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China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields // 中國模糊戰爭:未來戰場的發展趨勢

China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields //

中國模糊戰爭:未來戰場的發展趨勢

With the continuous development of information technology, changing the form, nature and scale of war, so that the combat style, combat methods, combat environment, combat conditions and other elements have been a lot of changes in the past, the future battlefield becomes more blurred, Can be summarized as the following:

War scale and level ambiguity

War in size and level, can be divided into strategies, campaigns and tactics, in the past, the difference between the three very obvious. From the three interrelationships, the strategy decides the battle, the battle determines the tactics, and the tactics reacts to the battle, the battle reacts to the strategy, which is the inherent law of the existence of the war itself. With the development of information technology, the development of high-tech war as information war, although not fundamentally change the strategic, campaign, tactical and counter-role of this dialectical relationship, but it makes the strategy, battle, tactical action scale increasingly blurred. This is because, under the conditions of information under the conditions of local war, the size and use of troops, weapons, limited duration of war, political prominence, war and strategy, battle, tactics combined very closely, tend to one. Information weapons and weapons to combat high precision, powerful, long range, with all-weather, all-weather combination of peaceful reconnaissance and combat integration capabilities for the rapid realization of the purpose of war to provide an effective means, sometimes do not use large forces can Reach the strategy, the battle target. Any combat unit, and even the individual combat operations, can get a strong information and fire support. Under their influence, tactical combat can directly achieve strategic objectives, strategic command can be involved in the tactical level is no longer a dream at any time. Thus, in the past through the local small victory gradually integrated into a strategic victory of the operational theory of the impact of the strategy, campaign, tactical three combat levels between the increasingly blurred.

With the extensive use of precision strike weapons, stealth weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and thus through the first and second fire assault can be reached a battle or strategic objectives. In the Gulf War, the multinational force first through a large-scale strategic air raids, and then through the ground operations of the various forces reached a war purpose; US invasion of Panama, through the use of the Army to implement the five-way center of the campaign to achieve the desired purpose; In the war in Afghanistan, the US military, through the air strike and the special forces to achieve the purpose of the war; the Iraq war, the US military in the air against the cover, the US Army division through tactical action reached a war purpose. The scale of operation and the ambiguity of the level are the reflection of the essential characteristics of information warfare. In the information war, the hostile parties for the rapid completion of the established strategic objectives, will be extraordinary use of combat power, to maximize the advanced technical weapons and elite troops, and strive to destroy each other in a short time the command and control system to win the battlefield The advantage of making information right. This feature of the information warfare, so that the battle of combat and strategic purposes there is no obvious distinction between the scale of operations there is no clear battle battle difference. A battle may determine the outcome of the war, a battle may also achieve the purpose of war, thus greatly improving the strategic role of the battle battle. Especially the various precision guidance weapons, ballistic missile defense system, reconnaissance surveillance system, stealth weapon, C4ISR system and other information weapons and the extensive use of rapid reaction forces, special forces, strategic reserve and other frequently into the battlefield, making the definition of combat scale fuzzy More prominent.

Therefore, in the future information operations, the two sides will fight with the uncertainty of the scale of operations, to take over-the-line precision strike, non-programmatic “acupuncture” and structural damage and other tactics, against each other’s battlefield awareness system and information systems Quickly achieve the purpose of fighting. In this way, the special operations forces on the battlefield may be able to show their talents, that is, before the war secretly penetrate the enemy, direct attack and paralyze the enemy command and control system, so that the enemy lost control of its combat forces, and thus into the chaos of command, The Although the scale of the operation of the smaller, but for the outcome of the war can play a very important role.

Weapon equipment and functional blur

Technical decision tactics, also determines the army’s system and the composition of military and arms. For example, the emergence of weapons and equipment such as artillery, chemical weapons and radio telegraphy, laid the material foundation for the emergence of new arms such as artillery, chemical warfare, and communications. In terms of military services, due to the emergence of the aircraft, and then produced the Air Force; ship advent, gave birth to the Navy. Industrial era, the requirements of the division of labor, so refined and produced more and more professional, reflected in the composition of the army, is the division of arms and branches more and more fine; information age, requires the overall combat, the professional Close cooperation, and take the road of integrated and integrated operations. Reflected in the composition of the military trend, is the integration of combat systems. For example, many of the future weapons and equipment system will form an independent combat unit, both to complete the army requirements of the combat mission, but also to achieve the Air Force’s operational requirements, but also to achieve the purpose of naval combat. In other words, when the future combat aircraft’s infinite capacity to extend, and beyond the atmosphere combat; Army bid farewell to the “ground crawling” to achieve global arrival, global operations; the Navy to the sea to land, to the air combat capability transformation, Battle will inevitably lead to integrated forces. Integrated combat troops, generally composed of armored forces, artillery, mechanized infantry, missiles, attack and transport helicopters, naval vessels and other components, can independently combat, will realize the professional army to the professional army transition.

Future integration forces will be the main performance, will break the traditional land, sea, air, days and other military system, in accordance with the requirements of system integration, the establishment of “super-integrated” integrated combat forces. The future of information warfare is a highly integrated joint operations, the use of traditional forces of the implementation of joint operations, it is difficult to adapt to this highly integrated joint operations needs. To this end, the future composition of the military organization, will break the traditional land, sea, air, days and other military system, in accordance with the reconnaissance surveillance, command and control, precision strike and support to protect the four operational functions, built four subsystems, namely: Subsystems, command and control subsystems, precision strike and combat subsystems, and support assurance subsystems. The functions of these four subsystems are closely linked and organically linked to form an interdependent large integrated joint combat system. The army constructed in accordance with this idea will fundamentally abandon the pattern of military construction in the industrial age, eliminate the disadvantages of playing the military expertise and pursuing the interests of a single service, so that the combat forces form a “systematic system” or “system integration” Give full play to the overall power, the implementation of the true sense of “super-joint” integrated joint operations.

 

Military combat operations and the preparation of fuzzy war

Military combat forces have different targets and perform different combat missions. World War II, combat forces mainly infantry-based, basically infantry and infantry confrontation; the Second World War, due to the development of weapons and equipment, aircraft, tanks, cannons for war, arms and arms between the combat The task has a distinct distinction, usually performing a different combat mission. However, under the conditions of information in the local war, due to the development of weapons and equipment to the direction of multi-functional integration, the establishment of the army, not only the arms, as well as various services. Combat forces can perform both ground combat missions, but also the implementation of the fight against air and sea objectives and tasks, so that the boundaries between the military operations will be difficult to distinguish. For example: destroy the enemy tank weapons, may have been the Army’s tanks or anti-tank weapons, it may be the Air Force aircraft or naval submarines launched “smart” missiles. The US military plans to form four integrated forces: an integrated ground force composed of armored forces, artillery, flying warriors, attack and transport helicopters: air-to-air mechanized units with “flying tanks”; air force mixed knits composed of multiple models and A “joint task force” consisting of various military units. The Russian army intends to form a “multi-purpose mobile force”, an “aerospace force” composed of ground, air and space forces, and a “non-nuclear strategic deterrent force” composed of non-strategic nuclear forces.

In the future of localized information warfare, weapons and equipment to the multi-functional, integrated direction, the development of the trend of the trend of mixing, miniaturization. Combat, the arms and arms around the established operational objectives, each other, integrated into the organic whole. On the battlefield, the arms and services will be in the land, sea, air, days, electricity and other multi-dimensional areas, around the purpose of a unified combat, both in the activities of space is relatively independent, but also in the combat operations on a high degree of integration, making different arms and arms The task line becomes more vague.

War motives and ambiguity

The motive of the traditional war is generally the political struggle to cover up the economic interests of the dispute. In the information age, the economic interests of the dispute will continue to lead to the root causes of the war, but in addition, due to the international and domestic political forces between the various contacts increased, closely linked, which will inevitably lead to various countries, And the conflicts between the societies caused by political, diplomatic and spiritual factors have increased, so that the contradictions between religions and nationalities have increased, so that violence can be smuggled and drug trafficking and terrorist activities are internationalized. These contradictions and conflicts are not only the direct cause of the “sub-war operations”, but also one of the causes of the war. The direct cause of the Gulf War in 1991 was the convening of the United Nations Security Council immediately after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the adoption of resolution 660, condemning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and demanding that Iraq be unconditionally withdrawn from its forces. The United States for the protection of Western oil sources and in order to establish a new order in line with the interests of the world’s new order, take the lead in the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq, followed by the United States led the multinational force to implement the UN Security Council resolution in the name of the troops to the Gulf. Through 42 days of war, the US military reached the purpose of the war. The war in Iraq, the United States to Iraq has a weapons of mass destruction on the grounds, without the authorization of the United Nations launched an injustice war. Throughout the war, the focus of US military operations against Saddam Hussein and a handful of Iraqi high-level leaders, and to find weapons of mass destruction and launched the attack. Although the war has overthrew the Saddam regime, the United States still has not found strong evidence that Iraq has such banned weapons. In this war military purpose, the United States is also to test the new operational theory.

In recent years, the US military vigorously advocated military reform. The theory of the war in Iraq is the theory of “cyber-centric warfare” and uses the new theory of “shock and deterrence” put forward in 1996: emphasizing the use of violent firepower, shocking against opponents, regardless of frontier and depth, The enemy to combat, the use of advanced precision guidance technology, against each other’s goals when one side of the pursuit of both sides less casualties; air and ground operations at the same time, the purpose is to destroy each other’s will, so that its regime collapse, so as to achieve war and subdue The purpose of the soldiers. In the Iraq war, the US military did not carry out large-scale strategic bombing, but the use of high-tech and special forces tactics to combat, which is one of the main achievements of US military reform.

War attack and defense blur

The process of attack and defense in the past is very clear, the attacking party usually in accordance with the offensive preparation, breakthrough, shock, deep combat and other step by step attack procedures, defense side in accordance with the defense preparation, fire against the preparation, anti-impact, deep combat and other sub-combat operations Attack and defense both sides of the various stages of combat orderly. The development of high-tech weapons and equipment and information technology, the new military revolution will change the future combat procedures, combat operations will break through the fixed battlefield and position constraints in the entire operational space at all levels, all directions, all aspects of the same time. In this way, the front and rear lines in the past are blurred, the relatively stable front and fixed battlefields no longer exist, the line of offensive action and defensive action because the battlefield’s high mobility and uncertainty also become blurred and influence World military force balance. Offensive and defensive both offensive and defensive combat, especially offensive and defensive information war will become the focus of future combat art, so that every war has attack in the defense, anti-attack.

Attack and defense operations will be in the land, sea, air, days, electricity and outer space and front and depth, front and wing side, front and rear at the same time, the battlefield frequent mobility, line combat style has not adapted to the conditions of local war development Need to, instead of non-line operations, the formation of a “island-based combat base”, front and rear of the line, the enemy and the two sides of the front becomes blurred, the battlefield of the flow of non-linear or non-state state of the multi-dimensional battlefield.

Measure the outcome of the war with the standard fuzzy

In the past, the criteria for measuring the outcome of a war usually refer to how many troops are wiped out, how many weapons are seized, how many cities and territories are occupied, but in the case of local warfare, the criteria for measuring the outcome of a war are not just that. Under the conditions of information, local warfare, political purpose and war are closely integrated, war attempts often not through the invasion of each other’s territory, wiped out the enemy or the enemy completely surrendered, so as not to lead the world public opinion and the people’s strong opposition, resulting in political Passive.

One of the hallmarks of information warfare is that it minimizes casualties, in particular, collateral damage, and often uses precision-guided weapons to strike precisely, to avoid heavy assault, face-to-face fights, and fight against Libya “Surgical” operations, the implementation of air long-range maneuvers, to achieve the purpose of war; also the implementation of missiles, thousands of miles away siege warfare, but also to achieve the purpose of local war; also like the Gulf War, do not occupy its territory, Do not kill their soldiers a soldier, not seized its weapons, ammunition, the implementation of large-scale air strikes, weakened its military facilities, destroyed its regime.

The war army is blurred with the people

In previous wars, the links between the army and the society were relatively “loose” due to restrictions on information infrastructure and technology; pure war weapons and equipment also led to military organizations that were completely independent of the people. Information age, information has become a link between the military and the people, this combination, with the social and military information degree of development, integration will also continue to improve. This makes society and ordinary people no longer a spectator of war, and even not only in support and subordinate status, but with the army, from the back of the war to the front desk.

As people see, on the one hand, the purpose of modern warfare is no longer simply pursuing siege and the greatest annihilation of enemy forces, the target is no longer confined to the enemy’s heavy military and military facilities, but includes Corresponding to the survival and operation of the infrastructure, such as: financial networks, power grids, transport networks, administrative networks, communications networks. On the other hand, the war has a tendency to “civilians”. For example, information makes the “non-state” has the ability to confront national power. Any “non-state subject”, as long as there is a certain technical and information equipment, you can attack the vital goal of a country, its harm is sometimes no less than a traditional sense of the war. Such as Al Qaeda attacks on the United States launched the 9.11 attack, that is the case. Although the composition of the information warfare forces, although still have traces of the war in the past war, but in the form of form and combat quality, due to more information to join the content, in particular, more to join the information of the whole society Warfare ability, so no doubt to determine the specific role of information warfare when the thinking tends to blur, but for combat decision-making and command to bring greater difficulties. With the in-depth development of information technology, the degree of social information will be greatly improved. In this case the information war, it is more prominent military and civilian compatibility characteristics. Especially in the information warfare, many high-tech work, alone, the strength of the army is difficult to complete independently, but also the need for the whole social forces of collaboration, which makes the information warfare combat power, more into the national factors.

Combat both forces with contrast and blur

In the past, the strength of the war between the two sides, usually the number of military personnel, the number of weapons to measure the number of weapons to determine the strength of the advantages of planning and combat operations. But in the information under the conditions of local war, concentrated forces of content and methods have changed. The strength of the comparison is not only the number of considerations, but also mainly consider the quality, in particular, to consider the concentration of firepower and information, a variety of long-range strike weapons do not need to focus on deployment, you can focus on the implementation of the target surprise. To make the concentration of fire after the effective role, but also must focus on a lot of information, otherwise they can not capture, track and destroy the target. The most important weapon in military forces will no longer be a high-performance fighter, bomber, tank, warships, but a huge flood of data from the information system. Invisible information and knowledge, like armored masters, play a huge role in combat and are increasingly becoming the most important combat and power multiplier. Computing power, communication ability, reconnaissance ability, processing ability, decision-making ability, computer simulation ability, network warfare and other information and knowledge factors will become a key factor in measuring military power.

The contrast of military forces is increasingly dependent on the invisible and difficult potential of the intelligence and structural forces of the information weapons system. Therefore, in the past according to the number of combatants and tanks, aircraft, artillery, warships and other weapons and equipment performance, quantity and other static indicators to assess the strength of military strength is clearly challenged. Because of the intelligence of the information weapon system, the structural force has great potential for dynamic. The strength of the Gulf War contrast and the outcome of the war can explain this problem. Before the war, Iraq and the multinational force compared to 1.6: 1, but the result of the war is the Iraqi army casualties for the multinational force 100 times. Obviously, if not a large number of multinational force weapons system to play a multiplier combat potential, there will be no such a war situation. It can be seen that the principle of force assessment of the number of static quantities will be replaced by a new force theory.

Battlefield information is true and false

Because of the development of information technology, and widely used in future war, so that a large amount of modern war information, processing information has been very difficult. Such as: the US Strategic Air Force Command, an average of more than 815,000 per month to deal with military information, almost 26,500 copies per day. In the Gulf War, the multinational force in the 42 days of combat, dealing with up to millions of military information. Only the US Army logistics will handle 10,700 copies of military information every day. After the military, weapons and equipment and the battlefield are digitized, the military information highway will cover the entire combat space, the information is true and false, there are new and old, heavy and light, there is real, there are thick and so on, information Like the tide to the red and blue both sides of the command came. In such a fast-paced, fighter fleeting, information massive battlefield environment, to the red and blue commander of a brief decision-making time, forcing both commanders in the complex battlefield information forging discrimination, analysis and judgment, quick decision-making , Through the phenomenon to seize the essence, improve the command ability.

Battlefield space and scope is blurred

Battlefield is the enemy of the two sides of the interaction between combat forces and combat forces and firepower to kill the maximum distance. In the past war, due to the level of weapons and equipment constraints, cold weapons era battlefield space, basically confined to the war between the two sides of the visual distance; hot weapons and mechanized war era, battlefield space by the firearms and the two sides of the maneuverability And the battlefield space is expanding, and from a single land battlefield, to the development of the marine battlefield and air battlefield; combat distance from the visual distance to the development of remote and ultra-long-range , The depth and dimension of the battlefield continue to expand. After entering the information warfare, with the development of military weapons and equipment and structure changes, modern warfare space from the traditional land, sea and air to space, computer space, especially information, psychology, electromagnetic, cognitive and other virtual space expansion , In addition to the range of modern weapons and equipment and a substantial increase in mobility, the future battlefield in front and rear become increasingly blurred, in addition to the solid space in the solid before and after the exception, in the dynamic action space has no difference. Fighting may start from the front, it may start from the depth. Especially the establishment of digital forces, so that the army choose the way of combat operations, with greater freedom and flexibility. At the same time, but also to accurately determine the other side of the operational space and the exact location of the space, increasing the complexity. First, information weapons greatly improve the military’s ability to war, so that the military battlefield combat more flexible way. Second, information weapons greatly enhance the military’s full-time, all-round rapid mobility, so that information warfare warfare areas to expand.

Military aerospace capacity and long-range air transport capacity, the extensive use of armed helicopters, to achieve long-range rapid maneuver provides a good material basis. Future information warfare, or in three-dimensional space or in four-dimensional space, generally difficult to accurately grasp. And only when the other side of the combat operations to a certain size, it is possible to make a relatively accurate judgments, which to some extent increased the difficulty of command and control. The ambiguity of combat space is also manifested in the fuzzy scope of combat operations. As the future of information operations will break through the frontier to the depth of the gradual advance of the pattern, in a multi-dimensional space within the full range, full depth of the war, so that the scope of combat operations increased, combat space has become elusive. The uncertainty of the scale of combat operations in the information warfare determines the diversity of combat space. This also makes it possible to judge the space of the other combat operations, become blurred, and show the characteristics of difficult to predict and control.

Combat methods and methods are blurred

Advanced information technology, not only to achieve the real-time reconnaissance intelligence and digital battlefield, greatly improving the combat effectiveness of the army, more importantly, there have been many new means of warfare: such as information warfare momentum and power to make enemies Information deterrence; to disperse, conceal and open the information channel of the information shielding; on the enemy battlefield awareness system and information system implementation of information attacks; through the information system hidden false information fraud and information cut, computer virus attacks , Special operations, psychological warfare, non-contact operations, non-fatal attacks, structural damage warfare, these combat methods used in information warfare, completely changed the past offensive and defensive procedures clear and coherent characteristics, so that the use of combat means Order, combat form of non-model and other characteristics of more and more prominent, and then led to the information warfare, the use of the enemy means of warfare, timing and methods, become more difficult to guess. In the process of the combination of fuzzy, that is, in the course of the war, due to the enemy due to the appropriate choice of means of attack, and flexible combination, so that the enemy can not determine what the other side will take the means of combat, can not effectively take the appropriate protective measures. In the use of the timing of the fuzzy, that is, according to the intention of war and combat purposes, for different stages of combat and different areas of combat, to take different means of attack, reduce the enemy resistance will make it in trouble. In the fight against the ambiguity of the target, that is, the use of information warfare means of diversification, for the needs of information operations, both sound East West, but also the East and East, the flexibility to combat the enemy command center, communication center or radar station, air defense system , Logistical support systems and other key nodes, so that the enemy is difficult to use the means of my war to make accurate predictions.
原文網址:https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

Original Mandarin Chinese:

隨著信息技術的不斷發展,改變了戰爭的形態、性質和規模,使作戰樣式、作戰方法、作戰環境、作戰條件等諸要素已較以往發生了諸多變化,未來戰場變得更加模糊不清,可歸納為以下幾種:

戰爭規模與層次模糊

戰爭在規模和層次上,可劃分為戰略、戰役和戰術,在以往戰爭中三者之間的區別十分明顯。從三者相互關係上,戰略決定戰役,戰役決定戰術,而且戰術反作用於戰役,戰役又反作用於戰略,這是戰爭本身存在的內在規律。隨著信息技術的發展,高技術戰爭發展為信息化戰爭,雖然未從根本上改變戰略、戰役、戰術這種作用與反作用的辯證關係,但是卻使戰略、戰役、戰術行動規模的日益模糊。這是因為,信息化條件下局部戰爭目的、規模和使用兵力、兵器有限,戰爭持續時間短,政治性突出,戰爭與戰略、戰役、戰術結合得十分緊密,趨於一體。信息化武器和兵器打擊精度高、威力大、射程遠,具有全天候、全時空的平戰結合的偵察與打擊一體化能力,為迅速達成戰爭目的提供了有效手段,有時不動用大部隊也能達成戰略、戰役目標。任何一個作戰單元,甚至是單兵的戰鬥行動,都能得到強大的信息和火力支援。在它們的作用下,戰術打擊可以直接達成戰略目的,戰略指揮可以隨時介入戰術層次已不再是夢想。由此可見,以往通過局部小勝逐步匯集成戰略性勝利的作戰理論受到衝擊,戰略、戰役、戰術三個作戰層次間的界線日益模糊。

隨著大量使用精確打擊兵器、隱形兵器、無人機,因而通過一、二次火力突擊就可達成戰役或戰略目標。海灣戰爭中,多國部隊首先是通過大規模的戰略空襲行動,爾後通過地面諸軍種聯合作戰達成了戰爭目的;美軍入侵巴拿馬,是通過動用陸軍實施五路重心攻擊的戰役行動達成了預期目的;阿富汗戰爭中,美軍主要通過空中精確打擊和特種部隊搜剿達成了戰爭目的;伊拉克戰爭中,美軍在空中打擊掩護下,美國陸軍師通過戰術行動達成了戰爭目的。作戰規模、層次的模糊性,是信息戰本質特徵的反映。在信息戰中,敵對雙方為迅速達成既定的戰略目的,將會超常使用作戰力量,最大限度地投入先進的技術兵器和精銳部隊,力求在短時間內摧毀對方的指揮控制系統,以奪取戰場上制信息權的優勢。信息戰的這一特點,使戰役戰鬥與戰略目的沒有明顯的區分,作戰規模也沒有明確的戰役戰鬥的區別。一次戰役既可能決定戰爭的勝負,一次戰鬥也可能實現戰爭的目的,從而大幅度地提高了戰役戰鬥的戰略作用。特別是各種精確制導武器、彈道飛彈防禦系統、偵察監視系統、隱形武器、C4ISR系統等信息化兵器的廣泛運用和快速反應部隊、特種部隊、戰略預備隊等頻繁投入戰場,使得作戰規模的界定模糊性更加突出。

因此,在未來信息作戰中,作戰雙方都將以不確定的作戰規模,採取超視距精確打擊、非程式化「點穴」和結構破壞等戰法,打擊對方的戰場感知系統與信息系統,以便迅速地達成作戰目的。這樣,戰場上的特種作戰部隊就可能大顯身手,即在戰前秘密地深入敵後,直接攻擊和癱瘓敵指揮控制系統,使敵失去對其作戰力量的控制,從而陷入指揮混亂、協調無序的困境。這種規模的作戰雖然較小,但對於作戰的勝負卻能起到極其重要的作用。

武器裝備與功能模糊

技術決定戰術,同樣也決定著軍隊的編制體制和軍兵種構成。例如,火炮、化學武器、無線電報機等武器裝備的出現,為炮兵、防化兵、通信兵等新兵種的出現奠定了物質基礎。就軍種而言,由於飛機的出現,進而產生了空軍;船舶的問世,催生出了海軍。工業時代,要求的是分工合作,所以細化和產生的專業越來越多,體現在軍隊的構成上,就是軍兵種劃分得越來越細;資訊時代,要求的是整體作戰,各專業之間密切協同,走集成一體化聯合作戰之路。反映在軍隊的構成趨勢上,就是作戰系統的一體化。比如,未來許多武器裝備系統將形成一個獨立的作戰單元,既可完成陸軍要求的作戰任務,也可實現空軍的作戰要求,還可達到海軍的作戰目的。換句話說,當未來作戰飛機的續航能力無限延長,並超越大氣層作戰;陸軍告別「地面爬行」,實現全球抵達、全球作戰;海軍實現由海到陸、到空的作戰能力轉化之時,一體化作戰必然催生一體化部隊。一體化作戰部隊,一般由裝甲兵、炮兵、機械化步兵、飛彈、攻擊和運輸直升機、海軍艦艇等組成,能獨立作戰,將實現專業軍隊向職業化軍隊過渡。

未來一體化部隊將主要表現為,將打破傳統的陸、海、空、天等軍種體制,按照系統集成的要求,建立「超聯合」的一體化作戰部隊。未來信息化戰爭是高度一體化聯合作戰,使用傳統的諸軍種力量實施聯合作戰,已難以適應這種高度一體化聯合作戰的需要。為此,未來軍隊組織的編成,將打破傳統的陸、海、空、天等軍種體制,按照偵察監視、指揮控制、精確打擊和支援保障四大作戰職能,建成四個子系統,即:探測預警子系統、指揮控制子系統、精確打擊與作戰子系統和支援保障子系統。這四個子系統的功能緊密銜接,有機聯繫,構成一個相互依存龐大的一體化聯合作戰系統。按照這個思路構建的軍隊,將從根本上拋棄工業化時代軍隊建設的模式,革除偏重發揮軍種專長和追求單一軍種利益的弊端,使作戰力量形成「系統的系統」或「系統的集成」,從而能夠充分發揮整體威力,實施真正意義上「超聯合」的一體化聯合作戰。

軍兵種作戰任務與編制模糊

軍兵種作戰力量具有不同的打擊目標和執行不同作戰任務。第一次世界大戰,作戰力量主要以步兵為主,基本上是步兵與步兵的對抗;第二次世界大戰,由於武器裝備的發展,飛機、坦克、大炮用於戰爭,軍兵種之間的作戰任務有了明顯區分,通常執行不同的作戰任務。但是在信息化條件下局部戰爭中,由於武器裝備向多功能一體化方向上發展,部隊的編制內,不僅有各兵種,還有各軍種。作戰部隊既能執行地面作戰任務,又能執行打擊空中和海上目標任務,使軍種間作戰的界線將不易區分。例如:摧毀敵方坦克的兵器,可能是已方陸軍的坦克或反坦克兵器,也可能是空軍的飛機或海軍潛艇發射的「智能」型飛彈。美軍計劃組建四種一體化部隊:由裝甲兵、炮兵、飛彈兵、攻擊與運輸直升機組成的一體化地面部隊:編有「飛行坦克」的陸空機械化部隊;由多機種組成的空軍混編聯隊和中隊;由各軍種部隊組成的「聯合特遣部隊」。俄軍擬組建集各軍兵種於一體的「多用途機動部隊」,由地面、空中和太空兵力組成的「航空航天部隊」,以及由各軍種非戰略核力量組成的「非核戰略威懾部隊」。

在未來信息化局部戰爭中,武器裝備向多功能、一體化方向發展,部隊的編制趨向混合化、小型化。作戰中,各軍兵種圍繞既定的作戰目標,彼此依存,融為有機的整體。在戰場上,各軍兵種將在陸、海、空、天、電等多維領域,圍繞統一的作戰目的,既在活動空間上相對獨立,又在作戰行動上高度融合,使得不同軍兵種所執行的任務界線變得更加模糊。

戰爭動因與目的模糊

傳統戰爭的動因一般是政治鬥爭掩蓋下的經濟利益之爭。在資訊時代,經濟利益之爭仍將是導致戰爭的根本原因,但除此之外,由於各國之間、國際國內各派政治力量之間交往增多,聯繫密切,這就必然導致各個國家、民族、社團之間由政治、外交、精神等因素引發的衝突增多,使宗教、民族矛盾上升,使暴力活動、走私販毒、恐怖活動國際化。這些矛盾與衝突不僅是「亞戰爭行動」的直接根源,也是導致戰爭的動因之一。1991年海灣戰爭直接動因,是1990年8月2日伊拉克入侵科威特之後,聯合國安理會立即召開會議,通過了660號決議,譴責伊拉克入侵科威特,要求伊拉克無條件從科撤軍。美國出於保護西方石油來源和為建立符合其利益的世界新秩序的目的,乘虛而入帶頭對伊拉克實施經濟制裁,隨後以美國為首的多國部隊以執行聯合國安理會決議為名,出兵海灣。通過42天的交戰,美軍達到了戰爭目的。伊拉克戰爭,美國以伊拉克擁有大規模殺傷性武器為由,沒有經過聯合國授權而發動的一場非正義戰爭。整個戰爭中,美軍作戰的重心是針對薩達姆等少數伊拉克高層領導人,並以尋找大規模殺傷性武器而展開的攻擊行動。雖然戰爭已經推翻了薩達姆政權,但是美國至今仍然沒有找到伊拉克擁有這種違禁武器的有力證據。在這場戰爭軍事目的上,美國也是為了試驗新的作戰理論。

近幾年,美軍大力倡導軍事變革。指導伊拉克戰爭的理論是「網絡中心戰」理論,並運用1996年提出的「震撼與威懾」的新理論:強調運用猛烈的火力,震撼性打擊對手,不分前沿和縱深,全方位迅速地對敵人進行打擊,運用先進的精確制導技術,打擊對方目標時片面追求雙方較少的傷亡;空中與地面行動同時展開,目的是摧毀對方的意志,使其政權崩潰,從而達到不戰而屈人之兵的目的。伊拉克戰爭中,美軍沒有進行大規模的戰略轟炸,而是利用高技術加特種兵的戰術進行作戰,這是美軍軍事變革的主要成果之一。

戰爭進攻與防禦模糊

以往攻防作戰的程序十分明,進攻一方通常按照進攻準備、突破、衝擊、縱深作戰等步步進攻程序進行,防禦一方按照防禦準備、火力反準備、反衝擊、縱深抗擊等分段抗擊作戰程序進行,攻防雙方各個作戰階段展開有序。而高技術武器裝備和信息技術的發展,新軍事革命將改變未來作戰程序,作戰行動將突破固定的戰場和陣地的限制,在整個作戰空間的各個層次、各個方向、各個方面同時進行。這樣一來,以往戰爭中的前後方界線模糊,相對穩定的正面和固定的戰場不復存在,進攻行動和防禦行動的界線因為戰場的高度流動性和不確定性也變得模糊不清並影響世界軍事力量平衡。攻防兼備、攻防一體作戰尤其是攻防一體的信息戰將成為今後作戰藝術的焦點,使每一次戰爭都有攻中有防、防中有攻。

攻防作戰將在陸、海、空、天、電以及外層空間和前沿與縱深、正面與翼側、前方與後方同時展開,戰場機動頻繁,線式作戰樣式已不適應信息化條件下局部戰爭發展的需要,取而代之的是非線式作戰,形成一種「島嶼式作戰基點」,前方與後方的界線、敵我雙方的戰線變得模糊,戰場呈現流動的非線性或無戰線狀態的多維立體戰場。

衡量戰爭勝負與標準模糊

以往衡量一場戰爭勝負的標準通常指的是殲滅對方多少兵力,繳獲多少武器,占領多少城鎮和領土,然而在未來信息化條件下局部戰爭中,衡量一場戰爭勝負的標準已不只是這些。信息化條件下的局部戰爭,政治目的與戰爭結合得緊密,戰爭企圖往往不通過侵入對方領土,全殲敵軍或使敵方徹底投降,以免引發世界輿論的和民眾的強烈反對,造成政治上的被動。

信息化戰爭的一大特點是,將使傷亡、破壞,特別是附帶性破壞減少到最低限度,通常使用精確制導武器精確打擊,避免重兵集結進行面對面的拼殺,打一場像美軍懲罰利比亞發動的「外科手術式」作戰,實施空中遠程機動空襲,達成戰爭目的;也可實施飛彈,進行遠隔千里的攻城戰,也能達成局部戰爭的目的;也可像海灣戰爭那樣,不占領其國土,不殺傷其一兵一卒,不繳獲其武器、彈藥,實施的大規模的空襲戰,削弱其軍事設施,搗毀其國政權。

戰爭軍隊與民眾模糊

以往的戰爭,由於受信息基礎設施和技術的限制,軍隊與社會的聯繫相對「鬆散」;純戰爭的武器裝備亦導致完全獨立於民間之外的軍事組織。資訊時代,信息成為軍民結合的紐帶,這種結合,隨著社會和軍隊的信息化程度的發展,融合程度也將不斷提高。這就使得社會和普通民眾不再是戰爭的旁觀者,甚至也不僅處於支援和從屬地位,而是與軍隊一樣,從戰爭的幕後走向了前台。

正如人們看到的,一方面,現代戰爭的目的已不再單純地追求攻城掠地和最大限度地殲滅敵有生力量,打擊目標亦不再局限於敵方的重兵集團和軍事設施,而是包括對應賴以生存和運轉的基礎設施,如:金融網、電力網、交通網、行政網、通信網等。另一方面,戰爭有向「平民化」發展的趨勢。比如,信息化使得「非國家主體」具備了與國家力量進行對抗的能力。任何一個「非國家主體」,只要具備一定的技術和信息設備,就可以對一個國家的要害目標進行攻擊,其危害有時並不亞於一場傳統意義上的戰爭。比如基地組織對美發動的9·11襲擊,就是如此。信息戰力量的構成,雖然仍具有以往戰爭全民參戰的痕跡,但是在構成的形式和作戰的質量上,由於較多地加入了信息化的含量,特別是較多地加入了全社會民眾的信息戰能力,所以無疑使判斷信息戰具體參與力量時的思維趨於模糊,而為作戰決策與指揮帶來較大的困難。隨著信息技術深入發展,社會民眾的信息化程度也將極大地提高。在這種情況下的信息戰,就更加突出軍民兼容的特徵。特別在信息戰中,許多高技術工作,僅靠軍隊的力量難以獨立完成,還需要全社會力量的協作,這就使信息戰的作戰力量,較多地融入了全民皆兵的因素。

作戰雙方力量對比與能力模糊

以往交戰雙方力量對比,通常以軍隊人員數量多少、各種武器多少的比數來衡量力量優勢,進行籌劃攻防作戰。但在信息化條件下局部戰爭中,集中兵力的內容和方式有所改變。力量的對比不只是考慮數量多少,更主要是考慮質量,尤其是要考慮集中火力和信息,各種遠程打擊兵器不需要集中部署,就可對目標實施集中突擊。要使集中後的火力有效地發揮作用,還必須集中大量信息,否則就無法捕捉、跟蹤和摧毀目標。軍事力量中最重要的武器將不再是高性能的戰鬥機、轟炸機、坦克、戰艦,而是由信息系統湧現的巨大數據洪流。無形的信息和知識像裝甲雄師一般,在作戰中發揮巨大的作用,並日益成為最重要的戰鬥力和力量倍增器。計算能力、通信能力、偵察能力、處理能力、決策能力、計算機模擬能力、網絡戰等信息和知識因素都將成為衡量軍事力量的關鍵因素。

軍事力量的對比,越來越多地取決於信息武器系統的智力和結構力所帶來的無形的、難以量化的巨大潛力。因此,以往根據作戰人數和坦克、飛機、大炮、軍艦等武器裝備的性能、數量等靜態指標評定軍事力量強弱的方法顯然受到了挑戰。因為信息武器系統的智力、結構力具有巨大的動態潛力。海灣戰爭的兵力對比和戰爭結局就可說明這個問題。戰前,伊拉克與多國部隊的兵力對比是1.6:1,但戰爭結果是伊軍的傷亡為多國部隊的100倍。顯然,如果不是多國部隊的大量信息武器系統發揮出成倍的作戰潛力,是不會有如此戰局。可見,靜態數質量指標的力量評估原則將會被一種全新的力量理論所取代。

戰場信息真與假模糊

由於信息技術的發展,並廣泛運用於未來戰爭,使現代戰爭信息量很大,處理信息已經十分困難。如:美國戰略空軍司令部,平均每月要處理軍事信息815000多份,差不多每天處理26500份。在海灣戰爭中,多國部隊在42 天作戰中,處理軍事信息多達數百萬份。僅美國陸軍後勤每天就要處理軍事信息10700份。在軍隊、武器裝備和戰場都實現數字化以後,軍事信息高速公路將覆蓋整個作戰空間,這些信息有真有假、有新有舊、有重有輕、有虛有實、有粗有細等,信息像潮水般地向紅藍雙方指揮所湧來。在這樣快節奏、戰機稍縱即逝、信息海量戰場環境中,給紅藍雙方指揮員短暫決策處理時間,逼著雙方指揮員在錯綜複雜的戰場信息中鍛鍊辨別力、分析判斷力、快速決策力,透過現象抓住本質,提高指揮能力。

戰場空間與範圍模糊

戰場是指敵對雙方作戰力量相互作用並加上作戰力量機動和火力殺傷的最大距離。以往戰爭中,由於受武器裝備水平的限制,冷兵器時代的戰場空間,基本局限在交戰雙方的目視距離之內;熱兵器和機械化戰爭時代,戰場空間由火器的射程和雙方兵力的機動能力所決定,並隨著火器(炮)射程和兵力機動能力的不斷提高,戰場空間日漸擴大,並由單一的陸地戰場,發展到海洋戰場和空中戰場;作戰距離則由目視距離發展到遠程和超遠程,戰場的縱深和維度不斷拓展。進入信息化作戰後,隨著軍隊武器裝備和結構的發展變化,現代戰爭的作戰空間又從傳統的陸、海、空向太空、計算機空間,特別是信息、心理、電磁、認知等虛擬空間拓展,加之現代武器裝備的射程及機動能力大幅提高,未來戰場的前方和後方變得日漸模糊,除了在固態的地理空間上有前後之分外,在動態的行動空間上已無先後之別。戰鬥既可能從前方打響,也可能從縱深開始。特別是數字化部隊的建立,使軍隊選擇作戰行動的方式,具備了更大的自由度和靈活性。同時,也為準確地判斷對方作戰行動空間的具體範圍和準確位置,增加了複雜度。一是信息化武器大大提高了軍隊的遠戰能力,使軍隊的戰場打擊方式更加靈活。二是信息化武器大大增強了軍隊的全時空、全方位快速機動能力,使信息戰的交戰區域更加擴大。

軍事航天能力和遠程空運能力的提高,武裝直升機的廣泛運用,為實現遠距離快速機動提供了良好的物質基礎。未來信息戰,或在三維空間或在四維空間進行,一般不易準確把握。而只有當對方的作戰行動達到一定規模時,才有可能作出相對準確的判斷,這在一定程度上增加了指揮和控制的難度。作戰空間的模糊性,還表現在作戰行動範圍的模糊。由於未來信息作戰將打破由前沿向縱深逐次推進的格局,在多維的空間內進行全方位、全縱深的交戰,就使作戰行動的範圍增大,作戰空間變得難以捉摸。信息戰所具有的作戰行動規模的不確定性,決定了作戰空間的多樣性。這也使判斷對方作戰行動的空間,變得模糊起來,而呈現出不易預測和控制的特點。

作戰手段與方法模糊

先進的信息技術,不僅實現了偵察情報的實時化和戰場數字化,極大地提高了軍隊的戰鬥效能,更重要的是出現了許多嶄新的作戰手段:如以信息戰的聲勢和威力使敵懾服的信息威懾;以分散、隱蔽和廣開信息通道的方法進行的信息屏蔽;對敵戰場認識系統和信息系統實施的信息攻擊;通過信息系統隱真示假行動的信息欺騙以及信息割斷、計算機病毒襲擊、特種作戰、心理戰、非接觸作戰、非致命攻擊、結構破壞戰等,這些作戰手段運用於信息戰,完全改變了以往攻防作戰程序清晰、連貫性強的特點,使作戰手段運用的非有序性、作戰形式的非模式化等特點越來越突出,進而導致了在信息戰中,對敵方作戰手段運用的規律、時機和方法,變得更加難以揣度。在手段組合上的模糊,即在作戰過程中,因勢因敵恰當地選擇打擊手段,並靈活地進行組合,使敵無法判斷對方將要採取何種作戰手段,無法有效地採取相應的防護措施。在運用時機上的模糊,即根據作戰的意圖和作戰目的,針對不同的作戰階段和不同的作戰領域,採取不同的打擊手段,降低敵抵抗意志,使之陷入困境。在打擊目標上的模糊,即利用信息戰作戰手段多樣化的特點,針對信息作戰的需要,既可聲東擊西,亦可聲東擊東,靈活地打擊敵指揮中心、通信中心或雷達站、防空系統、後勤保障系統等關鍵節點,使敵難以對我作戰手段的運用作出準確的預測。
原文網址:https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

Original Source: https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

 

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

Who is responsible for configuring the information resources owned by the United States? Who is responsible for assigning these resources to use the priority order? What measures have we taken to ensure that the Global Information Grid (GIG), the Independent Joint Service System, and the GCCs: Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Global Network Associations (GCCs), which rely on information from them, Trojans (JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force-Global NetOps) security? In recent years, the entire network combat system on the discussion of these issues has not been suspended, the focus of debate is the theater operations in the network operations should play what role.

The US military has announced the deployment of the war command for each theater, and also announced that it would reduce military support in the cross-border areas. For each theater combat command, how to configure the information infrastructure to support the war in the theater has become very important. The enemy may be infiltrated into the critical network system area responsible for military power dispatch, which is often underestimated and even treated as an accident or incidental event, but these intrusion is virtually Made a connection request to block the normal operation of the commercial website, and even led to some of the military logistics business logistics company was marked as invalid. The theater warfare command should ensure that the information conditions of its zone are not affected by external invasions. Countless viruses are destroying the Internet, the Department of Defense system began to be attacked. It is now under discussion whether the Global Network Joint Task Force should be disconnected from the military network on the Internet, but the military is concerned that with the cooperation of commercial suppliers alone, the Department of Defense can not guarantee that all logistical support operations will continue without error To go on. Each theater combat command is not sure about the state of the theater itself, and they are skeptical about the security of the global information grid itself, and they are concerned about their ability to carry out the tasks assigned to it.

(STRATCOM) and the global network of joint contingents in the network operations in the dominant ideology of the impact of the theater operations headquarters of its command and control of the zone has a more global network of operations control institutions to strengthen the United States Strategic Command Weakened. The focus on the operational information grid to the global information grid has also affected, to a certain extent, the battlefield operations command of the global information grid is how to support the theater of the specific behavior of the understanding. This article will introduce the existing command relationship, the war between the theater operations command, the direct relationship between command and combat, the old and emerging joint operational principles of a special case analysis, and finally will be the theater combat command In the network operations should play the role of the proposed recommendations.

Network combat environment

The command and control in cyber warfare is a concept that appeared ten years ago, and its connotation has been evolving. Each of the relevant departments, the theater operations headquarters and the global network of joint contingents have carried out some organizational structure and work focus on the adjustment, but ultimately did not solve their respective roles should play this issue. To really understand why the role of theater warfare in cyber operations will be a problem, it is necessary to clarify the question: where is cyber warfare, what is real cyber warfare, and every What is the organizational structure and command and control structure of the department?

The first thing to explain is, what is the global information grid? According to the definition of Ministry of Defense No. 8100.1, it includes “global interconnection, terminal-to-terminal information transmission capability and joint processing capability.” Ability to collect, process, store, transmit and manage information according to the needs of warriors and policy makers ” This covers government and leased communications information systems and services, as well as other software, security and service support required for global information grids, as well as the Clinger- The National Security System, as defined in Section 5142 of the Cohen Act. According to this definition, the global information grid contains all levels of information systems from the Department of Defense and the national security system, from the tactical level to the strategic level, as well as the interconnected communication system.

Most of the discussion on the command and control of the Global Information Grid Network Operations Center focuses on the defense capabilities of the system, but the content of the network operations is far more than that. The tasks to be accomplished by the network operations include three: departmental management, Content management and network defense, whose purpose is to provide a lack of central support across the boundaries of strategic, tactical and operational concepts, and to support the Department of Defense’s full range of combat, intelligence and mission tasks.

1. Sector management is one of the specific tasks of the global information grid, which is the technology, process and policy management of systems and networks that make up the global information grid, including public sector management, systems management, network management, satellite communications management and Electromagnetic spectrum management of these aspects.

2. Content management refers to managing the information itself in the global information grid. It ensures that information is available to users, operators, and decision makers in real time. Content management includes the search, access, transmission, storage and integration of specific information content of the global information grid.

3. Network defense is the global information grid all the information, including additional information to protect, it mainly includes a number of policies, processes, projects and operations. If necessary, the task can be requested through cross-agency cooperation to complete. It is responsible for the global information grid information security, computer network defense, computer defense response capabilities and critical infrastructure protection.

Now we have learned about the basic organizational structure of the cyber warfare, the next step in the various organizations in the network operations and how they are performing the tasks, which are mainly composed of troops, theater warfare headquarters and global network joint contingents, all of which are With the changes in the battlefield requirements to improve their organizational structure.

The change in the organizational structure of the force is mainly to meet the requirements of the global information grid for information transmission, access, control and protection. Ten years ago, the troops had some changes to regional control in order to adapt to cyber warfare, but those measures eventually developed into centralized controls, and these measures were not preserved. Now it is necessary to understand the composition of the forces in order to better understand why the network operations command and control will become so full of controversy.

GEM: GIG Enterprise Management GCM: GIG Content Management GND: GIG network defense

Army ‘s network operations command and control

The army is the least of all the reforms in the service. The Army continues to hold the previous commander, now known as the Theater Network Operations and Security Centers (TNOSC), which is directly responsible for the various theater war operations. The Army maintains an independent global network operations and security center (GNOSC: Global NetOps and Security Center), all of the battlefield network operations and security centers are its affiliates. The Global Network Operations and Security Center has technical control over the Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, but the Battlefield Operations and Security Center is also part of the Theater Command and is also managed by the Theater Network Command. A typical example is the Army’s battlefield signal The brigade is managed by the Army Service Component Command.

The Global Network Operations and Security Center provides technical guidance to the network operations forces in each theater. The US Army Network Command and the 9th Signal Command are responsible for the technical and management of the Global Network Operations and Security Center. But in wartime, the Global Network Operations and Security Center was also commanded by the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as Army Element.

ACERT: Army Computer Emergency Response Unit

AGNOSC: Army Global Network and Security Center

ASCC: Army Army Command

ARSTRAT: Army Strategic Command (Missile Defense and Strategy)

CIO: Chief Information Officer

GCC: Theater Combat Command (Regional Joint Command, Six of the US Army’s Top Ten Command)

INSCOM: Intelligence and Security Command (one of the Army’s reporting units)

JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NETCOM: Army Network War Command

RCERT: Regional Computer Emergency Response Team

STRATCOM: US Strategic Command

TNCC: Theater Network Operations Control Center

TNOCC: Theater Network Operations and Security Center

G6: Army Command Department of Communications

G2 Army Command Information Department

Installation Network Provider

COMMAND – Strategic level operational command

OPCON: Battle (Battle) Command

TACON: tactical control

GS: Global Strike

TECHCON: echelon

ADCON: management control

Air Force ‘s Network Operations Command Control

The Air Force has chosen a different organizational approach to move the focus from the former headquarters of the Network Operations and Security Center (MAJCOM NOSCs) to the Integrated Network Operations and Security Centers (I-NOSCs: Integrated NetOps and Security Centers). Unlike the Army’s Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, which is managed by the Theater Operations Command, the Air Force’s Integrated Network Operations and Security Center is not affiliated with any theater war command, but only by the Air Force Operations Center (AFNOC : Air Force NetOps Center), which is similar to the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Air Force realizes that the Theater Command must have the power to direct direct operations in its zone, and it is necessary to establish a general support relationship between the Air Force Operations Center and the Theater Operations Command, establishing a dedicated link between the two departments unit. In addition, the Air Force has given a command to the establishment of a communications control center in their respective theater areas. These control centers can be used as a shortcut between the Air Force Operations Center and their respective theater operations.

ACC: Air Warfare Center

AFCHQ: Air Force Command

AFNETOPS: Air Force Network Operations Command

ARSTRAT: Air Force Strategic Command Theater Network Operations Control Center

CIO: Chief Information Officer

I-NOSC: Integrated Network Operations and Security Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

JFCC-NW: Network War Joint Function Composition Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NCC: Network Control Center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNOS: Ibid., Theater Network Operations and Security Center

Naval network operations command control

The Navy and the Air Force, no longer regard the theater as a unit of command. In order to better support global operations, they assisted two existing theater naval warfare centers (RNOSCs) affiliated with the Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) to assist the original two naval schools in Naples and Bahrain Communication master station (NCTMS: Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station). In addition, since most of the Navy’s cyber operations were carried out at sea, they also established Fleet NetOps Centers (FNOCs: Fleet NetOps Centers), echoing the theater and cyber warfare centers located in the United States. The fleet network operations center is the tactical entry point for the fleet to conduct cyber operations, providing network services for audio, video and data for the fleet of the zone, and can be provided when the fleet goes from another area of ​​the fleet network operations center into another area Smooth information transitions. Most unclassified networks are contracted by the US Navy Marine Corps Internet or the US Overseas Overseas Navy Enterprise Network (ONENET: Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network). In order to meet the needs of the battlefield, the Navy established the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet Global Network Operations and Security Center to provide global combat support, as well as the establishment of a war zone network combat and security center of the theater network security center on each Specific battlefield support. There is no subordinate relationship between the Theater Network Operations and Security Center and the theater operations headquarters in the theater.

Fleet NOC: Fleet Network Operations Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

INSCON: Ibid., Army Intelligence and Security Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NAVGNOSC: Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center

NAVSOC: Navy Satellite Operations Center

NCC MHQ: Navy Network Operations Information Operations and Space Warfare Center

NMCI GNOC: Maritime Network Global Network Operations Center

RNOSC: ibid, regional network operations center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNCC: Ibid., Theater Network Operations Control Center

Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) and the East and West Regional Network Operations and Security Center (East and West RNOSCs), which support the most basic organization of global naval operations. The Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center brings together information from the Theater Network Operations and Security Center, the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet and the Naval Satellite Operations Center to provide global command and control information for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. Unlike the Navy and the Army, they did not maintain a body belonging to the Theater Command. The support relationship between the forces established by the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations and the Theater Warfare Command did not give the theater war command the power to command the Naval Department’s global information grid. All command requests of the Theater Warfare Command must be approved by the Navy’s Global Network Operations and Security Center.

Command and Control of Theater Combat Command

Although each theater combat command in their respective jurisdictions for network operations are not the same way, but they have a common feature, that is, have established a theater network operations control center and a subordinate to the defense information system (DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency) of the theater network operations center. (CENTCOM) will be the theater network operations control center and the Defense Information Systems Agency’s theater network operations center known as the Central Theater Network Operations Center (Central Region Theater NetOps), the Central Commander of the Central Theater, Center, and the European Command (EUCOM) has established a Theater Communication Control Center (Theater Communication Control Center). Although there are some differences in the organization, but all the theater network operations control center are basically used by the theater combat command for the area of ​​the global information grid command control (area of ​​the global information grid is also known as the theater Information Grid TIG: Theater Information Grid).

The Theater Operations Command has optimized the configuration and control of the information resources of the global information grid through the Theater Network Operations Control Center to enable them to better serve the battle, while the Theater Network Operations Control Center is also connected to the Defense Information Systems Authority, the regular forces and the global Joint Operations of the Network Operations Joint Task Force. They collaborated with the Theater Network Warfare Center, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center to monitor the status of the theater information grid, to decide on the proposed global operations of the Joint Operations Task Force, and to assess the impact of its actions. The Theater Network Warfare Control Center has the right to decide on the reduction and termination of combat operations and to adjust the priority of operations through the Theater Network Operations Center and the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If there is no theater network operations and security center in the theater, the theater network operations control center under the Global Network Operations and Security Center tie is responsible for completing the mission required by the Theater Operations Command.

The North North Command (NORTHCOM) is a rather special sector, although it is a theater warfare command with a clear zone, but most of its troops in the zone – including cyber combat troops – are not affiliated with the commander , But belong to the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM: Join Forces Command). This deployment is intended to facilitate the global management of the force. The North Command, like several other theater warfare commanders, also set up a theater network operations control center, but did not establish a theater network operations and security center, which makes the North Command must rely on network operations and security centers and other departments for its Provide general support. In this case, the role of the North Command is to be responsible for the operations within its jurisdiction, but also the lack of understanding of the corresponding battlefield information grid, and no direct control of its power.

Strategic Command Network Operations Command Control

With the troops fighting command on the network combat structure to adjust the same, the Ministry of Defense departments are also undergoing reform. Over the years, the Department of Defense has not had a centralized control of the network operations. But in 1997 when the Department of Defense conducted this attempt to find some of the weaknesses of the network at that time, also came to the “combat command – troops – defense agencies,” this network mode of operation is not suitable for modern battlefield situation The That attempt has led to the formation of a Defense Force (IAA) bureau, which is part of today’s Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, which is responsible for the operation and defense of global information grids.

Global Network Operations Joint Task Force network operations command and control mechanism is also constantly evolving. Prior to the advent of the existing UCP: Unified Command Plan, the command and control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was under the responsibility of the Theater Operations Command, but it proved that it was not conducive to managing all the components in the network, It is also difficult to provide enough information for the global information grid information. The original version of the operational concept of cyber warfare emphasizes the control of the theater operations of the theater in the theater, which was described as follows: “The combat command has the power to command the troops assigned to its zone, Is conducive to the completion of the task, when the combat command feel appropriate, or even adjust the priority of the global information grid.All of these activities should be through the theater network operations center to achieve. “In fact, even the global Event, the initial version of the network combat concept document also provides that the global network operations Joint Task Force needs to be in the theater combat command of the theater network operations control center under the command of combat.

The follow-up version of the operational concept has been adapted to this principle. The control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was moved to a more global command and control structure, through which the overall role of the strategic headquarters, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and other forces involved in the network operations Has been strengthened. The operational concept of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subdivided into three environmental operational concepts: global, theater and non-global. What kind of environmental concepts apply to different events depends on the actual impact of the events and the impact of the theater. This form of command and control structure is more suitable for the current network combat diversity characteristics, for different levels of events, theater combat command can take a more flexible response measures, and even at the same time to support and supportive action. In this system, sometimes the process of dealing with the event to go through a complete command system chain, and sometimes you can skip some steps.

Global events

Global events refer to activities or events that clearly affect the preparedness of the entire global information grid, which often requires the concordation of multiple theater combatants to be resolved. Commander of the Strategic Command must have the ability to quickly identify global events and to be able to determine which theater combat operations or other agencies of the Department of Defense will be affected. Global events include fast-spreading network malicious code attacks, satellite communications attacks, and enterprise application attacks that are not limited to single-theater network events.

The Global Strategic Command is a reliable command center with command and command for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and the Theater Command. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force uses its own resources to execute the instructions of the Strategic Command, which can be quickly sent to troops around the world. It is noteworthy that this order is not in the event of transmission to the theater of combat operations.

Although the notion of operational concept conferred the command of the commander of the strategic command worldwide, it did not completely deny the right of the theater war command to be commanded by the assigned joint command. While the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force performs the operational command of the Strategic Command, the Theater Operations Command can also deploy its troops to carry out the corresponding activities. Of course, in accordance with the requirements of the operational concept, the forces under the leadership of the theater operations command must be consistent with the action guidelines of the Joint Operations Task Force under the leadership of the Strategic Command. In fact, according to the historical action log of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations, most of the cyber operations began at the beginning of a small theater, and the Theater Command was always the first unit to deal with these incidents, and If they are handled properly, these theater-level events will not develop into global events.

Theater events

Theater events are those that occur in a battlefield area, and its foreseeable range of influence does not go beyond the theater, and the biggest difference between theater and global events is that. In the event of such incidents, the theater operations headquarters played a leading role, while the strategic headquarters only take the support role. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force can provide support to the Theater Command by its Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If the local forces do not have a theater network operations and security center, it can also provide general support for the Theater Network Operations Control Center through the Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Command of the Theater Combat Command to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subordinate to the subordinate command, that is to say there is no right to direct the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force through its Global Network Operations and Security Center to operate in its area.

Non-global event

A non-global event is an event that only affects the functional warfare headquarters and a particular defense agency. Since such institutions do not have a clear zone, these events can neither be regarded as global nor can they be seen as theater. In dealing with non-global events, the Strategic Command plays the role of auxiliary command, and the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force provides general support for the operational operational warfare headquarters involved. Most of the non-global events generally occur in the northern command zone, since many of the relevant functional departments are subordinate to the Northern Command. In the case of command and control procedures, non-global events and global events are the same.

Contradictory command and control requirements

Tactical technical requirements

Although the positioning of the various forces are not the same, but in the pursuit of efficient network operations, reasonable combat methods are their common theme. Different forces shoulder different responsibilities, they established an independent combat network, application facilities and auxiliary tools to meet their own and global information grid to maintain connectivity needs. Each unit is responsible for operating part of the global information grid, which to some extent the need for combat operations between the various departments of the centralized management, so as to get the desired combat efficiency and return on investment.

The focus of the discussion on centralized control of global information grids is the global nature of cyber warfare. The only way for the Department of Defense to achieve a network-centric commanding mechanism, to enhance the Force’s awareness of the situation and to significantly shorten the decision-making cycle, is to integrate the network and the forces horizontally, which is a centralized control mechanism The The latest “four-year defense assessment report” mentioned in the “to simplify the current ‘chimney’ system structure, to achieve a network-centric command mechanism.”

In order to make better use of scarce resources, the Department of Defense must consider when and where to allocate resources from a global perspective. The allocation of essential resources for network operations such as satellite transmission bands, standard tactical entry network sites and bandwidth must have clear mission objectives and easy to understand global significance. From the perspective of the force, the centralized command is, to some extent, a reshuffle of the existing force institutions and operations, defense networks.

The combat operations led by the theater war command will no longer be strictly limited to its zone. Ground forces are re-starting to use aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles) to routinely fly in the United States to support their operations. With the development of the PGS: Prompt Global Strike project, the commander has the power to call for conventional strike assistance from weapons systems outside the theater.

On the Navy, they pointed out that one of the essential characteristics of the maritime forces was global mobility, and the naval forces were constantly interspersed between the various theater warheads. Especially as aircraft carrier battle group such units, once deployed, it can not stay in a small battlefield. In addition, even the theater-level operations taken by the theater war command may have a global impact. The adjustment of the network defensive posture may have a huge financial burden on the Internet sector, and the combat command may not be able to understand the specific details of the adjustment behavior.

For the Department of Defense’s network system, all attacks are essentially global in nature. The enemy can not easily from the other side of the Earth to the United States to attack the physical objectives, but in the field of computer network technology, such things happen often. Once such an attack is detected, the information about it must be communicated to all relevant departments in the shortest possible time to ensure that such attacks are identified from anywhere to protect the security of the global information grid. Every time a network intrusion – even if it does not seem to fail the invasion – is likely to give the global information grid content a huge potential harm, because they invade the system behind the back door will be in the future Attack to play a role. The outbreak of the virus is an undisputed global event, and if we do not realize this, we will suffer more losses.

The Navy emphasizes that the impact of no events will be limited to a theater area, and that all efforts to combat cyber operations must be global. Their defense is that there is no theater boundaries, the Department of Defense every battlefield combat headquarters are facing the same potential threat, in order to obtain information on the advantages of the Department of Defense must make full use of its large coverage of the network resources , Quickly share all useful information on a global basis.

In addition, the Air Force and the Navy have pointed out that their cyber warfare forces are not deployed by the Theater Warfare Command. The Air Force and the Navy have their own cyber warfare organizations (such as the Theater Network Operations and Security Center) in each zone of the Theater Command, and the Air Force and Navy’s cyber warfare forces are usually defender in the theater. Finally, the Air Force and the Navy believe that the Strategic Command is responsible for the Global Information Grid through the Theater Operations Command, based on the description of the official documents available for reference.

Theater war command

There are two issues that need to be concerned about the command and control of cyber warfare against the Theater Command. One is the need for timely control of the battlefield information grid, the second is the need to turn the network into a weapon system, so that commanders can be the same as the conventional weapon system to use the same network resources, the use of the full range of network advantages to conduct a comprehensive battle.

Those forces that have been assigned specific responsibilities have already deployed their own unique solutions, each of which is involved in a network operation or each institution believes that it already has the most effective allocation of scarce resources. But the global information grid is not exclusive to a particular department, but a joint structure. “Chimney” type system and the existing deployment of the troops is actually to reduce the efficiency of the battlefield information grid efficiency. For example, the Army developed a secure IP telephony solution before other departments in the Department of Defense to communicate with the secret voice. For security reasons, other departments usually do not use this program, but their own development of a set of the same function of the solution. So there will be two sets of independent, confidential IP voice schemes in the zone of the Combat Command, which can not be connected to each other. The theater warfare command had to be screened, leaving only a set of programs to ensure that all departments in their zones could cooperate with each other. But the solution is eliminated by the party can no longer with the theater outside the brother forces for confidential contact.

Some of the resources in the combat command zone can serve multiple forces and the public sector. However, there are many examples of the use of duplication of work for the establishment of their own can not be linked to each other independent systems, such as satellite terminals and some technical control equipment. Sometimes, to send a message, you need to send the signal back to the United States, and then sent from the local distance from the initial sender only two miles of the recipient there. All kinds of fibers are arranged one by one on the same route, but the data between them can not be exchanged directly because they belong to different forces or public departments. The theater operations command must take measures to address the interconnection between the troops or the civil service in the zone.

To solve this problem, you can use centralized control approach. The centralized command of the cyber warfare forces requires the theater war command to make some adjustments to its own organization, but at the same time it does not affect its power to direct action when there is a need for combat. Relevant forces must accept orders for multiple combat orders and effectively optimize and feedback battlefield information. At present, the troops sent to the front are becoming more and more independent, and through the help of the global information grid they can cross the border of the theater combat command back and forth, and the theater warfare command has been compromised by the support and confrontation of the cyber warfare , After the implementation of centralized command, the troops can not or do not want to respond to the requirements of the theater combat command.

The Pacific Command (PACOM: Pacific Command) first adopted a “joint attempt” approach in humanitarian aid operations when it participated in the Indonesian tsunami relief work in 2004. The Pacific Command issued instructions to the assigned troops to carry out special network defenses under the framework of the entire action plan. Many naval forces and Marine Corps units have established relatively direct network defenses under the centralized command of the Navy’s Global Network Operations Center, which goes beyond the mandate of the Pacific Command to the Navy and Marine Corps, which Posing a potential risk factor for the global operations of the Pacific Command.

The Combat Command is concerned that the idea of ​​centralizing control of global information grids will always reduce their grip on information and control of the global information grid. Under the existing command system, a unit will carry out training or perform other tasks under the command of its troops, and participate in the battle under the command of the theater combat command, and the rules of command and control are very clear. The command and control of the forces in the field of information is as important as their command and control in the air, land, sea and space fields. For the C3S system (control, communications and computer systems), under its command to combat and responsible for the protection of its forces are often in a double or even triple the report chain, the results can not tell who is responsible for the final battle. In a global or non-global event, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force often conducts direct operations around the theater operations headquarters. Although the operational concept of joint cyber warfare specifically emphasizes the need for coordinated operations with the theater combat command, this requirement has become almost in the context of modern combat rapid changes. Information Security Weakness Alert System, Computer Task Sequence, and Information Condition Adjustment System Problems outside the jurisdiction of the Combat Command are typical examples of this requirement failure. These events directly affect the command of the Theater Command in the battlefield, when the troops want to directly use these mechanisms from the management level to strengthen their own control, they can not determine when and how in the implementation of these Operation, and do not know what impact this will have on the command of the theater combat command, because under current conditions, only the theater combat command has the ability to carry out these operations. When a threat event requires the Air Force’s Space Command to seek the cooperation of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations with Air Force forces, it would bring to the command of the North Command if it did not notify or obtain cooperation with the Northern Command Big trouble.

In the Central Command, due to the lack of adequate control of the network combat forces, resulting in the commander sometimes can not determine whether the network resources are available. The Navy is responsible for operating a large number of battlefield information grids. Navy network combat forces in the operational area are not responsible for the Central Command of the Navy, who only need to report to the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. The central theater’s central theater theater operations center, whose duty is to maintain and direct all the combat operations of the theater operations, but it is not in the naval network combat force report chain, so it is often impossible to get all the battlefield information grid Of the state of affairs, there are already alternatives to deal with this problem, but this can not be said to be a formal solution.

For the North Command, because of the lack of cyber warfare control, they encountered great trouble in the rescue work of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In that operation, the troops’ equipment was transported to the joint warfare zone without permission. Which makes the North Command can not grasp and guide the transfer of materials, but can not coordinate the actions of various forces, which is a multi-directional management and operational issues.

As the various forces advocate the implementation of a centralized command framework centered on the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the theater commanders are reluctant to see such changes, Some of them are responsible for the strategic headquarters, with the global information grid operating rights and defense rights mechanism. The presence of the Strategic Command has been instrumental in maintaining the command of the theater combat command in combat operations in theater and global events and in enhancing communication between the theater combat command and the Joint Staff.

Combat headquarters and troops want to focus on the network operations from the level of joint operations, but there are several issues that need to be discussed:

Who is responsible for the first leadership?

2. Network operations to focus on what the specific direction of the command to be reflected, the global level, the theater level or what other level?

3. What is the change brought about by this adjustment only when a part of the theater combat command sends a request to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force or is the theater commander’s complete command and priority in the theater?

Finally, the Theater Command is the body that is ultimately responsible for the President’s mission to complete the military mission in the area, and the troops dispatched to the theater combat command need to complete their respective tasks under their jurisdiction. It is unquestionable that they will still be under the command of the strategic command when the troops advocate the implementation of a global centralized command. But the current global information grid is a key part of the command and control capability of the theater combat command and the commander’s ability to guide the troops. Without a global information grid, the plane can not fly, the ground forces can not move, the ships can not sail, even the satellite can not provide the signal. Commanders need to get the status of the global information grid and control, just as they need to master the position and status of the troops as important. They must grasp the scope, ability and status of the battlefield information grid, and must know how the situation outside the theater will affect the battlefield information grid in the area where the troops are located and must be able to command and optimize the troops to support operations. If we really believe that the speculation of the centralized command will have a better effect, it can not be ignored for the theater war command to retain the appropriate command and control.

Also, as long as the structure of the Theater Command is still preserved, all military missions, including those directed by the Functional Command Command, will inevitably occur in the theater of the Theater Command, as all networks Combat missions must be carried out by an entity unit. At the same time, centralized command is necessary to achieve a network-centric command model and to more effectively defend against attacks. The concept of this centralized command and the command of the theater war command to master and optimize the battlefield information grid is not mutually exclusive.

The way forward

To develop a viable network combat command and control framework, it is necessary to avoid extremes, taking into account the needs of theater warfare headquarters and the need to establish centralized control of global information grids. In the process of the development of the operational concept of joint network operations and the transformation process of network combat forces, the principle of organization needs to play the role of adjusting the interests of all parties. In order to achieve this goal, the Department of Defense should do the following:

1. Create a simple, clear network combat command chain, to ensure that the strategic headquarters of all network operations can be directed. This can solve the problem just mentioned “who is responsible for the first leadership”. Only when the event occurred in a rapidly changing environment, the theater command and control agencies began to play a role. Simple command chain can ensure that troops involved in network operations know who should listen to who should report to whom, in this command chain, must include the theater combat command.

2. The command of the theater war command in its zone can be given:

– to amend the Joint Command plan to clarify the responsibilities of the Theater Operations Command to operate the network in its zone.

– Revise the existing global information grid network operational concept, detailing that those outside the theater network operations and security centers can obtain direct assistance from the World Network Operations and Security Center of the Theater Operations Command.

– All orders for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force shall be enforced through the Theater Operations Command.

These adjustments ensure that all units in the theater are acting under a single command chain, which is responsible for the strategic headquarters through the Theater Operations Command. This can also solve the North Command should be responsible for the area but did not command the power of the network fighting the embarrassing situation.

3. In each theater combat command, a joint network operations center under the jurisdiction of the Central Command shall be established to integrate the Theater Network Operations Control Center of the Theater Command Command and the Theater Network Operations Center of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. As a result, each theater war command will have a joint operations command in the field of computer space, just as in the battlefield of land, sea and air. Any troops outside the Theater Network Operations and Security Center can obtain direct assistance from the Global Network Operations and Security Center of the Joint Network Operations Center.

4. To consolidate the status of the global information grid, the highest control to the strategic headquarters. The development of centralized command is now focused on the command of the forces involved in the network operations, which runs counter to the network-centric command concept. The force-centric “chimney” command system is not conducive to the transmission and processing of information, let us from the “all users to provide the latest and most accurate information” goal farther and farther. In the previous “Goldwater Nichols Defense Ministry Reconstruction Law” report has made it clear that the organization and management and command and control should be controlled by a joint agency.

Concluding remarks

The current centralized command of network operations is an urgent need. Optimizing the network operational command mechanism can help the Department of Defense to improve efficiency, save costs and better allocate scarce resources. More importantly, this allows network combat troops to provide information more quickly and accurately to commanders, which is important in large-scale network operations. The process of centralized command can not affect the efficiency of network combat command and control. This depends on whether the global information grid can provide enough information for all participating units and whether the commander makes full use of the theater information grid to help command operations.

“We have to change the network combat problem discussion and thinking mode, we are in the network” combat “rather than the network” management “, all participating units must ensure that they are ready to war every time to ensure that the network system A decisive weapon system. ” Network operations are a key part of our country’s ability to win war, it can help us provide command and control, shorten the decision-making cycle and adjust the resources of the theater. The Strategic Command has taken a big step in strengthening the concept of cyber warfare, and these efforts need to be continued. The theater warfare command must be an important part of the control and protection of the global information grid to ensure that we can continue to win the network.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

是誰在負責配置美國所擁有的信息資源?誰在負責分配這些資源利用時的優先級順序?我們採取了哪些措施來保證全球信息柵格(GIG:Global Information Grid)、獨立聯合服務系統以及依靠從它們身上獲取信息來開展工作的戰區作戰司令部(GCCs:Geographic Combatant Commanders)和全球網絡聯合特遣部隊(JTF-GNO:Joint Task Force-Global NetOps)的安全?最近幾年以來,整個網絡作戰系統對這些問題的討論一直沒有停息過,人們爭論的焦點就是戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中應該扮演什麼樣的角色。

美國軍方公佈了對每個戰區作戰司令部的部署,同時還宣布將會減少跨戰區的軍事支持行動。對每個戰區作戰司令部來說,如何配置支持本戰區作戰的信息基礎設施就變得非常重要了。敵人有可能會滲透進負責軍事力量調度的關鍵網絡系統區域進行破壞,這些入侵的危害常常被低估,甚至被當作意外事件或者偶發事件輕描淡寫地處理掉,但是這些入侵行為實際上完全有可能濫發連接請求來阻塞商業網站的正常運行,甚至導致一些承擔軍隊後勤業務的物流公司被標為無效狀態。戰區作戰司令部應該保證其防區的信息條件不受外部入侵的影響。不計其數的病毒正在破壞著互聯網,國防部的系統也開始遭到攻擊。現在有人在討論是否應該讓全球網絡聯合特遣隊斷開互聯網上的軍事入網點,但軍方又擔心僅靠和商業供應商的合作,國防部不能保證所有的後勤支持行動都能繼續無差錯地進行下去。每個戰區作戰司令部對各自的戰區網絡狀態都不太確定,他們對全球信息柵格本身的安全持有懷疑態度,他們擔心其是否有能力執行分配給它的任務。

受到建立一個更全球化的網絡作戰控制機構、加強美國戰略司令部(STRATCOM)和全球網絡聯合特遣隊在網絡作戰中的主導地位思想的影響,戰區作戰司令部對其防區的指揮控制權有所削弱。將作戰信息集中到全球信息柵格的做法也在一定程度上影響了戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格是如何支持該戰區的作戰的具體行為的了解。本文將會介紹現有的指揮關係、戰區作戰司令部的職責、指揮和作戰之間的線性關係、舊有的和新興的聯合作戰原則一級特殊戰例分析,最後還將會對戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中所應扮演的角色提出建議。

網絡作戰的環境

網絡作戰中的指揮控制是一個在十年以前就出現了的概念,之後它的內涵一直處在演變之中。每個相關部門、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊都為此進行過一些組織結構和工作重心上的調整,但是最終都沒有解決好各自應該扮演的角色這個問題。要想真正明白為什麼戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中的角色會成為一個難題,就必須先弄清楚這幾個問題:網絡作戰是在哪兒發生的、什麼是真正的網絡作戰、網絡作戰中的每個部門的組織結構和指揮控制結構是怎樣的。

首先需要解釋的是,什麼是全球信息柵格?按照國防部第8100.1號文件的定義,它包括“全球互聯的、終端到終端的信息傳輸能力和聯合處理能力。按照戰士、決策者的需要來進行信息採集、處理、儲存、傳播和管理的能力”。這就涵蓋了政府的和租用的通信信息系統及服務,以及全球信息柵格所需的其他軟件、安全和服務支持,還包括1996年3月頒布的《克林格-科恩法》(Clinger- Cohen Act)第5142節所定義的國家安全系統(National Security System)。按照這個定義,全球信息柵格包含了國防部和國家安全系統的所有級別的信息系統,從戰術層次到戰略層次,以及互聯通信系統。

大多數關於全球信息柵格網絡作戰中心的指揮控制的討論都在著重強調該系統的防禦能力,但是網絡作戰包含的內容其實遠不止這點,網絡作戰要完成的任務包括三項:部門管理、內容管理和網絡防禦,其工作目的是提供跨越戰略、戰術和作戰概念邊界的無中心式支持,為國防部的全方位的戰鬥、情報和考察任務提供支持。

1.部門管理是全球信息柵格的具體任務之一,它是對構成全球信息柵格的系統和網絡的技術、過程和政策管理,包括公務部門管理、系統管理、網絡管理、衛星通信管理和電磁光譜管理這幾個方面。

2.內容管理指的是管理全球信息柵格里的信息本身。它用即時的方式保證信息對使用者、操作者和決策者都是可用的。內容管理包括對全球信息柵格的具體信息內容的查找、訪問、傳輸、儲存和一體化。

3.網絡防禦就是對全球信息柵格所有的信息包括附加信息進行保護,它主要包括一些政策、過程、項目和操作。如果有必要的話,該任務可以請求通過跨機構合作來完成。它負責的是全球信息柵格的信息安全、計算機網絡防禦、計算機防衛反應能力和關鍵性基礎設施保護。

現在已經了解了網絡作戰的基本組織結構,下一步介紹網絡作戰中的各個組織和他們是如何執行任務的,需要介紹的主要是部隊、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊,它們都在隨著戰場要求的變化而改進著各自的組織結構。

部隊在組織結構上的改變主要是為了滿足全球信息柵格對信息傳輸、訪問、控制和保護能力的要求。十年之前,部隊為了適應網絡作戰曾針對區域控制進行過一些變革,但那些措施最終發展成了集中化的控制,這些措施也沒有保留下來。現在我們有必要了解一下部隊的組織構成,以便更好地理解為什麼網絡作戰的指揮控制會變得如此充滿爭議。
GEM:GIG企業管理 GCM:GIG內容管理 GND:GIG網絡防禦
陸軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

陸軍是所有軍種中改革措施最少的。陸軍繼續保持著以前的指揮機構,現在叫做戰場網絡作戰與安全中心(TNOSC:Theater NetOps and Security Centers),該組織直接對各個戰區作戰司令部負責。陸軍維持著一個獨立的全球網絡作戰與安全中心(GNOSC:Global NetOps and Security Center),所有的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心都是其下屬機構。全球網絡作戰與安全中心對戰場網絡作戰與安全中心進行技術控制,但是戰場網絡作戰與安全中心同時又隸屬於戰區作戰司令部,也受到戰區網絡司令部的管理,典型的例子就是陸軍的戰場信號旅受陸軍服務組件指揮部的管理。

全球網絡作戰與安全中心對各個戰區的網絡作戰部隊提供技術指導。美國陸軍網絡司令部暨第9信號司令部對全球網絡作戰與安全中心的技術和管理負責。但是在戰時,全球網絡作戰與安全中心又作為陸軍的元素受戰略司令部(STRATCOM)的指揮。
ACERT:陸軍計算機應急響應分隊
AGNOSC:陸軍全球網絡和安全中心

ASCC:陸軍軍種組成司令部

ARSTRAT:陸軍戰略司令部(導彈防禦與戰略)

CIO:首席信息官

GCC:戰區作戰司令部(地區性聯合司令部,美軍十大司令部中的六個)

INSCOM:情報和安全司令部(陸軍直屬報告單位之一)

JTF-GNO:聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NETCOM:陸軍網絡戰爭司令部

RCERT:地區性計算機應急響應分隊

STRATCOM:美軍戰略司令部

TNCC:戰區網絡作戰控制中心

TNOCC:戰區網絡作戰和安全中心

G6:陸軍司令部通信部門

G2陸軍司令部情報部門

Installation Network Provider網絡施設提供商

COMMAND—戰略層面作戰指揮

OPCON:作戰(戰役)指揮

TACON:戰術控制

GS:全球打擊

TECHCON:梯隊

ADCON:管理控制

空軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

空軍選擇了一條不同的組織途徑,把重點從以前的一級司令部網絡作戰和安全中心(MAJCOM NOSCs)轉移到了一體化網絡作戰和安全中心(I-NOSCs:Integrated NetOps and Security Centers)。與陸軍的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心受戰區作戰司令部的管理不同的是,空軍的一體化網絡作戰和安全中心並不隸屬於任何一個戰區作戰司令部,而是只受空軍網絡作戰中心(AFNOC :Air Force NetOps Center)的管理,該中心與陸軍的全球網絡作戰和安全中心性質類似。空軍意識到了戰區作戰司令部必須擁有在其防區直接指揮網絡作戰行動的權力,有必要在空軍網絡作戰中心和戰區作戰司令部之間建立起一般支持的關係,建立兩個部門之間的專用聯絡單元。另外空軍方面還賦予了一級司令部在各自的戰區建立通信控制中心的自主權,這些控制中心可以當作空軍網絡作戰中心與各自戰區作戰司令部相互聯繫的快捷通道。
ACC:空戰中心
AFCHQ:空軍組成司令部

AFNETOPS:空軍網絡作戰司令部

ARSTRAT:空軍戰略司令部戰區網絡作戰控制中心

CIO:首席信息官

I-NOSC:集成網絡作戰和安全中心

GCC:同上,地區性聯合司令部

JFCC-NW:網絡戰聯合職能組成司令部

JTF-GNO:同上,聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NCC:網絡控制中心

STRATCOM:同上,戰略司令部

TNOS:同上,戰區網絡作戰與安全中心

海軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

海軍和空軍一樣,不再把戰區當作指揮的單位。為了更好地支持全球作戰,他們用隸屬於海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心(NAVGNOSC)的兩個戰區網絡戰安全中心(RNOSCs)來協助原有的位於那不勒斯和巴林島的兩個戰區海軍計算機與通信主站(NCTMS:Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station)。另外,由於海軍的大多數網絡作戰是在海上進行,所以他們還建立了艦隊網絡作戰中心(FNOCs:Fleet NetOps Centers),與位於美國本土的戰區網絡戰安全中心互為呼應。艦隊網絡作戰中心是艦隊進行網絡作戰的戰術切入點,可以為本防區的艦隊提供音頻、視頻和數據等網絡服務,並且可以在艦隊從一個艦隊網絡作戰中心的轄區駛入另一個轄區的時候提供平滑的信息過渡。多數未分類的網絡都是由美國本土的海軍陸戰隊內聯網(NMCI:Navy Marine Corps Internet)或者美國海外的海外海軍企業網絡(ONENET:Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network)負責承包運營的。為了適應戰場的需求,海軍建立了海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網全球網絡作戰與安全中心來提供全球性的作戰支持,同時也建立了隸屬於戰區網絡作戰與安全中心的戰區網絡戰安全中心對各個具體戰場提供支持。戰區網絡作戰與安全中心與所在戰區的戰區作戰司令部並沒有從屬關係。
Fleet NOC:艦隊網絡作戰中心
GCC:同上,地區性聯合司令部

INSCON:同上,陸軍情報和安全司令部

JTF-GNO:同上,聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NAVGNOSC:海軍全球網絡作戰和安全中心

NAVSOC:海軍衛星作戰中心

NCC MHQ:海軍網絡作戰信息作戰和太空戰中心

NMCI GNOC:海軍陸戰隊網全球網絡作戰中心

RNOSC:同上,地區性網絡作戰中心

STRATCOM:同上,戰略司令部

TNCC:同上,戰區網絡作戰控制中心

支持全球海軍作戰的最基本的組織的海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心(NAVGNOSC)和東西部戰區網絡作戰與安全中心(East and West RNOSCs)。海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心匯集了來自戰區網絡作戰與安全中心、海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網和海軍衛星作戰中心的信息,為全球網絡行動聯合特遣部隊提供全球性的指揮控制信息。海軍和陸軍不同的是,他們沒有維持一個隸屬於戰區作戰司令部的機構。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊建立的部隊與戰區作戰司令部之間的支持關係並沒有賦予戰區作戰司令部在海軍部負責的全球信息柵格範圍內進行指揮的權力。戰區作戰司令部的所有指揮請求都必須先經過海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心的批准。

戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰指揮控制

儘管每個戰區作戰司令部在各自的轄區內針對網絡作戰的組織方式都不盡相同,但是他們卻有一個共同的特點,那就是都建立了一個戰區網絡作戰控制中心和一個隸屬於國防信息系統局(DISA:Defense Information Systems Agency)的戰區網絡作戰中心。各個戰區網絡作戰控制中心的組織結構並不完全相同,美國中央司令部(CENTCOM)將戰區網絡作戰控制中心和國防信息系統局的戰區網絡作戰中心合稱為中央戰區網絡作戰中心(Central Region Theater NetOps Center),而歐洲司令部(EUCOM)則建立了一個戰區通信控制中心(Theater Communication Control Center)。雖然在組織上有些差異,但是所有的戰區網絡作戰控制中心基本上都是被戰區作戰司令部用來對轄區內的全球信息柵格進行指揮控制(轄區內的全球信息柵格也被稱為戰區信息柵格TIG:Theater Information Grid)。

戰區作戰司令部通過戰區網絡作戰控制中心來優化配置和控制全球信息柵格的信息資源,以使它們更好地為戰鬥服務,同時戰區網絡作戰控制中心也是連接國防信息系統局、常規部隊和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區接口。他們與戰區網絡戰中心、戰區網絡作戰和安全中心合作來監控戰區信息柵格的狀態,對被提議的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊相關行動作出決定,並評估其行動的影響。戰區網絡戰控制中心對作戰行動力度的減小和終止有決定權,並且通過戰區網絡作戰中心和戰區網絡作戰與安全中心來調整作戰的優先級。如果該戰區沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心,那麼就由全球網絡作戰與安全中心領帶下的戰區網絡作戰控制中心來負責完成戰區作戰司令部所要求的任務。

美國的北方司令部(NORTHCOM)是一個比較特別的部門,雖然它是一個有著明確防區的戰區作戰司令部,但是其防區內的大部分部隊——包括網絡作戰部隊——都不隸屬於該司令部,而是屬於美國聯合部隊司令部(JFCOM:Join Forces Command)。這樣的部署是為了便於部隊的全球性管理。北方司令部和其他幾個戰區作戰司令部一樣,也設立了戰區網絡作戰控制中心,但是卻沒有建立戰區網絡作戰與安全中心,這就使得北方司令部必須依靠網絡作戰與安全中心等部門為其提供一般支持。在這種情況下,北方司令部所扮演的角色就是需要負責其轄區內的作戰行動,但是又對相應的戰場信息柵格缺乏了解,更沒有直接控制它的權力。

戰略司令部網絡作戰指揮控制

與部隊戰鬥司令部對網絡作戰結構進行調整一樣,國防部的相關部門也在進行著改革。多年以來,國防部一直沒有一個集中控制的網絡作戰部。但是在1997年的時候國防部進行過這方面的嘗試,發現了一些當時網絡的弱點,也得出了“作戰司令部-部隊-國防機構”這種網絡作戰的模式已經不適合現代的戰場情況。那次嘗試促成了國防信息系統局最終組建了一支實體部隊,也就是今天的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊來負責全球信息柵格的操作和防禦。

全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的網絡作戰指揮控制機制同樣也在不斷發展。在現有的聯合司令部計劃(UCP:Unified Command Plan)出現之前,全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮控制都是由戰區作戰司令部負責,但是事實證明這不利於管理網絡中的所有組件,也難以為全球信息柵格提供足夠的事態感知信息。最初版本的網絡作戰的作戰概念比較強調戰區作戰司令部對其防區的網絡作戰的控制,當時對處理戰區問題的描述是這樣的:“作戰司令部有權指揮被指派到其防區的部隊,只要是利於任務的完成,在作戰司令部覺得合適的時候,甚至可以調整全球信息柵格的優先級。所有的這些活動,都應該通過戰區網絡作戰中心來實現。”事實上,即使是全球性的事件,最初版本的網絡作戰概念文件也規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊需要在戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心指揮下進行作戰。
作戰概念的後續版本對這項原則進行了調整。對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的控制被移到了一個更加全球化的指揮控制架構中,通過這樣的調整,戰略司令部、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和其他參與網絡作戰的部隊的整體角色都得到了加強。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的作戰概念被細分成了三個環境作戰概念:全球性的、戰區性的和非全局性的。不同的事件適用何種環境概念取決於事件造成的實際影響和戰區影響。這種形式的指揮控制結構更加適用於目前網絡作戰多樣性特性,針對不同級別的事件,戰區作戰司令部可以採取更加靈活的應對措施,甚至可以同時展開支持性的和輔助性的行動。在這種制度下,有時候處理事件的過程要經過完整的指揮系統鏈,有時候可以跳過一些步驟。

全球性事件

全球性事件是指那些顯而易見會影響整個全球信息柵格的備戰度的活動或事件,這類事件通常需要多個戰區作戰司令部的協同處理才能得到解決。戰略司令部的指揮官必須要具備快速鑑別全球性事件的能力,並要能具體判斷出有哪些戰區作戰司令部或者國防部的其他機構會受到影響。全球性事件包括快速傳播的網絡惡意代碼攻擊、衛星通信攻擊、企業應用攻擊等不僅僅局限於單個戰區的網絡事件。

全球戰略司令部是一個可靠的指揮中心,它對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和戰區作戰司令部都有命令和指揮權。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊利用自己的資源來執行戰略司令部的指示,作戰命令可以很快地發送到在全球各地的部隊中。值得注意的是,這種命令在傳遞時不經過事件發生地的戰區作戰司令部。

雖然作戰概念的原則賦予了戰略司令部指揮官全球範圍內的指揮權,但是這也並沒有完全否定戰區作戰司令部可以通過分配的聯合司令部計劃來進行指揮的權利。在全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊執行戰略司令部的作戰命令的同時,戰區作戰司令部也可以調遣其麾下的部隊進行相應的活動。當然,按照作戰概念的要求,戰區作戰司令部領導下的部隊的行動必須與戰略司令部領導下的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的行動方針保持一致。事實上,據全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的歷史行動日誌記載,大多數的網絡作戰一開始都是在小範圍戰區開始出現的,戰區作戰司令部總是著手處理這些事件的第一單位,而且如果處理得適當的話,這些戰區級別的事件就不會發展成全球性事件。

戰區性事件

戰區性事件是指那些發生在某個戰場區域,其可預見的影響範圍不會超出該戰區的事件,戰區性事件與全球性事件的最大區別也就在於此。在處理這類事件的時候,戰區作戰司令部起著主導作用,而戰略司令部只承擔輔助的支持作用。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊可以通過其戰區網絡作戰與安全中心對戰區作戰司令部提供支援。如果當地的部隊沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心,那也可以通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心為戰區網絡作戰控制中心提供一般支持。戰區作戰司令部對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮屬於次級指揮,也就是說沒有權利通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心來直接調動全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊到其所轄區域進行作戰。

非全局性事件

非全局性事件是指只對職能作戰司令部和特定的國防機構造成影響的事件。由於這類機構沒有明確的防區,所以這些事件既不能被看成全球性的也不能被看成戰區性的。在處理非全局性事件時,戰略司令部扮演輔助指揮的角色,全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊對所涉及到的職能作戰司令部提供一般支持。大多數的非全局性事件一般都發生在北方司令部的防區,因為很多相關的職能部門都隸屬於北方司令部。在指揮控制的程序方面,非全局性事件和全球性事件是相同的。

相互矛盾的指揮控制要求

戰術技術的要求

儘管各個部隊的定位不盡相同,但是在網絡作戰中追求高效、合理的作戰方法是他們共同的主題。不同的部隊肩負著不同的職責,他們建立了獨立的作戰網絡、應用設施和輔助工具來滿足自身與全球信息柵格保持聯通的需求。每支部隊都要負責操作一部分全球信息柵格,這在一定程度上需要各部隊間作戰鏈的集中化管理,這樣才能獲得所期待的作戰效率和投入回報率。

關於對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制討論的焦點是網絡作戰的全球性特質。國防部想要實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制、增強部隊的事態感知能力和顯著縮短決策週期的目標的話,唯一的方法就是將網絡和部隊進行橫向的融合,這是一種集中化的控制機制。最新的一份《四年防務評估報告》裡就提到過“要簡化目前的‘煙囪式’系統結構,實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制”。

為了更好地利用緊缺資源,國防部必須從全球性的角度來考慮何時何地調撥何種資源。對衛星傳輸波段、標準戰術入口網絡站點和帶寬等網絡作戰必需資源的分配必須要有明確的任務目標和易於理解的全球性意義。從部隊的角度來看,集中化指揮在某種程度上是對現有部隊機構和作戰、防禦網絡的一次重新洗牌。

由戰區作戰司令部領導的作戰行動將不再嚴格地限於其防區內。地面部隊重新開始利用飛機(包括無人機)例行地在美國本土飛行來支持他們的作戰。隨著快速全球打擊(PGS:Prompt Global Strike)項目的發展,指揮官已經有權力呼叫從戰區以外的武器系統發出常規打擊援助。

在海軍方面,他們指出海上部隊的一個本質性特點就是全球流動性,海軍部隊作戰時會不斷地在各個戰區作戰司令部之間穿插。尤其是像航母戰鬥群這樣的單位,一旦被部署出發,就不可能一直呆在一塊小範圍的戰場。另外,即使是戰區作戰司令部所採取的戰區級別的行動,也有可能產生全球性的影響。網絡防禦姿態的調整可能對互聯網部門帶來巨大的經濟負擔,而且作戰司令部還有可能無法了解到調整行為的具體細節結果。

對國防部的網絡系統來說,所有的攻擊本質上同樣都是全球性的。敵人不可能輕易地從地球的另一端對美國本土的實體目標進行攻擊,但是在計算機網絡科技領域,這樣的事情經常發生。一旦檢測到這種攻擊,關於它的信息必須要在最短的時間內傳遍全球所有的相關部門,以保證從任何地方都能識別出這樣的攻擊方式,從而保護全球信息柵格的安全。每一次網絡入侵——哪怕是看起來無關緊要的失敗的入侵——都有可能給全球信息柵格的內容帶來巨大的潛在危害,因為它們入侵時在系統中留下的後門會在以後的攻擊中發揮作用。病毒的爆發是毫無爭議的全球性事件,如果認識不到這一點的話,我們將會受到更大的損失。

海軍強調沒有任何事件的影響會僅限於某個戰區範圍,所有關於網絡作戰的努力都必須是全球性的。他們的理由是網絡作戰是沒有戰區界限的,國防部的每個戰區作戰司令部所面臨的潛在威脅都是相同的,為了獲得信息上的優勢,國防部必須要充分利用其大覆蓋面的網絡資源,快速地在全球範圍內分享所有的有用信息。

此外,空軍和海軍方面指出,他們的網絡作戰部隊都不是由戰區作戰司令部來負責部署的。在每個戰區作戰司令部的防區內,空軍和海軍都有自己的網絡作戰組織(例如戰區網絡作戰與安全中心),而且空軍和海軍的網絡作戰部隊在戰區內通常是扮演維護者的角色。最後一點,空軍和海軍都認為,根據可供參考的官方文件的描述,戰略司令部通過戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格負責。

戰區作戰司令部的要求

對戰區作戰司令部來說,在網絡作戰的指揮控制方面有兩個需要關心的問題。一是需要對戰場信息柵格進行及時的控制,二是需要把網絡變成一個武器系統,讓指揮官們可以像對常規的武器系統一樣共同利用網絡資源,利用網絡全方位的優勢來進行全面的戰鬥。

那些被分配了特定職責的部隊,已經部署好了各自唯一的解決方案,參與到網絡作戰中的每支部隊或者每個機構都相信自己已經擁有了最有效分配緊缺資源的辦法。但是全球信息柵格並不是專屬於某一個部門的,而是一個聯合結構。 “煙囪”式系統和現有的部隊部署方式實際上是降低了戰場信息柵格的利用效率。舉個例子來說,陸軍在國防部的其他部門之前研發出了一套安全的IP電話解決方案,可以進行保密語音的聯絡。出於安全考慮,其他部門通常不會再採用這套方案,而是自己再開發一套功能相同的解決方案。這樣在作戰司令部的防區內就有了兩套獨立的保密IP語音方案,它們相互之間不能進行聯通。戰區作戰司令部只得進行篩選,只保留一套方案,以保證在其防區內所有部門可以進行彼此協作。但是解決方案被淘汰的一方就不能再與該戰區以外的兄弟部隊進行保密聯絡了。

作戰司令部防區內的有些資源可以為多個部隊和公務部門服務。但是也有很多例子是使用者進行重複勞動為各自建立了不能相互聯絡的獨立系統,比如衛星終端和一些技術控制設備。有些時候,要傳遞一個信息的話,需要先把信號發回美國本土,然後再從本土發到距離初始發送者只有兩英里的接收者那裡。各種各樣的光纖一條挨一條地按照相同的路線排列著,但是它們之間的數據卻不能進行直接交換,因為它們分屬於不同的部隊或者公務部門。戰區作戰司令部必須採取措施來解決防區內的部隊或者公務部門之間的互聯性問題。

要解決這個問題,可以採用集中化控制的辦法。對網絡作戰部隊的集中化指揮需要戰區作戰司令部對自身的組織機構進行一定的調整,但是同時又不能影響其在有作戰需要時指揮行動的權力。相關部隊必須接受多個作戰司令部的命令,並且有效地優化和反饋戰場信息。目前,派往前線的部隊獨立性越來越高,通過全球信息柵格的幫助他們可以來回地越過戰區作戰司令部的邊界,戰區作戰司令部對網絡作戰的輔助和對抗作用因此而受到了損害,施行集中化指揮以後,部隊就不能或者說不願意響應戰區作戰司令部的要求了。

在2004年參與印尼海嘯救助工作的時候,太平洋司令部(PACOM:Pacific Command)首次在人道援助行動中採取了“聯合嘗試”的方式。太平洋司令部向被分派有任務的部隊發出指令,讓他們在整個行動計劃的框架之下進行特別的網絡防禦工作。很多海軍部隊和海軍陸戰隊的部隊在海軍全球網絡作戰中心的集中化指揮下,建立了一些相對直接的網絡防禦措施,這些措施超越了太平洋司令部給海軍和海軍陸戰隊分配的任務範圍,這就給太平洋司令部的全球網絡作戰帶來了潛在的危險因素。

作戰司令部很關心總是強調的對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制的思想會降低他們對全球信息柵格的信息掌握度和控制力度。在現有的指揮制度下,一個單位會在其所在部隊的指揮權下進行訓練或者執行其他任務,在戰區作戰司令部的指揮權下參加戰鬥,指揮控制的條理非常清晰。對部隊在信息領域的指揮控制與對其在空中、陸上、海上和空間領域的指揮控制同等重要。對C3S系統(control, communications and computer systems)來說,在其指揮下進行作戰並負責保護它的部隊常常要處於雙重甚至三重的報告鏈中,結果最後分不清到底是誰在負責指揮戰鬥。在全球性或者非全局性事件中,全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊經常繞開戰區作戰司令部直接展開行動。儘管聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念專門強調了與戰區作戰司令部進行協調作戰的要求,但是在現代作戰快速變化的環境中,這條要求幾乎成了擺設。信息保障弱點警報系統、計算機任務序列和信息條件調整系統在作戰司令部的轄區之外出現問題就是這條要求失效的典型例子。這些事件直接影響了戰區作戰司令部在戰場上的指揮,當部隊想要直接利用這些機制從管理級上加強自身的控制的時候,他們不能判斷應該在何時、以什麼樣的方式在執行這些操作,也不知道這樣做會對戰區作戰司令部的指揮產生什麼影響,因為在目前的條件下,只有戰區作戰司令部才有能力來進行這些操作。當一個威脅事件需要空軍太空司令部向空軍部隊尋求全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的協同配合的時候,如果不通知或者取得與北方司令部的合作的話,將會給北方司令部的指揮帶來極大的麻煩。

在中央司令部,由於對網絡作戰部隊缺乏足夠的控制,導致指揮官有時候也不能確定網絡資源是否可用。海軍負責操作大量的戰場信息柵格,在作戰區域的海軍網絡作戰部隊並不用對中央司令部的海軍部負責,他們只需要向戰區網絡作戰與安全中心報告。中央司令部的中央戰區戰區網絡作戰中心,其職責是維持和指揮所有戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰,但是它也不在海軍網絡作戰部隊的報告鏈當中,所以也常常不能獲得所有戰場信息柵格上的事態感知,目前已經有替代辦法來處理這個問題了,不過這還不能說是正式的解決辦法。

對北方司令部來說,因為網絡作戰部隊的控制權的缺乏,他們在2005年“卡特琳娜”颶風的救援工作中遇到了極大的麻煩。在那次行動中,部隊的設備在未經許可的情況下就被運送到了聯合作戰區域。這使得北方司令部無法掌握和引導物資的調動情況,更無法協同各個部隊的行動,這是個多方位的管理和操作問題。

在各個部隊都主張施行在以全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊為中心的集中化指揮構架的時候,我們有必要強調一個事實,那就是戰區司令部並不願意看到這樣的變化,他們想保持原有的他們對戰略司令部負責,擁有全球信息柵格的操作權和防禦權的機制。戰略司令部的存在對保持戰區作戰司令部在戰區和全球性事件的作戰行動中的指揮地位以及增強戰區作戰司令部與聯合參謀部的溝通都有很大的幫助。

作戰司令部和部隊方面都想從聯合作戰的層面上對網絡作戰進行集中化指揮,但是其中有幾個問題還需要討論:

1.誰負第一領導責任?

2.網絡作戰進行集中化指揮具體在哪個層面上得到體現,全球層面、戰區層面還是其他什麼層面?

3.這種調整帶來的改變是僅僅體現在戰區作戰司令部的某個部門向全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊發出請求時還是戰區作戰司令部獲得戰區內的完全指揮權和優先權?

最後,戰區作戰司令部是最終對總統負責的以完成轄區內的軍事任務為目標的機構,被派遣到戰區作戰司令部的部隊需要在其管轄權之下完成各自的任務。因此在部隊方面主張實施全球性的集中指揮的時候,他們仍然會處於戰略司令部的指揮之下這一點是不容置疑的。但是目前全球信息柵格是影響戰區作戰司令部的指揮控制能力和指揮官對部隊的指導能力的關鍵一環。沒有全球信息柵格的話,飛機不能飛行、地面部隊無法移動、艦艇不能航行,連衛星都不能提供信號。指揮官們需要獲取全球信息柵格的狀態並進行控制,就像他們需要掌握部隊的方位和狀態一樣重要。他們必須要掌握戰場信息柵格的範圍、能力和狀態,必須知道戰區以外的情況會如何影響部隊所在區域的戰場信息柵格,還必須能夠指揮和優化部隊配置以支持作戰。如果我們真的相信被描述得天花亂墜的集中化指揮會有更好的效果,那也不能忽視為戰區作戰司令部保留適當的指揮和控制權。

還有,只要戰區作戰司令部這種結構還保留著,那麼所有的軍事任務,包括那些由職能作戰司令部指揮的作戰,都必然還是會發生在戰區作戰司令部的防區內,因為所有的網絡作戰任務都必定要由一個實體單位來執行。同時,集中化指揮對於實現以網絡為中心的指揮模式以及更加有效地防禦攻擊、傳遞信息都是必要的。這種集中化指揮的概念與戰區作戰司令部要求掌握和優化戰場信息柵格的願望是不互斥的。

前進之路

要想制定出一套可行的網絡作戰指揮控制框架,必須要避免走極端,既要考慮戰區作戰司令部的需要,也要考慮建立對全球信息柵格的集中化控制的需要。在目前聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念的發展過程和網絡作戰部隊的轉型過程中,組織原則需要發揮調整各方利益的槓桿作用。為了達到這樣的目標,國防部應該做到以下幾點:

1.創建一個簡單、明確的網絡作戰指揮鏈,保證戰略司令部可以對所有的網絡作戰行動進行指揮。這就可以解決剛才提到的“誰負第一領導責任”的問題。只有當事件發生在快速變化的環境中的時候,戰區指揮控制機構才開始發揮作用。簡潔的指揮鏈可以保證參加網絡作戰的部隊知道自己應該聽從誰的指揮、應該向誰報告,在這條指揮鏈中,必須包括戰區作戰司令部。

2.可以賦予戰區作戰司令部在其防區內的指揮權:

——修正聯合司令部計劃以明確戰區作戰司令部在其防區內對網絡作戰的職責。

——修正已有的全球信息柵格網絡作戰概念,詳細說明那些處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊可以從戰區作戰司令部的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

——規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的所有命令都要通過戰區作戰司令部來執行。

這些調整可以保證戰區中的所有單位都在唯一的一條指揮鏈下行動,那就是通過戰區作戰司令部對戰略司令部負責。這也可以解決北方司令部應該對轄區負責但是又沒有指揮網絡作戰的權力的尷尬境地。

3.在每個戰區作戰司令部建立一個由中央司令部管轄的聯合網絡作戰中心,將戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區網絡作戰中心進行融合。這樣一來,每個戰區作戰司令部都將有一個在計算機空間領域的聯合作戰司令部,就像在海陸空的實體戰場上一樣。任何處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊都可以從聯合網絡作戰中心的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

4.鞏固全球信息柵格的地位,將最高控制權交給戰略司令部。目前集中化指揮的發展偏重於對參與網絡作戰的部隊的指揮,這與以網絡為中心的指揮概念背道而馳。以部隊為中心的“煙囪”式指揮系統不利於信息的傳遞和處理,讓我們離“為所有使用者提供最新、最準確的信息”的目標越來越遠。在之前的《戈德華特·尼科爾斯國防部重構法》報告中已經明確提到,組織管理和指揮控制應該由一個聯合的機構來掌控。

結束語

目前對網絡作戰的集中化指揮是一個迫切的需要。優化網絡作戰指揮機制可以幫助國防部提高效率、節約成本以及更好地分配緊缺資源。更重要的是,這樣可以讓網絡作戰部隊更加快速、準確地為指揮官提供信息,這在大規模的網絡作戰中非常重要。集中化指揮的進程不能影響到網絡作戰指揮控制的效率。這取決於全球信息柵格能否為所有參戰的單位提供足夠的信息以及指揮官是否充分利用戰區信息柵格來幫助指揮作戰。

“我們必須改變對網絡作戰問題的討論和思考模式,我們是在進行網絡“作戰”而不是網絡“管理”,所有的參戰單位必須保證自己每時每刻都準備著開戰,以保證網絡系統這一決定性的武器系統的安全”。網絡作戰是我們國家能夠贏得戰爭的關鍵一環,它可以幫助我們提供指揮和控制、縮短決策週期以及調整各戰區的資源配備。戰略司令部已經在強化網絡作戰概念方面邁出了很大的一步,這些努力還需要繼續進行下去。戰區作戰司令部必須是掌控和防護全球信息柵格的重要一環,以保證我們可以繼續取得網絡作戰的勝利。

Reference URL:  http://www.china.com.cn/military

中國軍隊信息戰裝備的作戰運用 – Chinese Military Operation of Information Warfare Equipment

中國軍隊信息戰裝備的作戰運用

Chinese Military Operation of Information Warfare Equipment

Information warfare is the C4ISR system and C4ISR system of confrontation, is the advantage of information contention, the main purpose is to ensure that their own information system to run properly, from the enemy use, paralysis and destruction; the same time, trying to use, paralyzed and destroy the enemy’s information system, So that in a paralyzed, confused state. Information warfare includes two parts: strategic information warfare and battlefield information warfare.

Strategic information warfare and information warfare battlefield

strategic information warfare is mainly characterized by a wide range of sectors covering all key political, economic, technological, and military and other special areas; special way, relates to psychological warfare, media warfare, deception warfare, media warfare and other special Means that the target is special, mainly through the decadence war, psychological warfare, information deterrence attack the enemy’s understanding system and thinking system; great harm, can make the whole country’s economic, political or military paralyzed, and even make it happen alternately; Personnel special, the war is not necessarily military personnel, computer experts, international criminal groups, ulterior motives of hackers or terrorist organizations and so may become war personnel.

Battlefield information warfare is the information warfare in the battle space, refers to the preparation and conduct of a campaign, the integrated use of information technology and a variety of information technology weapons, information combat platform and C4ISR system, in reconnaissance detection and early warning, information processing and Transmission, weapons control and guidance, operational command and control, camouflage deception and interference, as well as military strategy and other aspects of the comprehensive confrontation and struggle. Battlefield information warfare is through the interference or disrupting the enemy decision-making process, so that the enemy can not effectively take concerted action. Therefore, we must first affect the enemy decision-making, and then affect its actions, that is, to win the air electromagnetic advantage, and then made the air superiority, and finally the use of conventional forces to take combat operations. To seize the right to information system, to seize the initiative to fight the space, but also for the fight for land rights, air supremacy, sea power and the system of the right to lay a good foundation and necessary conditions.

A The basic combat forces and means are digital forces and information weapons equipment, the main contents include combat confidentiality, military deception, electronic warfare, psychological warfare and fire destroyed, the core purpose is to compete for the battle space information access , Control and use rights. Battlefield information warfare is the confrontation of the information system, it directly affects the entire battle space, the whole process of war and success or failure. Battlefield information warfare The main combat style is the electronic warfare and cyber warfare. Electronic warfare is an important part of the battlefield information warfare, mainly for the enemy communications, radar and other electromagnetic radiation source for the lure, interference, destruction and destruction activities. In the Gulf War, the electronic warfare was not only for the first time on a large scale, but also as a campaign stage and a specific campaign in war. In the Kosovo war, NATO used a lot of electronic warfare equipment, and the first use of electromagnetic pulse bombs and the first time a network war. Network warfare is a cyber-confrontational activity in computer cyberspace, using the Internet, and is being used for the first time in the Kosovo war. NATO network warfare measures include: network advertising; hacker attacks; attacks on financial networks. The main feature of the network war in the Southern Alliance is the people’s war mode, fans, computer fans and computer enthusiasts spontaneously carried out a large number of network operations, such as online publicity, attack NATO website, the use of network transmission of information.

Information warfare equipment in war equipment electronic warfare equipment the trend of electronic warfare equipment increasingly integrated and universal, under the conditions of information technology in the local war, the battlefield of the electromagnetic environment is increasingly complex, the past that the separation of each other, a single function of electronic warfare equipment is far from Adapt to combat needs. Integration and generalization has become the focus of the development of electronic warfare equipment and future electronic warfare equipment overall development direction. In order to deal more effectively with the complex and volatile electromagnetic threat in the information warfare, the future of the new generation of electronic warfare equipment, will be widely used advanced computer technology, greatly improve the automation of the entire system to have better real-time capabilities, since Adaptability and full power management capability. Electronic warfare equipment, work areas continue to widen, increasing the transmission power, millimeter-wave technology and the development of optical technology, the modern electronic warfare equipment, the frequency of continuous development to a wider band. On the whole, the future range of electronic warfare equipment will be extended to the entire electromagnetic spectrum. GPS interference and anti-interference will be concerned about the practice of war has shown that if the loss of GPS support, it will greatly weaken the information advantage, so that command, control, reconnaissance, combat, military and other military aspects are facing severe tests, Combat effectiveness. Focusing on the development of anti-radiation and new electronic warfare jets, attention to the development of new, special electronic warfare technology and equipment, such as anti-satellite laser weapons, high-energy particle beam weapons, and meteor communication, neutrino communication and so on.

Computer virus weapon <a In the military information system, the battlefield information acquisition, transmission, processing and other functions need to complete the computer and network, computer network is the basis and pioneer of information warfare. The use of software-driven sniffers and hardware magnetic sniffers and other sniffing network is an important way to attack the network. These sniffing tools were originally a test device used to diagnose and assist in repairing the network, so it was a powerful tool for network management personnel to manage the network, but it was a terrible computer virus weapon in information warfare. It can make the network “service denied”, “information tampering”, information “halfway steal” and so on. In addition, will also focus on design “portal trap”. “Portal trap”, also known as “back door”, is a computer system designer in the system in advance of a structure, in the application appears or operating system, the programmer to insert some debugging agencies. System programmers in order to achieve the purpose of the attack system, deliberately left a small number of portal traps for familiar with the system staff to go beyond the normal system protection and sneak into the system. Network is an important infrastructure for information warfare, network-based warfare is mainly based on the network and the network is reliable to determine the outcome of the war. Therefore, to strengthen the network of offensive and defensive combat research, to win the future of information war is essential.   Electromagnetic pulse bombs

Iraq war, the US military used a lot of electronic warfare equipment, and the use of electromagnetic pulse bombs attacked the Iraqi radio and television system and the Iraqi military various types of electronic radiation source. Electromagnetic pulse bomb, also known as microwave pulse bomb, is through the micro-beam into electromagnetic energy, damage to each other’s electronic facilities and personnel of a new directional energy weapons. Its working principle is: high-power microwave through the antenna gathered into a very narrow, very strong electromagnetic waves fired at each other, relying on this beam of electromagnetic waves generated by high temperature, ionization, radiation and other integrated effects in the target internal electronic circuit to produce fatal voltage And the current, breakdown or burn the sensitive components, damage to the computer stored in the data, so that the other side of the weapons and command system paralyzed, loss of combat effectiveness. According to the test, a briefcase size of the microwave bomb, can produce power of 300 million watts of pulse waves. Will be more than one connection, it can become an adjustable radiation source, resulting in more than 2 billion watts of pulse waves. This pulse wave is somewhat similar to the nuclear pulse generated when the nuclear explosion can easily from the power and communication pipes into the underground bunker, which rely on radio, radar, computers, power grids and telephone modern weapons systems, chemical and biological arsenal and its production The shop was paralyzed in an instant.

GPS interference device <a I = 13> Iraq war, the Iraqi military use of GPS interferometer on the Tomahawk cruise missiles for effective interference, which is the first time in combat in the GPS guidance system interference. GPS signal is very weak, very easy to interfere. A Russian company offers a 4-watt power handheld GPS jammers that can be bought for less than $ 4,000. If you buy parts from a retail e-store, spend $ 400 to create a GPS jammer with a radius of 16 km or more. Before the war in Iraq, the United States had expected the Iraqi side to interfere with GPS signals. The United States has already been equipped with anti-jamming technology for its GPS bombs and missiles so that these GPS-guided weapons can continue to use GPS signals in the event of interference; even if the GPS signal is lost, these weapons can also use their own other guidance system Such as inertial navigation, laser guidance, etc., so that they reach the target. Nevertheless, the early Iraq war, the US military more than a dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles or because of interference from the scheduled route, falling in Turkey, Syria and Iran. Small GPS jitter problem alerted the US government, Powell personally come forward to investigate the source of Iraqi GPS jammers, Russia and other countries imposed no small pressure.

Gulf War, GPS navigator as a trial for the first time issued to the use of desert combat personnel, the effect is obvious. At that time, including cruise missiles, including all the weapons are not using GPS navigation device. During the war in Iraq, we saw almost all of the combat platforms, and every soldier, almost all of the missiles and bombs used this kind of navigation device, so that the tanks, planes, ships were more mobile so that the missiles and bombs were The probability error is reduced to 1-3 m, within a maximum of 10 m. <A I = 15> everything has a disadvantage. GPS navigation defects and information technology weapons and equipment of the drawbacks is the same, that is, electronic interference. From the perspective of the development of weapons and equipment, the purchase of a cruise missile needs more than 100 million dollars, and manufacturing a GPS jammers only a few hundred dollars, as a strategic defense side, if a large number of development and development of GPS jammers, not only for US missiles And bombs are a threat to their tanks, planes, ships and personnel navigation and positioning will also have a huge impact. Of course, you should also see the US military fight, further, after the end of the war in Iraq will be based on the lessons of the war to improve the GPS system. Is expected to be improved in three areas: First, GPS satellites, mainly to enhance the satellite launch signal, and as much as possible to launch GPS satellites; Second, improve the guidance system, mainly to increase the composite guidance device, after the GPS guidance is disturbed, Automatic recovery or transfer to inertia and other navigation methods to ensure the normal operation of the platform and weapons; Third, GPS anti-interference, mainly to improve the GPS receiver anti-jamming capability, the development of new GPS receiver, Machine and jamming machine for electronic suppression and interference.

 

Original Mandarin Chinese:

信息戰是C4ISR系統與C4ISR系統的對抗,是信息優勢的爭奪,主要目的是確保己方信息系統正常運行,免遭敵方利用、癱瘓和破壞﹔同時,設法利用、癱瘓和破壞敵人的信息系統,使之處於癱瘓、迷茫狀態。信息戰包括戰略信息戰和戰場信息戰兩大部分。

戰略信息戰和戰場信息戰

戰略信息戰主要特征是范圍廣泛,涉及國家政治、經濟、科技、軍事等各個要害部門和特殊領域﹔方式特殊,涉及心理戰、輿論戰、欺騙戰、媒體戰等特殊手段﹔目標特殊,主要是通過誘騙戰、心理戰、信息威懾等攻擊敵人的認識體系和思維體系﹔危害巨大,能使整個國家的經濟、政治或軍事陷入癱瘓,甚至能使其發生政權交替﹔人員特殊,參戰人員不一定軍人,計算機專家、國際犯罪集團、別有用心的黑客或恐怖組織等都可能成為參戰人員。

戰場信息戰是發生在戰斗空間內的信息戰,是指為准備和進行一場戰役,綜合運用信息技術手段和各種信息化武器、信息化作戰平台和C4ISR系統,在偵察探測及預警、信息處理與傳遞、武器控制和制導、作戰指揮與控制、偽裝欺騙與干擾以及軍事謀略等方面展開的全面對抗和斗爭。戰場信息戰是通過干擾或打亂敵方決策程序,使敵方無法有效採取協調一致的行動。因此,要先影響敵人決策,然后再影響其行動,即先贏得空中電磁優勢,再取得空中優勢,最后使用常規部隊採取作戰行動。奪取了制信息權,就奪取了戰斗空間的主動權,而且為爭奪制陸權、制空權、制海權和制天權奠定一個良好基礎和必要條件。

戰場信息戰的基本作戰力量和手段是數字化部隊及信息化武器裝備,主要內容包括作戰保密、軍事欺騙、電子戰、心理戰和火力摧毀,核心目的是爭奪戰斗空間的信息獲取權、控制權和使用權。戰場信息戰是信息體系的對抗,它直接影響到整個戰斗空間、整場戰爭的進程和成敗。戰場信息戰的主要作戰樣式是電子戰和網絡戰。電子戰是戰場信息戰的一個重要組成部分,主要是針對敵人通信、雷達等電磁輻射源進行的誘騙、干擾、破壞和摧毀活動。海灣戰爭中,電子戰不僅首次大規模使用,而且正式作為戰爭中的一個戰役階段和特定戰役行動。科索沃戰爭中,北約使用了大量電子戰裝備,並首次使用了電磁脈沖炸彈並首次進行了網絡戰。網絡戰是在計算機網絡空間,利用因特網進行的一種網絡對抗活動,並在科索沃戰爭中首次使用。北約網絡戰的措施包括:網絡宣傳﹔黑客攻擊﹔襲擊金融網絡等。南聯盟網絡戰的主要特征是人民戰爭模式,網迷、電腦迷和計算機愛好者自發地進行了大量網絡作戰行動,如開展網上宣傳、攻擊北約網站、利用網絡傳遞情報等。

戰爭中的信息戰裝備

電子戰裝備

電子戰裝備的發展趨勢日趨一體化和通用化,信息化條件下的局部戰爭中,戰場上的電磁環境日益復雜,以往那種彼此分立、功能單一的電子戰裝備已遠遠不能適應作戰需要了。一體化和通用化已成為當前電子戰裝備發展的重點和未來電子戰裝備總的發展方向。為了更有效地對付信息化戰爭中復雜多變的電磁威脅,未來新一代的電子對抗裝備,將廣泛採用先進的計算機技術,大幅度提高整個系統的自動化程度,以具備更好的實時能力、自適應能力和全功率管理能力。電子戰裝備的工作頻段不斷拓寬,發射功率不斷增大,毫米波技術和光電技術的發展,使現代電子戰裝備的工作頻率不斷向更寬的頻段發展。從整體上看,未來電子戰裝備的工作范圍必將擴展到整個電磁波頻譜。GPS干擾與反干擾將受到關注,戰爭實踐已經表明,如果失去GPS的支持,就會極大地削弱信息優勢,使指揮、控制、偵察、打擊、部隊機動等各個軍事環節都面臨嚴峻考驗,嚴重降低戰斗力。重點發展反輻射和新型電子戰干擾機,重視發展新型、特殊的電子戰技術裝備,如用於反衛星的激光武器、高能粒子束武器,以及流星余跡通信、中微子通信等等。

計算機病毒武器

在軍事信息系統中,戰場信息的獲取、傳遞、處理等功能需要計算機及網絡來完成,計算機網絡是進行信息戰的基礎和先鋒。利用軟件驅動嗅探器和硬件磁感應嗅探器等對網絡進行嗅探是進攻網絡的重要方法。這些嗅探工具原本是一種測試設備,用來診斷和協助修理網絡,因此它是網管人員管理網絡的一種得力工具,但在信息戰中卻是一種可怕的計算機病毒武器。它能使網絡“服務否認”、“信息篡改”、信息“中途竊取”等。另外,也將重視設計“門戶陷阱”。“門戶陷阱”又稱“后門”,是計算機系統設計者預先在系統中構造的一種機構,在應用出現或操作系統期間,程序員插入一些調試機構。系統程序員為了達到攻擊系統的目的,特意留下少數門戶陷阱,供熟悉系統的人員用以超越對方正常的系統保護而潛入系統。網絡是信息化戰爭的重要基礎設施,網絡中心戰主要是基於網絡而進行的,網絡是否可靠決定戰爭的勝負。因此,加強網絡攻防作戰的研究,對於贏得未來信息化戰爭至關重要。

電磁脈沖炸彈

伊拉克戰爭中,美軍使用了大量電子戰裝備,並使用電磁脈沖炸彈襲擊了伊拉克廣播電視系統及伊軍各類電子輻射源。電磁脈沖炸彈也稱微波脈沖炸彈,是通過把微波束轉化為電磁能,毀傷對方電子設施和人員的一種新型定向能武器。其工作原理是:高功率微波經過天線聚集成一束很窄、很強的電磁波射向對方,依靠這束電磁波產生的高溫、電離、輻射等綜合效應,在目標內部的電子線路中產生致命的電壓和電流,擊穿或燒毀其中的敏感元器件,毀損電腦中存貯的數據,從而使對方的武器和指揮系統陷於癱瘓,喪失戰斗力。據測試,一枚公文包大小的微波炸彈,可產生功率達3億瓦的脈沖波。將其多個聯接后,則能成為可調整的輻射源,產生20億瓦以上的脈沖波。這種脈沖波有點類似核爆炸時產生的電磁脈沖,可以輕易地從電力和通訊管道進入地下掩體,使其中依賴無線電、雷達、計算機、電網和電話等的現代化武器系統、生化武器庫及其生產車間在瞬間癱瘓。

GPS干擾設備

伊拉克戰爭中,伊軍利用GPS干擾儀對戰斧巡航導彈進行了有效的干擾,這是第一次在實戰中對GPS制導系統進行干擾。GPS信號很弱,很易於干擾。一家俄羅斯公司提供的一種4瓦功率的手持GPS干擾機,不到4000美元就能買到。如果從零售電子商店購買部件組裝,花400美元就可以制造一個干擾半徑16公裡以上的GPS干擾機。伊拉克戰爭開戰之前,美國就已經預料到伊拉克方面會干擾GPS信號。美國其實早已經給其GPS炸彈和導彈裝載了抗干擾技術,使這些GPS導引的武器能夠在干擾的情況下繼續使用GPS信號﹔即使GPS信號丟失,這些武器還可以使用自身的其他導引系統如慣性導航、激光制導等,使自己到達目標。盡管如此,伊拉克戰爭初期,美軍十幾枚戰斧式巡航導彈還是因受干擾偏離預定航線,落在土耳其、敘利亞和伊朗境內。小小的GPS干擾機問題驚動了美國朝野,鮑威爾親自出面調查伊拉克GPS干擾機的來源,對俄羅斯等國施加了不小的壓力。

海灣戰爭中,GPS導航儀作為試用品首次發放給沙漠作戰人員使用,效果明顯。當時,包括巡航導彈在內的所有武器都沒有採用GPS導航裝置。伊拉克戰爭中,我們看到幾乎所有的作戰平台,每一個單兵,幾乎全部的導彈和炸彈都採用了這種導航裝置,從而使坦克、飛機、艦艇的機動更加精確,使導彈和炸彈的原概率誤差縮小到1—3米,最大10米范圍之內。

凡事有一利必有一弊。GPS導航的弊端與信息化武器裝備的弊端是一樣的,就是電子干擾問題。從武器裝備發展角度來看,購買一枚巡航導彈需要100多萬美元,而制造一部GPS干擾機才幾百美元,作為戰略防御一方,如果能夠大量發展和研制GPS干擾機,不僅對於美軍導彈和炸彈是一種威脅,對其坦克、飛機、艦艇和人員的導航定位也將產生巨大影響。當然,也應看到美軍打一仗、進一步,伊拉克戰爭結束后必將根據戰爭中的教訓,改進GPS系統。預計將在三個方面進行改進:一是GPS衛星,主要是增強衛星發射信號,並盡可能多的發射GPS衛星﹔二是改進制導系統,主要是增加復合制導裝置,在GPS指導受到干擾之后,自動恢復或轉入慣性等其他導航方式,以保証平台和武器的正常運行﹔三是GPS反干擾,主要是提高GPS接收機抗干擾能力,研制新型GPS接收機,在戰區對地方軍民用GPS接收機和干擾機進行電子壓制和干擾等。

Aspects of Chinese Hacker Information Attacks //中國黑客信息攻擊手段面面觀

Aspects of Chinese Hacker Information Attacks

中國黑客信息攻擊手段面面觀

The so-called information attack is the integrated use of electronic, network, psychological, fire, force and other means, against the enemy’s weaknesses and key information systems, flexible to take appropriate tactics and actively interfere with or disrupt the enemy’s information acquisition, transmission, processing and utilization to maximize the information advantage and weaken the enemy command and control capabilities. It is a soft kill and hard to destroy, integrated use of physical and psychological attacks and other means of attack.

信息攻击手段面面观
1. Focus on information to deceive and mislead the enemy taking the wrong action
is to take the analog information to deceive, camouflage, feint and other means, implicitly shown true or false, to lure the enemy to take the wrong decisions and actions. Fair in war, deception winning information is an important aspect of the fight against the use of strategy. Recently several high-tech local wars shows that clever use of deception, high technology can effectively confuse enemy reconnaissance, reduce the value of the enemy’s use of information to achieve good move by the enemy, the shape, the enemy will result from.

信息攻击手段面面观 a

The main methods are:
1.1 electronic active enemy deception and confusion
is emitted through a conscious, forward, transform, absorb or reflect electromagnetic waves, so that the enemy misleading when you receive a message. The main take many forms and means of transmitting information, create a false impression, concealed the true fight one’s own intentions, so misjudged the enemy, command failure, operational deployment confusion, reached their ears, impaired nerve head and containment purposes. There are three main ways: First analog electronic deception by simulating forces or capabilities that do not exist, or the ability to simulate real forces or false position against enemy electronic warfare and information on intelligence activities. Secondly posing electronic deception, disinformation or the information directly into the temptation of the enemy communications network to send false commands, false information or indirectly acquire a variety of information needed. Third-induced electronic deception, namely the use of electromagnetic feint, feint and in some troops fit for me to attempt to combat, deployment and operations of implicit shown true or false, to confuse, to mobilize the enemy, both in the secondary direction suddenly the implementation of high-power electromagnetic radiation information can be maintained in a predetermined direction or the main area of fighter electromagnetic shielding, shift focus enemy reconnaissance, reducing stress my main deployment; when I transfer command post or maneuver command, the right amount of information should be organized network in place to continue to work, or the implementation of force, electromagnetic feint in the other direction, a small movable cover a great ship, contain information about the enemy reconnaissance and jamming systems.
1.2 camouflage tactics confuse deception
tactics’ deception, disguise is to use a variety of measures in combination, make full use of the terrain, vegetation, artificial barrier cover, camouflage, smokescreen, camouflage net, paint and other standard equipment or handy equipment and other favorable conditions, setting the anti radar, anti-infrared, anti-reconnaissance comprehensive three-dimensional photoelectric barrier cover, shielding the true position of one’s own goals and action, of no promising, its essence lies hidden truth; or by changing one’s own electronic technology features and changes may have been exposed to one’s own true intentions electromagnetic image, to achieve electronic camouflage deception. Tactical confuse deception, is through interference confuse enemy reconnaissance, surveillance and battlefield observation, direct access to weaken the enemy’s ability to battlefield information, resulting in information overload enemy, increasing the degree of fuzzy information, so that the enemy of true and false information contradictory the enemy, so that action indecision adversely affected by aircraft. Or electromagnetic interference may be implemented over the main direction of serving chaff interference wire, so that confuse enemy radar; the enemy can be infrared, night vision equipment, laser irradiation interfere with their work or make it blinding, can maneuver when the forces to carry out offensive fighter, I am scheduled to enter enemy fighter-zone general or special cast smokescreen to blind enemy interference observed visible and infrared, laser, microwave and other reconnaissance equipment; can also be man-made noise, vibration and magnetic interference such as enemy action plan.
2. Implementation of electromagnetic harassment, destruction of the enemy or prevent the effective use of electronic systems
is the use of electromagnetic harassment electromagnetic radiation, reflection, refraction, scattering or absorption of electromagnetic energy and other means to hinder and weaken the enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum against information technology, aimed at preventing enemy electronic equipment and systems to obtain useful information, reduce the enemy’s combat efficiency.
2.1 electromagnetic shutoff
namely full use of electronic warfare units and equipment, flexible use of a variety of means, actively enemy command and communications facilities and weapons control systems implementation of electronic suppression, within a certain time and scope, to make the enemy and its internal and external interrupts radio contact causing chaos fighting each other. The motorized combat electronic warfare force, the number of targets, the location and nature of the use of formula or throwing placed jamming equipment, take aim and blocking interference formula, combining active and passive jamming methods utilize cutoff point, local interdiction, interdiction and other three-dimensional tactical means to actively suppress the enemy’s command and communications network. As I was entering the predetermined area when the enemy fighter electromagnetic shutoff embodiment, can be taken against electromagnetic dimensional and multi-point, internal disturbance outside the cut to form a local electromagnetic advantage, both inside and outside the enemy cut off contact, it is vulnerable to attack, limb, and actively cooperate offensive fighter operations.
2.2 electronic attacks
to electronic warfare as the main force, make full use of vehicle-mounted, knapsack, put style, throwing electronic countermeasure equipment, into a number of groups capable of swimming harassment, the use of flexible battlefield favorable conditions covert maneuvering, timely investigation avowed enemy electronic target location quickly expand to occupy a favorable terrain, choose the best time to implement strong sudden attack, immediately after the withdrawal of tasks; also capable of sending electronic warfare units deep into the enemy near the depth key targets, enemy firepower system, precision-guided systems, C3I systems, airborne electronic equipment such as the implementation of electronic interference.
3. Implementation of network sabotage, sudden attack enemy computer
network sabotage is the use of a variety of offensive and damaging computer software technology, computer systems into a variety of enemy interference, sabotage, or paralyzed by destroying the enemy’s computer as the core information network system to prevent enemy battlefield information acquisition, transmission and processing, they lost the ability to control the battlefield. Under modern conditions, computer technology has penetrated into all aspects of the military field, the computer has become almost all major high-tech and advanced weapons combat system platform. Destroy the enemy’s computer network system is one of the mobile operations of the information against the most critical action.Therefore, the use of professional and technical personnel, the use of a computer or other special equipment, under the unified organization, timing and selection of key key objectives, multiple penetration into the enemy’s computer network to find gaps, and its attack.
3.1 saturation attack
enemies despite widespread use of high-tech digital communications technology to transmit the battlefield information, fast, secure and strong, but its existing equipment more information nodes and the transmission capacity and real-time information sharing with all combat certain gap. For this feature, through various means pouring a lot of waste to the enemy information network, outdated information, false information or refuse to cast the program, manufacturing information flood, blocking, squeeze the enemy information channel, information flow hysteresis enemy, seize enemy cyberspace, it is a long time information network saturation, causing the enemy can not be timely and effective use of network access, transmission, processing and distribution of information, thus weakening the enemy network capabilities. In addition, since the proliferation of information also allows the enemy is hard to determine the authenticity, it is difficult to make valid judgments.
3.2 Virus surprise
that the use of computer information network implementation infiltrate enemy virus attacks. A computer virus is a special preparation, self-replicating computer program transmission, has a hidden, latent, infectious and destructive characteristics, separating a complex virus may take a long time. Therefore, the computer virus attack is to implement a network of the most effective weapons. Press the virus destroys the mechanism can be divided into: seize the resource-based, modify the file type, to eliminate the program type, type of data theft and destruction of hardware type. Its injection mode there are four:
First, directional electromagnetic radiation injection. Computer viruses coming modulated electromagnetic emissions from electronic equipment, the use of enemy radio receiver into the enemy’s weak points from the electronic information network system.
Second, the information network node injection. Namely the use of wireless or wired communication network, the virus injected into the enemy’s battlefield information from the user node network, terminal or device.
Third, the use of pre-latent curing equipment. Through special channels (agents into, instigation enemy programmers, etc.) will be pre-populated enemy virus computer hardware, software programs, operating system or repair tool, activate the remote control by radio during the war, the virus attack.
Fourth, the hacker Descent. Namely the use of computer hackers skilled technology, multiple protection system to bypass the secret enemy tight settings, sneak into enemy battlefield information network penetration attacks, the enemy can pretend superiors or subordinates instruction issued false information or steal confidential data online; and to be enemy implant false data and information networks harmful programs, or formatting the hard disk of a computer, causing the enemy’s information systems paralyzed.
4. The integrated use of a variety of combat forces, attack the enemy in combat node
fist to take measures to deal with the system, and actively enemy important device information system, the implementation of key objectives node hard to destroy, and depending on the location and nature of the different objectives, to take appropriate and flexible means of attack, undermine the overall function of their information systems to achieve the high limit, drop, high system purposes.
4.1 Accurate Fire pits
located on the important goal of the enemy is not easy to interfere with the depth and strength of attacks, taking a variety of means to identify the basis for its position, taking tactical missiles, long-range artillery, helicopter or Air Force rapid mobility, the implementation of pinpoint precision-strike . When circumstances permit, it can also infiltrate enemy reconnaissance squad depth to pinpoint the location of the enemy command posts and other important information node, aviation and other guidance to be destroyed by fire.
4.2 elite penetration attacks
against the enemy’s battlefield information network points, lines long, wide, weak protection features to scout and special operations forces capable grouping a plurality of synthetic penetration combat units in a variety of ways to penetrate the enemy in depth, flexible, arrived in the deployment of nearly enemy reconnaissance information system, in particular the choice is not easy to interfere with important goals and firepower, flexible to take surprise storm or other means to look for an opportunity sabotage enemy headquarters, communications hub, radar technology weapons firing positions and other targets, from fast attack fast, quick.
4.3 Damage commando unit
for the relative concentration of enemy electronic equipment, or high-energy laser weapons can EMP implementation area of damage, with a strong electromagnetic pulse, breakdown, burning enemy of electronic components, damage to protective measures weak radar, communications systems, data processing systems and other electronic equipment.
5. Extensive psychological attacks, the collapse of the morale of enemy combatants
in accordance with changes in the means of psychological warfare under high-tech conditions and the environment, fully aware of the merits of the mental status of the enemy confrontation, practical focus, find enemy weaknesses, psychological warfare plans to develop and maintain an effective psychological warfare resilience and implement effective psychological attacks. The main measures: dissemination of information through the manufacture of a psychological deterrent to the enemy; identify weaknesses in enemy psychology, to ascertain the enemy internal state of mind, constitute troops, personality religion, customs and commanders, hobbies, expertise and the people to fight the enemy attitude, launched various forms of psychological attack, destroyed the enemy psychological defense; using distance artillery, aviation emission leaflets to the enemy; the use of radio as a person or the use of defectors living textbook battlefield propaganda; for the enemy melee fear, fear of psychological casualties, I take full advantage of the effect of fire attack, close combat with the enemy stalemate, killing a large number of the enemy’s effective strength, defeat the enemy spirit, and with the hard-kill effect expand psychological offensive, the enemy accelerate psychological breakdown, for I have entered a predetermined zone of the enemy fighter, should take advantage of sounding political propaganda offensive, which tempts it to abandon unnecessary resistance.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

所謂信息攻擊,就是綜合運用電子、網絡、心理、火力、兵力等多種手段,針對敵信息系統的要害和薄弱環節,靈活採取相應戰法,積極干擾或破壞敵信息獲取、傳遞、處理和利用,最大限度地削弱敵信息優勢和指揮控制能力。它是軟殺傷與硬摧毀、物理攻擊與心理攻擊等多種手段的綜合運用。

信息攻击手段面面观

1.注重信息欺騙,誤導敵採取錯誤行動
信息欺騙就是採取模擬、偽裝、佯動及其他手段,隱真示假,誘敵採取錯誤的決策和行動。兵不厭詐、詭道製勝是信息對抗謀略運用的一個重要方面。近期幾場高技術局部戰爭表明,巧妙地運用欺騙手段,能有效迷惑敵高技術偵察,降低敵信息的利用價值,達到善動敵者,形之,敵必從之的效果。

信息攻击手段面面观 a

主要方法有:
1.1電子主動惑敵欺騙
就是通過有意識地發射、轉發、變換、吸收或反射電磁波,使敵方在收到信息時造成誤解。主要採取多種形式和手段傳輸信息,製造假象,隱蔽己方的真實作戰意圖,使敵判斷失誤,指揮失靈,作戰部署混亂,達到掩耳、障目和遏制神經的目的。其主要方式有三種:其一模擬式電子欺騙,通過模擬不存在的部隊或能力,或在假位置上模擬真實部隊或能力來對抗敵軍的電子戰和信息情報活動。其二冒充式電子欺騙,將假情報或誘惑信息直接插入敵通信網發送假命令、假信息或間接地獲取所需的各種信息。其三誘導式電子欺騙,即利用電磁佯動,並在部分兵力佯動的配合下,對我作戰企圖、部署和行動隱真示假,以迷惑、調動敵人,既可在次要方向上突然實施大功率電磁信息輻射,也可在主要方向或預定殲擊區保持電磁屏蔽,轉移敵方偵察的重心,減輕我主要部署的壓力;當我轉移指揮所或實施機動指揮時,應組織適量的信息網絡繼續在原地工作,或在其他方向上實施兵力、電磁佯動,以小動掩大謀,牽制敵方信息偵察和乾擾系統。
1.2戰術偽裝迷盲欺騙
戰術偽裝欺騙,就是結合使用多種偽裝措施,充分利用地形、植被、人工遮障、迷彩、煙幕、偽裝網、塗料等製式器材或就便器材及其他有利條件,設置反雷達、反紅外、反光電偵察的綜合立體遮障,屏蔽己方目標的真實位置和行動,化有為無,其實質就在於隱真;或通過改變己方電子技術特徵和變更可能已暴露己方真實意圖的電磁形象,來達成電子偽裝欺騙。戰術迷盲欺騙,就是通過迷盲干擾敵方的偵察、監視和戰場觀察,削弱敵直接獲取戰場信息的能力,造成敵信息氾濫,增加信息的模糊程度,使敵方對相互矛盾的情報真假難辨,以至於行動上猶豫不決而貽誤戰機。可實施電磁信號干擾或在主要方向上空投放乾擾箔條、干擾絲等,使敵雷達迷盲;可向敵紅外、微光夜視器材照射激光,干擾其工作或使其致盲,可在機動力量實施攻勢殲擊時,向進入我預定殲擊區之敵施放普通或特種煙幕,迷盲干擾敵可見光觀察和紅外、激光、微波等偵察器材;也可人為製造噪聲、震動和磁場等乾擾敵方行動計劃。
2.實施電磁襲擾,破壞或阻止敵有效使用電子系統
電磁襲擾是利用電磁波的輻射、反射、折射、散射或吸收電磁能等手段,阻礙和削弱敵方有效使用電磁頻譜的信息對抗技術手段,旨在阻止敵方電子設備和系統獲得有效信息,降低敵作戰效能。
2.1電磁遮斷
即充分利用電子對抗分隊和器材,靈活運用多種手段,積極對敵指揮通信設施和武器控制系統實施電子壓制,在一定時間和範圍內,使敵內部及其與外部的無線聯絡中斷,造成各自為戰的混亂狀態。根據機動作戰電子對抗力量、打擊目標數量、位置和性質,使用投擲式或擺放式乾擾器材,採取瞄準式與阻塞式乾擾、有源與無源干擾相結合的方法,靈活運用要點遮斷、局部遮斷、立體遮斷等戰術手段,積極壓制敵指揮通信網。如對進入我預定殲擊區之敵實施電磁遮斷時,可採取多維多點電磁打擊,內擾外割,形成局部電磁優勢,切斷敵內外聯絡,使其處於被動挨​​打、孤立無援的境地,積極配合攻勢殲擊行動。
2.2電子襲擊
以電子對抗力量為主體,充分利用各種車載式、背負式、擺放式、投擲式電子對抗器材,編成若干精幹的游動襲擾組,利用戰場有利條件靈活隱蔽機動,及時查明敵電子目標的位置,快速展開佔領有利地形,選擇最佳時機突然實施強烈的襲擊,完成任務後迅即撤離;還可派出精幹的電子對抗分隊深入敵縱深重點目標附近,對敵火力打擊系統、精確制導系統、C3I系統、機載電子設備等實施電子乾擾。
3.實施網絡破襲,對敵計算機進行突然攻擊
網絡破襲是指利用各種具有攻擊破壞作用的計算機軟件和技術,對敵計算機系統進各種干擾、破壞活動,通過破壞或癱瘓敵以計算機為核心的信息網絡系統,阻止敵戰場信息的獲取、傳遞與處理,使其喪失戰場控制能力。現代條件下,計算機技術已經滲透到軍事領域的方方面面,計算機已成為幾乎所有先進武器和作戰系統重要的高技術平台。破壞敵計算機網絡系統是機動作戰中信息對抗最關鍵的行動之一。因此,應使用專業技術人員,利用計算機或其他特種設備,在統一組織下,選擇關鍵時機和重點目標,多路滲透,尋找打入敵計算機網絡的缺口,並對其進行攻擊。
3.1飽和攻擊
儘管高技術強敵普遍採用數字化通信技術傳輸戰場信息,速度快,保密性強,但其現有裝備的信息節點數多,且在傳輸容量和信息實時共享方面均與實戰存在一定的差距。針對這一特點,通過各種途徑向敵信息網絡大量傾瀉廢信息、過時信息、假信息或施放垃圾程序,製造信息洪流,阻塞、擠占敵信息通道,遲滯敵信息流通,奪佔敵網絡空間,使其網絡長時間處於信息飽和狀態,造成敵無法利用網絡及時有效地獲取、傳輸、處理和分發信息,從而削弱敵網絡功能。另外,由於信息氾濫也可使敵難辨真偽,難以作出有效判斷。
3.2病毒奇襲
即使用計算機病毒對敵信息網絡實施滲透襲擊。計算機病毒是一種特殊編制的、能自我複制傳播的計算機程序,具有隱蔽性、潛伏性、傳染性和破壞性等特點,分離一種複雜的病毒可能需要很長時間。因此,計算機病毒是實施網絡攻擊的一種最有效的武器。按病毒破壞作用機理,可分為:搶占資源型、修改文件型、消除程序型、竊取數據型和破壞硬件型。其註入方式有四種:
第一,電磁定向輻射注入。即將計算機病毒調製到電子設備發射的電磁波中,利用敵方無線電接收機從電子系統的薄弱環節進入敵信息網絡。
第二,信息網絡節點注入。即利用無線通信或有線通信網絡,將病毒從敵戰場信息網絡的用戶節點、終端或設備註入。
第三,利用配套設備固化預先潛伏。通過特殊途徑(特工潛入、策反敵程序設計人員等)將病毒預先植入敵計算機硬件、軟件程序、操作系統或維修工具中,戰時通過無線電遙控方式激活,使病毒發作。
第四,黑客暗襲。即利用黑客嫻熟的計算機技術,秘密繞過敵嚴密設置的多重防護系統,潛入敵方戰場信息網絡進行滲透攻擊,可以冒充敵方的上級或部屬發出虛假的指令信息或竊取網上機密數據;也可以對敵信息網絡植入偽數據和有害程序,或對計算機硬盤格式化,造成敵信息系統癱瘓。
4.綜合運用多種作戰力量,對敵實施節點打擊
採取以拳頭對付體系的辦法,積極對敵信息系統的重要設備、關鍵目標等節點實施硬摧毀,並根據不同目標的位置和性質,靈活採取恰當的打擊手段,破壞其信息系統的整體功能,達到限高、降高、制高的目的。
4.1火力精確點穴
對位於敵縱深不便於乾擾和兵力襲擊的重要目標,在採取多種手段查明其位置的基礎上,以戰役戰術導彈、遠程砲兵、直升機或航空兵快速機動,實施點穴式精確打擊。情況許可時,還可以偵察小分隊滲透敵縱深準確查明敵指揮所等重要信息節點的位置,引導航空兵等火力予以摧毀。
4.2精兵滲透襲擊
針對敵戰場信息網絡點多、線長、面廣、防護能力弱的特點,以偵察兵和特種作戰力量編組多個精幹、合成的滲透打擊分隊,以多種方式滲入敵縱深,靈活機動,抵近偵察敵信息系統的部署情況,特別是選擇不易乾擾和火力打擊的重要目標,靈活採取奇襲或強攻等手段,尋機破襲敵指揮機構、通信樞紐、雷達站、技術兵器發射陣地等目標,快襲快離,速戰速決。
4.3特種兵器毀傷
對於敵相對集中的電子設備,可以激光武器或高能電磁脈衝武器實施面積毀傷,以強大的電磁脈衝,擊穿、燒毀敵電子元件,破壞防護措施較弱的雷達、通信系統、數據處理系統等電子設備。
5.廣泛開展心理攻擊,瓦解敵方作戰士氣
根據高技術條件下心理戰手段和環境的變化,充分認識敵我心理對抗的優劣地位,著眼實際,尋敵弱點,制定心理戰預案,保持有效的心理戰應變能力和實施有效的心理攻擊。主要措施:通過傳播信息給敵製造心理威懾;找准敵心理弱點,弄清敵內部思想狀況、兵員構成、宗教信仰、風俗習慣以及指揮官的個性特點、嗜好、專長和敵方民眾對作戰的態度等,展開多種形式的心理攻擊,摧垮敵心理防線;利用遠程砲兵、航空兵向敵發射傳單;利用廣播或利用投誠人員作為活教材進行戰場宣傳;針對敵懼近戰、怕傷亡的心理,充分利用我火力突擊效果,與敵近戰膠著,大量殺傷敵有生力量,挫敗敵銳氣,並藉助硬殺傷效果展開心理攻勢,加速敵心理崩潰,對於已進入我預定殲擊區之敵,應充分利用陣前宣傳的政治攻勢,誘使其放棄無謂的抵抗。

Original Source X