2012年10月26日作者：知遠

Over the past decade, the United States has coped with a large number of unconventional warfare challenges. In Afghanistan, for example, at the beginning of 2012, a total of nearly 432,000 in Afghanistan, anti-riot troops, including US soldiers nearly 90,000 people, nearly 30,000 NATO soldiers, the Afghan national security forces of nearly 300,000 people, near the Afghan local police forces 12,000 people. In addition, the United States to this end spends more than 100 billion US dollars, the deployment of a large variety of advanced platforms and systems. On the other hand, “the Taliban” organization to deploy troops in between 20,000 to 40,000 people (the ratio of anti-riot troops to 1:11), the annual cost amounted to between 100 million to 200 million (with a consumption of anti-insurgency operations funds ratio of 1: 500). In addition, the Afghan insurgent groups from the main use of improvised explosive devices to the Internet using asymmetric warfare strategy and tactics. The ability to “Taliban” organization with limited resources to maintain a longer period of insurgency, highlighting the unconventional warfare challenges facing the United States. Accordingly, this report focuses on the following three questions:

• What is the United States may face challenges in the future unconventional warfare?

• What strategies best suited to address future challenges?

• Which existing cases or model can support these strategies effectively deal with unconventional warfare challenges?

And “terrorism”, “insurgency” is very similar to that, “unconventional warfare” has a variety of definitions. From the practical sense, unconventional warfare violent struggle for the national and NGO legitimacy and influence specific populations carried out.Unconventional threats include the use of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, criminal activities and other activities rebel insurrection way countries and organizations. This article begins with a brief discussion of unconventional warfare threats, including threats from national and NGO’s. Then, the paper summarizes the United States in the fight against violence and support the insurrection could take unconventional warfare strategy. Finally, the “village stability operations,” US special forces in Afghanistan (Village Stability Operations, VSO) as an example to discuss.

　First, unconventional warfare challenges

What is the future of the United States could face unconventional warfare challenges?Period of the next decade, the United States will likely face a variety of unconventional warfare challenges, including terrorist groups (such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah), drug trafficking organizations (such as the Mexican “cartels” drug cartels), global violence Activities Group (such as anarchist Group) NGO. In addition, the United States also faced for some countries (such as Iran) for their own purposes and the formation of unconventional warfare threats from some countries (such as Mexico) due to a result of weak dominance.These network threats, adaptability is gradually improving, and has leveraging cyberspace open up recruitment, intelligence gathering, training, spread propaganda, obtain funding and new ways to implement action.

To illustrate the future threat, it is necessary to highlight the al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, and now they have been a big hit because of some mysterious and gradually disappear. Future threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations might cause depends on several factors: Some countries support the weak rule of force surviving leadership structure, North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and other regional and local organizations. According to current trends, al-Qaeda is likely to save important leaders (with the possible exception of Pakistan), the ruling power in some countries will remain weak government, al-Qaeda will be local support in some countries. Al Qaeda may target as always: the overthrow of the monarchy more than one regime to establish pan-Islam (near enemy, or “throw into confusion the enemy within”), against the United States and its allies (the far enemy, or “anti-foreign enemies”). However, these trends are not yet clear how this will develop. For example, al-Qaeda as a global activity may be more dispersed bases in Pakistan to its core strength in Iran (Iran-Qaida), Yemen (AQAP), Somalia (Islamic Youth Corps), North Africa (Islamic Maghreb organizational relationships weaken organized base cloth) or other areas. This dispersion will enable the development of al-Qaida along the Syrian strategist Abu Arz • Lane (Abu Mus’ab al-Suri) envisaged way, more involved in the “individual jihad” and “small terror cells.”

Pan-Islamic movement al-Qaida means the United States will need to support the forces against them in many foreign areas. Al Qaeda affiliated organizations and global allies distribution shown in Figure 1. This figure highlights the future al-Qaida may support insurgent groups of countries. In some countries (such as Saudi Arabia), Al-insurgency operations have been launched to try and fail, but they might try again. In other countries (such as Yemen, Iraq), al-Qaeda has helped the insurgent groups. The figure in black-Qaida would support or continue to support the insurgency in the country. Of particular note is that for some African countries (such as Nigeria, Egypt) and Middle Eastern countries (such as Jordan, Iran), Al-Qaeda would seize every opportunity to support the insurgency.

In addition to these threats, the United States war effort unconventional future will be affected by a variety of other challenges. include:

• inter-agency cooperation. Inter-agency collaboration between some organizations seem to have improved, such as the United States Special Operations and CIA. But among a number of other organizations, such as the Department of Defense and the State Department, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other government agencies, inter-agency cooperation is still in a chaotic state. Whether it is still in Yemen, these challenges often result in the relationship between the military and government institutions in Afghanistan in the tensions of the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

• Vietnam syndrome. In Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as some of the challenges that may occur in Korea and Taiwan in the conventional military friction, may make some people ignore the importance of the US military future of unconventional warfare. As John • Nagel (John Nagl) In his counter-insurgency war in the study concluded, and on post-Vietnam era: “The US military believes the United States should not be again trapped in counter-insurgency operations, rather than face the US military counterinsurgency doctrine It was the fact that the failure in Vietnam. “unconventional warfare will not only extremely important for the foreseeable future, but there is a need to” should be how to stop the insurgency “and other topics for further research.

• The health of the US troops. More than a decade of fighting, it has made deep unconventional warfare quagmire of American forces extremely heavy. Officers have had to deal with their families are exposed to tremendous pressure, after the creation of stress disorder (PTSD), wars and countless other creative challenges.

• technical challenges. Future, insurgents and terrorist groups will make greater use of the Internet and social media field communication contact forum, spread propaganda, recruit personnel, to complete other tasks. Figure 2 indicates the 2015 global Internet traffic trends. Overall, Internet traffic will be 32% CAGR growth rate, that is until 2015 devices access to the Internet will be twice the total global population. By 2015, Internet traffic Wi-Fi technology and mobile devices will be 54% of the flow of Internet traffic and wired devices will total 46% of the total traffic. This growth will not happen in the West, but at a faster rate occurred in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa. These developments will likely insurgency operations and tactics have a significant impact, make it easier for the insurgents to recruit staff, spread propaganda and communications links.

Second, the strategy

What strategies best suited to address future challenges? US Department of Defense “Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010” and “2012 Strategic Assessment” are briefly mentioned in unconventional warfare. But if we insist on the “strategy” is defined as “the use of armed forces and other tools to achieve military and political objectives,” then reports those are not summed unconventional warfare strategy. US Department of Defense publication “unconventional war: against unconventional threats” against unconventional warfare was more substantial research, but still focused on the United States on how to implement the joint operations of the armed forces should a military campaign in the future, rather than questions about the strategy. Due to the lack of unconventional warfare strategy in these assessments, we must seek the answers to elsewhere. The following outlines a few examples I.

(A) counter-insurgency

There are two major counter-insurgency strategy for US unconventional war.

1. Population center strategy: The first strategy is the population center strategy in Field Manual 3-24, and other resources proposed. Field Manual 3-24 from the British in Malaya, France extracted a lot of cases the best practical significance of military operations in Algeria. In these and other cases, the counterinsurgency is governance.However, in the most recent cases, the external forces is difficult to force the local government to make the necessary political change. As the American experience in Vietnam and Afghanistan as external forces can not force local governments to become legal regime. In addition, the deployment of large numbers of foreign troops is not always successful.

2. Indirect strategy: In some cases, the best way might mainly focus on the proposal, indirect strategic equipment and support local conventional and unconventional forces and organizations above. Such assistance, including foreign internal defense (Foreign Internal Defense) and unconventional warfare, has historically become the US Special Operations task forces and intelligence agencies. In the 1950s, the United States and the Philippines since 2001, in the 1960s in Thailand, the early 1990s and the 21st century, Colombia’s aid work, weakening relative success or defeat insurgent groups. In each case, the approach adopted in the USA are indirect rather than a direct way. Indirect way means that the US personnel To combat forces in the host country provide advice and support. Although this support sometimes include tactical leadership issues, but its focus has always been to help the host country instead of the United States against the enemy elements.

(Ii) riot

In other years, the United States might need to support insurgent groups, you may have to select one of the following two strategies.

1. Maoist insurgency strategy: The first strategy is that the United States can choose Mao guerrilla strategy in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the United States had this strategy against the Soviet Union. Such a strategy, a considerable part of the national organization of the population, the government has brought enormous consumption. While Mao Zedong’s guerrilla strategy is to target against the armed forces and their support networks, but the goal is the collapse of the morale of the attacker, but not necessarily the other’s combat strength. Goal of the strategy is not to ensure the rapid defeat the government. As Mao Zedong pointed out, the objective of the strategy is to consume the enemy to make the final surrender, that “the enemy advances, we retreat to the enemy camps, we harass the enemy tires, we attack the enemy retreats, we pursue.”

Mao Zedong’s guerrilla strategy includes three sequential advance and overlapping phases. The first stage is to establish a political and military structures riots among the general public. As Mao summed up: “The main feature is to rely on the people’s guerrilla fronts and other organizations to establish their own.” One of the main objectives of the first phase is to mobilize as many people to participate in sports. When Mao Zedong’s guerrilla strategy implemented in the rural uprising also began for urban riots. If the riots can be gradually achieved support and access to initial victory, then enter the second phase, the main feature of this phase is the most long guerrilla war and the gradual expansion. For more victory, guerrilla warfare will enable the Government military morale, no fighting, and gradually betrayal. So, the war entered the third phase, namely the collapse of the enemy. Riots changed to government collapsed for the purpose of large-scale conventional attack maneuver.

2. Conventional insurrection strategy: the United States can choose the second strategy is routine riot strategy, the United States against “Taliban” in 2001 adopted this strategy in action. This strategy, skip the first two stages of Mao Zedong’s guerrilla strategy, mainly in conventional military action against each other. Elements of the strategy include the use of armed forces to capture or destroy the enemy’s armed forces, so as to control its population, territory, city or important industrial center and communications center.Objective of the strategy is a decisive action or series of actions, by defeating the enemy on which to resist the physical strength to win the war. For example, the riot troops could move forward, seizing strategic facilities the defense side, such as the capital, the communication center or base, while the defender will also take action to confront. Thus the two sides will launch a campaign or a series of battles, until the formation of a party or a political agreement to admit defeat.

Three, efficient sample

Development “Village stability operations” and Afghan local police force is one of the recent anti-insurgency operations in the most efficient mode. After three years, the United States Special Operations Forces have been in the majority of rural development in this model. Their goal is to help the Afghan people conscious action, reconstruction of traditional security institutions, economic development and consistent with Afghan history, culture and informal management. In essence, the “village stability operations” and Afghan local police forces will have joint and inter-institutional features. Since 2009, “village stability operations,” local police forces and the Afghan and US troops deployed in Afghanistan into the rural Afghanistan to help the local community of security, management and development, and enable them to better coupled to the central government. “Village stability operations” and Afghan local police forces according to the point quickly flourish throughout the country, the ultimate success of the “Taliban” to recapture the territory.

CONCLUSIONS

According to recent US experience in unconventional warfare and future threats, following several issues should be considered:

(A) Organization: According to current threats and challenges, the United States Special Operations Forces Command (SOCOM) should be in the fight against the terrorists, insurgents and other unconventional threats of war to play a front-line “defense” role. Although the US economy is more serious, we should continue (if not increase) investment in the future projects, such as the “village stability operations,” local police forces and the Afghan project.

(B) the health of the US troops: As unconventional warfare deployed US soldiers and their families have been treated countless pressures. The possibility of these threats continue to evolve, and the deployment of troops, means that the US Defense Department needs to continue to strengthen the soldiers and their families for the physical and mental health programs. March 2012 occurred in Kandahar, Afghanistan, US soldiers shot and killed civilians, had a negative impact on the US unconventional warfare operations, but also from the broader sense, is not conducive to US foreign policy.

(C) Training and education: especially for US conventional forces, the unconventional warfare military training of a temporary ad hoc in nature. In some core US military agencies, such as the US Army War College, unconventional warfare military training is relatively good. However, the current unconventional warfare military training and investment in danger of being weakened, so some departments and agencies might consider unconventional warfare military training obsolete. After the Vietnam War, and things like that happen, it would be a very serious mistake.

(D) Inter-agency cooperation: Congress may consider supporting one pair of unconventional warfare campaign experience of cooperation across agencies work assessment efforts as they perform operations against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq for cross-agency team made same. Inter-agency cooperation and did not complete the play should have the performance, we should consider an objective, analytical assessments.

Unconventional warfare struggle is a long-term activity, which will continue to be a global battlefield, will extend from the United States, Britain long coastline to Yemen, Pakistan deserted hilltop. This struggle will continue for decades, rather than months or years, this is a concept for most Westerners can not easily handle.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

過去十年內，美國應對了大量非常規戰爭挑戰。以阿富汗戰爭為例，至2012年初期，阿富汗境內共有近432000名反暴亂部隊官兵，其中包括美國官兵近90000人、北約組織官兵近30000人、阿富汗國家安全部隊近300000人、阿富汗地方警察部隊近12000人。另外，美國為此每年花費超過1000億美元，部署了大量各種先進的平台和系統。另一方面，“塔利班”組織部署部隊在20000人至40000人之間（與反暴亂兵力之比為1：11），每年花費額為1億至2億之間（與反暴亂行動資金消耗之比為1：500）。另外，阿富汗暴亂組織主要運用從使用簡易爆炸裝置到因特網作戰的不對稱戰略和戰術。 “塔利班”組織利用有限資源維持較長時間的暴亂活動的能力，凸顯了美國所面臨的非常規戰爭挑戰。因此，本報告主要關注如下三個問題：
•美國未來可能會面臨何種非常規戰爭挑戰？
•何種戰略最適於解決未來挑戰？
•哪種現有案例或者模式能夠支持這些戰略、有效應對非常規戰爭挑戰？
和“恐怖主義”、“暴亂活動”極為相似的是，“非常規戰爭”擁有各種定義。從實踐意義上說，非常規戰爭是國家和非政府組織為特定人群的合法性和影響力而進行的暴力鬥爭。非常規威脅包括運用游擊戰、恐怖主義、陰謀破壞、犯罪活動和暴動叛亂等活動方式的國家和組織。本文首先簡要討論非常規戰爭威脅，包括來自國家和非政府組織的威脅。繼而，本文總結了美國在打擊暴亂和支持暴動時可以採取的非常規戰爭戰略。最後，本文以美軍特種部隊在阿富汗進行的“鄉村穩定行動”（Village Stability Operations，VSO）為範例進行探討。
一、非常規戰爭挑戰
美國未來可能面臨何種非常規戰爭挑戰？在下一個十年時間段內，美國將有可能面臨著各種非常規戰爭挑戰，包括恐怖主義集團（如基地組織和真主黨）、毒品走私組織（如墨西哥“卡特爾”販毒集團）、全球暴力活動集團（如無政府主義分子集團）等非政府組織。此外，美國還面臨著出於某些國家（如伊朗）出於自身目的而形成的、某些國家（如墨西哥）因統治力薄弱而造成的非常規戰爭威脅。這些威脅的網絡性、適應性正在逐步提高，而且已借力網絡空間開拓招募人員、收集情報、進行訓練、散佈宣傳、獲得資助和實施行動的新途徑。
為說明未來威脅，有必要突出強調基地組織及其附屬組織，目前他們因遭到巨大打擊而有些神秘的逐步消失。未來由基地組織及其附屬組織造成的威脅可能會取決於以下幾項因素：領導結構的倖存，北非、中東和南亞等地區國家薄弱的統治力，地方組織的某些支持。根據當前趨勢，基地組織很有可能將保存重要領導人（巴基斯坦可能例外），某些國家政府的統治力將依然薄弱，基地組織將在某些國家得到地方性支持。基地組織的目標也可能一如既往：推翻多個政權建立泛伊斯蘭教王權（近敵，或者說是“攘內敵”），對抗美國及其盟友（遠敵，或者說是“抗外敵”）。但是，這些趨勢將如何發展尚不明朗。例如，基地組織作為一種全球性活動可能更加分散，在巴基斯坦的基地核心力量與其在伊朗（伊朗基地組織）、也門​​（阿拉伯半島基地組織）、索馬里（伊斯蘭青年軍）、北非（伊斯蘭馬格里布基地組織）或者其他地區的基地組織關係弱化。這種分散，將使基地組織沿由敘利亞戰略家​​阿布•阿爾蘇里（Abu Mus’ab al-Suri）所設想的方式發展，更多地捲入“個人聖戰”和“小細胞恐怖行動”。
基地組織的泛伊斯蘭教運動意味著美國將需要對抗他們在多外地區的支持力量。基地組織的附屬組織及全球盟友分佈如圖1所示。此圖突出介紹了未來基地組織可能支持暴亂集團的國家。在部分國家（如沙特阿拉伯），基地已經嘗試發起暴亂行動，而且遭到失敗，但他們可能會再次嘗試。在另外一些國家（如也門、伊拉克），基地組織已經協助了暴亂集團。圖中以黑色顯示基地組織將支持或者繼續支持暴亂活動的國家。特別值得注意的是，對於一些非洲國家（如尼日利亞、埃及）和中東國家（如約旦、伊朗），基地組織將抓住一切機會支持暴亂活動。
2
除了這些威脅，美國未來非常規戰爭努力將會受到其他各種挑戰的影響。包括：
•跨機構合作。跨機構合作似乎在某些組織之間已經有所提升，如美國特種作戰和中央情報局。但在其他一些組織之間，如國防部和國務院、美國國際開發署（USAID）等政府機構，跨機構合作尚處於一種混沌狀態。不管是在阿富汗還是在也門，這些挑戰經常會在戰略、戰役和戰術層次上造成軍事機構和政府機構之間的關係緊張化。
•越戰綜合症。在伊拉克和阿富汗以及在可能發生於朝鮮和台灣的常規性軍事摩擦中的一些挑戰，可能會使美國軍界部分人忽視未來非常規戰爭的重要性。如約翰•納格爾（John Nagl）在他反暴亂戰爭研究中所總結到的，關於越戰後時代：“美國軍隊認為美國不應當再次自陷於反暴亂作戰，而不是直面美國軍隊反暴亂作戰原則在越戰中遭到失敗這一事實。”不但非常規戰爭對於可預見的未來仍將極為重要，而且還有必要對“應當如何制止暴亂活動”等議題進行更進一步的研究。
•美國部隊的健康度。超過十年時間的戰鬥，已經使深陷非常規戰爭泥淖的美國部隊異常沉重。官兵已經不得不處理其家庭所承受的巨大壓力、創作後應激障礙（PTSD）、戰爭創作和其他無數挑戰。
•技術性挑戰。未來，暴亂分子和恐怖主義集團將更多地利用田因特網和社會媒體論壇進行通信聯繫、散佈宣傳、招募人員、完成其他任務。圖2指出了至2015年全球互聯網流量趨勢。總體上說，互聯網流量將以年復合增長率32%的速度增長，也就是至2015年接入國際互聯網的設備將是全球總人口的兩倍。到2015年，Wi-Fi技術和移動設備的互聯網流量將佔總流量的54%，而有線設備的互聯網流量將佔總流量的46%。這一增長將不僅僅發生於西方，而是將以更快的速率發生於拉丁美洲、中東和非洲。這些發展，將有可能會暴亂行動及其戰術產生重大影響，使暴亂分子更輕易的招募人員、散佈宣傳和通信聯繫。
圖2. 2010-2015年全球互聯網流量2
圖2. 2010-2015年全球互聯網流量[保存到相冊]

二、戰略
何種戰略最適於解決未來挑戰？美國國防部《2010年四年防務評估報告》​​和《2012年戰略評估》都簡要提及了非常規戰爭。但是，如果我們堅持將“戰略”定義為“運用武裝力量和其他工具達到軍事和政治目標”的話，這些文件報告都沒有總結出非常規戰爭戰略。美國國防部出版物《非常規戰爭：對抗非常規威脅》對非常規戰爭進行了更多實質性研究，但仍然主要集中於美國武裝力量應當如何在未來一場軍事戰役中實施聯合作戰，而不是關於戰略的問題。由於在這些評估工作中缺乏非常規戰爭戰略，我們必須向別處尋求答案。以下我概要介紹幾個範例。
（一）反暴亂
有兩種主要的反暴亂戰略適用於美國的非常規戰爭。
1.人口中心戰略：第一種戰略是在戰地手冊3-24和其他資源中提出的人口中心戰略。戰地手冊3-24從英國在馬來亞、法國在阿爾及利亞的軍事行動中提取了很多具有最佳實踐意義的案例。在這些以及其他案例中，反暴亂也就是治理。但是，在大部分近期案例中，外部勢力很難迫使當地政府作出必要的政治性改變。正如美國在越南和阿富汗所經歷的那樣，外部勢力無法強迫當地政府成為合法政權。另外，部署大量外來兵力也不是總能取得成功。
2.間接戰略：在一些案例中，最好的途徑可能會將主要著力點放在建議、裝備和支援當地常規和非常規部隊和組織之上的間接戰略。這種援助，包括國外內部防禦(Foreign Internal Defense)和非常規戰爭，已經歷史性地成為美國特種作戰部隊和情報機構的任務。美國在20世紀50年代以及自2001年開始對菲律賓、20世紀60年代對泰國、20世紀90年代和21世紀初對哥倫比亞的援助工作，相對成功地削弱或者擊敗了暴亂集團。在每一案例中，美國所採用的都是間接途徑而不是直接途徑。間接途徑意味著美國人員要向作戰中的主辦國部隊提供建議和支持。雖然這一支持有時也會包括戰術領導力問題，但其焦點始終是幫助主辦國而不是美國元素對抗敵人。
（二）暴動
在另外一些時間裡，美國可能會需要支持暴亂集團，可能必須在以下兩種戰略選擇其一。
1.毛澤東主義者的暴動戰略：美國可以選擇的第一種戰略是毛澤東游擊戰略，在上世紀80年代的阿富汗戰場上，美國就曾以此戰略對抗蘇聯。這種戰略，組織相當一部分國家人口，為政府帶來巨大消耗。雖然毛澤東游擊戰略的目標是對抗武裝力量及其支持網絡，但其目標是瓦解攻擊者的鬥志，而不一定是對方的作戰實力。這種戰略的目標並不是確保迅速擊潰政府。正如毛澤東所指出的，戰略的目標是消耗敵人使之最終投降，即“要敵進我退，敵駐我擾，敵疲我打，敵退我追。”
毛澤東游擊戰略包括三個順序推進又相互重疊的階段。第一階段是在人民大眾中建立暴動政治和軍事結構。如毛澤東所總結的：“游擊戰的主要特徵就是依靠人民群眾自己建立戰線和其他組織。”第一階段的主要目標之一，是發動盡可能多的人民參加運動。當毛澤東游擊戰略貫徹於農村暴動，也就開始適用於城市暴動。如果暴動可以逐步取得支持並獲得初步勝利，則進入第二個階段，這一最為漫長的階段的主要特點是游擊戰爭和逐步擴張。獲得更多勝利後，游擊戰將使政府軍事力量士氣低落、毫無鬥志、逐漸背叛。如此，戰爭就進入第三階段，即瓦解敵人。暴亂轉變為以政府垮台為目的的大規模常規機動攻擊。
2.常規暴動戰略：美國可以選擇的第二種戰略是常規暴動戰略，美國在2001年打擊“塔利班”行動中採取了這一戰略。這一戰略，跳過毛澤東游擊戰略的前兩個階段，主要以常規軍事行動打擊對方。戰略的內容包括運用武裝力量俘獲或者破壞敵方武裝力量，從而控制其人口、領土、城市或者重要工業中心和通信中心。戰略的目標是以一次決定性行動或者一系列行動，通過擊敗敵人賴以抵抗的物理實力，贏得戰爭。例如，暴動部隊可能會向前推進，奪取防禦方的戰略設施，如首都、通信中心或者基地，而防禦方則也採取行動進行對抗。雙方因此將展開一場戰役或者一系列戰役，直到了一方承認失敗或者形成政治協定。
三、有效的範例
“鄉村穩定行動”和阿富汗地方警察部隊的發展是近期反暴亂行動的最有效模式之一。此前三年，美國特種作戰部隊一直在廣大農村發展這一模式。他們的目標是幫助阿富汗人民自覺行動起來，重建傳統性安全機構、經濟發展和與阿富汗歷史、文化相一致的非正式管理。在本質上，“鄉村穩定行動”和阿富汗地方警察部隊就具有聯合性和跨機構性的特點。自2009年開始，“鄉村穩定行動”和阿富汗地方警察部隊部署阿富汗和美國兵力進入阿富汗農村，幫助地方群落的安全、管理和發展，使他們更好地聯結於中央政府。 “鄉村穩定行動”和阿富汗地方警察部隊的根據點很快在整個國家內蓬勃發展，最終成功從“塔利班”手中奪回了領土。
四、結論
根據美國近期在非常規戰爭和未來威脅的經驗，對以下幾項問題應當加以考慮：
（一）組織：根據當前威脅和挑戰，美國特種作戰部隊司令部（SOCOM）應當在打擊恐怖分子、暴亂分子和其他非常規戰爭威脅中發揮前線“國防部”的作用。儘管美國的經濟形勢較為嚴峻，我們還是應當繼續（如果不是增加）對未來各種項目的投資，如“鄉村穩定行動”和阿富汗地方警察部隊項目。
（二）美國部隊的健康度：由於非常規戰爭部署，美國官兵及其家庭已經處理了無數壓力。這些威脅的可能性繼續發展以及兵力部署，意味著美國國防部需要繼續加強針對官兵及其家庭的身體和心理健康項目。 2012年3月發生於阿富汗坎大哈省的美國士兵槍殺平民事件，為美國非常規戰爭行動帶來了負面影響，而且從更廣泛的意義上說也不利於美國外交政策。
（三）訓練和教育：特別是對於美國常規部隊來說，非常規戰爭軍事訓練具有臨時特設的性質。在一些美國核心軍事機構，如美國陸軍戰爭學院，非常規戰爭軍事訓練相對較好。但是，目前非常規戰爭軍事訓練和投資面臨著被消弱的危險，因此某些部門和機構可能會認為非常規戰爭軍事訓練已經過時。和越南戰爭之後所發生的事一樣，這將是一個極為重大的錯誤。
（四）跨機構合作：國會可能會考慮支持一項對非常規戰爭戰役中的跨機構合作經驗進行評估的工作，正如他們對正在阿富汗和伊拉克執行打擊恐怖主義行動的跨機構團隊所做的努力一樣。跨機構合作並沒有完成發揮出應當具備的效能，我們應當考慮進行一項客觀性、解析性評估。
非常規戰爭鬥爭是一種長期的活動，其戰場仍將是全球性的，會從美國、英國漫長海岸線延伸到也門、巴基斯坦荒無人煙的山頂。這一斗爭將持續數十年，而不是幾個月或者幾年，這是一項對大部分西方人來說都無法輕易處理的概念。

Source:  http://mil.sohu.com/20121026