國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 // Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

國外軍事家看中國特色的信息戰 //

Chinese Characteristics of Information Warfare: Foreign Military Observations

In recent years, information warfare has become a hot spot all over the world.China’s military strategists have not neglected their importance as a tool of war, and are accelerating the development of information warfare theory. They are not only exploring theoretical issues, but also training troops.

Information warfare with Chinese characteristics

Chinese military theorists believe that information warfare can give Mao Zedong’s people’s war ideas into the omission. This view by the Chinese information warfare expert Wang Pufeng (transliteration) generals in 1995 for the first time. Some people think that electronics, computer and information engineering experts, like the past soldiers on the battlefield, can become the main force in the new people’s war. Obviously they want to use the people’s war ideas to fight the information war – a war with a home computer, when necessary to mobilize thousands of people, attack foreign computer systems. China has a number of outstanding software experts, in the field of information war has great potential. The question is how to seek greater information space and equipment for the huge population.

“The whole society will replace the traditional battlefield,” said Shen Weiguang, an information warfare expert. “Different classes and social groups will participate in political activities in their own country or other countries.” He advocates the establishment of a scientist, police, Other experts to form the information protection forces to defend the security of the national information field, to counter the invasion of information launched by other countries.

The idea of ​​combining the people’s war with the information war is being carried out in China’s 1.5 million strong reserve army. The People’s Liberation Army is turning the reserve forces of certain military sub-divisions into small-scale information warfare. In Hubei, a military division, the People’s Armed Forces Department has 20 towns of the armed forces to form a reserve / militia information warfare. The Department has a network of war camps, electronic war camps, intelligence and psychological camps, and 35 technical units (classes to camp). The department has also established the first training base for information services that can accommodate 500 people.

The above-mentioned military division is not the only military division of the organization’s reserve and militia for information warfare. “Liberation Army Daily” has reported that in December 1999 a city along the southeast coast held a meeting of the reserve and militia forces, during the electronic interference, network attack and defense and radar reconnaissance and other red. There are also reports of information warfare activities organized by the People’s Armed Forces and the Armed Forces in other regions.

In the information war era, China is also affected by another important tactics, that is, China’s “thirty-six dollars.” About 300 years ago, an unnamed scholar collected 36 Chinese tactics, and compiled a book, named “thirty-six dollars.” The book focuses on deception as a military art that achieves military goals. In the information age, due to the unknown uncertainty of the attacker’s origin (the program’s listening to the source of the virus and the presence of the back door increases the vulnerability of the system), some tactics may be reusable, thirty-six may find new Meaning and new use.

Some critics argue that in today’s high-tech era, these ancient strategies are hard to do. However, just look at a few of them, then it is another situation: the first plan “deceive”, meaning by resorting to deceit and camouflage means to hide their true intentions, in order to achieve the purpose of loosening the enemy vigilance. Applying to information wartime is the use of regular e-mail and commercial lines on the Internet to cover the purpose of sending dangerous code and viruses. The fourth meter “to wait and see”. Meaning that when fighting their own recharge your batteries, until the enemy fatigue chaos, take the opportunity to win. Application to the information wartime is the use of people’s war theory, extensive mobilization of the masses to attack, until all the Western computer to meet the difficulty of self-propelled when the implementation of large-scale attack.

At present, China is considering the establishment of future high-tech operations of the “network army.” It will protect the network sovereignty, network warfare and technology and knowledge-intensive operations. Network technology will include: can decipher the password, steal data and restore data browsing technology; can attack on the network and attack counterattack technology; can fake fake identity from the network to steal the license of camouflage technology; to avoid attacks, Prevent internal leaks, and defensive techniques that prevent random action like electronic police.

Definition of information warfare

China’s famous author of the issue of information warfare at home and abroad is Dr. Shen Weiguang, Major General Wang Pufeng, Wang Baoji University and Yuan Bangji General (both sound Ze). In 1996, Dr. Shen first proposed the definition of information warfare: information war is a two sides through the control of information and intelligence to try to master the battlefield initiative of the war. As the United States defined, Dr. Shen stressed that “save yourself, fight against the enemy” into “to protect themselves, control the enemy.” Wang generals also believe that the key to information warfare is to control the information.
In 1997, Wang Baoji University from the perspective of China’s military science and Marxism-Leninism to elaborate on the word information warfare. This article covers the form, nature, hierarchy, characteristics, characteristics and principles of information warfare. He believes that the form of information warfare is divided into normal, crisis and wartime three; nature is attack and defense of the contest; level is divided into national, strategic, theater and tactical four; features include command and control warfare, intelligence war Such as electronic warfare, psychological warfare, space control warfare, hacking warfare, virtual warfare, economic warfare, strategic and precise contest, etc .; features complex, transparent, limited target, short duration, small damage, large combat space, Comprehensive, strong command capability, etc .; in principle, to take cut, blinded, transparent, fast melon and improve the viability and other measures. His office and analysis of information warfare help people gain a deeper understanding of China’s information warfare.

Another author of China’s definition of information war is the General Staff of the PLA General Staff, he wrote in the 1999 book that: “Information war is a capture and maintain the control of information and struggle between the hostile parties Compete for access to control and use of information initiative, they use and protect their own information and resources and information systems at the same time, will use and destroy the enemy’s information resources, information systems and information-based weapons systems.

In 2000, General Wang Pufeng made a more thorough and thorough explanation of the “information warfare” than he used to be “information war”. Wang believes that the information war refers to a war and a war mode; information warfare refers to a kind of combat and a combat mode. The new mode of action refers to the action that is carried out in the computer network. Information warfare includes information detection systems, information transmission systems, information and weapons attack systems, and information processing and application systems. Information warfare contains information warfare, which combines information and ability to use information networks based on the battlefield as their place of activity.

Information warfare training

In February 1999, an interesting article on information warfare training defined information warfare as a knowledge war, a special contest for the power of high intelligence. The definition stems from the fact that high-tech warfare requires commanders and operators to have a high level of knowledge, strong mental, command and operational skills.
Chinese military leaders, after recognizing the gap between the above and the more developed countries, decided to carry out training activities at all levels. The staff will be divided into three categories by age:

The first category for the support of talent, the main goal is more than 40 years of age at all levels of leading cadres. The aim is to eliminate their blind spots by training (from mechanization concepts to simulated computer fights) to change their minds and apply them to future wars. Training content includes: information technology foundation, information warfare theory, information warfare weapons universal knowledge. Training methods of color training courses and other auxiliary methods.

The second category is a transitional talent, training goal is 30-40 year old cadres. As the future leaders of the Chinese army, they must focus on improving the commanding ability in the information warfare environment.

The third category for the regeneration of talent, training for the 30-year-old cadres. These people have long been adapted to the information society, with a good foundation of modern information technology theory, focusing on improving their commanding ability and skills.

The training of various age groups includes: basic theory (computer foundation and application, communication network technology, information highway, digital force); electronic warfare; radar technology; information war rules and rules; information strategy and tactics; theater and strategic information warfare Information systems (including the collection of letters, processing, information and use of information warfare); monitoring, decision-making and control systems; information weapons (soft and hard destruction of the concept and principles, how to use information weapons, analog information warfare); information system protection; Computer virus attack and defense, as well as communication network interference and anti-interference.

The article shows that China is preparing a first-class information warfare course. However, subsequent reports indicate that this is not the case. In July 1999, a “Liberation Army Daily” pointed out: “training content, system and structure of the rationality of the information warfare training can not really become the mainstream of our military training.Currently, information warfare training in a state of arbitrary. System, operation is not standardized, the lack of assessment standards and management regulations.

Information warfare

Over the past three years, China has held several major information warfare military exercises, every time it is important, because it is a test of information war theory. The first “special war” (information warfare) exercise was conducted in October 1997; a military army in a military area was subjected to a computer attack aimed at paralyzing its system, and the group’s military antivirus software was defended. The exercise is called “invasion and anti-intrusion exercise”. The exercise used ground logistics, medical and air forces.

In October 1998, China held a high-tech comprehensive exercise with several national military zones. The first use of the “military information superhighway” was used for joint defense operations. The information network subsystem in the command automation system is composed of digital, dialing, command network and secret channel. The other parts of the command automation system are subsystems such as command warfare, audio and graphics processing, control and data encryption. Military information highway in addition to the trend map, but also send graphics, characters and audio data.

In October 1999, the People’s Liberation Army for the first time between the two groups of war-level computer online confrontation exercise. Conducted reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance, interference and anti-interference, blockade and anti-blockade, air strikes and anti-air raid and other subjects. In the software environment, resource sharing, combat command, situation display, auxiliary evaluation, signal transmission and intelligence warfare and other six types of operations. The computer evaluation system conducts mathematical and qualitative analysis of the performance of the participant.
In July 2000, a military area in southwest China also conducted an online confrontation exercise. The three training tasks related to the exercise are: organizing and planning the campaign, seizing air power and making information, implementing breakthroughs and breaking down. There are more than 100 terminal networking involved in the exercise. Three weeks later, another military area also opened a high-tech exercise curtain, and issued to the subordinate units began to control the communication line command.

China ‘s Information Warfare Ability

Chinese military theorists have found a voluntary, very economical and obedient partner in information warfare. This partner will enable China to catch up with the West in strategic, military and international status. Which will enable China to play an important strategic role in the future Asia-Pacific region. China may gradually pay close attention to economic competitors.

China attaches great importance to the role played by the new information warfare forces, including the network forces (independent arms), the network warriors commando, the information protection forces, the information corps, the electronic police and the joint people’s war network. The latter is particularly concerned by foreign analysts because of its unique nature and potential. Chinese military theorists believe that the victory of information warfare will belong to the one who can mobilize the most computer experts to participate in the “information family war”, they will use such as cyber war strategy, trying to cut off important information nodes and contacts.

At present, China’s information warfare combines Western, Russian and Chinese ideas. However, information wars with Chinese characteristics, which are different from Russia and the West, are gradually forming. China’s information warfare should look for answers to the questions from today’s military history, such as the nature and characteristics of information warfare.

However, there are still many shortcomings in China’s information warfare methods, not just quantitative aspects. The core of the information warfare theory also involves maintaining the integrity and stability of the infrastructure. In the information age, infrastructure stability is as important as troop survivability. China’s biggest weakness is just in terms of infrastructure. At present, China is accelerating the development of electronic information industry, its purpose is nothing more than for the military and civilian information base for the use of infrastructure.

China is good at drawing lessons from others, may soon be able to set up a compelling information warfare force. Information war has forced China to cross a number of technological development stages, the use of Western technology, not only save time but also save money. However, China may not fully follow the example of others, but will take a creative or indirect information war strategy. But no matter what, China is worthy of attention is different from other countries, the power of information.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

近些年來,信息戰已經成為全世界的熱點。中國的軍事家們也沒有忽視其作為戰爭工具的重要意義,正在加速發展信息戰理論。他們不僅正在探索理論方面的課題,而且也在據此訓練部隊。

中國特色的信息戰

中國軍事理論家認為,信息戰可以給毛澤東的人民戰爭思想注入省略。此觀點由中國信息戰專家王普峰(音譯)將軍於1995年首次提出。有人認為,電子、計算機和信息工程專家如同過去戰場上的將士一樣,可以成為新人民戰爭中的主力軍。顯然他們是希望用人民戰爭思想打信息戰--一種用家用微機即可進行的戰爭,需要時動員成千上萬人,攻擊外國計算機系統。中國擁有一批傑出的軟件專家,在信息戰領域有巨大潛力。問題是如何為龐大的人口尋求更大的信息空間和設備。

信息戰專家沈偉光在文章中寫道:“整個社會將取代傳統戰場。不同階層和社會團體將參與本國或其他國家的政治活動。”他主張建立一支由精通信息戰的科學家、警察、士兵和其他專家組成的信息保護部隊,以捍衛國家信息領域的安全,反擊其他國家發動的信息入侵。

將人民戰爭和信息戰相結合的思想正在貫徹到中國150萬強大後備軍中。人民解放軍正將某些軍分區的後備役部隊變成小型信息戰團。在湖北某軍分區,人民武裝部已將20個城鎮的武裝部組成一個後備役/民兵信息戰團。該部擁有網絡戰營、電子戰營、情報和心理戰營,以及35支技術分隊(班到營)。該部還建立了第一個可容納500人的後備役信息戰訓練基地。

上述軍分區並非是組織後備役和民兵進行信息戰訓練的唯一軍分區。 《解放軍報》曾報導說,1999年12月東南沿海某城市舉行了一次運用後備役和民兵部隊的會議,期間進行了電子乾擾,網絡攻防和雷達偵察等演紅。同樣還有其他地區人武部和軍分區組織信息戰活動的報導。

在信息戰時代,中國還受到另一個重要戰法的影響,即中國的“三十六計”。大約300年前,一位無名學者蒐集到中國的36個計謀,並彙編成書,取名為《三十六計》。該書著重將欺騙作為達成軍事目標的軍事藝術。在信息時代,因攻擊者來歷不明的情況不確定性(程序聽病毒源和存在的後門增大了系統的易損性),有些計謀可能會重新有用武之地,三十六計可能會找到新含義和新用途。

一些評論家認為,在當今的高技術時代,這些古代計策難有作為。然而,只需看看其中的幾計,則又是另一番情況:第一計“瞞天過海”,意思是通過採取欺騙和偽裝的手段隱藏自己的真實意圖,以達到鬆懈敵人警惕性的目的。應用到信息戰時就是使用互聯網上的正規電子郵件和商業線路來掩蓋發送危險代碼和病毒的目的。第四計“以逸待勞”。意思是作戰時自己養精蓄銳,待敵疲勞混亂時,乘機出擊取勝。應用到信息戰時就是利用人民戰爭理論,廣泛發動群眾進行攻擊,待所有西方計算機應爭反應小級難以自拔時再實施大規模進攻。

目前中國正考慮建立未來高科技作戰的“網絡軍”。它將保護網絡主權,進行網絡戰以及技術和知識密集型作戰。網絡技術將包括:能破譯密碼、偷取數據和恢復數據的瀏覽技術;能在網絡上發起攻擊和乾擾的反擊技術;能通過偽造假身份從網絡竊取許可權的偽裝技術;能避開攻擊、防止內部洩密以及像電子警察那樣阻止隨意行動的防禦技術。

信息戰的定義

中國探討國內外信息戰問題的著名作者是沈偉光博士、王普鋒少將、王保存大校和袁邦概將軍(均為音澤)。 1996年,沈博士首次提出信息戰定義:信息戰是一場雙方通過控制信息和情報輿來設法掌握戰場主動權的戰爭。正如美國界定的那樣,沈博士強調把“保存自己,打擊敵人”變為“保護自己,控制敵人”。王將軍也認為信息戰取勝的關鍵是控制信息。
1997年,王保存大校從中國軍事科學和馬列主義的角度精闢地闡述字信息戰問題。該文涵蓋信息戰的形式、性質、層次、特徵、特點和原則。他認為:形式上信息戰分為平時、危機時和戰時三種;性質上是攻與防的較量;層次分為國家、戰略、戰區和戰術四級;特徵包括指揮與控制戰、情報戰、電子戰、心理戰、空間控制戰、黑客戰、虛擬戰、經濟戰、戰略和精確的較量等;特點有復雜、透明、目標有限、持續時間短、毀傷小、戰鬥空間大、部隊疏散、綜合性強、指揮能力要求強等;原則上採取切斷、蒙蔽、透明、快速瓜和提高生存力等措施。他對信息戰的辦公室和分析有助於人們更深入了解中國的信息戰。

中國另一位界定信息戰的作者是解放軍總參謀部的袁將軍,他在1999年撰寫的書中認為:“信息戰是一場奪取和保持信息控制權而進行的鬥爭,是敵對雙方之間爭奪獲取控制和使用信息主動權的鬥爭,他們在使用和保護己方各種信息戰資源和信息系統的同時,會利用和破壞敵方的信息資源、信息系統和基於信息的武器系統。

2000年,王普鋒將軍對“信息戰爭”作了比以往更深入透徹的解釋,以別於“信息戰”。王將軍認為,信息戰爭指的是一種戰爭和一種戰爭模式;信息戰指的是一種作戰和一種作戰模式。之種新作戰模式指的是在計算機網絡窨進行的行動。信息戰包括信息探測系統、信息傳輸系統、信息和武器攻擊系統以及信息處理和應用系統。信息戰爭包含信息戰,兩者將信息和能力融為一體,使用以信息網絡為基礎的戰場作為他們的活動場所。

信息戰訓練

1999年2月,一篇關於信息戰訓練的有趣文章將信息戰界定為知識型戰爭,是高智能人才之間力量的特殊較量。該定義源於這樣一個事實:高技術戰爭需要指揮員和操作員有很高的知識、很強的心理素質、指揮能力和作戰技術。
中國軍方領導人在認識到上述幾方面與較發達國家存在的差距後,決定在各級開展訓練活動。將人員按年齡分為3類:

第一類為支撐型人才,主要目標是40多歲以上的各級領導幹部。目的是通過訓練(從機械化概念到模擬計算機戰鬥)消除他們的信息盲區,轉變他們的觀念,使其將新思維應用到未來戰爭中去。訓練內容包括:信息技術基礎、信息戰理論、信息戰武器普及知識。訓練方法彩短訓班和其他輔助方法。

第二類為過渡型人才,培養目標是30-40歲的干部。作為中國軍隊的未來領導者,他們必須著重提高信息戰環境下的指揮能力。

第三類為再生型人才,培養對象為30歲以下的干部。這些人早已適應信息社會,擁有現代信息技術理論的良好根基,重點是提高他們的指揮能力和技藝。

各個年齡組的訓練包括:基礎理論(計算機基礎和應用、通信網絡技術、信息高速公路、數字化部隊);電子對抗;雷達技術;信息戰規律與規則;信息戰略與戰術;戰區與戰略信息戰的信息系統(包括收信紙、處理、輿和使用信息戰指令);監測、決策和控制系統;信息武器(軟、硬破壞的概念和原則、如何應用信息武器、模擬信息戰);信息系統保護;計算機病毒攻與防,以及通信網絡的干擾與反干擾。

該文章表明中國正在編制第一流的信息戰課程。然而,後來的報導表明情況並非如此。 1999年7月的一份《解放軍報》指出:“訓練內容、體制和結構的無理性使信息戰訓練不能真正成為我軍訓練的主流。目前,信息戰訓練處於一種隨心所欲的狀態。內容不系統,運作不規範,缺乏評估標準和管理規章”。

信息戰演練

過去3年,中國舉行過數次重大信息戰軍事演習,每次都很重要,因為那是對信息戰理論的一次檢驗。首次“特種戰”(信息戰)演練於1997年10月進行;某軍區的一個集團軍遭到旨在癱瘓其係統的計算機攻擊,該集團軍用殺毒軟件進行了防衛。該演練被稱為“入侵與反入侵演練”。演習時運用了地面後勤、醫療和空軍部隊。

1998年10月,中國舉行了一場有全國數個軍區聯合進行的高科技綜合演練。聯合防禦作戰演練時首次使用了“軍事信息高速公路”。指揮自動化系統中的信息網絡子系統由數字、撥號、指揮網和保密信道組成。指揮自動化系統的其他部分是指揮作戰、音頻和圖形處理、控制和數據加密等子系統。軍事信息高速公路除傳勢圖外,還發發送圖形、字符和音頻數據。

1999年10月,解放軍首次進行了兩個集團軍之間的戰役級計算機網上對抗演練。演練了偵察與反偵察、干擾與反干擾、封鎖與反封鎖、空襲與反空襲等科目。在軟件環境下進行了資源共享、作戰指揮、態勢顯示、輔助評估、信號傳輸和情報戰等6類作業。計算機評估系統對參演者的表現進行數理與質量分析。
2000年7月,西南某軍區也進行了網上對抗演練。與此次演練有關的3項訓練任務是:組織和計劃戰役、奪取制空權和製信息權、實施突破和反突破。有100多台終端聯網參與了演練。三週後,另一個軍區也拉開了高技術演練的帷幕,並向下屬部隊下達開始控制通信線路的命令。

中國的信息戰能力

中國軍事理論家已在信息戰方面找到一個自願、非常經濟和順從的伙伴。這個夥伴將使中國在戰略、軍事和國際地位上趕上西方。這將使中國在未來亞太地區發揮重要的戰略作用。中國可能會逐步引起經濟競爭者的密切關注。

中國異常重視新信息戰部隊所表現出的作用,這方面的各種組織包括:網絡部隊(獨立兵種)、網絡勇士突擊隊、信息保護部隊、信息兵團、電子警察和聯合的人民戰爭網絡機構。後者因其獨特的性質和潛力引起外國分析家格外關注。中國軍事理論家認為,信息戰的勝利將屬於能夠動員最多的計算機專家參加“信息家庭戰”的那一方,他們將採用諸如網點戰那樣的戰略,設法切斷重要的信息節點和接點。

目前,中國的信息戰融合了西方、俄羅斯和中國的思想,然而,有別於俄羅斯和西方的具有中國特色的信息戰詞彙正在逐步形成。中國信息戰應從中國軍事歷史中尋找解決當今問題的答案,如36計、信息戰的性質和特點看來非常適合這些計策。

但是,中國的信息戰方法還存在許多不足,還不僅僅是數量方面的問題。信息戰作戰理論的核心還涉及到保持基礎設施的完整性和穩定性。在信息時代,基礎設施穩定性與部隊生存能力同等重要。中國的最大弱點恰恰就在基礎設施方面。目前中國正在加速發展電子信息產業,其目的不外乎是為軍民聯用的信息基礎設施打基礎。

中國善於吸取別人的前車之鑑,可能很快就可以組建一支令人刮目相看的信息戰力量。信息戰已迫使中國跨越了若干技術發展階段,利用西方的技術,不僅節省了時間而且還節省了金錢。然而,中國可能不會完全仿效別人,而將採取創造性的或間接的信息戰策略。但不管怎麼樣,中國都是值得關注的一支不同於其他國家的信息戰力量.

Original Date: 新華網 ( 2003-06-12 16:0x:xx )

Original Source:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2003-06/12/content_916888.htm

中國新的網絡安全法 // Internet Security Law of the People ‘s Republic of China

中國新的網絡安全法 // Internet Security Law of the People ‘s Republic of China

Table of Contents

    Chapter 1 General Provisions

Chapter 2 Network Security Support and Promotion

Chapter 3 Network Operation Safety

Section 1 General Provisions

SECTION 2: Operational safety of key information infrastructures

Chapter 4 Network Information Security

Chapter 5 Monitoring Early Warning and Emergency Handling

Chapter VI Legal Liability

Chapter VII Supplementary Provisions

Chapter 1 General Provisions

The first order to protect network security , safeguard cyberspace sovereignty and national security , public interests , protection of citizens , legal persons and other organizations , to promote the healthy development of economic and social information , this law is enacted .

Article in the territory of People’s Republic of China construction , operation , maintenance and use of the network , as well as supervision and management of network security , this Law shall apply .

Third countries adhere to both network security and information technology development , follow the active use , scientific development , according to management , to ensure the safety policy , promote the network infrastructure construction and interoperability , to encourage innovation and application of network technology , to support the development of network security personnel , Establish and improve the network security system , improve network security protection .

Article 4 The State shall formulate and continuously improve the network security strategy , clearly define the basic requirements and main objectives of the network security , and put forward the network security policies , tasks and measures in the key areas .

Article 5 The State shall take measures to monitor , defend and dispose of network security risks and threats arising from the territory of the People’s Republic of China , protect the critical information infrastructure from attack , intrusion , interference and destruction , punish the network for criminal activities and maintain the network Space security and order .

Article 6 The State shall promote the network behavior of honesty and trustworthiness , health and civilization , promote the dissemination of socialist core values , and take measures to raise the awareness and level of cybersecurity in the whole society and form a favorable environment for the whole society to participate in promoting network security .

Article VII countries active in cyberspace governance , network technology research and standards development , the fight against international exchange and cooperation network and other crimes , to promote the building of peace , security , open , cooperative cyberspace , multilateral , democratic , transparent network Governance system .

Article VIII of the National Network Information Department is responsible for co-ordination network security and related supervision and administration . State Council department in charge of telecommunications , public security departments and other relevant authorities in accordance with this Law and other relevant laws , administrative regulations , responsible for network security and supervision and administration within their respective areas of responsibility .

Local people’s governments above the county level of network security and regulatory functions , determined in accordance with relevant state regulations .

Article IX network and service operators to carry out business activities , must abide by laws , administrative regulations , respect social ethics , abide by business ethics , honesty and credit , fulfill the obligation to protect network security , and accept the supervision of government and society , social responsibility .

Article X build , operate or provide network services through a network , it should be in accordance with laws , regulations and national standards and administrative regulations of mandatory requirements , technical measures and other necessary measures , to ensure network security , stable operation , to effectively deal with network security incidents , Prevent cyber criminal activities , maintain the integrity of network data , confidentiality and usability .

Article XI  network-related industry organizations accordance with the constitution , strengthen self-discipline , to develop guidelines for network security behavior , guide members to strengthen network security , increase network security levels , and promote the healthy development of the industry .

Article XII of  the State protection of citizens , legal persons and other organizations the right to use the network in accordance with law , the promotion of universal access network , improve network service levels , and provide safe , convenient network services , to protect the free flow of network information according to law and orderly .

Any person and organization using the network should abide by the constitutional law , abide by the public order , respect social morality , not endanger the network security , shall not use the network to endanger national security , honor and interests , incite subversion of state power , overthrow the socialist system , incitement to split the country , The destruction of national unity , the promotion of terrorism , extremism , the promotion of national hatred , ethnic discrimination , the dissemination of violence , obscene pornography , fabricating and disseminating false information to disrupt economic order and social order , and infringe upon the reputation , privacy , intellectual property and other legitimate rights and interests of others And other activities .

Article XIII  countries to support research and development is conducive to healthy growth of minors networking products and services , punishing minors using the Internet to endanger physical and mental health activities according to law , to provide security for minors , healthy network environment .

Article 14  Any individual or organization shall have the right to report to the network , telecommunications , public security and other departments that are harmful to the safety of the Internet . The department that receives the report shall handle it in a timely manner and if it does not belong to the duties of the department , it shall promptly transfer the department to be handled .

The relevant departments shall keep the relevant information of the whistleblower and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the whistleblower .

Chapter 2 Network Security Support and Promotion

Article 15 The  State shall establish and improve the network security standard system . The department in charge of standardization of the State Council and other relevant departments under the State Council shall, in accordance with their respective duties , organize and formulate and revise the national standards and industry standards for network security management and network products , services and operation safety .

National support enterprises , research institutions , colleges and universities , network-related industry organizations to participate in network security national standards , industry standards .

Article 16 The   State Council and the people’s governments of provinces , autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government shall make overall plans , increase investment , support key network security technology industries and projects , support the research and development and application of network security technology , promote safe and reliable network products and services , Protection of network technology intellectual property rights , support enterprises , research institutions and colleges and universities to participate in national network security technology innovation projects .

Article 17 The   State shall promote the construction of a social security service system for network security and encourage the relevant enterprises and institutions to carry out safety services such as network security certification , testing and risk assessment .

Article 18 The   State encourages the development of network data security protection and utilization technology to promote the opening of public data resources and promote technological innovation and economic and social development .

State support innovative network security management , the use of new network technologies , enhance network security level .

Article XIX   governments at all levels and relevant departments should organize regular network security education , and guidance , and urge the relevant units to do network safety publicity and education work .

The mass media should be targeted to the community for network security publicity and education .

Article 20 The  State shall support enterprises and institutions of higher education , vocational schools and other educational and training institutions to carry out network safety-related education and training , and adopt a variety of ways to train network security personnel and promote the exchange of network security personnel .

Chapter 3 Network Operation Safety

Section 1 General Provisions

Article 21 The  State shall implement a system of network security protection . Network operators should be in accordance with the requirements of the network security level protection system , perform the following security obligations , to protect networks from interference , damage or unauthorized access , preventing data leakage or stolen , tampered with :

( 1 ) to formulate internal safety management systems and operating procedures , to determine the network security responsible person , the implementation of network security protection responsibility ;

( 2 ) to take precautions against computer viruses and network attacks , network intrusion and other hazards of network security behavior of technical measures ;

( 3 ) to take technical measures to monitor and record the operation status of the network and the network security incident , and to keep the relevant network log in accordance with the regulations for not less than six months ;

( D ) to take data classification , important data backup and encryption and other measures ;

( 5 ) other obligations stipulated by laws and administrative regulations .

Article 22 The  network products and services shall conform to the mandatory requirements of the relevant national standards . Network products , service providers may not set up malicious programs ; found their network products , services, security defects , loopholes and other risks , should immediately take remedial measures , in accordance with the provisions of the timely notification of the user and report to the relevant authorities .

The providers of network products and services shall provide continuous maintenance of their products and services ; they shall not terminate the provision of safety maintenance within the time limit prescribed by the parties or the parties .

Network products , services with the collection of user information function , the provider should be clear to the user and obtain consent ; involving the user’s personal information , but also should comply with this law and the relevant laws and administrative regulations on personal information protection requirements .

Article 23 The  network of key equipment and network security specific products should be in accordance with national standards of mandatory requirements , qualified by the agency safety certification or qualified safety testing to meet the requirements after , before they sell or provide . The State Network letter department in conjunction with the relevant departments of the State Council to develop and publish network key equipment and network security products directory , and promote safety certification and safety testing results mutual recognition , to avoid duplication of certification , testing .

Article 24 The  network operator shall handle the services such as network access , domain name registration service , fixed telephone and mobile telephone , or provide services such as information release and instant messaging , and enter into an agreement with the user or confirm the service when , should be required to provide true user identity information . If the user does not provide the true identity information , the network operator shall not provide the relevant service .

National implementation trusted identity network strategy , to support research and development of safe , convenient electronic authentication technology , to promote mutual recognition between different electronic authentication .

Article 25  network operators shall develop network security emergency response plan , timely disposal system vulnerabilities , computer viruses , network attacks , security risks and other network intrusions ; in the event of the occurrence of the harm network security , immediately launched the emergency plan , take the appropriate remedial measures , and report to the relevant authorities in accordance with the provisions .

Article 26   to carry out certification of network security , detection , risk assessment and other activities , released to the public system vulnerabilities , computer viruses , network attacks , network intrusions and other network information security , should comply with the relevant provisions of the State .

Article 27   No individual or organization may not engage in illegal intrusion into networks of others , interfere with the normal function of the network of others , active network data theft and other hazards network security ; not provide specifically for the network in the invasion , interfere with the normal function of the network and protective measures , theft Network data and other activities that endanger the network security activities , tools ; knowing that others engaged in activities that endanger network security , not to provide technical support , advertising , payment and settlement help .

Article 28 The   network operators shall provide technical support and assistance to the public security organs and the state security organs to safeguard the national security and the investigation of crimes according to law .

Article 29 The   State supports between network operators to collect information on network security , analysis , reporting and emergency response and other aspects of cooperation , to improve the security capabilities of network operators .

Relevant industry organizations to establish and improve network security norms and mechanisms for cooperation in this sector , to strengthen the analysis and evaluation of network security risks , regularly risk warning to the members , to support , to assist members to deal with network security risks .

Article 30   Network and Information Department and relevant information acquired in the performance of network security protection responsibilities , only for the need to maintain network security , shall not be used for other purposes .

SECTION 2: Operational safety of key information infrastructures

Article 31 The   state public communication and information services , energy , transportation , water conservancy , finance , public services , e-government and other important industries and fields , as well as other once destroyed , the loss of functionality or data leakage , could seriously endanger national security , people’s livelihood , the critical information infrastructure of public interest , on the basis of network security protection system on , special protection . The specific scope and safety protection of key information infrastructure shall be formulated by the State Council .

The country encourages network operators outside key information infrastructures to participate voluntarily in critical information infrastructure protection systems .

Article 32  in accordance with the division of duties prescribed by the State Council , responsible for the protection of critical information infrastructure security departments are working to formulate and implement the industry , the art of critical information infrastructure security planning , guidance and supervision of the safe operation of critical information infrastructure protection Work .

Article 33 The   construction of the critical information infrastructure to support business should ensure it has a stable , continuous operation performance , and technical measures to ensure the safety synchronized planning , simultaneous construction , simultaneous use .

Article 34   In addition to the provisions of Article 21 of this Law , critical information infrastructure operators shall perform the following security obligations :

( A ) set up a special safety management and safety management agency in charge of people , and the negative security background screening of responsibility and the key staff positions ;

( 2 ) regularly carry out network security education , technical training and skills assessment for employees ;

( Iii ) disaster recovery of critical systems and databases ;

( D ) the development of network security incident contingency plans , and regular exercise ;

( 5 ) other obligations stipulated by laws and administrative regulations .

Article 35 Where  a operator of a key information infrastructure purchases a network of products and services that may affect the safety of the State , it shall pass the national security review organized by the State Network Department in conjunction with the relevant departments of the State Council .

Article 36 of   the critical information infrastructure of network operators purchasing products and services , shall sign a confidentiality agreement with the security provider in accordance with the provisions , clear security and confidentiality obligations and responsibilities .

Article 37  Personal information and important data collected and produced by operators of key information infrastructure operators in the territory of the People’s Republic of China shall be stored in the territory . Due to business needs , do need to provide to the outside , should be in accordance with the State Network letter department in conjunction with the relevant departments of the State Council to develop a safety assessment ; laws and administrative regulations otherwise provided , in accordance with its provisions .

Article 38   critical information infrastructure operator shall himself or entrust their network security services and the possible risk of network security test and evaluation carried out at least once a year , and will assess the situation and improve the detection measures submitted to the responsible Key information Infrastructure Security protection work .

Article 39 The   State Network Letters shall coordinate the relevant departments to take the following measures for the protection of key information infrastructures :

( A ) the security risk of critical information infrastructure will be random testing , suggest improvements , can be entrusted network security services when necessary for the existence of network security risk assessment to detect ;

( 2 ) to organize the operators of key information infrastructures on a regular basis to conduct network security emergency drills to improve the level and coordination capability of responding to network security incidents ;

( 3 ) to promote the sharing of network security information between the relevant departments and operators of key information infrastructures and relevant research institutions and network security services ;

( Four ) emergency response network security incidents and recovery network functions, etc. , to provide technical support and assistance .

Chapter 4 Network Information Security

Article 40  network operators should collect information on its users strictly confidential , and establish and improve the user information protection system .

Article 41 Where a  network operator collects or uses personal information , it shall follow the principles of lawfulness , reason and necessity , publicly collect and use the rules , expressly collect and use the purpose , manner and scope of the information and agree with the collectors .

Services unrelated to the personal information of the network operator shall not collect its offer , shall not violate laws , administrative regulations and bilateral agreements to collect , use of personal information , and shall be in accordance with laws , administrative regulations and the agreement with the user , process save Of personal information .

Article 42   network operators shall not be disclosed , tampering , destruction of personal information it collects ; without the consent of the collectors , may not provide personal information to others . However , except that processing does not recognize a particular person and can not be recovered .

The network operator shall take technical measures and other necessary measures to ensure that the personal information collected by it is safe to prevent leakage , damage and loss of information . Or may occur in the event of leakage of personal information , damage , time lost the case , it should take immediate remedial measures , in accordance with the provisions promptly inform the user to the relevant competent authorities report .

Article 43   personal discovery network operators violate laws , administrative regulations or bilateral agreements to collect , use their personal information , the right to require network operators to delete their personal information ; find network operators to collect , store their personal The information is wrong , the right to require the network operator to be corrected . The network operator should take action to remove or correct it .

Article 44   No individual or organization may steal or acquire personal information in any other illegal manner and may not illegally sell or illegally provide personal information to others .

Article 45 The   departments and their staff members with network security supervision and administration according to law , must be aware of personal information in carrying out their duties , privacy and trade secrets strictly confidential , shall not disclose , sell or illegally available to others .

Article 46   No individual or organization shall be responsible for the use of network behavior , not set up to commit fraud , to teach criminal methods , production or sale of prohibited items , sites illegal and criminal activities of controlled items, etc. , communication groups , should not be used Internet publishing involves the implementation of fraud , the production or sale of prohibited items , control of goods and other criminal activities of the information .

Article 47   network operators should strengthen the management of information published by its users , we found that laws , administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer of information , should immediately stop the transmission of the information , to take measures to eliminate the disposal, etc. , to prevent the diffusion of information , save The relevant records and report to the relevant authorities .

Article 48  electronic information sent by any individual and organization , application software provided , shall set up a malicious program , shall not contain laws , administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer of information .

Send electronic information service providers and application software download service provider , shall perform the safety management obligations , know that the user is under the aforesaid acts , it should stop providing services , to take measures to eliminate the disposal, etc. , keep the relevant records , and the relevant authorities Report .

Article 49 The  network operators shall establish information such as complaints and reporting systems for network information security , announce complaints and report methods, and promptly accept and handle complaints and reports on the security of network information .

Supervision and inspection network operators to network and Information Department and relevant departments according to law , shall cooperate .

Article 50   National Grid and other departments concerned to fulfill the letter of network information security supervision and administration according to law , found legal , information and administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer , should be required to stop the transmission network operator , to take measures to eliminate the disposal, etc. , keep the relevant records ; the above information comes from outside the People’s Republic of China , it shall notify the relevant agencies to take technical measures and other necessary measures to interrupt transmission .

Chapter 5 Monitoring Early Warning and Emergency Handling

Article 51 The   State shall establish a network security monitoring and early warning and information communication system . The national network letter department should coordinate the relevant departments to strengthen the network security information collection , analysis and notification work , in accordance with the provisions of unified release of network security monitoring and early warning information .

Article 52   is responsible for critical information infrastructure security affairs , shall establish and improve the industry , network security monitoring and early warning and communications systems in the art , and network security monitoring and early warning information submitted in accordance with the provisions .

Article 53   National Grid and Information Department to coordinate relevant departments to establish and improve network security risk assessment and emergency response mechanisms , the development of network security emergency response plan , and regular exercise .

Responsible for key information infrastructure security work departments should develop the industry , the field of network security incident contingency plans , and regularly organize exercises .

Network security emergency response plan should be in accordance with the degree of harm after the incident , the network security incidents were graded sphere of influence and other factors , and provides the appropriate emergency measures .

Article 54   of network security event that occurs when the risk increases , the provincial people’s governments shall, in accordance with statutory authorities and procedures , and the characteristics of the network security risks and possible harm , take the following measures :

( A ) asked the relevant authorities , institutions and personnel timely collection , reporting information , strengthening the monitoring of network security risks ;

( Two ) organizational departments , agencies and professionals , network security risk assessment information for analysis , predicting the likelihood of events , the scope and extent of harm ;

( C ) to the community release network security risk early warning , release to avoid , reduce the harm measures .

Article 55   of network security incidents , should immediately start emergency response plan network security , network security incident investigation and assessment , require network operators to take technical measures and other necessary measures , to eliminate safety hazards , prevent harm to expand , and in a timely manner Publish public-related warning messages to the community .

Article 56  above the provincial level people’s governments in the implementation of network safety supervision and management responsibilities , found that there is a big security risk or network security incidents , be in accordance with the authority and procedures of the legal representative of the network operator’s Person or main person in charge . The network operator shall take measures as required and carry out rectification and rectification to eliminate the hidden danger .

Article 57  because of network security incidents , the occurrence of unexpected events or production safety accidents , should be in accordance with the ” Emergency Response Law of People’s Republic of China “, ” Production Safety Law of People’s Republic of China ,” the relevant laws and so on , disposal and administrative regulations The

Article 58 for the maintenance of national security and public order , require major emergency incidents disposal of social security , the State Council decision or approval , can take temporary measures such as limiting network traffic in a particular area .

Chapter VI Legal Liability

Article 59 Where the   network operator fails to perform the obligations of the network security protection stipulated in Article 21 and Article 25 of this Law , the relevant competent department shall order it to make corrections and give a warning ; refusing to correct or cause harm to the network security and other consequences of , at 100,000 yuan fine of $ 10,000 or more , the person directly responsible for the 50,000 yuan fine of $ 5,000 or more .

If the operator of the key information infrastructure fails to perform the obligations of the network security protection as prescribed in Article 33 , Article 34 , Article 36 and Article 38 of this Law , the relevant competent department shall order it to make corrections and give a warning ; refuse to correct or cause harm network security consequences , at 1,000,000 yuan fine of $ 100,000 or more , the person directly responsible for at 100,000 yuan fine of $ 10,000 or more .

Article 60   in violation of the first paragraph of Article 22 of this Law , (2) and the first paragraph Article 48 , any of the following acts , ordered by the competent department of corrections , give a warning ; refuse to correct Or cause harm to the network security and other consequences , at 50,000 yuan to more than 500,000 yuan fine , the person in charge directly responsible for more than 10,000 yuan more than 100,000 yuan fine :

( A ) set up malicious programs ;

( Two ) of their products , security flaws services , risk exposure and other remedial measures are not taken immediately , or failing to promptly inform the user of the report to the relevant authorities ;

( 3 ) to terminate the security of its products and services .

Article 61   network operators who violate the provisions of Article 24 first paragraph , did not require users to provide real identity information , or provide related services for the user does not provide real identity information , by the competent authorities ordered to make corrections ; or refuse to correct the circumstances are serious , at five hundred thousand fine of $ 50,000 or more , and may be ordered by the competent authorities to suspend the relevant business , ordered to stop , to close the site , revoke the relevant business license or business license revoked , directly responsible for The person in charge and other directly responsible persons shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan .

Article 62  in violation of Article 26 of this Law , to carry out certification of network security , detection , risk assessment and other activities , or to the public distribution system vulnerability , computer viruses , network attacks , network intrusions and other network security information , by the relevant the competent department shall order correction , given a warning ; refuse to correct or circumstances are serious , at 100,000 yuan fine of $ 10,000 or more , and may be ordered by the competent authorities to suspend the relevant business , ordered to stop , to close the site , revoked or related business license revoke the business license , the persons in charge and other directly responsible personnel directly responsible for 50,000 yuan fine of $ 5,000 or more .

Article 63   violation of Article 27 of this Law , engaged in activities that endanger network security , or to provide dedicated program to endanger network security activities , tools , technical support, or to endanger the security of network activity for others , advertising , payment settlement and other help , not constitute a crime , the public security authorities confiscate the illegal income , 5 days detention , can fine of over 50,000 yuan to 500,000 yuan fine ; the circumstances are serious , at least five days 15 days of detention , and may impose a fine of not less than 100,000 yuan but not more than one million yuan .

Units with the conduct of , the public security authorities confiscate the illegal income , at a fine of one million yuan more than 100,000 yuan , and directly in charge and other directly responsible personnel shall be punished in accordance with the preceding paragraph .

Violation of Article 27 of this Law , subject to administrative penalties for public security personnel , shall not engage in network security management and network operators work in key positions within five years ; people subject to criminal punishment , he may not engage in key positions in operations and network security management network Work .

Article 64 A  provider of a network operator , a network product or service shall , in violation of the provisions of Article 22 , paragraph 3 , and Article 41 to Article 43 of this Law , violate the right of the personal information to be protected according to law , ordered to make corrections by the competent authorities , can be a warning or a fine according to the seriousness single office , confiscate the illegal income , illegal income more than doubled a fine of ten times , there is no illegal income , at a fine of one million yuan , directly responsible Supervisors and other directly responsible persons shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan ; if the circumstances are serious , they may order to suspend the relevant business , suspend business for rectification , close the website , revoke the relevant business license or revoke the business license .

Violation of the provisions of Article 44 of this Law , theft or other illegal means to obtain , illegally sell or illegally provide personal information to others , does not constitute a crime , the public security organs confiscated the illegal income , and more than double the illegal income ten times If there is no illegal income , a fine of not more than one million yuan shall be imposed .

Article 65 of the   critical information infrastructure of operators in violation of the provisions of Article 35 of this Law , used without safety review or not to review the security of the network through a product or service , by the competent authorities ordered to stop using , at the purchase amount More than ten times the fine ; the person directly in charge and other directly responsible persons shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan .

Article 66   critical information infrastructure operators in violation of the provisions of Article 37 of this Law , outside the network data storage , or network data provided to the outside , ordered to make corrections by the competent authorities , be given a warning , confiscate the illegal income , of fifty yuan fine of $ 50,000 or more , and may be ordered to suspend the business , ordered to stop , to close the site , revoke the relevant business license or revoke the business license ; in charge and other directly responsible personnel directly responsible yuan and not Fine of not more than 100,000 yuan .

Article 67   in violation of the provisions of Article 46 of this Law , the website set up for the implementation of criminal activities , distribution group , or use the Internet release of information related to the implementation of criminal activities , does not constitute a crime , the public security organs 5 days detention , can impose a fine of 100,000 yuan ; the circumstances are serious , at least five days custody for 15 days or less , you can fine of over 50,000 yuan to 500,000 yuan fine . Close the website for the implementation of criminal activities , communication groups .

If the unit has the preceding paragraph , the public security organ shall be fined not less than 100,000 yuan but not more than 500,000 yuan , and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph for the person directly in charge and other directly responsible persons .

Article 68  network operators in violation of the provisions of Article 47 of this Law , legal , administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer of information transmission is not stopped , to take measures to eliminate the disposal, etc. , keep the relevant records , ordered by the competent department of corrections , given a warning , confiscation of illegal gains ; refuse to correct or circumstances are serious , at 500,000 yuan more than 100,000 yuan , and can be ordered to suspend the relevant business , ordered to stop , to close the site , revoke the relevant business license or business license revoked , A fine of not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 100,000 yuan shall be imposed on the person directly in charge and other directly responsible persons .

Electronic messaging services provider , application software download service providers , non-compliance and safety management obligations specified in the second paragraph of Article 48 of this Law , in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be punished .

Article 69   network operators in violation of the provisions of this Act , any of the following acts , by the competent authorities shall order rectification ; refuse to correct or circumstances are serious , at 500,000 Yuan more than 50,000 yuan , directly responsible for the charge and other directly responsible personnel , at one million yuan to 100,000 yuan fine :

( A ) not in accordance with the requirements of the relevant departments of the law , administrative regulations prohibit the release or the information’s transmission , taken to stop transmission , disposal measures to eliminate such ;

( 2 ) refusing or hindering the supervision and inspection carried out by the relevant departments according to law ;

( 3 ) refusing to provide technical support and assistance to the public security organs and the state security organs .

Article 70  issued or transmitted in Article 12 (2) and other laws , administrative regulations prohibit the release or transfer of information , in accordance with relevant laws , penalties and administrative regulations .

Article 71   of this Law prescribed offenses , in accordance with relevant laws , administrative regulations credited to the credit files , and to be publicized .

Article 72 Where  an operator of a government organ of a state organ fails to perform its obligations under the provisions of this Law , it shall be ordered by its superior organ or the relevant organ to make corrections , and the directly responsible person in charge and other directly responsible persons shall be punished according to law .

Article 73  Network and Information Department and relevant departments in violation of the provisions of Article 30 of this Law , the information acquired in the performance of network security protection responsibilities for other purposes , given to the persons in charge and other directly responsible personnel directly responsible according to law Punish .

The network department and the relevant departments of the staff neglected duty , abuse of power , favoritism , does not constitute a crime , according to the law to give punishment .

Article 74 Whoever , in violation of the   provisions of this Law , causes damage to others , shall bear civil liability according to law .

Violation of the provisions of this Law , constitute a violation of public security management behavior , according to the law to give security management punishment ; constitute a crime , shall be held criminally responsible .

Article 75   The organs , organizations and individuals engaged in activities , such as attack , intrusion , interference or destruction , which violate the key information infrastructure of the People’s Republic of China , cause serious consequences, and shall hold legal liabilities according to law ; the public security departments and relevant departments of the State Council the institution may decide , organize , to freeze property or other necessary personal sanctions .

Chapter VII Supplementary Provisions

Article 76   The meaning of the following terms in this Law :

( A ) network , refers to a computer or other information terminals and associated equipment consisting of the information collected in accordance with certain rules and procedures , storage , transmission , switching , the system processing .

( Two ) network security , refers to taking the necessary measures , to prevent attacks on the network , intrusion , interference , destruction and illegal use and accidents , the network is in a state of stable and reliable operation , integrity, and protect network data , privacy , The ability to be available .

( C ) network operators , refers to the network of owners , managers and network service providers .

( D ) network data , refers to the network through the collection , storage , transmission , processing and production of various electronic data .

( Five ) personal information , refer to various identification information can be used alone or in combination with other natural personal identity information electronically recorded or otherwise , including but not limited to a natural person’s name , date of birth , ID number , personal biometric information , Address , telephone number and so on .

Article 77 The   storage , processing network information involving state secrets operational security , in addition shall comply with this Act , shall also comply with privacy laws , administrative regulations .

Article 78   security protection of military networks , otherwise provided by the Central Military Commission .

Article 79   of this Law since 2017  6 June 1 from the date of implementation .

Original mandarin Chinese:

目    录

    第一章  总    则

第二章  网络安全支持与促进

第三章  网络运行安全

第一节  一般规定

第二节  关键信息基础设施的运行安全

第四章  网络信息安全

第五章  监测预警与应急处置

第六章  法律责任

第七章  附    则

第一章  总    则

第一条  为了保障网络安全,维护网络空间主权和国家安全、社会公共利益,保护公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益,促进经济社会信息化健康发展,制定本法。

第二条  在中华人民共和国境内建设、运营、维护和使用网络,以及网络安全的监督管理,适用本法。

第三条  国家坚持网络安全与信息化发展并重,遵循积极利用、科学发展、依法管理、确保安全的方针,推进网络基础设施建设和互联互通,鼓励网络技术创新和应用,支持培养网络安全人才,建立健全网络安全保障体系,提高网络安全保护能力。

第四条  国家制定并不断完善网络安全战略,明确保障网络安全的基本要求和主要目标,提出重点领域的网络安全政策、工作任务和措施。

第五条  国家采取措施,监测、防御、处置来源于中华人民共和国境内外的网络安全风险和威胁,保护关键信息基础设施免受攻击、侵入、干扰和破坏,依法惩治网络违法犯罪活动,维护网络空间安全和秩序。

第六条  国家倡导诚实守信、健康文明的网络行为,推动传播社会主义核心价值观,采取措施提高全社会的网络安全意识和水平,形成全社会共同参与促进网络安全的良好环境。

第七条  国家积极开展网络空间治理、网络技术研发和标准制定、打击网络违法犯罪等方面的国际交流与合作,推动构建和平、安全、开放、合作的网络空间,建立多边、民主、透明的网络治理体系。

第八条  国家网信部门负责统筹协调网络安全工作和相关监督管理工作。国务院电信主管部门、公安部门和其他有关机关依照本法和有关法律、行政法规的规定,在各自职责范围内负责网络安全保护和监督管理工作。

县级以上地方人民政府有关部门的网络安全保护和监督管理职责,按照国家有关规定确定。

第九条  网络运营者开展经营和服务活动,必须遵守法律、行政法规,尊重社会公德,遵守商业道德,诚实信用,履行网络安全保护义务,接受政府和社会的监督,承担社会责任。

第十条  建设、运营网络或者通过网络提供服务,应当依照法律、行政法规的规定和国家标准的强制性要求,采取技术措施和其他必要措施,保障网络安全、稳定运行,有效应对网络安全事件,防范网络违法犯罪活动,维护网络数据的完整性、保密性和可用性。

第十一条  网络相关行业组织按照章程,加强行业自律,制定网络安全行为规范,指导会员加强网络安全保护,提高网络安全保护水平,促进行业健康发展。

第十二条  国家保护公民、法人和其他组织依法使用网络的权利,促进网络接入普及,提升网络服务水平,为社会提供安全、便利的网络服务,保障网络信息依法有序自由流动。

任何个人和组织使用网络应当遵守宪法法律,遵守公共秩序,尊重社会公德,不得危害网络安全,不得利用网络从事危害国家安全、荣誉和利益,煽动颠覆国家政权、推翻社会主义制度,煽动分裂国家、破坏国家统一,宣扬恐怖主义、极端主义,宣扬民族仇恨、民族歧视,传播暴力、淫秽色情信息,编造、传播虚假信息扰乱经济秩序和社会秩序,以及侵害他人名誉、隐私、知识产权和其他合法权益等活动。

第十三条  国家支持研究开发有利于未成年人健康成长的网络产品和服务,依法惩治利用网络从事危害未成年人身心健康的活动,为未成年人提供安全、健康的网络环境。

第十四条  任何个人和组织有权对危害网络安全的行为向网信、电信、公安等部门举报。收到举报的部门应当及时依法作出处理;不属于本部门职责的,应当及时移送有权处理的部门。

有关部门应当对举报人的相关信息予以保密,保护举报人的合法权益。

第二章  网络安全支持与促进

第十五条  国家建立和完善网络安全标准体系。国务院标准化行政主管部门和国务院其他有关部门根据各自的职责,组织制定并适时修订有关网络安全管理以及网络产品、服务和运行安全的国家标准、行业标准。

国家支持企业、研究机构、高等学校、网络相关行业组织参与网络安全国家标准、行业标准的制定。

第十六条  国务院和省、自治区、直辖市人民政府应当统筹规划,加大投入,扶持重点网络安全技术产业和项目,支持网络安全技术的研究开发和应用,推广安全可信的网络产品和服务,保护网络技术知识产权,支持企业、研究机构和高等学校等参与国家网络安全技术创新项目。

第十七条  国家推进网络安全社会化服务体系建设,鼓励有关企业、机构开展网络安全认证、检测和风险评估等安全服务。

第十八条  国家鼓励开发网络数据安全保护和利用技术,促进公共数据资源开放,推动技术创新和经济社会发展。

国家支持创新网络安全管理方式,运用网络新技术,提升网络安全保护水平。

第十九条  各级人民政府及其有关部门应当组织开展经常性的网络安全宣传教育,并指导、督促有关单位做好网络安全宣传教育工作。

大众传播媒介应当有针对性地面向社会进行网络安全宣传教育。

第二十条  国家支持企业和高等学校、职业学校等教育培训机构开展网络安全相关教育与培训,采取多种方式培养网络安全人才,促进网络安全人才交流。

第三章  网络运行安全

第一节 一般规定

第二十一条  国家实行网络安全等级保护制度。网络运营者应当按照网络安全等级保护制度的要求,履行下列安全保护义务,保障网络免受干扰、破坏或者未经授权的访问,防止网络数据泄露或者被窃取、篡改:

(一)制定内部安全管理制度和操作规程,确定网络安全负责人,落实网络安全保护责任;

(二)采取防范计算机病毒和网络攻击、网络侵入等危害网络安全行为的技术措施;

(三)采取监测、记录网络运行状态、网络安全事件的技术措施,并按照规定留存相关的网络日志不少于六个月;

(四)采取数据分类、重要数据备份和加密等措施;

(五)法律、行政法规规定的其他义务。

第二十二条  网络产品、服务应当符合相关国家标准的强制性要求。网络产品、服务的提供者不得设置恶意程序;发现其网络产品、服务存在安全缺陷、漏洞等风险时,应当立即采取补救措施,按照规定及时告知用户并向有关主管部门报告。

网络产品、服务的提供者应当为其产品、服务持续提供安全维护;在规定或者当事人约定的期限内,不得终止提供安全维护。

网络产品、服务具有收集用户信息功能的,其提供者应当向用户明示并取得同意;涉及用户个人信息的,还应当遵守本法和有关法律、行政法规关于个人信息保护的规定。

第二十三条  网络关键设备和网络安全专用产品应当按照相关国家标准的强制性要求,由具备资格的机构安全认证合格或者安全检测符合要求后,方可销售或者提供。国家网信部门会同国务院有关部门制定、公布网络关键设备和网络安全专用产品目录,并推动安全认证和安全检测结果互认,避免重复认证、检测。

第二十四条  网络运营者为用户办理网络接入、域名注册服务,办理固定电话、移动电话等入网手续,或者为用户提供信息发布、即时通讯等服务,在与用户签订协议或者确认提供服务时,应当要求用户提供真实身份信息。用户不提供真实身份信息的,网络运营者不得为其提供相关服务。

国家实施网络可信身份战略,支持研究开发安全、方便的电子身份认证技术,推动不同电子身份认证之间的互认。

第二十五条  网络运营者应当制定网络安全事件应急预案,及时处置系统漏洞、计算机病毒、网络攻击、网络侵入等安全风险;在发生危害网络安全的事件时,立即启动应急预案,采取相应的补救措施,并按照规定向有关主管部门报告。

第二十六条  开展网络安全认证、检测、风险评估等活动,向社会发布系统漏洞、计算机病毒、网络攻击、网络侵入等网络安全信息,应当遵守国家有关规定。

第二十七条  任何个人和组织不得从事非法侵入他人网络、干扰他人网络正常功能、窃取网络数据等危害网络安全的活动;不得提供专门用于从事侵入网络、干扰网络正常功能及防护措施、窃取网络数据等危害网络安全活动的程序、工具;明知他人从事危害网络安全的活动的,不得为其提供技术支持、广告推广、支付结算等帮助。

第二十八条  网络运营者应当为公安机关、国家安全机关依法维护国家安全和侦查犯罪的活动提供技术支持和协助。

第二十九条  国家支持网络运营者之间在网络安全信息收集、分析、通报和应急处置等方面进行合作,提高网络运营者的安全保障能力。

有关行业组织建立健全本行业的网络安全保护规范和协作机制,加强对网络安全风险的分析评估,定期向会员进行风险警示,支持、协助会员应对网络安全风险。

第三十条  网信部门和有关部门在履行网络安全保护职责中获取的信息,只能用于维护网络安全的需要,不得用于其他用途。

第二节 关键信息基础设施的运行安全

第三十一条  国家对公共通信和信息服务、能源、交通、水利、金融、公共服务、电子政务等重要行业和领域,以及其他一旦遭到破坏、丧失功能或者数据泄露,可能严重危害国家安全、国计民生、公共利益的关键信息基础设施,在网络安全等级保护制度的基础上,实行重点保护。关键信息基础设施的具体范围和安全保护办法由国务院制定。

国家鼓励关键信息基础设施以外的网络运营者自愿参与关键信息基础设施保护体系。

第三十二条  按照国务院规定的职责分工,负责关键信息基础设施安全保护工作的部门分别编制并组织实施本行业、本领域的关键信息基础设施安全规划,指导和监督关键信息基础设施运行安全保护工作。

第三十三条  建设关键信息基础设施应当确保其具有支持业务稳定、持续运行的性能,并保证安全技术措施同步规划、同步建设、同步使用。

第三十四条  除本法第二十一条的规定外,关键信息基础设施的运营者还应当履行下列安全保护义务:

(一)设置专门安全管理机构和安全管理负责人,并对该负责人和关键岗位的人员进行安全背景审查;

(二)定期对从业人员进行网络安全教育、技术培训和技能考核;

(三)对重要系统和数据库进行容灾备份;

(四)制定网络安全事件应急预案,并定期进行演练;

(五)法律、行政法规规定的其他义务。

第三十五条  关键信息基础设施的运营者采购网络产品和服务,可能影响国家安全的,应当通过国家网信部门会同国务院有关部门组织的国家安全审查。

第三十六条  关键信息基础设施的运营者采购网络产品和服务,应当按照规定与提供者签订安全保密协议,明确安全和保密义务与责任。

第三十七条  关键信息基础设施的运营者在中华人民共和国境内运营中收集和产生的个人信息和重要数据应当在境内存储。因业务需要,确需向境外提供的,应当按照国家网信部门会同国务院有关部门制定的办法进行安全评估;法律、行政法规另有规定的,依照其规定。

第三十八条  关键信息基础设施的运营者应当自行或者委托网络安全服务机构对其网络的安全性和可能存在的风险每年至少进行一次检测评估,并将检测评估情况和改进措施报送相关负责关键信息基础设施安全保护工作的部门。

第三十九条  国家网信部门应当统筹协调有关部门对关键信息基础设施的安全保护采取下列措施:

(一)对关键信息基础设施的安全风险进行抽查检测,提出改进措施,必要时可以委托网络安全服务机构对网络存在的安全风险进行检测评估;

(二)定期组织关键信息基础设施的运营者进行网络安全应急演练,提高应对网络安全事件的水平和协同配合能力;

(三)促进有关部门、关键信息基础设施的运营者以及有关研究机构、网络安全服务机构等之间的网络安全信息共享;

(四)对网络安全事件的应急处置与网络功能的恢复等,提供技术支持和协助。

第四章  网络信息安全

第四十条  网络运营者应当对其收集的用户信息严格保密,并建立健全用户信息保护制度。

第四十一条  网络运营者收集、使用个人信息,应当遵循合法、正当、必要的原则,公开收集、使用规则,明示收集、使用信息的目的、方式和范围,并经被收集者同意。

网络运营者不得收集与其提供的服务无关的个人信息,不得违反法律、行政法规的规定和双方的约定收集、使用个人信息,并应当依照法律、行政法规的规定和与用户的约定,处理其保存的个人信息。

第四十二条  网络运营者不得泄露、篡改、毁损其收集的个人信息;未经被收集者同意,不得向他人提供个人信息。但是,经过处理无法识别特定个人且不能复原的除外。

网络运营者应当采取技术措施和其他必要措施,确保其收集的个人信息安全,防止信息泄露、毁损、丢失。在发生或者可能发生个人信息泄露、毁损、丢失的情况时,应当立即采取补救措施,按照规定及时告知用户并向有关主管部门报告。

第四十三条  个人发现网络运营者违反法律、行政法规的规定或者双方的约定收集、使用其个人信息的,有权要求网络运营者删除其个人信息;发现网络运营者收集、存储的其个人信息有错误的,有权要求网络运营者予以更正。网络运营者应当采取措施予以删除或者更正。

第四十四条  任何个人和组织不得窃取或者以其他非法方式获取个人信息,不得非法出售或者非法向他人提供个人信息。

第四十五条  依法负有网络安全监督管理职责的部门及其工作人员,必须对在履行职责中知悉的个人信息、隐私和商业秘密严格保密,不得泄露、出售或者非法向他人提供。

第四十六条  任何个人和组织应当对其使用网络的行为负责,不得设立用于实施诈骗,传授犯罪方法,制作或者销售违禁物品、管制物品等违法犯罪活动的网站、通讯群组,不得利用网络发布涉及实施诈骗,制作或者销售违禁物品、管制物品以及其他违法犯罪活动的信息。

第四十七条  网络运营者应当加强对其用户发布的信息的管理,发现法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息的,应当立即停止传输该信息,采取消除等处置措施,防止信息扩散,保存有关记录,并向有关主管部门报告。

第四十八条  任何个人和组织发送的电子信息、提供的应用软件,不得设置恶意程序,不得含有法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息。

电子信息发送服务提供者和应用软件下载服务提供者,应当履行安全管理义务,知道其用户有前款规定行为的,应当停止提供服务,采取消除等处置措施,保存有关记录,并向有关主管部门报告。

第四十九条  网络运营者应当建立网络信息安全投诉、举报制度,公布投诉、举报方式等信息,及时受理并处理有关网络信息安全的投诉和举报。

网络运营者对网信部门和有关部门依法实施的监督检查,应当予以配合。

第五十条  国家网信部门和有关部门依法履行网络信息安全监督管理职责,发现法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息的,应当要求网络运营者停止传输,采取消除等处置措施,保存有关记录;对来源于中华人民共和国境外的上述信息,应当通知有关机构采取技术措施和其他必要措施阻断传播。

第五章  监测预警与应急处置

第五十一条  国家建立网络安全监测预警和信息通报制度。国家网信部门应当统筹协调有关部门加强网络安全信息收集、分析和通报工作,按照规定统一发布网络安全监测预警信息。

第五十二条  负责关键信息基础设施安全保护工作的部门,应当建立健全本行业、本领域的网络安全监测预警和信息通报制度,并按照规定报送网络安全监测预警信息。

第五十三条  国家网信部门协调有关部门建立健全网络安全风险评估和应急工作机制,制定网络安全事件应急预案,并定期组织演练。

负责关键信息基础设施安全保护工作的部门应当制定本行业、本领域的网络安全事件应急预案,并定期组织演练。

网络安全事件应急预案应当按照事件发生后的危害程度、影响范围等因素对网络安全事件进行分级,并规定相应的应急处置措施。

第五十四条  网络安全事件发生的风险增大时,省级以上人民政府有关部门应当按照规定的权限和程序,并根据网络安全风险的特点和可能造成的危害,采取下列措施:

(一)要求有关部门、机构和人员及时收集、报告有关信息,加强对网络安全风险的监测;

(二)组织有关部门、机构和专业人员,对网络安全风险信息进行分析评估,预测事件发生的可能性、影响范围和危害程度;

(三)向社会发布网络安全风险预警,发布避免、减轻危害的措施。

第五十五条  发生网络安全事件,应当立即启动网络安全事件应急预案,对网络安全事件进行调查和评估,要求网络运营者采取技术措施和其他必要措施,消除安全隐患,防止危害扩大,并及时向社会发布与公众有关的警示信息。

第五十六条  省级以上人民政府有关部门在履行网络安全监督管理职责中,发现网络存在较大安全风险或者发生安全事件的,可以按照规定的权限和程序对该网络的运营者的法定代表人或者主要负责人进行约谈。网络运营者应当按照要求采取措施,进行整改,消除隐患。

第五十七条  因网络安全事件,发生突发事件或者生产安全事故的,应当依照《中华人民共和国突发事件应对法》、《中华人民共和国安全生产法》等有关法律、行政法规的规定处置。

第五十八条 因维护国家安全和社会公共秩序,处置重大突发社会安全事件的需要,经国务院决定或者批准,可以在特定区域对网络通信采取限制等临时措施。

第六章  法律责任

第五十九条  网络运营者不履行本法第二十一条、第二十五条规定的网络安全保护义务的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告;拒不改正或者导致危害网络安全等后果的,处一万元以上十万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员处五千元以上五万元以下罚款。

关键信息基础设施的运营者不履行本法第三十三条、第三十四条、第三十六条、第三十八条规定的网络安全保护义务的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告;拒不改正或者导致危害网络安全等后果的,处十万元以上一百万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

第六十条  违反本法第二十二条第一款、第二款和第四十八条第一款规定,有下列行为之一的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告;拒不改正或者导致危害网络安全等后果的,处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款:

(一)设置恶意程序的;

(二)对其产品、服务存在的安全缺陷、漏洞等风险未立即采取补救措施,或者未按照规定及时告知用户并向有关主管部门报告的;

(三)擅自终止为其产品、服务提供安全维护的。

第六十一条  网络运营者违反本法第二十四条第一款规定,未要求用户提供真实身份信息,或者对不提供真实身份信息的用户提供相关服务的,由有关主管部门责令改正;拒不改正或者情节严重的,处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款,并可以由有关主管部门责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

第六十二条  违反本法第二十六条规定,开展网络安全认证、检测、风险评估等活动,或者向社会发布系统漏洞、计算机病毒、网络攻击、网络侵入等网络安全信息的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告;拒不改正或者情节严重的,处一万元以上十万元以下罚款,并可以由有关主管部门责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处五千元以上五万元以下罚款。

第六十三条  违反本法第二十七条规定,从事危害网络安全的活动,或者提供专门用于从事危害网络安全活动的程序、工具,或者为他人从事危害网络安全的活动提供技术支持、广告推广、支付结算等帮助,尚不构成犯罪的,由公安机关没收违法所得,处五日以下拘留,可以并处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款;情节较重的,处五日以上十五日以下拘留,可以并处十万元以上一百万元以下罚款。

单位有前款行为的,由公安机关没收违法所得,处十万元以上一百万元以下罚款,并对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依照前款规定处罚。

违反本法第二十七条规定,受到治安管理处罚的人员,五年内不得从事网络安全管理和网络运营关键岗位的工作;受到刑事处罚的人员,终身不得从事网络安全管理和网络运营关键岗位的工作。

第六十四条  网络运营者、网络产品或者服务的提供者违反本法第二十二条第三款、第四十一条至第四十三条规定,侵害个人信息依法得到保护的权利的,由有关主管部门责令改正,可以根据情节单处或者并处警告、没收违法所得、处违法所得一倍以上十倍以下罚款,没有违法所得的,处一百万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款;情节严重的,并可以责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照。

违反本法第四十四条规定,窃取或者以其他非法方式获取、非法出售或者非法向他人提供个人信息,尚不构成犯罪的,由公安机关没收违法所得,并处违法所得一倍以上十倍以下罚款,没有违法所得的,处一百万元以下罚款。

第六十五条  关键信息基础设施的运营者违反本法第三十五条规定,使用未经安全审查或者安全审查未通过的网络产品或者服务的,由有关主管部门责令停止使用,处采购金额一倍以上十倍以下罚款;对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

第六十六条  关键信息基础设施的运营者违反本法第三十七条规定,在境外存储网络数据,或者向境外提供网络数据的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告,没收违法所得,处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款,并可以责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照;对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

第六十七条  违反本法第四十六条规定,设立用于实施违法犯罪活动的网站、通讯群组,或者利用网络发布涉及实施违法犯罪活动的信息,尚不构成犯罪的,由公安机关处五日以下拘留,可以并处一万元以上十万元以下罚款;情节较重的,处五日以上十五日以下拘留,可以并处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款。关闭用于实施违法犯罪活动的网站、通讯群组。

单位有前款行为的,由公安机关处十万元以上五十万元以下罚款,并对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依照前款规定处罚。

第六十八条  网络运营者违反本法第四十七条规定,对法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息未停止传输、采取消除等处置措施、保存有关记录的,由有关主管部门责令改正,给予警告,没收违法所得;拒不改正或者情节严重的,处十万元以上五十万元以下罚款,并可以责令暂停相关业务、停业整顿、关闭网站、吊销相关业务许可证或者吊销营业执照,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处一万元以上十万元以下罚款。

电子信息发送服务提供者、应用软件下载服务提供者,不履行本法第四十八条第二款规定的安全管理义务的,依照前款规定处罚。

第六十九条  网络运营者违反本法规定,有下列行为之一的,由有关主管部门责令改正;拒不改正或者情节严重的,处五万元以上五十万元以下罚款,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员,处一万元以上十万元以下罚款:

(一)不按照有关部门的要求对法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息,采取停止传输、消除等处置措施的;

(二)拒绝、阻碍有关部门依法实施的监督检查的;

(三)拒不向公安机关、国家安全机关提供技术支持和协助的。

第七十条  发布或者传输本法第十二条第二款和其他法律、行政法规禁止发布或者传输的信息的,依照有关法律、行政法规的规定处罚。

第七十一条  有本法规定的违法行为的,依照有关法律、行政法规的规定记入信用档案,并予以公示。

第七十二条  国家机关政务网络的运营者不履行本法规定的网络安全保护义务的,由其上级机关或者有关机关责令改正;对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依法给予处分。

第七十三条  网信部门和有关部门违反本法第三十条规定,将在履行网络安全保护职责中获取的信息用于其他用途的,对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依法给予处分。

网信部门和有关部门的工作人员玩忽职守、滥用职权、徇私舞弊,尚不构成犯罪的,依法给予处分。

第七十四条  违反本法规定,给他人造成损害的,依法承担民事责任。

违反本法规定,构成违反治安管理行为的,依法给予治安管理处罚;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。

第七十五条  境外的机构、组织、个人从事攻击、侵入、干扰、破坏等危害中华人民共和国的关键信息基础设施的活动,造成严重后果的,依法追究法律责任;国务院公安部门和有关部门并可以决定对该机构、组织、个人采取冻结财产或者其他必要的制裁措施。

第七章  附    则

第七十六条  本法下列用语的含义:

(一)网络,是指由计算机或者其他信息终端及相关设备组成的按照一定的规则和程序对信息进行收集、存储、传输、交换、处理的系统。

(二)网络安全,是指通过采取必要措施,防范对网络的攻击、侵入、干扰、破坏和非法使用以及意外事故,使网络处于稳定可靠运行的状态,以及保障网络数据的完整性、保密性、可用性的能力。

(三)网络运营者,是指网络的所有者、管理者和网络服务提供者。

(四)网络数据,是指通过网络收集、存储、传输、处理和产生的各种电子数据。

(五)个人信息,是指以电子或者其他方式记录的能够单独或者与其他信息结合识别自然人个人身份的各种信息,包括但不限于自然人的姓名、出生日期、身份证件号码、个人生物识别信息、住址、电话号码等。

第七十七条  存储、处理涉及国家秘密信息的网络的运行安全保护,除应当遵守本法外,还应当遵守保密法律、行政法规的规定。

第七十八条  军事网络的安全保护,由中央军事委员会另行规定。

第七十九条  本法自2017年6月1日起施行。

Communist Party of China referring URL:

http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2016-11/07/content_2001605.htm

 

中華人民共和國國家信息與情報法草案 // People’s Republic of China DRAFT National Information & Intelligence Law

中華人民共和國國家信息與情報法草案

People’s Republic of China DRAFT National Information & Intelligence Law

A Note on the “National Information Law of the People ‘s Republic of China (Draft)”

First, the general idea of ​​legislation
First, under the guidance of the overall national security concept, adhere to the principle of socialist rule of law, focus on strengthening and safeguarding national intelligence work, respecting and safeguarding human rights, providing basic legal principles and legal basis for national intelligence work.
The second is to sum up the successful experience of China’s national intelligence work, based on the current and future period to carry out the actual needs of national intelligence work, provides the national intelligence work system mechanism, the national intelligence work agency’s authority and national intelligence work and so on.
The third is to deal with the national security law, anti-espionage law, anti-terrorism law and other legal relations, do with these laws convergence.

Second, the main content of the draft
(A) clear the national intelligence work tasks and institutional mechanisms. The draft stipulates that the national intelligence work should adhere to the overall national security concept and provide information for the major national decision-making, provide intelligence support for the prevention and mitigation of the risks that endanger national security, safeguard national power, sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity, people’s well-being and economy Social sustainable development and other significant national interests (Article 2). Establish a sound national reunification, division of labor, scientific and efficient national intelligence system (Article 3). National security organs and public security organs intelligence agencies, military intelligence agencies in accordance with the division of responsibilities, with each other, do intelligence work, carry out intelligence action (Article 5).
(2) to clarify the powers of the State Intelligence Working Party. The drafting regulations stipulate that the national intelligence work agencies shall collect and deal with the organs of foreign institutions, organizations, individuals or implement or direct the financing of others, or the harm that the domestic institutions, organizations and individuals collusion with the overseas institutions, organizations and individuals of the People’s Republic of China Information on interests (Article 10). The national intelligence work agency shall provide information reference or basis (Article 11) for the prevention, suppression and punishment of foreign institutions, organizations and individuals in China to carry out acts that endanger our national security and interests in China. When the staff of the State Intelligence Working Party carry out their tasks according to law, they may go to the relevant authorities, organizations, enterprises and organizations and individuals to understand and inquire about the relevant circumstances, inspect or retrieve the relevant files, materials and articles; enter the relevant areas and places that restrict access; Enjoy the convenience of accommodation (Article 15, Article 16).
(3) to clarify the protection of national intelligence work. The drafting stipulates that the state shall strengthen the construction of the national intelligence work organization and carry out special management of its institutions, personnel, establishment, funds and assets; establish a management system for personnel recruitment, selection, assessment, training, treatment and withdrawal of personnel Nineteen). (Article 21) shall be protected by the staff of the national intelligence working agency and the personnel of the cooperative relationship and their close relatives. For those who contribute to the national intelligence work and need to be resettled, the relevant departments shall assist the national intelligence work agencies to properly resettle (Article 22). The draft also provides for the support and cooperation of citizens and organizations (Article 6, Article 13). Provides for the imposition of national intelligence work, disclosure of legal responsibility for state secrets related to national intelligence work (Article 25, Article 26).
(4) to clarify the norms and supervision of national intelligence work. The draft stipulates that national intelligence work should be carried out in accordance with the law, respect and protect human rights (Article VII). The national intelligence working agencies and their staff shall not go beyond their powers, abuse their power and engage in malpractices for personal gains, and shall not violate the lawful rights and interests of citizens and organizations and shall not disclose state secrets, trade secrets and personal privacy (Article 18). The State Intelligence Working Party shall abide by the relevant provisions of the State when using the necessary means, means and channels (Article 14, Article 15, Article 16 and Article 17). The national intelligence working agency shall establish a supervision and safety review system (Article 23). The draft also stipulates that any individual and organization shall have the right to report to the higher authorities or relevant departments for the violation of the powers, abuse of power, malpractice for personal gains and other offenses against the national intelligence working agencies and their staff members (Article 24).

Original Mandarin Chinese:

關於《中華人民共和國國家情報法(草案)》的說明

一、立法的總體思路
一是以總體國家安全觀為指導,堅持社會主義法治原則,著眼於加強和保障國家情報工作,尊重和保障人權,為國家情報工作提供基本的法律原則和法律依據。
二是總結我國國家情報工作的成功經驗,立足於當前和今後一段時期開展國家情報工作的實際需要,規定了國家情報工作的體制機制、國家情報工作機構的職權以及國家情報工作保障等內容。
三是處理好與國家安全法、反間諜法、反恐怖主義法等法律的關係,做好與這些法律的銜接。
二、草案的主要內容
(一)明確國家情報工作的任務和體制機制。草案規定,國家情報工作堅持總體國家安全觀,為國家重大決策提供情報參考,為防範和化解危害國家安全的風險提供情報支持,維護國家政權、主權、統一、獨立和領土完整、人民福祉、經濟社會可持續發展和國家其他重大利益(第二條)。建立健全集中統一、分工協作、科學高效的國家情報體制(第三條)。國家安全機關和公安機關情報機構、軍隊情報機構按照職責分工,相互配合,做好情報工作、開展情報行動(第五條)。
(二)明確國家情報工作機構的職權。草案規定,國家情報工作機構應當依法蒐集、處理境外機構、組織、個人實施或者指使、資助他人實施,或者境內機構、組織、個人與境外機構、組織、個人相勾結實施的危害中華人民共和國國家安全、利益的相關信息(第十條)。國家情報工作機構應當為防範、制止和懲治境外機構、組織、個人在中國境內實施的危害我國國家安全、利益的行為提供情報參考或依據(第十一條)。國家情報工作機構工作人員依法執行任務時,可以向有關機關、團體、企業事業組織和個人了解、詢問有關情況,查閱或者調取有關的檔案、資料、物品;進入限制進入的有關地區、場所;享受通行便利等(第十五條、第十六條)。
(三)明確國家情報工作保障。草案規定,國家加強國家情報工作機構建設,對其機構設置、人員、編制、經費、資產實行特殊管理;建立適應情報工作需要的人員錄用、選調、考核、培訓、待遇、退出等管理制度(第十九條)。對國家情報工作機構工作人員和有合作關係人員及其近親屬人身安全予以保護(第二十一條)。對為國家情報工作作出貢獻並需要安置的人員,有關部門應當協助國家情報工作機構妥善安置(第二十二條)。草案還規定了公民和組織的支持、配合義務(第六條、第十三條)。規定了阻礙國家情報工作、洩露與國家情報工作有關的國家秘密的法律責任(第二十五條、第二十六條)。
(四)明確對國家情報工作的規範和監督。草案規定,國家情報工作應當依法進行,尊重和保障人權(第七條)。國家情報工作機構及其工作人員不得超越職權、濫用職權、徇私舞弊,不得侵犯公民和組織的合法權益,不得洩露國家秘密、商業秘密和個人隱私(第十八條)。國家情報工作機構使用必要的方式、手段和渠道開展工作時,應當遵守國家有關規定(第十四條、第十五條、第十六條、第十七條)。國家情報工作機構應當建立監督和安全審查制度(第二十三條)。草案還規定了任何個人和組織對國家情報工作機構及其工作人員超越職權、濫用職權、徇私舞弊和其他違法行為,有權向上級機關或者有關部門檢舉、控告(第二十四條)。

 

Original Communist Chinese Government Source:

http://www.npc.gov.cn/COBRS_LFYJNEW/user/UserIndex.jsp?ID=8289337

China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields // 中國模糊戰爭:未來戰場的發展趨勢

China’s Blurred War: Trends of Future Battlefields //

中國模糊戰爭:未來戰場的發展趨勢

With the continuous development of information technology, changing the form, nature and scale of war, so that the combat style, combat methods, combat environment, combat conditions and other elements have been a lot of changes in the past, the future battlefield becomes more blurred, Can be summarized as the following:

War scale and level ambiguity

War in size and level, can be divided into strategies, campaigns and tactics, in the past, the difference between the three very obvious. From the three interrelationships, the strategy decides the battle, the battle determines the tactics, and the tactics reacts to the battle, the battle reacts to the strategy, which is the inherent law of the existence of the war itself. With the development of information technology, the development of high-tech war as information war, although not fundamentally change the strategic, campaign, tactical and counter-role of this dialectical relationship, but it makes the strategy, battle, tactical action scale increasingly blurred. This is because, under the conditions of information under the conditions of local war, the size and use of troops, weapons, limited duration of war, political prominence, war and strategy, battle, tactics combined very closely, tend to one. Information weapons and weapons to combat high precision, powerful, long range, with all-weather, all-weather combination of peaceful reconnaissance and combat integration capabilities for the rapid realization of the purpose of war to provide an effective means, sometimes do not use large forces can Reach the strategy, the battle target. Any combat unit, and even the individual combat operations, can get a strong information and fire support. Under their influence, tactical combat can directly achieve strategic objectives, strategic command can be involved in the tactical level is no longer a dream at any time. Thus, in the past through the local small victory gradually integrated into a strategic victory of the operational theory of the impact of the strategy, campaign, tactical three combat levels between the increasingly blurred.

With the extensive use of precision strike weapons, stealth weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and thus through the first and second fire assault can be reached a battle or strategic objectives. In the Gulf War, the multinational force first through a large-scale strategic air raids, and then through the ground operations of the various forces reached a war purpose; US invasion of Panama, through the use of the Army to implement the five-way center of the campaign to achieve the desired purpose; In the war in Afghanistan, the US military, through the air strike and the special forces to achieve the purpose of the war; the Iraq war, the US military in the air against the cover, the US Army division through tactical action reached a war purpose. The scale of operation and the ambiguity of the level are the reflection of the essential characteristics of information warfare. In the information war, the hostile parties for the rapid completion of the established strategic objectives, will be extraordinary use of combat power, to maximize the advanced technical weapons and elite troops, and strive to destroy each other in a short time the command and control system to win the battlefield The advantage of making information right. This feature of the information warfare, so that the battle of combat and strategic purposes there is no obvious distinction between the scale of operations there is no clear battle battle difference. A battle may determine the outcome of the war, a battle may also achieve the purpose of war, thus greatly improving the strategic role of the battle battle. Especially the various precision guidance weapons, ballistic missile defense system, reconnaissance surveillance system, stealth weapon, C4ISR system and other information weapons and the extensive use of rapid reaction forces, special forces, strategic reserve and other frequently into the battlefield, making the definition of combat scale fuzzy More prominent.

Therefore, in the future information operations, the two sides will fight with the uncertainty of the scale of operations, to take over-the-line precision strike, non-programmatic “acupuncture” and structural damage and other tactics, against each other’s battlefield awareness system and information systems Quickly achieve the purpose of fighting. In this way, the special operations forces on the battlefield may be able to show their talents, that is, before the war secretly penetrate the enemy, direct attack and paralyze the enemy command and control system, so that the enemy lost control of its combat forces, and thus into the chaos of command, The Although the scale of the operation of the smaller, but for the outcome of the war can play a very important role.

Weapon equipment and functional blur

Technical decision tactics, also determines the army’s system and the composition of military and arms. For example, the emergence of weapons and equipment such as artillery, chemical weapons and radio telegraphy, laid the material foundation for the emergence of new arms such as artillery, chemical warfare, and communications. In terms of military services, due to the emergence of the aircraft, and then produced the Air Force; ship advent, gave birth to the Navy. Industrial era, the requirements of the division of labor, so refined and produced more and more professional, reflected in the composition of the army, is the division of arms and branches more and more fine; information age, requires the overall combat, the professional Close cooperation, and take the road of integrated and integrated operations. Reflected in the composition of the military trend, is the integration of combat systems. For example, many of the future weapons and equipment system will form an independent combat unit, both to complete the army requirements of the combat mission, but also to achieve the Air Force’s operational requirements, but also to achieve the purpose of naval combat. In other words, when the future combat aircraft’s infinite capacity to extend, and beyond the atmosphere combat; Army bid farewell to the “ground crawling” to achieve global arrival, global operations; the Navy to the sea to land, to the air combat capability transformation, Battle will inevitably lead to integrated forces. Integrated combat troops, generally composed of armored forces, artillery, mechanized infantry, missiles, attack and transport helicopters, naval vessels and other components, can independently combat, will realize the professional army to the professional army transition.

Future integration forces will be the main performance, will break the traditional land, sea, air, days and other military system, in accordance with the requirements of system integration, the establishment of “super-integrated” integrated combat forces. The future of information warfare is a highly integrated joint operations, the use of traditional forces of the implementation of joint operations, it is difficult to adapt to this highly integrated joint operations needs. To this end, the future composition of the military organization, will break the traditional land, sea, air, days and other military system, in accordance with the reconnaissance surveillance, command and control, precision strike and support to protect the four operational functions, built four subsystems, namely: Subsystems, command and control subsystems, precision strike and combat subsystems, and support assurance subsystems. The functions of these four subsystems are closely linked and organically linked to form an interdependent large integrated joint combat system. The army constructed in accordance with this idea will fundamentally abandon the pattern of military construction in the industrial age, eliminate the disadvantages of playing the military expertise and pursuing the interests of a single service, so that the combat forces form a “systematic system” or “system integration” Give full play to the overall power, the implementation of the true sense of “super-joint” integrated joint operations.

 

Military combat operations and the preparation of fuzzy war

Military combat forces have different targets and perform different combat missions. World War II, combat forces mainly infantry-based, basically infantry and infantry confrontation; the Second World War, due to the development of weapons and equipment, aircraft, tanks, cannons for war, arms and arms between the combat The task has a distinct distinction, usually performing a different combat mission. However, under the conditions of information in the local war, due to the development of weapons and equipment to the direction of multi-functional integration, the establishment of the army, not only the arms, as well as various services. Combat forces can perform both ground combat missions, but also the implementation of the fight against air and sea objectives and tasks, so that the boundaries between the military operations will be difficult to distinguish. For example: destroy the enemy tank weapons, may have been the Army’s tanks or anti-tank weapons, it may be the Air Force aircraft or naval submarines launched “smart” missiles. The US military plans to form four integrated forces: an integrated ground force composed of armored forces, artillery, flying warriors, attack and transport helicopters: air-to-air mechanized units with “flying tanks”; air force mixed knits composed of multiple models and A “joint task force” consisting of various military units. The Russian army intends to form a “multi-purpose mobile force”, an “aerospace force” composed of ground, air and space forces, and a “non-nuclear strategic deterrent force” composed of non-strategic nuclear forces.

In the future of localized information warfare, weapons and equipment to the multi-functional, integrated direction, the development of the trend of the trend of mixing, miniaturization. Combat, the arms and arms around the established operational objectives, each other, integrated into the organic whole. On the battlefield, the arms and services will be in the land, sea, air, days, electricity and other multi-dimensional areas, around the purpose of a unified combat, both in the activities of space is relatively independent, but also in the combat operations on a high degree of integration, making different arms and arms The task line becomes more vague.

War motives and ambiguity

The motive of the traditional war is generally the political struggle to cover up the economic interests of the dispute. In the information age, the economic interests of the dispute will continue to lead to the root causes of the war, but in addition, due to the international and domestic political forces between the various contacts increased, closely linked, which will inevitably lead to various countries, And the conflicts between the societies caused by political, diplomatic and spiritual factors have increased, so that the contradictions between religions and nationalities have increased, so that violence can be smuggled and drug trafficking and terrorist activities are internationalized. These contradictions and conflicts are not only the direct cause of the “sub-war operations”, but also one of the causes of the war. The direct cause of the Gulf War in 1991 was the convening of the United Nations Security Council immediately after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the adoption of resolution 660, condemning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and demanding that Iraq be unconditionally withdrawn from its forces. The United States for the protection of Western oil sources and in order to establish a new order in line with the interests of the world’s new order, take the lead in the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq, followed by the United States led the multinational force to implement the UN Security Council resolution in the name of the troops to the Gulf. Through 42 days of war, the US military reached the purpose of the war. The war in Iraq, the United States to Iraq has a weapons of mass destruction on the grounds, without the authorization of the United Nations launched an injustice war. Throughout the war, the focus of US military operations against Saddam Hussein and a handful of Iraqi high-level leaders, and to find weapons of mass destruction and launched the attack. Although the war has overthrew the Saddam regime, the United States still has not found strong evidence that Iraq has such banned weapons. In this war military purpose, the United States is also to test the new operational theory.

In recent years, the US military vigorously advocated military reform. The theory of the war in Iraq is the theory of “cyber-centric warfare” and uses the new theory of “shock and deterrence” put forward in 1996: emphasizing the use of violent firepower, shocking against opponents, regardless of frontier and depth, The enemy to combat, the use of advanced precision guidance technology, against each other’s goals when one side of the pursuit of both sides less casualties; air and ground operations at the same time, the purpose is to destroy each other’s will, so that its regime collapse, so as to achieve war and subdue The purpose of the soldiers. In the Iraq war, the US military did not carry out large-scale strategic bombing, but the use of high-tech and special forces tactics to combat, which is one of the main achievements of US military reform.

War attack and defense blur

The process of attack and defense in the past is very clear, the attacking party usually in accordance with the offensive preparation, breakthrough, shock, deep combat and other step by step attack procedures, defense side in accordance with the defense preparation, fire against the preparation, anti-impact, deep combat and other sub-combat operations Attack and defense both sides of the various stages of combat orderly. The development of high-tech weapons and equipment and information technology, the new military revolution will change the future combat procedures, combat operations will break through the fixed battlefield and position constraints in the entire operational space at all levels, all directions, all aspects of the same time. In this way, the front and rear lines in the past are blurred, the relatively stable front and fixed battlefields no longer exist, the line of offensive action and defensive action because the battlefield’s high mobility and uncertainty also become blurred and influence World military force balance. Offensive and defensive both offensive and defensive combat, especially offensive and defensive information war will become the focus of future combat art, so that every war has attack in the defense, anti-attack.

Attack and defense operations will be in the land, sea, air, days, electricity and outer space and front and depth, front and wing side, front and rear at the same time, the battlefield frequent mobility, line combat style has not adapted to the conditions of local war development Need to, instead of non-line operations, the formation of a “island-based combat base”, front and rear of the line, the enemy and the two sides of the front becomes blurred, the battlefield of the flow of non-linear or non-state state of the multi-dimensional battlefield.

Measure the outcome of the war with the standard fuzzy

In the past, the criteria for measuring the outcome of a war usually refer to how many troops are wiped out, how many weapons are seized, how many cities and territories are occupied, but in the case of local warfare, the criteria for measuring the outcome of a war are not just that. Under the conditions of information, local warfare, political purpose and war are closely integrated, war attempts often not through the invasion of each other’s territory, wiped out the enemy or the enemy completely surrendered, so as not to lead the world public opinion and the people’s strong opposition, resulting in political Passive.

One of the hallmarks of information warfare is that it minimizes casualties, in particular, collateral damage, and often uses precision-guided weapons to strike precisely, to avoid heavy assault, face-to-face fights, and fight against Libya “Surgical” operations, the implementation of air long-range maneuvers, to achieve the purpose of war; also the implementation of missiles, thousands of miles away siege warfare, but also to achieve the purpose of local war; also like the Gulf War, do not occupy its territory, Do not kill their soldiers a soldier, not seized its weapons, ammunition, the implementation of large-scale air strikes, weakened its military facilities, destroyed its regime.

The war army is blurred with the people

In previous wars, the links between the army and the society were relatively “loose” due to restrictions on information infrastructure and technology; pure war weapons and equipment also led to military organizations that were completely independent of the people. Information age, information has become a link between the military and the people, this combination, with the social and military information degree of development, integration will also continue to improve. This makes society and ordinary people no longer a spectator of war, and even not only in support and subordinate status, but with the army, from the back of the war to the front desk.

As people see, on the one hand, the purpose of modern warfare is no longer simply pursuing siege and the greatest annihilation of enemy forces, the target is no longer confined to the enemy’s heavy military and military facilities, but includes Corresponding to the survival and operation of the infrastructure, such as: financial networks, power grids, transport networks, administrative networks, communications networks. On the other hand, the war has a tendency to “civilians”. For example, information makes the “non-state” has the ability to confront national power. Any “non-state subject”, as long as there is a certain technical and information equipment, you can attack the vital goal of a country, its harm is sometimes no less than a traditional sense of the war. Such as Al Qaeda attacks on the United States launched the 9.11 attack, that is the case. Although the composition of the information warfare forces, although still have traces of the war in the past war, but in the form of form and combat quality, due to more information to join the content, in particular, more to join the information of the whole society Warfare ability, so no doubt to determine the specific role of information warfare when the thinking tends to blur, but for combat decision-making and command to bring greater difficulties. With the in-depth development of information technology, the degree of social information will be greatly improved. In this case the information war, it is more prominent military and civilian compatibility characteristics. Especially in the information warfare, many high-tech work, alone, the strength of the army is difficult to complete independently, but also the need for the whole social forces of collaboration, which makes the information warfare combat power, more into the national factors.

Combat both forces with contrast and blur

In the past, the strength of the war between the two sides, usually the number of military personnel, the number of weapons to measure the number of weapons to determine the strength of the advantages of planning and combat operations. But in the information under the conditions of local war, concentrated forces of content and methods have changed. The strength of the comparison is not only the number of considerations, but also mainly consider the quality, in particular, to consider the concentration of firepower and information, a variety of long-range strike weapons do not need to focus on deployment, you can focus on the implementation of the target surprise. To make the concentration of fire after the effective role, but also must focus on a lot of information, otherwise they can not capture, track and destroy the target. The most important weapon in military forces will no longer be a high-performance fighter, bomber, tank, warships, but a huge flood of data from the information system. Invisible information and knowledge, like armored masters, play a huge role in combat and are increasingly becoming the most important combat and power multiplier. Computing power, communication ability, reconnaissance ability, processing ability, decision-making ability, computer simulation ability, network warfare and other information and knowledge factors will become a key factor in measuring military power.

The contrast of military forces is increasingly dependent on the invisible and difficult potential of the intelligence and structural forces of the information weapons system. Therefore, in the past according to the number of combatants and tanks, aircraft, artillery, warships and other weapons and equipment performance, quantity and other static indicators to assess the strength of military strength is clearly challenged. Because of the intelligence of the information weapon system, the structural force has great potential for dynamic. The strength of the Gulf War contrast and the outcome of the war can explain this problem. Before the war, Iraq and the multinational force compared to 1.6: 1, but the result of the war is the Iraqi army casualties for the multinational force 100 times. Obviously, if not a large number of multinational force weapons system to play a multiplier combat potential, there will be no such a war situation. It can be seen that the principle of force assessment of the number of static quantities will be replaced by a new force theory.

Battlefield information is true and false

Because of the development of information technology, and widely used in future war, so that a large amount of modern war information, processing information has been very difficult. Such as: the US Strategic Air Force Command, an average of more than 815,000 per month to deal with military information, almost 26,500 copies per day. In the Gulf War, the multinational force in the 42 days of combat, dealing with up to millions of military information. Only the US Army logistics will handle 10,700 copies of military information every day. After the military, weapons and equipment and the battlefield are digitized, the military information highway will cover the entire combat space, the information is true and false, there are new and old, heavy and light, there is real, there are thick and so on, information Like the tide to the red and blue both sides of the command came. In such a fast-paced, fighter fleeting, information massive battlefield environment, to the red and blue commander of a brief decision-making time, forcing both commanders in the complex battlefield information forging discrimination, analysis and judgment, quick decision-making , Through the phenomenon to seize the essence, improve the command ability.

Battlefield space and scope is blurred

Battlefield is the enemy of the two sides of the interaction between combat forces and combat forces and firepower to kill the maximum distance. In the past war, due to the level of weapons and equipment constraints, cold weapons era battlefield space, basically confined to the war between the two sides of the visual distance; hot weapons and mechanized war era, battlefield space by the firearms and the two sides of the maneuverability And the battlefield space is expanding, and from a single land battlefield, to the development of the marine battlefield and air battlefield; combat distance from the visual distance to the development of remote and ultra-long-range , The depth and dimension of the battlefield continue to expand. After entering the information warfare, with the development of military weapons and equipment and structure changes, modern warfare space from the traditional land, sea and air to space, computer space, especially information, psychology, electromagnetic, cognitive and other virtual space expansion , In addition to the range of modern weapons and equipment and a substantial increase in mobility, the future battlefield in front and rear become increasingly blurred, in addition to the solid space in the solid before and after the exception, in the dynamic action space has no difference. Fighting may start from the front, it may start from the depth. Especially the establishment of digital forces, so that the army choose the way of combat operations, with greater freedom and flexibility. At the same time, but also to accurately determine the other side of the operational space and the exact location of the space, increasing the complexity. First, information weapons greatly improve the military’s ability to war, so that the military battlefield combat more flexible way. Second, information weapons greatly enhance the military’s full-time, all-round rapid mobility, so that information warfare warfare areas to expand.

Military aerospace capacity and long-range air transport capacity, the extensive use of armed helicopters, to achieve long-range rapid maneuver provides a good material basis. Future information warfare, or in three-dimensional space or in four-dimensional space, generally difficult to accurately grasp. And only when the other side of the combat operations to a certain size, it is possible to make a relatively accurate judgments, which to some extent increased the difficulty of command and control. The ambiguity of combat space is also manifested in the fuzzy scope of combat operations. As the future of information operations will break through the frontier to the depth of the gradual advance of the pattern, in a multi-dimensional space within the full range, full depth of the war, so that the scope of combat operations increased, combat space has become elusive. The uncertainty of the scale of combat operations in the information warfare determines the diversity of combat space. This also makes it possible to judge the space of the other combat operations, become blurred, and show the characteristics of difficult to predict and control.

Combat methods and methods are blurred

Advanced information technology, not only to achieve the real-time reconnaissance intelligence and digital battlefield, greatly improving the combat effectiveness of the army, more importantly, there have been many new means of warfare: such as information warfare momentum and power to make enemies Information deterrence; to disperse, conceal and open the information channel of the information shielding; on the enemy battlefield awareness system and information system implementation of information attacks; through the information system hidden false information fraud and information cut, computer virus attacks , Special operations, psychological warfare, non-contact operations, non-fatal attacks, structural damage warfare, these combat methods used in information warfare, completely changed the past offensive and defensive procedures clear and coherent characteristics, so that the use of combat means Order, combat form of non-model and other characteristics of more and more prominent, and then led to the information warfare, the use of the enemy means of warfare, timing and methods, become more difficult to guess. In the process of the combination of fuzzy, that is, in the course of the war, due to the enemy due to the appropriate choice of means of attack, and flexible combination, so that the enemy can not determine what the other side will take the means of combat, can not effectively take the appropriate protective measures. In the use of the timing of the fuzzy, that is, according to the intention of war and combat purposes, for different stages of combat and different areas of combat, to take different means of attack, reduce the enemy resistance will make it in trouble. In the fight against the ambiguity of the target, that is, the use of information warfare means of diversification, for the needs of information operations, both sound East West, but also the East and East, the flexibility to combat the enemy command center, communication center or radar station, air defense system , Logistical support systems and other key nodes, so that the enemy is difficult to use the means of my war to make accurate predictions.
原文網址:https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

Original Mandarin Chinese:

隨著信息技術的不斷發展,改變了戰爭的形態、性質和規模,使作戰樣式、作戰方法、作戰環境、作戰條件等諸要素已較以往發生了諸多變化,未來戰場變得更加模糊不清,可歸納為以下幾種:

戰爭規模與層次模糊

戰爭在規模和層次上,可劃分為戰略、戰役和戰術,在以往戰爭中三者之間的區別十分明顯。從三者相互關係上,戰略決定戰役,戰役決定戰術,而且戰術反作用於戰役,戰役又反作用於戰略,這是戰爭本身存在的內在規律。隨著信息技術的發展,高技術戰爭發展為信息化戰爭,雖然未從根本上改變戰略、戰役、戰術這種作用與反作用的辯證關係,但是卻使戰略、戰役、戰術行動規模的日益模糊。這是因為,信息化條件下局部戰爭目的、規模和使用兵力、兵器有限,戰爭持續時間短,政治性突出,戰爭與戰略、戰役、戰術結合得十分緊密,趨於一體。信息化武器和兵器打擊精度高、威力大、射程遠,具有全天候、全時空的平戰結合的偵察與打擊一體化能力,為迅速達成戰爭目的提供了有效手段,有時不動用大部隊也能達成戰略、戰役目標。任何一個作戰單元,甚至是單兵的戰鬥行動,都能得到強大的信息和火力支援。在它們的作用下,戰術打擊可以直接達成戰略目的,戰略指揮可以隨時介入戰術層次已不再是夢想。由此可見,以往通過局部小勝逐步匯集成戰略性勝利的作戰理論受到衝擊,戰略、戰役、戰術三個作戰層次間的界線日益模糊。

隨著大量使用精確打擊兵器、隱形兵器、無人機,因而通過一、二次火力突擊就可達成戰役或戰略目標。海灣戰爭中,多國部隊首先是通過大規模的戰略空襲行動,爾後通過地面諸軍種聯合作戰達成了戰爭目的;美軍入侵巴拿馬,是通過動用陸軍實施五路重心攻擊的戰役行動達成了預期目的;阿富汗戰爭中,美軍主要通過空中精確打擊和特種部隊搜剿達成了戰爭目的;伊拉克戰爭中,美軍在空中打擊掩護下,美國陸軍師通過戰術行動達成了戰爭目的。作戰規模、層次的模糊性,是信息戰本質特徵的反映。在信息戰中,敵對雙方為迅速達成既定的戰略目的,將會超常使用作戰力量,最大限度地投入先進的技術兵器和精銳部隊,力求在短時間內摧毀對方的指揮控制系統,以奪取戰場上制信息權的優勢。信息戰的這一特點,使戰役戰鬥與戰略目的沒有明顯的區分,作戰規模也沒有明確的戰役戰鬥的區別。一次戰役既可能決定戰爭的勝負,一次戰鬥也可能實現戰爭的目的,從而大幅度地提高了戰役戰鬥的戰略作用。特別是各種精確制導武器、彈道飛彈防禦系統、偵察監視系統、隱形武器、C4ISR系統等信息化兵器的廣泛運用和快速反應部隊、特種部隊、戰略預備隊等頻繁投入戰場,使得作戰規模的界定模糊性更加突出。

因此,在未來信息作戰中,作戰雙方都將以不確定的作戰規模,採取超視距精確打擊、非程式化「點穴」和結構破壞等戰法,打擊對方的戰場感知系統與信息系統,以便迅速地達成作戰目的。這樣,戰場上的特種作戰部隊就可能大顯身手,即在戰前秘密地深入敵後,直接攻擊和癱瘓敵指揮控制系統,使敵失去對其作戰力量的控制,從而陷入指揮混亂、協調無序的困境。這種規模的作戰雖然較小,但對於作戰的勝負卻能起到極其重要的作用。

武器裝備與功能模糊

技術決定戰術,同樣也決定著軍隊的編制體制和軍兵種構成。例如,火炮、化學武器、無線電報機等武器裝備的出現,為炮兵、防化兵、通信兵等新兵種的出現奠定了物質基礎。就軍種而言,由於飛機的出現,進而產生了空軍;船舶的問世,催生出了海軍。工業時代,要求的是分工合作,所以細化和產生的專業越來越多,體現在軍隊的構成上,就是軍兵種劃分得越來越細;資訊時代,要求的是整體作戰,各專業之間密切協同,走集成一體化聯合作戰之路。反映在軍隊的構成趨勢上,就是作戰系統的一體化。比如,未來許多武器裝備系統將形成一個獨立的作戰單元,既可完成陸軍要求的作戰任務,也可實現空軍的作戰要求,還可達到海軍的作戰目的。換句話說,當未來作戰飛機的續航能力無限延長,並超越大氣層作戰;陸軍告別「地面爬行」,實現全球抵達、全球作戰;海軍實現由海到陸、到空的作戰能力轉化之時,一體化作戰必然催生一體化部隊。一體化作戰部隊,一般由裝甲兵、炮兵、機械化步兵、飛彈、攻擊和運輸直升機、海軍艦艇等組成,能獨立作戰,將實現專業軍隊向職業化軍隊過渡。

未來一體化部隊將主要表現為,將打破傳統的陸、海、空、天等軍種體制,按照系統集成的要求,建立「超聯合」的一體化作戰部隊。未來信息化戰爭是高度一體化聯合作戰,使用傳統的諸軍種力量實施聯合作戰,已難以適應這種高度一體化聯合作戰的需要。為此,未來軍隊組織的編成,將打破傳統的陸、海、空、天等軍種體制,按照偵察監視、指揮控制、精確打擊和支援保障四大作戰職能,建成四個子系統,即:探測預警子系統、指揮控制子系統、精確打擊與作戰子系統和支援保障子系統。這四個子系統的功能緊密銜接,有機聯繫,構成一個相互依存龐大的一體化聯合作戰系統。按照這個思路構建的軍隊,將從根本上拋棄工業化時代軍隊建設的模式,革除偏重發揮軍種專長和追求單一軍種利益的弊端,使作戰力量形成「系統的系統」或「系統的集成」,從而能夠充分發揮整體威力,實施真正意義上「超聯合」的一體化聯合作戰。

軍兵種作戰任務與編制模糊

軍兵種作戰力量具有不同的打擊目標和執行不同作戰任務。第一次世界大戰,作戰力量主要以步兵為主,基本上是步兵與步兵的對抗;第二次世界大戰,由於武器裝備的發展,飛機、坦克、大炮用於戰爭,軍兵種之間的作戰任務有了明顯區分,通常執行不同的作戰任務。但是在信息化條件下局部戰爭中,由於武器裝備向多功能一體化方向上發展,部隊的編制內,不僅有各兵種,還有各軍種。作戰部隊既能執行地面作戰任務,又能執行打擊空中和海上目標任務,使軍種間作戰的界線將不易區分。例如:摧毀敵方坦克的兵器,可能是已方陸軍的坦克或反坦克兵器,也可能是空軍的飛機或海軍潛艇發射的「智能」型飛彈。美軍計劃組建四種一體化部隊:由裝甲兵、炮兵、飛彈兵、攻擊與運輸直升機組成的一體化地面部隊:編有「飛行坦克」的陸空機械化部隊;由多機種組成的空軍混編聯隊和中隊;由各軍種部隊組成的「聯合特遣部隊」。俄軍擬組建集各軍兵種於一體的「多用途機動部隊」,由地面、空中和太空兵力組成的「航空航天部隊」,以及由各軍種非戰略核力量組成的「非核戰略威懾部隊」。

在未來信息化局部戰爭中,武器裝備向多功能、一體化方向發展,部隊的編制趨向混合化、小型化。作戰中,各軍兵種圍繞既定的作戰目標,彼此依存,融為有機的整體。在戰場上,各軍兵種將在陸、海、空、天、電等多維領域,圍繞統一的作戰目的,既在活動空間上相對獨立,又在作戰行動上高度融合,使得不同軍兵種所執行的任務界線變得更加模糊。

戰爭動因與目的模糊

傳統戰爭的動因一般是政治鬥爭掩蓋下的經濟利益之爭。在資訊時代,經濟利益之爭仍將是導致戰爭的根本原因,但除此之外,由於各國之間、國際國內各派政治力量之間交往增多,聯繫密切,這就必然導致各個國家、民族、社團之間由政治、外交、精神等因素引發的衝突增多,使宗教、民族矛盾上升,使暴力活動、走私販毒、恐怖活動國際化。這些矛盾與衝突不僅是「亞戰爭行動」的直接根源,也是導致戰爭的動因之一。1991年海灣戰爭直接動因,是1990年8月2日伊拉克入侵科威特之後,聯合國安理會立即召開會議,通過了660號決議,譴責伊拉克入侵科威特,要求伊拉克無條件從科撤軍。美國出於保護西方石油來源和為建立符合其利益的世界新秩序的目的,乘虛而入帶頭對伊拉克實施經濟制裁,隨後以美國為首的多國部隊以執行聯合國安理會決議為名,出兵海灣。通過42天的交戰,美軍達到了戰爭目的。伊拉克戰爭,美國以伊拉克擁有大規模殺傷性武器為由,沒有經過聯合國授權而發動的一場非正義戰爭。整個戰爭中,美軍作戰的重心是針對薩達姆等少數伊拉克高層領導人,並以尋找大規模殺傷性武器而展開的攻擊行動。雖然戰爭已經推翻了薩達姆政權,但是美國至今仍然沒有找到伊拉克擁有這種違禁武器的有力證據。在這場戰爭軍事目的上,美國也是為了試驗新的作戰理論。

近幾年,美軍大力倡導軍事變革。指導伊拉克戰爭的理論是「網絡中心戰」理論,並運用1996年提出的「震撼與威懾」的新理論:強調運用猛烈的火力,震撼性打擊對手,不分前沿和縱深,全方位迅速地對敵人進行打擊,運用先進的精確制導技術,打擊對方目標時片面追求雙方較少的傷亡;空中與地面行動同時展開,目的是摧毀對方的意志,使其政權崩潰,從而達到不戰而屈人之兵的目的。伊拉克戰爭中,美軍沒有進行大規模的戰略轟炸,而是利用高技術加特種兵的戰術進行作戰,這是美軍軍事變革的主要成果之一。

戰爭進攻與防禦模糊

以往攻防作戰的程序十分明,進攻一方通常按照進攻準備、突破、衝擊、縱深作戰等步步進攻程序進行,防禦一方按照防禦準備、火力反準備、反衝擊、縱深抗擊等分段抗擊作戰程序進行,攻防雙方各個作戰階段展開有序。而高技術武器裝備和信息技術的發展,新軍事革命將改變未來作戰程序,作戰行動將突破固定的戰場和陣地的限制,在整個作戰空間的各個層次、各個方向、各個方面同時進行。這樣一來,以往戰爭中的前後方界線模糊,相對穩定的正面和固定的戰場不復存在,進攻行動和防禦行動的界線因為戰場的高度流動性和不確定性也變得模糊不清並影響世界軍事力量平衡。攻防兼備、攻防一體作戰尤其是攻防一體的信息戰將成為今後作戰藝術的焦點,使每一次戰爭都有攻中有防、防中有攻。

攻防作戰將在陸、海、空、天、電以及外層空間和前沿與縱深、正面與翼側、前方與後方同時展開,戰場機動頻繁,線式作戰樣式已不適應信息化條件下局部戰爭發展的需要,取而代之的是非線式作戰,形成一種「島嶼式作戰基點」,前方與後方的界線、敵我雙方的戰線變得模糊,戰場呈現流動的非線性或無戰線狀態的多維立體戰場。

衡量戰爭勝負與標準模糊

以往衡量一場戰爭勝負的標準通常指的是殲滅對方多少兵力,繳獲多少武器,占領多少城鎮和領土,然而在未來信息化條件下局部戰爭中,衡量一場戰爭勝負的標準已不只是這些。信息化條件下的局部戰爭,政治目的與戰爭結合得緊密,戰爭企圖往往不通過侵入對方領土,全殲敵軍或使敵方徹底投降,以免引發世界輿論的和民眾的強烈反對,造成政治上的被動。

信息化戰爭的一大特點是,將使傷亡、破壞,特別是附帶性破壞減少到最低限度,通常使用精確制導武器精確打擊,避免重兵集結進行面對面的拼殺,打一場像美軍懲罰利比亞發動的「外科手術式」作戰,實施空中遠程機動空襲,達成戰爭目的;也可實施飛彈,進行遠隔千里的攻城戰,也能達成局部戰爭的目的;也可像海灣戰爭那樣,不占領其國土,不殺傷其一兵一卒,不繳獲其武器、彈藥,實施的大規模的空襲戰,削弱其軍事設施,搗毀其國政權。

戰爭軍隊與民眾模糊

以往的戰爭,由於受信息基礎設施和技術的限制,軍隊與社會的聯繫相對「鬆散」;純戰爭的武器裝備亦導致完全獨立於民間之外的軍事組織。資訊時代,信息成為軍民結合的紐帶,這種結合,隨著社會和軍隊的信息化程度的發展,融合程度也將不斷提高。這就使得社會和普通民眾不再是戰爭的旁觀者,甚至也不僅處於支援和從屬地位,而是與軍隊一樣,從戰爭的幕後走向了前台。

正如人們看到的,一方面,現代戰爭的目的已不再單純地追求攻城掠地和最大限度地殲滅敵有生力量,打擊目標亦不再局限於敵方的重兵集團和軍事設施,而是包括對應賴以生存和運轉的基礎設施,如:金融網、電力網、交通網、行政網、通信網等。另一方面,戰爭有向「平民化」發展的趨勢。比如,信息化使得「非國家主體」具備了與國家力量進行對抗的能力。任何一個「非國家主體」,只要具備一定的技術和信息設備,就可以對一個國家的要害目標進行攻擊,其危害有時並不亞於一場傳統意義上的戰爭。比如基地組織對美發動的9·11襲擊,就是如此。信息戰力量的構成,雖然仍具有以往戰爭全民參戰的痕跡,但是在構成的形式和作戰的質量上,由於較多地加入了信息化的含量,特別是較多地加入了全社會民眾的信息戰能力,所以無疑使判斷信息戰具體參與力量時的思維趨於模糊,而為作戰決策與指揮帶來較大的困難。隨著信息技術深入發展,社會民眾的信息化程度也將極大地提高。在這種情況下的信息戰,就更加突出軍民兼容的特徵。特別在信息戰中,許多高技術工作,僅靠軍隊的力量難以獨立完成,還需要全社會力量的協作,這就使信息戰的作戰力量,較多地融入了全民皆兵的因素。

作戰雙方力量對比與能力模糊

以往交戰雙方力量對比,通常以軍隊人員數量多少、各種武器多少的比數來衡量力量優勢,進行籌劃攻防作戰。但在信息化條件下局部戰爭中,集中兵力的內容和方式有所改變。力量的對比不只是考慮數量多少,更主要是考慮質量,尤其是要考慮集中火力和信息,各種遠程打擊兵器不需要集中部署,就可對目標實施集中突擊。要使集中後的火力有效地發揮作用,還必須集中大量信息,否則就無法捕捉、跟蹤和摧毀目標。軍事力量中最重要的武器將不再是高性能的戰鬥機、轟炸機、坦克、戰艦,而是由信息系統湧現的巨大數據洪流。無形的信息和知識像裝甲雄師一般,在作戰中發揮巨大的作用,並日益成為最重要的戰鬥力和力量倍增器。計算能力、通信能力、偵察能力、處理能力、決策能力、計算機模擬能力、網絡戰等信息和知識因素都將成為衡量軍事力量的關鍵因素。

軍事力量的對比,越來越多地取決於信息武器系統的智力和結構力所帶來的無形的、難以量化的巨大潛力。因此,以往根據作戰人數和坦克、飛機、大炮、軍艦等武器裝備的性能、數量等靜態指標評定軍事力量強弱的方法顯然受到了挑戰。因為信息武器系統的智力、結構力具有巨大的動態潛力。海灣戰爭的兵力對比和戰爭結局就可說明這個問題。戰前,伊拉克與多國部隊的兵力對比是1.6:1,但戰爭結果是伊軍的傷亡為多國部隊的100倍。顯然,如果不是多國部隊的大量信息武器系統發揮出成倍的作戰潛力,是不會有如此戰局。可見,靜態數質量指標的力量評估原則將會被一種全新的力量理論所取代。

戰場信息真與假模糊

由於信息技術的發展,並廣泛運用於未來戰爭,使現代戰爭信息量很大,處理信息已經十分困難。如:美國戰略空軍司令部,平均每月要處理軍事信息815000多份,差不多每天處理26500份。在海灣戰爭中,多國部隊在42 天作戰中,處理軍事信息多達數百萬份。僅美國陸軍後勤每天就要處理軍事信息10700份。在軍隊、武器裝備和戰場都實現數字化以後,軍事信息高速公路將覆蓋整個作戰空間,這些信息有真有假、有新有舊、有重有輕、有虛有實、有粗有細等,信息像潮水般地向紅藍雙方指揮所湧來。在這樣快節奏、戰機稍縱即逝、信息海量戰場環境中,給紅藍雙方指揮員短暫決策處理時間,逼著雙方指揮員在錯綜複雜的戰場信息中鍛鍊辨別力、分析判斷力、快速決策力,透過現象抓住本質,提高指揮能力。

戰場空間與範圍模糊

戰場是指敵對雙方作戰力量相互作用並加上作戰力量機動和火力殺傷的最大距離。以往戰爭中,由於受武器裝備水平的限制,冷兵器時代的戰場空間,基本局限在交戰雙方的目視距離之內;熱兵器和機械化戰爭時代,戰場空間由火器的射程和雙方兵力的機動能力所決定,並隨著火器(炮)射程和兵力機動能力的不斷提高,戰場空間日漸擴大,並由單一的陸地戰場,發展到海洋戰場和空中戰場;作戰距離則由目視距離發展到遠程和超遠程,戰場的縱深和維度不斷拓展。進入信息化作戰後,隨著軍隊武器裝備和結構的發展變化,現代戰爭的作戰空間又從傳統的陸、海、空向太空、計算機空間,特別是信息、心理、電磁、認知等虛擬空間拓展,加之現代武器裝備的射程及機動能力大幅提高,未來戰場的前方和後方變得日漸模糊,除了在固態的地理空間上有前後之分外,在動態的行動空間上已無先後之別。戰鬥既可能從前方打響,也可能從縱深開始。特別是數字化部隊的建立,使軍隊選擇作戰行動的方式,具備了更大的自由度和靈活性。同時,也為準確地判斷對方作戰行動空間的具體範圍和準確位置,增加了複雜度。一是信息化武器大大提高了軍隊的遠戰能力,使軍隊的戰場打擊方式更加靈活。二是信息化武器大大增強了軍隊的全時空、全方位快速機動能力,使信息戰的交戰區域更加擴大。

軍事航天能力和遠程空運能力的提高,武裝直升機的廣泛運用,為實現遠距離快速機動提供了良好的物質基礎。未來信息戰,或在三維空間或在四維空間進行,一般不易準確把握。而只有當對方的作戰行動達到一定規模時,才有可能作出相對準確的判斷,這在一定程度上增加了指揮和控制的難度。作戰空間的模糊性,還表現在作戰行動範圍的模糊。由於未來信息作戰將打破由前沿向縱深逐次推進的格局,在多維的空間內進行全方位、全縱深的交戰,就使作戰行動的範圍增大,作戰空間變得難以捉摸。信息戰所具有的作戰行動規模的不確定性,決定了作戰空間的多樣性。這也使判斷對方作戰行動的空間,變得模糊起來,而呈現出不易預測和控制的特點。

作戰手段與方法模糊

先進的信息技術,不僅實現了偵察情報的實時化和戰場數字化,極大地提高了軍隊的戰鬥效能,更重要的是出現了許多嶄新的作戰手段:如以信息戰的聲勢和威力使敵懾服的信息威懾;以分散、隱蔽和廣開信息通道的方法進行的信息屏蔽;對敵戰場認識系統和信息系統實施的信息攻擊;通過信息系統隱真示假行動的信息欺騙以及信息割斷、計算機病毒襲擊、特種作戰、心理戰、非接觸作戰、非致命攻擊、結構破壞戰等,這些作戰手段運用於信息戰,完全改變了以往攻防作戰程序清晰、連貫性強的特點,使作戰手段運用的非有序性、作戰形式的非模式化等特點越來越突出,進而導致了在信息戰中,對敵方作戰手段運用的規律、時機和方法,變得更加難以揣度。在手段組合上的模糊,即在作戰過程中,因勢因敵恰當地選擇打擊手段,並靈活地進行組合,使敵無法判斷對方將要採取何種作戰手段,無法有效地採取相應的防護措施。在運用時機上的模糊,即根據作戰的意圖和作戰目的,針對不同的作戰階段和不同的作戰領域,採取不同的打擊手段,降低敵抵抗意志,使之陷入困境。在打擊目標上的模糊,即利用信息戰作戰手段多樣化的特點,針對信息作戰的需要,既可聲東擊西,亦可聲東擊東,靈活地打擊敵指揮中心、通信中心或雷達站、防空系統、後勤保障系統等關鍵節點,使敵難以對我作戰手段的運用作出準確的預測。
原文網址:https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

Original Source: https://read01.com/j7m0M8.html

 

中國優先發展網絡戰略信息化戰 // China to give priority to the development of network strategy & information warfare

中國優先發展網絡戰略信息化戰 //

China to give priority to the development of network strategy & information warfare

Cyberspace has become the national comprehensive security of the door. Network warfare reality, the network battlefield globalization, network confrontation normalization, the network attack heart white hot, the network to build the army of the general trend, no one can block. Give priority to the development of network strategy, and actively seize the commanding heights of network strategy, for my army building is of great significance.

  The main features of network strategy

Network strategic strength refers to the ability to achieve the desired results through cyberspace. From the current development and possible future trends, mainly with the following characteristics.

Composed of multiple. In recent years, the major network events in the world have shown that the strategic power of the military network is the main force of cyberspace competition. The strategic power of the government departments and the private sector is an important part of the cyberspace competition. The “cyber warrior” An important addition.

Strong professionalism. Network strategy strength has a strong latent and difficult to predict, and the speed of light, instantaneous effect, monitoring and early warning is difficult; once the action is effective, damage effect superimposed magnification or non-linear step, with a typical “butterfly effect.” In 2010, the “shock net” virus attacked the centrifuges of the Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant and the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, resulting in nearly a thousand centrifuge scrapped, forcing Iran’s nuclear capacity building to delay 2 to 3 years, opened the network attack soft means Destroy the national hard facilities.

Destructive. The strategic power of the network is no less than the weapons of mass destruction. Russia and Georgia in 2008, “the five-day war”, the Russian military to Georgia’s television media, government websites and transportation systems as the goal, to carry out a comprehensive “bee group” type of network paralysis attacks, leading to grid government agencies operating chaos, Logistics and communication system collapse, much-needed war materials can not be delivered in a timely manner, the potential of the war has been seriously weakened, a direct impact on the grid of social order, operational command and troop scheduling. The Russian military doctrine has identified cybercrime as a weapon of mass destruction and has retained the right to use weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons to counterattack.

Advanced technology and phase. Network strategy strength development speed, replacement fast, technical materialization for the equipment cycle is short. At present, the speed of the microprocessor doubles every 18 months, the backbone bandwidth doubled every six months, a variety of new electronic information equipment after another, all kinds of application software dizzying. Cyber ​​space confrontation is the field of information in the field of offensive and defensive struggle, the use of network strategy forces in the confrontation of the phase with grams, constantly renovated. The development of the firewall and the information monitoring technology makes the software of the anti-wall software upgrade continuously. The development of the firewall and the information monitoring technology has led to the development of the firewall. , Can be described as “a foot high, magic high ten feet.”

  The Developing Trend of Network Strategic

From the subordinate force to the development of key forces. In the past, the network strategic power is mainly for other forces to provide information security, in a subordinate position; with the development of network information technology, network system control of other rights, network strategic forces from subordinate status to the dominant position to accelerate into, to maintain the country The key to safety. There is no network security there is no sovereign security, “no net” to become a new law of war, the world’s major countries around the network space development rights, dominance and control of a new round of competition, especially the United States and Russia adhere to the practice In the use and continue to develop.

From the maintenance of force to the development of specialized forces. In the past, the network strategy is mainly to maintain the network information system and all kinds of network transmission system, network attack and defense attributes are not clear. At present, all areas of the network space in depth, the world’s major countries are hard to build cyberspace offensive and defensive capabilities, the main military power of the network strategy has become a network of reconnaissance, network attacks, network defense and other clear division of labor, professional regular military forces. The United States has so far built the world’s most complete and powerful network of the army, and held a series of “network storm” series of exercises. The new “cyberspace strategy” in the United States, the first public to cyberspace combat as one of the tactical options for future military conflict, clearly proposed to improve the US military in the cyberspace of deterrence and offensive capability. In order to adapt to the new strategy, the US Department of Defense proposed 2018 to build a offensive and defensive, flexible form, with full combat capability of the network forces construction goals.

From the military to the integration of military and civilian development. The development of the strategic power of the military network started relatively late compared with the civil field, and because of the confidentiality of military confrontation and the specificity of the operational objectives, it is often developed independently. With the development of network technology, the military’s own network strategic strength is difficult to meet the needs of diversified tasks, we must learn from local folk technical means, integrate local network resources, realize the integration of military and civilian development. Network space capacity building on the talent, intelligence, experience and other software environment is extremely high, coupled with the local convergence of a wealth of network resources, military and civilian forces to promote the development of cyberspace capabilities become the strong tone of the times.

From a single model to the “network integration” development. At present, the network includes both the computer IP system network and the non-computer IP system network including a large number of complex early warning detection network, satellite communication network and tactical data link. The traditional single network confrontation model is difficult to meet the challenge of cyberspace. With the development of information technology, especially the Internet of Things technology, the relationship between the network and the power of the battlefield network more and more closely, which for the “network integration” in the technical means to provide the possibility. The use of electronic warfare and network warfare means, for different systems around the open bow, broken chain broken network, to achieve complementary advantages, system damage, as the latest guidance on the construction of network space. Data show that the US military typical network of integrated attack equipment “Shu special” system has been from the “Shu-1” to the current development of “Shu-5”. According to reports, “Shute” system through the enemy radar antenna, microwave relay station, network processing nodes to invade the enemy air defense network system, real-time monitoring of enemy radar detection results, even as a system administrator to take over the enemy network, Control of the sensor.

From non-state actors to state actors. At present, the network attack has developed from a single hacker behavior for the national, political, military confrontation, the attack object has been developed from the personal website to the country, the army’s important information system, attack “unit” has grown from stand-alone to tens of thousands Hundreds of thousands of terminals, and can instantly release the amazing attack energy. Although many of the intentions of malicious acts of non-State actors are non-state, the consequences are national, whether they are espionage, political opinions, or personal discontent, or terrorist activities , Have a direct impact on social stability, disrupt the economic order, endanger the stability of state power. Once the relevant reaction is made, the subject of the act must be the state and the army, and not the non-state actors themselves.

  The Construction of Network Strategic Strength

Strengthen strategic planning. Cyberspace competition is the first strategic battle of the contest. From the national level, the network strategy of the power of the main function is to reduce the risk of cyberspace, maintaining the normal operation of the country. We must understand the extreme importance and realistic urgency of cyberspace security from the perspective of national security, raise the focus of cyberspace capacity building to the strategic level, and try to reduce the national cyberspace security while trying to solve the problem of how to make good use of cyberspace Risk, so that cyberspace security has become an important support for national prosperity and security. From the military level, the network strategy is mainly to seize the system of network power. We must expand the military vision, the cyberspace as an important area of ​​action, to seize the system as the core, change the military ideas and ideas, adjust the structure and composition of armed forces, the development of weapons and equipment and take a new tactics.

Speed ​​up the construction of the power system. Maintain cyberspace security in the final analysis depends on the strength. We must base ourselves on the characteristics and laws of cyberspace capacity building, focus on the core elements of network capability system and the overall layout of network strategy, and systematically design the system structure which conforms to the law and characteristics of cyberspace confrontation in our country, and perfect the system of leadership and command Functional tasks, straighten out the relationship between command and management. We should take the network strategic power as an important new combat force, from the organization construction, personnel training, equipment development, elements of training and other aspects, to take extraordinary measures to give priority construction, focus on protection. To normalize the national network of offensive and defensive exercises, test theory, tactics, equipment and technology effectiveness, and comprehensively enhance the comprehensive prevention of cyberspace capabilities.

Promote technological innovation. The essence of cyberspace confrontation is the competition of core technology, and it is necessary to accelerate the independent innovation of network information technology. To improve the ability of independent innovation as a strategic basis to the national innovation system as the basic support, focus on breaking the forefront of network development technology and international competitiveness of the key core technology, advanced deployment and focus on the development of information technology and information industry. To speed up the process of localization of key core technologies, strengthen the construction of safety testing and active early warning means, and gradually improve the equipment system of cyberspace in China, and comprehensively improve our network space capability. To follow the basic laws of cyberspace confrontation, in accordance with the “asymmetric checks and balances” strategy, increase the quantum technology, Internet of things and cloud computing and other new technology research and development efforts to create unique combat capability, master the initiative of cyberspace security development The

Promote the integration of military and civilian development. The integration of the military space ability of military and civilian development is not only the overall situation of national security and development strategy, the overall planning of national defense and economic and social development, but also the objective fact that cyberspace security can not be avoided. We must actively promote the deep integration of military and civilian development, to promote China’s network space capacity supporting the construction. It is necessary to formulate top-level planning in the form of policies and regulations, clarify the objectives, methods, organizational division and basic requirements of the deepening development of cyberspace in the form of policies and regulations, and make the integration of military and civilian development into law enforcement and organizational behavior; To establish a sound military coordination, demand docking, resource sharing mechanism, through a unified leadership management organization and coordination of military needs and major work, to achieve risk sharing, sharing of resources and common development of the new situation. We should pay attention to the distinction between the boundaries of military and civilian integration, clear the concept of development-oriented people and the main battle concept of the army, and actively explore the military and the people, the advantages of complementary channels.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

网络空间成为国家综合安全的命门。网络战争现实化、网络战场全球化、网络对抗常态化、网络攻心白热化、网络建军正规化的大势,无人可挡。优先发展网络战略力量,积极抢占网络战略制高点,对于我军队建设具有重要意义。

  网络战略力量的主要特点

网络战略力量,是指通过网络空间来实现预期结果的能力。从当前发展及未来可能的走势看,主要有以下特点。

组成多元。近年来发生在全球范围内的重大网络事件表明,军队网络战略力量是网络空间竞争的主力军,政府部门、私营机构网络战略力量是网络空间竞争的重要部分,民间“网络战士”是网络空间竞争的重要补充。

专业性强。网络战略力量具有极强的潜伏性和难预测性,且以光速进行、瞬时产生效果,监测预警难度大;一旦行动奏效,损害效果叠加放大或非线性阶跃,具有典型的“蝴蝶效应”。2010年,“震网”病毒攻击了伊朗布什尔核电站和纳坦兹铀浓缩厂的离心机,造成近千台离心机报废,迫使伊朗核能力建设延迟2至3年,开启了网络攻击软手段摧毁国家硬设施的先河。

破坏性大。网络战略力量破坏力不亚于大规模杀伤性武器。2008年俄国与格鲁吉亚“五日战争”中,俄军以格方的电视媒体、政府网站和交通系统等为目标,开展全面的“蜂群”式网络阻瘫攻击,导致格政府机构运作混乱,物流和通信系统崩溃,急需的战争物资无法及时投送,战争潜力受到严重削弱,直接影响了格的社会秩序、作战指挥和部队调度。俄罗斯军事学说已将网络攻击手段定性为大规模毁灭性武器,并保留了运用大规模毁灭性武器或核武器反击的权利。

技术先进且相生相克。网络战略力量发展速度快、更新换代快,技术物化为装备的周期短。当前,微处理器的速度每18个月翻一番,主干网带宽每6个月增加一倍,各种新型电子信息设备层出不穷,各种应用软件目不暇接。网络空间对抗是信息领域的攻防斗争,网络战略力量使用的手段在对抗中相生相克、不断翻新。常规通信受干扰催生了跳、扩频通信体制,跳、扩频通信的出现又催生了频率跟踪干扰、相关信号干扰等新型电子干扰手段;防火墙、信息监控技术的发展,使翻墙软件不断升级,可谓“道高一尺,魔高一丈”。

  网络战略力量的发展趋势

由从属性力量向关键性力量发展。以往网络战略力量主要是为其他力量提供信息保障,处于从属地位;随着网络信息技术的发展,制网权统揽其他制权,网络战略力量由从属地位向主导地位加速转进,成为维护国家安全的关键。没有网络安全就没有主权安全,“无网不胜”成为战争的新定律,世界各主要国家围绕网络空间的发展权、主导权和控制权展开了新一轮的角逐,特别是美俄坚持在实践中运用并不断发展。

由维护型力量向专业化力量发展。以往网络战略力量主要是维护网络化信息系统和各类网络传输系统,网络攻击和防御属性均不鲜明。当下各领域对网络空间深度依赖,世界主要国家无不竭力打造网络空间攻防能力,主要军事强国的网络战略力量业已成为集网络侦察、网络攻击、网络防御等分工明确、专业化的正规军事力量。美国迄今已建成全球编制最齐全、力量最庞大的网军,并多次举行“网络风暴”系列演习。美国新版《网络空间战略》,首次公开把网络空间作战作为今后军事冲突的战术选项之一,明确提出要提高美军在网络空间的威慑和进攻能力。为适应新战略,美国防部提出2018年建成一支攻防兼备、形式灵活,具备全面作战能力的网络部队的建设目标。

由军地自主向军民融合发展。军队网络战略力量的发展相对于民用领域起步较晚,且由于军事对抗的保密性和作战目标的特定性,往往自主发展。随着网络技术的发展,军队自身的网络战略力量难满足多样化任务的需要,必须学习借鉴地方民间技术手段,整合地方网络资源,实现军民融合发展。网络空间能力建设对人才、智力、经验等软件环境要求极高,加上地方汇聚了丰富的网络资源,军民联手推进网络空间能力发展成为时代的强音。

由单一模式向“网电一体”发展。现阶段,网络既包括计算机IP体制网络,更包含大量复杂的预警探测网、卫星通信网、战术数据链等非计算机IP体制网络,传统的单一网络对抗模式难以应对网络空间的挑战。随着信息技术特别是物联网技术的发展,战场网中网与电的关系越来越紧密,这为“网电一体”在技术手段上提供了可能。综合运用电子战与网络战手段,针对不同体制的网络左右开弓、断链破网,实现优势互补、体系破击,成为网络空间能力建设的最新指导。有资料显示,美军典型网电一体攻击装备“舒特”系统已从“舒特-1”发展到目前的“舒特-5”。据报道,“舒特”系统可通过敌方雷达天线、微波中继站、网络处理节点入侵敌方防空网络系统,能够实时监视敌方雷达的探测结果,甚至以系统管理员身份接管敌方网络,实现对传感器的控制。

由非国家行为体向国家行为体发展。目前,网络攻击已从单个的黑客行为发展为国家、政治、军事上的对抗行为,攻击对象已从个人网站发展到国家、军队的重要信息系统,攻击“单元”已从单机发展到数万乃至数十万台终端,且能在瞬时释放惊人的攻击能量。尽管非国家行为体的恶意网络行为目的许多是非国家的,但由此所造成的后果却是国家的,无论是进行间谍活动,还是发表政治主张,或是发泄个人不满情绪,或是进行恐怖活动,都直接影响社会稳定、扰乱经济秩序、危及国家政权稳固。一旦因之作出相关反应,其行为主体一定是国家和军队,而不再是非国家行为体本身。

  网络战略力量的建设指向

加强战略统筹谋划。网络空间竞争首先是战略运筹的较量。从国家层面看,网络战略力量的职能主要是降低网络空间的风险,维护国家正常运转。必须从国家安全的视角认清网络空间安全的极端重要性和现实紧迫性,将网络空间能力建设的着眼点上升到战略层面,在着力解决如何利用好网络空间的同时,努力降低国家网络空间安全风险,使网络空间安全成为国家繁荣与安全的重要支撑。从军队层面看,网络战略力量主要是夺取制网权。必须拓展军事视野,把网络空间作为制权行动的一个重要领域,以夺取制网权为核心,变革军事思想和观念,调整武装力量结构与构成,发展武器装备并采取新的战法。

加快力量体系构建。维护网络空间安全说到底要靠实力。必须立足于网络空间能力建设的特点、规律,围绕我国网络能力体系核心要素和网络战略力量建设总体布局,以系统思维设计符合我国网络空间对抗规律和特点的体系架构,健全领导指挥体制机制,明确职能任务,理顺指挥管理关系。要把网络战略力量作为重要的新型作战力量突出出来,从组织建设、人才培养、装备发展、要素演训等各方面,采取超常举措,给予重点建设、重点保障。要常态化开展国家级网络攻防演练,检验理论、战法、装备及技术的有效性,全面提升网络空间综合防范能力。

推进技术自主创新。网络空间对抗的实质是核心技术的比拼,必须加快推进网络信息技术自主创新。要把提高自主创新能力作为战略基点,以国家创新体系为基本依托,集中力量突破网络发展的前沿技术和具有国际竞争力的关键核心技术,超前部署和重点发展信息技术和信息产业。要加速关键核心技术的国产化进程,加强安全测试和主动预警手段的建设,逐步完善我国网络空间的装备体系,全面提高我国网络空间能力。要遵循网络空间对抗的基本规律,按照“非对称制衡”方略,加大对量子科技、物联网和云计算等新技术的研发力度,以独创技术塑造实战能力,掌握网络空间安全发展的主动权。

推动军民融合发展。网络空间能力的军民融合式发展,既是站在国家安全与发展的战略全局,对国防和经济社会发展统筹谋划,也是网络空间安全不能回避的客观事实。必须积极推动军民深度融合发展,全力推进我国网络空间能力配套建设。要综合军民需求制定顶层规划,以政策法规的形式明确网络空间军民融合深度发展的目标任务、方法路径、组织分工和基本要求等关系全局的重大问题,变军民融合发展为执法行为、组织行为;要建立健全军地协调、需求对接、资源共享机制,通过统一的领导管理机构组织协调军地的各类需求和重大工作,达成风险共担、资源共享、共同发展的新局面。要注重军民融合的界限区分,明确以民为主的发展理念和以军为主的作战理念,积极探索军民一体、优势互补的可行性渠道。

Source URL:

http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1226/c40531-28977153.html

Full Text of China’s National Cyberspace Security Strategy // 國家網絡空間安全戰略全文

Full Text of China’s National Cyberspace Security Strategy

國家網絡空間安全戰略全文

Beijing,People’s Republic of China

27 DEC 2017

December 27, approved by the Central Network Security and Information Technology Leading Group, the National Internet Information Office released the “national cyberspace security strategy”, the full text is as follows.

The extensive application of information technology and the rise and development of cyberspace have greatly promoted the economic and social prosperity and progress, but also brought new security risks and challenges. Cyberspace security (hereinafter referred to as cybersecurity) concerns the common interests of mankind, related to world peace and development, and national security. Safeguarding China’s network security is an important measure to coordinate and promote the comprehensive construction of a well-off society, comprehensively deepen reform, comprehensively administer the country according to law, and strictly pursue the strategic layout of the party, and realize the goal of “two hundred years” and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation An important guarantee. In order to implement the “four principles” of promoting the transformation of the global Internet governance system and the “five-point proposition” to build the cyberspace destiny community, we have clarified China’s important position on cyberspace development and security, guided China’s network security work, The state in the cyberspace of sovereignty, security, development interests, the development of this strategy.

First, opportunities and challenges

(A) a major opportunity

With the rapid development of information revolution, Internet, communication network, computer system, automation control system, digital equipment and its application, service and data, such as the network space, is a comprehensive change in people’s production and lifestyle, profound impact on human society Development process.

New channels for information dissemination. The development of network technology, breaking the time and space constraints, expanding the scope of communication, innovative means of communication, triggering a fundamental change in the pattern of communication. The network has become a new channel for people to access information and learn to communicate, and become a new carrier of human knowledge transmission.

Production and life of the new space. In today’s world, the depth of the network into people’s learning, life, work and other aspects of online education, entrepreneurship, health care, shopping, finance and other increasingly popular, more and more people through the network exchange ideas, achievements and dreams.

The new engine of economic development. The Internet is becoming the leading force of innovation-driven development. Information technology is widely used in all sectors of the national economy. It has promoted the upgrading of traditional industries, promoted new technologies, new forms, new industries and new models, promoted the adjustment of economic structure and economic development , For economic and social development has injected new impetus.

Cultural prosperity of the new carrier. The network promotes the cultural exchange and the popularization of knowledge, the release of cultural development vitality, the promotion of cultural innovation creation, the enrichment of people’s spiritual and cultural life, has become a new way to spread culture, provide a new means of public cultural services. Network culture has become an important part of cultural construction.

A new platform for social governance. The role of the network in advancing the national governance system and the modernization of the governance capability has become increasingly prominent. The application of e-government has been deepened, and the government information has been shared and publicized. The government has made scientific decision-making, democratization and rule of law, and has smoothed the channels of citizens’ participation in social governance. An important way to protect citizens’ right to know, to participate, to express and to supervise.

Exchange and cooperation of the new link. The development of information and globalization has promoted the global flow of information, capital, technology, talent and other elements, and promoted the integration of different civilizations. Network to the world into a global village, the international community more and more you have me, I have your fate in the community.

National sovereignty of the new territory. Cyber ​​space has become an important part of human activity with land, sea, sky and space. National sovereignty extension extends to cyberspace, and cyberspace sovereignty becomes an important part of national sovereignty. Respect for cyberspace sovereignty, safeguard network security, seek co-governance, achieve win-win situation, is becoming the international community consensus.

(B) severe challenges

The security situation of the network is becoming more and more serious, the national politics, economy, culture, society, national defense security and the legitimate rights and interests of citizens in cyberspace are facing severe risks and challenges.

Network penetration threatens political security. Political stability is the basic prerequisite for national development and people’s happiness. The use of the network to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, to attack other countries political system, incite social unrest, subversion of other countries, as well as large-scale network monitoring, network theft and other activities seriously endanger the national political security and user information security.

Network attacks threaten economic security. Network and information systems have become the key infrastructure and the entire economic and social center of the nerve, suffered damage, a major security incident, will lead to energy, transportation, communications, financial and other infrastructure paralysis, resulting in catastrophic consequences, seriously endangering national economic security And public interest.

Network Harmful Information Erosion Cultural Security. Various ideological and cultural networks on the network agitation, confrontation, excellent traditional culture and mainstream values ​​facing the impact. Network rumors, decadent culture and obscenity, violence, superstition and other harmful information contrary to the socialist core values ​​erode the physical and mental health of young people, corrupt the social atmosphere, misleading the value orientation, endangering cultural security. Online moral anomie, the phenomenon of lack of integrity frequent, the degree of network civilization need to be improved.

Network terror and criminals undermine social security. Terrorism, separatism, extremism and other forces to use the network to incite, plan, organize and implement violent terrorist activities, a direct threat to people’s lives and property security, social order. Computer viruses, Trojans and other cyberspace spread spread, cyber-fraud, hacking, infringement of intellectual property rights, abuse of personal information and other illegal acts exist, some organizations want to steal user information, transaction data, location information and business secrets, serious damage to the country , Business and personal interests, affecting social harmony and stability.

The international competition in cyberspace is in the ascendant. International competition and control of cyberspace strategic resources, to seize the right to formulate rules and strategic high ground, to seek strategic competition in the increasingly fierce. Individual countries to strengthen the network deterrence strategy, intensify the cyberspace arms race, world peace by new challenges.

Cyberspace opportunities and challenges coexist, opportunities are greater than challenges. We must insist on active use, scientific development, management according to law, ensure safety, resolutely safeguard network security, make maximum use of cyberspace development potential, and benefit more than 1.3 billion Chinese people for the benefit of all mankind and firm maintenance of world peace.

Second, the goal

With the overall national security concept as the guide, implement the innovation, coordination, green, open and shared development concept, enhance the sense of risk and crisis awareness, the overall situation of domestic and international, overall development of security two major events, active defense, effective response, Promote network space peace, security, openness, cooperation and orderly, safeguard national sovereignty, security, development interests, and realize the strategic goal of building a network power.

Peace: the abuse of information technology has been effectively curbed, cyberspace arms race and other activities threatening international peace have been effectively controlled, cyberspace conflict has been effectively prevented.

Security: network security risks are effectively controlled, the national network security system is sound and perfect, the core technology and equipment are safe and controllable, and the network and information system are stable and reliable. Network security personnel to meet the needs of the whole society of network security awareness, basic protection skills and the use of network confidence greatly improved.

Open: Information technology standards, policies and markets open, transparent, product circulation and information dissemination more smoothly, the digital divide is increasingly bridging. Regardless of size, strength, rich and poor, countries around the world, especially developing countries can share development opportunities, share the fruits of development, fair participation in cyberspace governance.

Cooperation: the world in the technical exchanges, the fight against cyber terrorist and cyber crime and other areas of cooperation more closely, multilateral, democratic and transparent Internet governance system sound and perfect, win-win cooperation as the core of the network space fate community gradually formed.

Order: public interest in the cyberspace, participation, expression, supervision and other legitimate rights and interests are fully protected, cyberspace personal privacy is effectively protected, human rights are fully respected. The network environment of the domestic and international legal system, the standard norms gradually established, the network space to achieve effective management according to law, network environment integrity, civilization, health, freedom of information flow and safeguard national security, public interests to achieve organic unity.

Third, the principle

A safe, stable and prosperous cyberspace is of great significance to all countries and the world. China is willing to work with all countries to strengthen communication, expand consensus, deepen cooperation, and actively promote the global Internet governance system changes, and jointly safeguard the peace and security of cyberspace.

(A) respect for the maintenance of cyberspace sovereignty

Cyberspace sovereignty is inviolable, respect for the independent choice of development path, network management model, Internet public policy and equal participation in international network space management rights. The network affairs within the sovereign scope of each country are made by the people of each country, and each country has the right to take the necessary measures to manage the network activities of its own information system and its own territory according to its own national conditions and draw lessons from international experience, formulate laws and regulations on cyberspace, National information systems and information resources from intrusion, interference, attack and destruction, to protect the legitimate rights and interests of citizens in cyberspace; to prevent, prevent and punish harmful information harmful to national security and interests in the national network to disseminate and maintain cyberspace order. Any country does not engage in network hegemony, do not engage in double standards, do not use the network to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, do not engage in, condone or support national activities against national security.

(B) the peaceful use of cyberspace

Peaceful use of cyberspace is in the common interest of mankind. States should abide by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the non-use or threat of use of force and prevent the use of information technology in the context of the maintenance of international security and stability, to boycott cyberspace arms races and prevent cyberspace conflicts. Adhere to mutual respect, equal treatment, seeking common ground while reserving differences, tolerance and mutual trust, respect for each other in cyberspace security interests and major concerns, to promote the construction of a harmonious network world. Against the use of national security as an excuse to use technological advantages to control other countries network and information systems, to collect and steal other countries data, but can not sacrifice the security of other countries to seek their own so-called absolute security.

(C) to manage cyberspace according to law

Comprehensively promote the legalization of cyberspace, adhere to the rule of law network, according to the law network, according to the Internet, so that the Internet in the rule of law on the healthy operation of the track. According to the law to build a good network order, the protection of cyber space information according to the law of free flow, protection of personal privacy, protection of intellectual property rights. Any organization and individual in the cyberspace to enjoy freedom, exercise the rights at the same time, to comply with the law, respect for the rights of others, their own words and deeds on the network.

(4) co-ordinate network security and development

There is no national security without national security, there is no information without modernization. Network security and information is one of the two wings, driven by the two wheels. Correctly handle the development and security of the relationship, adhere to the security development, to promote the development of security. Security is the prerequisite for development, and any development at the expense of security is difficult to sustain. Development is the foundation of security, and development is not the greatest insecurity. No information development, network security is not guaranteed, the existing security and even lost.

Fourth, strategic tasks

China’s Internet users and network size of the world’s first, to maintain China’s network security, not only their own needs, for the maintenance of global network security and world peace are of great significance. China is committed to safeguarding the national cyberspace sovereignty, security, development interests, promote the Internet for the benefit of mankind, and promote the peaceful use of cyberspace and co-governance.

(A) firmly defended cyberspace sovereignty

According to the Constitution and laws and regulations to manage China’s sovereignty within the network activities to protect China’s information facilities and information resources security, including economic, administrative, scientific and technological, legal, diplomatic, military and other measures, unswervingly maintain China’s cyberspace sovereignty. Resolutely oppose all the acts of subverting China’s state power through the Internet and undermining our national sovereignty.

(B) firmly uphold national security

To prevent, stop and punish any act of using the Internet for treason, secession, incitement to rebellion, subversion or incitement to subdue the people’s democratic dictatorship; to prevent, stop and punish the use of the Internet to steal, to disclose state secrets and other acts endangering national security; Prevent, stop and punish foreign forces to use the network to penetrate, destroy, subvert, split the activities.

(Iii) Protection of critical information infrastructures

The key information infrastructure of the country refers to the information facilities that are related to national security, national economy and people’s livelihood, which have been damaged, destroyed or lost, which may seriously endanger the national security and public interests, including but not limited to the provision of public communication, radio and television transmission Information network, energy, finance, transportation, education, scientific research, water conservancy, industrial manufacturing, health care, social security, public utilities and other areas of important information systems, important Internet applications. Take all necessary measures to protect critical information infrastructures and their important data from attack damage. Adhere to the combination of technology and management, protection and deterrence simultaneously, focus on identification, protection, detection, early warning, response, disposal and other aspects, the establishment of the implementation of key information infrastructure protection system, from management, technology, personnel, Comprehensive measures to effectively strengthen the key information infrastructure security protection.

Key information infrastructure protection is the common responsibility of the government, enterprises and society as a whole. The supervisors, the operating units and organizations shall take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the key information infrastructure in accordance with the requirements of laws, regulations and system standards. Strengthen critical information infrastructure risk assessment. Strengthen the party and government organs and key areas of the site security protection, grassroots party and government organs to build an intensive mode of operation and management. The establishment of government, industry and business network security information orderly sharing mechanism, give full play to enterprises in the protection of key information infrastructure in the important role.

Adhere to open to the outside world, based on open environment to maintain network security. Establish and implement the network security review system, strengthen the supply chain security management, the party and government organs, key industries procurement and use of important information technology products and services to carry out security review, improve product and service security and control, to prevent product service providers And other organizations use information technology to implement unfair competition or harm the interests of users.

(D) to strengthen the construction of network culture

Strengthen the construction of online ideological and cultural positions, vigorously cultivate and practice the socialist core values, the implementation of network content construction projects, the development of a positive network culture, the dissemination of positive energy, gather a strong spiritual strength, and create a good network atmosphere. Encourage the development of new business, create new products, to create the spirit of the times reflect the network culture brand, and constantly improve the network culture industry scale. The implementation of the outstanding culture of Chinese online communication project, and actively promote the excellent traditional culture and contemporary culture of digital, network production and dissemination. Play the advantages of Internet communication platform, promote the excellent cultural exchange between China and foreign countries, so that people understand the Chinese culture, so that the Chinese people understand the excellent culture of all countries, and jointly promote the prosperity and development of network culture, enrich people’s spiritual world and promote the progress of human civilization.

Strengthen the network ethics, network civilization construction, play moral education guide role, with human civilization excellent results nourish network space, repair network ecology. The construction of civilized integrity of the network environment, advocate civilization network, civilized Internet, the formation of safe, civilized and orderly information dissemination order. Resolutely crack down on rumors, obscenity, violence, superstition, cults and other harmful information spread in cyberspace spread. Improve the youth network literacy literacy, strengthen the protection of minors online, through the government, social organizations, communities, schools, families and other aspects of the joint efforts for the healthy growth of young people to create a good network environment.

(5) to combat cyber terror and crime

Strengthen the network anti-terrorism, anti-spy, anti-stealing capacity building, crack down on cyber terror and cyber espionage.

Adhere to comprehensive management, source control, according to the law to prevent, crack down on cyber fraud, Internet theft, trafficking in drug trafficking, infringement of personal information, dissemination of pornography, hacking, infringement of intellectual property rights and other criminal acts.

(6) improve the network management system

Adhere to the law, open, transparent network management network, and effectively do law, according to law, law enforcement must be strict, illegal research. Improve the network security laws and regulations system, enacted network security law, minor network protection regulations and other laws and regulations, a clear social responsibility and obligations, a clear network security management requirements. To speed up the revision and interpretation of existing laws, so that it applies to cyberspace. Improve the network security related system, establish a network trust system, improve the network security management of the scientific standardization level.

Speed ​​up the construction of legal norms, administrative supervision, industry self-discipline, technical support, public supervision, social education, a combination of network governance system to promote the network of social organization and management innovation, improve the basic management, content management, industry management and network crime prevention and combat Work linkage mechanism. Strengthen the cyberspace communication secrets, freedom of speech, trade secrets, as well as the right to reputation, property rights and other legitimate rights and interests of protection.

Encourage social organizations to participate in network governance, the development of network public welfare undertakings, strengthen the new network of social organization. Encourage Internet users to report network violations and bad information.

(7) reinforce the network security foundation

Adhere to innovation-driven development, and actively create a policy environment conducive to technological innovation, co-ordinate resources and strength to enterprises as the main body, combining production and research, collaborative research to point to the surface, the overall advance, as soon as possible in the core technology breakthrough. Attention to software security, accelerate the application of secure and credible products. The development of network infrastructure, rich network space information content. The implementation of “Internet +” action, vigorously develop the network economy. The implementation of national large data strategy, the establishment of large data security management system to support large data, cloud computing and other new generation of information technology innovation and application. Optimize the market environment, encourage network security enterprises bigger and stronger, to protect the national network security and consolidate the industrial base.

Establish and improve the national network security technology support system. Strengthening the basic theory and major problems of network security. Strengthen the network security standardization and certification work, more use of standard norms cyberspace behavior. Do a good job of level protection, risk assessment, vulnerability discovery and other basic work, improve the network security monitoring and early warning and network security emergency response mechanism.

The implementation of network security personnel projects, strengthen the network security professional construction, build first-class network security college and innovation park, the formation of personnel training and innovation and entrepreneurship of the ecological environment. Run the network security publicity week activities, vigorously carry out the national network security publicity and education. Promote the network security education into the teaching materials, into the school, into the classroom, improve the network media literacy, enhance the whole society network security awareness and protection skills, improve the network of Internet users harmful information, network fraud and other illegal and criminal activities identification and resistance.

(8) to enhance the ability of network space protection

Cyberspace is the new territory of national sovereignty. Construction and international status commensurate with the network power to adapt to the network space protection, and vigorously develop the network security and defense means to detect and resist the network invasion, casting and maintenance of national network security strong backing.

(9) to strengthen international cooperation in cyberspace

On the basis of mutual respect and mutual trust, strengthen cooperation in international cyberspace dialogue and promote the transformation of the global governance system of the Internet. Deepen cooperation with the bilateral and multilateral network security dialogue and information communication, effective control of differences, and actively participate in global and regional organizations, network security cooperation, to promote the Internet address, root domain name servers and other basic resource management internationalization.

Support the United Nations to play a leading role in promoting the development of international agreements on cyberspace, international cyberspace international anti-terrorism conventions, and sound legal mechanisms to combat cybercrime, deepening policy and legal, technical innovation, standards, emergency response, critical information infrastructure Protection and other fields of international cooperation.

Strengthen support for assistance in the development of Internet technologies and infrastructure in developing and backward regions, and strive to bridge the digital divide. To promote “along the way” building, improve the level of international communication interoperability, smooth information Silk Road. To build the World Internet Conference and other global Internet sharing system, and jointly promote the healthy development of the Internet. We will build a multilateral, democratic and transparent international Internet governance system through active and effective international cooperation to build a peaceful, safe, open, cooperative and orderly cyberspace.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

12月27日,經中央網絡安全和信息化領導小組批准,國家互聯網信息辦公室發布《國家網絡空間安全戰略》,全文如下。

信息技術廣泛應用和網絡空間興起發展,極大促進了經濟社會繁榮進步,同時也帶來了新的安全風險和挑戰。網絡空間安全(以下稱網絡安全)事關人類共同利益,事關世界和平與發展,事關各國國家安全。維護我國網絡安全是協調推進全面建成小康社會、全面深化改革、全面依法治國、全面從嚴治黨戰略佈局的重要舉措,是實現“兩個一百年”奮鬥目標、實現中華民族偉大復興中國夢的重要保障。為貫徹落實習近平主席關於推進全球互聯網治理體系變革的“四項原則”和構建網絡空間命運共同體的“五點主張”,闡明中國關於網絡空間發展和安全的重大立場,指導中國網絡安全工作,維護國家在網絡空間的主權、安全、發展利益,制定本戰略。

一、機遇和挑戰

(一)重大機遇

伴隨信息革命的飛速發展,互聯網、通信網、計算機系統、自動化控制系統、數字設備及其承載的應用、服務和數據等組成的網絡空間,正在全面改變人們的生產生活方式,深刻影響人類社會歷史發展進程。

信息傳播的新渠道。網絡技術的發展,突破了時空限制,拓展了傳播範圍,創新了傳播手段,引發了傳播格局的根本性變革。網絡已成為人們獲取信息、學習交流的新渠道,成為人類知識傳播的新載體。

生產生活的新空間。當今世界,網絡深度融入人們的學習、生活、工作等方方面面,網絡教育、創業、醫療、購物、金融等日益普及,越來越多的人通過網絡交流思想、成就事業、實現夢想。

經濟發展的新引擎。互聯網日益成為創新驅動發展的先導力量,信息技術在國民經濟各行業廣泛應用,推動傳統產業改造升級,催生了新技術、新業態、新產業、新模式,促進了經濟結構調整和經濟發展方式轉變,為經濟社會發展注入了新的動力。

文化繁榮的新載體。網絡促進了文化交流和知識普及,釋放了文化發展活力,推動了文化創新創造,豐富了人們精神文化生活,已經成為傳播文化的新途徑、提供公共文化服務的新手段。網絡文化已成為文化建設的重要組成部分。

社會治理的新平台。網絡在推進國家治理體系和治理能力現代化方面的作用日益凸顯,電子政務應用走向深入,政府信息公開共享,推動了政府決策科學化、民主化、法治化,暢通了公民​​參與社會治理的渠道,成為保障公民知情權、參與權、表達權、監督權的重要途徑。

交流合作的新紐帶。信息化與全球化交織發展,促進了信息、資金、技術、人才等要素的全球流動,增進了不同文明交流融合。網絡讓世界變成了地球村,國際社會越來越成為你中有我、我中有你的命運共同體。

國家主權的新疆域。網絡空間已經成為與陸地、海洋、天空、太空同等重要的人類活動新領域,國家主權拓展延伸到網絡空間,網絡空間主權成為國家主權的重要組成部分。尊重網絡空間主權,維護網絡安全,謀求共治,實現共贏,正在成為國際社會共識。

(二)嚴峻挑戰

網絡安全形勢日益嚴峻,國家政治、經濟、文化、社會、國防安全及公民在網絡空間的合法權益面臨嚴峻風險與挑戰。

網絡滲透危害政治安全。政治穩定是國家發展、人民幸福的基本前提。利用網絡干涉他國內政、攻擊他國政治制度、煽動社會動亂、顛覆他國政權,以及大規模網絡監控、網絡竊密等活動嚴重危害國家政治安全和用戶信息安全。

網絡攻擊威脅經濟安全。網絡和信息系統已經成為關鍵基礎設施乃至整個經濟社會的神經中樞,遭受攻擊破壞、發生重大安全事件,將導致能源、交通、通信、金融等基礎設施癱瘓,造成災難性後果,嚴重危害國家經濟安全和公共利益。

網絡有害信息侵蝕文化安全。網絡上各種思想文化相互激盪、交鋒,優秀傳統文化和主流價值觀面臨衝擊。網絡謠言、頹廢文化和淫穢、暴力、迷信等違背社會主義核心價值觀的有害信息侵蝕青少年身心健康,敗壞社會風氣,誤導價值取向,危害文化安全。網上道德失範、誠信缺失現象頻發,網絡文明程度亟待提高。

網絡恐怖和違法犯罪破壞社會安全。恐怖主義、分裂主義、極端主義等勢力利用網絡煽動、策劃、組織和實施暴力恐怖活動,直接威脅人民生命財產安全、社會秩序。計算機病毒、木馬等在網絡空間傳播蔓延,網絡欺詐、黑客攻擊、侵犯知識產權、濫用個人信息等不法行為大量存在,一些組織肆意竊取用戶信息、交易數據、位置信息以及企業商業秘密,嚴重損害國家、企業和個人利益,影響社會和諧穩定。

網絡空間的國際競爭方興未艾。國際上爭奪和控製網絡空間戰略資源、搶占規則制定權和戰略制高點、謀求戰略主動權的競爭日趨激烈。個別國家強化網絡威懾戰略,加劇網絡空間軍備競賽,世界和平受到新的挑戰。

網絡空間機遇和挑戰並存,機遇大於挑戰。必須堅持積極利用、科學發展、依法管理、確保安全,堅決維護網絡安全,最大限度利用網絡空間發展潛力,更好惠及13億多中國人民,造福全人類,堅定維護世界和平。

二、目標

以總體國家安全觀為指導,貫徹落實創新、協調、綠色、開放、共享的發展理念,增強風險意識和危機意識,統籌國內國際兩個大局,統籌發展安全兩件大事,積極防禦、有效應對,推進網絡空間和平、安全、開放、合作、有序,維護國家主權、安全、發展利益,實現建設網絡強國的戰略目標。

和平:信息技術濫用得到有效遏制,網絡空間軍備競賽等威脅國際和平的活動得到有效控制,網絡空間衝突得到有效防範。

安全:網絡安全風險得到有效控制,國家網絡安全保障體系健全完善,核心技術裝備安全可控,網絡和信息系統運行穩定可靠。網絡安全人才滿足需求,全社會的網絡安全意識、基本防護技能和利用網絡的信心大幅提升。

開放:信息技術標準、政策和市場開放、透明,產品流通和信息傳播更加順暢,數字鴻溝日益彌合。不分大小、強弱、貧富,世界各國特別是發展中國家都能分享發展機遇、共享發展成果、公平參與網絡空間治理。

合作:世界各國在技術交流、打擊網絡恐怖和網絡犯罪等領域的合作更加密切,多邊、民主、透明的國際互聯網治理體系健全完善,以合作共贏為核心的網絡空間命運共同體逐步形成。

有序:公眾在網絡空間的知情權、參與權、表達權、監督權等合法權益得到充分保障,網絡空間個人隱私獲得有效保護,人權受到充分尊重。網絡空間的國內和國際法律體系、標準規範逐步建立,網絡空間實現依法有效治理,網絡環境誠信、文明、健康,信息自由流動與維護國家安全、公共利益實現有機統一。

三、原則

一個安全穩定繁榮的網絡空間,對各國乃至世界都具有重大意義。中國願與各國一道,加強溝通、擴大共識、深化合作,積極推進全球互聯網治理體系變革,共同維護網絡空間和平安全。

(一)尊重維護網絡空間主權

網絡空間主權不容侵犯,尊重各國自主選擇發展道路、網絡管理模式、互聯網公共政策和平等參與國際網絡空間治理的權利。各國主權範圍內的網絡事務由各國人民自己做主,各國有權根據本國國情,借鑒國際經驗,制定有關網絡空間的法律法規,依法採取必要措施,管理本國信息系統及本國疆域上的網絡活動;保護本國信息系統和信息資源免受侵入、干擾、攻擊和破壞,保障公民在網絡空間的合法權益;防範、阻止和懲治危害國家安全和利益的有害信息在本國網絡傳播,維護網絡空間秩序。任何國家都不搞網絡霸權、不搞雙重標準,不利用網絡干涉他國內政,不從事、縱容或支持危害他國國家安全的網絡活動。

(二)和平利用網絡空間

和平利用網絡空間符合人類的共同利益。各國應遵守《聯合國憲章》關於不得使用或威脅使用武力的原則,防止信息技術被用於與維護國際安全與穩定相悖的目的,共同抵製網絡空間軍備競賽、防範網絡空間衝突。堅持相互尊重、平等相待,求同存異、包容互信,尊重彼此在網絡空間的安全利益和重大關切,推動構建和諧網絡世界。反對以國家安全為藉口,利用技術優勢控制他國網絡和信息系統、收集和竊取他國數據,更不能以犧牲別國安全謀求自身所謂絕對安全。

(三)依法治理網絡空間

全面推進網絡空間法治化,堅持依法治網、依法辦網、依法上網,讓互聯網在法治軌道上健康運行。依法構建良好網絡秩序,保護網絡空間信息依法有序自由流動,保護個人隱私,保護知識產權。任何組織和個人在網絡空間享有自由、行使權利的同時,須遵守法律,尊重他人權利,對自己在網絡上的言行負責。

(四)統籌網絡安全與發展

沒有網絡安全就沒有國家安全,沒有信息化就沒有現代化。網絡安全和信息化是一體之兩翼、驅動之雙輪。正確處理髮展和安全的關係,堅持以安全保發展,以發展促安全。安全是發展的前提,任何以犧牲安全為代價的發展都難以持續。發展是安全的基礎,不發展是最大的不安全。沒有信息化發展,網絡安全也沒有保障,已有的安全甚至會喪失。

四、戰略任務

中國的網民數量和網絡規模世界第一,維護好中國網絡安全,不僅是自身需要,對於維護全球網絡安全乃至世界和平都具有重大意義。中國致力於維護國家網絡空間主權、安全、發展利益,推動互聯網造福人類,推動網絡空間和平利用和共同治理。

(一)堅定捍衛網絡空間主權

根據憲法和法律法規管理我國主權範圍內的網絡活動,保護我國信息設施和信息資源安全,採取包括經濟、行政、科技、法律、外交、軍事等一切措施,堅定不移地維護我國網絡空間主權。堅決反對通過網絡顛覆我國國家政權、破壞我國國家主權的一切行為。

(二)堅決維護國家安全

防範、制止和依法懲治任何利用網絡進行叛國、分裂國家、煽動叛亂、顛覆或者煽動顛覆人民民主專政政權的行為;防範、制止和依法懲治利用網絡進行竊取、洩露國家秘密等危害國家安全的行為;防範、制止和依法懲治境外勢力利用網絡進行滲透、破壞、顛覆、分裂活動。

(三)保護關鍵信息基礎設施

國家關鍵信息基礎設施是指關係國家安全、國計民生,一旦數據洩露、遭到破壞或者喪失功能可能嚴重危害國家安全、公共利益的信息設施,包括但不限於提供公共通信、廣播電視傳輸等服務的基礎信息網絡,能源、金融、交通、教育、科研、水利、工業製造、醫療衛生、社會保障、公用事業等領域和國家機關的重要信息系統,重要互聯網應用系統等。採取一切必要措施保護關鍵信息基礎設施及其重要數據不受攻擊破壞。堅持技術和管理並重、保護和震懾並舉,著眼識別、防護、檢測、預警、響應、處置等環節,建立實施關鍵信息基礎設施保護製度,從管理、技術、人才、資金等方面加大投入,依法綜合施策,切實加強關鍵信息基礎設施安全防護。

關鍵信息基礎設施保護是政府、企業和全社會的共同責任,主管、運營單位和組織要按照法律法規、制度標準的要求,採取必要措施保障關鍵信息基礎設施安全,逐步實現先評估後使用。加強關鍵信息基礎設施風險評估。加強黨政機關以及重點領域網站的安全防護,基層黨政機關網站要按集約化模式建設運行和管理。建立政府、行業與企業的網絡安全信息有序共享機制,充分發揮企業在保護關鍵信息基礎設施中的重要作用。

堅持對外開放,立足開放環境下維護網絡安全。建立實施網絡安全審查制度,加強供應鏈安全管理,對黨政機關、重點行業採購使用的重要信息技術產品和服務開展安全審查,提高產品和服務的安全性和可控性,防止產品服務提供者和其他組織利用信息技術優勢實施不正當競爭或損害用戶利益。

(四)統籌網絡安全與發展

沒有網絡安全就沒有國家安全,沒有信息化就沒有現代化。網絡安全和信息化是一體之兩翼、驅動之雙輪。正確處理髮展和安全的關係,堅持以安全保發展,以發展促安全。安全是發展的前提,任何以犧牲安全為代價的發展都難以持續。發展是安全的基礎,不發展是最大的不安全。沒有信息化發展,網絡安全也沒有保障,已有的安全甚至會喪失。

四、戰略任務

中國的網民數量和網絡規模世界第一,維護好中國網絡安全,不僅是自身需要,對於維護全球網絡安全乃至世界和平都具有重大意義。中國致力於維護國家網絡空間主權、安全、發展利益,推動互聯網造福人類,推動網絡空間和平利用和共同治理。

(一)堅定捍衛網絡空間主權

根據憲法和法律法規管理我國主權範圍內的網絡活動,保護我國信息設施和信息資源安全,採取包括經濟、行政、科技、法律、外交、軍事等一切措施,堅定不移地維護我國網絡空間主權。堅決反對通過網絡顛覆我國國家政權、破壞我國國家主權的一切行為。

(二)堅決維護國家安全

防範、制止和依法懲治任何利用網絡進行叛國、分裂國家、煽動叛亂、顛覆或者煽動顛覆人民民主專政政權的行為;防範、制止和依法懲治利用網絡進行竊取、洩露國家秘密等危害國家安全的行為;防範、制止和依法懲治境外勢力利用網絡進行滲透、破壞、顛覆、分裂活動。

(三)保護關鍵信息基礎設施

國家關鍵信息基礎設施是指關係國家安全、國計民生,一旦數據洩露、遭到破壞或者喪失功能可能嚴重危害國家安全、公共利益的信息設施,包括但不限於提供公共通信、廣播電視傳輸等服務的基礎信息網絡,能源、金融、交通、教育、科研、水利、工業製造、醫療衛生、社會保障、公用事業等領域和國家機關的重要信息系統,重要互聯網應用系統等。採取一切必要措施保護關鍵信息基礎設施及其重要數據不受攻擊破壞。堅持技術和管理並重、保護和震懾並舉,著眼識別、防護、檢測、預警、響應、處置等環節,建立實施關鍵信息基礎設施保護製度,從管理、技術、人才、資金等方面加大投入,依法綜合施策,切實加強關鍵信息基礎設施安全防護。

關鍵信息基礎設施保護是政府、企業和全社會的共同責任,主管、運營單位和組織要按照法律法規、制度標準的要求,採取必要措施保障關鍵信息基礎設施安全,逐步實現先評估後使用。加強關鍵信息基礎設施風險評估。加強黨政機關以及重點領域網站的安全防護,基層黨政機關網站要按集約化模式建設運行和管理。建立政府、行業與企業的網絡安全信息有序共享機制,充分發揮企業在保護關鍵信息基礎設施中的重要作用。

堅持對外開放,立足開放環境下維護網絡安全。建立實施網絡安全審查制度,加強供應鏈安全管理,對黨政機關、重點行業採購使用的重要信息技術產品和服務開展安全審查,提高產品和服務的安全性和可控性,防止產品服務提供者和其他組織利用信息技術優勢實施不正當競爭或損害用戶利益。

(四)加強網絡文化建設

加強網上思想文化陣地建設,大力培育和踐行社會主義核心價值觀,實施網絡內容建設工程,發展積極向上的網絡文化,傳播正能量,凝聚強大精神力量,營造良好網絡氛圍。鼓勵拓展新業務、創作新產品,打造體現時代精神的網絡文化品牌,不斷提高網絡文化產業規模水平。實施中華優秀文化網上傳播工程,積極推動優秀傳統文化和當代文化精品的數字化、網絡化製作和傳播。發揮互聯網傳播平台優勢,推動中外優秀文化交流互鑑,讓各國人民了解中華優秀文化,讓中國人民了解各國優秀文化,共同推動網絡文化繁榮發展,豐富人們精神世界,促進人類文明進步。

加強網絡倫理、網絡文明建設,發揮道德教化引導作用,用人類文明優秀成果滋養網絡空間、修復網絡生態。建設文明誠信的網絡環境,倡導文明辦網、文明上網,形成安全、文明、有序的信息傳播秩序。堅決打擊謠言、淫穢、暴力、迷信、邪教等違法有害信息在網絡空間傳播蔓延。提高青少年網絡文明素養,加強對未成年人上網保護,通過政府、社會組織、社區、學校、家庭等方面的共同努力,為青少年健康成長創造良好的網絡環境。

(五)打擊網絡恐怖和違法犯罪

加強網絡反恐、反間諜、反竊密能力建設,嚴厲打擊網絡恐怖和網絡間諜活動。

堅持綜合治理、源頭控制、依法防範,嚴厲打擊網絡詐騙、網絡盜竊、販槍販毒、侵害公民個人信息、傳播淫穢色情、黑客攻擊、侵犯知識產權等違法犯罪行為。

(六)完善網絡治理體系

堅持依法、公開、透明管網治網,切實做到有法可依、有法必依、執法必嚴、違法必究。健全網絡安全法律法規體系,制定出台網絡安全法、未成年人網絡保護條例等法律法規,明確社會各方面的責任和義務,明確網絡安全管理要求。加快對現行法律的修訂和解釋,使之適用於網絡空間。完善網絡安全相關製度,建立網絡信任體系,提高網絡安全管理的科學化規範化水平。

加快構建法律規範、行政監管、行業自律、技術保障、公眾監督、社會教育相結合的網絡治理體系,推進網絡社會組織管理創新,健全基礎管理、內容管理、行業管理以及網絡違法犯罪防範和打擊等工作聯動機制。加強網絡空間通信秘密、言論自由、商業秘密,以及名譽權、財產權等合法權益的保護。

鼓勵社會組織等參與網絡治理,發展網絡公益事業,加強新型網絡社會組織建設。鼓勵網民舉報網絡違法行為和不良信息。

(七)夯實網絡安全基礎

堅持創新驅動發展,積極創造有利於技術創新的政策環境,統籌資源和力量,以企業為主體,產學研用相結合,協同攻關、以點帶面、整體推進,盡快在核心技術上取得突破。重視軟件安全,加快安全可信產品推廣應用。發展網絡基礎設施,豐富網絡空間信息內容。實施“互聯網+”行動,大力發展網絡經濟。實施國家大數據戰略,建立大數據安全管理制度,支持大數據、雲計算等新一代信息技術創新和應用。優化市場環境,鼓勵網絡安全企業做大做強,為保障國家網絡安全夯實產業基礎。

建立完善國家網絡安全技術支撐體系。加強網絡安全基礎理論和重大問題研究。加強網絡安全標準化和認證認可工作,更多地利用標準規範網絡空間行為。做好等級保護、風險評估、漏洞發現等基礎性工作,完善網絡安全監測預警和網絡安全重大事件應急處置機制。

實施網絡安全人才工程,加強網絡安全學科專業建設,打造一流網絡安全學院和創新園區,形成有利於人才培養和創新創業的生態環境。辦好網絡安全宣傳周活動,大力開展全民網絡安全宣傳教育。推動網絡安全教育進教材、進學校、進課堂,提高網絡媒介素養,增強全社會網絡安全意識和防護技能,提高廣大網民對網絡違法有害信息、網絡欺詐等違法犯罪活動的辨識和抵禦能力。

(八)提升網絡空間防護能力

網絡空間是國家主權的新疆域。建設與我國國際地位相稱、與網絡強國相適應的網絡空間防護力量,大力發展網絡安全防御手段,及時發現和抵禦網絡入侵,鑄造維護國家網絡安全的堅強後盾。

(九)強化網絡空間國際合作

在相互尊重、相互信任的基礎上,加強國際網絡空間對話合作,推動互聯網全球治理體系變革。深化同各國的雙邊、多邊網絡安全對話交流和信息溝通,有效管控分歧,積極參與全球和區域組織網絡安全合作,推動互聯網地址、根域名服務器等基礎資源管理國際化。

支持聯合國發揮主導作用,推動制定各方普遍接受的網絡空間國際規則、網絡空間國際反恐公約,健全打擊網絡犯罪司法協助機制,深化在政策法律、技術創新、標準規範、應急響應、關鍵信息基礎設施保護等領域的國際合作。

加強對發展中國家和落後地區互聯網技術普及和基礎設施建設的支持援助,努力彌合數字鴻溝。推動“一帶一路”建設,提高國際通信互聯互通水平,暢通信息絲綢之路。搭建世界互聯網大會等全球互聯網共享共治平台,共同推動互聯網健康發展。通過積極有效的國際合作,建立多邊、民主、透明的國際互聯網治理體系,共同構建和平、安全、開放、合作、有序的網絡空間。

Original Source: http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1227/c1001-28980829.html

 

A Summary of China ‘s Internet Security Situation in China in 2016 // 2016年中國中國互聯網安全形勢總結

A Summary of China ‘s Internet Security Situation in China in 2016

2016年中國中國互聯網安全形勢總結

19 APRIL 2017 BEIJING, People’s Republic of China

April 19, the National Computer Network Emergency Technology Processing Coordination Center (referred to as “National Internet Emergency Response Center”, the English referred to as “CNCERT”) released “China’s Internet security situation in 2016,” a review of China’s Internet macro security situation monitoring On the basis of the combination of network security warning and emergency response work, the paper focuses on analyzing and summarizing the Internet security situation of China in 2016 and predicting the hotspot of network security in 2017.

Analysis of Internet Security Monitoring Data in China in 2016

CNCs continued to monitor the macroeconomic situation of China’s cybersecurity. In 2016, the number of mobile Internet malicious programs was captured, the number of backdoor attacks and the number of security vulnerabilities were increased compared with 2015, and the number of Trojans and botnets was denied. Quantity, phishing and page tampering the number of pages have declined.

According to the sampling monitoring, about 70,000 Trojans and botnet control servers in 2016 control 1699 million hosts in our country, the number of control servers decreased by 8.0% compared with 2015, the number of domestic infection host decreased by 14.1% compared with 2015. The Among them, about 48,000 from outside the control server control of China’s 1499 million units in the host, from the United States the number of control servers in the first place, followed by Hong Kong, China and Japan.

In the botnet found in the detection of malicious programs and the formation of botnets, the size of more than 100 hosts in the number of botnets 4896, of which the size of more than 100,000 units in the number of botnets 52. According to the quantitative analysis of the distribution of Trojans and botnets in China, the top three were Guangdong Province (13.4% of the total number of infections in China), Jiangsu Province (9.2%) and Shandong Province (8.3 %). In order to effectively control the damage caused by the host of Trojans and botnets, in 2016, under the guidance of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, under the guidance of “Trojan and botnet monitoring and disposal mechanism”, CNCERT organization basic telecommunications companies, domain name service agencies, etc. successfully closed 1011 Control the larger botnets.

In 2016, CNCERT received more than 205 million mobile Internet malpractions through autonomous capture and vendor switching, an increase of 39.0% over 2015, and continued to maintain rapid growth in the past seven years. According to their malicious behavior classification, the top three were hooliganism, malicious deductions and tariff consumption class 1, accounting for 61.1%, respectively, 18.2% and 13.6%. CNCERT found that mobile Internet malicious program download links nearly 670,000, an increase of nearly 1.2 times compared with 2015, involving more than 22 million source of the source, IP address of more than 30,000, the number of malicious programs spread to 124 million times.

In 2016, CNCERT focused on the “album” category 2 Andrews and malicious pornographic software with malicious deductions and maliciously disseminated attributes that were spread by SMS and had malicious behavior such as stealing user messages and correspondence, and coordinated work The A total of 47,316 cases of such malicious programs were found in the year, and more than 1.01 million were collected, and 6045 domain names were used to disseminate malicious programs. 7645 malicious mailbox accounts for receiving user’s text messages and contacts were used to receive user text messages Malicious mobile phone number 6616, leaked users SMS and address book mail 222 million, seriously endangering the user’s personal information security and property security. Under the guidance of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, according to the “mobile Internet malicious program monitoring and disposal mechanism”, CNCERT organization of e-mail service providers, domain name registrar and other active coordination work to find the malicious mailbox account, malicious domain name, etc. Dispose of.

Second, 2016 China’s Internet security situation

In recent years, with China’s network security laws and regulations, management system of continuous improvement, China’s network security technology strength, personnel, international cooperation, and achieved remarkable results. In 2016, China’s Internet security situation is generally stable, the rapid development of network security industry, network security and protection capabilities have been improved, international cooperation to further strengthen the network security. But with cyberspace strategically

The increasing number of countries, the world’s major countries have set up cyberspace attack capability, the growing national network conflict, China’s cyberspace security challenges facing increasingly complex.

Domain name system security in good condition, anti-attack ability increased significantly. In 2016, China’s domain name service system security in good condition, no major security incidents. According to the sampling monitoring, 2016 years for China’s domain name system traffic scale of more than 1Gpbs DDoS attacks on the daily average of about 32 cases, did not affect the domain name resolution services in China, the basic telecommunications companies have not seriously affected the success rate of analysis Attack events, mainly with the domain name system to strengthen security measures, anti-DDoS attack ability significantly improved related. In June 2016, there were large-scale DDoS attacks against the global root domain name servers and their mirrors. Most of the root domain servers were affected to varying degrees. The domain name mirroring servers in China also suffered large-scale network traffic attacks at the same time. Due to emergency treatment in a timely manner, and the root zone top-level domain cache expiration time is often more than 1 day, the attack did not affect the domain name system network security.

For the industrial control system of network security attacks increasing, many important industrial control system security incidents should pay attention. In 2016, the world occurred more than the major areas of industrial accidents worthy of our country wake up. In August, Kaspersky Security Laboratories exposed the “ghoul” network attack against the industrial sector, which focused on the Middle East and other countries’ Industrial enterprises launched a targeted network intrusion; in December, the Ukrainian power grid once again experienced a power supply failure, according to the analysis of the origin of this malpractice “dark forces” variants.

China’s industrial control system is huge, security vulnerabilities, malicious detection, etc. to our industrial control system to bring some security risks. As of the end of 2016, CNVD included 1036 industrial malpractices, of which 173 were included in 2016, an increase of 38.4% over 2015. Industrial control system mainly exists buffer overflow, lack of access control mechanism, weak password, directory traversal and other loopholes risk. Through the analysis of network traffic, 2016 CNCERT cumulative monitoring to the network of industrial equipment fingerprint detection event more than 880,000 times, and found 60 countries from outside the 1610 IP address of China’s network of industrial equipment for fingerprint detection.

High-level persistent threat normalization, China’s attack is particularly serious threat. As of the end of 2016, domestic enterprises issued a senior Sustainability Threat (APT) study reported a total of 43 APT organizations, including targeted targets for China’s APT organizations have 36 4. From the attack to achieve the point of view, more APT attacks using engineering to achieve, that is, relying on commercial attack platform and the Internet black industry

Chain data and other mature resources to achieve APT attacks. This kind of attack not only reduces the technical and resource threshold of initiating APT attack, but also increases the difficulty of traceability analysis. In 2016, many of the important information system for the implementation of the APT attacks were exposed, including “white elephant action 5”, “Man Linghua attack action”, mainly in China’s education, energy, military and scientific research as the main target The In August 2016, the hacker organization “Shadow Brokers” published the Formula Organization 6 frequently used toolkits, including various firewall exploits, hacking tools and scripts involving Juniper, Flying Tower, Cisco, and Financial letter, Huawei and other manufacturers products. CNCERT released 11 software vulnerabilities (there are four suspected 0day vulnerability) for census analysis and found that the world has about 120,000 IP addresses carrying the relevant products of network equipment, of which China’s IP address of about 33,000, accounting for 27.8% of all IP addresses poses a serious potential threat to cyberspace security in China. In November 2016, the hacker organization “shadow broker” also announced a group has been attacked by the National Security Agency network control and IP address and domain name data, China is the most attacked countries, involving at least nine universities in China, 12 Energy, aviation, telecommunications and other important information systems departments and two government information centers.

A large number of networked smart devices were attacked by malicious programs to form botnets, which were used to initiate large traffic DDoS attacks. In recent years, with the intelligent wearable equipment, intelligent home, intelligent routers and other terminal equipment and network equipment, the rapid development and popularization, for the Internet of intelligent devices, the proportion of network attacks increased, the attackers use the Internet of things intelligent device vulnerabilities Access to device control rights, or other hacker underground transactions for user information data theft, network traffic hijacking, or for controlling the formation of large-scale botnets. CNCERT on-line monitoring of vehicle network security system analysis and found that some car network information service providers and related products, security vulnerabilities can lead to vehicle, location and vehicle owners information disclosure and vehicle remote control and other security risks. At the end of 2016, Mirai malicious programs were widely watched as a result of large-scale off-site events on the east coast of the United States and a large number of users of Deutsche Telekom visited Internet anomalies. Mirai is a typical use of Internet of things intelligent device vulnerabilities to penetrate infiltration to achieve the control of the device malicious code, the number of charged devices accumulated to a certain extent will form a huge “botnet”, known as “Mirai botnet.” And because of Internet of things intelligent devices are generally 24 hours online, infected with malicious programs are not easily perceived by the user, forming a “stable” attack source. CNC inspections of the Mirai botnet show that by the end of 2016, a total of 2526 control servers were deployed to control 125.4 million devices, which posed a serious potential security threat to the stable operation of the Internet. In addition, CNCERT also analyzed the Gafgyt botnet sampling analysis. In the fourth quarter of 2016, a total of 817 control servers were selected to control 425,000 devices, and more than 18,000 DDoS attacks were initiated, with peak traffic 5Gpbs more than 72 times the number of attacks.

Web site data and personal information leak is not uncommon, “derivative disaster” serious. Due to the disappearance of the traditional boundaries of the Internet, all kinds of data spread across the terminal, network, mobile phone and cloud, coupled with the interests of the Internet black industry chain driven by data leakage threats are increasing. In 2016, the domestic and international website data and personal information leakage incidents frequently, the political, economic and social impact gradually deepened, and even personal life safety has also been violated. In the United States, the United States election candidate Hillary’s mail leak, directly affect the US election process; Yahoo two account information disclosure involving about 1.5 billion personal accounts, resulting in US telecom operators Verizon $ 4.8 billion acquisition of Yahoo plans to shelve May even be canceled. In the country, China’s immune planning system network was malicious invasion, 200,000 children’s information was stolen and publicly sold online; information leakage led to frequent fraud cases, college entrance examination information leaks to take away the university students will soon enter the life of Xu Yuyu ; 2016 public security organs were detected more than 1,800 cases of infringement of personal information, seized 30 million pieces of personal information of various types of citizens. In addition, according to the news media reported that Russia, Mexico, Turkey, the Philippines, Syria, Kenya and other countries of the government website data leaked.

Mobile Internet malicious program more profitable, mobile Internet black industry chain has matured. In 2016, CNCERT received more than 205 million mobile Internet malpractions through autonomous capture and vendor exchange, up 39.0% from 2015 and continued to grow at a high rate in the past six years. Through malware behavior analysis, it was found that the number of applications for fraudulent, malicious deductions, lockdowns and other economic interests was 59.6% of the total number of malicious programs, nearly three times over 2015. From the spread of malicious programs found that fraudulent acts of fraudulent procedures mainly through SMS, advertising and network disk and other specific communication channels to spread, the number of infected users reached 24.93 million, causing significant economic losses. From the attack mode of malicious programs, it is found that the number of malicious programs that steal SMS verification codes is larger than that of SMS, and 10845 samples are obtained in the whole year. It shows the characteristics of simple production, fixed attack mode and huge profits. The mobile Internet industry Mature.

Extortion software raging, a serious threat to local data and intelligent equipment security. According to CNCERT monitoring found in 2016 in the traditional PC side, to capture extortion class malicious program sample of about 19,000, the number of a record high in recent years. Analysis of extortion software attack object found that extortion software has been gradually extended from the individual terminal equipment to business users, especially for high-value target blackmail situation

Heavy. For enterprise users, blackmail software exploits security vulnerabilities to attack, the enterprise database encryption and extortion, the end of 2016 open source MongoDB database was a blackmail software attacks, a large number of users affected. For personal terminal equipment, extortion software malicious behavior in the traditional PC and mobile terminals show obvious different characteristics: in the traditional PC side, mainly through the “encrypted data” to blackmail, that is, the user’s computer file encryption, stress users Purchase the decryption key; on the mobile side, mainly through the “encryption device” to blackmail, that is, remote lock the user mobile devices, so that users can not use the device, and to coerce users to pay the cost of unlocking. However, from the extortion of software transmission point of view, the traditional PC and mobile side show a common, mainly through e-mail, counterfeit normal application, QQ group, network disk, paste it, victims and other spread.

Three, 2017 worthy of attention to the hot spots

According to the analysis of the characteristics of China’s Internet security situation in 2016, CNCERT predicts that the hot spots that are worthy of attention in 2017 are as follows.

(A) cyberspace according to the law of governance more clear. On November 7, 2016, the Twenty-fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress passed the “Network Security Law” and came into effect on June 1, 2017. The Act has 7 chapters and 79 articles on cyberspace sovereignty, network products and service providers ‘security obligations, network operators’ safety obligations, personal information protection rules, critical information infrastructure security protection systems and important data cross-border transmission rules, etc. Has been clearly defined. It is expected that the departments will pay more attention to the propaganda and interpretation work of the “Network Security Law” in 2017, compile relevant supporting policies and regulations, implement various supporting measures, and make cyberspace according to law more clear.

(B) the use of Internet of things intelligent device network attacks will continue to increase. 2016 CNVD collection of intelligent networking equipment vulnerabilities 1117, mainly related to web cameras, intelligent routers, smart appliances, intelligent gateway and other equipment. The vulnerability type is mainly privilege to bypass, information disclosure, command execution, etc., which weak password (or built-in default password) vulnerability is easy to be used, the actual impact is very extensive, malicious code attack to use an important risk point. With the development of unmanned aerial vehicles, autopilot vehicles, the popularity of smart home appliances and the development of smart cities, the number of vulnerabilities in networked smart devices will increase significantly, and network attacks against or using intelligent networking devices will be more frequent.

(C) the Internet and the traditional industry integration caused by the security threat is more complex. With the deepening of China’s “Internet +” and “Made in China 2025” action plan, almost all traditional industries, traditional applications and services in China are being changed by the Internet, bringing innovation and development opportunities to various industries. In the process of integration innovation and development, the traditional industry closed mode gradually changed to open mode, but also the future of the Internet virtual network security events into real-world security threats. Internet finance, industrial Internet and other emerging industries rapid development, but triggered a new network security threats can not be ignored, the Internet financial integration of information flow and capital flow, the risk of information flow is likely to lead to loss of capital flow; industrial control system more For the intelligent, network, open Internet brings malicious sniffing behavior increased, the risk of malicious attacks continue to increase. Traditional Internet security and real-world security issues intertwined with the security threat is more complex, the consequences are more serious.

(D) personal information and important data protection will be more attention. In recent years, the development of Internet technology is extremely convenient and rich in our lives and work, online shopping, online job search, social platform, government services and other platforms are filled with a large number of personal detailed privacy information. Since 2011, China’s serious personal information on the leak of the event, especially in recent years, the case of network fraud, the victim’s details have been grasped by fraud, to social stability and serious harm. 2013 “Snowdon incident” and the follow-up of the US government has been a large-scale monitoring of the project, to stimulate countries to strengthen the protection of important data measures, strict norms of Internet data collection, use, storage and so on. China in the “Network Security Law” on the personal information protection rules, important data cross-border transmission has been clearly defined, is expected on personal information and important data protection of the detailed regulatory documents will be enacted, and effectively implement the protection measures.

(5) Network security threats Information sharing has attracted the attention of all parties. Timely comprehensive access to and analysis of network security threats, ahead of network security early warning and deployment of emergency response measures, fully embodies a national network security comprehensive defense capabilities. Through the network security threat information sharing, the use of collective knowledge and technical ability, is to achieve a comprehensive grasp of the network security threats an effective way. The United States as early as 1998 in the Clinton administration signed a presidential decree to encourage the government and enterprises to carry out network security information sharing, to the Obama administration is the network security information sharing is written into the government bill. In recent years, China attaches great importance to the work of network security information sharing, in the “Network Security Law” clearly put forward to promote the relevant departments, key information infrastructure operators and the relevant research institutions, network security services and other network security information sharing The However, in the face of complex and multi-dimensional data source information, how to carry out sharing and in-depth analysis efficiently, we need to establish a set of information security standards for network security threats based on large data analysis. At present, many organizations in our country have been engaged in the exploration and practice of information sharing of network security threats. The relevant national standards and industry standards have been formulated. CNCERT has also established a network security threat information sharing platform for sharing in the communication industry and security industry. jobs.

(6) the background of the network disputes will continue to heat up the degree of concern. At present, China’s Internet penetration rate has reached 53.2% 7, the public through the Internet to get the news more and more fast and convenient, people concerned about the global political hot spots are also rising. 2016 US presidential election “mail door” incident, the Russian hacker exposure of the World Anti-Doping Agency scandal, etc., allow netizens to feel organized, purposeful careful network attacks can have a serious impact on the politics of other countries, Will have a national background of the network disputes from the perspective of industry concerns extended to all Internet users. With a large number of countries continue to strengthen the network space military capacity building, there are national background of the network dispute event will be hot, the crisis frequently, the trend of popular discussion will continue to heat up.

(7) based on artificial intelligence network security technology research in full swing. In the third World Internet Conference, “World Internet leading technology results release activities” site, Microsoft, IBM, Google three major international technology giants show machine learning based on artificial intelligence technology, for us to describe a beautiful future of artificial intelligence. At present, the network attack events are endless, the means are complex, the purpose is complex, the shortage of network security personnel is difficult to cope with the rapid changes in the network security situation, and machine learning in the field of data analysis outstanding performance, artificial intelligence is considered in the network security will “Great as”. There are statistical agencies found that the 2016 “network security” and “artificial intelligence” co-appeared in the article the frequency of rapid rise, indicating that more and more discussions will be linked together with the two together. Based on the large data related to network security, artificial intelligence technology such as machine learning can make breakthrough progress in unknown threat discovery, network behavior analysis and network security warning.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

4月19日消息,國家計算機網絡應急技術處理協調中心(簡稱“國家互聯網應急中心”,英文簡稱“CNCERT”)發布《2016年我國互聯網網絡安全態勢綜述》,在對我國互聯網宏觀安全態勢監測的基礎上,結合網絡安全預警通報、應急處置工作實踐成果,著重分析和總結了2016年我國互聯網網絡安全狀況,並預測2017年網絡安全熱點問題。
一、2016年我國互聯網網絡安全監測數據分析
CNCERT持續對我國網絡安全宏觀狀況開展抽樣監測,2016年,移動互聯網惡意程序捕獲數量、網站後門攻擊數量以及安全漏洞收錄數量較2015年有所上升,而木馬和殭屍網絡感染數量、拒絕服務攻擊事件數量、網頁仿冒和網頁篡改頁面數量等均有所下降。
據抽樣監測,2016年約9.7萬個木馬和殭屍網絡控制服務器控制了我國境內1699萬餘台主機,控制服務器數量較2015年下降8.0%,境內感染主機數量較2015年下降了14.1%。 。其中,來自境外的約4.8萬個控制服務器控制了我國境內1499萬餘台主機,來自美國的控制服務器數量居首位,其次是中國香港和日本。
在監測發現的因感染惡意程序而形成的殭屍網絡中,規模在100台主機以上的殭屍網絡數量4896個,其中規模在10萬台以上的殭屍網絡數量52個。從我國境內感染木馬和殭屍網絡主機按地區分佈數量分析來看,排名前三位的分別是廣東省(占我國境內感染數量的13.4%)、江蘇省(佔9.2%)和山東省(佔8.3 %)。為有效控制木馬和殭屍網絡感染主機引發的危害,2016年,在工業和信息化部指導下,根據《木馬和殭屍網絡監測與處置機制》,CNCERT組織基礎電信企業、域名服務機構等成功關閉1011個控制規模較大的殭屍網絡。
2016年,CNCERT通過自主捕獲和廠商交換獲得移動互聯網惡意程序數量205萬餘個,較2015年增長39.0%,近7年來持續保持高速增長趨勢。按其惡意行為進行分類,前三位分別是流氓行為類、惡意扣費類和資費消耗類1,佔比分別為61.1%、18.2%和13.6%。 CNCERT發現移動互聯網惡意程序下載鏈接近67萬條,較2015年增長近1.2倍,涉及的傳播源域名22萬餘個、IP地址3萬餘個,惡意程序傳播次數達1.24億次。
2016年,CNCERT重點對通過短信傳播,且具有竊取用戶短信和通信錄等惡意行為的“相冊”類2安卓惡意程序及具有惡意扣費、惡意傳播屬性的色情軟件進行監測,並開展協調處置工作。全年共發現此類惡意程序47316個,累計感染用戶超過101萬人,用於傳播惡意程序的域名6045個,用於接收用戶短信和通訊錄的惡意郵箱賬戶7645個,用於接收用戶短信的惡意手機號6616個,洩露用戶短信和通訊錄的郵件222萬封,嚴重危害用戶個人信息安全和財產安全。在工業和信息化部指導下,根據《移動互聯網惡意程序監測與處置機制》,CNCERT組織郵箱服務商、域名註冊商等積極開展協調處置工作,對發現的惡意郵箱賬號、惡意域名等進行關停處置。
二、2016年我國互聯網網絡安全狀況
近年來,隨著我國網絡安全法律法規、管理制度的不斷完善,我國在網絡安全技術實力、人才隊伍、國際合作等方面取得了明顯的成效。 2016年,我國互聯網網絡安全狀況總體平穩,網絡安全產業快速發展,網絡安全防護能力得到提升,網絡安全國際合作進一步加強。但隨著網絡空間戰略地
位的日益提升,世界主要國家紛紛建立網絡空間攻擊能力,國家級網絡衝突日益增多,我國網絡空間面臨的安全挑戰日益複雜。
域名系統安全狀況良好,防攻擊能力明顯上升。 2016年,我國域名服務系統安全狀況良好,無重大安全事件發生。據抽樣監測,2016年針對我國域名系統的流量規模達1Gpbs以上的DDoS攻擊事件日均約32起,均未對我國域名解析服務造成影響,在基礎電信企業側也未發生嚴重影響解析成功率的攻擊事件,主要與域名系統普遍加強安全防護措施,抗DDoS攻擊能力顯著提升相關。 2016年6月,發生針對全球根域名服務器及其鏡像的大規模DDoS攻擊,大部分根域名服務器受到不同程度的影響,位於我國的域名根鏡像服務器也在同時段遭受大規模網絡流量攻擊。因應急處置及時,且根區頂級域緩存過期時間往往超過1天,此次攻擊未對我國域名系統網絡安全造成影響。
針對工業控制系統的網絡安全攻擊日益增多,多起重要工控系統安全事件應引起重視。 2016年,全球發生的多起工控領域重大事件值得我國警醒。 3月,美國紐約鮑曼水壩的一個小型防洪控制系統遭攻擊;8月,卡巴斯基安全實驗室揭露了針對工控行業的“食屍鬼”網絡攻擊活動,該攻擊主要對中東和其他國家的工業企業發起定向網絡入侵;12月,烏克蘭電網再一次經歷了供電故障,據分析本次故障緣起惡意程序“黑暗勢力”的變種。
我國工控系統規模巨大,安全漏洞、惡意探測等均給我國工控系統帶來一定安全隱患。截至2016年年底,CNVD共收錄工控漏洞1036條,其中2016年收錄了173個,較2015年增長了38.4%。工控系統主要存在緩衝區溢出、缺乏訪問控制機制、弱口令、目錄遍歷等漏洞風險。通過對網絡流量分析發現,2016年度CNCERT累計監測到聯網工控設備指紋探測事件88萬餘次,並發現來自境外60個國家的1610個IP地址對我國聯網工控設備進行了指紋探測。
高級持續性威脅常態化,我國面臨的攻擊威脅尤為嚴重。截止到2016年底,國內企業發布高級持續性威脅(APT)研究報告共提及43個APT組織,其中針對我國境內目標發動攻擊的APT組織有36個4。從攻擊實現方式來看,更多APT攻擊採用工程化實現,即依托商業攻擊平台和互聯網黑色產業
鏈數據等成熟資源實現 APT攻擊。這類攻擊不僅降低了發起APT攻擊的技術和資源門檻,而且加大了受害方溯源分析的難度。 2016年,多起針對我國重要信息系統實施的APT攻擊事件被曝光,包括“白象行動5”、“蔓靈花攻擊行動”等,主要以我國教育、能源、軍事和科研領域為主要攻擊目標。 2016年8月,黑客組織“影子經紀人(Shadow Brokers)”公佈了方程式組織6經常使用的工具包,包含各種防火牆的漏洞利用代碼、黑客工具和腳本,涉及Juniper、飛塔、思科、天融信、華為等廠商產品。 CNCERT對公佈的11個產品漏洞(有4個疑似為0day漏洞)進行普查分析,發現全球有約12萬個IP地址承載了相關產品的網絡設備,其中我國境內IP地址有約3.3萬個,佔全部IP地址的27.8%,對我國網絡空間安全造成嚴重的潛在威脅。 2016年11月,黑客組織“影子經紀人”又公佈一組曾受美國國家安全局網絡攻擊與控制的IP地址和域名數據,中國是被攻擊最多的國家,涉及我國至少9所高校,12家能源、航空、電信等重要信息系統部門和2個政府部門信息中心。
大量聯網智能設備遭惡意程序攻擊形成殭屍網絡,被用於發起大流量DDoS攻擊。近年來,隨著智能可穿戴設備、智能家居、智能路由器等終端設備和網絡設備的迅速發展和普及利用,針對物聯網智能設備的網絡攻擊事件比例呈上升趨勢,攻擊者利用物聯網智能設備漏洞可獲取設備控制權限,或用於用戶信息數據竊取、網絡流量劫持等其他黑客地下產業交易,或用於被控制形成大規模殭屍網絡。 CNCERT對車聯網系統安全性進行在線監測分析,發現部分車聯網信息服務商及相關產品存在安全漏洞,可導致車輛、位置及車主信息洩露和車輛被遠程控制等安全風險。 2016年底,因美國東海岸大規模斷網事件和德國電信大量用戶訪問網絡異常事件,Mirai惡意程序受到廣泛關注。 Mirai是一款典型的利用物聯網智能設備漏洞進行入侵滲透以實現對設備控制的惡意代碼,被控設備數量積累到一定程度將形成一個龐大的“殭屍網絡”,稱為“Mirai殭屍網絡”。又因物聯網智能設備普遍是24小時在線,感染惡意程序後也不易被用戶察覺,形成了“穩定”的攻擊源。 CNCERT對Mirai殭屍網絡進行抽樣監測顯示,截至2016年年底,共發現2526台控制服務器控制了125.4萬餘台物聯網智能設備,對互聯網的穩定運行形成了嚴重的潛在安全威脅。此外,CNCERT還對Gafgyt殭屍網絡進行抽樣檢測分析,在2016年第四季度,共發現817台控制服務器控制了42.5萬台物聯網智能設備,累計發起超過1.8萬次的DDoS攻擊,其中峰值流量在5Gpbs以上的攻擊次數高達72次。
網站數據和個人信息洩露屢見不鮮,“衍生災害”嚴重。由於互聯網傳統邊界的消失,各種數據遍布終端、網絡、手機和雲上,加上互聯網黑色產業鏈的利益驅動,數據洩露威脅日益加劇。 2016年,國內外網站數據和個人信息洩露事件頻發,對政治、經濟、社會的影響逐步加深,甚至個人生命安全也受到侵犯。在國外,美國大選候選人希拉里的郵件洩露,直接影響到美國大選的進程;雅虎兩次賬戶信息洩露涉及約15億的個人賬戶,致使美國電信運營商威瑞森48億美元收購雅虎計劃擱置甚至可能取消。在國內,我國免疫規劃系統網絡被惡意入侵,20萬兒童信息被竊取並在網上公開售賣;信息洩露導致精準詐騙案件頻發,高考考生信息洩露間接奪去即將步入大學的女學生徐玉玉的生命;2016年公安機關共偵破侵犯個人信息案件1800餘起,查獲各類公民個人信息300億餘條。此外,據新聞媒體報導,俄羅斯、墨西哥、土耳其、菲律賓、敘利亞、肯尼亞等多個國家政府的網站數據發生了洩漏。
移動互聯網惡意程序趨利性更加明確,移動互聯網黑色產業鏈已經成熟。 2016年,CNCERT通過自主捕獲和廠商交換獲得移動互聯網惡意程序數量205萬餘個,較2015年增長39.0%,近6年來持續保持高速增長趨勢。通過惡意程序行為分析發現,以誘騙欺詐、惡意扣費、鎖屏勒索等攫取經濟利益為目的的應用程序驟增,佔惡意程序總數的59.6%,較2015年增長了近三倍。從惡意程序傳播途徑發現,誘騙欺詐行為的惡意程序主要通過短信、廣告和網盤等特定傳播渠道進行傳播,感染用戶數達到2493萬人,造成重大經濟損失。從惡意程序的攻擊模式發現,通過短信方式傳播竊取短信驗證碼的惡意程序數量佔比較大,全年獲得相關樣本10845個,表現出製作簡單、攻擊模式固定、暴利等特點,移動互聯網黑色產業鏈已經成熟。
敲詐勒索軟件肆虐,嚴重威脅本地數據和智能設備安全。根據CNCERT監測發現,2016年在傳統PC端,捕獲敲詐勒索類惡意程序樣本約1.9萬個,數量創近年來新高。對敲詐勒索軟件攻擊對象分析發現,勒索軟件已逐漸由針對個人終端設備延伸至企業用戶,特別是針對高價值目標的勒索情況嚴
重。針對企業用戶方面,勒索軟件利用安全漏洞發起攻擊,對企業數據庫進行加密勒索,2016年底開源MongoDB數據庫遭一輪勒索軟件攻擊,大量的用戶受到影響。針對個人終端設備方面,敲詐勒索軟件惡意行為在傳統PC端和移動端表現出明顯的不同特點:在傳統PC端,主要通過“加密數據”進行勒索,即對用戶電腦中的文件加密,脅迫用戶購買解密密鑰;在移動端,主要通過“加密設備”進行勒索,即遠程鎖住用戶移動設備,使用戶無法正常使用設備,並以此脅迫用戶支付解鎖費用。但從敲詐勒索軟件傳播方式來看,傳統PC端和移動端表現出共性,主要是通過郵件、仿冒正常應用、QQ群、網盤、貼吧、受害者等傳播。
三、2017年值得關注的熱點
根據對2016年我國互聯網網絡安全形勢特點的分析,CNCERT預測2017年值得關注的熱點方向主要如下。
(一)網絡空間依法治理脈絡更為清晰。 2016年11月7日第十二屆全國人大常委會第二十四次會議表決通過《網絡安全法》,並將於2017年6月1日起施行。該法有7章79條,對網絡空間主權、網絡產品和服務提供者的安全義務、網絡運營者的安全義務、個人信息保護規則、關鍵信息基礎設施安全保護製度和重要數據跨境傳輸規則等進行了明確規定。預計2017年各部門將更加重視《網絡安全法》的宣傳和解讀工作,編制出台相關配套政策法規,落實各項配套措施,網絡空間依法治理脈絡將更為清晰。
(二)利用物聯網智能設備的網絡攻擊事件將繼續增多。 2016年CNVD收錄物聯網智能設備漏洞1117個,

(三)互聯網與傳統產業融合引發的安全威脅更為複雜。隨著我國“互聯網+”、“中國製造2025”行動計劃的深入推進,我國幾乎所有的傳統行業、傳統應用與服務都在被互聯網改變,給各個行業帶來了創新和發展機會。在融合創新發展的過程中,傳統產業封閉的模式逐漸轉變為開放模式,也將以往互聯網上虛擬的網絡安全事件轉變為現實世界安全威脅。互聯網金融、工業互聯網等融合的新興行業快速發展,但引發的新的網絡安全威脅也不容忽略,互聯網金融整合了信息流和資金流,信息流的風險很可能引發資金流損失;工業控制系統更為智能化、網絡化,開放互聯帶來的惡意嗅探行為增多,被惡意攻擊的風險不斷加大。傳統互聯網安全與現實世界安全問題相交織引發的安全威脅更為複雜,產生的後果也更為嚴重。
(四)個人信息和重要數據保護將更受重視。近年來,互聯網技術的發展極大的方便和豐富了我們的生活和工作,網上購物、網上求職、社交平台、政府服務等平台上充斥著大量的個人詳細隱私信息。自2011年以來我國關於嚴重個人信息洩露的事件不絕於耳,特別是近年來的網絡詐騙案件中,受害人的詳細信息都被詐騙分子所掌握,給社會安定帶來嚴重危害。 2013年 “斯諾登事件”及後續相繼爆出的美國政府大範圍監聽項目,刺激著各國加強重要數據的保護措施,嚴格規範互聯網數據的收集、使用、存儲等。我國在《網絡安全法》中對個人信息保護規則、重要數據跨境傳輸進行了明確規定,預計關於個人信息和重要數據信息保護的詳細規範性文件將製定出台,切實落實保護措施。
(五)網絡安全威脅信息共享工作備受各方關注。及時全面獲取和分析網絡安全威脅,提前做好網絡安全預警和部署應急響應措施,充分體現了一個國家網絡安全綜合防禦能力。通過網絡安全威脅信息共享,利用集體的知識和技術能力,是實現全面掌握網絡安全威脅情況的有效途徑。美國早在1998年的克林頓政府時期就簽署了總統令,鼓勵政府與企業開展網絡安全信息共享,到奧巴馬政府時期更是將網絡安全信息共享寫入了政府法案。近年來,我國高度重視網絡安全信息共享工作,在《網絡安全法》中明確提出了促進有關部門、關鍵信息基礎設施的運營者以及有關研究機構、網絡安全服務機構等之間的網絡安全信息共享。但面對紛繁複雜的、多維度的數據源信息,如何高效地開展共享和深入分析,需建立一套基於大數據分析的網絡安全威脅信息共享標準。目前,我國很多機構已經在開展網絡安全威脅信息共享的探索與實踐,相關國家標準和行業標準已在製定中,CNCERT也建立了網絡安全威脅信息共享平台,在通信行業和安全行業內進行相關共享工作。
(六)有國家背景的網絡爭端受關注度將繼續升溫。目前,我國互聯網普及率已經達到53.2%7,民眾通過互聯網獲得的新聞資訊越來越快捷方便,民眾關注全球政治熱點的熱度也不斷高漲。 2016年美國總統大選“郵件門”事件、俄羅斯黑客曝光世界反興奮劑機構醜聞事件等,都讓網民真切感受到有組織、有目的的一場縝密的網絡攻擊可以對他國政治產生嚴重的影響,將有國家背景的網絡爭端從行業領域關注視角延伸到了全體網民。隨著大量的國家不斷強化網絡空間軍事能力建設,有國家背景的網絡爭端事件將會熱點不斷、危機頻出,全民討論的趨勢將會持續升溫。
(七)基於人工智能的網絡安全技術研究全面鋪開。在第三屆世界互聯網大會“世界互聯網領先科技成果發布活動”現場,微軟、IBM、谷歌三大國際科技巨頭展示了基於機器學習的人工智能技術,為我們描繪了人工智能美好的未來。目前,網絡攻擊事件層出不窮、手段多樣、目的複雜,較為短缺的網絡安全人才難以應對變化過快的網絡安全形勢,而機器學習在數據分析領域的出色表現,人工智能被認為在網絡安全方面將會“大有作為”。有研究機構8統計發現,2016年“網絡安全”與“人工智能”兩詞共同出現在文章中的頻率快速上升,表明越來越多的討論將二者聯繫在一起共同關注。以網絡安全相關的大數據為基礎,利用機器學習等人工智能技術,能夠在未知威脅發現、網絡行為分析、網絡安全預警等方面取得突破性進展。

中國軍事戰雲 ~ Chinese Military Use of the Battle Cloud

中國軍事戰雲 ~ Chinese Military Use of the Battle Cloud

“Cloud” is a metaphor of the network, the Internet, “cloud concept” is one of the hottest high-tech concept in recent years, its Internet, efficient, shared and other characteristics, not only profound impact and change our lives, Is also promoting major changes in the military field. In 2013, the US Air Force for the first time the “cloud concept” into the field of operations, put forward the “operational cloud” concept, and quickly get the US Department of Defense, Navy and other military recognition, and gradually become the US military response to the 21st century, a new information war Strategy.

Why –

Intended to build the new US military superiority

In the 21st century, the US military has launched a number of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria in the name of anti-terrorism and the suppression of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Every time the war is almost entirely dominated by powerful information and firepower, Quickly won the war. But the US military has a clear sense of this: the above war a few US military did not encounter a truly strong opponent, the war in the United States to grasp the absolute air power and the right to information under the low confrontation environment, the future if the loss of absolute space and information advantages , The US military will be difficult to maintain control of the battlefield. The US military believes that if you want to maintain a sustained battlefield advantage in future wars, facing an unprecedented “threat and challenge”:

Rival strong “anti-entry / regional denial” threat. The US military believes that its information in previous local wars, the advantages of firepower, mainly rely on a strong space-based information systems, large-scale maritime combat platform, joint command and control center, etc., and in the “opponents into the area and the ability to continue Enhance the “background, especially in the face of a large number of” precision-guided long-range cruise missiles and ballistic missiles “threat, these traditional strengths and the strength of the US military to rely on these forces formed by the combat style” will not be renewed, “” opponents Can be a small number of key nodes through the attack quickly paralyzed US military combat power system.

The Challenges of Advanced Combat Weapons and Backward Combat. In the new century, after a large number of equipment F-22 advanced stealth fighters, the US military has ushered in F-35 fighters, DDG-1000 missile destroyers, Ford-class aircraft carrier and other highly informative weapons and equipment. But the appearance of the US military command and control, but also remain in the 2003 “free Iraq” action, highly dependent on satellite, early warning aircraft and other core equipment platform “network-centric war” era. Former US Air Force Secretary Mike Wayne exclaimed: “Just as the use of the 20th century mechanized forces in the First World War was fighting in the 19th century, we now have the danger of fighting in the twentieth century in the twentieth century. “The US military in urgent need of new operational theory to activate the new information technology equipment combat potential,” to regain the US military and rival superiority. ”

Combat power to maintain the challenges with the defense budget tightening. In the United States “financial crisis” “debt crisis” and “national security needs continue to grow” and other factors, the US military arms are also caught in financial dilemma. In the same report, the US Air Force is mainly from the old A-10, F-15/16, B-1, B-1, the first deputy chief of staff, 52 aircraft and B-2 and a small number of F-22, F-35, not enough to meet the opponent’s “anti-entry and regional denial” capabilities, and called to “change strategy” to deal with “available for defense resources The proportion of decline “challenge.

These “threats and challenges” that the US military consider themselves are the context of the concept of “operational cloud”.

Core concept –

To achieve a variety of platforms cross-domain joint operations

In the face of these new “threats and challenges”, in January 2013, the US Air Force Air Combat Command Commander Michael Ostić first proposed the “operational cloud” concept program. In 2014, David de Putura on its basis, the “operational cloud” concept of a comprehensive program, pointed out: “similar to the way cloud computing, ‘combat cloud’ is a kind of military air force use Decentralized air combat, in the evolution of the data chain, anti-jamming communication systems and new targeting tools to support the realization of the air, ground, sea and space field information sharing capabilities jump, and thus maximize the stealth aircraft, accurate Combat weapons, advanced command and control systems, and the combined use of unmanned systems to create large, modular and flexible combat capabilities to ensure that enemies’ attacks on single combat units will not paralyze US operations.

In the same year, the United States “Aviation Week” released a “operational cloud” concept map, described by the orbital space reconnaissance / communications / navigation satellites, airborne early warning aircraft, F-15/16 fighter, maritime aviation battle group, and in-depth integrated air defense system F-22/35 stealth fighter, RQ-180 unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, new long-range bomber (LRS-B) and other multi-dimensional combat unit, jointly build the “air superiority cloud” development prospects, more clearly show the US military “combat Cloud “concept of the whole picture.

From the above US military interpretation and description of the concept of “operational cloud”, we can roughly analyze the characteristics of the US military “operational cloud” and its basic ideas to deal with “threats and challenges”

Battlefield information cross – domain integration. “Combat cloud” relying on “evolving data link, anti-jamming communication system” and other advanced battlefield information network, and “new targeting tool” and other new battlefield sensor system, large data and cloud computing and other information network technology support , Will be widely distributed in space, near the space, air, ground, sea and underwater combat platform of the battlefield intelligence information integration, and real-time seamless operation in the various areas of the platform on-demand distribution. “Combat cloud” formed by the “information sharing capabilities”, both to ensure that the US military on the battlefield on demand is highly transparent, but also to avoid the “anti-entry / regional denial” ability of opponents, its space-based information system , Large-scale maritime combat platform, joint command and control center and other key information nodes “break a little, paralysis of a” situation. The US military envisages that in the “battle cloud” system, the absence of any one or more battlefield nodes will not decisively influence the sharing and distribution of information on the unity of its battlefield.

Group strength distribution operations. With the traditional combat forces of the air forces according to the platform attribute classification allocation, according to the administrative means of combining different ways, “combat cloud” through the “continuous evolution of the data chain, anti-jamming communication system”, the arms of the air force to ” Decentralized air combat form “, according to real-time task requirements, online optimization configuration combination, the formation of” modular “group strength. Each group of forces in a highly integrated cross-domain integration of information support, through the “operational cloud” system of efficient scheduling and control, distribution operations. This group of forces distribution mode of operation, not only inherited the “network-centric war” to obtain the advantages of information, and further developed from the information to the fire distribution, target damage transformation advantages, significantly reduced the combat ” – Review “cycle chain, comprehensively enhance the combat effectiveness of US military information equipment.

Cross – platform platform synergies. Through the “battle cloud” battlefield information cross-domain integration capabilities, three generations of four generations of combat platform to gain dive into the enemy of the five generations of stealth combat platform, unmanned combat platform target information, to achieve an effective blow to the depth of the battlefield; But also to get three generations of four generations of combat platform for long-range fire support, to make up for their own lack of volatility. “Combat cloud” of this inter-generation platform synergies, is considered the US military to deal with “power and financial dilemma” an important means. In September 2014, the outgoing Michael Ostić at the annual meeting of the American Air Force Association made it clear that the US Air Force did not have enough budget to form a full five fleet, to fulfill the role of the Air Force, the highest priority The task is to achieve the “four generations and five generations” of information fusion, collaborative operations.

Development status –

Is changing from concept to actual action

As soon as possible to the “operational cloud” concept program into a practical state, in the United States Department of Defense co-ordination and traction, the US military arms and arms are in line with their own military functions and equipment characteristics, to promote their own “combat cloud” project construction and experiment verification.

Ministry of Defense steadily traction “cloud” infrastructure and conceptual improvement. As early as 2009, the US Department of Defense proposed a concept of data sharing at sea, air and space, and tried to apply the increasingly sophisticated Internet technology to tactical intelligence. In July 2012, the US Department of Defense Chief Information Officer signed the “Ministry of Defense cloud computing strategy” to the military strategy in the form of advancing the process, and continued to carry out “cloud” related storage facilities, computing platform and software services. At present, the US Department of Defense has identified this concept as a “war cloud”, and from the arms and arms, industrial sector and academia deployed personnel, work together to create a perfect “combat cloud” concept program, the ultimate goal is to form an arch Data network, expansion and upgrading of the existing “global information grid” to achieve the maritime warships, combat aircraft, space satellite real-time data sharing.

Each army and arms competing to carry out “combat cloud” project construction. The Air Force is the pioneer of the concept of “operational cloud”, which argues that the key to achieving the “operational cloud” is information fusion and the focus of the “Sky Advantage Cloud” on F-15/16 and F-22/35 Five generations of information on the exchange of information. In 2014, the “Multi-Domain Adaptive System (MAPS) Program” was launched to attempt to integrate the F16-16 Link16 data link, the F-22 IFDL data link, and the F-35’s MADL data link to achieve battlefield data Real-time exchange. US Navy also through the “Naval Integrated Fire Control and Air Defense (NIFC-CA) program” to achieve its use of air E-2D early warning aircraft or sea “Aegis” ship and other combat platforms for the F / A-18E / F and F- 35C and other carrier-based aircraft and the “standard” series of ship-to-air missiles to provide targeted information, and even command the future of the sixth generation F / A-XX multi-purpose fighter aircraft to launch weapons vision. Although the Navy project is not called “combat cloud” due to military interests, the project emphasizes multi-platform information cross-domain integration has a typical “cloud” features. In addition, the US Marine Corps also launched the implementation of its “expeditionary combat sea tactical cloud” project construction.

“Combat cloud” combat mode test verification has been in full swing. September 23, 2014, the US Air Force F-22 for the first time led the joint air raid fleet, the Syrian territory of the “Islamic countries” extreme organizational goals of air strikes. After the completion of the task, when the US Air Operations Commander Mike Hustage in an interview with “defense headlines”, said, “generally believed that stealth is a symbol of the five generations of machines, in fact, the focus is on ‘integration’,” Fusion “makes the F-22 fundamentally different from other platforms,” ​​”Fusion” is the fundamental feature of the five generations of machines, “” Five generations of machines in front of reconnaissance detection targets, and then let four generations of machines in the area to fight it, you must have ‘combat Cloud ‘, which has the ability to transfer data back and forth. ” The position, but also directly proved that the US Air Force is actively against the “combat cloud” combat mode to carry out actual test verification.

(Author: Air Force Military Theory Institute)

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Jump on the “cloud” end of the wind and thunder

Huyongbo

When we shop online, the website will be based on the previous shopping records to determine our purchase preferences, push a lot of commodity information; when we browse the news, the software will be based on our reading habits, “good” Directional push content topic … … these phenomena are that we have come to a cloud computing era.

“Combat cloud” reason to enter our topic vision, not only because it frequently appeared in the latest US combat theory, everywhere revealed against the “system of combat” thinking, more importantly, it represents the US military cloud computing used in the field of military the latest achievements, reflecting the US military use of scientific and technological achievements to maximize the effectiveness of combat a train of thought.

Like many high-tech, cloud computing first appeared in the commercial field. In August 2006, Google CEO Eric Schmidt first proposed the “cloud computing” concept. Soon, the US military on this new technology showed a strong interest. In 2008, the US Department of Defense and Hewlett-Packard Company to establish a cloud computing infrastructure. Then, the United States air, sea, land and other military services are signed with commercial companies related to cloud computing systems. The US military’s passion for cloud computing has a strong background in the field of information technology, but it also reflects their keen sense of smell and rapid transformation of the latest cutting-edge technology.

In attending the plenary session of the PLA delegation at the Second Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, the Chairman stressed that “it is necessary to take the initiative to discover, cultivate and use the cutting-edge technology that can serve the national defense and army building to capture the potential growth point of military capability development”. Obviously, to promote the field of cloud computing military and civilian collaboration innovation, we are promising. Because, compared to the United States and other developed countries in the field of cloud computing development, China is not backward, some domestic companies have a more mature use of experience. The key is how to combine our military reality, to achieve the transformation of cloud computing technology in the military field.

Of course, we develop the use of cloud computing technology, we must learn from the experience of foreign troops, but not step by step also cloning. The practice of the US military is only to provide a model used. In the era of information revolution boom, through the core key technological breakthrough is possible to achieve “corner overtaking”. Dare to hit the water flow, Fang Xian hero character.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

“雲”是對網絡、互聯網的一種比喻說法,“雲概念”則是近年來最火的高科技概念之一,其互聯、高效、共享等特質,不但深刻影響和改變著我們的生活,也正在推動軍事領域的重大變革。 2013年,美空軍首次將“雲概念”引入作戰領域,提出“作戰雲”概念,並迅速得到美國防部、海軍及其他軍種的認可,逐漸成為美軍應對21世紀下一場信息化戰爭的新方略。

緣何提出——

意在打造美軍新的跨代優勢

進入21世紀,美軍先後以反恐和製止大規模殺傷性武器擴散等名義在阿富汗、伊拉克、利比亞和敘利亞發動多場戰爭,每次戰爭美國幾乎都憑藉強大的信息、火力優勢,完全掌控戰場局面,快速取得戰爭勝利。但美軍高層對此有著清醒意識:以上幾場戰爭美軍並未遇到真正強大的對手,戰爭在美軍掌握絕對製空權和製信息權的低對抗環境下進行,未來倘若喪失絕對的空天和信息優勢,美軍將很難保持對戰場的控制。美軍認為,若想在未來戰爭中保持持續的戰場優勢,面臨著前所未有的“威脅和挑戰”:

對手強大“反進入/區域拒止”能力的威脅。美軍認為,其在歷次局部戰爭中所仰仗的信息、火力優勢,主要依托強大的天基信息系統、大型海上作戰平台、聯合指揮控制中心等獲得,而在“對手反進入與區域拒止能力不斷提升”的背景下,尤其是面對大量“精確制導遠程巡航導彈和彈道導彈”威脅,這些傳統的優勢力量,以及美軍依托這些優勢力量所形成的作戰樣式“都將不可續存”,“對手可以通過對少數關鍵節點的攻擊迅速癱瘓美軍的作戰力量體系”。

先進作戰武器與落後作戰方式的挑戰。進入新世紀,在大量裝備F-22先進隱身戰機後,美軍又先後迎來F-35戰機、DDG-1000導彈驅逐艦、福特級航母等高度信息化武器裝備。但綜觀美軍的作戰指揮與控制,還停留在2003年“自由伊拉克”行動時,高度依賴衛星、預警機等核心裝備平台的“網絡中心戰”時代。美國前空軍部長麥克·韋恩就驚呼:“正如第一次世界大戰使用20世紀的機械化部隊卻在以19世紀的方式作戰,我們現在同樣存在以20世紀的方式在21世紀作戰的危險。 ”美軍急需新的作戰理論來激活新型信息化裝備的作戰潛能,“重拾美​​軍與對手的跨代優勢”。

作戰力量保持與國防預算緊縮的挑戰。在美國“金融危機”“債務危機”和“國家安全需求不斷增長”等多重因素影響下,美軍各軍兵種也陷入財政窘境。美空軍前情報主管、第一副參謀長大衛·德普圖拉在一份報告中指出,目前美軍空中力量主要由老舊的A-10、F-15/16、B-1、B- 52飛機和B-2以及少量的F-22、F-35組成,不足以應對21世紀對手的“反進入與區域拒止”能力,並呼籲要“改變方略”以應對“可用於國防的資源比重下降”的挑戰。

美軍自認為的這些“威脅和挑戰”,正是其提出“作戰雲”概念的背景。

核心理念——

實現多種平台跨域聯合作戰

面對這些新的“威脅和挑戰”,2013年1月,美空軍空中作戰司令部司令邁克爾·奧斯蒂奇首次提出“作戰雲”概念方案。 2014年,大衛·德普圖拉在其基礎上,對“作戰雲”概念方案進行了全面闡述,指出:“類似於雲計算的方式,’作戰雲’是一種各軍種的空中力量採用分散的空中作戰形式,在不斷進化的數據鏈、抗干擾通信系統和新的瞄準工具等支持下,實現空中、地面、海上和太空領域信息共享能力的躍升,進而最大程度地發揮隱身飛機、精確打擊武器、先進指揮與控制系統以及有人與無人系統結合的優勢,創造出規模化、模塊化的靈活作戰能力,並以此確保敵人對單一作戰單元的攻擊不會癱瘓美軍的作戰行動。”

同年,美國《航空周刊》發布了“作戰雲”構想圖,描述了由在軌太空偵察/通信/導航衛星,空中預警機、F-15/16戰鬥機,海上航空戰鬥群,與深入對方綜合防空系統區的F-22/35隱身戰機、RQ-180無人偵察機、新型遠程轟炸機(LRS-B)等多維作戰單元,共同構建的“空中優勢雲”發展遠景,更加清晰地展現了美軍“作戰雲”概念全貌。

從以上美軍對於“作戰雲”概念的闡釋和描述,我們可以粗略探析美軍“作戰雲”的特徵和其應對“威脅和挑戰”的基本思路:

戰場信息跨域融合。 “作戰雲”依托“不斷進化的數據鏈、抗干擾通信系統”等先進的戰場信息網絡,和“新的瞄準工具”等新型戰場傳感系統,在大數據和雲計算等信息網絡技術的支撐下,將廣泛分佈於太空、臨近空間、空中、地面、海上和水下各域作戰平台的戰場情報信息一體融合,並實時無縫地在各域作戰平台按需分發。 “作戰雲”所形成的這種“信息共享能力”,既保證了美軍對戰場的按需高度透明,同時也避免了具備“反進入/區域拒止”能力的對手,對其天基信息系統、大型海上作戰平台、聯合指揮控制中心等關鍵信息節點“破一點、癱一片”的局面。美軍設想,在“作戰雲”體系中,任何一個和多個戰場節點的缺失,都不會決定性地影響其戰場統一態勢信息的共享和分發。

群組力量分佈作戰。與傳統作戰各軍兵種空中力量按平台屬性分類編配、按行政手段組合的方式不同,“作戰雲”通過“不斷進化的數據鏈、抗干擾通信系統”,將各軍兵種的空中力量以“分散的空中作戰形式”,根據實時任務需求,在線優化配置組合,形成“模塊化”的群組力量。各群組力量在高度一體跨域融合的信息支撐下,通過“作戰雲”體系的高效調度和管控,分佈實施作戰。這種群組力量分佈作戰的模式,既繼承了“網絡中心戰”獲取信息的優勢,又進一步發展了從信息向火力分配、目標毀傷轉化的優勢,大幅縮減了作戰的“偵-控-打-評”週期鏈,全面提升了美軍信息化裝備的作戰效能。

跨代平台協同增效。通過“作戰雲”的戰場信息跨域融合能力,三代四代作戰平台能夠獲得潛入敵縱深的五代隱身作戰平台、無人作戰平台的目標指示信息,實現對縱深戰場的有效打擊;五代隱身作戰平台也能夠獲得三代四代作戰平台的遠程火力支援,彌補自身載彈量不足的劣勢。 “作戰雲”的這種跨代平台協同增效,被認為是美軍應對“力量與財務困局”的重要手段。 2014年9月,即將離任的邁克爾·奧斯蒂奇在美國空軍協會年會上明確表示,美國空軍沒有足夠的預算來組建一支全五代機隊,要履行好空軍的職能,最優先的任務是實現“四代與五代”的信息融合、協同作戰。

發展現狀——

正在由概念向實戰行動轉變

為盡快地將“作戰雲”概念方案轉化到實用狀態,在美國防部的統籌和牽引下,美軍各軍兵種都在結合自身軍種職能和裝備特色,推進自己的“作戰雲”項目建設和實驗驗證。

國防部穩步牽引“雲”基礎建設和概念完善。早在2009年,美國防部就提出了覆蓋海上、空中、太空的數據共享概念,嘗試將日益成熟的互聯網技術應用到戰術情報領域。 2012年7月,美國防部首席信息官簽署了《國防部雲計算戰略》,以軍隊戰略的形式推進這一進程,並持續穩步開展“雲”相關的存儲設施、計算平台和軟件服務建設。目前,美國防部已將這一概念確定為“作戰雲”,並分別從各軍兵種、工業部門和學術界抽調人員,共同著力塑造完善“作戰雲”概念方案,最終目標是要形成一個拱形數據網絡,擴展升級現有“全球信息柵格”,實現海上戰艦、作戰飛機、空間衛星的實時數據共享。

各軍兵種爭相開展“作戰雲”項目建設。美空軍是“作戰雲”概念的先行者,其認為實現“作戰雲”的關鍵是信息融合,並將“空中優勢雲”的重點放在F-15/16等四代機與F-22/35五代機的信息互通上。 2014年啟動了“多域自適應系統(MAPS)計劃”,企圖將F-15/16的Link16數據鏈、F-22的IFDL數據鏈、F-35的MADL數據鏈有機融合,實現戰場數據的實時交換。美海軍也在通過“海軍綜合火控與防空(NIFC-CA)計劃”,實現其用空中E-2D預警機或海上“宙斯盾”艦等作戰平台,為F/A-18E/F和F- 35C等艦載機及“標準”系列艦空導彈提供瞄准信息,甚至指揮未來第六代F/A-XX多用途戰鬥機發射武器的願景。雖然由於軍種利益,海軍項目並不叫“作戰雲”,但其項目強調的多平台信息跨域融合具有典型的“雲”特徵。此外,美海軍陸戰隊也啟動實施了其“遠征作戰海上戰術雲”項目建設。

“作戰雲”作戰模式檢驗驗證已經全面展開。 2014年9月23日,美空軍F-22首次率領聯合空襲機群,對敘利亞境內的“伊斯蘭國”極端組織目標實施空襲作戰。任務完成後,時任美軍空中作戰司令部司令麥克·侯斯塔奇在接受《防務頭條》採訪時,表示“一般認為隱身是五代機的標誌,其實不然,重點在於’融合’”,“’融合’使得F-22與其他平台根本不同”,“’融合’是五代機的根本特徵”,“五代機在前方偵察探測目標,然後讓四代機在防區外打擊它,你必須擁有’作戰雲’,其擁有將數據來回傳輸的能力”。這次表態,也直接證明了美空軍正在積極針對“作戰雲”作戰模式開展實戰性檢驗驗證。

(作者單位:空軍軍事理論研究所)

編輯點評

躍上“雲”端觀風雷

侯永波

當我們在網上購物時,網站會根據以往的購物記錄來判斷我們的購買偏好,推送大量的商品信息;當我們在瀏覽新聞時,軟件同樣會根據我們的閱讀習慣,“投其所好”地定向推送內容話題……這些現像都說明,我們已經來到了一個雲計算時代。

“作戰雲”之所以進入我們的選題視野,不僅僅是因為它頻繁地出現於美軍最新的作戰理論中,處處透露著對抗消解“體系破擊戰”的思維,更重要的是它代表著美軍把雲計算運用於軍事領域的最新成果,反映出美軍運用科技成果最大限度提高作戰效能的一種思路。
像很多高新技術一樣,雲計算最早出現在民用商業領域。 2006年8月,谷歌首席執行官埃里克·施密特首次提出“雲計算”概念。很快,美軍就對這種新技術表現出濃厚興趣。 2008年,美國防部與惠普公司合作建立了一個雲計算基礎設施。緊接著,美國空、海、陸等各軍種都與商業公司簽約設計相關雲計算系統。美軍對雲計算技術的熱情擁抱,有其在信息技術領域處於領先地位的大背景,但同時也反映了他們對最新前沿科技的敏銳嗅覺以及迅速的轉化運用能力。

習主席在出席十二屆全國人大五次會議解放軍代表團全體會議時強調,“要主動發現、培育、運用可服務於國防和軍隊建設的前沿尖端技術,捕捉軍事能力發展的潛在增長點”。顯然,推進云計算領域的軍民協同創新,我們是大有可為的。因為,相比美國等發達國家在雲計算領域的發展,我國並不落後,國內一些公司已經有著較為成熟的運用經驗。關鍵是如何結合我軍實際,來實現雲計算技術在軍事領域的轉化運用。

當然,我們發展運用雲計算技術,須藉鑑外軍的經驗,但絕非亦步亦趨克隆。美軍的做法只是提供了運用的一種模式。在信息革命大潮雲湧的時代,通過核心關鍵性技術突破是有可能實現“彎道超車”的。敢於擊水中流,方顯英雄本色。

Original Source:

2017年03月21日09:52  来源:解放军报

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

Who is responsible for configuring the information resources owned by the United States? Who is responsible for assigning these resources to use the priority order? What measures have we taken to ensure that the Global Information Grid (GIG), the Independent Joint Service System, and the GCCs: Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Global Network Associations (GCCs), which rely on information from them, Trojans (JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force-Global NetOps) security? In recent years, the entire network combat system on the discussion of these issues has not been suspended, the focus of debate is the theater operations in the network operations should play what role.

The US military has announced the deployment of the war command for each theater, and also announced that it would reduce military support in the cross-border areas. For each theater combat command, how to configure the information infrastructure to support the war in the theater has become very important. The enemy may be infiltrated into the critical network system area responsible for military power dispatch, which is often underestimated and even treated as an accident or incidental event, but these intrusion is virtually Made a connection request to block the normal operation of the commercial website, and even led to some of the military logistics business logistics company was marked as invalid. The theater warfare command should ensure that the information conditions of its zone are not affected by external invasions. Countless viruses are destroying the Internet, the Department of Defense system began to be attacked. It is now under discussion whether the Global Network Joint Task Force should be disconnected from the military network on the Internet, but the military is concerned that with the cooperation of commercial suppliers alone, the Department of Defense can not guarantee that all logistical support operations will continue without error To go on. Each theater combat command is not sure about the state of the theater itself, and they are skeptical about the security of the global information grid itself, and they are concerned about their ability to carry out the tasks assigned to it.

(STRATCOM) and the global network of joint contingents in the network operations in the dominant ideology of the impact of the theater operations headquarters of its command and control of the zone has a more global network of operations control institutions to strengthen the United States Strategic Command Weakened. The focus on the operational information grid to the global information grid has also affected, to a certain extent, the battlefield operations command of the global information grid is how to support the theater of the specific behavior of the understanding. This article will introduce the existing command relationship, the war between the theater operations command, the direct relationship between command and combat, the old and emerging joint operational principles of a special case analysis, and finally will be the theater combat command In the network operations should play the role of the proposed recommendations.

Network combat environment

The command and control in cyber warfare is a concept that appeared ten years ago, and its connotation has been evolving. Each of the relevant departments, the theater operations headquarters and the global network of joint contingents have carried out some organizational structure and work focus on the adjustment, but ultimately did not solve their respective roles should play this issue. To really understand why the role of theater warfare in cyber operations will be a problem, it is necessary to clarify the question: where is cyber warfare, what is real cyber warfare, and every What is the organizational structure and command and control structure of the department?

The first thing to explain is, what is the global information grid? According to the definition of Ministry of Defense No. 8100.1, it includes “global interconnection, terminal-to-terminal information transmission capability and joint processing capability.” Ability to collect, process, store, transmit and manage information according to the needs of warriors and policy makers ” This covers government and leased communications information systems and services, as well as other software, security and service support required for global information grids, as well as the Clinger- The National Security System, as defined in Section 5142 of the Cohen Act. According to this definition, the global information grid contains all levels of information systems from the Department of Defense and the national security system, from the tactical level to the strategic level, as well as the interconnected communication system.

Most of the discussion on the command and control of the Global Information Grid Network Operations Center focuses on the defense capabilities of the system, but the content of the network operations is far more than that. The tasks to be accomplished by the network operations include three: departmental management, Content management and network defense, whose purpose is to provide a lack of central support across the boundaries of strategic, tactical and operational concepts, and to support the Department of Defense’s full range of combat, intelligence and mission tasks.

1. Sector management is one of the specific tasks of the global information grid, which is the technology, process and policy management of systems and networks that make up the global information grid, including public sector management, systems management, network management, satellite communications management and Electromagnetic spectrum management of these aspects.

2. Content management refers to managing the information itself in the global information grid. It ensures that information is available to users, operators, and decision makers in real time. Content management includes the search, access, transmission, storage and integration of specific information content of the global information grid.

3. Network defense is the global information grid all the information, including additional information to protect, it mainly includes a number of policies, processes, projects and operations. If necessary, the task can be requested through cross-agency cooperation to complete. It is responsible for the global information grid information security, computer network defense, computer defense response capabilities and critical infrastructure protection.

Now we have learned about the basic organizational structure of the cyber warfare, the next step in the various organizations in the network operations and how they are performing the tasks, which are mainly composed of troops, theater warfare headquarters and global network joint contingents, all of which are With the changes in the battlefield requirements to improve their organizational structure.

The change in the organizational structure of the force is mainly to meet the requirements of the global information grid for information transmission, access, control and protection. Ten years ago, the troops had some changes to regional control in order to adapt to cyber warfare, but those measures eventually developed into centralized controls, and these measures were not preserved. Now it is necessary to understand the composition of the forces in order to better understand why the network operations command and control will become so full of controversy.

GEM: GIG Enterprise Management GCM: GIG Content Management GND: GIG network defense

Army ‘s network operations command and control

The army is the least of all the reforms in the service. The Army continues to hold the previous commander, now known as the Theater Network Operations and Security Centers (TNOSC), which is directly responsible for the various theater war operations. The Army maintains an independent global network operations and security center (GNOSC: Global NetOps and Security Center), all of the battlefield network operations and security centers are its affiliates. The Global Network Operations and Security Center has technical control over the Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, but the Battlefield Operations and Security Center is also part of the Theater Command and is also managed by the Theater Network Command. A typical example is the Army’s battlefield signal The brigade is managed by the Army Service Component Command.

The Global Network Operations and Security Center provides technical guidance to the network operations forces in each theater. The US Army Network Command and the 9th Signal Command are responsible for the technical and management of the Global Network Operations and Security Center. But in wartime, the Global Network Operations and Security Center was also commanded by the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as Army Element.

ACERT: Army Computer Emergency Response Unit

AGNOSC: Army Global Network and Security Center

ASCC: Army Army Command

ARSTRAT: Army Strategic Command (Missile Defense and Strategy)

CIO: Chief Information Officer

GCC: Theater Combat Command (Regional Joint Command, Six of the US Army’s Top Ten Command)

INSCOM: Intelligence and Security Command (one of the Army’s reporting units)

JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NETCOM: Army Network War Command

RCERT: Regional Computer Emergency Response Team

STRATCOM: US Strategic Command

TNCC: Theater Network Operations Control Center

TNOCC: Theater Network Operations and Security Center

G6: Army Command Department of Communications

G2 Army Command Information Department

Installation Network Provider

COMMAND – Strategic level operational command

OPCON: Battle (Battle) Command

TACON: tactical control

GS: Global Strike

TECHCON: echelon

ADCON: management control

Air Force ‘s Network Operations Command Control

The Air Force has chosen a different organizational approach to move the focus from the former headquarters of the Network Operations and Security Center (MAJCOM NOSCs) to the Integrated Network Operations and Security Centers (I-NOSCs: Integrated NetOps and Security Centers). Unlike the Army’s Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, which is managed by the Theater Operations Command, the Air Force’s Integrated Network Operations and Security Center is not affiliated with any theater war command, but only by the Air Force Operations Center (AFNOC : Air Force NetOps Center), which is similar to the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Air Force realizes that the Theater Command must have the power to direct direct operations in its zone, and it is necessary to establish a general support relationship between the Air Force Operations Center and the Theater Operations Command, establishing a dedicated link between the two departments unit. In addition, the Air Force has given a command to the establishment of a communications control center in their respective theater areas. These control centers can be used as a shortcut between the Air Force Operations Center and their respective theater operations.

ACC: Air Warfare Center

AFCHQ: Air Force Command

AFNETOPS: Air Force Network Operations Command

ARSTRAT: Air Force Strategic Command Theater Network Operations Control Center

CIO: Chief Information Officer

I-NOSC: Integrated Network Operations and Security Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

JFCC-NW: Network War Joint Function Composition Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NCC: Network Control Center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNOS: Ibid., Theater Network Operations and Security Center

Naval network operations command control

The Navy and the Air Force, no longer regard the theater as a unit of command. In order to better support global operations, they assisted two existing theater naval warfare centers (RNOSCs) affiliated with the Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) to assist the original two naval schools in Naples and Bahrain Communication master station (NCTMS: Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station). In addition, since most of the Navy’s cyber operations were carried out at sea, they also established Fleet NetOps Centers (FNOCs: Fleet NetOps Centers), echoing the theater and cyber warfare centers located in the United States. The fleet network operations center is the tactical entry point for the fleet to conduct cyber operations, providing network services for audio, video and data for the fleet of the zone, and can be provided when the fleet goes from another area of ​​the fleet network operations center into another area Smooth information transitions. Most unclassified networks are contracted by the US Navy Marine Corps Internet or the US Overseas Overseas Navy Enterprise Network (ONENET: Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network). In order to meet the needs of the battlefield, the Navy established the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet Global Network Operations and Security Center to provide global combat support, as well as the establishment of a war zone network combat and security center of the theater network security center on each Specific battlefield support. There is no subordinate relationship between the Theater Network Operations and Security Center and the theater operations headquarters in the theater.

Fleet NOC: Fleet Network Operations Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

INSCON: Ibid., Army Intelligence and Security Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NAVGNOSC: Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center

NAVSOC: Navy Satellite Operations Center

NCC MHQ: Navy Network Operations Information Operations and Space Warfare Center

NMCI GNOC: Maritime Network Global Network Operations Center

RNOSC: ibid, regional network operations center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNCC: Ibid., Theater Network Operations Control Center

Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) and the East and West Regional Network Operations and Security Center (East and West RNOSCs), which support the most basic organization of global naval operations. The Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center brings together information from the Theater Network Operations and Security Center, the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet and the Naval Satellite Operations Center to provide global command and control information for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. Unlike the Navy and the Army, they did not maintain a body belonging to the Theater Command. The support relationship between the forces established by the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations and the Theater Warfare Command did not give the theater war command the power to command the Naval Department’s global information grid. All command requests of the Theater Warfare Command must be approved by the Navy’s Global Network Operations and Security Center.

Command and Control of Theater Combat Command

Although each theater combat command in their respective jurisdictions for network operations are not the same way, but they have a common feature, that is, have established a theater network operations control center and a subordinate to the defense information system (DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency) of the theater network operations center. (CENTCOM) will be the theater network operations control center and the Defense Information Systems Agency’s theater network operations center known as the Central Theater Network Operations Center (Central Region Theater NetOps), the Central Commander of the Central Theater, Center, and the European Command (EUCOM) has established a Theater Communication Control Center (Theater Communication Control Center). Although there are some differences in the organization, but all the theater network operations control center are basically used by the theater combat command for the area of ​​the global information grid command control (area of ​​the global information grid is also known as the theater Information Grid TIG: Theater Information Grid).

The Theater Operations Command has optimized the configuration and control of the information resources of the global information grid through the Theater Network Operations Control Center to enable them to better serve the battle, while the Theater Network Operations Control Center is also connected to the Defense Information Systems Authority, the regular forces and the global Joint Operations of the Network Operations Joint Task Force. They collaborated with the Theater Network Warfare Center, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center to monitor the status of the theater information grid, to decide on the proposed global operations of the Joint Operations Task Force, and to assess the impact of its actions. The Theater Network Warfare Control Center has the right to decide on the reduction and termination of combat operations and to adjust the priority of operations through the Theater Network Operations Center and the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If there is no theater network operations and security center in the theater, the theater network operations control center under the Global Network Operations and Security Center tie is responsible for completing the mission required by the Theater Operations Command.

The North North Command (NORTHCOM) is a rather special sector, although it is a theater warfare command with a clear zone, but most of its troops in the zone – including cyber combat troops – are not affiliated with the commander , But belong to the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM: Join Forces Command). This deployment is intended to facilitate the global management of the force. The North Command, like several other theater warfare commanders, also set up a theater network operations control center, but did not establish a theater network operations and security center, which makes the North Command must rely on network operations and security centers and other departments for its Provide general support. In this case, the role of the North Command is to be responsible for the operations within its jurisdiction, but also the lack of understanding of the corresponding battlefield information grid, and no direct control of its power.

Strategic Command Network Operations Command Control

With the troops fighting command on the network combat structure to adjust the same, the Ministry of Defense departments are also undergoing reform. Over the years, the Department of Defense has not had a centralized control of the network operations. But in 1997 when the Department of Defense conducted this attempt to find some of the weaknesses of the network at that time, also came to the “combat command – troops – defense agencies,” this network mode of operation is not suitable for modern battlefield situation The That attempt has led to the formation of a Defense Force (IAA) bureau, which is part of today’s Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, which is responsible for the operation and defense of global information grids.

Global Network Operations Joint Task Force network operations command and control mechanism is also constantly evolving. Prior to the advent of the existing UCP: Unified Command Plan, the command and control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was under the responsibility of the Theater Operations Command, but it proved that it was not conducive to managing all the components in the network, It is also difficult to provide enough information for the global information grid information. The original version of the operational concept of cyber warfare emphasizes the control of the theater operations of the theater in the theater, which was described as follows: “The combat command has the power to command the troops assigned to its zone, Is conducive to the completion of the task, when the combat command feel appropriate, or even adjust the priority of the global information grid.All of these activities should be through the theater network operations center to achieve. “In fact, even the global Event, the initial version of the network combat concept document also provides that the global network operations Joint Task Force needs to be in the theater combat command of the theater network operations control center under the command of combat.

The follow-up version of the operational concept has been adapted to this principle. The control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was moved to a more global command and control structure, through which the overall role of the strategic headquarters, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and other forces involved in the network operations Has been strengthened. The operational concept of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subdivided into three environmental operational concepts: global, theater and non-global. What kind of environmental concepts apply to different events depends on the actual impact of the events and the impact of the theater. This form of command and control structure is more suitable for the current network combat diversity characteristics, for different levels of events, theater combat command can take a more flexible response measures, and even at the same time to support and supportive action. In this system, sometimes the process of dealing with the event to go through a complete command system chain, and sometimes you can skip some steps.

Global events

Global events refer to activities or events that clearly affect the preparedness of the entire global information grid, which often requires the concordation of multiple theater combatants to be resolved. Commander of the Strategic Command must have the ability to quickly identify global events and to be able to determine which theater combat operations or other agencies of the Department of Defense will be affected. Global events include fast-spreading network malicious code attacks, satellite communications attacks, and enterprise application attacks that are not limited to single-theater network events.

The Global Strategic Command is a reliable command center with command and command for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and the Theater Command. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force uses its own resources to execute the instructions of the Strategic Command, which can be quickly sent to troops around the world. It is noteworthy that this order is not in the event of transmission to the theater of combat operations.

Although the notion of operational concept conferred the command of the commander of the strategic command worldwide, it did not completely deny the right of the theater war command to be commanded by the assigned joint command. While the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force performs the operational command of the Strategic Command, the Theater Operations Command can also deploy its troops to carry out the corresponding activities. Of course, in accordance with the requirements of the operational concept, the forces under the leadership of the theater operations command must be consistent with the action guidelines of the Joint Operations Task Force under the leadership of the Strategic Command. In fact, according to the historical action log of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations, most of the cyber operations began at the beginning of a small theater, and the Theater Command was always the first unit to deal with these incidents, and If they are handled properly, these theater-level events will not develop into global events.

Theater events

Theater events are those that occur in a battlefield area, and its foreseeable range of influence does not go beyond the theater, and the biggest difference between theater and global events is that. In the event of such incidents, the theater operations headquarters played a leading role, while the strategic headquarters only take the support role. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force can provide support to the Theater Command by its Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If the local forces do not have a theater network operations and security center, it can also provide general support for the Theater Network Operations Control Center through the Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Command of the Theater Combat Command to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subordinate to the subordinate command, that is to say there is no right to direct the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force through its Global Network Operations and Security Center to operate in its area.

Non-global event

A non-global event is an event that only affects the functional warfare headquarters and a particular defense agency. Since such institutions do not have a clear zone, these events can neither be regarded as global nor can they be seen as theater. In dealing with non-global events, the Strategic Command plays the role of auxiliary command, and the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force provides general support for the operational operational warfare headquarters involved. Most of the non-global events generally occur in the northern command zone, since many of the relevant functional departments are subordinate to the Northern Command. In the case of command and control procedures, non-global events and global events are the same.

Contradictory command and control requirements

Tactical technical requirements

Although the positioning of the various forces are not the same, but in the pursuit of efficient network operations, reasonable combat methods are their common theme. Different forces shoulder different responsibilities, they established an independent combat network, application facilities and auxiliary tools to meet their own and global information grid to maintain connectivity needs. Each unit is responsible for operating part of the global information grid, which to some extent the need for combat operations between the various departments of the centralized management, so as to get the desired combat efficiency and return on investment.

The focus of the discussion on centralized control of global information grids is the global nature of cyber warfare. The only way for the Department of Defense to achieve a network-centric commanding mechanism, to enhance the Force’s awareness of the situation and to significantly shorten the decision-making cycle, is to integrate the network and the forces horizontally, which is a centralized control mechanism The The latest “four-year defense assessment report” mentioned in the “to simplify the current ‘chimney’ system structure, to achieve a network-centric command mechanism.”

In order to make better use of scarce resources, the Department of Defense must consider when and where to allocate resources from a global perspective. The allocation of essential resources for network operations such as satellite transmission bands, standard tactical entry network sites and bandwidth must have clear mission objectives and easy to understand global significance. From the perspective of the force, the centralized command is, to some extent, a reshuffle of the existing force institutions and operations, defense networks.

The combat operations led by the theater war command will no longer be strictly limited to its zone. Ground forces are re-starting to use aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles) to routinely fly in the United States to support their operations. With the development of the PGS: Prompt Global Strike project, the commander has the power to call for conventional strike assistance from weapons systems outside the theater.

On the Navy, they pointed out that one of the essential characteristics of the maritime forces was global mobility, and the naval forces were constantly interspersed between the various theater warheads. Especially as aircraft carrier battle group such units, once deployed, it can not stay in a small battlefield. In addition, even the theater-level operations taken by the theater war command may have a global impact. The adjustment of the network defensive posture may have a huge financial burden on the Internet sector, and the combat command may not be able to understand the specific details of the adjustment behavior.

For the Department of Defense’s network system, all attacks are essentially global in nature. The enemy can not easily from the other side of the Earth to the United States to attack the physical objectives, but in the field of computer network technology, such things happen often. Once such an attack is detected, the information about it must be communicated to all relevant departments in the shortest possible time to ensure that such attacks are identified from anywhere to protect the security of the global information grid. Every time a network intrusion – even if it does not seem to fail the invasion – is likely to give the global information grid content a huge potential harm, because they invade the system behind the back door will be in the future Attack to play a role. The outbreak of the virus is an undisputed global event, and if we do not realize this, we will suffer more losses.

The Navy emphasizes that the impact of no events will be limited to a theater area, and that all efforts to combat cyber operations must be global. Their defense is that there is no theater boundaries, the Department of Defense every battlefield combat headquarters are facing the same potential threat, in order to obtain information on the advantages of the Department of Defense must make full use of its large coverage of the network resources , Quickly share all useful information on a global basis.

In addition, the Air Force and the Navy have pointed out that their cyber warfare forces are not deployed by the Theater Warfare Command. The Air Force and the Navy have their own cyber warfare organizations (such as the Theater Network Operations and Security Center) in each zone of the Theater Command, and the Air Force and Navy’s cyber warfare forces are usually defender in the theater. Finally, the Air Force and the Navy believe that the Strategic Command is responsible for the Global Information Grid through the Theater Operations Command, based on the description of the official documents available for reference.

Theater war command

There are two issues that need to be concerned about the command and control of cyber warfare against the Theater Command. One is the need for timely control of the battlefield information grid, the second is the need to turn the network into a weapon system, so that commanders can be the same as the conventional weapon system to use the same network resources, the use of the full range of network advantages to conduct a comprehensive battle.

Those forces that have been assigned specific responsibilities have already deployed their own unique solutions, each of which is involved in a network operation or each institution believes that it already has the most effective allocation of scarce resources. But the global information grid is not exclusive to a particular department, but a joint structure. “Chimney” type system and the existing deployment of the troops is actually to reduce the efficiency of the battlefield information grid efficiency. For example, the Army developed a secure IP telephony solution before other departments in the Department of Defense to communicate with the secret voice. For security reasons, other departments usually do not use this program, but their own development of a set of the same function of the solution. So there will be two sets of independent, confidential IP voice schemes in the zone of the Combat Command, which can not be connected to each other. The theater warfare command had to be screened, leaving only a set of programs to ensure that all departments in their zones could cooperate with each other. But the solution is eliminated by the party can no longer with the theater outside the brother forces for confidential contact.

Some of the resources in the combat command zone can serve multiple forces and the public sector. However, there are many examples of the use of duplication of work for the establishment of their own can not be linked to each other independent systems, such as satellite terminals and some technical control equipment. Sometimes, to send a message, you need to send the signal back to the United States, and then sent from the local distance from the initial sender only two miles of the recipient there. All kinds of fibers are arranged one by one on the same route, but the data between them can not be exchanged directly because they belong to different forces or public departments. The theater operations command must take measures to address the interconnection between the troops or the civil service in the zone.

To solve this problem, you can use centralized control approach. The centralized command of the cyber warfare forces requires the theater war command to make some adjustments to its own organization, but at the same time it does not affect its power to direct action when there is a need for combat. Relevant forces must accept orders for multiple combat orders and effectively optimize and feedback battlefield information. At present, the troops sent to the front are becoming more and more independent, and through the help of the global information grid they can cross the border of the theater combat command back and forth, and the theater warfare command has been compromised by the support and confrontation of the cyber warfare , After the implementation of centralized command, the troops can not or do not want to respond to the requirements of the theater combat command.

The Pacific Command (PACOM: Pacific Command) first adopted a “joint attempt” approach in humanitarian aid operations when it participated in the Indonesian tsunami relief work in 2004. The Pacific Command issued instructions to the assigned troops to carry out special network defenses under the framework of the entire action plan. Many naval forces and Marine Corps units have established relatively direct network defenses under the centralized command of the Navy’s Global Network Operations Center, which goes beyond the mandate of the Pacific Command to the Navy and Marine Corps, which Posing a potential risk factor for the global operations of the Pacific Command.

The Combat Command is concerned that the idea of ​​centralizing control of global information grids will always reduce their grip on information and control of the global information grid. Under the existing command system, a unit will carry out training or perform other tasks under the command of its troops, and participate in the battle under the command of the theater combat command, and the rules of command and control are very clear. The command and control of the forces in the field of information is as important as their command and control in the air, land, sea and space fields. For the C3S system (control, communications and computer systems), under its command to combat and responsible for the protection of its forces are often in a double or even triple the report chain, the results can not tell who is responsible for the final battle. In a global or non-global event, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force often conducts direct operations around the theater operations headquarters. Although the operational concept of joint cyber warfare specifically emphasizes the need for coordinated operations with the theater combat command, this requirement has become almost in the context of modern combat rapid changes. Information Security Weakness Alert System, Computer Task Sequence, and Information Condition Adjustment System Problems outside the jurisdiction of the Combat Command are typical examples of this requirement failure. These events directly affect the command of the Theater Command in the battlefield, when the troops want to directly use these mechanisms from the management level to strengthen their own control, they can not determine when and how in the implementation of these Operation, and do not know what impact this will have on the command of the theater combat command, because under current conditions, only the theater combat command has the ability to carry out these operations. When a threat event requires the Air Force’s Space Command to seek the cooperation of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations with Air Force forces, it would bring to the command of the North Command if it did not notify or obtain cooperation with the Northern Command Big trouble.

In the Central Command, due to the lack of adequate control of the network combat forces, resulting in the commander sometimes can not determine whether the network resources are available. The Navy is responsible for operating a large number of battlefield information grids. Navy network combat forces in the operational area are not responsible for the Central Command of the Navy, who only need to report to the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. The central theater’s central theater theater operations center, whose duty is to maintain and direct all the combat operations of the theater operations, but it is not in the naval network combat force report chain, so it is often impossible to get all the battlefield information grid Of the state of affairs, there are already alternatives to deal with this problem, but this can not be said to be a formal solution.

For the North Command, because of the lack of cyber warfare control, they encountered great trouble in the rescue work of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In that operation, the troops’ equipment was transported to the joint warfare zone without permission. Which makes the North Command can not grasp and guide the transfer of materials, but can not coordinate the actions of various forces, which is a multi-directional management and operational issues.

As the various forces advocate the implementation of a centralized command framework centered on the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the theater commanders are reluctant to see such changes, Some of them are responsible for the strategic headquarters, with the global information grid operating rights and defense rights mechanism. The presence of the Strategic Command has been instrumental in maintaining the command of the theater combat command in combat operations in theater and global events and in enhancing communication between the theater combat command and the Joint Staff.

Combat headquarters and troops want to focus on the network operations from the level of joint operations, but there are several issues that need to be discussed:

Who is responsible for the first leadership?

2. Network operations to focus on what the specific direction of the command to be reflected, the global level, the theater level or what other level?

3. What is the change brought about by this adjustment only when a part of the theater combat command sends a request to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force or is the theater commander’s complete command and priority in the theater?

Finally, the Theater Command is the body that is ultimately responsible for the President’s mission to complete the military mission in the area, and the troops dispatched to the theater combat command need to complete their respective tasks under their jurisdiction. It is unquestionable that they will still be under the command of the strategic command when the troops advocate the implementation of a global centralized command. But the current global information grid is a key part of the command and control capability of the theater combat command and the commander’s ability to guide the troops. Without a global information grid, the plane can not fly, the ground forces can not move, the ships can not sail, even the satellite can not provide the signal. Commanders need to get the status of the global information grid and control, just as they need to master the position and status of the troops as important. They must grasp the scope, ability and status of the battlefield information grid, and must know how the situation outside the theater will affect the battlefield information grid in the area where the troops are located and must be able to command and optimize the troops to support operations. If we really believe that the speculation of the centralized command will have a better effect, it can not be ignored for the theater war command to retain the appropriate command and control.

Also, as long as the structure of the Theater Command is still preserved, all military missions, including those directed by the Functional Command Command, will inevitably occur in the theater of the Theater Command, as all networks Combat missions must be carried out by an entity unit. At the same time, centralized command is necessary to achieve a network-centric command model and to more effectively defend against attacks. The concept of this centralized command and the command of the theater war command to master and optimize the battlefield information grid is not mutually exclusive.

The way forward

To develop a viable network combat command and control framework, it is necessary to avoid extremes, taking into account the needs of theater warfare headquarters and the need to establish centralized control of global information grids. In the process of the development of the operational concept of joint network operations and the transformation process of network combat forces, the principle of organization needs to play the role of adjusting the interests of all parties. In order to achieve this goal, the Department of Defense should do the following:

1. Create a simple, clear network combat command chain, to ensure that the strategic headquarters of all network operations can be directed. This can solve the problem just mentioned “who is responsible for the first leadership”. Only when the event occurred in a rapidly changing environment, the theater command and control agencies began to play a role. Simple command chain can ensure that troops involved in network operations know who should listen to who should report to whom, in this command chain, must include the theater combat command.

2. The command of the theater war command in its zone can be given:

– to amend the Joint Command plan to clarify the responsibilities of the Theater Operations Command to operate the network in its zone.

– Revise the existing global information grid network operational concept, detailing that those outside the theater network operations and security centers can obtain direct assistance from the World Network Operations and Security Center of the Theater Operations Command.

– All orders for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force shall be enforced through the Theater Operations Command.

These adjustments ensure that all units in the theater are acting under a single command chain, which is responsible for the strategic headquarters through the Theater Operations Command. This can also solve the North Command should be responsible for the area but did not command the power of the network fighting the embarrassing situation.

3. In each theater combat command, a joint network operations center under the jurisdiction of the Central Command shall be established to integrate the Theater Network Operations Control Center of the Theater Command Command and the Theater Network Operations Center of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. As a result, each theater war command will have a joint operations command in the field of computer space, just as in the battlefield of land, sea and air. Any troops outside the Theater Network Operations and Security Center can obtain direct assistance from the Global Network Operations and Security Center of the Joint Network Operations Center.

4. To consolidate the status of the global information grid, the highest control to the strategic headquarters. The development of centralized command is now focused on the command of the forces involved in the network operations, which runs counter to the network-centric command concept. The force-centric “chimney” command system is not conducive to the transmission and processing of information, let us from the “all users to provide the latest and most accurate information” goal farther and farther. In the previous “Goldwater Nichols Defense Ministry Reconstruction Law” report has made it clear that the organization and management and command and control should be controlled by a joint agency.

Concluding remarks

The current centralized command of network operations is an urgent need. Optimizing the network operational command mechanism can help the Department of Defense to improve efficiency, save costs and better allocate scarce resources. More importantly, this allows network combat troops to provide information more quickly and accurately to commanders, which is important in large-scale network operations. The process of centralized command can not affect the efficiency of network combat command and control. This depends on whether the global information grid can provide enough information for all participating units and whether the commander makes full use of the theater information grid to help command operations.

“We have to change the network combat problem discussion and thinking mode, we are in the network” combat “rather than the network” management “, all participating units must ensure that they are ready to war every time to ensure that the network system A decisive weapon system. ” Network operations are a key part of our country’s ability to win war, it can help us provide command and control, shorten the decision-making cycle and adjust the resources of the theater. The Strategic Command has taken a big step in strengthening the concept of cyber warfare, and these efforts need to be continued. The theater warfare command must be an important part of the control and protection of the global information grid to ensure that we can continue to win the network.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

是誰在負責配置美國所擁有的信息資源?誰在負責分配這些資源利用時的優先級順序?我們採取了哪些措施來保證全球信息柵格(GIG:Global Information Grid)、獨立聯合服務系統以及依靠從它們身上獲取信息來開展工作的戰區作戰司令部(GCCs:Geographic Combatant Commanders)和全球網絡聯合特遣部隊(JTF-GNO:Joint Task Force-Global NetOps)的安全?最近幾年以來,整個網絡作戰系統對這些問題的討論一直沒有停息過,人們爭論的焦點就是戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中應該扮演什麼樣的角色。

美國軍方公佈了對每個戰區作戰司令部的部署,同時還宣布將會減少跨戰區的軍事支持行動。對每個戰區作戰司令部來說,如何配置支持本戰區作戰的信息基礎設施就變得非常重要了。敵人有可能會滲透進負責軍事力量調度的關鍵網絡系統區域進行破壞,這些入侵的危害常常被低估,甚至被當作意外事件或者偶發事件輕描淡寫地處理掉,但是這些入侵行為實際上完全有可能濫發連接請求來阻塞商業網站的正常運行,甚至導致一些承擔軍隊後勤業務的物流公司被標為無效狀態。戰區作戰司令部應該保證其防區的信息條件不受外部入侵的影響。不計其數的病毒正在破壞著互聯網,國防部的系統也開始遭到攻擊。現在有人在討論是否應該讓全球網絡聯合特遣隊斷開互聯網上的軍事入網點,但軍方又擔心僅靠和商業供應商的合作,國防部不能保證所有的後勤支持行動都能繼續無差錯地進行下去。每個戰區作戰司令部對各自的戰區網絡狀態都不太確定,他們對全球信息柵格本身的安全持有懷疑態度,他們擔心其是否有能力執行分配給它的任務。

受到建立一個更全球化的網絡作戰控制機構、加強美國戰略司令部(STRATCOM)和全球網絡聯合特遣隊在網絡作戰中的主導地位思想的影響,戰區作戰司令部對其防區的指揮控制權有所削弱。將作戰信息集中到全球信息柵格的做法也在一定程度上影響了戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格是如何支持該戰區的作戰的具體行為的了解。本文將會介紹現有的指揮關係、戰區作戰司令部的職責、指揮和作戰之間的線性關係、舊有的和新興的聯合作戰原則一級特殊戰例分析,最後還將會對戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中所應扮演的角色提出建議。

網絡作戰的環境

網絡作戰中的指揮控制是一個在十年以前就出現了的概念,之後它的內涵一直處在演變之中。每個相關部門、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊都為此進行過一些組織結構和工作重心上的調整,但是最終都沒有解決好各自應該扮演的角色這個問題。要想真正明白為什麼戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中的角色會成為一個難題,就必須先弄清楚這幾個問題:網絡作戰是在哪兒發生的、什麼是真正的網絡作戰、網絡作戰中的每個部門的組織結構和指揮控制結構是怎樣的。

首先需要解釋的是,什麼是全球信息柵格?按照國防部第8100.1號文件的定義,它包括“全球互聯的、終端到終端的信息傳輸能力和聯合處理能力。按照戰士、決策者的需要來進行信息採集、處理、儲存、傳播和管理的能力”。這就涵蓋了政府的和租用的通信信息系統及服務,以及全球信息柵格所需的其他軟件、安全和服務支持,還包括1996年3月頒布的《克林格-科恩法》(Clinger- Cohen Act)第5142節所定義的國家安全系統(National Security System)。按照這個定義,全球信息柵格包含了國防部和國家安全系統的所有級別的信息系統,從戰術層次到戰略層次,以及互聯通信系統。

大多數關於全球信息柵格網絡作戰中心的指揮控制的討論都在著重強調該系統的防禦能力,但是網絡作戰包含的內容其實遠不止這點,網絡作戰要完成的任務包括三項:部門管理、內容管理和網絡防禦,其工作目的是提供跨越戰略、戰術和作戰概念邊界的無中心式支持,為國防部的全方位的戰鬥、情報和考察任務提供支持。

1.部門管理是全球信息柵格的具體任務之一,它是對構成全球信息柵格的系統和網絡的技術、過程和政策管理,包括公務部門管理、系統管理、網絡管理、衛星通信管理和電磁光譜管理這幾個方面。

2.內容管理指的是管理全球信息柵格里的信息本身。它用即時的方式保證信息對使用者、操作者和決策者都是可用的。內容管理包括對全球信息柵格的具體信息內容的查找、訪問、傳輸、儲存和一體化。

3.網絡防禦就是對全球信息柵格所有的信息包括附加信息進行保護,它主要包括一些政策、過程、項目和操作。如果有必要的話,該任務可以請求通過跨機構合作來完成。它負責的是全球信息柵格的信息安全、計算機網絡防禦、計算機防衛反應能力和關鍵性基礎設施保護。

現在已經了解了網絡作戰的基本組織結構,下一步介紹網絡作戰中的各個組織和他們是如何執行任務的,需要介紹的主要是部隊、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊,它們都在隨著戰場要求的變化而改進著各自的組織結構。

部隊在組織結構上的改變主要是為了滿足全球信息柵格對信息傳輸、訪問、控制和保護能力的要求。十年之前,部隊為了適應網絡作戰曾針對區域控制進行過一些變革,但那些措施最終發展成了集中化的控制,這些措施也沒有保留下來。現在我們有必要了解一下部隊的組織構成,以便更好地理解為什麼網絡作戰的指揮控制會變得如此充滿爭議。
GEM:GIG企業管理 GCM:GIG內容管理 GND:GIG網絡防禦
陸軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

陸軍是所有軍種中改革措施最少的。陸軍繼續保持著以前的指揮機構,現在叫做戰場網絡作戰與安全中心(TNOSC:Theater NetOps and Security Centers),該組織直接對各個戰區作戰司令部負責。陸軍維持著一個獨立的全球網絡作戰與安全中心(GNOSC:Global NetOps and Security Center),所有的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心都是其下屬機構。全球網絡作戰與安全中心對戰場網絡作戰與安全中心進行技術控制,但是戰場網絡作戰與安全中心同時又隸屬於戰區作戰司令部,也受到戰區網絡司令部的管理,典型的例子就是陸軍的戰場信號旅受陸軍服務組件指揮部的管理。

全球網絡作戰與安全中心對各個戰區的網絡作戰部隊提供技術指導。美國陸軍網絡司令部暨第9信號司令部對全球網絡作戰與安全中心的技術和管理負責。但是在戰時,全球網絡作戰與安全中心又作為陸軍的元素受戰略司令部(STRATCOM)的指揮。
ACERT:陸軍計算機應急響應分隊
AGNOSC:陸軍全球網絡和安全中心

ASCC:陸軍軍種組成司令部

ARSTRAT:陸軍戰略司令部(導彈防禦與戰略)

CIO:首席信息官

GCC:戰區作戰司令部(地區性聯合司令部,美軍十大司令部中的六個)

INSCOM:情報和安全司令部(陸軍直屬報告單位之一)

JTF-GNO:聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NETCOM:陸軍網絡戰爭司令部

RCERT:地區性計算機應急響應分隊

STRATCOM:美軍戰略司令部

TNCC:戰區網絡作戰控制中心

TNOCC:戰區網絡作戰和安全中心

G6:陸軍司令部通信部門

G2陸軍司令部情報部門

Installation Network Provider網絡施設提供商

COMMAND—戰略層面作戰指揮

OPCON:作戰(戰役)指揮

TACON:戰術控制

GS:全球打擊

TECHCON:梯隊

ADCON:管理控制

空軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

空軍選擇了一條不同的組織途徑,把重點從以前的一級司令部網絡作戰和安全中心(MAJCOM NOSCs)轉移到了一體化網絡作戰和安全中心(I-NOSCs:Integrated NetOps and Security Centers)。與陸軍的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心受戰區作戰司令部的管理不同的是,空軍的一體化網絡作戰和安全中心並不隸屬於任何一個戰區作戰司令部,而是只受空軍網絡作戰中心(AFNOC :Air Force NetOps Center)的管理,該中心與陸軍的全球網絡作戰和安全中心性質類似。空軍意識到了戰區作戰司令部必須擁有在其防區直接指揮網絡作戰行動的權力,有必要在空軍網絡作戰中心和戰區作戰司令部之間建立起一般支持的關係,建立兩個部門之間的專用聯絡單元。另外空軍方面還賦予了一級司令部在各自的戰區建立通信控制中心的自主權,這些控制中心可以當作空軍網絡作戰中心與各自戰區作戰司令部相互聯繫的快捷通道。
ACC:空戰中心
AFCHQ:空軍組成司令部

AFNETOPS:空軍網絡作戰司令部

ARSTRAT:空軍戰略司令部戰區網絡作戰控制中心

CIO:首席信息官

I-NOSC:集成網絡作戰和安全中心

GCC:同上,地區性聯合司令部

JFCC-NW:網絡戰聯合職能組成司令部

JTF-GNO:同上,聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NCC:網絡控制中心

STRATCOM:同上,戰略司令部

TNOS:同上,戰區網絡作戰與安全中心

海軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

海軍和空軍一樣,不再把戰區當作指揮的單位。為了更好地支持全球作戰,他們用隸屬於海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心(NAVGNOSC)的兩個戰區網絡戰安全中心(RNOSCs)來協助原有的位於那不勒斯和巴林島的兩個戰區海軍計算機與通信主站(NCTMS:Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station)。另外,由於海軍的大多數網絡作戰是在海上進行,所以他們還建立了艦隊網絡作戰中心(FNOCs:Fleet NetOps Centers),與位於美國本土的戰區網絡戰安全中心互為呼應。艦隊網絡作戰中心是艦隊進行網絡作戰的戰術切入點,可以為本防區的艦隊提供音頻、視頻和數據等網絡服務,並且可以在艦隊從一個艦隊網絡作戰中心的轄區駛入另一個轄區的時候提供平滑的信息過渡。多數未分類的網絡都是由美國本土的海軍陸戰隊內聯網(NMCI:Navy Marine Corps Internet)或者美國海外的海外海軍企業網絡(ONENET:Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network)負責承包運營的。為了適應戰場的需求,海軍建立了海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網全球網絡作戰與安全中心來提供全球性的作戰支持,同時也建立了隸屬於戰區網絡作戰與安全中心的戰區網絡戰安全中心對各個具體戰場提供支持。戰區網絡作戰與安全中心與所在戰區的戰區作戰司令部並沒有從屬關係。
Fleet NOC:艦隊網絡作戰中心
GCC:同上,地區性聯合司令部

INSCON:同上,陸軍情報和安全司令部

JTF-GNO:同上,聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NAVGNOSC:海軍全球網絡作戰和安全中心

NAVSOC:海軍衛星作戰中心

NCC MHQ:海軍網絡作戰信息作戰和太空戰中心

NMCI GNOC:海軍陸戰隊網全球網絡作戰中心

RNOSC:同上,地區性網絡作戰中心

STRATCOM:同上,戰略司令部

TNCC:同上,戰區網絡作戰控制中心

支持全球海軍作戰的最基本的組織的海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心(NAVGNOSC)和東西部戰區網絡作戰與安全中心(East and West RNOSCs)。海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心匯集了來自戰區網絡作戰與安全中心、海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網和海軍衛星作戰中心的信息,為全球網絡行動聯合特遣部隊提供全球性的指揮控制信息。海軍和陸軍不同的是,他們沒有維持一個隸屬於戰區作戰司令部的機構。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊建立的部隊與戰區作戰司令部之間的支持關係並沒有賦予戰區作戰司令部在海軍部負責的全球信息柵格範圍內進行指揮的權力。戰區作戰司令部的所有指揮請求都必須先經過海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心的批准。

戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰指揮控制

儘管每個戰區作戰司令部在各自的轄區內針對網絡作戰的組織方式都不盡相同,但是他們卻有一個共同的特點,那就是都建立了一個戰區網絡作戰控制中心和一個隸屬於國防信息系統局(DISA:Defense Information Systems Agency)的戰區網絡作戰中心。各個戰區網絡作戰控制中心的組織結構並不完全相同,美國中央司令部(CENTCOM)將戰區網絡作戰控制中心和國防信息系統局的戰區網絡作戰中心合稱為中央戰區網絡作戰中心(Central Region Theater NetOps Center),而歐洲司令部(EUCOM)則建立了一個戰區通信控制中心(Theater Communication Control Center)。雖然在組織上有些差異,但是所有的戰區網絡作戰控制中心基本上都是被戰區作戰司令部用來對轄區內的全球信息柵格進行指揮控制(轄區內的全球信息柵格也被稱為戰區信息柵格TIG:Theater Information Grid)。

戰區作戰司令部通過戰區網絡作戰控制中心來優化配置和控制全球信息柵格的信息資源,以使它們更好地為戰鬥服務,同時戰區網絡作戰控制中心也是連接國防信息系統局、常規部隊和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區接口。他們與戰區網絡戰中心、戰區網絡作戰和安全中心合作來監控戰區信息柵格的狀態,對被提議的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊相關行動作出決定,並評估其行動的影響。戰區網絡戰控制中心對作戰行動力度的減小和終止有決定權,並且通過戰區網絡作戰中心和戰區網絡作戰與安全中心來調整作戰的優先級。如果該戰區沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心,那麼就由全球網絡作戰與安全中心領帶下的戰區網絡作戰控制中心來負責完成戰區作戰司令部所要求的任務。

美國的北方司令部(NORTHCOM)是一個比較特別的部門,雖然它是一個有著明確防區的戰區作戰司令部,但是其防區內的大部分部隊——包括網絡作戰部隊——都不隸屬於該司令部,而是屬於美國聯合部隊司令部(JFCOM:Join Forces Command)。這樣的部署是為了便於部隊的全球性管理。北方司令部和其他幾個戰區作戰司令部一樣,也設立了戰區網絡作戰控制中心,但是卻沒有建立戰區網絡作戰與安全中心,這就使得北方司令部必須依靠網絡作戰與安全中心等部門為其提供一般支持。在這種情況下,北方司令部所扮演的角色就是需要負責其轄區內的作戰行動,但是又對相應的戰場信息柵格缺乏了解,更沒有直接控制它的權力。

戰略司令部網絡作戰指揮控制

與部隊戰鬥司令部對網絡作戰結構進行調整一樣,國防部的相關部門也在進行著改革。多年以來,國防部一直沒有一個集中控制的網絡作戰部。但是在1997年的時候國防部進行過這方面的嘗試,發現了一些當時網絡的弱點,也得出了“作戰司令部-部隊-國防機構”這種網絡作戰的模式已經不適合現代的戰場情況。那次嘗試促成了國防信息系統局最終組建了一支實體部隊,也就是今天的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊來負責全球信息柵格的操作和防禦。

全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的網絡作戰指揮控制機制同樣也在不斷發展。在現有的聯合司令部計劃(UCP:Unified Command Plan)出現之前,全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮控制都是由戰區作戰司令部負責,但是事實證明這不利於管理網絡中的所有組件,也難以為全球信息柵格提供足夠的事態感知信息。最初版本的網絡作戰的作戰概念比較強調戰區作戰司令部對其防區的網絡作戰的控制,當時對處理戰區問題的描述是這樣的:“作戰司令部有權指揮被指派到其防區的部隊,只要是利於任務的完成,在作戰司令部覺得合適的時候,甚至可以調整全球信息柵格的優先級。所有的這些活動,都應該通過戰區網絡作戰中心來實現。”事實上,即使是全球性的事件,最初版本的網絡作戰概念文件也規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊需要在戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心指揮下進行作戰。
作戰概念的後續版本對這項原則進行了調整。對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的控制被移到了一個更加全球化的指揮控制架構中,通過這樣的調整,戰略司令部、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和其他參與網絡作戰的部隊的整體角色都得到了加強。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的作戰概念被細分成了三個環境作戰概念:全球性的、戰區性的和非全局性的。不同的事件適用何種環境概念取決於事件造成的實際影響和戰區影響。這種形式的指揮控制結構更加適用於目前網絡作戰多樣性特性,針對不同級別的事件,戰區作戰司令部可以採取更加靈活的應對措施,甚至可以同時展開支持性的和輔助性的行動。在這種制度下,有時候處理事件的過程要經過完整的指揮系統鏈,有時候可以跳過一些步驟。

全球性事件

全球性事件是指那些顯而易見會影響整個全球信息柵格的備戰度的活動或事件,這類事件通常需要多個戰區作戰司令部的協同處理才能得到解決。戰略司令部的指揮官必須要具備快速鑑別全球性事件的能力,並要能具體判斷出有哪些戰區作戰司令部或者國防部的其他機構會受到影響。全球性事件包括快速傳播的網絡惡意代碼攻擊、衛星通信攻擊、企業應用攻擊等不僅僅局限於單個戰區的網絡事件。

全球戰略司令部是一個可靠的指揮中心,它對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和戰區作戰司令部都有命令和指揮權。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊利用自己的資源來執行戰略司令部的指示,作戰命令可以很快地發送到在全球各地的部隊中。值得注意的是,這種命令在傳遞時不經過事件發生地的戰區作戰司令部。

雖然作戰概念的原則賦予了戰略司令部指揮官全球範圍內的指揮權,但是這也並沒有完全否定戰區作戰司令部可以通過分配的聯合司令部計劃來進行指揮的權利。在全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊執行戰略司令部的作戰命令的同時,戰區作戰司令部也可以調遣其麾下的部隊進行相應的活動。當然,按照作戰概念的要求,戰區作戰司令部領導下的部隊的行動必須與戰略司令部領導下的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的行動方針保持一致。事實上,據全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的歷史行動日誌記載,大多數的網絡作戰一開始都是在小範圍戰區開始出現的,戰區作戰司令部總是著手處理這些事件的第一單位,而且如果處理得適當的話,這些戰區級別的事件就不會發展成全球性事件。

戰區性事件

戰區性事件是指那些發生在某個戰場區域,其可預見的影響範圍不會超出該戰區的事件,戰區性事件與全球性事件的最大區別也就在於此。在處理這類事件的時候,戰區作戰司令部起著主導作用,而戰略司令部只承擔輔助的支持作用。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊可以通過其戰區網絡作戰與安全中心對戰區作戰司令部提供支援。如果當地的部隊沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心,那也可以通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心為戰區網絡作戰控制中心提供一般支持。戰區作戰司令部對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮屬於次級指揮,也就是說沒有權利通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心來直接調動全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊到其所轄區域進行作戰。

非全局性事件

非全局性事件是指只對職能作戰司令部和特定的國防機構造成影響的事件。由於這類機構沒有明確的防區,所以這些事件既不能被看成全球性的也不能被看成戰區性的。在處理非全局性事件時,戰略司令部扮演輔助指揮的角色,全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊對所涉及到的職能作戰司令部提供一般支持。大多數的非全局性事件一般都發生在北方司令部的防區,因為很多相關的職能部門都隸屬於北方司令部。在指揮控制的程序方面,非全局性事件和全球性事件是相同的。

相互矛盾的指揮控制要求

戰術技術的要求

儘管各個部隊的定位不盡相同,但是在網絡作戰中追求高效、合理的作戰方法是他們共同的主題。不同的部隊肩負著不同的職責,他們建立了獨立的作戰網絡、應用設施和輔助工具來滿足自身與全球信息柵格保持聯通的需求。每支部隊都要負責操作一部分全球信息柵格,這在一定程度上需要各部隊間作戰鏈的集中化管理,這樣才能獲得所期待的作戰效率和投入回報率。

關於對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制討論的焦點是網絡作戰的全球性特質。國防部想要實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制、增強部隊的事態感知能力和顯著縮短決策週期的目標的話,唯一的方法就是將網絡和部隊進行橫向的融合,這是一種集中化的控制機制。最新的一份《四年防務評估報告》裡就提到過“要簡化目前的‘煙囪式’系統結構,實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制”。

為了更好地利用緊缺資源,國防部必須從全球性的角度來考慮何時何地調撥何種資源。對衛星傳輸波段、標準戰術入口網絡站點和帶寬等網絡作戰必需資源的分配必須要有明確的任務目標和易於理解的全球性意義。從部隊的角度來看,集中化指揮在某種程度上是對現有部隊機構和作戰、防禦網絡的一次重新洗牌。

由戰區作戰司令部領導的作戰行動將不再嚴格地限於其防區內。地面部隊重新開始利用飛機(包括無人機)例行地在美國本土飛行來支持他們的作戰。隨著快速全球打擊(PGS:Prompt Global Strike)項目的發展,指揮官已經有權力呼叫從戰區以外的武器系統發出常規打擊援助。

在海軍方面,他們指出海上部隊的一個本質性特點就是全球流動性,海軍部隊作戰時會不斷地在各個戰區作戰司令部之間穿插。尤其是像航母戰鬥群這樣的單位,一旦被部署出發,就不可能一直呆在一塊小範圍的戰場。另外,即使是戰區作戰司令部所採取的戰區級別的行動,也有可能產生全球性的影響。網絡防禦姿態的調整可能對互聯網部門帶來巨大的經濟負擔,而且作戰司令部還有可能無法了解到調整行為的具體細節結果。

對國防部的網絡系統來說,所有的攻擊本質上同樣都是全球性的。敵人不可能輕易地從地球的另一端對美國本土的實體目標進行攻擊,但是在計算機網絡科技領域,這樣的事情經常發生。一旦檢測到這種攻擊,關於它的信息必須要在最短的時間內傳遍全球所有的相關部門,以保證從任何地方都能識別出這樣的攻擊方式,從而保護全球信息柵格的安全。每一次網絡入侵——哪怕是看起來無關緊要的失敗的入侵——都有可能給全球信息柵格的內容帶來巨大的潛在危害,因為它們入侵時在系統中留下的後門會在以後的攻擊中發揮作用。病毒的爆發是毫無爭議的全球性事件,如果認識不到這一點的話,我們將會受到更大的損失。

海軍強調沒有任何事件的影響會僅限於某個戰區範圍,所有關於網絡作戰的努力都必須是全球性的。他們的理由是網絡作戰是沒有戰區界限的,國防部的每個戰區作戰司令部所面臨的潛在威脅都是相同的,為了獲得信息上的優勢,國防部必須要充分利用其大覆蓋面的網絡資源,快速地在全球範圍內分享所有的有用信息。

此外,空軍和海軍方面指出,他們的網絡作戰部隊都不是由戰區作戰司令部來負責部署的。在每個戰區作戰司令部的防區內,空軍和海軍都有自己的網絡作戰組織(例如戰區網絡作戰與安全中心),而且空軍和海軍的網絡作戰部隊在戰區內通常是扮演維護者的角色。最後一點,空軍和海軍都認為,根據可供參考的官方文件的描述,戰略司令部通過戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格負責。

戰區作戰司令部的要求

對戰區作戰司令部來說,在網絡作戰的指揮控制方面有兩個需要關心的問題。一是需要對戰場信息柵格進行及時的控制,二是需要把網絡變成一個武器系統,讓指揮官們可以像對常規的武器系統一樣共同利用網絡資源,利用網絡全方位的優勢來進行全面的戰鬥。

那些被分配了特定職責的部隊,已經部署好了各自唯一的解決方案,參與到網絡作戰中的每支部隊或者每個機構都相信自己已經擁有了最有效分配緊缺資源的辦法。但是全球信息柵格並不是專屬於某一個部門的,而是一個聯合結構。 “煙囪”式系統和現有的部隊部署方式實際上是降低了戰場信息柵格的利用效率。舉個例子來說,陸軍在國防部的其他部門之前研發出了一套安全的IP電話解決方案,可以進行保密語音的聯絡。出於安全考慮,其他部門通常不會再採用這套方案,而是自己再開發一套功能相同的解決方案。這樣在作戰司令部的防區內就有了兩套獨立的保密IP語音方案,它們相互之間不能進行聯通。戰區作戰司令部只得進行篩選,只保留一套方案,以保證在其防區內所有部門可以進行彼此協作。但是解決方案被淘汰的一方就不能再與該戰區以外的兄弟部隊進行保密聯絡了。

作戰司令部防區內的有些資源可以為多個部隊和公務部門服務。但是也有很多例子是使用者進行重複勞動為各自建立了不能相互聯絡的獨立系統,比如衛星終端和一些技術控制設備。有些時候,要傳遞一個信息的話,需要先把信號發回美國本土,然後再從本土發到距離初始發送者只有兩英里的接收者那裡。各種各樣的光纖一條挨一條地按照相同的路線排列著,但是它們之間的數據卻不能進行直接交換,因為它們分屬於不同的部隊或者公務部門。戰區作戰司令部必須採取措施來解決防區內的部隊或者公務部門之間的互聯性問題。

要解決這個問題,可以採用集中化控制的辦法。對網絡作戰部隊的集中化指揮需要戰區作戰司令部對自身的組織機構進行一定的調整,但是同時又不能影響其在有作戰需要時指揮行動的權力。相關部隊必須接受多個作戰司令部的命令,並且有效地優化和反饋戰場信息。目前,派往前線的部隊獨立性越來越高,通過全球信息柵格的幫助他們可以來回地越過戰區作戰司令部的邊界,戰區作戰司令部對網絡作戰的輔助和對抗作用因此而受到了損害,施行集中化指揮以後,部隊就不能或者說不願意響應戰區作戰司令部的要求了。

在2004年參與印尼海嘯救助工作的時候,太平洋司令部(PACOM:Pacific Command)首次在人道援助行動中採取了“聯合嘗試”的方式。太平洋司令部向被分派有任務的部隊發出指令,讓他們在整個行動計劃的框架之下進行特別的網絡防禦工作。很多海軍部隊和海軍陸戰隊的部隊在海軍全球網絡作戰中心的集中化指揮下,建立了一些相對直接的網絡防禦措施,這些措施超越了太平洋司令部給海軍和海軍陸戰隊分配的任務範圍,這就給太平洋司令部的全球網絡作戰帶來了潛在的危險因素。

作戰司令部很關心總是強調的對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制的思想會降低他們對全球信息柵格的信息掌握度和控制力度。在現有的指揮制度下,一個單位會在其所在部隊的指揮權下進行訓練或者執行其他任務,在戰區作戰司令部的指揮權下參加戰鬥,指揮控制的條理非常清晰。對部隊在信息領域的指揮控制與對其在空中、陸上、海上和空間領域的指揮控制同等重要。對C3S系統(control, communications and computer systems)來說,在其指揮下進行作戰並負責保護它的部隊常常要處於雙重甚至三重的報告鏈中,結果最後分不清到底是誰在負責指揮戰鬥。在全球性或者非全局性事件中,全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊經常繞開戰區作戰司令部直接展開行動。儘管聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念專門強調了與戰區作戰司令部進行協調作戰的要求,但是在現代作戰快速變化的環境中,這條要求幾乎成了擺設。信息保障弱點警報系統、計算機任務序列和信息條件調整系統在作戰司令部的轄區之外出現問題就是這條要求失效的典型例子。這些事件直接影響了戰區作戰司令部在戰場上的指揮,當部隊想要直接利用這些機制從管理級上加強自身的控制的時候,他們不能判斷應該在何時、以什麼樣的方式在執行這些操作,也不知道這樣做會對戰區作戰司令部的指揮產生什麼影響,因為在目前的條件下,只有戰區作戰司令部才有能力來進行這些操作。當一個威脅事件需要空軍太空司令部向空軍部隊尋求全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的協同配合的時候,如果不通知或者取得與北方司令部的合作的話,將會給北方司令部的指揮帶來極大的麻煩。

在中央司令部,由於對網絡作戰部隊缺乏足夠的控制,導致指揮官有時候也不能確定網絡資源是否可用。海軍負責操作大量的戰場信息柵格,在作戰區域的海軍網絡作戰部隊並不用對中央司令部的海軍部負責,他們只需要向戰區網絡作戰與安全中心報告。中央司令部的中央戰區戰區網絡作戰中心,其職責是維持和指揮所有戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰,但是它也不在海軍網絡作戰部隊的報告鏈當中,所以也常常不能獲得所有戰場信息柵格上的事態感知,目前已經有替代辦法來處理這個問題了,不過這還不能說是正式的解決辦法。

對北方司令部來說,因為網絡作戰部隊的控制權的缺乏,他們在2005年“卡特琳娜”颶風的救援工作中遇到了極大的麻煩。在那次行動中,部隊的設備在未經許可的情況下就被運送到了聯合作戰區域。這使得北方司令部無法掌握和引導物資的調動情況,更無法協同各個部隊的行動,這是個多方位的管理和操作問題。

在各個部隊都主張施行在以全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊為中心的集中化指揮構架的時候,我們有必要強調一個事實,那就是戰區司令部並不願意看到這樣的變化,他們想保持原有的他們對戰略司令部負責,擁有全球信息柵格的操作權和防禦權的機制。戰略司令部的存在對保持戰區作戰司令部在戰區和全球性事件的作戰行動中的指揮地位以及增強戰區作戰司令部與聯合參謀部的溝通都有很大的幫助。

作戰司令部和部隊方面都想從聯合作戰的層面上對網絡作戰進行集中化指揮,但是其中有幾個問題還需要討論:

1.誰負第一領導責任?

2.網絡作戰進行集中化指揮具體在哪個層面上得到體現,全球層面、戰區層面還是其他什麼層面?

3.這種調整帶來的改變是僅僅體現在戰區作戰司令部的某個部門向全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊發出請求時還是戰區作戰司令部獲得戰區內的完全指揮權和優先權?

最後,戰區作戰司令部是最終對總統負責的以完成轄區內的軍事任務為目標的機構,被派遣到戰區作戰司令部的部隊需要在其管轄權之下完成各自的任務。因此在部隊方面主張實施全球性的集中指揮的時候,他們仍然會處於戰略司令部的指揮之下這一點是不容置疑的。但是目前全球信息柵格是影響戰區作戰司令部的指揮控制能力和指揮官對部隊的指導能力的關鍵一環。沒有全球信息柵格的話,飛機不能飛行、地面部隊無法移動、艦艇不能航行,連衛星都不能提供信號。指揮官們需要獲取全球信息柵格的狀態並進行控制,就像他們需要掌握部隊的方位和狀態一樣重要。他們必須要掌握戰場信息柵格的範圍、能力和狀態,必須知道戰區以外的情況會如何影響部隊所在區域的戰場信息柵格,還必須能夠指揮和優化部隊配置以支持作戰。如果我們真的相信被描述得天花亂墜的集中化指揮會有更好的效果,那也不能忽視為戰區作戰司令部保留適當的指揮和控制權。

還有,只要戰區作戰司令部這種結構還保留著,那麼所有的軍事任務,包括那些由職能作戰司令部指揮的作戰,都必然還是會發生在戰區作戰司令部的防區內,因為所有的網絡作戰任務都必定要由一個實體單位來執行。同時,集中化指揮對於實現以網絡為中心的指揮模式以及更加有效地防禦攻擊、傳遞信息都是必要的。這種集中化指揮的概念與戰區作戰司令部要求掌握和優化戰場信息柵格的願望是不互斥的。

前進之路

要想制定出一套可行的網絡作戰指揮控制框架,必須要避免走極端,既要考慮戰區作戰司令部的需要,也要考慮建立對全球信息柵格的集中化控制的需要。在目前聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念的發展過程和網絡作戰部隊的轉型過程中,組織原則需要發揮調整各方利益的槓桿作用。為了達到這樣的目標,國防部應該做到以下幾點:

1.創建一個簡單、明確的網絡作戰指揮鏈,保證戰略司令部可以對所有的網絡作戰行動進行指揮。這就可以解決剛才提到的“誰負第一領導責任”的問題。只有當事件發生在快速變化的環境中的時候,戰區指揮控制機構才開始發揮作用。簡潔的指揮鏈可以保證參加網絡作戰的部隊知道自己應該聽從誰的指揮、應該向誰報告,在這條指揮鏈中,必須包括戰區作戰司令部。

2.可以賦予戰區作戰司令部在其防區內的指揮權:

——修正聯合司令部計劃以明確戰區作戰司令部在其防區內對網絡作戰的職責。

——修正已有的全球信息柵格網絡作戰概念,詳細說明那些處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊可以從戰區作戰司令部的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

——規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的所有命令都要通過戰區作戰司令部來執行。

這些調整可以保證戰區中的所有單位都在唯一的一條指揮鏈下行動,那就是通過戰區作戰司令部對戰略司令部負責。這也可以解決北方司令部應該對轄區負責但是又沒有指揮網絡作戰的權力的尷尬境地。

3.在每個戰區作戰司令部建立一個由中央司令部管轄的聯合網絡作戰中心,將戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區網絡作戰中心進行融合。這樣一來,每個戰區作戰司令部都將有一個在計算機空間領域的聯合作戰司令部,就像在海陸空的實體戰場上一樣。任何處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊都可以從聯合網絡作戰中心的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

4.鞏固全球信息柵格的地位,將最高控制權交給戰略司令部。目前集中化指揮的發展偏重於對參與網絡作戰的部隊的指揮,這與以網絡為中心的指揮概念背道而馳。以部隊為中心的“煙囪”式指揮系統不利於信息的傳遞和處理,讓我們離“為所有使用者提供最新、最準確的信息”的目標越來越遠。在之前的《戈德華特·尼科爾斯國防部重構法》報告中已經明確提到,組織管理和指揮控制應該由一個聯合的機構來掌控。

結束語

目前對網絡作戰的集中化指揮是一個迫切的需要。優化網絡作戰指揮機制可以幫助國防部提高效率、節約成本以及更好地分配緊缺資源。更重要的是,這樣可以讓網絡作戰部隊更加快速、準確地為指揮官提供信息,這在大規模的網絡作戰中非常重要。集中化指揮的進程不能影響到網絡作戰指揮控制的效率。這取決於全球信息柵格能否為所有參戰的單位提供足夠的信息以及指揮官是否充分利用戰區信息柵格來幫助指揮作戰。

“我們必須改變對網絡作戰問題的討論和思考模式,我們是在進行網絡“作戰”而不是網絡“管理”,所有的參戰單位必須保證自己每時每刻都準備著開戰,以保證網絡系統這一決定性的武器系統的安全”。網絡作戰是我們國家能夠贏得戰爭的關鍵一環,它可以幫助我們提供指揮和控制、縮短決策週期以及調整各戰區的資源配備。戰略司令部已經在強化網絡作戰概念方面邁出了很大的一步,這些努力還需要繼續進行下去。戰區作戰司令部必須是掌控和防護全球信息柵格的重要一環,以保證我們可以繼續取得網絡作戰的勝利。

Reference URL:  http://www.china.com.cn/military

中國浅析伊拉克战争中美军网络中心战 ~ China Analysis of Analysis of the US Central Command Network War During Iraq War

China Analysis of Analysis of the US Central Command Network War During Iraq War

浅析伊拉克战争中美军网络中心战

 

The network center war was first proposed by the US Navy in 1997, initially reflected in the war in Afghanistan, it is the core of the future of US military joint operations.

As early as 1997, the Navy put forward the concept of network-centric warfare. In 2001, the Pentagon upgraded it into the war form of the information age. In 2002, the Bush administration regarded the network center warfare capability as the focus of the military transformation and the core of the future joint operations. In view of the network center war in the war in Afghanistan in the initial results, the US military in the Iraq war to further test the new concept of combat.

· Construction of the US military network centric warfare architecture

in the Iraq war, the US military stressed that network-centric warfare, and the prominence of the role of information, with an agile and efficient digital network structure information gathering, command and control and communications, firepower three systems integration, Shortened the time from the detection of the target, the formation of operational instructions to combat the destruction of the target. The networked combat structure can improve the level of information sharing, enhance situational awareness, speed up command and decision speed, achieve combat coordination, enhance the lethality, viability and responsiveness, thus greatly improving the combat effectiveness and shorten the war process. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the network structure of the US military network structure and three-tier network structure diagram.

Full-dimensional detection network to seize the information advantage is to give full play to the network center war the first condition. The US military used almost all high-tech means of detection, the establishment of the days, air, sea and land integration of full-dimensional detection network. In addition to the outer space constitutes a huge satellite surveillance network, the air at the same time there are low altitude, hollow, high altitude three reconnaissance aircraft on the Iraqi military positions to scan, the ground also deployed a large number of sensors. It is with the full-dimensional detection network, the US military captured the asymmetric information advantage, and its conversion into asymmetric firepower advantage, arbitrary implementation of the long-range strike, not only makes the Iraqi air force can not fight, ground forces are not large-scale assembly , In a passive position. <A I = 5> flexible allegations In the Gulf War, the message in the chain after a few hours or days after the transfer, the commander to issue an attack command, so the US military even through the reconnaissance found a mobile missile launcher, can not Timely strike. In this Iraq war, the US military used a flexible allegation network to effectively integrate the allegation system, greatly reducing the combat preparation time. Through the network, the commander can at the same time with the subordinate forces at all levels to contact, while commanding scattered in the regional combat forces, the formation of the overall force.

Efficient combat network At present, the US military services are more than half of the equipment to achieve the information, these information equipment on the battlefield constitutes an interconnected, interoperable network environment, different services, deployed in different spaces of various weapons platforms and fire units Equivalent to a node in the network, you can exchange the battlefield information in a timely manner, indicating the target, in accordance with the unified fire plan to implement precision strike, more effective performance. In this battle, DDG-75 “Aegis” destroyers for the “Patriot” missiles to provide early warning information, the platform through the network to achieve an example of interoperability.

In the Iraq war, the US military with the network structure for the first time to achieve a real sense of the land, sea, air and marines combat operations. Soon after the war, the US military to effectively implement the space cooperation, air force in the use of precision guided weapons to combat the implementation of the enemy at the same time, the ground forces to provide effective close support.   Enhanced one-way transparency and situational awareness Since the war, the US military to use the most advanced and most powerful network technology, access to transparent and sustained battlefield charts. US Joint Operations Center is located in Qatar, is the command of the nerve center of war against Iraq. A variety of information after nearly 700 intelligence officers of the analysis, sent to the highest commander on the screen, six display battlefield information on a few minutes to update. Through the display can watch the battlefield situation, such as the movement of Iraqi tanks, deployed in Baghdad’s commando and in the flight section of the “Tomahawk” cruise missiles. <A I = 10> Realize the battlefield real-time Gulf War, the US air raid from the discovery to attack target takes 3 days, if the temporary target is difficult to adjust the air raid plan. In the Kosovo war, this time is shortened to 2h, making a considerable part of the air raid mission can be re-adjusted after the plane lift. Afghanistan war time to further shorten to 19min, the attack real-time greatly improved. In this war, this time control in 10min. The high-speed digital network system enables the US military to make faster and more responsive responses to the rapid changes in the battlefield, and to command and control the coordination of arms and operations efficiently and efficiently, which greatly improves the ability to respond quickly to changes in operational plans.

Try the effect-based operations and fast decisive combat Unlike the Gulf War, the US war in Iraq warn of information warfare using information-based weapons, not only to ensure victory, but also to achieve rapid decisive combat. To this end, the US military rely on the network of combat structure, the pursuit of effect-based operations, the target to combat more selective and targeted. US military straight to the goal of two: First, Saddam Hussein and other senior officials and the main defenders, “beheading action” from beginning to end throughout the war; the second is the Iraqi capital Baghdad, the US military did not like the traditional city war as the first to seize And occupation of the suburbs, and then step by step, layers of advance, but the first to capture the city’s strategic location.

Quickly hit time sensitive targets When time-sensitive targets appear on the battlefield, the time-sensitive targeting team within the Joint Air Combat Center of the Saudi Air Force Base will be able to identify the target in just a few minutes and determine the best attack. On 20 March, two mobile missile launchers in Iraq launched the “Abubel” -100 missile in Kuwaiti territory, which was discovered by the US airborne reconnaissance plane at a temporary US Air Force Base at 40 km from the launch site To fly the aircraft combat mission, the aircraft took off after the bombing of the missile launch vehicle bombing.

The first test of the digitalization of the United States after the Gulf War put forward the “digital network as the center of the war” concept, and at the end of the last century put forward the “digital battlefield and digital forces” concept. In 2001, the fourth machine division became the world’s first digital division, it can share the location and target information, has a unique battlefield access to tactical Internet capabilities, but has not yet been tested. April 13, the US military step 4 division vanguard arrived in Ticritt, to accept the actual test. <A (FBCB2)

The basic components of the system include the computer hardware / software, GPS receiver and communication interface, the main function is the main function of the system is the core of the war, To the commander, squad and individual show enemy position, send and receive combat command and logistical data, improve the battlefield situational awareness, target recognition. FBCB2 can provide e-mail service, connected with the Army’s high-level tactical communications system, allowing combatants to send a large number of news and digital reconnaissance reports to field commanders.

Tactical Internet Tactics The Internet is made up of three main tactical communications systems, namely, airborne radio systems, enhanced location reporting systems and mobile user equipment, including radio, communications satellites, mobile phones, fiber optic cables and switching facilities. Tactical Internet enables seamless connectivity between tactical users, voice, data, image and real-time video transmission, support for text, network management and security, and e-mail services, delivering fast and accurate information and instructions to each Combat unit.

“Global Command and Control System” (GCCS-J) to support the war against Iraq, the US military pre-war with the latest version of GCCS-J6. 0 The global command and control system enhances the intelligence capabilities so that the data from the common operations map can be better synchronized. GCCS-J combines the command and control systems of all arms and arms and correlates the data of unmanned aerial vehicles, terrestrial and satellite sensors to the integrated image and intelligence system, which can assist the commander in analyzing operational intelligence data, Generate target data and plan tasks.   ”Can be deployed joint command and control system” (DJCCS) In this war, the US military for the first time using the DJCCS. The system is a computer information sharing platform, with a video conference, Internet and send and receive e-mail function, the battlefield commander in the state of movement in an unprecedented way to monitor the progress of action, keep abreast of the arms and operations of the situation, the timely release of combat orders.

JFN is a network-centric combat system for the US Navy, consisting of the TES, the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Joint Operations Image Processing System, (JSIPS) to provide real-time information interaction, sensor control, target generation, mission planning and combat damage assessment capabilities, can identify and attack target time from a few hours to 10nin, to combat time-sensitive targets. TES allows the theater command center to receive target information directly from the wu1 man-machine or U-2 reconnaissance platform, and the pilots of the attack aircraft can receive the target indication data from the theater command center. GCCS provides the commander with a command and control network to issue target attack orders. JSIPS for data processing. In the future, JFN will be able to process intelligence data into targeted data more quickly, to achieve the goal of moving all people in the network, sharing common operational charts and requesting fire support.

“Tactical Input System” (TIS) TIS has been installed on the “Nimitz” aircraft carrier, and is expected to deploy to other US Navy aircraft carrier and the main amphibious ship. The system can receive digital images via terrestrial and sea-based airborne sensor platform radio lines, including optoelectronic, infrared and synthetic aperture radar images. Navy intelligence personnel can click on the interface to analyze the image, get important information, mark the potential target. TIS gives the US Navy a complete, end-to-end electronic image that greatly enhances the ability to collect, identify and target targets throughout the battlefield, reducing sensor-to-shooter time. <A (CEC) system April 7, equipped with CEC system, the US Navy “Nimitz” aircraft carrier into the designated waters, which is the first time the actual deployment of the system. CEC system is mainly composed of data distribution system and collaborative combat processor, is a network center war concept more mature a system, will make the sea air defense combat revolution, it will be aircraft carrier battle group formation in the platform (including ships and early warning aircraft ) The target detection system, the command and control system and the weapon system are organically linked to allow the platform to share all the data acquired by the various detection devices in the formation with a very short delay, so that the combat system breaks through the single ship, Within the realization of integration.

Tactical data information chain In the network center war, the tactical data information chain is one of the important means for the US military and allied forces to realize the information superiority, mainly including Link-16 and Link-11. Link-16 can transmit all kinds of tactical data information between command and control system and aircraft, missile and other weapons system platform and between combat units, effectively connect information source, accusation center and weapon system platform to realize battlefield resource sharing. The tactical data information chain using time division multiple access technology, with relative navigation and anti-jamming capability to relay the way of communication, the working frequency band 960MHz-1215MHz, the data rate of 115.2lkbps-238kbps. Link-11 operates at high frequency / UHF band, data rate is 1.8kbps, can be used for real-time exchange of early warning information, air / ground / underwater target data, control instructions and the status of the unit weapons, and has a certain degree of confidentiality , The entire network under the control of the network control station network communication, the use of master-slave polling, can be over-the-horizon transmission.

The analysis of the characteristics of the US military development network center war shows that the concept of network-centric warfare has gradually become a new form of combat for the US military in the 21st century. In the development and application of network-centric warfare concept, the US military showed the following characteristics:

In the Iraq war, the US military uses a variety of detection and communication means to make the entire battlefield transparent, from beginning to end are information-led. This shows that in the future war who can have the advantage in the detection and communication, to seize the right to information, who will be able to achieve greater battlefield initiative.

Pay attention to the digitalization of weapons and equipment, information construction Digital is the basis of network-based warfare, is expected to US military services in 2010-2020 to achieve full digital. Weapon and equipment information is to achieve the network as the center of the joint operations of the core, the US military will be further in the world to take the lead in the information age of information technology.   To strengthen the network center warfare related equipment R & D The US military effective implementation of the network center war relies on in recent years targeted research and development of various related equipment, such as joint fire network, collaborative combat capability, tactical Internet, tactical input system, global command and control system, Data information chain and so on.

(Source: “National Defense Technology” 2003 the first 18)

Original Mandarin Chinese:

中国日报网站消息:网络中心战最早由美国海军于1997年提出,在阿富汗战争中初步体现出优越性,它是美军未来联合作战的核心。

海军早在1997年就提出网络中心战概念,2001年五角大楼将其提升为信息时代的战争形态,2002年布什政府将网络中心战能力视为军队转型的重点和未来联合作战的核心。鉴于网络中心战在阿富汗战争中初见成效,美军在伊拉克战争中进一步检验了这一全新的作战概念。


·美军构建网络化作战结构

在伊拉克战争中,美军强调网络中心战,突出信息的地位和作用,借助灵敏高效的数字化网络结构将信息收集、指挥控制与通信、火力打击三大系统融为一体,缩短了从侦察发现目标、形成作战指令到打击摧毁目标的时间。网络化的作战结构可提高信息共享水平,增强态势感知能力,加快指挥和决策速度,实现作战协同,增强杀伤力、生存能力和响应能力,从而极大地提高作战效能,缩短战争进程。图1和图2分别显示了美军构建的网络中心战的网络结构原理图和三层网络结构图。

全维的探测网 夺取信息优势是充分发挥网络中心战的首要条件。美军动用了几乎所有高技术探测手段,建立了天、空、海、陆一体化全维探测网。除在外层空间构成庞大的卫星监视网外,空中同时有低空、中空、高空三个层次的各种侦察飞机对伊军阵地进行扫描,地面上也部署了大量传感器。正是借助全维的探测网,美军夺取了不对称的信息优势,并将其转化为不对称的火力优势,随心所欲地实施远程打击,不但使得伊拉克空军无法作战,地面部队也不敢大规模集结,陷于被动境地。

灵活的指控网 在海湾战争中,信息在指控链中需经过数小时或数天的传递后,指挥官才能下达攻击命令,因此美军即使通过侦察发现了机动导弹发射车,也无法及时实施打击。这次伊拉克战争中,美军利用灵活的指控网有效整合了指控系统,大大缩短打击准备时间。通过网络,指挥官可以同时与下属各级部队进行联络,同时指挥分散在各地域的作战部队,形成整体合力。

高效的作战网 目前,美军各军种均有一半以上的装备实现了信息化,这些信息化装备在战场上构成互联、互通的网络环境,不同军种、部署在不同空间的各种武器平台和火力单元相当于网络中的一个节点,可以及时交换战场信息,指示目标,按照统一的火力计划实施精确打击,更有效地发挥效能。在这次作战中,DDG-75“宙斯盾”驱逐舰为“爱国者”导弹提供预警信息,是平台通过网络化途径实现互通的一个例证。

·伊拉克战争中网络中心战的具体应用

检验联合作战的协同性 伊拉克战争中,美军借助网络化结构首次实现了真正意义上的陆、海、空和海军陆战队协同作战。开战不久,美军就有效地实施空地协同,空中力量在使用精确制导武器对敌军实施打击的同时,对地面部队提供有效的近距离支援。

增强单向透明度和态势感知能力 自开战以来,美军运用最先进、最强大的网络技术,获取透明持续的战场态势图。美军联合作战中心位于卡塔尔,是指挥对伊作战的神经中枢。各种信息经过近700名情报人员的分析,传送到最高指挥官的显示屏上,6个显示屏上的战场信息几分钟就更新一次。通过显示屏可观察战场情况,如运动中的伊拉克坦克、部署在巴格达的突击队以及处于飞行段的“战斧”巡航导弹。

实现战场实时化 海湾战争中,美军空袭从发现到攻击目标需要3天,若临时发现目标时很难及时调整空袭计划。在科索沃战争中,这一时间缩短到2h,使得相当一部分空袭任务可以在飞机升空后重新调整。阿富汗战争时这一时间进一步缩短到19min,攻击的实时性大大提高。而在这次战争中,这一时间控制在1Omin内。高速数字化网络系统使美军能对战场瞬息变化作出更快、更灵敏的反应,及时高效地指挥、控制与协调各军兵种的行动,大大提高了临时改变作战计划时的快速反应能力。

尝试基于效果的作战和快速决定性作战 与海湾战争不同,此次伊拉克战争美军提出用信息化武器装备打信息化战争,不仅要求确保胜利,而且要求实现快速决定性作战。为此,美军依靠网络化作战结构,追求基于效果的作战,对目标打击更有选择性和针对性。美军直取的目标有两个:一是萨达姆和其他高官以及主要捍卫者,“斩首行动”由始至终贯穿整个战争;二是伊拉克首都巴格达,美军没有像传统的城市战那样首先夺取和占领市郊,然后步步为营,层层推进,而是首先夺取市内的战略要地。

快速打击时间敏感目标 当战场上出现时间敏感目标时,美军在沙特空军基地的联合空中作战中心内的时间敏感瞄准小组只用几分钟时间就可准确识别目标,决定最佳攻击行动。3月20日,伊拉克两辆机动导弹发射车刚向科威特境内发射“阿巴比尔”-100导弹,即被美国空中侦察机发现,在距发射地点40km的一个美空军基地立即临时调整了几架待飞飞机的作战任务,飞机起飞后投掷炸弹将导弹发射车炸毁。

首次检验数字化师 美国在海湾战争后提出了“以数字化网络为中心的战争”概念,并于上世纪末率先提出了“数字化战场和数字化部队”的构想。2001年,第4机步师成为世界上第一支数字化师,它可以共享位置和目标信息,具有独一无二的战场接入战术因特网的能力,但尚未经过实战检验。4月13日,美军第4机步师先头部队到达提克里特,接受实战检验。

·伊拉克战争中网络中心战的部分装备

“21世纪旅及旅以下作战指挥控制系统”(FBCB2) 该系统的基本组件包括计算机硬/软件、GPS接收机和通信接口,主要功能是向指挥官、小分队和单兵显示敌我位置、收发作战命令和后勤数据、提高战场态势感知能力、进行目标识别等。FBCB2可提供电子邮件服务,与陆军的高层战术通信系统相连接,允许作战人员向战地指挥官发送大量消息和数字化侦察报告。

战术互联网 战术互联网由陆军3个主要的战术通信系统,即机载无线电系统、增强型定位报告系统和移动用户设备互联而成,包括无线电、通信卫星、移动电话、光缆和交换设施。战术互联网能够实现战术级用户间的无缝连接,提供语音、数据、图像和实时视频传输,支持文电、网络管理和安全以及电子邮件业务,可快速、准确地将战地情报和指示传递给每个作战单元。

“全球指挥与控制系统”(GCCS -J) 为支持对伊作战,美军战前采用了最新版本的GCCS-J6.0全球指挥和控制系统,提高了情报能力,使通用作战图传来的数据可以更好地同步。 GCCS-J联合了所有军兵种的指挥与控制系统,并使无人机、地面和卫星传感器的数据相互关联并传递到图像与情报综合系统,后者能够帮助指挥官分析作战情报数据、管理和生成目标数据以及规划任务。

“可部署的联合指挥与控制系统”(DJCCS) 在这次战争中,美军首次实战使用了DJCCS。该系统是一个计算机信息共享平台,具有召开电视会议、上网和收发邮件功能,可使战场指挥官在运动状态下以前所未有的方式监控行动进展,随时了解各军兵种作战情况,及时下达作战命令。

“联合火力网”(JFN) JFN是美海军的一个以网络为中心的作战系统,由“战术利用系统”(TES)、“全球指挥与控制系统”(GCCS)和“联合作战图像处理系统”(JSIPS)组成,能够提供实时信息交互、传感器控制、目标产生、任务计划制定以及作战毁伤评估功能,可将识别和攻击目标的时间从数小时减少到10nin,打击时间敏感目标。TES可使战区指挥中心直接从wu1人机或U -2等侦察平台接收目标信息,攻击机的飞行员能从战区指挥中心接收目标指示数据。GCCS为指挥官提供下达目标攻击指令的指挥控制网络。JSIPS进行数据处理。未来,JFN将能更快地把情报数据处理成瞄准数据,用于打击移动目标,最终实现使所有人员都置身于网络中,共享通用作战态势图和请求火力支援。

“战术输入系统”(TIS) TIS已安装在“尼米兹”号航母上,并有望部署到美海军其他航母和主要两栖舰上。该系统可通过陆基和海基机载传感器平台的无线电线路接收数字式图像,包括光电、红外及合成孔径雷达图像。海军情报人员可通过点击界面分析图像,获得重要信息,标记潜在目标。TIS使美海军拥有了完整的、端对端的电子图像,极大地提高在整个战场上搜集、识别和打击目标的能力,减少传感器到射手的时间。

“协同作战能力”(CEC)系统 4月7日,装有CEC系统的美海军“尼米兹”号航母进入指定海域,这是该系统首次实战部署。 CEC系统主要由数据分发系统和协同作战处理器组成,是网络中心战概念比较成熟的一个系统,将使海上防空作战发生革命性变化,它将航母战斗群编队中各平台(包括舰艇和预警机等)所装载的目标探测系统、指挥控制系统和武器系统有机联系起来,允许各平台以极短的延时共享编队内各种探测设备获取的所有数据,使作战系统突破单舰的限制,在编队内实现集成。

战术数据信息链 在网络中心战中,战术数据信息链是美军及盟军实现信息优势的重要手段之一,主要包括Link-16和Link -11。Link-16可在指挥控制系统与飞机、导弹等武器系统平台之间以及在各作战单元之间传输各种战术数据信息,有效连接信息源、指控中心与武器系统平台,实现战场资源共享。该战术数据信息链采用时分多址技术,具有相对导航和抗干扰能力,以中继方式进行通信,工作频段为960MHz-1215MHz,数据速率为115.2lkbps-238kbps。Link-11在高频/特高频频段工作,数据速率为1.8kbps,可用于实时交换预警信息、空中/地面/水下目标数据、控制指令以及各单元武器状况信息,并具有一定的保密能力,整个网络在网络控制站的管制下组网通信,采用主从式轮询,可进行超视距传输。

·美军发展网络中心战的特点

分析表明,网络中心战概念已逐渐成为美军面向21世纪的新型作战形式。在发展和应用网络中心战概念上,美军表现出以下特点:

建立全维的探测网,夺取制信息权 伊拉克战争中,美军运用多种探测和通信手段使整个战场透明化,从始至终都以信息为主导。这说明在未来战争中谁能够在探测和通信上占有优势,夺取制信息权,谁就能够取得更大的战场主动权。

注重武器装备的数字化、信息化建设 数字化是网络中心战的基础,预计美国各军种将在2010-2020年间全面实现数字化。武器装备的信息化是实现以网络为中心的联合作战的核心,美军将进一步在世界上率先建成信息时代的信息化军队。

加强网络中心战相关装备研发 此次美军有效实施网络中心战依赖于近年有针对性地研发各种相关装备,如联合火力网、协同作战能力、战术互联网、战术输入系统、全球指挥与控制系统、数据信息链等。(来源:《国防科技》2003年第18期)

 

中國網絡衝突討論,信息與研究 // Chinese Cyber Conflict Discussions, Information & Research