戰能力；另一方面可以刻意誇大已有網絡戰裝備的作戰效能。虛中有實、實中有虛，實施模糊政策，使對方摸不清己方真實情況和實力，產生恐懼和忌憚心理。例如，美軍的“舒特”機載網電一體攻擊系統已多次投入實戰使用，對其敵對國家的防空體系構成了嚴重威脅，但其基本原理、工作機制、戰技指標既沒有公開披露，也沒有被他國完全掌握破解，一直處於保密狀態，令人虛實難辨，起到了很好的威懾作用。

（三）網絡空間作戰演習威懾

網絡空間作戰演習威懾，是以實兵或虛擬的方式在網絡空間展開演習活動，並藉助各種媒體渠道，向潛在作戰對手展現本國網絡戰能力、實力與決心，以達到威懾對手的目的。網絡空間作戰演習可分為實兵演習和虛擬演習兩種。前者通常在全國范圍內或與盟國聯合進行，一般以演練軍地聯合網絡空間防禦行動為主。近幾年來，美國及盟國多次舉行“網絡風暴”系列網絡戰演習，以及“施里弗”系列太空-網絡空間演習，很好展現了網絡戰的動員實力、整體防禦水平，以及實施網絡戰的決心。後者通常在國家大型網絡綜合靶場舉行，一般以演練軍隊專業網絡戰力量的進攻行動為主。

（四）網絡空間作戰行動威懾

網絡空間作戰行動威懾，是指對特定的網絡目標實施攻擊，以確信的攻擊效果來威懾作戰對手的一種實戰性威懾。其運用的時機有兩個：一是當己方覺察敵方即將對己方發動戰爭時，己方選擇敵方重點防禦的關鍵性網絡目標進行針對性打擊，進行預防性、遏制性威懾；二是當敵方通過對己方發起試探性網絡攻擊，實施網絡空間威懾時，己方應立即進行有效的報復性、懲戒性威懾。具有威懾效果的網絡戰行動有多種。例如，對敵電信網滲透破壞，向敵國民眾手機大量發送宣傳反戰短信；對敵電力網進行攻擊，造成敵重要城市短時間的大面積停電；對敵廣播電視網進行攻擊，在黃金時段插播己方特製的視頻節目；等等。

三、網絡空間威懾的運用要點

網絡空間威懾總的運用要求是：懾戰結合，以實力、實戰展示能力和決心，力求以小戰體現威懾、以精打確保威懾，以較小的代價實現威懾目的。具體說來，應做到以下幾點。

（一）平戰結合，長期準備

“冰凍三尺，非一日之寒”。成功實施網絡空間威懾，需要平戰結合，在平時就要進行充分細緻的準備。一是要進行全面周密的網絡偵察。要求諜報偵察與技術偵察、無線偵察與有線偵察相結合，對敵網絡目標進行長期持續的網絡偵察，逐步摸清敵網絡基本情況，繪製其網絡拓撲結構圖，尤其是分析查找出敵各種軟硬件系統的漏洞。二是要進行大量有效的戰略預置。採用黑客手段，通過利用系統漏洞或口令破譯等辦法，秘密滲透進入敵各類網絡，留下後門，設置跳板機，埋設邏輯炸彈和木馬，為未來發動網絡攻擊預留突破口。三是進行預有準備的網絡防禦。在對敵實施網絡空間威懾時，己方應提前調整網絡防禦部署，使敵預先設計的攻擊路徑，預期利用的系統漏洞，預定執行的攻擊方案難以實施，或實施效果大打折扣，最大限度地降低敵網絡報復造成的損失。

（二）慎重決策，控制強度

孫子曰：“主不可以怒而興師，將不可以慍而致戰”。網絡空間威懾是國家之間的戰略博弈行為，尤其是實戰威懾，敏感性強，必須做到有理、有利、有節，決不能因為威懾“門檻”較低而濫用亂用，否則其效果可能會適得其反。網絡空間實戰威懾對作戰強度控制的要求很高。一方面，若強度太小，敵國政府和民眾不會產生畏懼心理，起不到應有的威懾效果，對方還可能採取同樣的手段實施反威懾，最終導致對抗升級，使己方威懾失效。另一方面，若強度過大，給敵國造成巨大的經濟損失和人員傷亡，引起國際社會的譴責和敵國政府、民眾的仇恨心理，就可能引發敵國運用常規力量進行大規模報復，有核國家甚至可能會動用核力量，這樣不但不能懾止戰爭，反而會起到戰爭導火索的作用。

（三）統一指揮，周密組織

網絡空間威懾的組織實施，要集中指揮，統一籌劃，搞好協同。一是精心組織力量。統一組織軍隊偵、攻、防、控四支力量，積極協調軍地各方網絡戰力量形成合力。尤其是要組織和協調好民間非專業網絡戰力量特別是愛國黑客，不能出現“盲動”現象，以免引發磨擦，擦槍走火，引起網絡戰的升級，或過早暴露攻擊意圖，授人以柄，導致局勢不可控或行動失敗。二是精當選擇目標。應選擇影響面廣，易產生明顯威懾效果的目標。例如，收視率排名靠前的廣播電視頻道、訪問量巨大的門戶網站、用戶眾多的無線通信網絡等。不能選擇無關痛癢、影響面小、民眾漠不關心的目標進行攻擊，易被誤認為是普通黑客製造的網絡安全事件，起不到應有的威懾效果。此外，還要考慮國際法和戰爭法約束，不能選擇易造成人道主義災難的目標，盡量不選取鐵路、航空、金融、醫療等部門的網絡目標，以免激起國際社會和對方民眾的譴責和反感。三是精確控制進程。實施網絡空間威懾性打擊之前，要通過廣泛的輿論宣傳造勢，向敵國發出打擊警告，並向全世界宣告己方行動的正義性，以爭取國際輿論的理解和支持。為突出威懾效果，己方可以高調宣布要攻擊的敵國網絡目標，再突破敵方層層網絡防禦，實施堅決有效的網絡攻擊，必要時最後還可對網絡攻擊效果進行定時恢復，以展現己方高超的網絡攻擊技術和手段，讓敵方決策者和民眾產生防不勝防、難以招架的心理挫折感，從而形成強烈的震懾效果。

（四）虛實結合，注重謀略

孫子所說的“能而示之不能，用而示之不用”，運用到網絡空間威懾，其要點概括起來就是“示而不宣、宣而不示”。 “示而不宣”，就是利用網絡攻擊難以追踪定位這一點，對特定目標實施網絡攻擊，但不對外宣布是己方所為，既展示了己方能力，又使得敵方雖然懷疑是己方所為，但沒有證據，無法追究。 “宣而不示”，就是公開宣傳或不經意透露己方研製或虛構的先進網絡戰裝備的型號、性能、特點，刻意誇大其作戰效能，虛虛實實，虛實結合，使敵摸不清己方真實實力，從而產生威懾效果。網絡戰行動具有追踪溯源困難、取證複雜的特點，發起方既可以承認，也可以矢口否認，或把責任推給民間黑客組織。（來源：中國信息安全）

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China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Strategic Support Forces, 美國軍事網絡戰：黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭

美國軍事網絡戰：黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭 // American military network warfare: hackers attack and defense creating a war without smoke

07/12/2017 admin Leave a comment

美國軍事網絡戰：黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭

American military network warfare: hackers attack and defense creating a war without smoke

Hackers may also be soldiers. Recently, the US Internet security company and the government issued a series of reports that “the Chinese military to participate in hacking.” With the “China hacker threat theory”, the US government immediately announced the latest anti-hacking strategy, although the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in a timely manner to make a refutation, but for a time, hacker news from the army or aroused everyone’s interest. In fact, the United States is the world’s largest Internet hacker location, has a huge network of troops.

As the daily consumption from the physical store to the transfer of electricity, and now the war has also moved from the line to the line. Not only the United States, Europe and the United States and Asia, many countries have begun to set up their own “network forces” – hackers is to become a frequent visitor to this service. And how these countries are leading the “formal” network of the army.

In 007 “skyfall” in the lovely Mr. Q is a network war master.

In May 2010, the US Department of Defense set up a network warfare headquarters officially launched, the US military strategic headquarters in September 1, 2010 before the development of a network warfare philosophy and plans, and plans in the next few years to expand the network security forces to 4900 people. This marks the United States intends to military hegemony from the land, sea, sky and space to the so-called “fifth field” of the network space extension.

It is reported that the United States is currently recruiting 2,000 to 4,000 soldiers, set up a “network special forces.” This unit not only to assume the task of network defense, but also to other countries of the computer network and electronic systems for secret attacks. According to Xinhua reported that a former US Air Force Major John Bradley at a meeting in 2002, said the United States spent on network attacks on the study than the network defense much more, because the senior staff of the former more Interested. And, the US military network attack time may be much earlier than we imagined.

In the Iraq war that began in 2003, the US military used the cyber warfare more widely. Before the war, thousands of Iraqi military and political officials in their e-mail mailbox received the US military sent the “persuade the letter”, resulting in a great psychological impact. Less than four hours after the war, Al Jazeera English website will be the US military “ban”, can not function properly.

In addition, the United States also in 2006 and 2008 has held two code-named “network storm” large-scale network war exercises.

Japan and South Korea: already set up a “network army”

At the end of 2009, the Ministry of Defense of Japan decided to establish a special “cyber space defense team” in 2011 to guard against hacker attacks and strengthen the ability to protect confidential information. According to the Japanese “Yomiuri Shimbun” reported on May 1, 2011, “cyberspace defense team” plan is set in the SDF command communications system under the initial number of about 60 people. This “network force” is responsible for collecting and analyzing the latest virus information, and anti-hacker attack training.

Japan’s network warfare is through the master “system of network” to paralyze the enemy combat system. Japan in the construction of network combat system, emphasizing the “offensive and defensive”, allocated large sums of money into the network hardware and “network warfare” construction, respectively, the establishment of the “defense information communication platform” and “computer system common platform”, to achieve the SDF Organs, forces network system of mutual exchange and resource sharing. And set up by the 5000 people of the “cyberspace defense team”, developed the network operations “offensive weapons” and network defense system, now has a strong network attack combat strength.

The DPRK this “enemy”, South Korea in 1999 put forward the overall vision of the future information construction, announced in 2009 will be the formation of “network command”, and officially launched in 2010. At present, South Korea already has about 20 million received professional training of the huge personnel, and 5% of annual defense funds are used to develop and improve the implementation of the core technology of network warfare.

Britain and Russia: enlisted hackers

Network forces hackers preferred, as early as 1998, because of the successful invasion of the US Pentagon computer system, Israel’s 18-year-old boy hacker Tenenbaum put on uniforms to become an Israeli soldier. Subsequently, the British government also in 2009, including former hackers, including network elite to defend the network security. They are young, diverse in background, some have been hackers, and even minor cybercrime.

On June 25, 2009, the UK government introduced its first national cybersecurity strategy and announced the establishment of two new departments of cybersecurity, the Network Security Office and the Network Security Operations Center, which are responsible for coordinating government security and coordination of government and government The security of the main computer system of civil society.

India in 2007 formed a land, sea and air armed forces joint emergency team, and enlisted hackers. At the same time, by absorbing the civil master enlisted and the cadet students “hacker” technical training, etc., and gradually complete the future network war talent pool.

Military power Russia in the 1990s on the establishment of the Information Security Committee, specifically responsible for network information security, launched in 2002, “Russian Federal Information Security Theory”, the network information warfare compared to the future “sixth generation of war.” Russia already has a large number of network elite, anti-virus technology is walking in the forefront of the world, in the event of a threat or need, these talents and technology will soon be transferred to military use.

“Black door”: ridiculous blame

Although there is no factual basis, but the US Internet security companies and the government is still often create “hacker door”, directed at China, not only involving colleges and universities, enterprises, as well as technical schools such as Shandong Lan Xiang, there are network individuals, now point to the Chinese military, Even to provide “hacker headquarters building” photos. However, the relationship between the IP address alone, “the source of the attack from China,” highlighting the ignorance of the relevant US people.

How do hackers use their own computer to attack? How can I leave a registered IP address? They usually through the springboard control of third-party computer to form a botnet and then attack. Take the initiative to expose the IP address left traces, is it a professional hacker!

China’s Ministry of Defense International Bureau of Communications Deputy Director Meng Yan wrote that the United States in the transformation of the way to render the Chinese hacker attack trick, even ignore itself is the network virtual space “rule makers.” 2012, 73,000 foreign IP addresses as Trojans and botnet control server to participate in the control of more than 1,400 million hosts in China, 32,000 IP through the implantation of the back door of China’s nearly 38,000 sites in the implementation of remote control, which originated in the United States The number of network attacks ranked first.

Hacker attack and defense: no smoke of the war

Only a few minutes, the domestic password experts, Tsinghua University Distinguished Professor Wang Xiaoyun and her research team with ordinary personal computers, will be able to crack MD5 password algorithm. Before her, even with the fastest giant computer, but also to calculate more than 1 million years to crack.

If this is a war, you can not hear the sound and can not see the smoke. Hackers often through the acquisition of passwords, place Trojan horse program, e-mail attacks, node attacks, network monitoring, find system vulnerabilities, steal privileges and so on, and the use of WWW spoofing technology, the use of account attacks, etc. to launch network attacks.

Reporters learned that the current “hanging horse” (that is, in the page to load Trojan virus), “phishing” (forged WEB site or e-mail, etc.) and other ways to become the mainstream of hacker attacks.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

黑客也可能是戰士。近日，美國網絡安全公司和政府接連發布報告稱“中國軍方參與黑客攻擊”。借助“中國黑客威脅論”，美國政府隨即公佈最新反黑客戰略，儘管中國外交部和國防部及時對此做出駁斥，但一時間，黑客從軍的消息還是激起大家的興趣。其實，美國才是世界上最大的網絡黑客所在地，擁有龐大的網絡大軍。

如同日常消費從實體店向電商轉移，如今戰爭也已經從線下搬到線上。不僅是美國，歐美亞等洲許多國家都已經著手建立本國的“網絡部隊”——黑客更是成為此軍種的常客。而這些國家又是如何領導這批“正規”的網絡大軍。

在007《skyfall》中可愛的Q先生就是一名網絡戰的高手。

2010年5月，美國國防部組建網絡戰司令部正式啟動，美軍戰略司令部要求在2010年9月1日前製訂出網絡戰作戰理念和計劃，併計劃在隨後幾年把網絡安全部隊擴編到4900人。這標誌著美國打算將軍事霸權從陸地、海洋、天空和太空向號稱“第五領域”的網絡空間延伸。

據悉，美國目前正在招募2000至4000名士兵，組建一支“網絡特種部隊”。這支部隊不僅要承擔網絡防禦的任務，還將對他國的電腦網絡和電子系統進行秘密攻擊。據新華網報導，一位前美國空軍少校約翰·布萊德利在參加2002年一次會議時就表示，美國花在網絡攻擊上的研究比網絡防禦上要多得多，因為高層人員對前者更感興趣。並且，美軍實施網絡攻擊的時間可能比大家想像的要早得多。

而在2003年開始的伊拉克戰爭中，美軍更為廣泛地使用網絡戰手段。戰前，數千名伊拉克軍政要員在他們的電子郵件信箱中收到美軍發來的“勸降信”，造成很大的心理影響。開戰後不到4個小時，半島電視台英語網站便被美軍“封殺”，不能正常運作。

另外，美國還於2006年和2008年先後舉行了兩次代號為“網絡風暴”的大規模網絡戰演習。

日韓：早已組建“網絡軍隊”

2009年底日本防衛省即決定，在2011年度建立一支專門的“網絡空間防衛隊”，以防備黑客攻擊，加強保護機密信息的能力。據日本《讀賣新聞》2011年5月1日報導，“網絡空間防衛隊”計劃設置於自衛隊指揮通信系統部之下，初期人數約60人。這支“網絡部隊”負責收集和分析研究最新的病毒信息，並進行反黑客攻擊訓練。

日本網絡戰是通過掌握“製網權”達到癱瘓敵人作戰系統。日本在構建網絡作戰系統中強調“攻守兼備”，撥付大筆經費投入網絡硬件及“網戰部隊”建設，分別建立了“防衛信息通信平台”和“計算機系統通用平台”，實現了自衛隊各機關、部隊網絡系統的相互交流和資源共享。並成立由5000人組成的“網絡空間防衛隊”，研製開發的網絡作戰“進攻武器”和網絡防禦系統，目前已經具備了較強的網絡進攻作戰實力。

而對朝鮮這個“敵人”，韓國在1999年提出了未來信息建設的總體設想，2009年宣布將組建“網絡司令部”，並於2010年正式啟動。目前，韓國已經擁有了約20萬接受過專業訓練的龐大的人才隊伍，而且每年國防經費的5%被用來研發和改進實施網絡戰的核心技術。

英俄：徵召黑客入伍

網絡部隊黑客優先，早在1998年，因為成功入侵美國五角大樓電腦系統，以色列18歲的少年黑客Tenenbaum穿上軍裝成為一名以色列士兵。隨後，英國政府也於2009年徵召包括前黑客在內的網絡精英保衛網絡安全。他們年輕，背景多樣，有的曾經是黑客，甚至有輕度網絡犯罪行為。

在2009年6月25日，英國政府出台首個國家網絡安全戰略，並宣布成立兩個網絡安全新部門，即網絡安全辦公室和網絡安全行動中心，分別負責協調政府各部門網絡安全和協調政府與民間機構主要電腦系統安全保護工作。

印度則在2007年組建了陸、海、空三軍聯合計算機應急分隊，並徵召黑客入伍。同時，通過吸納民間高手入伍和對軍校學員進行“黑客”技術培訓等方式，逐步完成未來網絡戰的人才儲備。

軍事大國俄羅斯上世紀90年代就設立了信息安全委員會，專門負責網絡信息安全，2002年推出《俄聯邦信息安全學說》，將網絡信息戰比作未來的“第六代戰爭”。俄羅斯已經擁有了眾多的網絡精英，反病毒技術更是走在了世界的前列，在遇到威脅或有需要時，這些人才和技術將能很快地轉入軍事用途。

“黑客門”：可笑的指責

雖然沒有事實依據，但美國網絡安全公司和政府仍然屢屢製造“黑客門”，矛頭直指中國，不僅涉及高校、企業，還有技校如山東藍翔，也有網絡個體，如今則指向中國軍方，甚至提供“黑客總部大樓”照片。然而，僅憑IP地址的關係就得出“攻擊源頭來自中國”，凸顯美國相關人士的無知。

黑客怎麼用自己的電腦發動攻擊？又怎麼會留下註冊IP地址？他們通常是通過跳板控制第三方電腦形成殭屍網絡再展開攻擊。主動暴露IP地址留下痕跡，豈是專業黑客所為！

中國國防部國際傳播局副局長孟彥日前撰文稱，美國各界在變換手法渲染中國黑客攻擊把戲時，竟然無視自身才是網絡虛擬空間的“規則制定者”。 2012年，7.3萬個境外IP地址作為木馬和殭屍網絡控制服務器參與控制中國境內1400餘萬台主機，3.2萬個IP通過植入後門對中國境內近3.8萬個網站實施遠程控制，其中源自美國的網絡攻擊數量名列第一。

黑客攻防：無硝煙的戰爭

只需要幾分鐘，國內密碼專家、清華大學特聘教授王小雲和她的研究小組用普通的個人電腦，就能破解MD5密碼算法。在她之前，即使採用最快的巨型計算機，也要運算100萬年以上才能破解。

如果這是戰爭，則聽不到聲音看不到硝煙。黑客往往通過獲取口令、放置特洛伊木馬程序、電子郵件攻擊、節點攻擊、網絡監聽、尋找系統漏洞、偷取特權等以及利用WWW欺騙技術、利用賬號攻擊等方式發起網絡攻擊。

記者了解到，目前“網頁掛馬”（即在網頁中加載木馬病毒）、“網絡釣魚”（偽造WEB站點或電子郵件等）等方式成為黑客攻擊的主流行為。

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, Cyberspace Adminstration of China 中央網絡安全和信息勇, Strategic Support Forces, 國家網絡空間安全戰略

國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 // Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

06/13/2017 admin Leave a comment

國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 //

Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

In recent years, information warfare has become a hot spot all over the world.China’s military strategists have not neglected their importance as a tool of war, and are accelerating the development of information warfare theory. They are not only exploring theoretical issues, but also training troops.

Information warfare with Chinese characteristics

Chinese military theorists believe that information warfare can give Mao Zedong’s people’s war ideas into the omission. This view by the Chinese information warfare expert Wang Pufeng (transliteration) generals in 1995 for the first time. Some people think that electronics, computer and information engineering experts, like the past soldiers on the battlefield, can become the main force in the new people’s war. Obviously they want to use the people’s war ideas to fight the information war – a war with a home computer, when necessary to mobilize thousands of people, attack foreign computer systems. China has a number of outstanding software experts, in the field of information war has great potential. The question is how to seek greater information space and equipment for the huge population.

“The whole society will replace the traditional battlefield,” said Shen Weiguang, an information warfare expert. “Different classes and social groups will participate in political activities in their own country or other countries.” He advocates the establishment of a scientist, police, Other experts to form the information protection forces to defend the security of the national information field, to counter the invasion of information launched by other countries.

The idea of combining the people’s war with the information war is being carried out in China’s 1.5 million strong reserve army. The People’s Liberation Army is turning the reserve forces of certain military sub-divisions into small-scale information warfare. In Hubei, a military division, the People’s Armed Forces Department has 20 towns of the armed forces to form a reserve / militia information warfare. The Department has a network of war camps, electronic war camps, intelligence and psychological camps, and 35 technical units (classes to camp). The department has also established the first training base for information services that can accommodate 500 people.

The above-mentioned military division is not the only military division of the organization’s reserve and militia for information warfare. “Liberation Army Daily” has reported that in December 1999 a city along the southeast coast held a meeting of the reserve and militia forces, during the electronic interference, network attack and defense and radar reconnaissance and other red. There are also reports of information warfare activities organized by the People’s Armed Forces and the Armed Forces in other regions.

In the information war era, China is also affected by another important tactics, that is, China’s “thirty-six dollars.” About 300 years ago, an unnamed scholar collected 36 Chinese tactics, and compiled a book, named “thirty-six dollars.” The book focuses on deception as a military art that achieves military goals. In the information age, due to the unknown uncertainty of the attacker’s origin (the program’s listening to the source of the virus and the presence of the back door increases the vulnerability of the system), some tactics may be reusable, thirty-six may find new Meaning and new use.

Some critics argue that in today’s high-tech era, these ancient strategies are hard to do. However, just look at a few of them, then it is another situation: the first plan “deceive”, meaning by resorting to deceit and camouflage means to hide their true intentions, in order to achieve the purpose of loosening the enemy vigilance. Applying to information wartime is the use of regular e-mail and commercial lines on the Internet to cover the purpose of sending dangerous code and viruses. The fourth meter “to wait and see”. Meaning that when fighting their own recharge your batteries, until the enemy fatigue chaos, take the opportunity to win. Application to the information wartime is the use of people’s war theory, extensive mobilization of the masses to attack, until all the Western computer to meet the difficulty of self-propelled when the implementation of large-scale attack.

At present, China is considering the establishment of future high-tech operations of the “network army.” It will protect the network sovereignty, network warfare and technology and knowledge-intensive operations. Network technology will include: can decipher the password, steal data and restore data browsing technology; can attack on the network and attack counterattack technology; can fake fake identity from the network to steal the license of camouflage technology; to avoid attacks, Prevent internal leaks, and defensive techniques that prevent random action like electronic police.

Definition of information warfare

China’s famous author of the issue of information warfare at home and abroad is Dr. Shen Weiguang, Major General Wang Pufeng, Wang Baoji University and Yuan Bangji General (both sound Ze). In 1996, Dr. Shen first proposed the definition of information warfare: information war is a two sides through the control of information and intelligence to try to master the battlefield initiative of the war. As the United States defined, Dr. Shen stressed that “save yourself, fight against the enemy” into “to protect themselves, control the enemy.” Wang generals also believe that the key to information warfare is to control the information.
In 1997, Wang Baoji University from the perspective of China’s military science and Marxism-Leninism to elaborate on the word information warfare. This article covers the form, nature, hierarchy, characteristics, characteristics and principles of information warfare. He believes that the form of information warfare is divided into normal, crisis and wartime three; nature is attack and defense of the contest; level is divided into national, strategic, theater and tactical four; features include command and control warfare, intelligence war Such as electronic warfare, psychological warfare, space control warfare, hacking warfare, virtual warfare, economic warfare, strategic and precise contest, etc .; features complex, transparent, limited target, short duration, small damage, large combat space, Comprehensive, strong command capability, etc .; in principle, to take cut, blinded, transparent, fast melon and improve the viability and other measures. His office and analysis of information warfare help people gain a deeper understanding of China’s information warfare.

Another author of China’s definition of information war is the General Staff of the PLA General Staff, he wrote in the 1999 book that: “Information war is a capture and maintain the control of information and struggle between the hostile parties Compete for access to control and use of information initiative, they use and protect their own information and resources and information systems at the same time, will use and destroy the enemy’s information resources, information systems and information-based weapons systems.

In 2000, General Wang Pufeng made a more thorough and thorough explanation of the “information warfare” than he used to be “information war”. Wang believes that the information war refers to a war and a war mode; information warfare refers to a kind of combat and a combat mode. The new mode of action refers to the action that is carried out in the computer network. Information warfare includes information detection systems, information transmission systems, information and weapons attack systems, and information processing and application systems. Information warfare contains information warfare, which combines information and ability to use information networks based on the battlefield as their place of activity.

Information warfare training

In February 1999, an interesting article on information warfare training defined information warfare as a knowledge war, a special contest for the power of high intelligence. The definition stems from the fact that high-tech warfare requires commanders and operators to have a high level of knowledge, strong mental, command and operational skills.
Chinese military leaders, after recognizing the gap between the above and the more developed countries, decided to carry out training activities at all levels. The staff will be divided into three categories by age:

The first category for the support of talent, the main goal is more than 40 years of age at all levels of leading cadres. The aim is to eliminate their blind spots by training (from mechanization concepts to simulated computer fights) to change their minds and apply them to future wars. Training content includes: information technology foundation, information warfare theory, information warfare weapons universal knowledge. Training methods of color training courses and other auxiliary methods.

The second category is a transitional talent, training goal is 30-40 year old cadres. As the future leaders of the Chinese army, they must focus on improving the commanding ability in the information warfare environment.

The third category for the regeneration of talent, training for the 30-year-old cadres. These people have long been adapted to the information society, with a good foundation of modern information technology theory, focusing on improving their commanding ability and skills.

The training of various age groups includes: basic theory (computer foundation and application, communication network technology, information highway, digital force); electronic warfare; radar technology; information war rules and rules; information strategy and tactics; theater and strategic information warfare Information systems (including the collection of letters, processing, information and use of information warfare); monitoring, decision-making and control systems; information weapons (soft and hard destruction of the concept and principles, how to use information weapons, analog information warfare); information system protection; Computer virus attack and defense, as well as communication network interference and anti-interference.

The article shows that China is preparing a first-class information warfare course. However, subsequent reports indicate that this is not the case. In July 1999, a “Liberation Army Daily” pointed out: “training content, system and structure of the rationality of the information warfare training can not really become the mainstream of our military training.Currently, information warfare training in a state of arbitrary. System, operation is not standardized, the lack of assessment standards and management regulations.

Information warfare

Over the past three years, China has held several major information warfare military exercises, every time it is important, because it is a test of information war theory. The first “special war” (information warfare) exercise was conducted in October 1997; a military army in a military area was subjected to a computer attack aimed at paralyzing its system, and the group’s military antivirus software was defended. The exercise is called “invasion and anti-intrusion exercise”. The exercise used ground logistics, medical and air forces.

In October 1998, China held a high-tech comprehensive exercise with several national military zones. The first use of the “military information superhighway” was used for joint defense operations. The information network subsystem in the command automation system is composed of digital, dialing, command network and secret channel. The other parts of the command automation system are subsystems such as command warfare, audio and graphics processing, control and data encryption. Military information highway in addition to the trend map, but also send graphics, characters and audio data.

In October 1999, the People’s Liberation Army for the first time between the two groups of war-level computer online confrontation exercise. Conducted reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance, interference and anti-interference, blockade and anti-blockade, air strikes and anti-air raid and other subjects. In the software environment, resource sharing, combat command, situation display, auxiliary evaluation, signal transmission and intelligence warfare and other six types of operations. The computer evaluation system conducts mathematical and qualitative analysis of the performance of the participant.
In July 2000, a military area in southwest China also conducted an online confrontation exercise. The three training tasks related to the exercise are: organizing and planning the campaign, seizing air power and making information, implementing breakthroughs and breaking down. There are more than 100 terminal networking involved in the exercise. Three weeks later, another military area also opened a high-tech exercise curtain, and issued to the subordinate units began to control the communication line command.

China ‘s Information Warfare Ability

Chinese military theorists have found a voluntary, very economical and obedient partner in information warfare. This partner will enable China to catch up with the West in strategic, military and international status. Which will enable China to play an important strategic role in the future Asia-Pacific region. China may gradually pay close attention to economic competitors.

China attaches great importance to the role played by the new information warfare forces, including the network forces (independent arms), the network warriors commando, the information protection forces, the information corps, the electronic police and the joint people’s war network. The latter is particularly concerned by foreign analysts because of its unique nature and potential. Chinese military theorists believe that the victory of information warfare will belong to the one who can mobilize the most computer experts to participate in the “information family war”, they will use such as cyber war strategy, trying to cut off important information nodes and contacts.

At present, China’s information warfare combines Western, Russian and Chinese ideas. However, information wars with Chinese characteristics, which are different from Russia and the West, are gradually forming. China’s information warfare should look for answers to the questions from today’s military history, such as the nature and characteristics of information warfare.

However, there are still many shortcomings in China’s information warfare methods, not just quantitative aspects. The core of the information warfare theory also involves maintaining the integrity and stability of the infrastructure. In the information age, infrastructure stability is as important as troop survivability. China’s biggest weakness is just in terms of infrastructure. At present, China is accelerating the development of electronic information industry, its purpose is nothing more than for the military and civilian information base for the use of infrastructure.

China is good at drawing lessons from others, may soon be able to set up a compelling information warfare force. Information war has forced China to cross a number of technological development stages, the use of Western technology, not only save time but also save money. However, China may not fully follow the example of others, but will take a creative or indirect information war strategy. But no matter what, China is worthy of attention is different from other countries, the power of information.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

近些年來，信息戰已經成為全世界的熱點。中國的軍事家們也沒有忽視其作為戰爭工具的重要意義，正在加速發展信息戰理論。他們不僅正在探索理論方面的課題，而且也在據此訓練部隊。

中國特色的信息戰

中國軍事理論家認為，信息戰可以給毛澤東的人民戰爭思想注入省略。此觀點由中國信息戰專家王普峰（音譯）將軍於１９９５年首次提出。有人認為，電子、計算機和信息工程專家如同過去戰場上的將士一樣，可以成為新人民戰爭中的主力軍。顯然他們是希望用人民戰爭思想打信息戰－－一種用家用微機即可進行的戰爭，需要時動員成千上萬人，攻擊外國計算機系統。中國擁有一批傑出的軟件專家，在信息戰領域有巨大潛力。問題是如何為龐大的人口尋求更大的信息空間和設備。

信息戰專家沈偉光在文章中寫道：“整個社會將取代傳統戰場。不同階層和社會團體將參與本國或其他國家的政治活動。”他主張建立一支由精通信息戰的科學家、警察、士兵和其他專家組成的信息保護部隊，以捍衛國家信息領域的安全，反擊其他國家發動的信息入侵。

將人民戰爭和信息戰相結合的思想正在貫徹到中國１５０萬強大後備軍中。人民解放軍正將某些軍分區的後備役部隊變成小型信息戰團。在湖北某軍分區，人民武裝部已將２０個城鎮的武裝部組成一個後備役／民兵信息戰團。該部擁有網絡戰營、電子戰營、情報和心理戰營，以及３５支技術分隊（班到營）。該部還建立了第一個可容納５００人的後備役信息戰訓練基地。

上述軍分區並非是組織後備役和民兵進行信息戰訓練的唯一軍分區。《解放軍報》曾報導說，１９９９年１２月東南沿海某城市舉行了一次運用後備役和民兵部隊的會議，期間進行了電子乾擾，網絡攻防和雷達偵察等演紅。同樣還有其他地區人武部和軍分區組織信息戰活動的報導。

在信息戰時代，中國還受到另一個重要戰法的影響，即中國的“三十六計”。大約３００年前，一位無名學者蒐集到中國的３６個計謀，並彙編成書，取名為《三十六計》。該書著重將欺騙作為達成軍事目標的軍事藝術。在信息時代，因攻擊者來歷不明的情況不確定性（程序聽病毒源和存在的後門增大了系統的易損性），有些計謀可能會重新有用武之地，三十六計可能會找到新含義和新用途。

一些評論家認為，在當今的高技術時代，這些古代計策難有作為。然而，只需看看其中的幾計，則又是另一番情況：第一計“瞞天過海”，意思是通過採取欺騙和偽裝的手段隱藏自己的真實意圖，以達到鬆懈敵人警惕性的目的。應用到信息戰時就是使用互聯網上的正規電子郵件和商業線路來掩蓋發送危險代碼和病毒的目的。第四計“以逸待勞”。意思是作戰時自己養精蓄銳，待敵疲勞混亂時，乘機出擊取勝。應用到信息戰時就是利用人民戰爭理論，廣泛發動群眾進行攻擊，待所有西方計算機應爭反應小級難以自拔時再實施大規模進攻。

目前中國正考慮建立未來高科技作戰的“網絡軍”。它將保護網絡主權，進行網絡戰以及技術和知識密集型作戰。網絡技術將包括：能破譯密碼、偷取數據和恢復數據的瀏覽技術；能在網絡上發起攻擊和乾擾的反擊技術；能通過偽造假身份從網絡竊取許可權的偽裝技術；能避開攻擊、防止內部洩密以及像電子警察那樣阻止隨意行動的防禦技術。

信息戰的定義

中國探討國內外信息戰問題的著名作者是沈偉光博士、王普鋒少將、王保存大校和袁邦概將軍（均為音澤）。１９９６年，沈博士首次提出信息戰定義：信息戰是一場雙方通過控制信息和情報輿來設法掌握戰場主動權的戰爭。正如美國界定的那樣，沈博士強調把“保存自己，打擊敵人”變為“保護自己，控制敵人”。王將軍也認為信息戰取勝的關鍵是控制信息。
１９９７年，王保存大校從中國軍事科學和馬列主義的角度精闢地闡述字信息戰問題。該文涵蓋信息戰的形式、性質、層次、特徵、特點和原則。他認為：形式上信息戰分為平時、危機時和戰時三種；性質上是攻與防的較量；層次分為國家、戰略、戰區和戰術四級；特徵包括指揮與控制戰、情報戰、電子戰、心理戰、空間控制戰、黑客戰、虛擬戰、經濟戰、戰略和精確的較量等；特點有復雜、透明、目標有限、持續時間短、毀傷小、戰鬥空間大、部隊疏散、綜合性強、指揮能力要求強等；原則上採取切斷、蒙蔽、透明、快速瓜和提高生存力等措施。他對信息戰的辦公室和分析有助於人們更深入了解中國的信息戰。

中國另一位界定信息戰的作者是解放軍總參謀部的袁將軍，他在１９９９年撰寫的書中認為：“信息戰是一場奪取和保持信息控制權而進行的鬥爭，是敵對雙方之間爭奪獲取控制和使用信息主動權的鬥爭，他們在使用和保護己方各種信息戰資源和信息系統的同時，會利用和破壞敵方的信息資源、信息系統和基於信息的武器系統。

２０００年，王普鋒將軍對“信息戰爭”作了比以往更深入透徹的解釋，以別於“信息戰”。王將軍認為，信息戰爭指的是一種戰爭和一種戰爭模式；信息戰指的是一種作戰和一種作戰模式。之種新作戰模式指的是在計算機網絡窨進行的行動。信息戰包括信息探測系統、信息傳輸系統、信息和武器攻擊系統以及信息處理和應用系統。信息戰爭包含信息戰，兩者將信息和能力融為一體，使用以信息網絡為基礎的戰場作為他們的活動場所。

信息戰訓練

１９９９年２月，一篇關於信息戰訓練的有趣文章將信息戰界定為知識型戰爭，是高智能人才之間力量的特殊較量。該定義源於這樣一個事實：高技術戰爭需要指揮員和操作員有很高的知識、很強的心理素質、指揮能力和作戰技術。
中國軍方領導人在認識到上述幾方面與較發達國家存在的差距後，決定在各級開展訓練活動。將人員按年齡分為３類：

第一類為支撐型人才，主要目標是４０多歲以上的各級領導幹部。目的是通過訓練（從機械化概念到模擬計算機戰鬥）消除他們的信息盲區，轉變他們的觀念，使其將新思維應用到未來戰爭中去。訓練內容包括：信息技術基礎、信息戰理論、信息戰武器普及知識。訓練方法彩短訓班和其他輔助方法。

第二類為過渡型人才，培養目標是３０－４０歲的干部。作為中國軍隊的未來領導者，他們必須著重提高信息戰環境下的指揮能力。

第三類為再生型人才，培養對象為３０歲以下的干部。這些人早已適應信息社會，擁有現代信息技術理論的良好根基，重點是提高他們的指揮能力和技藝。

各個年齡組的訓練包括：基礎理論（計算機基礎和應用、通信網絡技術、信息高速公路、數字化部隊）；電子對抗；雷達技術；信息戰規律與規則；信息戰略與戰術；戰區與戰略信息戰的信息系統（包括收信紙、處理、輿和使用信息戰指令）；監測、決策和控制系統；信息武器（軟、硬破壞的概念和原則、如何應用信息武器、模擬信息戰）；信息系統保護；計算機病毒攻與防，以及通信網絡的干擾與反干擾。

該文章表明中國正在編制第一流的信息戰課程。然而，後來的報導表明情況並非如此。１９９９年７月的一份《解放軍報》指出：“訓練內容、體制和結構的無理性使信息戰訓練不能真正成為我軍訓練的主流。目前，信息戰訓練處於一種隨心所欲的狀態。內容不系統，運作不規範，缺乏評估標準和管理規章”。

信息戰演練

過去３年，中國舉行過數次重大信息戰軍事演習，每次都很重要，因為那是對信息戰理論的一次檢驗。首次“特種戰”（信息戰）演練於１９９７年１０月進行；某軍區的一個集團軍遭到旨在癱瘓其係統的計算機攻擊，該集團軍用殺毒軟件進行了防衛。該演練被稱為“入侵與反入侵演練”。演習時運用了地面後勤、醫療和空軍部隊。

１９９８年１０月，中國舉行了一場有全國數個軍區聯合進行的高科技綜合演練。聯合防禦作戰演練時首次使用了“軍事信息高速公路”。指揮自動化系統中的信息網絡子系統由數字、撥號、指揮網和保密信道組成。指揮自動化系統的其他部分是指揮作戰、音頻和圖形處理、控制和數據加密等子系統。軍事信息高速公路除傳勢圖外，還發發送圖形、字符和音頻數據。

１９９９年１０月，解放軍首次進行了兩個集團軍之間的戰役級計算機網上對抗演練。演練了偵察與反偵察、干擾與反干擾、封鎖與反封鎖、空襲與反空襲等科目。在軟件環境下進行了資源共享、作戰指揮、態勢顯示、輔助評估、信號傳輸和情報戰等６類作業。計算機評估系統對參演者的表現進行數理與質量分析。
２０００年７月，西南某軍區也進行了網上對抗演練。與此次演練有關的３項訓練任務是：組織和計劃戰役、奪取制空權和製信息權、實施突破和反突破。有１００多台終端聯網參與了演練。三週後，另一個軍區也拉開了高技術演練的帷幕，並向下屬部隊下達開始控制通信線路的命令。

中國的信息戰能力

中國軍事理論家已在信息戰方面找到一個自願、非常經濟和順從的伙伴。這個夥伴將使中國在戰略、軍事和國際地位上趕上西方。這將使中國在未來亞太地區發揮重要的戰略作用。中國可能會逐步引起經濟競爭者的密切關注。

中國異常重視新信息戰部隊所表現出的作用，這方面的各種組織包括：網絡部隊（獨立兵種）、網絡勇士突擊隊、信息保護部隊、信息兵團、電子警察和聯合的人民戰爭網絡機構。後者因其獨特的性質和潛力引起外國分析家格外關注。中國軍事理論家認為，信息戰的勝利將屬於能夠動員最多的計算機專家參加“信息家庭戰”的那一方，他們將採用諸如網點戰那樣的戰略，設法切斷重要的信息節點和接點。

目前，中國的信息戰融合了西方、俄羅斯和中國的思想，然而，有別於俄羅斯和西方的具有中國特色的信息戰詞彙正在逐步形成。中國信息戰應從中國軍事歷史中尋找解決當今問題的答案，如３６計、信息戰的性質和特點看來非常適合這些計策。

但是，中國的信息戰方法還存在許多不足，還不僅僅是數量方面的問題。信息戰作戰理論的核心還涉及到保持基礎設施的完整性和穩定性。在信息時代，基礎設施穩定性與部隊生存能力同等重要。中國的最大弱點恰恰就在基礎設施方面。目前中國正在加速發展電子信息產業，其目的不外乎是為軍民聯用的信息基礎設施打基礎。

中國善於吸取別人的前車之鑑，可能很快就可以組建一支令人刮目相看的信息戰力量。信息戰已迫使中國跨越了若干技術發展階段，利用西方的技術，不僅節省了時間而且還節省了金錢。然而，中國可能不會完全仿效別人，而將採取創造性的或間接的信息戰策略。但不管怎麼樣，中國都是值得關注的一支不同於其他國家的信息戰力量.

Original Date: 新華網（ 2003-06-12 16:0x:xx ）

Original Source:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2003-06/12/content_916888.htm

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China National Cyber Security Strategy, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀, 國家網絡空間安全戰略

China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields // 中國模糊戰爭：未來戰場的發展趨勢

05/04/2017 admin Leave a comment

China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields //

中國模糊戰爭：未來戰場的發展趨勢

With the continuous development of information technology, changing the form, nature and scale of war, so that the combat style, combat methods, combat environment, combat conditions and other elements have been a lot of changes in the past, the future battlefield becomes more blurred, Can be summarized as the following:

War scale and level ambiguity

War in size and level, can be divided into strategies, campaigns and tactics, in the past, the difference between the three very obvious. From the three interrelationships, the strategy decides the battle, the battle determines the tactics, and the tactics reacts to the battle, the battle reacts to the strategy, which is the inherent law of the existence of the war itself. With the development of information technology, the development of high-tech war as information war, although not fundamentally change the strategic, campaign, tactical and counter-role of this dialectical relationship, but it makes the strategy, battle, tactical action scale increasingly blurred. This is because, under the conditions of information under the conditions of local war, the size and use of troops, weapons, limited duration of war, political prominence, war and strategy, battle, tactics combined very closely, tend to one. Information weapons and weapons to combat high precision, powerful, long range, with all-weather, all-weather combination of peaceful reconnaissance and combat integration capabilities for the rapid realization of the purpose of war to provide an effective means, sometimes do not use large forces can Reach the strategy, the battle target. Any combat unit, and even the individual combat operations, can get a strong information and fire support. Under their influence, tactical combat can directly achieve strategic objectives, strategic command can be involved in the tactical level is no longer a dream at any time. Thus, in the past through the local small victory gradually integrated into a strategic victory of the operational theory of the impact of the strategy, campaign, tactical three combat levels between the increasingly blurred.

With the extensive use of precision strike weapons, stealth weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and thus through the first and second fire assault can be reached a battle or strategic objectives. In the Gulf War, the multinational force first through a large-scale strategic air raids, and then through the ground operations of the various forces reached a war purpose; US invasion of Panama, through the use of the Army to implement the five-way center of the campaign to achieve the desired purpose; In the war in Afghanistan, the US military, through the air strike and the special forces to achieve the purpose of the war; the Iraq war, the US military in the air against the cover, the US Army division through tactical action reached a war purpose. The scale of operation and the ambiguity of the level are the reflection of the essential characteristics of information warfare. In the information war, the hostile parties for the rapid completion of the established strategic objectives, will be extraordinary use of combat power, to maximize the advanced technical weapons and elite troops, and strive to destroy each other in a short time the command and control system to win the battlefield The advantage of making information right. This feature of the information warfare, so that the battle of combat and strategic purposes there is no obvious distinction between the scale of operations there is no clear battle battle difference. A battle may determine the outcome of the war, a battle may also achieve the purpose of war, thus greatly improving the strategic role of the battle battle. Especially the various precision guidance weapons, ballistic missile defense system, reconnaissance surveillance system, stealth weapon, C4ISR system and other information weapons and the extensive use of rapid reaction forces, special forces, strategic reserve and other frequently into the battlefield, making the definition of combat scale fuzzy More prominent.

Therefore, in the future information operations, the two sides will fight with the uncertainty of the scale of operations, to take over-the-line precision strike, non-programmatic “acupuncture” and structural damage and other tactics, against each other’s battlefield awareness system and information systems Quickly achieve the purpose of fighting. In this way, the special operations forces on the battlefield may be able to show their talents, that is, before the war secretly penetrate the enemy, direct attack and paralyze the enemy command and control system, so that the enemy lost control of its combat forces, and thus into the chaos of command, The Although the scale of the operation of the smaller, but for the outcome of the war can play a very important role.

Weapon equipment and functional blur

Technical decision tactics, also determines the army’s system and the composition of military and arms. For example, the emergence of weapons and equipment such as artillery, chemical weapons and radio telegraphy, laid the material foundation for the emergence of new arms such as artillery, chemical warfare, and communications. In terms of military services, due to the emergence of the aircraft, and then produced the Air Force; ship advent, gave birth to the Navy. Industrial era, the requirements of the division of labor, so refined and produced more and more professional, reflected in the composition of the army, is the division of arms and branches more and more fine; information age, requires the overall combat, the professional Close cooperation, and take the road of integrated and integrated operations. Reflected in the composition of the military trend, is the integration of combat systems. For example, many of the future weapons and equipment system will form an independent combat unit, both to complete the army requirements of the combat mission, but also to achieve the Air Force’s operational requirements, but also to achieve the purpose of naval combat. In other words, when the future combat aircraft’s infinite capacity to extend, and beyond the atmosphere combat; Army bid farewell to the “ground crawling” to achieve global arrival, global operations; the Navy to the sea to land, to the air combat capability transformation, Battle will inevitably lead to integrated forces. Integrated combat troops, generally composed of armored forces, artillery, mechanized infantry, missiles, attack and transport helicopters, naval vessels and other components, can independently combat, will realize the professional army to the professional army transition.

Future integration forces will be the main performance, will break the traditional land, sea, air, days and other military system, in accordance with the requirements of system integration, the establishment of “super-integrated” integrated combat forces. The future of information warfare is a highly integrated joint operations, the use of traditional forces of the implementation of joint operations, it is difficult to adapt to this highly integrated joint operations needs. To this end, the future composition of the military organization, will break the traditional land, sea, air, days and other military system, in accordance with the reconnaissance surveillance, command and control, precision strike and support to protect the four operational functions, built four subsystems, namely: Subsystems, command and control subsystems, precision strike and combat subsystems, and support assurance subsystems. The functions of these four subsystems are closely linked and organically linked to form an interdependent large integrated joint combat system. The army constructed in accordance with this idea will fundamentally abandon the pattern of military construction in the industrial age, eliminate the disadvantages of playing the military expertise and pursuing the interests of a single service, so that the combat forces form a “systematic system” or “system integration” Give full play to the overall power, the implementation of the true sense of “super-joint” integrated joint operations.

Military combat operations and the preparation of fuzzy war

Military combat forces have different targets and perform different combat missions. World War II, combat forces mainly infantry-based, basically infantry and infantry confrontation; the Second World War, due to the development of weapons and equipment, aircraft, tanks, cannons for war, arms and arms between the combat The task has a distinct distinction, usually performing a different combat mission. However, under the conditions of information in the local war, due to the development of weapons and equipment to the direction of multi-functional integration, the establishment of the army, not only the arms, as well as various services. Combat forces can perform both ground combat missions, but also the implementation of the fight against air and sea objectives and tasks, so that the boundaries between the military operations will be difficult to distinguish. For example: destroy the enemy tank weapons, may have been the Army’s tanks or anti-tank weapons, it may be the Air Force aircraft or naval submarines launched “smart” missiles. The US military plans to form four integrated forces: an integrated ground force composed of armored forces, artillery, flying warriors, attack and transport helicopters: air-to-air mechanized units with “flying tanks”; air force mixed knits composed of multiple models and A “joint task force” consisting of various military units. The Russian army intends to form a “multi-purpose mobile force”, an “aerospace force” composed of ground, air and space forces, and a “non-nuclear strategic deterrent force” composed of non-strategic nuclear forces.

In the future of localized information warfare, weapons and equipment to the multi-functional, integrated direction, the development of the trend of the trend of mixing, miniaturization. Combat, the arms and arms around the established operational objectives, each other, integrated into the organic whole. On the battlefield, the arms and services will be in the land, sea, air, days, electricity and other multi-dimensional areas, around the purpose of a unified combat, both in the activities of space is relatively independent, but also in the combat operations on a high degree of integration, making different arms and arms The task line becomes more vague.

War motives and ambiguity

The motive of the traditional war is generally the political struggle to cover up the economic interests of the dispute. In the information age, the economic interests of the dispute will continue to lead to the root causes of the war, but in addition, due to the international and domestic political forces between the various contacts increased, closely linked, which will inevitably lead to various countries, And the conflicts between the societies caused by political, diplomatic and spiritual factors have increased, so that the contradictions between religions and nationalities have increased, so that violence can be smuggled and drug trafficking and terrorist activities are internationalized. These contradictions and conflicts are not only the direct cause of the “sub-war operations”, but also one of the causes of the war. The direct cause of the Gulf War in 1991 was the convening of the United Nations Security Council immediately after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the adoption of resolution 660, condemning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and demanding that Iraq be unconditionally withdrawn from its forces. The United States for the protection of Western oil sources and in order to establish a new order in line with the interests of the world’s new order, take the lead in the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq, followed by the United States led the multinational force to implement the UN Security Council resolution in the name of the troops to the Gulf. Through 42 days of war, the US military reached the purpose of the war. The war in Iraq, the United States to Iraq has a weapons of mass destruction on the grounds, without the authorization of the United Nations launched an injustice war. Throughout the war, the focus of US military operations against Saddam Hussein and a handful of Iraqi high-level leaders, and to find weapons of mass destruction and launched the attack. Although the war has overthrew the Saddam regime, the United States still has not found strong evidence that Iraq has such banned weapons. In this war military purpose, the United States is also to test the new operational theory.

In recent years, the US military vigorously advocated military reform. The theory of the war in Iraq is the theory of “cyber-centric warfare” and uses the new theory of “shock and deterrence” put forward in 1996: emphasizing the use of violent firepower, shocking against opponents, regardless of frontier and depth, The enemy to combat, the use of advanced precision guidance technology, against each other’s goals when one side of the pursuit of both sides less casualties; air and ground operations at the same time, the purpose is to destroy each other’s will, so that its regime collapse, so as to achieve war and subdue The purpose of the soldiers. In the Iraq war, the US military did not carry out large-scale strategic bombing, but the use of high-tech and special forces tactics to combat, which is one of the main achievements of US military reform.

War attack and defense blur

The process of attack and defense in the past is very clear, the attacking party usually in accordance with the offensive preparation, breakthrough, shock, deep combat and other step by step attack procedures, defense side in accordance with the defense preparation, fire against the preparation, anti-impact, deep combat and other sub-combat operations Attack and defense both sides of the various stages of combat orderly. The development of high-tech weapons and equipment and information technology, the new military revolution will change the future combat procedures, combat operations will break through the fixed battlefield and position constraints in the entire operational space at all levels, all directions, all aspects of the same time. In this way, the front and rear lines in the past are blurred, the relatively stable front and fixed battlefields no longer exist, the line of offensive action and defensive action because the battlefield’s high mobility and uncertainty also become blurred and influence World military force balance. Offensive and defensive both offensive and defensive combat, especially offensive and defensive information war will become the focus of future combat art, so that every war has attack in the defense, anti-attack.

Attack and defense operations will be in the land, sea, air, days, electricity and outer space and front and depth, front and wing side, front and rear at the same time, the battlefield frequent mobility, line combat style has not adapted to the conditions of local war development Need to, instead of non-line operations, the formation of a “island-based combat base”, front and rear of the line, the enemy and the two sides of the front becomes blurred, the battlefield of the flow of non-linear or non-state state of the multi-dimensional battlefield.

Measure the outcome of the war with the standard fuzzy

In the past, the criteria for measuring the outcome of a war usually refer to how many troops are wiped out, how many weapons are seized, how many cities and territories are occupied, but in the case of local warfare, the criteria for measuring the outcome of a war are not just that. Under the conditions of information, local warfare, political purpose and war are closely integrated, war attempts often not through the invasion of each other’s territory, wiped out the enemy or the enemy completely surrendered, so as not to lead the world public opinion and the people’s strong opposition, resulting in political Passive.

One of the hallmarks of information warfare is that it minimizes casualties, in particular, collateral damage, and often uses precision-guided weapons to strike precisely, to avoid heavy assault, face-to-face fights, and fight against Libya “Surgical” operations, the implementation of air long-range maneuvers, to achieve the purpose of war; also the implementation of missiles, thousands of miles away siege warfare, but also to achieve the purpose of local war; also like the Gulf War, do not occupy its territory, Do not kill their soldiers a soldier, not seized its weapons, ammunition, the implementation of large-scale air strikes, weakened its military facilities, destroyed its regime.

The war army is blurred with the people

In previous wars, the links between the army and the society were relatively “loose” due to restrictions on information infrastructure and technology; pure war weapons and equipment also led to military organizations that were completely independent of the people. Information age, information has become a link between the military and the people, this combination, with the social and military information degree of development, integration will also continue to improve. This makes society and ordinary people no longer a spectator of war, and even not only in support and subordinate status, but with the army, from the back of the war to the front desk.

As people see, on the one hand, the purpose of modern warfare is no longer simply pursuing siege and the greatest annihilation of enemy forces, the target is no longer confined to the enemy’s heavy military and military facilities, but includes Corresponding to the survival and operation of the infrastructure, such as: financial networks, power grids, transport networks, administrative networks, communications networks. On the other hand, the war has a tendency to “civilians”. For example, information makes the “non-state” has the ability to confront national power. Any “non-state subject”, as long as there is a certain technical and information equipment, you can attack the vital goal of a country, its harm is sometimes no less than a traditional sense of the war. Such as Al Qaeda attacks on the United States launched the 9.11 attack, that is the case. Although the composition of the information warfare forces, although still have traces of the war in the past war, but in the form of form and combat quality, due to more information to join the content, in particular, more to join the information of the whole society Warfare ability, so no doubt to determine the specific role of information warfare when the thinking tends to blur, but for combat decision-making and command to bring greater difficulties. With the in-depth development of information technology, the degree of social information will be greatly improved. In this case the information war, it is more prominent military and civilian compatibility characteristics. Especially in the information warfare, many high-tech work, alone, the strength of the army is difficult to complete independently, but also the need for the whole social forces of collaboration, which makes the information warfare combat power, more into the national factors.

Combat both forces with contrast and blur

In the past, the strength of the war between the two sides, usually the number of military personnel, the number of weapons to measure the number of weapons to determine the strength of the advantages of planning and combat operations. But in the information under the conditions of local war, concentrated forces of content and methods have changed. The strength of the comparison is not only the number of considerations, but also mainly consider the quality, in particular, to consider the concentration of firepower and information, a variety of long-range strike weapons do not need to focus on deployment, you can focus on the implementation of the target surprise. To make the concentration of fire after the effective role, but also must focus on a lot of information, otherwise they can not capture, track and destroy the target. The most important weapon in military forces will no longer be a high-performance fighter, bomber, tank, warships, but a huge flood of data from the information system. Invisible information and knowledge, like armored masters, play a huge role in combat and are increasingly becoming the most important combat and power multiplier. Computing power, communication ability, reconnaissance ability, processing ability, decision-making ability, computer simulation ability, network warfare and other information and knowledge factors will become a key factor in measuring military power.

The contrast of military forces is increasingly dependent on the invisible and difficult potential of the intelligence and structural forces of the information weapons system. Therefore, in the past according to the number of combatants and tanks, aircraft, artillery, warships and other weapons and equipment performance, quantity and other static indicators to assess the strength of military strength is clearly challenged. Because of the intelligence of the information weapon system, the structural force has great potential for dynamic. The strength of the Gulf War contrast and the outcome of the war can explain this problem. Before the war, Iraq and the multinational force compared to 1.6: 1, but the result of the war is the Iraqi army casualties for the multinational force 100 times. Obviously, if not a large number of multinational force weapons system to play a multiplier combat potential, there will be no such a war situation. It can be seen that the principle of force assessment of the number of static quantities will be replaced by a new force theory.

Battlefield information is true and false

Because of the development of information technology, and widely used in future war, so that a large amount of modern war information, processing information has been very difficult. Such as: the US Strategic Air Force Command, an average of more than 815,000 per month to deal with military information, almost 26,500 copies per day. In the Gulf War, the multinational force in the 42 days of combat, dealing with up to millions of military information. Only the US Army logistics will handle 10,700 copies of military information every day. After the military, weapons and equipment and the battlefield are digitized, the military information highway will cover the entire combat space, the information is true and false, there are new and old, heavy and light, there is real, there are thick and so on, information Like the tide to the red and blue both sides of the command came. In such a fast-paced, fighter fleeting, information massive battlefield environment, to the red and blue commander of a brief decision-making time, forcing both commanders in the complex battlefield information forging discrimination, analysis and judgment, quick decision-making , Through the phenomenon to seize the essence, improve the command ability.

Battlefield space and scope is blurred

Battlefield is the enemy of the two sides of the interaction between combat forces and combat forces and firepower to kill the maximum distance. In the past war, due to the level of weapons and equipment constraints, cold weapons era battlefield space, basically confined to the war between the two sides of the visual distance; hot weapons and mechanized war era, battlefield space by the firearms and the two sides of the maneuverability And the battlefield space is expanding, and from a single land battlefield, to the development of the marine battlefield and air battlefield; combat distance from the visual distance to the development of remote and ultra-long-range , The depth and dimension of the battlefield continue to expand. After entering the information warfare, with the development of military weapons and equipment and structure changes, modern warfare space from the traditional land, sea and air to space, computer space, especially information, psychology, electromagnetic, cognitive and other virtual space expansion , In addition to the range of modern weapons and equipment and a substantial increase in mobility, the future battlefield in front and rear become increasingly blurred, in addition to the solid space in the solid before and after the exception, in the dynamic action space has no difference. Fighting may start from the front, it may start from the depth. Especially the establishment of digital forces, so that the army choose the way of combat operations, with greater freedom and flexibility. At the same time, but also to accurately determine the other side of the operational space and the exact location of the space, increasing the complexity. First, information weapons greatly improve the military’s ability to war, so that the military battlefield combat more flexible way. Second, information weapons greatly enhance the military’s full-time, all-round rapid mobility, so that information warfare warfare areas to expand.

Military aerospace capacity and long-range air transport capacity, the extensive use of armed helicopters, to achieve long-range rapid maneuver provides a good material basis. Future information warfare, or in three-dimensional space or in four-dimensional space, generally difficult to accurately grasp. And only when the other side of the combat operations to a certain size, it is possible to make a relatively accurate judgments, which to some extent increased the difficulty of command and control. The ambiguity of combat space is also manifested in the fuzzy scope of combat operations. As the future of information operations will break through the frontier to the depth of the gradual advance of the pattern, in a multi-dimensional space within the full range, full depth of the war, so that the scope of combat operations increased, combat space has become elusive. The uncertainty of the scale of combat operations in the information warfare determines the diversity of combat space. This also makes it possible to judge the space of the other combat operations, become blurred, and show the characteristics of difficult to predict and control.

Combat methods and methods are blurred

Advanced information technology, not only to achieve the real-time reconnaissance intelligence and digital battlefield, greatly improving the combat effectiveness of the army, more importantly, there have been many new means of warfare: such as information warfare momentum and power to make enemies Information deterrence; to disperse, conceal and open the information channel of the information shielding; on the enemy battlefield awareness system and information system implementation of information attacks; through the information system hidden false information fraud and information cut, computer virus attacks , Special operations, psychological warfare, non-contact operations, non-fatal attacks, structural damage warfare, these combat methods used in information warfare, completely changed the past offensive and defensive procedures clear and coherent characteristics, so that the use of combat means Order, combat form of non-model and other characteristics of more and more prominent, and then led to the information warfare, the use of the enemy means of warfare, timing and methods, become more difficult to guess. In the process of the combination of fuzzy, that is, in the course of the war, due to the enemy due to the appropriate choice of means of attack, and flexible combination, so that the enemy can not determine what the other side will take the means of combat, can not effectively take the appropriate protective measures. In the use of the timing of the fuzzy, that is, according to the intention of war and combat purposes, for different stages of combat and different areas of combat, to take different means of attack, reduce the enemy resistance will make it in trouble. In the fight against the ambiguity of the target, that is, the use of information warfare means of diversification, for the needs of information operations, both sound East West, but also the East and East, the flexibility to combat the enemy command center, communication center or radar station, air defense system , Logistical support systems and other key nodes, so that the enemy is difficult to use the means of my war to make accurate predictions.
原文網址：https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

Original Mandarin Chinese:

隨著信息技術的不斷發展，改變了戰爭的形態、性質和規模，使作戰樣式、作戰方法、作戰環境、作戰條件等諸要素已較以往發生了諸多變化，未來戰場變得更加模糊不清，可歸納為以下幾種：

戰爭規模與層次模糊

戰爭在規模和層次上，可劃分為戰略、戰役和戰術，在以往戰爭中三者之間的區別十分明顯。從三者相互關係上，戰略決定戰役，戰役決定戰術，而且戰術反作用於戰役，戰役又反作用於戰略，這是戰爭本身存在的內在規律。隨著信息技術的發展，高技術戰爭發展為信息化戰爭，雖然未從根本上改變戰略、戰役、戰術這種作用與反作用的辯證關係，但是卻使戰略、戰役、戰術行動規模的日益模糊。這是因為，信息化條件下局部戰爭目的、規模和使用兵力、兵器有限，戰爭持續時間短，政治性突出，戰爭與戰略、戰役、戰術結合得十分緊密，趨於一體。信息化武器和兵器打擊精度高、威力大、射程遠，具有全天候、全時空的平戰結合的偵察與打擊一體化能力，為迅速達成戰爭目的提供了有效手段，有時不動用大部隊也能達成戰略、戰役目標。任何一個作戰單元，甚至是單兵的戰鬥行動，都能得到強大的信息和火力支援。在它們的作用下，戰術打擊可以直接達成戰略目的，戰略指揮可以隨時介入戰術層次已不再是夢想。由此可見，以往通過局部小勝逐步匯集成戰略性勝利的作戰理論受到衝擊，戰略、戰役、戰術三個作戰層次間的界線日益模糊。

隨著大量使用精確打擊兵器、隱形兵器、無人機，因而通過一、二次火力突擊就可達成戰役或戰略目標。海灣戰爭中，多國部隊首先是通過大規模的戰略空襲行動，爾後通過地面諸軍種聯合作戰達成了戰爭目的；美軍入侵巴拿馬，是通過動用陸軍實施五路重心攻擊的戰役行動達成了預期目的；阿富汗戰爭中，美軍主要通過空中精確打擊和特種部隊搜剿達成了戰爭目的；伊拉克戰爭中，美軍在空中打擊掩護下，美國陸軍師通過戰術行動達成了戰爭目的。作戰規模、層次的模糊性，是信息戰本質特徵的反映。在信息戰中，敵對雙方為迅速達成既定的戰略目的，將會超常使用作戰力量，最大限度地投入先進的技術兵器和精銳部隊，力求在短時間內摧毀對方的指揮控制系統，以奪取戰場上制信息權的優勢。信息戰的這一特點，使戰役戰鬥與戰略目的沒有明顯的區分，作戰規模也沒有明確的戰役戰鬥的區別。一次戰役既可能決定戰爭的勝負，一次戰鬥也可能實現戰爭的目的，從而大幅度地提高了戰役戰鬥的戰略作用。特別是各種精確制導武器、彈道飛彈防禦系統、偵察監視系統、隱形武器、C4ISR系統等信息化兵器的廣泛運用和快速反應部隊、特種部隊、戰略預備隊等頻繁投入戰場，使得作戰規模的界定模糊性更加突出。

因此，在未來信息作戰中，作戰雙方都將以不確定的作戰規模，採取超視距精確打擊、非程式化「點穴」和結構破壞等戰法，打擊對方的戰場感知系統與信息系統，以便迅速地達成作戰目的。這樣，戰場上的特種作戰部隊就可能大顯身手，即在戰前秘密地深入敵後，直接攻擊和癱瘓敵指揮控制系統，使敵失去對其作戰力量的控制，從而陷入指揮混亂、協調無序的困境。這種規模的作戰雖然較小，但對於作戰的勝負卻能起到極其重要的作用。

武器裝備與功能模糊

技術決定戰術，同樣也決定著軍隊的編制體制和軍兵種構成。例如，火炮、化學武器、無線電報機等武器裝備的出現，為炮兵、防化兵、通信兵等新兵種的出現奠定了物質基礎。就軍種而言，由於飛機的出現，進而產生了空軍；船舶的問世，催生出了海軍。工業時代，要求的是分工合作，所以細化和產生的專業越來越多，體現在軍隊的構成上，就是軍兵種劃分得越來越細；資訊時代，要求的是整體作戰，各專業之間密切協同，走集成一體化聯合作戰之路。反映在軍隊的構成趨勢上，就是作戰系統的一體化。比如，未來許多武器裝備系統將形成一個獨立的作戰單元，既可完成陸軍要求的作戰任務，也可實現空軍的作戰要求，還可達到海軍的作戰目的。換句話說，當未來作戰飛機的續航能力無限延長，並超越大氣層作戰；陸軍告別「地面爬行」，實現全球抵達、全球作戰；海軍實現由海到陸、到空的作戰能力轉化之時，一體化作戰必然催生一體化部隊。一體化作戰部隊，一般由裝甲兵、炮兵、機械化步兵、飛彈、攻擊和運輸直升機、海軍艦艇等組成，能獨立作戰，將實現專業軍隊向職業化軍隊過渡。

未來一體化部隊將主要表現為，將打破傳統的陸、海、空、天等軍種體制，按照系統集成的要求，建立「超聯合」的一體化作戰部隊。未來信息化戰爭是高度一體化聯合作戰，使用傳統的諸軍種力量實施聯合作戰，已難以適應這種高度一體化聯合作戰的需要。為此，未來軍隊組織的編成，將打破傳統的陸、海、空、天等軍種體制，按照偵察監視、指揮控制、精確打擊和支援保障四大作戰職能，建成四個子系統，即：探測預警子系統、指揮控制子系統、精確打擊與作戰子系統和支援保障子系統。這四個子系統的功能緊密銜接，有機聯繫，構成一個相互依存龐大的一體化聯合作戰系統。按照這個思路構建的軍隊，將從根本上拋棄工業化時代軍隊建設的模式，革除偏重發揮軍種專長和追求單一軍種利益的弊端，使作戰力量形成「系統的系統」或「系統的集成」，從而能夠充分發揮整體威力，實施真正意義上「超聯合」的一體化聯合作戰。

軍兵種作戰任務與編制模糊

軍兵種作戰力量具有不同的打擊目標和執行不同作戰任務。第一次世界大戰，作戰力量主要以步兵為主，基本上是步兵與步兵的對抗；第二次世界大戰，由於武器裝備的發展，飛機、坦克、大炮用於戰爭，軍兵種之間的作戰任務有了明顯區分，通常執行不同的作戰任務。但是在信息化條件下局部戰爭中，由於武器裝備向多功能一體化方向上發展，部隊的編制內，不僅有各兵種，還有各軍種。作戰部隊既能執行地面作戰任務，又能執行打擊空中和海上目標任務，使軍種間作戰的界線將不易區分。例如：摧毀敵方坦克的兵器，可能是已方陸軍的坦克或反坦克兵器，也可能是空軍的飛機或海軍潛艇發射的「智能」型飛彈。美軍計劃組建四種一體化部隊：由裝甲兵、炮兵、飛彈兵、攻擊與運輸直升機組成的一體化地面部隊：編有「飛行坦克」的陸空機械化部隊；由多機種組成的空軍混編聯隊和中隊；由各軍種部隊組成的「聯合特遣部隊」。俄軍擬組建集各軍兵種於一體的「多用途機動部隊」，由地面、空中和太空兵力組成的「航空航天部隊」，以及由各軍種非戰略核力量組成的「非核戰略威懾部隊」。

在未來信息化局部戰爭中，武器裝備向多功能、一體化方向發展，部隊的編制趨向混合化、小型化。作戰中，各軍兵種圍繞既定的作戰目標，彼此依存，融為有機的整體。在戰場上，各軍兵種將在陸、海、空、天、電等多維領域，圍繞統一的作戰目的，既在活動空間上相對獨立，又在作戰行動上高度融合，使得不同軍兵種所執行的任務界線變得更加模糊。

戰爭動因與目的模糊

傳統戰爭的動因一般是政治鬥爭掩蓋下的經濟利益之爭。在資訊時代，經濟利益之爭仍將是導致戰爭的根本原因，但除此之外，由於各國之間、國際國內各派政治力量之間交往增多，聯繫密切，這就必然導致各個國家、民族、社團之間由政治、外交、精神等因素引發的衝突增多，使宗教、民族矛盾上升，使暴力活動、走私販毒、恐怖活動國際化。這些矛盾與衝突不僅是「亞戰爭行動」的直接根源，也是導致戰爭的動因之一。1991年海灣戰爭直接動因，是1990年8月2日伊拉克入侵科威特之後，聯合國安理會立即召開會議，通過了660號決議，譴責伊拉克入侵科威特，要求伊拉克無條件從科撤軍。美國出於保護西方石油來源和為建立符合其利益的世界新秩序的目的，乘虛而入帶頭對伊拉克實施經濟制裁，隨後以美國為首的多國部隊以執行聯合國安理會決議為名，出兵海灣。通過42天的交戰，美軍達到了戰爭目的。伊拉克戰爭，美國以伊拉克擁有大規模殺傷性武器為由，沒有經過聯合國授權而發動的一場非正義戰爭。整個戰爭中，美軍作戰的重心是針對薩達姆等少數伊拉克高層領導人，並以尋找大規模殺傷性武器而展開的攻擊行動。雖然戰爭已經推翻了薩達姆政權，但是美國至今仍然沒有找到伊拉克擁有這種違禁武器的有力證據。在這場戰爭軍事目的上，美國也是為了試驗新的作戰理論。

近幾年，美軍大力倡導軍事變革。指導伊拉克戰爭的理論是「網絡中心戰」理論，並運用1996年提出的「震撼與威懾」的新理論：強調運用猛烈的火力，震撼性打擊對手，不分前沿和縱深，全方位迅速地對敵人進行打擊，運用先進的精確制導技術，打擊對方目標時片面追求雙方較少的傷亡；空中與地面行動同時展開，目的是摧毀對方的意志，使其政權崩潰，從而達到不戰而屈人之兵的目的。伊拉克戰爭中，美軍沒有進行大規模的戰略轟炸，而是利用高技術加特種兵的戰術進行作戰，這是美軍軍事變革的主要成果之一。

戰爭進攻與防禦模糊

以往攻防作戰的程序十分明，進攻一方通常按照進攻準備、突破、衝擊、縱深作戰等步步進攻程序進行，防禦一方按照防禦準備、火力反準備、反衝擊、縱深抗擊等分段抗擊作戰程序進行，攻防雙方各個作戰階段展開有序。而高技術武器裝備和信息技術的發展，新軍事革命將改變未來作戰程序，作戰行動將突破固定的戰場和陣地的限制，在整個作戰空間的各個層次、各個方向、各個方面同時進行。這樣一來，以往戰爭中的前後方界線模糊，相對穩定的正面和固定的戰場不復存在，進攻行動和防禦行動的界線因為戰場的高度流動性和不確定性也變得模糊不清並影響世界軍事力量平衡。攻防兼備、攻防一體作戰尤其是攻防一體的信息戰將成為今後作戰藝術的焦點，使每一次戰爭都有攻中有防、防中有攻。

攻防作戰將在陸、海、空、天、電以及外層空間和前沿與縱深、正面與翼側、前方與後方同時展開，戰場機動頻繁，線式作戰樣式已不適應信息化條件下局部戰爭發展的需要，取而代之的是非線式作戰，形成一種「島嶼式作戰基點」，前方與後方的界線、敵我雙方的戰線變得模糊，戰場呈現流動的非線性或無戰線狀態的多維立體戰場。

衡量戰爭勝負與標準模糊

以往衡量一場戰爭勝負的標準通常指的是殲滅對方多少兵力，繳獲多少武器，占領多少城鎮和領土，然而在未來信息化條件下局部戰爭中，衡量一場戰爭勝負的標準已不只是這些。信息化條件下的局部戰爭，政治目的與戰爭結合得緊密，戰爭企圖往往不通過侵入對方領土，全殲敵軍或使敵方徹底投降，以免引發世界輿論的和民眾的強烈反對，造成政治上的被動。

信息化戰爭的一大特點是，將使傷亡、破壞，特別是附帶性破壞減少到最低限度，通常使用精確制導武器精確打擊，避免重兵集結進行面對面的拼殺，打一場像美軍懲罰利比亞發動的「外科手術式」作戰，實施空中遠程機動空襲，達成戰爭目的；也可實施飛彈，進行遠隔千里的攻城戰，也能達成局部戰爭的目的；也可像海灣戰爭那樣，不占領其國土，不殺傷其一兵一卒，不繳獲其武器、彈藥，實施的大規模的空襲戰，削弱其軍事設施，搗毀其國政權。

戰爭軍隊與民眾模糊

以往的戰爭，由於受信息基礎設施和技術的限制，軍隊與社會的聯繫相對「鬆散」；純戰爭的武器裝備亦導致完全獨立於民間之外的軍事組織。資訊時代，信息成為軍民結合的紐帶，這種結合，隨著社會和軍隊的信息化程度的發展，融合程度也將不斷提高。這就使得社會和普通民眾不再是戰爭的旁觀者，甚至也不僅處於支援和從屬地位，而是與軍隊一樣，從戰爭的幕後走向了前台。

正如人們看到的，一方面，現代戰爭的目的已不再單純地追求攻城掠地和最大限度地殲滅敵有生力量，打擊目標亦不再局限於敵方的重兵集團和軍事設施，而是包括對應賴以生存和運轉的基礎設施，如：金融網、電力網、交通網、行政網、通信網等。另一方面，戰爭有向「平民化」發展的趨勢。比如，信息化使得「非國家主體」具備了與國家力量進行對抗的能力。任何一個「非國家主體」，只要具備一定的技術和信息設備，就可以對一個國家的要害目標進行攻擊，其危害有時並不亞於一場傳統意義上的戰爭。比如基地組織對美發動的9·11襲擊，就是如此。信息戰力量的構成，雖然仍具有以往戰爭全民參戰的痕跡，但是在構成的形式和作戰的質量上，由於較多地加入了信息化的含量，特別是較多地加入了全社會民眾的信息戰能力，所以無疑使判斷信息戰具體參與力量時的思維趨於模糊，而為作戰決策與指揮帶來較大的困難。隨著信息技術深入發展，社會民眾的信息化程度也將極大地提高。在這種情況下的信息戰，就更加突出軍民兼容的特徵。特別在信息戰中，許多高技術工作，僅靠軍隊的力量難以獨立完成，還需要全社會力量的協作，這就使信息戰的作戰力量，較多地融入了全民皆兵的因素。

作戰雙方力量對比與能力模糊

以往交戰雙方力量對比，通常以軍隊人員數量多少、各種武器多少的比數來衡量力量優勢，進行籌劃攻防作戰。但在信息化條件下局部戰爭中，集中兵力的內容和方式有所改變。力量的對比不只是考慮數量多少，更主要是考慮質量，尤其是要考慮集中火力和信息，各種遠程打擊兵器不需要集中部署，就可對目標實施集中突擊。要使集中後的火力有效地發揮作用，還必須集中大量信息，否則就無法捕捉、跟蹤和摧毀目標。軍事力量中最重要的武器將不再是高性能的戰鬥機、轟炸機、坦克、戰艦，而是由信息系統湧現的巨大數據洪流。無形的信息和知識像裝甲雄師一般，在作戰中發揮巨大的作用，並日益成為最重要的戰鬥力和力量倍增器。計算能力、通信能力、偵察能力、處理能力、決策能力、計算機模擬能力、網絡戰等信息和知識因素都將成為衡量軍事力量的關鍵因素。

軍事力量的對比，越來越多地取決於信息武器系統的智力和結構力所帶來的無形的、難以量化的巨大潛力。因此，以往根據作戰人數和坦克、飛機、大炮、軍艦等武器裝備的性能、數量等靜態指標評定軍事力量強弱的方法顯然受到了挑戰。因為信息武器系統的智力、結構力具有巨大的動態潛力。海灣戰爭的兵力對比和戰爭結局就可說明這個問題。戰前，伊拉克與多國部隊的兵力對比是1．６：１，但戰爭結果是伊軍的傷亡為多國部隊的100倍。顯然，如果不是多國部隊的大量信息武器系統發揮出成倍的作戰潛力，是不會有如此戰局。可見，靜態數質量指標的力量評估原則將會被一種全新的力量理論所取代。

戰場信息真與假模糊

由於信息技術的發展，並廣泛運用於未來戰爭，使現代戰爭信息量很大，處理信息已經十分困難。如：美國戰略空軍司令部，平均每月要處理軍事信息815000多份，差不多每天處理26500份。在海灣戰爭中，多國部隊在42 天作戰中，處理軍事信息多達數百萬份。僅美國陸軍後勤每天就要處理軍事信息10700份。在軍隊、武器裝備和戰場都實現數字化以後，軍事信息高速公路將覆蓋整個作戰空間，這些信息有真有假、有新有舊、有重有輕、有虛有實、有粗有細等，信息像潮水般地向紅藍雙方指揮所湧來。在這樣快節奏、戰機稍縱即逝、信息海量戰場環境中，給紅藍雙方指揮員短暫決策處理時間，逼著雙方指揮員在錯綜複雜的戰場信息中鍛鍊辨別力、分析判斷力、快速決策力，透過現象抓住本質，提高指揮能力。

戰場空間與範圍模糊

戰場是指敵對雙方作戰力量相互作用並加上作戰力量機動和火力殺傷的最大距離。以往戰爭中，由於受武器裝備水平的限制，冷兵器時代的戰場空間，基本局限在交戰雙方的目視距離之內；熱兵器和機械化戰爭時代，戰場空間由火器的射程和雙方兵力的機動能力所決定，並隨著火器(炮)射程和兵力機動能力的不斷提高，戰場空間日漸擴大，並由單一的陸地戰場，發展到海洋戰場和空中戰場；作戰距離則由目視距離發展到遠程和超遠程，戰場的縱深和維度不斷拓展。進入信息化作戰後，隨著軍隊武器裝備和結構的發展變化，現代戰爭的作戰空間又從傳統的陸、海、空向太空、計算機空間，特別是信息、心理、電磁、認知等虛擬空間拓展，加之現代武器裝備的射程及機動能力大幅提高，未來戰場的前方和後方變得日漸模糊，除了在固態的地理空間上有前後之分外，在動態的行動空間上已無先後之別。戰鬥既可能從前方打響，也可能從縱深開始。特別是數字化部隊的建立，使軍隊選擇作戰行動的方式，具備了更大的自由度和靈活性。同時，也為準確地判斷對方作戰行動空間的具體範圍和準確位置，增加了複雜度。一是信息化武器大大提高了軍隊的遠戰能力，使軍隊的戰場打擊方式更加靈活。二是信息化武器大大增強了軍隊的全時空、全方位快速機動能力，使信息戰的交戰區域更加擴大。

軍事航天能力和遠程空運能力的提高，武裝直升機的廣泛運用，為實現遠距離快速機動提供了良好的物質基礎。未來信息戰，或在三維空間或在四維空間進行，一般不易準確把握。而只有當對方的作戰行動達到一定規模時，才有可能作出相對準確的判斷，這在一定程度上增加了指揮和控制的難度。作戰空間的模糊性，還表現在作戰行動範圍的模糊。由於未來信息作戰將打破由前沿向縱深逐次推進的格局，在多維的空間內進行全方位、全縱深的交戰，就使作戰行動的範圍增大，作戰空間變得難以捉摸。信息戰所具有的作戰行動規模的不確定性，決定了作戰空間的多樣性。這也使判斷對方作戰行動的空間，變得模糊起來，而呈現出不易預測和控制的特點。

作戰手段與方法模糊

先進的信息技術，不僅實現了偵察情報的實時化和戰場數字化，極大地提高了軍隊的戰鬥效能，更重要的是出現了許多嶄新的作戰手段：如以信息戰的聲勢和威力使敵懾服的信息威懾；以分散、隱蔽和廣開信息通道的方法進行的信息屏蔽；對敵戰場認識系統和信息系統實施的信息攻擊；通過信息系統隱真示假行動的信息欺騙以及信息割斷、計算機病毒襲擊、特種作戰、心理戰、非接觸作戰、非致命攻擊、結構破壞戰等，這些作戰手段運用於信息戰，完全改變了以往攻防作戰程序清晰、連貫性強的特點，使作戰手段運用的非有序性、作戰形式的非模式化等特點越來越突出，進而導致了在信息戰中，對敵方作戰手段運用的規律、時機和方法，變得更加難以揣度。在手段組合上的模糊，即在作戰過程中，因勢因敵恰當地選擇打擊手段，並靈活地進行組合，使敵無法判斷對方將要採取何種作戰手段，無法有效地採取相應的防護措施。在運用時機上的模糊，即根據作戰的意圖和作戰目的，針對不同的作戰階段和不同的作戰領域，採取不同的打擊手段，降低敵抵抗意志，使之陷入困境。在打擊目標上的模糊，即利用信息戰作戰手段多樣化的特點，針對信息作戰的需要，既可聲東擊西，亦可聲東擊東，靈活地打擊敵指揮中心、通信中心或雷達站、防空系統、後勤保障系統等關鍵節點，使敵難以對我作戰手段的運用作出準確的預測。
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China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Organization - Intelligence

中國軍事戰雲 ~ Chinese Military Use of the Battle Cloud

03/28/2017 admin Leave a comment

中國軍事戰雲 ~ Chinese Military Use of the Battle Cloud

“Cloud” is a metaphor of the network, the Internet, “cloud concept” is one of the hottest high-tech concept in recent years, its Internet, efficient, shared and other characteristics, not only profound impact and change our lives, Is also promoting major changes in the military field. In 2013, the US Air Force for the first time the “cloud concept” into the field of operations, put forward the “operational cloud” concept, and quickly get the US Department of Defense, Navy and other military recognition, and gradually become the US military response to the 21st century, a new information war Strategy.

Why –

Intended to build the new US military superiority

In the 21st century, the US military has launched a number of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria in the name of anti-terrorism and the suppression of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Every time the war is almost entirely dominated by powerful information and firepower, Quickly won the war. But the US military has a clear sense of this: the above war a few US military did not encounter a truly strong opponent, the war in the United States to grasp the absolute air power and the right to information under the low confrontation environment, the future if the loss of absolute space and information advantages , The US military will be difficult to maintain control of the battlefield. The US military believes that if you want to maintain a sustained battlefield advantage in future wars, facing an unprecedented “threat and challenge”:

Rival strong “anti-entry / regional denial” threat. The US military believes that its information in previous local wars, the advantages of firepower, mainly rely on a strong space-based information systems, large-scale maritime combat platform, joint command and control center, etc., and in the “opponents into the area and the ability to continue Enhance the “background, especially in the face of a large number of” precision-guided long-range cruise missiles and ballistic missiles “threat, these traditional strengths and the strength of the US military to rely on these forces formed by the combat style” will not be renewed, “” opponents Can be a small number of key nodes through the attack quickly paralyzed US military combat power system.

The Challenges of Advanced Combat Weapons and Backward Combat. In the new century, after a large number of equipment F-22 advanced stealth fighters, the US military has ushered in F-35 fighters, DDG-1000 missile destroyers, Ford-class aircraft carrier and other highly informative weapons and equipment. But the appearance of the US military command and control, but also remain in the 2003 “free Iraq” action, highly dependent on satellite, early warning aircraft and other core equipment platform “network-centric war” era. Former US Air Force Secretary Mike Wayne exclaimed: “Just as the use of the 20th century mechanized forces in the First World War was fighting in the 19th century, we now have the danger of fighting in the twentieth century in the twentieth century. “The US military in urgent need of new operational theory to activate the new information technology equipment combat potential,” to regain the US military and rival superiority. ”

Combat power to maintain the challenges with the defense budget tightening. In the United States “financial crisis” “debt crisis” and “national security needs continue to grow” and other factors, the US military arms are also caught in financial dilemma. In the same report, the US Air Force is mainly from the old A-10, F-15/16, B-1, B-1, the first deputy chief of staff, 52 aircraft and B-2 and a small number of F-22, F-35, not enough to meet the opponent’s “anti-entry and regional denial” capabilities, and called to “change strategy” to deal with “available for defense resources The proportion of decline “challenge.

These “threats and challenges” that the US military consider themselves are the context of the concept of “operational cloud”.

Core concept –

To achieve a variety of platforms cross-domain joint operations

In the face of these new “threats and challenges”, in January 2013, the US Air Force Air Combat Command Commander Michael Ostić first proposed the “operational cloud” concept program. In 2014, David de Putura on its basis, the “operational cloud” concept of a comprehensive program, pointed out: “similar to the way cloud computing, ‘combat cloud’ is a kind of military air force use Decentralized air combat, in the evolution of the data chain, anti-jamming communication systems and new targeting tools to support the realization of the air, ground, sea and space field information sharing capabilities jump, and thus maximize the stealth aircraft, accurate Combat weapons, advanced command and control systems, and the combined use of unmanned systems to create large, modular and flexible combat capabilities to ensure that enemies’ attacks on single combat units will not paralyze US operations.

In the same year, the United States “Aviation Week” released a “operational cloud” concept map, described by the orbital space reconnaissance / communications / navigation satellites, airborne early warning aircraft, F-15/16 fighter, maritime aviation battle group, and in-depth integrated air defense system F-22/35 stealth fighter, RQ-180 unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, new long-range bomber (LRS-B) and other multi-dimensional combat unit, jointly build the “air superiority cloud” development prospects, more clearly show the US military “combat Cloud “concept of the whole picture.

From the above US military interpretation and description of the concept of “operational cloud”, we can roughly analyze the characteristics of the US military “operational cloud” and its basic ideas to deal with “threats and challenges”

Battlefield information cross – domain integration. “Combat cloud” relying on “evolving data link, anti-jamming communication system” and other advanced battlefield information network, and “new targeting tool” and other new battlefield sensor system, large data and cloud computing and other information network technology support , Will be widely distributed in space, near the space, air, ground, sea and underwater combat platform of the battlefield intelligence information integration, and real-time seamless operation in the various areas of the platform on-demand distribution. “Combat cloud” formed by the “information sharing capabilities”, both to ensure that the US military on the battlefield on demand is highly transparent, but also to avoid the “anti-entry / regional denial” ability of opponents, its space-based information system , Large-scale maritime combat platform, joint command and control center and other key information nodes “break a little, paralysis of a” situation. The US military envisages that in the “battle cloud” system, the absence of any one or more battlefield nodes will not decisively influence the sharing and distribution of information on the unity of its battlefield.

Group strength distribution operations. With the traditional combat forces of the air forces according to the platform attribute classification allocation, according to the administrative means of combining different ways, “combat cloud” through the “continuous evolution of the data chain, anti-jamming communication system”, the arms of the air force to ” Decentralized air combat form “, according to real-time task requirements, online optimization configuration combination, the formation of” modular “group strength. Each group of forces in a highly integrated cross-domain integration of information support, through the “operational cloud” system of efficient scheduling and control, distribution operations. This group of forces distribution mode of operation, not only inherited the “network-centric war” to obtain the advantages of information, and further developed from the information to the fire distribution, target damage transformation advantages, significantly reduced the combat ” – Review “cycle chain, comprehensively enhance the combat effectiveness of US military information equipment.

Cross – platform platform synergies. Through the “battle cloud” battlefield information cross-domain integration capabilities, three generations of four generations of combat platform to gain dive into the enemy of the five generations of stealth combat platform, unmanned combat platform target information, to achieve an effective blow to the depth of the battlefield; But also to get three generations of four generations of combat platform for long-range fire support, to make up for their own lack of volatility. “Combat cloud” of this inter-generation platform synergies, is considered the US military to deal with “power and financial dilemma” an important means. In September 2014, the outgoing Michael Ostić at the annual meeting of the American Air Force Association made it clear that the US Air Force did not have enough budget to form a full five fleet, to fulfill the role of the Air Force, the highest priority The task is to achieve the “four generations and five generations” of information fusion, collaborative operations.

Development status –

Is changing from concept to actual action

As soon as possible to the “operational cloud” concept program into a practical state, in the United States Department of Defense co-ordination and traction, the US military arms and arms are in line with their own military functions and equipment characteristics, to promote their own “combat cloud” project construction and experiment verification.

Ministry of Defense steadily traction “cloud” infrastructure and conceptual improvement. As early as 2009, the US Department of Defense proposed a concept of data sharing at sea, air and space, and tried to apply the increasingly sophisticated Internet technology to tactical intelligence. In July 2012, the US Department of Defense Chief Information Officer signed the “Ministry of Defense cloud computing strategy” to the military strategy in the form of advancing the process, and continued to carry out “cloud” related storage facilities, computing platform and software services. At present, the US Department of Defense has identified this concept as a “war cloud”, and from the arms and arms, industrial sector and academia deployed personnel, work together to create a perfect “combat cloud” concept program, the ultimate goal is to form an arch Data network, expansion and upgrading of the existing “global information grid” to achieve the maritime warships, combat aircraft, space satellite real-time data sharing.

Each army and arms competing to carry out “combat cloud” project construction. The Air Force is the pioneer of the concept of “operational cloud”, which argues that the key to achieving the “operational cloud” is information fusion and the focus of the “Sky Advantage Cloud” on F-15/16 and F-22/35 Five generations of information on the exchange of information. In 2014, the “Multi-Domain Adaptive System (MAPS) Program” was launched to attempt to integrate the F16-16 Link16 data link, the F-22 IFDL data link, and the F-35’s MADL data link to achieve battlefield data Real-time exchange. US Navy also through the “Naval Integrated Fire Control and Air Defense (NIFC-CA) program” to achieve its use of air E-2D early warning aircraft or sea “Aegis” ship and other combat platforms for the F / A-18E / F and F- 35C and other carrier-based aircraft and the “standard” series of ship-to-air missiles to provide targeted information, and even command the future of the sixth generation F / A-XX multi-purpose fighter aircraft to launch weapons vision. Although the Navy project is not called “combat cloud” due to military interests, the project emphasizes multi-platform information cross-domain integration has a typical “cloud” features. In addition, the US Marine Corps also launched the implementation of its “expeditionary combat sea tactical cloud” project construction.

“Combat cloud” combat mode test verification has been in full swing. September 23, 2014, the US Air Force F-22 for the first time led the joint air raid fleet, the Syrian territory of the “Islamic countries” extreme organizational goals of air strikes. After the completion of the task, when the US Air Operations Commander Mike Hustage in an interview with “defense headlines”, said, “generally believed that stealth is a symbol of the five generations of machines, in fact, the focus is on ‘integration’,” Fusion “makes the F-22 fundamentally different from other platforms,” ”Fusion” is the fundamental feature of the five generations of machines, “” Five generations of machines in front of reconnaissance detection targets, and then let four generations of machines in the area to fight it, you must have ‘combat Cloud ‘, which has the ability to transfer data back and forth. ” The position, but also directly proved that the US Air Force is actively against the “combat cloud” combat mode to carry out actual test verification.

(Author: Air Force Military Theory Institute)

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Jump on the “cloud” end of the wind and thunder

Huyongbo

When we shop online, the website will be based on the previous shopping records to determine our purchase preferences, push a lot of commodity information; when we browse the news, the software will be based on our reading habits, “good” Directional push content topic … … these phenomena are that we have come to a cloud computing era.

“Combat cloud” reason to enter our topic vision, not only because it frequently appeared in the latest US combat theory, everywhere revealed against the “system of combat” thinking, more importantly, it represents the US military cloud computing used in the field of military the latest achievements, reflecting the US military use of scientific and technological achievements to maximize the effectiveness of combat a train of thought.

Like many high-tech, cloud computing first appeared in the commercial field. In August 2006, Google CEO Eric Schmidt first proposed the “cloud computing” concept. Soon, the US military on this new technology showed a strong interest. In 2008, the US Department of Defense and Hewlett-Packard Company to establish a cloud computing infrastructure. Then, the United States air, sea, land and other military services are signed with commercial companies related to cloud computing systems. The US military’s passion for cloud computing has a strong background in the field of information technology, but it also reflects their keen sense of smell and rapid transformation of the latest cutting-edge technology.

In attending the plenary session of the PLA delegation at the Second Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, the Chairman stressed that “it is necessary to take the initiative to discover, cultivate and use the cutting-edge technology that can serve the national defense and army building to capture the potential growth point of military capability development”. Obviously, to promote the field of cloud computing military and civilian collaboration innovation, we are promising. Because, compared to the United States and other developed countries in the field of cloud computing development, China is not backward, some domestic companies have a more mature use of experience. The key is how to combine our military reality, to achieve the transformation of cloud computing technology in the military field.

Of course, we develop the use of cloud computing technology, we must learn from the experience of foreign troops, but not step by step also cloning. The practice of the US military is only to provide a model used. In the era of information revolution boom, through the core key technological breakthrough is possible to achieve “corner overtaking”. Dare to hit the water flow, Fang Xian hero character.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

“雲”是對網絡、互聯網的一種比喻說法，“雲概念”則是近年來最火的高科技概念之一，其互聯、高效、共享等特質，不但深刻影響和改變著我們的生活，也正在推動軍事領域的重大變革。 2013年，美空軍首次將“雲概念”引入作戰領域，提出“作戰雲”概念，並迅速得到美國防部、海軍及其他軍種的認可，逐漸成為美軍應對21世紀下一場信息化戰爭的新方略。

緣何提出——

意在打造美軍新的跨代優勢

進入21世紀，美軍先後以反恐和製止大規模殺傷性武器擴散等名義在阿富汗、伊拉克、利比亞和敘利亞發動多場戰爭，每次戰爭美國幾乎都憑藉強大的信息、火力優勢，完全掌控戰場局面，快速取得戰爭勝利。但美軍高層對此有著清醒意識：以上幾場戰爭美軍並未遇到真正強大的對手，戰爭在美軍掌握絕對製空權和製信息權的低對抗環境下進行，未來倘若喪失絕對的空天和信息優勢，美軍將很難保持對戰場的控制。美軍認為，若想在未來戰爭中保持持續的戰場優勢，面臨著前所未有的“威脅和挑戰”：

對手強大“反進入/區域拒止”能力的威脅。美軍認為，其在歷次局部戰爭中所仰仗的信息、火力優勢，主要依托強大的天基信息系統、大型海上作戰平台、聯合指揮控制中心等獲得，而在“對手反進入與區域拒止能力不斷提升”的背景下，尤其是面對大量“精確制導遠程巡航導彈和彈道導彈”威脅，這些傳統的優勢力量，以及美軍依托這些優勢力量所形成的作戰樣式“都將不可續存”，“對手可以通過對少數關鍵節點的攻擊迅速癱瘓美軍的作戰力量體系”。

先進作戰武器與落後作戰方式的挑戰。進入新世紀，在大量裝備F-22先進隱身戰機後，美軍又先後迎來F-35戰機、DDG-1000導彈驅逐艦、福特級航母等高度信息化武器裝備。但綜觀美軍的作戰指揮與控制，還停留在2003年“自由伊拉克”行動時，高度依賴衛星、預警機等核心裝備平台的“網絡中心戰”時代。美國前空軍部長麥克·韋恩就驚呼：“正如第一次世界大戰使用20世紀的機械化部隊卻在以19世紀的方式作戰，我們現在同樣存在以20世紀的方式在21世紀作戰的危險。 ”美軍急需新的作戰理論來激活新型信息化裝備的作戰潛能，“重拾美軍與對手的跨代優勢”。

作戰力量保持與國防預算緊縮的挑戰。在美國“金融危機”“債務危機”和“國家安全需求不斷增長”等多重因素影響下，美軍各軍兵種也陷入財政窘境。美空軍前情報主管、第一副參謀長大衛·德普圖拉在一份報告中指出，目前美軍空中力量主要由老舊的A-10、F-15/16、B-1、B- 52飛機和B-2以及少量的F-22、F-35組成，不足以應對21世紀對手的“反進入與區域拒止”能力，並呼籲要“改變方略”以應對“可用於國防的資源比重下降”的挑戰。

美軍自認為的這些“威脅和挑戰”，正是其提出“作戰雲”概念的背景。

核心理念——

實現多種平台跨域聯合作戰

面對這些新的“威脅和挑戰”，2013年1月，美空軍空中作戰司令部司令邁克爾·奧斯蒂奇首次提出“作戰雲”概念方案。 2014年，大衛·德普圖拉在其基礎上，對“作戰雲”概念方案進行了全面闡述，指出：“類似於雲計算的方式，’作戰雲’是一種各軍種的空中力量採用分散的空中作戰形式，在不斷進化的數據鏈、抗干擾通信系統和新的瞄準工具等支持下，實現空中、地面、海上和太空領域信息共享能力的躍升，進而最大程度地發揮隱身飛機、精確打擊武器、先進指揮與控制系統以及有人與無人系統結合的優勢，創造出規模化、模塊化的靈活作戰能力，並以此確保敵人對單一作戰單元的攻擊不會癱瘓美軍的作戰行動。”

同年，美國《航空周刊》發布了“作戰雲”構想圖，描述了由在軌太空偵察/通信/導航衛星，空中預警機、F-15/16戰鬥機，海上航空戰鬥群，與深入對方綜合防空系統區的F-22/35隱身戰機、RQ-180無人偵察機、新型遠程轟炸機(LRS-B)等多維作戰單元，共同構建的“空中優勢雲”發展遠景，更加清晰地展現了美軍“作戰雲”概念全貌。

從以上美軍對於“作戰雲”概念的闡釋和描述，我們可以粗略探析美軍“作戰雲”的特徵和其應對“威脅和挑戰”的基本思路：

戰場信息跨域融合。 “作戰雲”依托“不斷進化的數據鏈、抗干擾通信系統”等先進的戰場信息網絡，和“新的瞄準工具”等新型戰場傳感系統，在大數據和雲計算等信息網絡技術的支撐下，將廣泛分佈於太空、臨近空間、空中、地面、海上和水下各域作戰平台的戰場情報信息一體融合，並實時無縫地在各域作戰平台按需分發。 “作戰雲”所形成的這種“信息共享能力”，既保證了美軍對戰場的按需高度透明，同時也避免了具備“反進入/區域拒止”能力的對手，對其天基信息系統、大型海上作戰平台、聯合指揮控制中心等關鍵信息節點“破一點、癱一片”的局面。美軍設想，在“作戰雲”體系中，任何一個和多個戰場節點的缺失，都不會決定性地影響其戰場統一態勢信息的共享和分發。

群組力量分佈作戰。與傳統作戰各軍兵種空中力量按平台屬性分類編配、按行政手段組合的方式不同，“作戰雲”通過“不斷進化的數據鏈、抗干擾通信系統”，將各軍兵種的空中力量以“分散的空中作戰形式”，根據實時任務需求，在線優化配置組合，形成“模塊化”的群組力量。各群組力量在高度一體跨域融合的信息支撐下，通過“作戰雲”體系的高效調度和管控，分佈實施作戰。這種群組力量分佈作戰的模式，既繼承了“網絡中心戰”獲取信息的優勢，又進一步發展了從信息向火力分配、目標毀傷轉化的優勢，大幅縮減了作戰的“偵-控-打-評”週期鏈，全面提升了美軍信息化裝備的作戰效能。

跨代平台協同增效。通過“作戰雲”的戰場信息跨域融合能力，三代四代作戰平台能夠獲得潛入敵縱深的五代隱身作戰平台、無人作戰平台的目標指示信息，實現對縱深戰場的有效打擊；五代隱身作戰平台也能夠獲得三代四代作戰平台的遠程火力支援，彌補自身載彈量不足的劣勢。 “作戰雲”的這種跨代平台協同增效，被認為是美軍應對“力量與財務困局”的重要手段。 2014年9月，即將離任的邁克爾·奧斯蒂奇在美國空軍協會年會上明確表示，美國空軍沒有足夠的預算來組建一支全五代機隊，要履行好空軍的職能，最優先的任務是實現“四代與五代”的信息融合、協同作戰。

發展現狀——

正在由概念向實戰行動轉變

為盡快地將“作戰雲”概念方案轉化到實用狀態，在美國防部的統籌和牽引下，美軍各軍兵種都在結合自身軍種職能和裝備特色，推進自己的“作戰雲”項目建設和實驗驗證。

國防部穩步牽引“雲”基礎建設和概念完善。早在2009年，美國防部就提出了覆蓋海上、空中、太空的數據共享概念，嘗試將日益成熟的互聯網技術應用到戰術情報領域。 2012年7月，美國防部首席信息官簽署了《國防部雲計算戰略》，以軍隊戰略的形式推進這一進程，並持續穩步開展“雲”相關的存儲設施、計算平台和軟件服務建設。目前，美國防部已將這一概念確定為“作戰雲”，並分別從各軍兵種、工業部門和學術界抽調人員，共同著力塑造完善“作戰雲”概念方案，最終目標是要形成一個拱形數據網絡，擴展升級現有“全球信息柵格”，實現海上戰艦、作戰飛機、空間衛星的實時數據共享。

各軍兵種爭相開展“作戰雲”項目建設。美空軍是“作戰雲”概念的先行者，其認為實現“作戰雲”的關鍵是信息融合，並將“空中優勢雲”的重點放在F-15/16等四代機與F-22/35五代機的信息互通上。 2014年啟動了“多域自適應系統（MAPS）計劃”，企圖將F-15/16的Link16數據鏈、F-22的IFDL數據鏈、F-35的MADL數據鏈有機融合，實現戰場數據的實時交換。美海軍也在通過“海軍綜合火控與防空（NIFC-CA）計劃”，實現其用空中E-2D預警機或海上“宙斯盾”艦等作戰平台，為F/A-18E/F和F- 35C等艦載機及“標準”系列艦空導彈提供瞄准信息，甚至指揮未來第六代F/A-XX多用途戰鬥機發射武器的願景。雖然由於軍種利益，海軍項目並不叫“作戰雲”，但其項目強調的多平台信息跨域融合具有典型的“雲”特徵。此外，美海軍陸戰隊也啟動實施了其“遠征作戰海上戰術雲”項目建設。

“作戰雲”作戰模式檢驗驗證已經全面展開。 2014年9月23日，美空軍F-22首次率領聯合空襲機群，對敘利亞境內的“伊斯蘭國”極端組織目標實施空襲作戰。任務完成後，時任美軍空中作戰司令部司令麥克·侯斯塔奇在接受《防務頭條》採訪時，表示“一般認為隱身是五代機的標誌，其實不然，重點在於’融合’”，“’融合’使得F-22與其他平台根本不同”，“’融合’是五代機的根本特徵”，“五代機在前方偵察探測目標，然後讓四代機在防區外打擊它，你必須擁有’作戰雲’，其擁有將數據來回傳輸的能力”。這次表態，也直接證明了美空軍正在積極針對“作戰雲”作戰模式開展實戰性檢驗驗證。

（作者單位：空軍軍事理論研究所）

編輯點評

躍上“雲”端觀風雷

侯永波

當我們在網上購物時，網站會根據以往的購物記錄來判斷我們的購買偏好，推送大量的商品信息；當我們在瀏覽新聞時，軟件同樣會根據我們的閱讀習慣，“投其所好”地定向推送內容話題……這些現像都說明，我們已經來到了一個雲計算時代。

“作戰雲”之所以進入我們的選題視野，不僅僅是因為它頻繁地出現於美軍最新的作戰理論中，處處透露著對抗消解“體系破擊戰”的思維，更重要的是它代表著美軍把雲計算運用於軍事領域的最新成果，反映出美軍運用科技成果最大限度提高作戰效能的一種思路。
像很多高新技術一樣，雲計算最早出現在民用商業領域。 2006年8月，谷歌首席執行官埃里克·施密特首次提出“雲計算”概念。很快，美軍就對這種新技術表現出濃厚興趣。 2008年，美國防部與惠普公司合作建立了一個雲計算基礎設施。緊接著，美國空、海、陸等各軍種都與商業公司簽約設計相關雲計算系統。美軍對雲計算技術的熱情擁抱，有其在信息技術領域處於領先地位的大背景，但同時也反映了他們對最新前沿科技的敏銳嗅覺以及迅速的轉化運用能力。

習主席在出席十二屆全國人大五次會議解放軍代表團全體會議時強調，“要主動發現、培育、運用可服務於國防和軍隊建設的前沿尖端技術，捕捉軍事能力發展的潛在增長點”。顯然，推進云計算領域的軍民協同創新，我們是大有可為的。因為，相比美國等發達國家在雲計算領域的發展，我國並不落後，國內一些公司已經有著較為成熟的運用經驗。關鍵是如何結合我軍實際，來實現雲計算技術在軍事領域的轉化運用。

當然，我們發展運用雲計算技術，須藉鑑外軍的經驗，但絕非亦步亦趨克隆。美軍的做法只是提供了運用的一種模式。在信息革命大潮雲湧的時代，通過核心關鍵性技術突破是有可能實現“彎道超車”的。敢於擊水中流，方顯英雄本色。

Original Source:

2017年03月21日09:52 来源：解放军报

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

03/26/2017 admin Leave a comment

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

Who is responsible for configuring the information resources owned by the United States? Who is responsible for assigning these resources to use the priority order? What measures have we taken to ensure that the Global Information Grid (GIG), the Independent Joint Service System, and the GCCs: Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Global Network Associations (GCCs), which rely on information from them, Trojans (JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force-Global NetOps) security? In recent years, the entire network combat system on the discussion of these issues has not been suspended, the focus of debate is the theater operations in the network operations should play what role.

The US military has announced the deployment of the war command for each theater, and also announced that it would reduce military support in the cross-border areas. For each theater combat command, how to configure the information infrastructure to support the war in the theater has become very important. The enemy may be infiltrated into the critical network system area responsible for military power dispatch, which is often underestimated and even treated as an accident or incidental event, but these intrusion is virtually Made a connection request to block the normal operation of the commercial website, and even led to some of the military logistics business logistics company was marked as invalid. The theater warfare command should ensure that the information conditions of its zone are not affected by external invasions. Countless viruses are destroying the Internet, the Department of Defense system began to be attacked. It is now under discussion whether the Global Network Joint Task Force should be disconnected from the military network on the Internet, but the military is concerned that with the cooperation of commercial suppliers alone, the Department of Defense can not guarantee that all logistical support operations will continue without error To go on. Each theater combat command is not sure about the state of the theater itself, and they are skeptical about the security of the global information grid itself, and they are concerned about their ability to carry out the tasks assigned to it.

(STRATCOM) and the global network of joint contingents in the network operations in the dominant ideology of the impact of the theater operations headquarters of its command and control of the zone has a more global network of operations control institutions to strengthen the United States Strategic Command Weakened. The focus on the operational information grid to the global information grid has also affected, to a certain extent, the battlefield operations command of the global information grid is how to support the theater of the specific behavior of the understanding. This article will introduce the existing command relationship, the war between the theater operations command, the direct relationship between command and combat, the old and emerging joint operational principles of a special case analysis, and finally will be the theater combat command In the network operations should play the role of the proposed recommendations.

Network combat environment

The command and control in cyber warfare is a concept that appeared ten years ago, and its connotation has been evolving. Each of the relevant departments, the theater operations headquarters and the global network of joint contingents have carried out some organizational structure and work focus on the adjustment, but ultimately did not solve their respective roles should play this issue. To really understand why the role of theater warfare in cyber operations will be a problem, it is necessary to clarify the question: where is cyber warfare, what is real cyber warfare, and every What is the organizational structure and command and control structure of the department?

The first thing to explain is, what is the global information grid? According to the definition of Ministry of Defense No. 8100.1, it includes “global interconnection, terminal-to-terminal information transmission capability and joint processing capability.” Ability to collect, process, store, transmit and manage information according to the needs of warriors and policy makers ” This covers government and leased communications information systems and services, as well as other software, security and service support required for global information grids, as well as the Clinger- The National Security System, as defined in Section 5142 of the Cohen Act. According to this definition, the global information grid contains all levels of information systems from the Department of Defense and the national security system, from the tactical level to the strategic level, as well as the interconnected communication system.

Most of the discussion on the command and control of the Global Information Grid Network Operations Center focuses on the defense capabilities of the system, but the content of the network operations is far more than that. The tasks to be accomplished by the network operations include three: departmental management, Content management and network defense, whose purpose is to provide a lack of central support across the boundaries of strategic, tactical and operational concepts, and to support the Department of Defense’s full range of combat, intelligence and mission tasks.

1. Sector management is one of the specific tasks of the global information grid, which is the technology, process and policy management of systems and networks that make up the global information grid, including public sector management, systems management, network management, satellite communications management and Electromagnetic spectrum management of these aspects.

2. Content management refers to managing the information itself in the global information grid. It ensures that information is available to users, operators, and decision makers in real time. Content management includes the search, access, transmission, storage and integration of specific information content of the global information grid.

3. Network defense is the global information grid all the information, including additional information to protect, it mainly includes a number of policies, processes, projects and operations. If necessary, the task can be requested through cross-agency cooperation to complete. It is responsible for the global information grid information security, computer network defense, computer defense response capabilities and critical infrastructure protection.

Now we have learned about the basic organizational structure of the cyber warfare, the next step in the various organizations in the network operations and how they are performing the tasks, which are mainly composed of troops, theater warfare headquarters and global network joint contingents, all of which are With the changes in the battlefield requirements to improve their organizational structure.

The change in the organizational structure of the force is mainly to meet the requirements of the global information grid for information transmission, access, control and protection. Ten years ago, the troops had some changes to regional control in order to adapt to cyber warfare, but those measures eventually developed into centralized controls, and these measures were not preserved. Now it is necessary to understand the composition of the forces in order to better understand why the network operations command and control will become so full of controversy.

GEM: GIG Enterprise Management GCM: GIG Content Management GND: GIG network defense

Army ‘s network operations command and control

The army is the least of all the reforms in the service. The Army continues to hold the previous commander, now known as the Theater Network Operations and Security Centers (TNOSC), which is directly responsible for the various theater war operations. The Army maintains an independent global network operations and security center (GNOSC: Global NetOps and Security Center), all of the battlefield network operations and security centers are its affiliates. The Global Network Operations and Security Center has technical control over the Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, but the Battlefield Operations and Security Center is also part of the Theater Command and is also managed by the Theater Network Command. A typical example is the Army’s battlefield signal The brigade is managed by the Army Service Component Command.

The Global Network Operations and Security Center provides technical guidance to the network operations forces in each theater. The US Army Network Command and the 9th Signal Command are responsible for the technical and management of the Global Network Operations and Security Center. But in wartime, the Global Network Operations and Security Center was also commanded by the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as Army Element.

ACERT: Army Computer Emergency Response Unit

AGNOSC: Army Global Network and Security Center

ASCC: Army Army Command

ARSTRAT: Army Strategic Command (Missile Defense and Strategy)

CIO: Chief Information Officer

GCC: Theater Combat Command (Regional Joint Command, Six of the US Army’s Top Ten Command)

INSCOM: Intelligence and Security Command (one of the Army’s reporting units)

JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NETCOM: Army Network War Command

RCERT: Regional Computer Emergency Response Team

STRATCOM: US Strategic Command

TNCC: Theater Network Operations Control Center

TNOCC: Theater Network Operations and Security Center

G6: Army Command Department of Communications

G2 Army Command Information Department

Installation Network Provider

COMMAND – Strategic level operational command

OPCON: Battle (Battle) Command

TACON: tactical control

GS: Global Strike

TECHCON: echelon

ADCON: management control

Air Force ‘s Network Operations Command Control

The Air Force has chosen a different organizational approach to move the focus from the former headquarters of the Network Operations and Security Center (MAJCOM NOSCs) to the Integrated Network Operations and Security Centers (I-NOSCs: Integrated NetOps and Security Centers). Unlike the Army’s Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, which is managed by the Theater Operations Command, the Air Force’s Integrated Network Operations and Security Center is not affiliated with any theater war command, but only by the Air Force Operations Center (AFNOC : Air Force NetOps Center), which is similar to the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Air Force realizes that the Theater Command must have the power to direct direct operations in its zone, and it is necessary to establish a general support relationship between the Air Force Operations Center and the Theater Operations Command, establishing a dedicated link between the two departments unit. In addition, the Air Force has given a command to the establishment of a communications control center in their respective theater areas. These control centers can be used as a shortcut between the Air Force Operations Center and their respective theater operations.

ACC: Air Warfare Center

AFCHQ: Air Force Command

AFNETOPS: Air Force Network Operations Command

ARSTRAT: Air Force Strategic Command Theater Network Operations Control Center

CIO: Chief Information Officer

I-NOSC: Integrated Network Operations and Security Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

JFCC-NW: Network War Joint Function Composition Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NCC: Network Control Center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNOS: Ibid., Theater Network Operations and Security Center

Naval network operations command control

The Navy and the Air Force, no longer regard the theater as a unit of command. In order to better support global operations, they assisted two existing theater naval warfare centers (RNOSCs) affiliated with the Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) to assist the original two naval schools in Naples and Bahrain Communication master station (NCTMS: Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station). In addition, since most of the Navy’s cyber operations were carried out at sea, they also established Fleet NetOps Centers (FNOCs: Fleet NetOps Centers), echoing the theater and cyber warfare centers located in the United States. The fleet network operations center is the tactical entry point for the fleet to conduct cyber operations, providing network services for audio, video and data for the fleet of the zone, and can be provided when the fleet goes from another area of the fleet network operations center into another area Smooth information transitions. Most unclassified networks are contracted by the US Navy Marine Corps Internet or the US Overseas Overseas Navy Enterprise Network (ONENET: Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network). In order to meet the needs of the battlefield, the Navy established the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet Global Network Operations and Security Center to provide global combat support, as well as the establishment of a war zone network combat and security center of the theater network security center on each Specific battlefield support. There is no subordinate relationship between the Theater Network Operations and Security Center and the theater operations headquarters in the theater.

Fleet NOC: Fleet Network Operations Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

INSCON: Ibid., Army Intelligence and Security Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NAVGNOSC: Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center

NAVSOC: Navy Satellite Operations Center

NCC MHQ: Navy Network Operations Information Operations and Space Warfare Center

NMCI GNOC: Maritime Network Global Network Operations Center

RNOSC: ibid, regional network operations center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNCC: Ibid., Theater Network Operations Control Center

Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) and the East and West Regional Network Operations and Security Center (East and West RNOSCs), which support the most basic organization of global naval operations. The Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center brings together information from the Theater Network Operations and Security Center, the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet and the Naval Satellite Operations Center to provide global command and control information for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. Unlike the Navy and the Army, they did not maintain a body belonging to the Theater Command. The support relationship between the forces established by the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations and the Theater Warfare Command did not give the theater war command the power to command the Naval Department’s global information grid. All command requests of the Theater Warfare Command must be approved by the Navy’s Global Network Operations and Security Center.

Command and Control of Theater Combat Command

Although each theater combat command in their respective jurisdictions for network operations are not the same way, but they have a common feature, that is, have established a theater network operations control center and a subordinate to the defense information system (DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency) of the theater network operations center. (CENTCOM) will be the theater network operations control center and the Defense Information Systems Agency’s theater network operations center known as the Central Theater Network Operations Center (Central Region Theater NetOps), the Central Commander of the Central Theater, Center, and the European Command (EUCOM) has established a Theater Communication Control Center (Theater Communication Control Center). Although there are some differences in the organization, but all the theater network operations control center are basically used by the theater combat command for the area of the global information grid command control (area of the global information grid is also known as the theater Information Grid TIG: Theater Information Grid).

The Theater Operations Command has optimized the configuration and control of the information resources of the global information grid through the Theater Network Operations Control Center to enable them to better serve the battle, while the Theater Network Operations Control Center is also connected to the Defense Information Systems Authority, the regular forces and the global Joint Operations of the Network Operations Joint Task Force. They collaborated with the Theater Network Warfare Center, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center to monitor the status of the theater information grid, to decide on the proposed global operations of the Joint Operations Task Force, and to assess the impact of its actions. The Theater Network Warfare Control Center has the right to decide on the reduction and termination of combat operations and to adjust the priority of operations through the Theater Network Operations Center and the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If there is no theater network operations and security center in the theater, the theater network operations control center under the Global Network Operations and Security Center tie is responsible for completing the mission required by the Theater Operations Command.

The North North Command (NORTHCOM) is a rather special sector, although it is a theater warfare command with a clear zone, but most of its troops in the zone – including cyber combat troops – are not affiliated with the commander , But belong to the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM: Join Forces Command). This deployment is intended to facilitate the global management of the force. The North Command, like several other theater warfare commanders, also set up a theater network operations control center, but did not establish a theater network operations and security center, which makes the North Command must rely on network operations and security centers and other departments for its Provide general support. In this case, the role of the North Command is to be responsible for the operations within its jurisdiction, but also the lack of understanding of the corresponding battlefield information grid, and no direct control of its power.

Strategic Command Network Operations Command Control

With the troops fighting command on the network combat structure to adjust the same, the Ministry of Defense departments are also undergoing reform. Over the years, the Department of Defense has not had a centralized control of the network operations. But in 1997 when the Department of Defense conducted this attempt to find some of the weaknesses of the network at that time, also came to the “combat command – troops – defense agencies,” this network mode of operation is not suitable for modern battlefield situation The That attempt has led to the formation of a Defense Force (IAA) bureau, which is part of today’s Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, which is responsible for the operation and defense of global information grids.

Global Network Operations Joint Task Force network operations command and control mechanism is also constantly evolving. Prior to the advent of the existing UCP: Unified Command Plan, the command and control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was under the responsibility of the Theater Operations Command, but it proved that it was not conducive to managing all the components in the network, It is also difficult to provide enough information for the global information grid information. The original version of the operational concept of cyber warfare emphasizes the control of the theater operations of the theater in the theater, which was described as follows: “The combat command has the power to command the troops assigned to its zone, Is conducive to the completion of the task, when the combat command feel appropriate, or even adjust the priority of the global information grid.All of these activities should be through the theater network operations center to achieve. “In fact, even the global Event, the initial version of the network combat concept document also provides that the global network operations Joint Task Force needs to be in the theater combat command of the theater network operations control center under the command of combat.

The follow-up version of the operational concept has been adapted to this principle. The control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was moved to a more global command and control structure, through which the overall role of the strategic headquarters, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and other forces involved in the network operations Has been strengthened. The operational concept of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subdivided into three environmental operational concepts: global, theater and non-global. What kind of environmental concepts apply to different events depends on the actual impact of the events and the impact of the theater. This form of command and control structure is more suitable for the current network combat diversity characteristics, for different levels of events, theater combat command can take a more flexible response measures, and even at the same time to support and supportive action. In this system, sometimes the process of dealing with the event to go through a complete command system chain, and sometimes you can skip some steps.

Global events

Global events refer to activities or events that clearly affect the preparedness of the entire global information grid, which often requires the concordation of multiple theater combatants to be resolved. Commander of the Strategic Command must have the ability to quickly identify global events and to be able to determine which theater combat operations or other agencies of the Department of Defense will be affected. Global events include fast-spreading network malicious code attacks, satellite communications attacks, and enterprise application attacks that are not limited to single-theater network events.

The Global Strategic Command is a reliable command center with command and command for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and the Theater Command. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force uses its own resources to execute the instructions of the Strategic Command, which can be quickly sent to troops around the world. It is noteworthy that this order is not in the event of transmission to the theater of combat operations.

Although the notion of operational concept conferred the command of the commander of the strategic command worldwide, it did not completely deny the right of the theater war command to be commanded by the assigned joint command. While the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force performs the operational command of the Strategic Command, the Theater Operations Command can also deploy its troops to carry out the corresponding activities. Of course, in accordance with the requirements of the operational concept, the forces under the leadership of the theater operations command must be consistent with the action guidelines of the Joint Operations Task Force under the leadership of the Strategic Command. In fact, according to the historical action log of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations, most of the cyber operations began at the beginning of a small theater, and the Theater Command was always the first unit to deal with these incidents, and If they are handled properly, these theater-level events will not develop into global events.

Theater events

Theater events are those that occur in a battlefield area, and its foreseeable range of influence does not go beyond the theater, and the biggest difference between theater and global events is that. In the event of such incidents, the theater operations headquarters played a leading role, while the strategic headquarters only take the support role. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force can provide support to the Theater Command by its Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If the local forces do not have a theater network operations and security center, it can also provide general support for the Theater Network Operations Control Center through the Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Command of the Theater Combat Command to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subordinate to the subordinate command, that is to say there is no right to direct the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force through its Global Network Operations and Security Center to operate in its area.

Non-global event

A non-global event is an event that only affects the functional warfare headquarters and a particular defense agency. Since such institutions do not have a clear zone, these events can neither be regarded as global nor can they be seen as theater. In dealing with non-global events, the Strategic Command plays the role of auxiliary command, and the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force provides general support for the operational operational warfare headquarters involved. Most of the non-global events generally occur in the northern command zone, since many of the relevant functional departments are subordinate to the Northern Command. In the case of command and control procedures, non-global events and global events are the same.

Contradictory command and control requirements

Tactical technical requirements

Although the positioning of the various forces are not the same, but in the pursuit of efficient network operations, reasonable combat methods are their common theme. Different forces shoulder different responsibilities, they established an independent combat network, application facilities and auxiliary tools to meet their own and global information grid to maintain connectivity needs. Each unit is responsible for operating part of the global information grid, which to some extent the need for combat operations between the various departments of the centralized management, so as to get the desired combat efficiency and return on investment.

The focus of the discussion on centralized control of global information grids is the global nature of cyber warfare. The only way for the Department of Defense to achieve a network-centric commanding mechanism, to enhance the Force’s awareness of the situation and to significantly shorten the decision-making cycle, is to integrate the network and the forces horizontally, which is a centralized control mechanism The The latest “four-year defense assessment report” mentioned in the “to simplify the current ‘chimney’ system structure, to achieve a network-centric command mechanism.”

In order to make better use of scarce resources, the Department of Defense must consider when and where to allocate resources from a global perspective. The allocation of essential resources for network operations such as satellite transmission bands, standard tactical entry network sites and bandwidth must have clear mission objectives and easy to understand global significance. From the perspective of the force, the centralized command is, to some extent, a reshuffle of the existing force institutions and operations, defense networks.

The combat operations led by the theater war command will no longer be strictly limited to its zone. Ground forces are re-starting to use aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles) to routinely fly in the United States to support their operations. With the development of the PGS: Prompt Global Strike project, the commander has the power to call for conventional strike assistance from weapons systems outside the theater.

On the Navy, they pointed out that one of the essential characteristics of the maritime forces was global mobility, and the naval forces were constantly interspersed between the various theater warheads. Especially as aircraft carrier battle group such units, once deployed, it can not stay in a small battlefield. In addition, even the theater-level operations taken by the theater war command may have a global impact. The adjustment of the network defensive posture may have a huge financial burden on the Internet sector, and the combat command may not be able to understand the specific details of the adjustment behavior.

For the Department of Defense’s network system, all attacks are essentially global in nature. The enemy can not easily from the other side of the Earth to the United States to attack the physical objectives, but in the field of computer network technology, such things happen often. Once such an attack is detected, the information about it must be communicated to all relevant departments in the shortest possible time to ensure that such attacks are identified from anywhere to protect the security of the global information grid. Every time a network intrusion – even if it does not seem to fail the invasion – is likely to give the global information grid content a huge potential harm, because they invade the system behind the back door will be in the future Attack to play a role. The outbreak of the virus is an undisputed global event, and if we do not realize this, we will suffer more losses.

The Navy emphasizes that the impact of no events will be limited to a theater area, and that all efforts to combat cyber operations must be global. Their defense is that there is no theater boundaries, the Department of Defense every battlefield combat headquarters are facing the same potential threat, in order to obtain information on the advantages of the Department of Defense must make full use of its large coverage of the network resources , Quickly share all useful information on a global basis.

In addition, the Air Force and the Navy have pointed out that their cyber warfare forces are not deployed by the Theater Warfare Command. The Air Force and the Navy have their own cyber warfare organizations (such as the Theater Network Operations and Security Center) in each zone of the Theater Command, and the Air Force and Navy’s cyber warfare forces are usually defender in the theater. Finally, the Air Force and the Navy believe that the Strategic Command is responsible for the Global Information Grid through the Theater Operations Command, based on the description of the official documents available for reference.

Theater war command

There are two issues that need to be concerned about the command and control of cyber warfare against the Theater Command. One is the need for timely control of the battlefield information grid, the second is the need to turn the network into a weapon system, so that commanders can be the same as the conventional weapon system to use the same network resources, the use of the full range of network advantages to conduct a comprehensive battle.

Those forces that have been assigned specific responsibilities have already deployed their own unique solutions, each of which is involved in a network operation or each institution believes that it already has the most effective allocation of scarce resources. But the global information grid is not exclusive to a particular department, but a joint structure. “Chimney” type system and the existing deployment of the troops is actually to reduce the efficiency of the battlefield information grid efficiency. For example, the Army developed a secure IP telephony solution before other departments in the Department of Defense to communicate with the secret voice. For security reasons, other departments usually do not use this program, but their own development of a set of the same function of the solution. So there will be two sets of independent, confidential IP voice schemes in the zone of the Combat Command, which can not be connected to each other. The theater warfare command had to be screened, leaving only a set of programs to ensure that all departments in their zones could cooperate with each other. But the solution is eliminated by the party can no longer with the theater outside the brother forces for confidential contact.

Some of the resources in the combat command zone can serve multiple forces and the public sector. However, there are many examples of the use of duplication of work for the establishment of their own can not be linked to each other independent systems, such as satellite terminals and some technical control equipment. Sometimes, to send a message, you need to send the signal back to the United States, and then sent from the local distance from the initial sender only two miles of the recipient there. All kinds of fibers are arranged one by one on the same route, but the data between them can not be exchanged directly because they belong to different forces or public departments. The theater operations command must take measures to address the interconnection between the troops or the civil service in the zone.

To solve this problem, you can use centralized control approach. The centralized command of the cyber warfare forces requires the theater war command to make some adjustments to its own organization, but at the same time it does not affect its power to direct action when there is a need for combat. Relevant forces must accept orders for multiple combat orders and effectively optimize and feedback battlefield information. At present, the troops sent to the front are becoming more and more independent, and through the help of the global information grid they can cross the border of the theater combat command back and forth, and the theater warfare command has been compromised by the support and confrontation of the cyber warfare , After the implementation of centralized command, the troops can not or do not want to respond to the requirements of the theater combat command.

The Pacific Command (PACOM: Pacific Command) first adopted a “joint attempt” approach in humanitarian aid operations when it participated in the Indonesian tsunami relief work in 2004. The Pacific Command issued instructions to the assigned troops to carry out special network defenses under the framework of the entire action plan. Many naval forces and Marine Corps units have established relatively direct network defenses under the centralized command of the Navy’s Global Network Operations Center, which goes beyond the mandate of the Pacific Command to the Navy and Marine Corps, which Posing a potential risk factor for the global operations of the Pacific Command.

The Combat Command is concerned that the idea of centralizing control of global information grids will always reduce their grip on information and control of the global information grid. Under the existing command system, a unit will carry out training or perform other tasks under the command of its troops, and participate in the battle under the command of the theater combat command, and the rules of command and control are very clear. The command and control of the forces in the field of information is as important as their command and control in the air, land, sea and space fields. For the C3S system (control, communications and computer systems), under its command to combat and responsible for the protection of its forces are often in a double or even triple the report chain, the results can not tell who is responsible for the final battle. In a global or non-global event, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force often conducts direct operations around the theater operations headquarters. Although the operational concept of joint cyber warfare specifically emphasizes the need for coordinated operations with the theater combat command, this requirement has become almost in the context of modern combat rapid changes. Information Security Weakness Alert System, Computer Task Sequence, and Information Condition Adjustment System Problems outside the jurisdiction of the Combat Command are typical examples of this requirement failure. These events directly affect the command of the Theater Command in the battlefield, when the troops want to directly use these mechanisms from the management level to strengthen their own control, they can not determine when and how in the implementation of these Operation, and do not know what impact this will have on the command of the theater combat command, because under current conditions, only the theater combat command has the ability to carry out these operations. When a threat event requires the Air Force’s Space Command to seek the cooperation of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations with Air Force forces, it would bring to the command of the North Command if it did not notify or obtain cooperation with the Northern Command Big trouble.

In the Central Command, due to the lack of adequate control of the network combat forces, resulting in the commander sometimes can not determine whether the network resources are available. The Navy is responsible for operating a large number of battlefield information grids. Navy network combat forces in the operational area are not responsible for the Central Command of the Navy, who only need to report to the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. The central theater’s central theater theater operations center, whose duty is to maintain and direct all the combat operations of the theater operations, but it is not in the naval network combat force report chain, so it is often impossible to get all the battlefield information grid Of the state of affairs, there are already alternatives to deal with this problem, but this can not be said to be a formal solution.

For the North Command, because of the lack of cyber warfare control, they encountered great trouble in the rescue work of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In that operation, the troops’ equipment was transported to the joint warfare zone without permission. Which makes the North Command can not grasp and guide the transfer of materials, but can not coordinate the actions of various forces, which is a multi-directional management and operational issues.

As the various forces advocate the implementation of a centralized command framework centered on the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the theater commanders are reluctant to see such changes, Some of them are responsible for the strategic headquarters, with the global information grid operating rights and defense rights mechanism. The presence of the Strategic Command has been instrumental in maintaining the command of the theater combat command in combat operations in theater and global events and in enhancing communication between the theater combat command and the Joint Staff.

Combat headquarters and troops want to focus on the network operations from the level of joint operations, but there are several issues that need to be discussed:

Who is responsible for the first leadership?

2. Network operations to focus on what the specific direction of the command to be reflected, the global level, the theater level or what other level?

3. What is the change brought about by this adjustment only when a part of the theater combat command sends a request to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force or is the theater commander’s complete command and priority in the theater?

Finally, the Theater Command is the body that is ultimately responsible for the President’s mission to complete the military mission in the area, and the troops dispatched to the theater combat command need to complete their respective tasks under their jurisdiction. It is unquestionable that they will still be under the command of the strategic command when the troops advocate the implementation of a global centralized command. But the current global information grid is a key part of the command and control capability of the theater combat command and the commander’s ability to guide the troops. Without a global information grid, the plane can not fly, the ground forces can not move, the ships can not sail, even the satellite can not provide the signal. Commanders need to get the status of the global information grid and control, just as they need to master the position and status of the troops as important. They must grasp the scope, ability and status of the battlefield information grid, and must know how the situation outside the theater will affect the battlefield information grid in the area where the troops are located and must be able to command and optimize the troops to support operations. If we really believe that the speculation of the centralized command will have a better effect, it can not be ignored for the theater war command to retain the appropriate command and control.

Also, as long as the structure of the Theater Command is still preserved, all military missions, including those directed by the Functional Command Command, will inevitably occur in the theater of the Theater Command, as all networks Combat missions must be carried out by an entity unit. At the same time, centralized command is necessary to achieve a network-centric command model and to more effectively defend against attacks. The concept of this centralized command and the command of the theater war command to master and optimize the battlefield information grid is not mutually exclusive.

The way forward

To develop a viable network combat command and control framework, it is necessary to avoid extremes, taking into account the needs of theater warfare headquarters and the need to establish centralized control of global information grids. In the process of the development of the operational concept of joint network operations and the transformation process of network combat forces, the principle of organization needs to play the role of adjusting the interests of all parties. In order to achieve this goal, the Department of Defense should do the following:

1. Create a simple, clear network combat command chain, to ensure that the strategic headquarters of all network operations can be directed. This can solve the problem just mentioned “who is responsible for the first leadership”. Only when the event occurred in a rapidly changing environment, the theater command and control agencies began to play a role. Simple command chain can ensure that troops involved in network operations know who should listen to who should report to whom, in this command chain, must include the theater combat command.

2. The command of the theater war command in its zone can be given:

– to amend the Joint Command plan to clarify the responsibilities of the Theater Operations Command to operate the network in its zone.

– Revise the existing global information grid network operational concept, detailing that those outside the theater network operations and security centers can obtain direct assistance from the World Network Operations and Security Center of the Theater Operations Command.

– All orders for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force shall be enforced through the Theater Operations Command.

These adjustments ensure that all units in the theater are acting under a single command chain, which is responsible for the strategic headquarters through the Theater Operations Command. This can also solve the North Command should be responsible for the area but did not command the power of the network fighting the embarrassing situation.

3. In each theater combat command, a joint network operations center under the jurisdiction of the Central Command shall be established to integrate the Theater Network Operations Control Center of the Theater Command Command and the Theater Network Operations Center of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. As a result, each theater war command will have a joint operations command in the field of computer space, just as in the battlefield of land, sea and air. Any troops outside the Theater Network Operations and Security Center can obtain direct assistance from the Global Network Operations and Security Center of the Joint Network Operations Center.

4. To consolidate the status of the global information grid, the highest control to the strategic headquarters. The development of centralized command is now focused on the command of the forces involved in the network operations, which runs counter to the network-centric command concept. The force-centric “chimney” command system is not conducive to the transmission and processing of information, let us from the “all users to provide the latest and most accurate information” goal farther and farther. In the previous “Goldwater Nichols Defense Ministry Reconstruction Law” report has made it clear that the organization and management and command and control should be controlled by a joint agency.

Concluding remarks

The current centralized command of network operations is an urgent need. Optimizing the network operational command mechanism can help the Department of Defense to improve efficiency, save costs and better allocate scarce resources. More importantly, this allows network combat troops to provide information more quickly and accurately to commanders, which is important in large-scale network operations. The process of centralized command can not affect the efficiency of network combat command and control. This depends on whether the global information grid can provide enough information for all participating units and whether the commander makes full use of the theater information grid to help command operations.

“We have to change the network combat problem discussion and thinking mode, we are in the network” combat “rather than the network” management “, all participating units must ensure that they are ready to war every time to ensure that the network system A decisive weapon system. ” Network operations are a key part of our country’s ability to win war, it can help us provide command and control, shorten the decision-making cycle and adjust the resources of the theater. The Strategic Command has taken a big step in strengthening the concept of cyber warfare, and these efforts need to be continued. The theater warfare command must be an important part of the control and protection of the global information grid to ensure that we can continue to win the network.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

是誰在負責配置美國所擁有的信息資源？誰在負責分配這些資源利用時的優先級順序？我們採取了哪些措施來保證全球信息柵格（GIG：Global Information Grid）、獨立聯合服務系統以及依靠從它們身上獲取信息來開展工作的戰區作戰司令部（GCCs：Geographic Combatant Commanders）和全球網絡聯合特遣部隊（JTF-GNO：Joint Task Force-Global NetOps）的安全？最近幾年以來，整個網絡作戰系統對這些問題的討論一直沒有停息過，人們爭論的焦點就是戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中應該扮演什麼樣的角色。

美國軍方公佈了對每個戰區作戰司令部的部署，同時還宣布將會減少跨戰區的軍事支持行動。對每個戰區作戰司令部來說，如何配置支持本戰區作戰的信息基礎設施就變得非常重要了。敵人有可能會滲透進負責軍事力量調度的關鍵網絡系統區域進行破壞，這些入侵的危害常常被低估，甚至被當作意外事件或者偶發事件輕描淡寫地處理掉，但是這些入侵行為實際上完全有可能濫發連接請求來阻塞商業網站的正常運行，甚至導致一些承擔軍隊後勤業務的物流公司被標為無效狀態。戰區作戰司令部應該保證其防區的信息條件不受外部入侵的影響。不計其數的病毒正在破壞著互聯網，國防部的系統也開始遭到攻擊。現在有人在討論是否應該讓全球網絡聯合特遣隊斷開互聯網上的軍事入網點，但軍方又擔心僅靠和商業供應商的合作，國防部不能保證所有的後勤支持行動都能繼續無差錯地進行下去。每個戰區作戰司令部對各自的戰區網絡狀態都不太確定，他們對全球信息柵格本身的安全持有懷疑態度，他們擔心其是否有能力執行分配給它的任務。

受到建立一個更全球化的網絡作戰控制機構、加強美國戰略司令部（STRATCOM）和全球網絡聯合特遣隊在網絡作戰中的主導地位思想的影響，戰區作戰司令部對其防區的指揮控制權有所削弱。將作戰信息集中到全球信息柵格的做法也在一定程度上影響了戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格是如何支持該戰區的作戰的具體行為的了解。本文將會介紹現有的指揮關係、戰區作戰司令部的職責、指揮和作戰之間的線性關係、舊有的和新興的聯合作戰原則一級特殊戰例分析，最後還將會對戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中所應扮演的角色提出建議。

網絡作戰的環境

網絡作戰中的指揮控制是一個在十年以前就出現了的概念，之後它的內涵一直處在演變之中。每個相關部門、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊都為此進行過一些組織結構和工作重心上的調整，但是最終都沒有解決好各自應該扮演的角色這個問題。要想真正明白為什麼戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中的角色會成為一個難題，就必須先弄清楚這幾個問題：網絡作戰是在哪兒發生的、什麼是真正的網絡作戰、網絡作戰中的每個部門的組織結構和指揮控制結構是怎樣的。

首先需要解釋的是，什麼是全球信息柵格？按照國防部第8100.1號文件的定義，它包括“全球互聯的、終端到終端的信息傳輸能力和聯合處理能力。按照戰士、決策者的需要來進行信息採集、處理、儲存、傳播和管理的能力”。這就涵蓋了政府的和租用的通信信息系統及服務，以及全球信息柵格所需的其他軟件、安全和服務支持，還包括1996年3月頒布的《克林格-科恩法》（Clinger- Cohen Act）第5142節所定義的國家安全系統（National Security System）。按照這個定義，全球信息柵格包含了國防部和國家安全系統的所有級別的信息系統，從戰術層次到戰略層次，以及互聯通信系統。

大多數關於全球信息柵格網絡作戰中心的指揮控制的討論都在著重強調該系統的防禦能力，但是網絡作戰包含的內容其實遠不止這點，網絡作戰要完成的任務包括三項：部門管理、內容管理和網絡防禦，其工作目的是提供跨越戰略、戰術和作戰概念邊界的無中心式支持，為國防部的全方位的戰鬥、情報和考察任務提供支持。

1.部門管理是全球信息柵格的具體任務之一，它是對構成全球信息柵格的系統和網絡的技術、過程和政策管理，包括公務部門管理、系統管理、網絡管理、衛星通信管理和電磁光譜管理這幾個方面。

2.內容管理指的是管理全球信息柵格里的信息本身。它用即時的方式保證信息對使用者、操作者和決策者都是可用的。內容管理包括對全球信息柵格的具體信息內容的查找、訪問、傳輸、儲存和一體化。

3.網絡防禦就是對全球信息柵格所有的信息包括附加信息進行保護，它主要包括一些政策、過程、項目和操作。如果有必要的話，該任務可以請求通過跨機構合作來完成。它負責的是全球信息柵格的信息安全、計算機網絡防禦、計算機防衛反應能力和關鍵性基礎設施保護。

現在已經了解了網絡作戰的基本組織結構，下一步介紹網絡作戰中的各個組織和他們是如何執行任務的，需要介紹的主要是部隊、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊，它們都在隨著戰場要求的變化而改進著各自的組織結構。

部隊在組織結構上的改變主要是為了滿足全球信息柵格對信息傳輸、訪問、控制和保護能力的要求。十年之前，部隊為了適應網絡作戰曾針對區域控制進行過一些變革，但那些措施最終發展成了集中化的控制，這些措施也沒有保留下來。現在我們有必要了解一下部隊的組織構成，以便更好地理解為什麼網絡作戰的指揮控制會變得如此充滿爭議。
GEM：GIG企業管理 GCM：GIG內容管理 GND:GIG網絡防禦
陸軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

陸軍是所有軍種中改革措施最少的。陸軍繼續保持著以前的指揮機構，現在叫做戰場網絡作戰與安全中心（TNOSC：Theater NetOps and Security Centers），該組織直接對各個戰區作戰司令部負責。陸軍維持著一個獨立的全球網絡作戰與安全中心（GNOSC：Global NetOps and Security Center），所有的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心都是其下屬機構。全球網絡作戰與安全中心對戰場網絡作戰與安全中心進行技術控制，但是戰場網絡作戰與安全中心同時又隸屬於戰區作戰司令部，也受到戰區網絡司令部的管理，典型的例子就是陸軍的戰場信號旅受陸軍服務組件指揮部的管理。

全球網絡作戰與安全中心對各個戰區的網絡作戰部隊提供技術指導。美國陸軍網絡司令部暨第9信號司令部對全球網絡作戰與安全中心的技術和管理負責。但是在戰時，全球網絡作戰與安全中心又作為陸軍的元素受戰略司令部（STRATCOM）的指揮。
ACERT：陸軍計算機應急響應分隊
AGNOSC：陸軍全球網絡和安全中心

ASCC：陸軍軍種組成司令部

ARSTRAT：陸軍戰略司令部（導彈防禦與戰略）

CIO：首席信息官

GCC：戰區作戰司令部（地區性聯合司令部，美軍十大司令部中的六個）

INSCOM：情報和安全司令部（陸軍直屬報告單位之一）

JTF-GNO：聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NETCOM：陸軍網絡戰爭司令部

RCERT：地區性計算機應急響應分隊

STRATCOM：美軍戰略司令部

TNCC：戰區網絡作戰控制中心

TNOCC：戰區網絡作戰和安全中心

G6：陸軍司令部通信部門

G2陸軍司令部情報部門

Installation Network Provider網絡施設提供商

COMMAND—戰略層面作戰指揮

OPCON:作戰（戰役）指揮

TACON：戰術控制

GS：全球打擊

TECHCON：梯隊

ADCON：管理控制

空軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

空軍選擇了一條不同的組織途徑，把重點從以前的一級司令部網絡作戰和安全中心（MAJCOM NOSCs）轉移到了一體化網絡作戰和安全中心（I-NOSCs：Integrated NetOps and Security Centers）。與陸軍的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心受戰區作戰司令部的管理不同的是，空軍的一體化網絡作戰和安全中心並不隸屬於任何一個戰區作戰司令部，而是只受空軍網絡作戰中心（AFNOC ：Air Force NetOps Center）的管理，該中心與陸軍的全球網絡作戰和安全中心性質類似。空軍意識到了戰區作戰司令部必須擁有在其防區直接指揮網絡作戰行動的權力，有必要在空軍網絡作戰中心和戰區作戰司令部之間建立起一般支持的關係，建立兩個部門之間的專用聯絡單元。另外空軍方面還賦予了一級司令部在各自的戰區建立通信控制中心的自主權，這些控制中心可以當作空軍網絡作戰中心與各自戰區作戰司令部相互聯繫的快捷通道。
ACC：空戰中心
AFCHQ：空軍組成司令部

AFNETOPS：空軍網絡作戰司令部

ARSTRAT：空軍戰略司令部戰區網絡作戰控制中心

CIO：首席信息官

I-NOSC：集成網絡作戰和安全中心

GCC：同上，地區性聯合司令部

JFCC-NW：網絡戰聯合職能組成司令部

JTF-GNO：同上，聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NCC：網絡控制中心

STRATCOM：同上，戰略司令部

TNOS：同上，戰區網絡作戰與安全中心

海軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

海軍和空軍一樣，不再把戰區當作指揮的單位。為了更好地支持全球作戰，他們用隸屬於海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心（NAVGNOSC）的兩個戰區網絡戰安全中心（RNOSCs）來協助原有的位於那不勒斯和巴林島的兩個戰區海軍計算機與通信主站（NCTMS：Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station）。另外，由於海軍的大多數網絡作戰是在海上進行，所以他們還建立了艦隊網絡作戰中心（FNOCs：Fleet NetOps Centers），與位於美國本土的戰區網絡戰安全中心互為呼應。艦隊網絡作戰中心是艦隊進行網絡作戰的戰術切入點，可以為本防區的艦隊提供音頻、視頻和數據等網絡服務，並且可以在艦隊從一個艦隊網絡作戰中心的轄區駛入另一個轄區的時候提供平滑的信息過渡。多數未分類的網絡都是由美國本土的海軍陸戰隊內聯網（NMCI：Navy Marine Corps Internet）或者美國海外的海外海軍企業網絡（ONENET：Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network）負責承包運營的。為了適應戰場的需求，海軍建立了海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網全球網絡作戰與安全中心來提供全球性的作戰支持，同時也建立了隸屬於戰區網絡作戰與安全中心的戰區網絡戰安全中心對各個具體戰場提供支持。戰區網絡作戰與安全中心與所在戰區的戰區作戰司令部並沒有從屬關係。
Fleet NOC:艦隊網絡作戰中心
GCC：同上，地區性聯合司令部

INSCON：同上，陸軍情報和安全司令部

JTF-GNO：同上，聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NAVGNOSC：海軍全球網絡作戰和安全中心

NAVSOC：海軍衛星作戰中心

NCC MHQ：海軍網絡作戰信息作戰和太空戰中心

NMCI GNOC：海軍陸戰隊網全球網絡作戰中心

RNOSC：同上，地區性網絡作戰中心

STRATCOM：同上，戰略司令部

TNCC：同上，戰區網絡作戰控制中心

支持全球海軍作戰的最基本的組織的海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心（NAVGNOSC）和東西部戰區網絡作戰與安全中心（East and West RNOSCs）。海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心匯集了來自戰區網絡作戰與安全中心、海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網和海軍衛星作戰中心的信息，為全球網絡行動聯合特遣部隊提供全球性的指揮控制信息。海軍和陸軍不同的是，他們沒有維持一個隸屬於戰區作戰司令部的機構。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊建立的部隊與戰區作戰司令部之間的支持關係並沒有賦予戰區作戰司令部在海軍部負責的全球信息柵格範圍內進行指揮的權力。戰區作戰司令部的所有指揮請求都必須先經過海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心的批准。

戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰指揮控制

儘管每個戰區作戰司令部在各自的轄區內針對網絡作戰的組織方式都不盡相同，但是他們卻有一個共同的特點，那就是都建立了一個戰區網絡作戰控制中心和一個隸屬於國防信息系統局（DISA：Defense Information Systems Agency）的戰區網絡作戰中心。各個戰區網絡作戰控制中心的組織結構並不完全相同，美國中央司令部（CENTCOM）將戰區網絡作戰控制中心和國防信息系統局的戰區網絡作戰中心合稱為中央戰區網絡作戰中心（Central Region Theater NetOps Center），而歐洲司令部（EUCOM）則建立了一個戰區通信控制中心（Theater Communication Control Center）。雖然在組織上有些差異，但是所有的戰區網絡作戰控制中心基本上都是被戰區作戰司令部用來對轄區內的全球信息柵格進行指揮控制（轄區內的全球信息柵格也被稱為戰區信息柵格TIG：Theater Information Grid）。

戰區作戰司令部通過戰區網絡作戰控制中心來優化配置和控制全球信息柵格的信息資源，以使它們更好地為戰鬥服務，同時戰區網絡作戰控制中心也是連接國防信息系統局、常規部隊和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區接口。他們與戰區網絡戰中心、戰區網絡作戰和安全中心合作來監控戰區信息柵格的狀態，對被提議的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊相關行動作出決定，並評估其行動的影響。戰區網絡戰控制中心對作戰行動力度的減小和終止有決定權，並且通過戰區網絡作戰中心和戰區網絡作戰與安全中心來調整作戰的優先級。如果該戰區沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，那麼就由全球網絡作戰與安全中心領帶下的戰區網絡作戰控制中心來負責完成戰區作戰司令部所要求的任務。

美國的北方司令部（NORTHCOM）是一個比較特別的部門，雖然它是一個有著明確防區的戰區作戰司令部，但是其防區內的大部分部隊——包括網絡作戰部隊——都不隸屬於該司令部，而是屬於美國聯合部隊司令部（JFCOM：Join Forces Command）。這樣的部署是為了便於部隊的全球性管理。北方司令部和其他幾個戰區作戰司令部一樣，也設立了戰區網絡作戰控制中心，但是卻沒有建立戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，這就使得北方司令部必須依靠網絡作戰與安全中心等部門為其提供一般支持。在這種情況下，北方司令部所扮演的角色就是需要負責其轄區內的作戰行動，但是又對相應的戰場信息柵格缺乏了解，更沒有直接控制它的權力。

戰略司令部網絡作戰指揮控制

與部隊戰鬥司令部對網絡作戰結構進行調整一樣，國防部的相關部門也在進行著改革。多年以來，國防部一直沒有一個集中控制的網絡作戰部。但是在1997年的時候國防部進行過這方面的嘗試，發現了一些當時網絡的弱點，也得出了“作戰司令部-部隊-國防機構”這種網絡作戰的模式已經不適合現代的戰場情況。那次嘗試促成了國防信息系統局最終組建了一支實體部隊，也就是今天的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊來負責全球信息柵格的操作和防禦。

全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的網絡作戰指揮控制機制同樣也在不斷發展。在現有的聯合司令部計劃（UCP：Unified Command Plan）出現之前，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮控制都是由戰區作戰司令部負責，但是事實證明這不利於管理網絡中的所有組件，也難以為全球信息柵格提供足夠的事態感知信息。最初版本的網絡作戰的作戰概念比較強調戰區作戰司令部對其防區的網絡作戰的控制，當時對處理戰區問題的描述是這樣的：“作戰司令部有權指揮被指派到其防區的部隊，只要是利於任務的完成，在作戰司令部覺得合適的時候，甚至可以調整全球信息柵格的優先級。所有的這些活動，都應該通過戰區網絡作戰中心來實現。”事實上，即使是全球性的事件，最初版本的網絡作戰概念文件也規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊需要在戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心指揮下進行作戰。
作戰概念的後續版本對這項原則進行了調整。對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的控制被移到了一個更加全球化的指揮控制架構中，通過這樣的調整，戰略司令部、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和其他參與網絡作戰的部隊的整體角色都得到了加強。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的作戰概念被細分成了三個環境作戰概念：全球性的、戰區性的和非全局性的。不同的事件適用何種環境概念取決於事件造成的實際影響和戰區影響。這種形式的指揮控制結構更加適用於目前網絡作戰多樣性特性，針對不同級別的事件，戰區作戰司令部可以採取更加靈活的應對措施，甚至可以同時展開支持性的和輔助性的行動。在這種制度下，有時候處理事件的過程要經過完整的指揮系統鏈，有時候可以跳過一些步驟。

全球性事件

全球性事件是指那些顯而易見會影響整個全球信息柵格的備戰度的活動或事件，這類事件通常需要多個戰區作戰司令部的協同處理才能得到解決。戰略司令部的指揮官必須要具備快速鑑別全球性事件的能力，並要能具體判斷出有哪些戰區作戰司令部或者國防部的其他機構會受到影響。全球性事件包括快速傳播的網絡惡意代碼攻擊、衛星通信攻擊、企業應用攻擊等不僅僅局限於單個戰區的網絡事件。

全球戰略司令部是一個可靠的指揮中心，它對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和戰區作戰司令部都有命令和指揮權。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊利用自己的資源來執行戰略司令部的指示，作戰命令可以很快地發送到在全球各地的部隊中。值得注意的是，這種命令在傳遞時不經過事件發生地的戰區作戰司令部。

雖然作戰概念的原則賦予了戰略司令部指揮官全球範圍內的指揮權，但是這也並沒有完全否定戰區作戰司令部可以通過分配的聯合司令部計劃來進行指揮的權利。在全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊執行戰略司令部的作戰命令的同時，戰區作戰司令部也可以調遣其麾下的部隊進行相應的活動。當然，按照作戰概念的要求，戰區作戰司令部領導下的部隊的行動必須與戰略司令部領導下的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的行動方針保持一致。事實上，據全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的歷史行動日誌記載，大多數的網絡作戰一開始都是在小範圍戰區開始出現的，戰區作戰司令部總是著手處理這些事件的第一單位，而且如果處理得適當的話，這些戰區級別的事件就不會發展成全球性事件。

戰區性事件

戰區性事件是指那些發生在某個戰場區域，其可預見的影響範圍不會超出該戰區的事件，戰區性事件與全球性事件的最大區別也就在於此。在處理這類事件的時候，戰區作戰司令部起著主導作用，而戰略司令部只承擔輔助的支持作用。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊可以通過其戰區網絡作戰與安全中心對戰區作戰司令部提供支援。如果當地的部隊沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，那也可以通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心為戰區網絡作戰控制中心提供一般支持。戰區作戰司令部對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮屬於次級指揮，也就是說沒有權利通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心來直接調動全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊到其所轄區域進行作戰。

非全局性事件

非全局性事件是指只對職能作戰司令部和特定的國防機構造成影響的事件。由於這類機構沒有明確的防區，所以這些事件既不能被看成全球性的也不能被看成戰區性的。在處理非全局性事件時，戰略司令部扮演輔助指揮的角色，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊對所涉及到的職能作戰司令部提供一般支持。大多數的非全局性事件一般都發生在北方司令部的防區，因為很多相關的職能部門都隸屬於北方司令部。在指揮控制的程序方面，非全局性事件和全球性事件是相同的。

相互矛盾的指揮控制要求

戰術技術的要求

儘管各個部隊的定位不盡相同，但是在網絡作戰中追求高效、合理的作戰方法是他們共同的主題。不同的部隊肩負著不同的職責，他們建立了獨立的作戰網絡、應用設施和輔助工具來滿足自身與全球信息柵格保持聯通的需求。每支部隊都要負責操作一部分全球信息柵格，這在一定程度上需要各部隊間作戰鏈的集中化管理，這樣才能獲得所期待的作戰效率和投入回報率。

關於對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制討論的焦點是網絡作戰的全球性特質。國防部想要實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制、增強部隊的事態感知能力和顯著縮短決策週期的目標的話，唯一的方法就是將網絡和部隊進行橫向的融合，這是一種集中化的控制機制。最新的一份《四年防務評估報告》裡就提到過“要簡化目前的‘煙囪式’系統結構，實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制”。

為了更好地利用緊缺資源，國防部必須從全球性的角度來考慮何時何地調撥何種資源。對衛星傳輸波段、標準戰術入口網絡站點和帶寬等網絡作戰必需資源的分配必須要有明確的任務目標和易於理解的全球性意義。從部隊的角度來看，集中化指揮在某種程度上是對現有部隊機構和作戰、防禦網絡的一次重新洗牌。

由戰區作戰司令部領導的作戰行動將不再嚴格地限於其防區內。地面部隊重新開始利用飛機（包括無人機）例行地在美國本土飛行來支持他們的作戰。隨著快速全球打擊（PGS：Prompt Global Strike）項目的發展，指揮官已經有權力呼叫從戰區以外的武器系統發出常規打擊援助。

在海軍方面，他們指出海上部隊的一個本質性特點就是全球流動性，海軍部隊作戰時會不斷地在各個戰區作戰司令部之間穿插。尤其是像航母戰鬥群這樣的單位，一旦被部署出發，就不可能一直呆在一塊小範圍的戰場。另外，即使是戰區作戰司令部所採取的戰區級別的行動，也有可能產生全球性的影響。網絡防禦姿態的調整可能對互聯網部門帶來巨大的經濟負擔，而且作戰司令部還有可能無法了解到調整行為的具體細節結果。

對國防部的網絡系統來說，所有的攻擊本質上同樣都是全球性的。敵人不可能輕易地從地球的另一端對美國本土的實體目標進行攻擊，但是在計算機網絡科技領域，這樣的事情經常發生。一旦檢測到這種攻擊，關於它的信息必須要在最短的時間內傳遍全球所有的相關部門，以保證從任何地方都能識別出這樣的攻擊方式，從而保護全球信息柵格的安全。每一次網絡入侵——哪怕是看起來無關緊要的失敗的入侵——都有可能給全球信息柵格的內容帶來巨大的潛在危害，因為它們入侵時在系統中留下的後門會在以後的攻擊中發揮作用。病毒的爆發是毫無爭議的全球性事件，如果認識不到這一點的話，我們將會受到更大的損失。

海軍強調沒有任何事件的影響會僅限於某個戰區範圍，所有關於網絡作戰的努力都必須是全球性的。他們的理由是網絡作戰是沒有戰區界限的，國防部的每個戰區作戰司令部所面臨的潛在威脅都是相同的，為了獲得信息上的優勢，國防部必須要充分利用其大覆蓋面的網絡資源，快速地在全球範圍內分享所有的有用信息。

此外，空軍和海軍方面指出，他們的網絡作戰部隊都不是由戰區作戰司令部來負責部署的。在每個戰區作戰司令部的防區內，空軍和海軍都有自己的網絡作戰組織（例如戰區網絡作戰與安全中心），而且空軍和海軍的網絡作戰部隊在戰區內通常是扮演維護者的角色。最後一點，空軍和海軍都認為，根據可供參考的官方文件的描述，戰略司令部通過戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格負責。

戰區作戰司令部的要求

對戰區作戰司令部來說，在網絡作戰的指揮控制方面有兩個需要關心的問題。一是需要對戰場信息柵格進行及時的控制，二是需要把網絡變成一個武器系統，讓指揮官們可以像對常規的武器系統一樣共同利用網絡資源，利用網絡全方位的優勢來進行全面的戰鬥。

那些被分配了特定職責的部隊，已經部署好了各自唯一的解決方案，參與到網絡作戰中的每支部隊或者每個機構都相信自己已經擁有了最有效分配緊缺資源的辦法。但是全球信息柵格並不是專屬於某一個部門的，而是一個聯合結構。 “煙囪”式系統和現有的部隊部署方式實際上是降低了戰場信息柵格的利用效率。舉個例子來說，陸軍在國防部的其他部門之前研發出了一套安全的IP電話解決方案，可以進行保密語音的聯絡。出於安全考慮，其他部門通常不會再採用這套方案，而是自己再開發一套功能相同的解決方案。這樣在作戰司令部的防區內就有了兩套獨立的保密IP語音方案，它們相互之間不能進行聯通。戰區作戰司令部只得進行篩選，只保留一套方案，以保證在其防區內所有部門可以進行彼此協作。但是解決方案被淘汰的一方就不能再與該戰區以外的兄弟部隊進行保密聯絡了。

作戰司令部防區內的有些資源可以為多個部隊和公務部門服務。但是也有很多例子是使用者進行重複勞動為各自建立了不能相互聯絡的獨立系統，比如衛星終端和一些技術控制設備。有些時候，要傳遞一個信息的話，需要先把信號發回美國本土，然後再從本土發到距離初始發送者只有兩英里的接收者那裡。各種各樣的光纖一條挨一條地按照相同的路線排列著，但是它們之間的數據卻不能進行直接交換，因為它們分屬於不同的部隊或者公務部門。戰區作戰司令部必須採取措施來解決防區內的部隊或者公務部門之間的互聯性問題。

要解決這個問題，可以採用集中化控制的辦法。對網絡作戰部隊的集中化指揮需要戰區作戰司令部對自身的組織機構進行一定的調整，但是同時又不能影響其在有作戰需要時指揮行動的權力。相關部隊必須接受多個作戰司令部的命令，並且有效地優化和反饋戰場信息。目前，派往前線的部隊獨立性越來越高，通過全球信息柵格的幫助他們可以來回地越過戰區作戰司令部的邊界，戰區作戰司令部對網絡作戰的輔助和對抗作用因此而受到了損害，施行集中化指揮以後，部隊就不能或者說不願意響應戰區作戰司令部的要求了。

在2004年參與印尼海嘯救助工作的時候，太平洋司令部（PACOM：Pacific Command）首次在人道援助行動中採取了“聯合嘗試”的方式。太平洋司令部向被分派有任務的部隊發出指令，讓他們在整個行動計劃的框架之下進行特別的網絡防禦工作。很多海軍部隊和海軍陸戰隊的部隊在海軍全球網絡作戰中心的集中化指揮下，建立了一些相對直接的網絡防禦措施，這些措施超越了太平洋司令部給海軍和海軍陸戰隊分配的任務範圍，這就給太平洋司令部的全球網絡作戰帶來了潛在的危險因素。

作戰司令部很關心總是強調的對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制的思想會降低他們對全球信息柵格的信息掌握度和控制力度。在現有的指揮制度下，一個單位會在其所在部隊的指揮權下進行訓練或者執行其他任務，在戰區作戰司令部的指揮權下參加戰鬥，指揮控制的條理非常清晰。對部隊在信息領域的指揮控制與對其在空中、陸上、海上和空間領域的指揮控制同等重要。對C3S系統（control, communications and computer systems）來說，在其指揮下進行作戰並負責保護它的部隊常常要處於雙重甚至三重的報告鏈中，結果最後分不清到底是誰在負責指揮戰鬥。在全球性或者非全局性事件中，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊經常繞開戰區作戰司令部直接展開行動。儘管聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念專門強調了與戰區作戰司令部進行協調作戰的要求，但是在現代作戰快速變化的環境中，這條要求幾乎成了擺設。信息保障弱點警報系統、計算機任務序列和信息條件調整系統在作戰司令部的轄區之外出現問題就是這條要求失效的典型例子。這些事件直接影響了戰區作戰司令部在戰場上的指揮，當部隊想要直接利用這些機制從管理級上加強自身的控制的時候，他們不能判斷應該在何時、以什麼樣的方式在執行這些操作，也不知道這樣做會對戰區作戰司令部的指揮產生什麼影響，因為在目前的條件下，只有戰區作戰司令部才有能力來進行這些操作。當一個威脅事件需要空軍太空司令部向空軍部隊尋求全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的協同配合的時候，如果不通知或者取得與北方司令部的合作的話，將會給北方司令部的指揮帶來極大的麻煩。

在中央司令部，由於對網絡作戰部隊缺乏足夠的控制，導致指揮官有時候也不能確定網絡資源是否可用。海軍負責操作大量的戰場信息柵格，在作戰區域的海軍網絡作戰部隊並不用對中央司令部的海軍部負責，他們只需要向戰區網絡作戰與安全中心報告。中央司令部的中央戰區戰區網絡作戰中心，其職責是維持和指揮所有戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰，但是它也不在海軍網絡作戰部隊的報告鏈當中，所以也常常不能獲得所有戰場信息柵格上的事態感知，目前已經有替代辦法來處理這個問題了，不過這還不能說是正式的解決辦法。

對北方司令部來說，因為網絡作戰部隊的控制權的缺乏，他們在2005年“卡特琳娜”颶風的救援工作中遇到了極大的麻煩。在那次行動中，部隊的設備在未經許可的情況下就被運送到了聯合作戰區域。這使得北方司令部無法掌握和引導物資的調動情況，更無法協同各個部隊的行動，這是個多方位的管理和操作問題。

在各個部隊都主張施行在以全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊為中心的集中化指揮構架的時候，我們有必要強調一個事實，那就是戰區司令部並不願意看到這樣的變化，他們想保持原有的他們對戰略司令部負責，擁有全球信息柵格的操作權和防禦權的機制。戰略司令部的存在對保持戰區作戰司令部在戰區和全球性事件的作戰行動中的指揮地位以及增強戰區作戰司令部與聯合參謀部的溝通都有很大的幫助。

作戰司令部和部隊方面都想從聯合作戰的層面上對網絡作戰進行集中化指揮，但是其中有幾個問題還需要討論：

1.誰負第一領導責任？

2.網絡作戰進行集中化指揮具體在哪個層面上得到體現，全球層面、戰區層面還是其他什麼層面？

3.這種調整帶來的改變是僅僅體現在戰區作戰司令部的某個部門向全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊發出請求時還是戰區作戰司令部獲得戰區內的完全指揮權和優先權？

最後，戰區作戰司令部是最終對總統負責的以完成轄區內的軍事任務為目標的機構，被派遣到戰區作戰司令部的部隊需要在其管轄權之下完成各自的任務。因此在部隊方面主張實施全球性的集中指揮的時候，他們仍然會處於戰略司令部的指揮之下這一點是不容置疑的。但是目前全球信息柵格是影響戰區作戰司令部的指揮控制能力和指揮官對部隊的指導能力的關鍵一環。沒有全球信息柵格的話，飛機不能飛行、地面部隊無法移動、艦艇不能航行，連衛星都不能提供信號。指揮官們需要獲取全球信息柵格的狀態並進行控制，就像他們需要掌握部隊的方位和狀態一樣重要。他們必須要掌握戰場信息柵格的範圍、能力和狀態，必須知道戰區以外的情況會如何影響部隊所在區域的戰場信息柵格，還必須能夠指揮和優化部隊配置以支持作戰。如果我們真的相信被描述得天花亂墜的集中化指揮會有更好的效果，那也不能忽視為戰區作戰司令部保留適當的指揮和控制權。

還有，只要戰區作戰司令部這種結構還保留著，那麼所有的軍事任務，包括那些由職能作戰司令部指揮的作戰，都必然還是會發生在戰區作戰司令部的防區內，因為所有的網絡作戰任務都必定要由一個實體單位來執行。同時，集中化指揮對於實現以網絡為中心的指揮模式以及更加有效地防禦攻擊、傳遞信息都是必要的。這種集中化指揮的概念與戰區作戰司令部要求掌握和優化戰場信息柵格的願望是不互斥的。

前進之路

要想制定出一套可行的網絡作戰指揮控制框架，必須要避免走極端，既要考慮戰區作戰司令部的需要，也要考慮建立對全球信息柵格的集中化控制的需要。在目前聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念的發展過程和網絡作戰部隊的轉型過程中，組織原則需要發揮調整各方利益的槓桿作用。為了達到這樣的目標，國防部應該做到以下幾點：

1.創建一個簡單、明確的網絡作戰指揮鏈，保證戰略司令部可以對所有的網絡作戰行動進行指揮。這就可以解決剛才提到的“誰負第一領導責任”的問題。只有當事件發生在快速變化的環境中的時候，戰區指揮控制機構才開始發揮作用。簡潔的指揮鏈可以保證參加網絡作戰的部隊知道自己應該聽從誰的指揮、應該向誰報告，在這條指揮鏈中，必須包括戰區作戰司令部。

2.可以賦予戰區作戰司令部在其防區內的指揮權：

——修正聯合司令部計劃以明確戰區作戰司令部在其防區內對網絡作戰的職責。

——修正已有的全球信息柵格網絡作戰概念，詳細說明那些處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊可以從戰區作戰司令部的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

——規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的所有命令都要通過戰區作戰司令部來執行。

這些調整可以保證戰區中的所有單位都在唯一的一條指揮鏈下行動，那就是通過戰區作戰司令部對戰略司令部負責。這也可以解決北方司令部應該對轄區負責但是又沒有指揮網絡作戰的權力的尷尬境地。

3.在每個戰區作戰司令部建立一個由中央司令部管轄的聯合網絡作戰中心，將戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區網絡作戰中心進行融合。這樣一來，每個戰區作戰司令部都將有一個在計算機空間領域的聯合作戰司令部，就像在海陸空的實體戰場上一樣。任何處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊都可以從聯合網絡作戰中心的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

4.鞏固全球信息柵格的地位，將最高控制權交給戰略司令部。目前集中化指揮的發展偏重於對參與網絡作戰的部隊的指揮，這與以網絡為中心的指揮概念背道而馳。以部隊為中心的“煙囪”式指揮系統不利於信息的傳遞和處理，讓我們離“為所有使用者提供最新、最準確的信息”的目標越來越遠。在之前的《戈德華特·尼科爾斯國防部重構法》報告中已經明確提到，組織管理和指揮控制應該由一個聯合的機構來掌控。

結束語

目前對網絡作戰的集中化指揮是一個迫切的需要。優化網絡作戰指揮機制可以幫助國防部提高效率、節約成本以及更好地分配緊缺資源。更重要的是，這樣可以讓網絡作戰部隊更加快速、準確地為指揮官提供信息，這在大規模的網絡作戰中非常重要。集中化指揮的進程不能影響到網絡作戰指揮控制的效率。這取決於全球信息柵格能否為所有參戰的單位提供足夠的信息以及指揮官是否充分利用戰區信息柵格來幫助指揮作戰。

“我們必須改變對網絡作戰問題的討論和思考模式，我們是在進行網絡“作戰”而不是網絡“管理”，所有的參戰單位必須保證自己每時每刻都準備著開戰，以保證網絡系統這一決定性的武器系統的安全”。網絡作戰是我們國家能夠贏得戰爭的關鍵一環，它可以幫助我們提供指揮和控制、縮短決策週期以及調整各戰區的資源配備。戰略司令部已經在強化網絡作戰概念方面邁出了很大的一步，這些努力還需要繼續進行下去。戰區作戰司令部必須是掌控和防護全球信息柵格的重要一環，以保證我們可以繼續取得網絡作戰的勝利。

Reference URL: http://www.china.com.cn/military

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence

中國浅析伊拉克战争中美军网络中心战 ~ China Analysis of Analysis of the US Central Command Network War During Iraq War

03/23/2017 admin Leave a comment

China Analysis of Analysis of the US Central Command Network War During Iraq War

浅析伊拉克战争中美军网络中心战

The network center war was first proposed by the US Navy in 1997, initially reflected in the war in Afghanistan, it is the core of the future of US military joint operations.

As early as 1997, the Navy put forward the concept of network-centric warfare. In 2001, the Pentagon upgraded it into the war form of the information age. In 2002, the Bush administration regarded the network center warfare capability as the focus of the military transformation and the core of the future joint operations. In view of the network center war in the war in Afghanistan in the initial results, the US military in the Iraq war to further test the new concept of combat.

· Construction of the US military network centric warfare architecture

in the Iraq war, the US military stressed that network-centric warfare, and the prominence of the role of information, with an agile and efficient digital network structure information gathering, command and control and communications, firepower three systems integration, Shortened the time from the detection of the target, the formation of operational instructions to combat the destruction of the target. The networked combat structure can improve the level of information sharing, enhance situational awareness, speed up command and decision speed, achieve combat coordination, enhance the lethality, viability and responsiveness, thus greatly improving the combat effectiveness and shorten the war process. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the network structure of the US military network structure and three-tier network structure diagram.

Full-dimensional detection network to seize the information advantage is to give full play to the network center war the first condition. The US military used almost all high-tech means of detection, the establishment of the days, air, sea and land integration of full-dimensional detection network. In addition to the outer space constitutes a huge satellite surveillance network, the air at the same time there are low altitude, hollow, high altitude three reconnaissance aircraft on the Iraqi military positions to scan, the ground also deployed a large number of sensors. It is with the full-dimensional detection network, the US military captured the asymmetric information advantage, and its conversion into asymmetric firepower advantage, arbitrary implementation of the long-range strike, not only makes the Iraqi air force can not fight, ground forces are not large-scale assembly , In a passive position. <A I = 5> flexible allegations In the Gulf War, the message in the chain after a few hours or days after the transfer, the commander to issue an attack command, so the US military even through the reconnaissance found a mobile missile launcher, can not Timely strike. In this Iraq war, the US military used a flexible allegation network to effectively integrate the allegation system, greatly reducing the combat preparation time. Through the network, the commander can at the same time with the subordinate forces at all levels to contact, while commanding scattered in the regional combat forces, the formation of the overall force.

Efficient combat network At present, the US military services are more than half of the equipment to achieve the information, these information equipment on the battlefield constitutes an interconnected, interoperable network environment, different services, deployed in different spaces of various weapons platforms and fire units Equivalent to a node in the network, you can exchange the battlefield information in a timely manner, indicating the target, in accordance with the unified fire plan to implement precision strike, more effective performance. In this battle, DDG-75 “Aegis” destroyers for the “Patriot” missiles to provide early warning information, the platform through the network to achieve an example of interoperability.

In the Iraq war, the US military with the network structure for the first time to achieve a real sense of the land, sea, air and marines combat operations. Soon after the war, the US military to effectively implement the space cooperation, air force in the use of precision guided weapons to combat the implementation of the enemy at the same time, the ground forces to provide effective close support. 　　Enhanced one-way transparency and situational awareness Since the war, the US military to use the most advanced and most powerful network technology, access to transparent and sustained battlefield charts. US Joint Operations Center is located in Qatar, is the command of the nerve center of war against Iraq. A variety of information after nearly 700 intelligence officers of the analysis, sent to the highest commander on the screen, six display battlefield information on a few minutes to update. Through the display can watch the battlefield situation, such as the movement of Iraqi tanks, deployed in Baghdad’s commando and in the flight section of the “Tomahawk” cruise missiles. <A I = 10> Realize the battlefield real-time Gulf War, the US air raid from the discovery to attack target takes 3 days, if the temporary target is difficult to adjust the air raid plan. In the Kosovo war, this time is shortened to 2h, making a considerable part of the air raid mission can be re-adjusted after the plane lift. Afghanistan war time to further shorten to 19min, the attack real-time greatly improved. In this war, this time control in 10min. The high-speed digital network system enables the US military to make faster and more responsive responses to the rapid changes in the battlefield, and to command and control the coordination of arms and operations efficiently and efficiently, which greatly improves the ability to respond quickly to changes in operational plans.

Try the effect-based operations and fast decisive combat Unlike the Gulf War, the US war in Iraq warn of information warfare using information-based weapons, not only to ensure victory, but also to achieve rapid decisive combat. To this end, the US military rely on the network of combat structure, the pursuit of effect-based operations, the target to combat more selective and targeted. US military straight to the goal of two: First, Saddam Hussein and other senior officials and the main defenders, “beheading action” from beginning to end throughout the war; the second is the Iraqi capital Baghdad, the US military did not like the traditional city war as the first to seize And occupation of the suburbs, and then step by step, layers of advance, but the first to capture the city’s strategic location.

Quickly hit time sensitive targets When time-sensitive targets appear on the battlefield, the time-sensitive targeting team within the Joint Air Combat Center of the Saudi Air Force Base will be able to identify the target in just a few minutes and determine the best attack. On 20 March, two mobile missile launchers in Iraq launched the “Abubel” -100 missile in Kuwaiti territory, which was discovered by the US airborne reconnaissance plane at a temporary US Air Force Base at 40 km from the launch site To fly the aircraft combat mission, the aircraft took off after the bombing of the missile launch vehicle bombing.

The first test of the digitalization of the United States after the Gulf War put forward the “digital network as the center of the war” concept, and at the end of the last century put forward the “digital battlefield and digital forces” concept. In 2001, the fourth machine division became the world’s first digital division, it can share the location and target information, has a unique battlefield access to tactical Internet capabilities, but has not yet been tested. April 13, the US military step 4 division vanguard arrived in Ticritt, to accept the actual test. <A (FBCB2)

The basic components of the system include the computer hardware / software, GPS receiver and communication interface, the main function is the main function of the system is the core of the war, To the commander, squad and individual show enemy position, send and receive combat command and logistical data, improve the battlefield situational awareness, target recognition. FBCB2 can provide e-mail service, connected with the Army’s high-level tactical communications system, allowing combatants to send a large number of news and digital reconnaissance reports to field commanders.

Tactical Internet Tactics The Internet is made up of three main tactical communications systems, namely, airborne radio systems, enhanced location reporting systems and mobile user equipment, including radio, communications satellites, mobile phones, fiber optic cables and switching facilities. Tactical Internet enables seamless connectivity between tactical users, voice, data, image and real-time video transmission, support for text, network management and security, and e-mail services, delivering fast and accurate information and instructions to each Combat unit.

“Global Command and Control System” (GCCS-J) to support the war against Iraq, the US military pre-war with the latest version of GCCS-J6. 0 The global command and control system enhances the intelligence capabilities so that the data from the common operations map can be better synchronized. GCCS-J combines the command and control systems of all arms and arms and correlates the data of unmanned aerial vehicles, terrestrial and satellite sensors to the integrated image and intelligence system, which can assist the commander in analyzing operational intelligence data, Generate target data and plan tasks. 　　”Can be deployed joint command and control system” (DJCCS) In this war, the US military for the first time using the DJCCS. The system is a computer information sharing platform, with a video conference, Internet and send and receive e-mail function, the battlefield commander in the state of movement in an unprecedented way to monitor the progress of action, keep abreast of the arms and operations of the situation, the timely release of combat orders.

JFN is a network-centric combat system for the US Navy, consisting of the TES, the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Joint Operations Image Processing System, (JSIPS) to provide real-time information interaction, sensor control, target generation, mission planning and combat damage assessment capabilities, can identify and attack target time from a few hours to 10nin, to combat time-sensitive targets. TES allows the theater command center to receive target information directly from the wu1 man-machine or U-2 reconnaissance platform, and the pilots of the attack aircraft can receive the target indication data from the theater command center. GCCS provides the commander with a command and control network to issue target attack orders. JSIPS for data processing. In the future, JFN will be able to process intelligence data into targeted data more quickly, to achieve the goal of moving all people in the network, sharing common operational charts and requesting fire support.

“Tactical Input System” (TIS) TIS has been installed on the “Nimitz” aircraft carrier, and is expected to deploy to other US Navy aircraft carrier and the main amphibious ship. The system can receive digital images via terrestrial and sea-based airborne sensor platform radio lines, including optoelectronic, infrared and synthetic aperture radar images. Navy intelligence personnel can click on the interface to analyze the image, get important information, mark the potential target. TIS gives the US Navy a complete, end-to-end electronic image that greatly enhances the ability to collect, identify and target targets throughout the battlefield, reducing sensor-to-shooter time. <A (CEC) system April 7, equipped with CEC system, the US Navy “Nimitz” aircraft carrier into the designated waters, which is the first time the actual deployment of the system. CEC system is mainly composed of data distribution system and collaborative combat processor, is a network center war concept more mature a system, will make the sea air defense combat revolution, it will be aircraft carrier battle group formation in the platform (including ships and early warning aircraft ) The target detection system, the command and control system and the weapon system are organically linked to allow the platform to share all the data acquired by the various detection devices in the formation with a very short delay, so that the combat system breaks through the single ship, Within the realization of integration.

Tactical data information chain In the network center war, the tactical data information chain is one of the important means for the US military and allied forces to realize the information superiority, mainly including Link-16 and Link-11. Link-16 can transmit all kinds of tactical data information between command and control system and aircraft, missile and other weapons system platform and between combat units, effectively connect information source, accusation center and weapon system platform to realize battlefield resource sharing. The tactical data information chain using time division multiple access technology, with relative navigation and anti-jamming capability to relay the way of communication, the working frequency band 960MHz-1215MHz, the data rate of 115.2lkbps-238kbps. Link-11 operates at high frequency / UHF band, data rate is 1.8kbps, can be used for real-time exchange of early warning information, air / ground / underwater target data, control instructions and the status of the unit weapons, and has a certain degree of confidentiality , The entire network under the control of the network control station network communication, the use of master-slave polling, can be over-the-horizon transmission.

The analysis of the characteristics of the US military development network center war shows that the concept of network-centric warfare has gradually become a new form of combat for the US military in the 21st century. In the development and application of network-centric warfare concept, the US military showed the following characteristics:

In the Iraq war, the US military uses a variety of detection and communication means to make the entire battlefield transparent, from beginning to end are information-led. This shows that in the future war who can have the advantage in the detection and communication, to seize the right to information, who will be able to achieve greater battlefield initiative.

Pay attention to the digitalization of weapons and equipment, information construction Digital is the basis of network-based warfare, is expected to US military services in 2010-2020 to achieve full digital. Weapon and equipment information is to achieve the network as the center of the joint operations of the core, the US military will be further in the world to take the lead in the information age of information technology. 　　To strengthen the network center warfare related equipment R & D The US military effective implementation of the network center war relies on in recent years targeted research and development of various related equipment, such as joint fire network, collaborative combat capability, tactical Internet, tactical input system, global command and control system, Data information chain and so on.

(Source: “National Defense Technology” 2003 the first 18)

Original Mandarin Chinese:

中国日报网站消息：网络中心战最早由美国海军于1997年提出，在阿富汗战争中初步体现出优越性，它是美军未来联合作战的核心。

海军早在1997年就提出网络中心战概念，2001年五角大楼将其提升为信息时代的战争形态，2002年布什政府将网络中心战能力视为军队转型的重点和未来联合作战的核心。鉴于网络中心战在阿富汗战争中初见成效，美军在伊拉克战争中进一步检验了这一全新的作战概念。

·美军构建网络化作战结构

在伊拉克战争中，美军强调网络中心战，突出信息的地位和作用，借助灵敏高效的数字化网络结构将信息收集、指挥控制与通信、火力打击三大系统融为一体，缩短了从侦察发现目标、形成作战指令到打击摧毁目标的时间。网络化的作战结构可提高信息共享水平，增强态势感知能力，加快指挥和决策速度，实现作战协同，增强杀伤力、生存能力和响应能力，从而极大地提高作战效能，缩短战争进程。图1和图2分别显示了美军构建的网络中心战的网络结构原理图和三层网络结构图。

全维的探测网夺取信息优势是充分发挥网络中心战的首要条件。美军动用了几乎所有高技术探测手段，建立了天、空、海、陆一体化全维探测网。除在外层空间构成庞大的卫星监视网外，空中同时有低空、中空、高空三个层次的各种侦察飞机对伊军阵地进行扫描，地面上也部署了大量传感器。正是借助全维的探测网，美军夺取了不对称的信息优势，并将其转化为不对称的火力优势，随心所欲地实施远程打击，不但使得伊拉克空军无法作战，地面部队也不敢大规模集结，陷于被动境地。

灵活的指控网在海湾战争中，信息在指控链中需经过数小时或数天的传递后，指挥官才能下达攻击命令，因此美军即使通过侦察发现了机动导弹发射车，也无法及时实施打击。这次伊拉克战争中，美军利用灵活的指控网有效整合了指控系统，大大缩短打击准备时间。通过网络，指挥官可以同时与下属各级部队进行联络，同时指挥分散在各地域的作战部队，形成整体合力。

高效的作战网目前，美军各军种均有一半以上的装备实现了信息化，这些信息化装备在战场上构成互联、互通的网络环境，不同军种、部署在不同空间的各种武器平台和火力单元相当于网络中的一个节点，可以及时交换战场信息，指示目标，按照统一的火力计划实施精确打击，更有效地发挥效能。在这次作战中，DDG-75“宙斯盾”驱逐舰为“爱国者”导弹提供预警信息，是平台通过网络化途径实现互通的一个例证。

·伊拉克战争中网络中心战的具体应用

检验联合作战的协同性伊拉克战争中，美军借助网络化结构首次实现了真正意义上的陆、海、空和海军陆战队协同作战。开战不久，美军就有效地实施空地协同，空中力量在使用精确制导武器对敌军实施打击的同时，对地面部队提供有效的近距离支援。

增强单向透明度和态势感知能力自开战以来，美军运用最先进、最强大的网络技术，获取透明持续的战场态势图。美军联合作战中心位于卡塔尔，是指挥对伊作战的神经中枢。各种信息经过近700名情报人员的分析，传送到最高指挥官的显示屏上，6个显示屏上的战场信息几分钟就更新一次。通过显示屏可观察战场情况，如运动中的伊拉克坦克、部署在巴格达的突击队以及处于飞行段的“战斧”巡航导弹。

实现战场实时化海湾战争中，美军空袭从发现到攻击目标需要3天，若临时发现目标时很难及时调整空袭计划。在科索沃战争中，这一时间缩短到2h，使得相当一部分空袭任务可以在飞机升空后重新调整。阿富汗战争时这一时间进一步缩短到19min，攻击的实时性大大提高。而在这次战争中，这一时间控制在1Omin内。高速数字化网络系统使美军能对战场瞬息变化作出更快、更灵敏的反应，及时高效地指挥、控制与协调各军兵种的行动，大大提高了临时改变作战计划时的快速反应能力。

尝试基于效果的作战和快速决定性作战与海湾战争不同，此次伊拉克战争美军提出用信息化武器装备打信息化战争，不仅要求确保胜利，而且要求实现快速决定性作战。为此，美军依靠网络化作战结构，追求基于效果的作战，对目标打击更有选择性和针对性。美军直取的目标有两个：一是萨达姆和其他高官以及主要捍卫者，“斩首行动”由始至终贯穿整个战争；二是伊拉克首都巴格达，美军没有像传统的城市战那样首先夺取和占领市郊，然后步步为营，层层推进，而是首先夺取市内的战略要地。

快速打击时间敏感目标当战场上出现时间敏感目标时，美军在沙特空军基地的联合空中作战中心内的时间敏感瞄准小组只用几分钟时间就可准确识别目标，决定最佳攻击行动。3月20日，伊拉克两辆机动导弹发射车刚向科威特境内发射“阿巴比尔”－100导弹，即被美国空中侦察机发现，在距发射地点40km的一个美空军基地立即临时调整了几架待飞飞机的作战任务，飞机起飞后投掷炸弹将导弹发射车炸毁。

首次检验数字化师美国在海湾战争后提出了“以数字化网络为中心的战争”概念，并于上世纪末率先提出了“数字化战场和数字化部队”的构想。2001年，第4机步师成为世界上第一支数字化师，它可以共享位置和目标信息，具有独一无二的战场接入战术因特网的能力，但尚未经过实战检验。4月13日，美军第4机步师先头部队到达提克里特，接受实战检验。

·伊拉克战争中网络中心战的部分装备

“21世纪旅及旅以下作战指挥控制系统”（FBCB2）该系统的基本组件包括计算机硬/软件、GPS接收机和通信接口，主要功能是向指挥官、小分队和单兵显示敌我位置、收发作战命令和后勤数据、提高战场态势感知能力、进行目标识别等。FBCB2可提供电子邮件服务，与陆军的高层战术通信系统相连接，允许作战人员向战地指挥官发送大量消息和数字化侦察报告。

战术互联网战术互联网由陆军3个主要的战术通信系统，即机载无线电系统、增强型定位报告系统和移动用户设备互联而成，包括无线电、通信卫星、移动电话、光缆和交换设施。战术互联网能够实现战术级用户间的无缝连接，提供语音、数据、图像和实时视频传输，支持文电、网络管理和安全以及电子邮件业务，可快速、准确地将战地情报和指示传递给每个作战单元。

“全球指挥与控制系统”(GCCS -J) 为支持对伊作战，美军战前采用了最新版本的GCCS-J6.0全球指挥和控制系统，提高了情报能力，使通用作战图传来的数据可以更好地同步。 GCCS－J联合了所有军兵种的指挥与控制系统，并使无人机、地面和卫星传感器的数据相互关联并传递到图像与情报综合系统，后者能够帮助指挥官分析作战情报数据、管理和生成目标数据以及规划任务。

“可部署的联合指挥与控制系统”（DJCCS）在这次战争中，美军首次实战使用了DJCCS。该系统是一个计算机信息共享平台，具有召开电视会议、上网和收发邮件功能，可使战场指挥官在运动状态下以前所未有的方式监控行动进展，随时了解各军兵种作战情况，及时下达作战命令。

“联合火力网”(JFN) JFN是美海军的一个以网络为中心的作战系统，由“战术利用系统”(TES)、“全球指挥与控制系统”(GCCS)和“联合作战图像处理系统”(JSIPS)组成，能够提供实时信息交互、传感器控制、目标产生、任务计划制定以及作战毁伤评估功能，可将识别和攻击目标的时间从数小时减少到10nin，打击时间敏感目标。TES可使战区指挥中心直接从wu1人机或U -2等侦察平台接收目标信息，攻击机的飞行员能从战区指挥中心接收目标指示数据。GCCS为指挥官提供下达目标攻击指令的指挥控制网络。JSIPS进行数据处理。未来，JFN将能更快地把情报数据处理成瞄准数据，用于打击移动目标，最终实现使所有人员都置身于网络中，共享通用作战态势图和请求火力支援。

“战术输入系统”(TIS) TIS已安装在“尼米兹”号航母上，并有望部署到美海军其他航母和主要两栖舰上。该系统可通过陆基和海基机载传感器平台的无线电线路接收数字式图像，包括光电、红外及合成孔径雷达图像。海军情报人员可通过点击界面分析图像，获得重要信息，标记潜在目标。TIS使美海军拥有了完整的、端对端的电子图像，极大地提高在整个战场上搜集、识别和打击目标的能力，减少传感器到射手的时间。

“协同作战能力”(CEC)系统 4月7日，装有CEC系统的美海军“尼米兹”号航母进入指定海域，这是该系统首次实战部署。 CEC系统主要由数据分发系统和协同作战处理器组成，是网络中心战概念比较成熟的一个系统，将使海上防空作战发生革命性变化，它将航母战斗群编队中各平台(包括舰艇和预警机等)所装载的目标探测系统、指挥控制系统和武器系统有机联系起来，允许各平台以极短的延时共享编队内各种探测设备获取的所有数据，使作战系统突破单舰的限制，在编队内实现集成。

战术数据信息链在网络中心战中，战术数据信息链是美军及盟军实现信息优势的重要手段之一，主要包括Link-16和Link -11。Link-16可在指挥控制系统与飞机、导弹等武器系统平台之间以及在各作战单元之间传输各种战术数据信息，有效连接信息源、指控中心与武器系统平台，实现战场资源共享。该战术数据信息链采用时分多址技术，具有相对导航和抗干扰能力，以中继方式进行通信，工作频段为960MHz-1215MHz，数据速率为115.2lkbps-238kbps。Link-11在高频/特高频频段工作，数据速率为1.8kbps，可用于实时交换预警信息、空中/地面/水下目标数据、控制指令以及各单元武器状况信息，并具有一定的保密能力，整个网络在网络控制站的管制下组网通信，采用主从式轮询，可进行超视距传输。

·美军发展网络中心战的特点

分析表明，网络中心战概念已逐渐成为美军面向21世纪的新型作战形式。在发展和应用网络中心战概念上，美军表现出以下特点:

建立全维的探测网，夺取制信息权伊拉克战争中，美军运用多种探测和通信手段使整个战场透明化，从始至终都以信息为主导。这说明在未来战争中谁能够在探测和通信上占有优势，夺取制信息权，谁就能够取得更大的战场主动权。

注重武器装备的数字化、信息化建设数字化是网络中心战的基础，预计美国各军种将在2010-2020年间全面实现数字化。武器装备的信息化是实现以网络为中心的联合作战的核心，美军将进一步在世界上率先建成信息时代的信息化军队。

加强网络中心战相关装备研发此次美军有效实施网络中心战依赖于近年有针对性地研发各种相关装备，如联合火力网、协同作战能力、战术互联网、战术输入系统、全球指挥与控制系统、数据信息链等。（来源：《国防科技》2003年第18期）

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 – US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

03/17/2017 admin Leave a comment

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 –

US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

With the rapid development of the global information grid system of the US military, the conceptual research based on the information technology system is becoming more and more thorough. Finally, the American combat theory establishes the cyberspace as a combat domain with land, sea, air and sky. In this context, the US Army will be the construction of cyberspace as a key factor in promoting the process of modernization of the army, determined to follow the formal militarization of the organization’s standards and structure of high-quality network combat forces. Since the establishment of the Army Network Command in 2010, the US Army has established a comprehensive network of operational forces based on the goal of combating the military forces of cyberspace through new means such as new construction, adjustment, transformation and integration.

The basic organizational structure under the guidance of the concept of network operations

From the 90s of the 20th century, in order to ensure the US military information grid system in the army part of the efficient and safe operation, the US Army under the guidance of the joint army, around the concept of network operations carried out a series of organizational restructuring, the dissolution of the information system commander And has set up the Army Signal Command and the network enterprise technology command and other institutions, and gradually formed based on technology, defense, focusing on the basic network of emergency operations organizational structure.

In 2005, the US Strategic Command issued the “Global Information Grid Collaborative Combat Concept”, which elaborated on the organizational structure of the US Army’s cyberspace forces during this period, dividing the Army’s network operations system into three Level: At the first level, under the command of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command, the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center is responsible for situational awareness and command coordination as the only governing body for Army operations, In the US Army Joint Force Network Power System, the agency functions as a global network of operations and security centers. At the second level, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center is the supporting element of the operational headquarters, which is responsible for “guiding network operations, managing and defending the global information grid elements that are part of the Army’s jurisdiction.” The regional network operations and security centers in the theater constitute the third dimension of the Army’s network operations system. In addition, the Army Computer Emergency Response Unit is the disposal of the network emergency response, in the emergency can accept the global network operations task force tactical control, each theater network operations and security center also established a computer emergency response unit.

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Global military clean sweep, do in the public micro-signal “new global military”

Long press the next two-dimensional code can be concerned about

Set up Army Network Command

With the US military for the degree of dependence on cyberspace, control and weaken the threat of the Internet has continued to become the focus of US military tasks, the establishment of an independent network of space operations command of the voice of the growing US military. In 2008, “Yankee deer bomb action” directly under the impetus, the US military decided to end the unit of independent decentralization of the development of network combat capability of the situation, through the withdrawal, transfer, change and other measures to reorganize the relevant institutions, the establishment of a comprehensive network Space operations of the joint command agencies, the US Army network power organization construction has entered a stage of rapid development.

Through the global deployment of decentralized development of the formation of cyberspace combat organization of the backbone. As the awareness of the network operations will have a far-reaching impact on the military field, the US Army in the combat force level into a lot of resources, and gradually establish the backbone of the network operations. For example, the Army launched its first cyber warfare in July 2008, which provides tactical support, brigade combatant support, and strategic support to other service units, joint forces and even cross-agency partners; the Army also operates on cyber operations The upper-level command system to implement the adjustment, so that the relevant action to be appropriate authority to monitor. During this period, the Army’s future network combat forces were integrated in the form of units in the military and joint forces within the combat unit, including from the Defense Information Systems Agency, the global network operations joint contingent, the National Security Agency to the brigade combat team and other Level of strategic and tactical institutions.
The new core coordination agencies, straighten out the headquarters to the unit level of the command relationship. In June 2009, the US Department of Defense announced the establishment of the US Internet Command in the form of a memorandum to consolidate and promote the construction of cyberspace military forces through a dedicated subordinate joint command. At the same time, as a transitional measure for the formation of the Army Force Network Command in the future, the Army decided to retain the organizational structure of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command and rename it as Army Force Network Command. February 2010, the US Army announced on this basis, the formal formation of the Army Network Force Command, its formation and initial construction phase of the work mainly around the three tasks: to achieve cyber space military forces combat, increase the Army network combat power Capacity and scale, the development of the Army network space professionals team. As the previous command system was disrupted, the newly established Army Network Space Operations and Integration Center under the Cyber Command actually played a central role in command control and coordinated synchronization. The agency is similar to the previous Army Global Network Operations and Security Center, but in addition to “providing clear, concise and timely guidance in the implementation of full spectrum cyberspace operations,” the organization is also responsible for “with the Army’s other headquarters, Other units in the same type of institutions, the United States cyberspace joint operations center to share information. ” At the beginning of the establishment of the organization, some members of the cyberspace operations and integration center also joined the US Department of Network Command staff to better promote the unity of command and operation of the joint force and service units.

US Army Network Space Force Organizational Structure, 2005

The transformation of combat forces functions, to promote the traditional ability to network space combat capability development. At the level of the combat force construction, the field signal force as the main body of the network Enterprise Technology Command / 9 signal command to the Army Network Force Command, the Army Intelligence and Security Command of the cyberspace combat forces combat command by the army Network command. Through this organizational adjustment, the Army Network Command for the first time mastered the forefront of the deployment of combat forces, to form a global presence and have the expedition, you can combat commander to provide more comprehensive combat support capabilities. It is noteworthy that the network enterprise technology command and the intelligence and security commander in the Army Network Command as deputy commander, respectively, responsible for different types of network operations mission, the basic formation of the original signal forces in charge of network defense, the original military Intelligence forces in charge of the network attack mode, which will be previously discrete deployment, loosely combined network space related organizations into a complete army network strength. In addition, the Army Network Command in 2011 was also given the task of carrying out information operations, master the first information combat command of the operational command, intelligence and security headquarters under the 780 military intelligence brigade will also be transformed into Army Network Command Direct command of the network brigade.

Continuously optimize the Army cyberspace forces

After the establishment of the Army Network Command, cyber space military forces combat is always the center of its work, which in the Army Network Power Organization continue to optimize the integration process has been highlighted. For the current network operations have been formed, electronic warfare, information operations, military intelligence and even space combat capability, the US Army in the network of military organizational structure design also reflects the integration of a variety of capacity trends. The US Army is also actively promoting the overall military model in the construction of network forces, highlighting the development of the national guards and reserve forces. After years of construction, the US Army network power organization has been basically formed.
Army Network Combat Force Organizational Structure, 2011

Optimize the combat strength of the organizational structure, to adapt to operational support needs. At the headquarters level, in order to further improve the command and implementation of cyberspace operations, the Army approved the Network Command in March 2014 as the headquarters of the Army Force, and designated the 2nd Army as its immediate unit, and the network enterprise technology Command to become the second army direct command of the network combat troops, network enterprise technology command commander of the second group army deputy commander. And the previous year, the network command has been under the guidance of the US Internet Command and Army headquarters began to form a joint force network headquarters, which will be the implementation of the network space combat command command, and have direct support to the combat command of the network combat capability The At the combat forces and theater levels, the network command is trying to improve the global network defense situation through regional network centers. Based on the strength of the original Theater Network Operations and Security Center and Regional Computer Emergency Response Center, these regional cybersecurity centers streamline the operational plan of the network operations, and can play a strong planning, coordination and synchronization function to more effectively support geography Operation of the Combat Command.

To determine the development of the responsible institutions, improve the network to build military theory guidance. As the US Army Network Command merged with the original network operations, information operations and the strength of the signal forces, a large number of signal forces combat theory urgent need to be revised and translated into the network combat theory, in order to achieve a unified operational capability development model, to avoid the concept of guidance On the chaos. In March 2014, the US Training and Command Command, on the basis of the Center for Excellence, integrated other relevant professional elements to form the Army Network Center of Excellence, with the goal of providing guidance, network and signal The full ability of training. The cyberspace promotion office under the Cyber Command is also incorporated into the Network Excellence Center to further enhance the advantages of the Network Excellence Center in summing up lessons learned from the construction of network forces. Through the implementation of the Ordinance to publish the project, the Network Excellence Center tried to merge the original signal and electronic warfare forces regulations, according to the Army “2015 order system” related requirements to develop new cyberspace operations, electronic warfare and signal forces regulations. At present, the Army has completed the revision of the field command FM6-02 “signal force support operations” to guide the signal forces to the network forces for functional transformation; the first release of the field order FM3-38 “network electromagnetic action”, clear “Army in the unified ground action to integrate the overall principles of network electromagnetic activity, tactics and procedures”; as the Army network army building a basic guidance document, field command FM3-12 “cyberspace combat” also basically completed the final approval process, Officially distributed within the Army in 2015. With the above documents as the main body, the Network Excellence Center will continue to improve the publication of dozens of related military ordinances publications, build a complete Army cyber space combat technology, tactics and procedures for the Army network forces to provide comprehensive theoretical guidance.
Army Network Combat Force Organizational Structure, 2015

Integration of cyberspace education and training strength, and promote the regular development of network forces. The US Army will promote the development of formal training as a fundamental way to improve the level of network operations and combat readiness. In the Army Network Center of excellence at the same time, the Army Network School as its affiliated institutions in the original electronic warfare school set up on the basis of the Army Signal School is also under the network center of excellence will continue to be retained, the Army on the regularization of the construction of cyberspace “Regulations – Organization – Training – Resources – Leadership and Education – Personnel – Facilities” model has been further refined. With the establishment of the Army Network Arsenal (“17-Series” Career Management), the Army requested new staff members to enter the network career field to complete the school’s school training program, from signal, intelligence and information operations forces and other units to the Corresponding to a large number of network operations staff also need to carry out new vocational education and training, the two schools will jointly set up the new Army network arms units officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers for individual personnel skills training. For example, the Army Leadership Foundation Training Program was officially launched at the online school in August 2015, and the 14-week Senior Officer Training Program was implemented in May 2016. For the first batch of network combatants recruited by the Army in October 2015, the senior personal training program that must be attended by the Army began in February 2016. As the cyberspace operations essentially have the characteristics of joint operations, the first phase of the 22-week training program will be the Naval Joint Network Analyst Course, the second phase of training for the same 22 weeks, training venues from the Navy The facility is transferred to the Army Network School.

Attention to the National Guard and reserve network strength, highlighting the support and coordination functions. In view of the development of the network combat force, the Army believes that the reserve department can assist the active forces to share some of the tasks and be able to provide reinforcements with high levels of training as quickly as necessary. Because of its unique dual legal position, the Army National Guard can play the role of state and federal government agencies, civil and military organizations, private and public sector convergence, “with the development of cyberspace capabilities of the natural advantages.” Therefore, the Army in the development of network combat forces also pay attention to the construction of the relevant reserve organizations. For example, the First Information Operations Command also includes four reserve forces theater information operations brigade, which has the ability to provide information operations and cyberspace planning, analysis and technical support. According to a memorandum signed by the Army National Guard in June 2014 with the Army Network Command, the Army National Guard transferred one of its network defenses in the previous year to the Army Network Command / 2nd Army. The cyber force, known as the 1636th Network Defense Unit, will be in Service No. 10 of the United States Code, which is a full-time service and will receive the same standard training with other active forces of the Army Network Command and jointly All types of tasks.

This article from the “Military Digest” December Editor: Zhang Chuanliang

Original Mandarin Chinese:

伴隨著美軍全球信息柵格系統的高速發展，基於信息技術系統作戰的概念研究不斷走向深入，最終美軍作戰理論將網絡空間確立為一種與陸、海、空、天並列的作戰域。在這種背景下，美國陸軍將網絡空間力量建設作為推進陸軍現代化進程的關鍵因素，決心按照正規軍事化組織的標準和結構高質量建設網絡作戰部隊。自陸軍網絡司令部於2010年成立以來，美國陸軍圍繞網絡空間軍事力量作戰化的目標，通過新建、調整、轉型和融合等手段逐步建立起完善的網絡作戰力量組織結構。

網絡作戰概念指導下的基本組織結構

從20世紀90年代開始，為確保美軍全球信息柵格系統中的陸軍部分高效安全運行，美國陸軍在聯合軍隊的指導下，圍繞網絡作戰行動概念進行了一系列組織結構調整，解散了信息系統司令部，並先後組建了陸軍信號司令部以及網絡企業技術司令部等機構，逐步形成基於技術、防禦為主、重在應急的網絡作戰基本組織架構。

2005年，美國戰略司令部發布了《全球信息柵格網絡作戰聯合作戰概念》，對這一時期美國陸軍網絡空間力量建設的組織結構進行了詳細說明，將陸軍網絡作戰體系組織架構劃分為三個層次：在第一個層面，在陸軍太空和導彈防禦司令部/陸軍戰略司令部的指揮下，作為陸軍網絡作戰行動唯一的領導機構，陸軍全球網絡行動和安全中心負責態勢感知和指揮協調工作，在美軍聯合部隊網絡力量體系中，該機構發揮軍種全球網絡作戰與安全中心的功能。在第二個層面，戰區網絡行動和安全中心是各作戰司令部的支持元素，負責“指導網絡作戰行動，管理和防禦屬於陸軍管轄的全球信息柵格元素”。戰區內各地區網絡行動和安全中心構成了陸軍網絡作戰體系的第三個層面。此外，陸軍計算機應急響應分隊是應對網絡突發事件的處置力量，在緊急情況下可以接受全球網絡作戰特遣部隊的戰術控制，每個戰區網絡行動和安全中心也都建立了計算機應急響應分隊。

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成立陸軍網絡司令部

隨著美軍對於網絡空間依賴程度的加深，控制和削弱網絡威脅持續成為美軍關注的重點任務，組建獨立負責網絡空間作戰指揮機構的呼聲在美軍內部日益高漲。在2008年“揚基鹿彈行動”的直接推動下，美軍決定結束軍種單位獨立分散發展網絡作戰能力的局面，通過並、撤、轉、改等措施對相關機構進行結構重組，成立全面負責網絡空間作戰的聯合指揮機構，美國陸軍網絡力量組織建設也進入快速發展階段。

通過全球部署分散發展的方式形成網絡空間作戰組織的基幹力量。由於意識到網絡作戰行動將對軍事領域產生更加深遠的影響，美國陸軍在作戰部隊層面投入大量資源，逐步建立起網絡作戰行動的基幹力量。例如，陸軍在2008年7月啟動了第一支網絡戰營，其能夠提供戰術支持、旅戰鬥隊支援以及向其他軍種單位、聯合部隊甚至跨機構夥伴提供戰略支援；陸軍還對網絡作戰行動的上層指揮體系實施調整，從而使相關行動得到適度權限的監管。在這個時期，陸軍未來網絡作戰力量都以分隊形式整合在軍種和聯合部隊架構下作戰單位的內部，包括從國防信息系統局、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣隊、國家安全局到旅戰鬥隊等各個級別的戰略和戰術機構。
新建核心協調機構，理順總部到分隊層面的指揮關係。 2009年6月，美國國防部通過發表備忘錄的形式宣佈建立美國網絡司令部，旨在通過一個專門的次級聯合司令部集中統籌和推進網絡空間軍事力量建設。與此同時，作為日後組建陸軍部隊網絡司令部的過渡性措施，陸軍決定保留陸軍太空和導彈防禦司令部/陸軍戰略司令部的組織架構，並將其重新命名為陸軍部隊網絡司令部。 2010年2月，美國陸軍宣佈在此基礎上正式組建陸軍網絡部隊司令部，其在組建和初始建設階段的工作主要圍繞三項任務展開：實現網絡空間軍事力量作戰化、增加陸軍網絡作戰力量的能力和規模、發展陸軍網絡空間專業人才隊伍。由於以往的指揮體係被打亂，網絡司令部下新成立的陸軍網絡空間作戰與整合中心實際上發揮了指揮控制和協調同步的核心作用。該機構與此前的陸軍全球網絡行動和安全中心功能類似，但是除了“在執行全譜網絡空間作戰行動過程中提供清晰、簡潔、及時的指導”以外，該組織還負責“與陸軍其他司令部、其他軍種單位中的同類機構、美國網絡空間聯合作戰中心共享信息”。在機構建立之初，網絡空間作戰與整合中心的部分人員還直接加入美國網絡司令部參謀機構，從而更好地促進實現聯合部隊與軍種單位網絡作戰行動的指揮統一。

美國陸軍網絡空間力量組織結構，2005年

轉型作戰部隊職能，促進傳統能力向網絡空間作戰能力發展。在作戰部隊建設層面，以野戰信號部隊為主體的網絡企業技術司令部/第9信號司令部轉隸陸軍網絡部隊司令部，陸軍情報和安全司令部所屬網絡空間作戰部隊的作戰指揮權也由陸軍網絡司令部掌握。通過這種組織調整，陸軍網絡司令部第一次掌握了前沿部署作戰力量，能夠形成全球存在態勢並具備遠征能力，可以向作戰指揮官提供更加全面的戰鬥支援能力。值得注意的是，網絡企業技術司令部以及情報和安全司令部指揮官都在陸軍網絡司令部擔任副司令，分別負責不同類型的網絡作戰行動任務，基本形成了原信號部隊主管網絡防禦、原軍事情報部隊主管網絡進攻的模式，從而將此前離散部署、鬆散聯合的網絡空間相關組織整合為一支完備的陸軍網絡力量。此外，陸軍網絡司令部在2011年還被賦予執行信息作戰的任務，掌握第1信息作戰司令部的作戰指揮權，情報和安全司令部下屬的第780軍事情報旅也將轉型為陸軍網絡司令部直接指揮的網絡旅。

持續優化陸軍網絡空間部隊

陸軍網絡司令部成立後，網絡空間軍事力量作戰化始終是其中心工作，這一點在陸軍網絡力量組織不斷優化整合的過程中得到突出體現。對於當前已經形成的網絡作戰、電子戰、信息作戰、軍事情報甚至太空作戰能力，美軍陸軍在進行網絡軍隊組織結構設計時也體現出融合多種能力的趨勢。美國陸軍還在網絡部隊建設中積極推進整體型軍隊模式，突出國民警衛隊和預備役網絡力量的發展。經過多年建設，美國陸軍網絡力量組織結構已經基本形成。
陸軍網絡作戰力量組織結構，2011年

優化戰鬥力量組織結構，適應作戰行動支援需求。在總部機構層面，為了進一步完善網絡空間作戰行動的指揮程序並實現意圖統一，陸軍在2014年3月批准網絡司令部為陸軍部隊組成總部，同時指定第2集團軍為其直屬單位，而網絡企業技術司令部成為第2集團軍直接指揮的網絡作戰部隊，網絡企業技術司令部指揮官兼任第2集團軍副軍長。而且在前一年，網絡司令部已經在美國網絡司令部和陸軍總部的指導下開始組建聯合部隊網絡總部，其將對網絡空間作戰部隊實施任務指揮，並且具備直接支持作戰司令部的網絡作戰能力。在作戰部隊和戰區層面，網絡司令部試圖通過地區網絡中心改善全球網絡防禦態勢。在原有戰區網絡作戰和安全中心、地區計算機應急響應中心力量基礎上，這些地區網絡安全中心對網絡作戰行動指揮程序進行精簡，能夠發揮較強的計劃、協調和同步功能，從而更加高效地支援地理作戰司令部的行動。

確定條令開發負責機構，完善網絡建軍理論指導。由於美國陸軍網絡司令部合併了原網絡作戰、信息作戰和信號部隊的力量，信號部隊的大量作戰理論迫切需要修訂並轉化為網絡作戰理論，從而實現協調統一的作戰能力發展模式，避免出現概念指導上的混亂。 2014年3月，美國訓練和條令司令部在原信號卓越中心的基礎上，整合其他相關專業力量元素，組建了陸軍網絡卓越中心，目標在2015年10月使其具備指導網絡、信號和電子戰部隊訓練的全面能力。網絡司令部下屬的網絡空間促進辦公室也被合併入網絡卓越中心，從而進一步增強網絡卓越中心在總結網絡部隊建設經驗教訓方面的優勢。通過實施條令出版項目，網絡卓越中心試圖合併原有的信號和電子戰部隊條令，根據陸軍“2015條令體系”的相關要求開發全新的網絡空間作戰、電子戰以及信號部隊條令。目前，陸軍已經完成了對野戰條令FM6-02《信號部隊支持作戰行動》的修訂，指導信號部隊向網絡部隊進行職能轉型；第一次發布了野戰條令FM3-38《網絡電磁行動》，明確了“陸軍在統一地面行動中整合網絡電磁活動的總體原則、戰術和規程”；作為陸軍網絡軍隊建設的根本性指導文件，野戰條令FM3-12《網絡空間作戰》也基本完成了最後的批准程序，於2015年正式在陸軍內部發行。以上述條令文件為主體，網絡卓越中心將繼續完善數十種相關陸軍條令出版物的編撰發布工作，構建完整的陸軍網絡空間作戰技術、戰術和規程體系，為陸軍網絡部隊建設提供全面理論指導。
陸軍網絡作戰力量組織結構，2015年

整合網絡空間教育訓練力量，促進網絡部隊正規化發展。美國陸軍將推進網絡訓練正規化發展視為提高網絡作戰和戰備水平的根本途徑。在陸軍網絡卓越中心組建的同時，陸軍網絡學校作為其下屬機構在原電子戰學校的基礎上成立，而且陸軍信號學校也在網絡卓越中心的建制下繼續得以保留，陸軍關於網絡空間力量正規化建設的“條令-組織-訓練-資源-領導力和教育-人員-設施”模型得到進一步完善。隨著陸軍網絡兵種（“17-系列”職業管理領域）的設立，陸軍要求進入網絡職業領域的新任職人員必須完成網絡學校的駐校訓練項目，從信號、情報和信息作戰部隊等單位調動到相應網絡作戰崗位的大量人員也需要進行新的職業教育訓練，上述兩所學校將共同對新成立的陸軍網絡兵種單位的軍官、準尉和士官進行單個人員技能訓練。例如，軍官領導力基礎訓練課程於2015年8月在網絡學校正式啟動，為期14週的準尉軍官高級訓練項目則在2016年5月開始實施。對於陸軍在2015年10月徵募的第一批網絡作戰士兵，其必須參加的高級個人訓練項目則在2016年2月開始。由於網絡空間作戰行動本質上具有聯合作戰的屬性，高級個人訓練項目為期22週的第一階段訓練內容將是海軍聯合網絡分析師課程，第二階段訓練同樣持續22週，訓練場地也會從海軍設施轉移到陸軍網絡學校。

重視國民警衛隊和預備役網絡力量，突出支援和協調功能。針對網絡作戰力量的發展問題，陸軍認為預備役部門可以協助現役部隊分擔部分任務，能夠在必要時迅速提供具備較高訓練水平的增援力量。因其獨特的雙重法律定位，陸軍國民警衛隊可以發揮各州與聯邦政府機構、民事與軍事組織、私營與公共部門之間的銜接作用，“具備發展網絡空間能力的天然優勢”。因此，陸軍在網絡作戰力量發展過程中也注重相關預備役組織的建設。例如，第1信息作戰司令部還包含4支預備役部隊戰區信息作戰大隊，其都具備提供信息作戰和網絡空間計劃、分析、技術支持能力。根據陸軍國民警衛隊2014年6月與陸軍網絡司令部簽署的一份備忘錄，陸軍國民警衛隊將其在此前一年組建的1支網絡防禦分隊轉隸於陸軍網絡司令部/第2集團軍。這支被稱為第1636網絡防禦分隊的網絡部隊將處於《美國法典》第10卷服役狀態，即全時服役狀態，將與陸軍網絡司令部其他現役部隊共同接受同等標準的訓練，並共同執行所有類型的任務。

本文轉自《軍事文摘》12月刊責任編輯：張傳良

中國軍隊戰略層面的網絡空間特種作戰 China’s Strategic Level of Cyberspace Special Operations

03/17/2017 admin Leave a comment

战略层面的网络空间特种作战 –

China’s Strategic level of Cyberspace Special Operations

Editor’s Note: US Army Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Mitchell Dugen at the US Army War College during the fourth quarter of 2015, “Joint Force Quarterly” published “strategic level of cyberspace special operations,” a paper, the article was Chairman of the Association of the United Nations in 2008 Strategic Papers Competition Strategy Research Award.

In this paper, by reviewing the cyberspace special operations cases, this paper analyzes the potential power of using network tools in asymmetric conflicts, and points out that cyberspace special operations have become an effective strategic tool to achieve national goals. Become a regional power to avoid the US military dominance and to ensure that their strategic interests of the unconventional path. The author proposes three new options for integrating emerging technologies and special operations: “cloud-driven” foreign defense, network counter-insurgency and unconventional cyber warfare advance team. Designed to maintain the US network technology advantages, and to build an important partnership, shaping the full spectrum of the conflict environment has a revolutionary impact. Iran and Russia and other regional forces of cyberspace special combat readiness why more than the United States? How does Iran and Russia strengthen its power at the tactical level while the United States has assembled its network and network capabilities at the strategic level? The United States in more than 20 years ago issued a network of special operations related documents, but why the network of special operations policies, departments and regulations are still not mature enough? For the US military, the most basic question is: how will the United States build a strategic level of network special combat capability?

As early as 1993, Internet technology theorists John Achilla and David Lennfield in his book “cyber war is coming” a book has predicted the recent Iran and Russia to implement the cyberspace special operations. “A large number of scattered small groups around the use of the latest communications technology coordinated” control network, to obtain the decisive advantage of the opponent. In reality this scene has been staged again and again. “We are using the information and the more information we have, and the less demand for traditional weapons,” says Achilla and Lunfield. US military executives have also realized that with asymmetric network tools, unconventional tactics and a large number of false information armed, a small amount of special combatants can form a certain strategic impact. There is news that both Iran and Russia have succeeded in using cyberspace special operations as a strategic tool to achieve their national goals. Both countries have an integrated network of special operations forces that know how to exploit the potential power of network tools in asymmetric conflicts. The asymmetric approach of the two countries has become a strong and unconventional path for regional powers to circumvent US military superiority and to ensure their strategic interests. Low price Of the network of high-tech allows potential rivals can develop a strong network warfare capabilities. Therefore, the United States urgently need to make strategic choices, the development of cyberspace special operations, as a tool for the protection and projection of national interests.

Low-cost network of high-tech technology allows potential rivals to develop a strong network warfare capabilities In February 2013, the Russian chief of staff Grazimov in the Russian “military messenger” magazine published “science in the forecast value” article. In the paper, Gracimov predicted a new generation of war that could “change the rules of the game”, whose strategic value would exceed “the effectiveness of weapon forces.” He called for universal asymmetric action to counter the enemy’s strengths and create a permanent frontier in the territory of the enemy through “special forces and internal confrontation and continuous improvement of information operations, equipment and means.” In the spring of 2014, Western media reported that in the eastern part of Ukraine, a casual special operations squad from Russia through the Ukrainian border, occupation of government buildings and arsenal and transferred to the separatist armed. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities claim that their digital, telephone and cyber communications are cut off, interfered or attacked. The Ukrainian government attributed the cyber attacks on information and logistics infrastructure, including Internet servers and railroad control systems, to the destruction of Russia, and argued that the implementation of information fraud in Russia was costly in important social media, blogs, and News website published 50 pro-Russian comments every day, inside and outside Ukraine to form a large number of false information flow, on the one hand to cover up its non-traditional military operations in cyberspace, on the other hand to create a political illusion. “Russia is not doing the usual information warfare about false information, lies, leaks or cyber sabotage, it reshapes reality, creates public illusions, and then translates them into political action,” said senior government officials. To this end, in September 2014 at the NATO security summit, the NATO Allied Supreme Commander, US Air Force Admiral Philip Bride Leaf pointed out that Russia in East Ukraine to implement the “mixed” non-traditional operations on behalf of the war The most amazing information in history is Blitzkrieg. Bride Leaf urges the Allies to immediately develop the ability to counter the Russian non-traditional warfare, propaganda and cyber attacks. Russia’s use of the “non-traditional Western as a war” non-traditional means to achieve its political purpose, which makes the Western and NATO countries by surprise. Russia is not a fragmented way to use special forces, information operations or network capabilities.

On the contrary, as General Glashimov said, “the war does not need to be publicly announced, when the special forces with advanced technology and a lot of information for the traditional forces in the maintenance of peace and crisis under the cover of strategic objectives to create good conditions, the war on “Cybercrime deception and cyber attacks are special forces in” war and peace ”

Network information spoofing and cyber attack action for special combat forces in the “war and peace” between the implementation of non-traditional warfare to win the time and space lessons learned from the Russian case can draw four major experience, for the United States special operations Action and network capacity integration to provide a viable theoretical framework. First, there are tactical and strategic differences in the offensive network tools used by the Russian Special Forces, targeting tactical “closed networks”, such as local communications, social media, regional networks and logistics infrastructure, while retaining Its more advanced open network tools as a backup. Second, the network special operations are primarily an agent behavior, emphasizing the minimization of the source tracking. As Gracimov described, “the long-distance, non-contact action against the enemy is becoming the primary means of the tactical battle.” Network special operations usually avoid direct contact with people, but in peace and war in the gray area to start action. Third, information and communication technology, network attacks and information operations in the network to form a non-conventional warfare play an important role. As long as the appropriate implementation, the traditional special operations can go far beyond its original function, “which involves the comprehensive application of a wide range of capabilities to achieve policy objectives.” To be effective, it must also be integrated to synchronize other areas of expertise. Fourth, the network special operations can both deter the conflict, can also be used to deal with the whole spectrum of conflict, because “it is suitable for all stages of action, from shaping the environment to the intense war to post-war reconstruction.” Although the network war to destroy the original intention, but also has a constructive side. The widespread dissemination of low-cost information and communication technologies is conducive to strengthening the security of partner countries and thus helping to prevent the occurrence of conflicts.

“‘Foreign help defense’ (FID) under ‘cloud drive’ is both a concept of cloud computing and a metaphorical description of partnering and trust through virtual means. “The concept of” cloud-driven “FID” has not yet been clearly defined, but it can be integrated into an interdisciplinary field to better understand people, geography and virtual worlds and to act together on related goals. Technically, the “cloud-driven” FID “strengthens the partnership, consolidates data through the federated facilities, enhances automation, and disseminates the analysis process. “Cloud-driven” is flexible and can be developed in private, public, community, or mixed form, using different software, platforms, and infrastructure. Security personnel use intelligent technology to drive confidential mobile applications, analyze tools and share data through “cloud-driven” FIDs. Although the data associated with the virtual cloud, but its real value is to make the timely dissemination of information to the hands of tactics. “The cloud-driven” FID “can also be likened to a persistent, active partnership, the data never stops, the network has been busy. Technology is only a tool to drive deeper, extensive socio-cultural, political and historical factors that are often prone to conflict. “Cloud-driven” FID “can build more sustainable competencies and trust with partner countries. “The cloud-driven” FID “lay a virtual foundation for the future establishment of various institutions, centers and laboratories to bridge the benefits of inter-agency across the United States. From the strategic point of view of the US government, “cloud-driven” FID “is a pragmatic” partnership-centered approach designed to target the core interests of partner countries rather than to Way to change the partner country “. “The cloud-driven” FID “is also a prudent strategic move to” prevent the US partner countries from becoming a public relations crisis due to domestic political problems. ” “The cloud drive ‘FID’ also offers other opportunities. The technology and networks it forms can react quickly to emergencies, such as humanitarian relief or relief operations, prevent mass killings, or evacuate personnel from non-combatants. This saves time, money and manpower by providing information for the decision-making process. For the construction of the partnership, the cloud-driven FID can store local non-US social media information, rich social network analysis, social network maps, and behavioral and opinion trends analysis. Most importantly, the “cloud drive ‘FID” builds trust in an innovative and extremely powerful way to build lasting influence on allies and partners.

Today’s global environment drives the United States to use cyber special operations as a strategic tool network for national military strategies Anti-riot counterintelligence network Anti-riot operations (CNCOIN) aims to use social media networks to achieve the purpose of rebellion. To break the asymmetric information superiority of the enemy, CNCOIN uses non-technical means to combat the relevant crowd and control its perception, behavior and action. It adds a military color to the cyber space’s ubiquitous anti-social network. Although these means are not clearly defined, this article believes that it actually refers to the manipulation of social media, cover up the true identity, to achieve ulterior motives. While social media provides a wide range of opportunities for anti-social networks, such as malicious use, intentional misconduct, but from the military point of view, social media provides a wealth of information resources to affect the psychological vulnerability, but also an ideal attack platform. There are several technologies that contribute to its implementation in each functional category. The scope of action includes, but is not limited to, cyber-pseudo operation and cyber-herding operation. Network fraud is a classic counter-insurgency strategy, “government forces and technical staff will pretend to be insurgents, into the enemy network after the use of advanced intelligence technology in the network within the implementation of the destruction.” Internet expulsion means that “individuals, groups, or organizations deport other individuals, groups, or organizations to the default network area.” The magic of the two technologies is the expulsion of insurgents in the virtual network by exploiting the inherent flaws of the communication technology and communication platform. The two tactics are aimed at rebel activist online communities, manipulating or disrupting them, and ultimately providing more opportunities for cyberbullying. The virtual world magnifies the environmental factors, because the characters in the network are more difficult to determine their authenticity. Planning command control, communication frequency and equipment platform and other elements will become the key to the implementation of network fraud or network expulsion operations to manipulate, mislead or expel the target group to the desired results. The scope of information includes, but is not limited to, Crowdsourcing and Social Networking Analysis, SNA). Crowdsourcing is the use of large-scale knowledge base, provided by the participants voluntarily, to solve the problem to provide new ideas, services or observation, you can quickly expand the organizers of the field of vision. Social network analysis depicts and measures the relationships, strengths, and cores of social links in a visual way to illustrate the social network structure. Social network visualization or social networking maps can provide a unique window for assessing, depicting and even predicting the intensity, time, space, and relationship dimensions of relationship events. In September 2013, during the crisis in the Philippines, the anti-government armed Moro National Liberation Front (hereinafter referred to as “the dismount”) was dissatisfied with the situation of national reconciliation, hijacked more than 200 civilians as hostages, attacked commercial shops and burned urban buildings. Throughout the crisis, crowdsourcing and social network analysis are very successful non-traditional tactical means. The Philippine security forces use crowdsourcing tactics to encourage Zamboang residents to discover and report on the “melodic” members of the hiding place. FEI security forces, together with crowdsourcing information and intelligence analysis, provide information for security operations and humanitarian operations. The use of social network analysis to assess the “Mobility” of the public support, and in the social media against the “interpretation” declaration, to ban the violation of social media user agreement propaganda site, but also the use of crowds of information blockade ” Troops, attacking their temporary command post. The Philippine security forces used solid media to track the key information and lead the use of social media, and then use the solid forces to defeat the “interpretation” of the asymmetric advantage. The information warfare category includes but is not limited to cyber intrusion (cyber Aggression, forum vest (sock-puppeting), astro-turfing and so on. Three tactics are anonymous use of social media to implement misleading, false information to manipulate behavior, public opinion and action. The cyber-invasion is proposed by Teanna Felmyr, which refers to “an electronic or online act that is intended to cause psychological harm to others or damage its reputation by using e-mail, instant messaging, cell phones, digital information, chat rooms

As well as social media, video, game sites, etc. “. It is much broader than the range of ordinary cyber-aggressive behavior. Its anonymity may cause substantial psychological harm and negative consequences, as the relevant information will be repeatedly sent to the target or published in the social media. Its value to CNCOIN is that it can use sensitive digital information to humiliate, defame or hurt the target, causing psychological barriers. This powerful cyber-invading action can reduce the credibility, influence and power of the target, and ultimately lose the power of the target or other insurgents. The other two tactics, the forum vest and the fake are all fictitious online propaganda tools used to spread distorted views to create a wider range of support or opposition to the illusion. In fact, with the forum vest is the same concept, but more complex, more organized, larger. Both tactics use virtual characters to distribute false information in cyberspace, with the aim of initiating group reactions or actions. Combining massive amounts of text, images, and video with a planned misleading network activity will significantly enhance the effectiveness of CNCOIN’s action. The third way to advance the US network’s special operations is the unconventional cyber warfare team (cyber-UW Pilot Team, using social media networks to shape the physical environment, the establishment of regional mechanisms, in the implementation of non – conventional war before the regional connectivity. The core of the unconventional network warfare team is the special forces, with a number of professional organizations to provide technical support, its task is in the field of network security for the preparation of unconventional operations. The penetration of the traditional advance team is the target of enemy territory, military facilities and other entities, rather than the conventional advance team is through the virtual means of infiltration, and then into the sensitive, hostile or refused to area. Through the virtual means, can reduce the United States and partner countries armed forces in time, risk, equipment and other aspects of the loss and risk. Conceptually, unconventional cyber warfare teams use web tools and advanced technology to build people, entities, intelligence, and information infrastructures on social media. While deepening understanding of the local human terrain, the team can strengthen its local language and cultural skills, as well as identify resistance leaders, assess motivation and resistance, and overall support for US government goals, while at the same time understanding Informal hierarchical distribution, psychology and behavior. In addition, you can also incorporate the Internet’s white noise into the social media network to “improve the cultural understanding of potential collaborators in the United States and the local situation before action.” While the US national security strategy has long recognized the strategy of cyber warfare Role, but this understanding is not fully translated into a clear strategic level of thinking and combat capability. For example, the US Department of Defense cyberspace action strategy did not give much solution or specific measures, only from five aspects of the previous repeated network ideas. Lack of clear ideas lead to our network strategy is flawed, making the United States advanced network technology advantages to hand over to the potential rival risk. In contrast, Iran and Russia’s asymmetric innovation modeled other regions and global forces, trying to circumvent the US military advantage by unconventional means to ensure their strategic interests. Cyberspace special operations are a must to fill the strategic level of the blank. Obviously, the United States must actively seek a tactical level of unconventional combat into the cyber space operations in the form of special operations. Rand’s recent study of special operations concluded that “the United States needs to use a more advanced form of special operations to ensure national interests, taking into account the recent US and its interests facing the security threat situation, special operations

Become the most appropriate form of ensuring national interests “. In an increasingly interconnected global environment, the physical infrastructure is quickly allocated Internet protocol addresses, accessory networking. By 2020, there will be 50 billion “machine-to-machine” equipment (currently 1 3 billion units) will be through the “embedded computer, sensor and Internet capabilities” access to network space. Cyberspace special operations Unicom virtual and reality, through the modern information network and with the traditional face-to-face combination of special operations partnership. Today’s global environment has prompted the United States to use cyber special operations as a strategic tool for national military strategies. Potential rivals combine offensive network capabilities with unconventional tactics to set a terrible example for other enemies in the United States, and they will follow suit quickly. This paper presents three new options for integrating emerging technologies and special operations: foreign-assisted defense under “cloud-driven”, anti-riot operations in the network, and non-conventional cyber warfare advance teams. Full play of these three tactics will not only maintain the advantages of the US network technology, but also to build an important partnership, shaping the whole spectrum of combat environment have a revolutionary impact. If successful implementation, network special operations will become the United States a strong new strategic options

Original Mandarin Chinese:

编者按：美国陆军中校帕特里克·米歇尔·杜根在美陆军战争学院就读期间，于2015年第4季度《联合部队季刊》发表《战略层面的网络空间特种作战》一文，该文曾获得2015年度参联会主席战略论文竞赛战略研究类奖。本文通过回顾网络空间特种作战案例，分析了在非对称性冲突中利用网络工具的潜在力量，指出网络空间特种作战已经成为达成国家目标的有效战略工具。成为地区强国用以规避美国军事主导权以及确保本国战略利益的非常规性路径。作者提出了融合新兴技术与特种作战的三种新选项：“云驱动”下的国外协助防御，网络反暴乱平叛行动与非常规网络战先遣队。旨在维持美国的网络技术优势，并对构建重要伙伴关系、塑造全频谱冲突环境产生革命性影响。伊朗和俄罗斯等地区力量的网络空间特种作战战备为何比美国更为充分？

美国在战略层面集结其网络部门和网络能力的同时，伊朗和俄罗斯又是如何在战术层面强化其力量的呢？美国在20多年前就发布了网络特种作战的相关文件，但为何其网络特种作战的政策、部门和条令仍然不够成熟呢？对于美军而言，最基本的问题是：美国将如何打造战略层面的网络特种作战能力？早在1993年，互联网技术理论家约翰·阿奇拉和大卫·伦菲尔德在其著作《网络战争即将来临》一书中就已经预言了最近伊朗和俄罗斯所实施的网络空间特种作战行动。“大量分散各地的小规模团体利用最新的通信技术协调一致”控制网络，取得对对手的决定性优势。现实中这一情景一再上演。阿奇拉和伦菲尔德认为，“战争中我们投向敌人的不再是质量和能量；如今我们使用的是信息，掌握的信息越多，对传统武器的需求就越少”。

美军高层也已经意识到，有了非对称性网络工具、非常规战术以及大量虚假信息的武装，少量的特种作战人员就可以形成一定的战略影响。目前有消息表明，伊朗和俄罗斯均已成功地将网络空间特种作战作为一种战略工具来达成其国家目标。两国都拥有一体化的网络特种作战部队，知道如何在非对称性冲突中利用网络工具的潜在力量。两国的非对称性手段成为地区强国用以规避美国军事优势以及确保本国战略利益的强大非常规性路径。价格低廉的网络高新技术使得潜在对手可以发展出强大的网络战能力。因此，美国亟需做出战略选择，发展网络空间特种作战，作为保护和投射国家利益的工具。

价格低廉的网络高新技术使得潜在对手可以发展出强大的网络战能力2013年2月，俄罗斯总参谋长格拉西莫夫在俄《军工信使》杂志发表了《科学在预测中的价值》一文。文中，格拉西莫夫预测了能够“改变游戏规则”的新一代战争，其战略价值将超过“武器力量的效能”。他号召普遍开展非对称性行动，以抵消敌方的优势，通过“特种作战力量和内部对抗以及不断完善的信息行动、装备和手段，在敌国的领土中创造一个永久活动的前线”。2014年春，有西方媒体报道，在乌克兰东部的乱局中，一支便装的特种作战小分队从俄罗斯境内穿越乌克兰边界，占领政府建筑和武器库并转交给分裂主义武装。与此同时，乌克兰当局声称，其全境的数字、电话及网络通信均遭到切断、干扰或攻击活动。乌克兰政府将信息和物流基础设施（包括互联网服务器和铁路控制系统）遭受的网络攻击归因于俄方的破坏，同时还认为，俄罗斯实施信息欺骗行动，花费巨资在重要的社交媒体、博客以及新闻网站每天发布50条亲俄评论，在乌克兰内外形成大量的虚假信息流，一方面掩盖其在网络空间的非传统军事行动，另一方面制造了政治假象。乌政府高级官员表示，“俄罗斯所做的并不是通常的信息作战所涉及的虚假信息、谎言、泄漏机密或网络破坏活动，它重新塑造现实，造成大众幻象，然后将之转化为政治行动”。为此，在2014年9月召开的北约安全峰会上，北约盟军最高司令、美国空军上将菲利普·布里德莱弗指出，俄罗斯在东乌克兰实施的“混合型”非传统作战代表了战争史上最惊人的信息闪电战。布里德莱弗敦促盟军立即发展相应的能力以反制俄罗斯的非传统战、宣传战及网络攻击行动。俄罗斯使用“根本不被西方视为战争的”非传统手段达成其政治目的，这使得西方及北约国家措手不及。俄罗斯并不是以碎片化的方式来使用特种力量、信息作战或网络能力。相反，正如格拉西莫夫将军所言，“发动战争不再需要公开宣布，当配备先进技术和大量信息的特种力量为传统部队在维持和平与危机的掩护下达成战略目标创造好条件，战争就发生了。”言外之意，网络信息欺骗和网络攻击行动为特种作战力量在“战争与和平之间”实施非传统战赢得了时间和空间。俄罗斯的网络赋能非传统战极为成功，不仅是其网络特种力量的混成，而且还成功地侵入欧盟成员国，甚至没有引起西方有效的军事反应。

网络信息欺骗和网络攻击行动为特种作战力量在“战争与和平之间”实施非传统战赢得了时间和空间经验教训从俄罗斯的案例中可以得出四个方面的主要经验，可为美国特种作战行动与网络能力整合提供一个可行的理论框架。第一，俄罗斯特种部队所使用的进攻性网络工具存在战术和战略层面的差别，主要以战术层面的“封闭网络”为目标，如本地通讯、社交媒体、区域网络和后勤基础设施等，同时保留其更为先进的开放网络工具作为备用。第二，网络特种作战主要是一种代理人行为，强调最小化的来源跟踪。正如格拉西莫夫所描述的那样，“对敌方的远距离、无接触行动正在成为战术战役目标的主要手段”。网络特种作战通常避免人员的直接接触，而是在和平与战争的灰色地带展开行动。第三，信息与通信技术、网络攻击及信息作战等在网络赋能的非常规战中发挥着重要作用。只要恰当的实施，传统的特种作战可以远远超出其原有的功能，“这涉及到对广泛能力的综合运用，以达成政策目标”。要发挥效能，还必须整合同步其他领域的专门知识。第四，网络特种作战既可以慑止冲突，也可用于应对全频谱冲突，因为“它适合行动的各个阶段，从塑造环境到剧烈战争再到战后重建等”。虽然网络战以破坏为初衷，但也具有建设性的一面。低成本的信息和通信技术的广泛传播有利于强化伙伴国安全，从而有助于阻止冲突的发生。

网络空间特种作战是一种必须填补的战略层面的能力空白，美国必须积极寻求一种在战术层面的非常规作战中融入网络空间作战的特种作战形式 “‘云驱动’下的‘国外协助防御’（FID）”既是一种云计算概念，也是通过虚拟手段增强伙伴能力和信任的一种比喻性描述。“‘云驱动’FID”概念虽然还未经明确界定，但是它却可以联接整合跨学科领域，以更好地理解人员、地理及虚拟世界，并对相关目标展开共同行动。从技术上而言，“‘云驱动’FID”可以强化伙伴关系，通过联合设施，实时共享数据，增强自动化，传播分析过程。“云驱动”是灵活多变的，能够以私人、公共、社区或混合形式出现，各自使用不同的软件、平台和基础设施等。安全人员通过“‘云驱动’FID”使用智能技术驱动保密的移动应用软件、分析工具和共享数据。虽然数据与虚拟云相联，但其真正价值在于使信息及时传播到战术人员手中。“‘云驱动’FID”也可比喻为一种持续的、活跃的伙伴关系，数据永不停止，网络一直忙碌。技术仅仅是一种工具，用以驱动更深入、广泛的社会文化、政治和历史因素的理解，这些往往是容易造成冲突的因素。“‘云驱动’FID”可以与伙伴国构建更具持续性的能力和信任。“‘云驱动’FID”为未来建立各种机构、中心和实验室弥合美国各跨机构间的利益打下一个虚拟的基础。从美国政府的战略视角而言，“‘云驱动’FID”是一种实用主义的“以伙伴国为中心的方式，旨在围绕伙伴国的核心利益设计行动，而不是寄希望于以短视的方式来改变伙伴国”。“‘云驱动’FID”还是一种审慎的战略举措，“以防美国的伙伴国由于国内政治问题出现公共关系危机”。“‘云驱动’FID”也提供了其他的机会。它所形成的技术和关系网络可以迅速对紧急事件做出反应，如人道主义救援或救灾行动、阻止大规模屠杀，或者非战斗人员撤离任务等。这样可以通过为决策过程提供信息而节约时间、金钱和人力等。对于伙伴关系的构建而言，“‘云驱动’FID”可以存储当地的非美国社交媒体信息、丰富的社交网络分析、社会网络地图以及行为和舆论趋势分析等信息。最为重要的是，“‘云驱动’FID”以富有创新性和极为有力的方式构建信任，打造对盟友及伙伴国的持久影响力。

当今的全球环境促使美国采用网络特种作战作为国家军事战略的战略性工具网络反暴乱平叛行动网络反暴乱平叛行动（CNCOIN）旨在利用社交媒体网络达成平叛的目的。为打破敌人的非对称性信息优势，CNCOIN使用非技术手段打击相关人群，控制其感知、行为和行动。它为网络空间无处不在的反社交网络手段增添了军事色彩。虽然这些手段没有明确界定，本文认为，它实际上就是指操纵社交媒体，掩盖真实身份，达成不可告人的目的。虽然社交媒体为反社交网络提供了广泛的机会，如恶意利用、有意误导等，但从军事角度而言，社交媒体提供了丰富的信息资源以影响心理脆弱性，也是一个理想的攻击平台。每种功能性范畴中都有几种有助于其实施的技术。行动范畴包括但不局限于网络欺骗行动（cyber-pseudo operation）和网络驱逐行动（cyber-herding operation）。网络欺骗行动是一种经典的平叛策略，“政府军和技术人员将自己假扮为叛乱分子，渗入敌方网络后使用先进的谍报技术在该网络内部实施破坏”。网络驱逐行动就是指，“个人、团体或组织把其他的个人、团体或组织驱逐到预设的网络区域”。两种技术的奇妙之处在于，通过利用通信技术与通信平台的内在缺陷来驱逐虚拟网络中的叛乱分子。两种战术以叛乱分子活跃的网络社群为目标，对其进行操控或者瓦解，最终为网络平叛提供更多的机会。虚拟世界放大了环境因素，因为网络中的人物更难确定其真实性。规划指挥控制、通信频率以及设备平台等要素将成为网络欺骗行动或网络驱逐行动实施的关键点，用以操纵、误导或者驱逐目标群走向预想的结果。情报范畴包括但不局限于众包（Crowdsourcing）和社交网络分析技术（Social Networking Analysis， SNA）。众包就是利用大规模的知识库，由参与者自愿提供的，为解决问题提供新思路、服务或观察，可以迅速扩展组织者的视野。社交网络分析以可视的方式描绘和测量社交链接的关系、强度及核心性以说明社会网络结构。社交网络可视化或者社网图可以提供独特的窗口用以评估、描绘甚至预测关系事件的强度、时间、空间和关系维度。2013年9月，菲律宾三宝颜危机期间，反政府武装摩洛民族解放阵线（以下简称“摩解”）对民族和解状况感到不满，挟持200多名平民为人质，袭击商业店铺，烧毁城市建筑。整个危机期间，众包和社交网络分析都是非常成功的非传统战术手段。菲律宾安全部队使用众包战术鼓励三宝颜居民发现并报告“摩解”成员的藏身地点。菲安全部队结合众包信息和情报分析，为安全行动和人道主义行动提供信息。使用社交网络分析来评估“摩解”的民众支持度，并在社交媒体上反制“摩解”宣言，封禁违反社交媒体用户协议的宣传网站，还使用众包信息封锁“摩解”小股部队，攻击其临时指挥哨所。菲安全部队通过使用社交媒体跟踪关键信息和领导节点，随后使用实体部队挫败了“摩解”的非对称性优势。信息作战范畴包括但不局限于网络入侵（cyber aggression）、论坛马甲（袜子手偶sock-puppeting）、以假乱真（Astro-turfing）等。三种战术都是匿名利用社交媒体实施误导、假信息等来操纵行为、舆论及行动。网络入侵是由蒂安娜·菲尔姆利提出，是指“一种电子或在线行为，旨在对他人实施心理伤害或损毁其名誉，通过使用电子邮件、即时信息、手机、数字信息、聊天室以及社交媒体、视频、游戏网站等”。它比普通的网络攻击性行为的范围要广泛得多。它的匿名性可能会引起实质性的心理伤害和负面后果，因为相关信息会被重复发送给目标或者在社交媒体发布。它对CNCOIN的价值在于，可以利用敏感的数字信息来羞辱、诽谤或伤害目标，造成心理障碍行为。这种强大的网络入侵行动可以降低目标的可信度、影响力和权力，最终使目标或其它叛乱分子丧失实力。其它两种战术，论坛马甲和以假乱真都是虚构的在线宣传工具，用来散布扭曲的观点，以制造更广范围的支持或者反对的假象。以假乱真实际上跟论坛马甲是同一个概念，只不过更为复杂、更有组织、规模更大。两种战术都使用虚拟人物在网络空间散布虚假信息，目的是引发群体反应或行动。以假乱真的网络信息作战行动包含海量文字、图片和视频，与有计划的误导性网络活动相结合，将显著增强CNCOIN行动的效果。非常规网络战先遣队推进美国网络特种作战的第三种方式是非常规网络战先遣队（cyber-UW Pilot Team），利用社交媒体网络塑造实体环境，建立区域机制，在实施非常规战之前将各区域联通起来。非常规网络战先遣队的核心是特种部队，拥有多个专业机构提供的技术支持，其任务是在网络安全领域进行非常规作战的准备。传统先遣队的渗透目标是敌方领土、军事设施等实体目标，而非常规先遣队则是通过虚拟手段进行渗透，再潜入敏感、敌对或拒止区域。通过虚拟手段，可以减少美国及伙伴国武装力量在时间、风险、装备等方面的损失和风险。从概念上讲，非常规网络战先遣队利用网络工具和先进技术在社交媒体上打造人员、实体、情报以及信息基础设施。在加深对当地人文地形理解的同时，小组可以强化其本地语言和文化技能，还可识别抵抗活动领导者、评估动机和抵抗能力以及对美国政府目标的总体支持度，与此同时，还可以了解非正式的层级分布、心理及行为等。此外，还可以通过接入社交媒体网络混入互联网白噪音，以“提高美国对潜在合作者的文化理解以及在采取行动之前的当地形势。”虽然美国国家安全战略中早就承认了网络作战的战略作用，但是这种认识并没有完全转化成明晰的战略层面的思维和作战能力。例如，美国《国防部网络空间行动战略》中并没有给出多少解决方案或具体措施，仅仅从五个方面重复了先前的网络思路。缺乏明确的思路导致我们的网络战略存在缺陷，使得美国先进的网络技术优势有拱手让给潜在对手的风险。对比之下，伊朗和俄罗斯的非对称性创新为其他地区和全球力量树立了模仿的样板，都试图以非常规手段规避美国的军事优势，确保各自的战略利益。网络空间特种作战是一种必须填补的战略层面的能力空白。很显然，美国必须积极寻求一种在战术层面的非常规作战中融入网络空间作战的特种作战形式。兰德公司最近的一份研究特种作战的报告得出结论，称“美国需要运用一种更为先进的特种作战形式来确保国家利益，考虑到近来美国及其利益面临的安全威胁形势，特种作战成为确保国家利益的最合适的形式”。在一个日益互联的全球环境中，实体性基础设施快速被分配互联网协议地址，接入物联网。到2020年，将有500亿台“机器对机器”设备（目前为130亿台）会通过“嵌入计算机、传感器和互联网能力”接入网络空间。网络空间特种作战联通了虚拟与现实，通过现代的信息网络并与传统的面对面的特种作战伙伴关系相结合。当今的全球环境促使美国采用网络特种作战作为国家军事战略的战略性工具。潜在对手将进攻性网络能力与非常规战术相结合为美国的其他敌人树立了可怕的榜样，他们必将快速跟进。本文提出了融合新兴技术与特种作战的三种新选项：“云驱动”下的国外协助防御、网络反暴乱平叛行动以及非常规网络战先遣队。充分发挥这三种战术将不仅仅能维持美国的网络技术优势，还可对构建重要伙伴关系、塑造全频谱作战环境产生革命性影响。如果能成功实施，网络特种作战必将成为美国强有力的新战略选项。

2016-08-22 17:42现代军事

Red Dragon 1949 / 紅龍1949

Category Archives: China’s Military Infratsructure

China’s One Belt One Road Justification for PLA Expeditionary Deployment // 中國解放軍遠征部署的一帶一路理由

China’s One Belt One Road Justification for PLA Expeditionary Deployment // 中國解放軍遠征部署的一帶一路理由

Chinese Military Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points // 淺析網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點

Chinese Analysis of Cyber Space Deterrence – Important Strategic Points

淺析網絡空間威懾的特徵、類型和運用要點

January 04, 2016

美國軍事網絡戰：黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭 // American military network warfare: hackers attack and defense creating a war without smoke

美國軍事網絡戰：黑客入侵防禦成為無菸的戰爭

American military network warfare: hackers attack and defense creating a war without smoke

國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 // Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 //

Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields // 中國模糊戰爭：未來戰場的發展趨勢

China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields //

中國模糊戰爭：未來戰場的發展趨勢

中國軍事戰雲 ~ Chinese Military Use of the Battle Cloud

中國軍事戰雲 ~ Chinese Military Use of the Battle Cloud

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

中國浅析伊拉克战争中美军网络中心战 ~ China Analysis of Analysis of the US Central Command Network War During Iraq War

China Analysis of Analysis of the US Central Command Network War During Iraq War

浅析伊拉克战争中美军网络中心战

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 – US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 –

US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

中國軍隊戰略層面的網絡空間特種作戰 China’s Strategic Level of Cyberspace Special Operations

战略层面的网络空间特种作战 –

China’s Strategic level of Cyberspace Special Operations

中國網絡衝突討論，信息與研究 // Chinese Cyber Conflict Discussions, Information & Research