Tag Archives: Chinese Military Analsysis of US Military Cyber Warfare Capability

General Qiao Liang: Confident Cyber Leadership Wins the future “network space war” // 喬亮將軍:充滿信心的網絡領導贏得了未來的“網絡太空戰爭”

General Qiao Liang: Confident Cyber Leadership Wins the future “network space war” //

喬亮將軍:充滿信心的網絡領導贏得了未來的“網絡太空戰爭”

For nearly half a century, electronic technology and information technology have developed at an impressive speed, and thus have completely changed the style of modern warfare. Although people are accustomed to the sorting of land, sea and air when they talk about the dimensions of war, from the military technical level, the “network warfare” capability of “electronic warfare” and “cyber warfare” has no doubt that it has come to the fore. Become the first combat power. Who can dominate the electronic warfare, who can dominate the battlefield. It is a pity that this conclusion has not yet been universally accepted by the military.

Carving a sword for a sword is a portrayal of the evolution of people’s understanding and the development of things. Today, when this round of military revolution is marked by electronic technology and chip technology, as the technology matures and the potential approaches the limit and comes to an end, the soldiers of most countries have a small tube and a smaller chip. It is possible to change the style of war and not yet fully prepared for the spirit and knowledge. This is an irony for human beings living in the age of information, especially those armed with informatized weapons.

The individual representation of the appearance of the world makes people intuitively divide the whole world into parts to understand and understand. Even though electronic technology and information technology have long integrated the whole world into the grid space and welded into a “domain”, people are still accustomed to split it into different “domain” blocks. For example, many soldiers who are ignorant of traditional thinking take the battle space into five major dimensions: land, sea, air, sky, and electricity, and think that they will fight in these five dimensions. The grid space battlefield, in their view, is only one of them. Even in the concept of joint operations, which attempted to bring the five-dimensional space into one, the space and space warfare is only one of the combat areas and combat styles. It is completely unknown that the world has been “informed.” Such lag thinking can’t keep up with the pace of technological leap: the boat is far from the lake, but the sword sinks to the bottom of the lake. Those who can win and win in the future battlefield must be the army that observes and thinks, operates and controls all battlefields as a whole. Only in this way can we find the key to open the door to victory: who can control the grid space, who can control the battlefield; who can prevail in the space war, who is the winner of the war. This is the general trend that modern warfare can not be reversed today.

Electronic warfare (which has evolved into information warfare or cyberspace warfare today) is a prerequisite for all modern battles, battles and even wars. In contrast, air supremacy, sea power, and even land and power, have handed over the first battle of the future battlefield to the power of the grid. Moreover, the struggle for the right to heaven is itself part of the power of the network. In Deng Shiping’s words, modern warfare, “there is no air superiority, and no one can beat it.” Yes, in the future war, there is no power to make electricity in the net, and nothing can be beaten.

Today, it is proposed to use the “air-sea battle” concept to contain China’s US military. It is a military machine that is almost fully informatized. Therefore, the US military knows that informatization is its strength and its shortcomings. Short and short, whoever has the advantage of space and space warfare, who can restrain the US military. Some people may ask, is it from a military point of view that the space warfare is so important that people think it is more important than firepower? Yes, this is the author’s answer. Because when your opponent has been fully dimensioned, it will either be better than the opponent’s network space warfare, or defeat the war first, and then the firepower war will only destroy the opponents who are still unwilling to admit defeat. The process of physical digestion.

Why is the space warfare so important? In fact, all of our main rivals have their strengths in all-dimensional informationization, and all their shortcomings are over-informatization. The shortcoming of informationization is that there is no chip-free, thus forming chip dependence. The chip makes the weapon platform ammunition stronger, but it is also extremely fragile. An electromagnetic pulse bomb can destroy all electronic components within its explosive coverage. This kind of scene makes the opponent who is armed with the chip to the teeth very scared. For us, what we fear the opponents should be our priority to focus on development.

If you play against a full-dimensional informatization opponent, the opponent is most worried about: one is attacked by the network, and the other is destroyed by the sky-based system. Because this will make the hardware advantages of all weapon platforms meaningless. Although our opponents also have this ability, once both sides use this ability to smash opponents, it means that the two sides will return to World War II. At that time, who has the advantage of population, who has the advantage of resources, who has the advantage of manufacturing, who has the advantage of war.

Seeing this clearly helps us to get rid of some kind of paradox: the more we understand the military system of our opponents, the more we worry about the gap in our military system. The more we recognize the gap, the more we want to learn to catch up with our opponents. The result is what the opponent has, I There is also something to be. In the end, I forced myself to a dead end with the strength of the opponent and the length of the opponent. How can this road lead us to “can fight, win and win”? Ancient and modern Chinese and foreign, whereever wins, all of them are short of my enemy, even if it is hard, it is the longest attack of my enemy. There is a winner who wins the enemy with the enemy. Moreover, winning the war in the future cannot be achieved at all costs. For China, there should be a requirement that is as important as victory. Weapons and equipment development and operational plan development must consider how to reduce costs. Never have anything for the opponent, we must have something. You can’t do it with the Dragon King, and you can’t become a local tyrant. You can’t compare it with the Dragon King. Today, we have some cognitive defects on how to win the overall war of local war under informatization conditions. We always consciously and unconsciously think that playing high-tech wars is a high-cost war, and we always want to compare costs with our competitors. And fight costs.

In fact, we can completely change the way of thinking, that is to take the low-cost route. There are no heavy aircraft carriers, there is no X37, there is no global fast strike system, the opponent does not care. It only cares if you can destroy its satellite system and lick its network system. After all, the tools and means of attacking satellite weapons and electromagnetic pulse bombs are not very expensive and scarce, and their effects will be low-cost and high-yield. We can’t help but fall into the arms race with our opponents because we are worried about the gap between ourselves and our opponents.

The Americans said in the “air-sea battle” concept that “we will drag China into the competition with us in this way, so that the Chinese will put more energy into the production of such missiles such as Dongfeng 21D. Then use a lot of bait and deception to force the Chinese to consume these weapons in a meaningful direction.” In this regard, someone in the country wrote an article reminding us that “we must prevent falling into the trap of the United States.” This is not wrong in itself, but it still belongs to only know one, and I don’t know the other. It is important to know that after such articles come out, it is very likely that our understanding will produce new deviations, because there are “trap traps (ie double traps)” in the above-mentioned American discourse. First, it attempts to lure the Chinese army into the trap of an arms race. If you compete with the US military, you will spend a lot of money and resources to follow the US military and not to surpass; secondly, if you realize that this is a trap and give up the competition, you will immediately fall into another trap: since giving up the arms race Waste martial arts. For China, if we are not willing to compete with our opponents and we are not willing to squander martial arts, what should we do? The conclusion is that we can only go our own way.

To develop our own strengths and develop the things that are most beneficial to me, it is best to use my strength and defeat the enemy. At least it must be my long, the enemy’s long. I can’t do it with my short enemy, and the enemy’s long enemy will not do the same. With the enemy’s long attacking enemy, you will never win.

Take a look at the main design of the “Air-Sea Battle”: the opening is to hit your space-based system, let you blind; then hit the “reconnaissance war”, let you call you; then come to officially start a regular battle with you.

Under such circumstances, what should we do? It is a passive move, the soldiers will block, the water will cover the earth, or will it be my strength, in exchange for low-cost means, in exchange for the opponent’s high-value goal? Of course, the latter. To do this, we must first have three capabilities:

The first is satellite anti-missile capability. This ability will lead to a serious reliance on informatized opponents, making them blind, defamatory, and dumb, so that they can only return to the level of World War II to compete with conventional forces.

The second is the ability to remotely play. You must ensure that you have the ability to sink high-priced targets like aircraft carriers. If such a high-priced target is sunk, it will seriously undermine the confidence of investors around the world against the opponent, so that the capital does not dare to invest in it again, resulting in a serious war financing dilemma for the opponent. This is the national weakness of the opponent’s combat planners who are not aware of it. The confidence of the sinking aircraft carrier in global investors will be a huge blow, which will interrupt the opponent’s global capital chain.

The third is that there must be a network space combat capability. Especially the ability to attack any network system of the opponent. If China and the powerful opponents are really fighting, you must demonstrate your ability and determination to attack and smash all of the grid system from the very beginning. This is a necessary way to contain war by deterrence.

The reason is always easier said than done. How to get the power of the network in the future war, or to offset the advantage of the opponent’s network warfare? It is necessary to make yourself technological progress. But what is more necessary is the progress of thinking. The long history of evolution proves that human beings are not always in a state of thought progress in the coordinate system of time. Degradation will happen from time to time. The degradation of thinking is sad, but consciously pull the pair back to the “old battlefield”, that is, to offset the opponent’s informational combat capability, so that the opponent’s technical advantage is lost, and thus with us to return to a certain historical stage of combat, At that time, it is a feasible idea to give full play to my own advantages.

(The author is a professor at the National Defense University)

Original Mandarin Chinese:

近半個世紀以來,電子技術、信息技術以令人瞠目的速度迅猛發展,並因此全面改變了現代戰爭的風貌。儘管人們在談論戰爭的維度時,習慣於陸海空天電的排序,但從軍事技術層面講,“電子戰”“網絡戰”所構成的“網電空間戰”能力,卻毫無疑問已後來居上,成為第一戰鬥力。誰能主導電子戰,誰就能主宰戰場。可惜的是,這一結論至今還未能被各國軍隊普遍接受。

刻舟求劍,是對人們的認識滯後於事物的演變和發展的形象寫照。時至今日,當以電子技術和芯片技術為標誌的這一輪軍事革命,因技術日臻成熟,潛力逼近極限而漸近尾聲時,大多數國家的軍人對一個小小的電子管和更小的芯片就能改變戰爭的風貌,還沒做好充分接納的精神和知識準備。這對生活在信息化時代的人類,特別是掌握著信息化武器的軍隊來說,不能不說是一種諷刺。

世界外觀所呈現的個體性表徵,使人們憑直覺把整個世界區分成各個部分去認知和理解。即便電子技術、信息技術早已把整個世界都納入了網電空間而焊接成了一“域”,人們仍然習慣於將其切分成不同的“域”塊。如不少囿於傳統思維的軍人,就想當然地把作戰空間切分成陸、海、空、天、電五大維度,並以為自己將在這五種維度下作戰。而網電空間戰場,在他們看來,只不過是其中的一維。甚至在聯合作戰這一試圖把五維空間打通成一體的概念中,網電空間戰也只是其中一種作戰領域和作戰樣式而已,全然不懂大千世界已然被“信息化”了。這樣的滯後思維不可能跟上技術飛躍的步伐:舟已遠離湖面,劍卻沉在了湖底。能在未來戰場上穩操勝券者,一定是把全部戰場作為一個整體觀察和思考、操作並控制的軍隊。只有如此,才能找到打開胜利之門的鑰匙:誰能控製網電空間,誰就能控制戰場;誰能在網電空間戰中佔上風,誰就是戰爭的贏家。這是現代戰爭發展到今天誰也無法逆轉的大趨勢。

電子戰(今日已衍化成為信息戰或網電空間戰)是一切現代戰鬥、戰役乃至戰爭的前提。與此相比,制空權、制海權,甚至制陸權與製天權,都已向製網電權拱手交出了未來戰場的第一制權。何況制天權的爭奪本身就是製網電權的一部分。套用鄧小平的一句話說,現代戰爭,“沒有製空權,什麼仗都打不下來”。是的,未來戰爭,沒有製網電權,什麼仗都打不下來。

今天,提出要用“空海一體戰”構想遏制中國的美軍,是一架幾乎全面信息化了的軍事機器。因此,美軍深知信息化是其所長,亦是其所短。短就短在誰具備網電空間戰優勢,誰就能製約美軍。有人會問,難道從軍事角度講,網電空間戰真的那麼重要,以至於讓人認為比火力硬殺傷更重要嗎?是的,這正是筆者的回答。因為當你的對手已全維信息化後,它要么先勝於與對手的網電空間戰,要么先敗於此戰,其後的火力戰,只是對還不肯認輸的對手進行從心理摧毀到物理消解的過程。

為什麼網電空間戰如此重要?實際上,我們的主要對手其全部的長處就在於全維信息化,而其全部的短處也在於過度信息化。信息化的短處就是無一處無芯片,從而形成芯片依賴。芯片讓武器平台彈藥如虎添翼變得強大,而其自身卻也極端脆弱。一枚電磁脈衝炸彈,就可以讓在它爆炸覆蓋範圍內的所有電子元件被毀失能。這種場景讓用芯片武裝到牙齒的對手很恐懼。而對我們來說,讓對手恐懼的東西,就應該是我們要優先側重發展的武器。

如果跟全維信息化對手交手,對手最擔心的是:一被網攻癱瘓網絡,二被天戰摧毀天基系統。因為這將使其一切武器平台的硬件優勢都變得沒有意義。儘管我們的對手同樣也有這種能力,但一旦雙方都動用這種能力將對手癱瘓,那就意味著,對陣雙方將一起退回二戰水平。那時,誰具有人口優勢,誰有資源優勢,誰有製造業優勢,誰就有戰爭優勢。

看清這一點,有助於我們擺脫某種悖論:越了解對手的軍事系統,就越擔心自身軍事系統存在的差距,越承認差距,就越想學習追趕對手,結果就是對手有什麼,我就也要有什麼。最終把自己逼上一條以對手之長,攻對手之長的死路。這條路怎麼可能把我們引向“能打仗,打勝仗”?古今中外,凡勝仗,無一不是以我之長攻敵之短,即便是硬仗也是以我之長攻敵之長,未見有以敵之長攻敵之長而取勝者。何況,取勝於未來戰爭,不能以不惜一切代價獲勝為目的。對於中國來說,還應該有一個與勝利同樣重要的要求,武器裝備發展,作戰方案製定,都要考慮如何降低成本。決不能對手有什麼,我們就一定要有什麼。乞丐跟龍王爺比寶不行,變成土豪了,也不能跟龍王爺比寶。今天,我們對如何打贏信息化條件下局部戰爭的整體想法是存在某種認知缺陷的,總是自覺不自覺地以為打高技術戰爭就是打高成本戰爭,總想和對手一樣去比成本、拼成本。

實際上,我們完全可以換一種思路,那就是走低成本路線。有沒有重型航母,有沒有X37,有沒有全球快速打擊系統,對手並不在乎。它只在乎你能不能摧毀它的衛星系統,癱瘓它的網絡系統。畢竟,攻擊衛星武器和電磁脈衝炸彈的工具和手段都不是很昂貴、很稀缺,而其效果將是低成本、高收益。我們斷不能因為擔心自己與對手的差距,就不由自主地陷入跟對手的軍備競賽中。

美國人在“空海一體戰”構想中說,“我們要通過這個方式,把中國拖入到與我們的競賽,讓中國人把更多的精力都投入到東風21D等諸如此類導彈的生產中去,然後用大量的誘餌和欺騙迫使中國人大量地把這些武器消耗到沒有意義的方向”。對此,國內有人寫了一篇文章,提醒“我們要防止掉入美國陷阱”,這本身沒有錯,但仍然屬於只知其一,不知其二。要知道,此類文章出來以後,很有可能導致我們的認識產生新的偏差,因為上述美國人的話語中存在“陷阱的陷阱(即雙重陷阱)”。首先,它企圖將中國軍隊引誘到軍備競賽的陷阱中來。如果你跟美軍進行競賽,你就會耗費大量財力物力尾隨美軍而不得超越;其次,如果你意識到這是陷阱而放棄競賽,你又立刻就會掉入另一個陷阱:由於放棄軍備競賽而自廢武功。對中國來說,如果我們既不願意跟對手競賽,又不願意自廢武功,那我們應該怎麼辦?結論是,我們只能走自己的路。

發展我們自己之長,發展對我最有利的東西,最好以我之長,克敵之短。起碼也要以我之長,克敵之長。以我之短克敵之長不行,以敵之長克敵之長同樣也不行。以敵之長攻敵之長,你將永無勝算。

看看“空海一體戰”最主要的設計:開場就是打擊你的天基系統,讓你致盲;接著打“偵察戰”,讓你致聾;然後才來跟你正式開打常規戰。

這種情形下,我們怎麼辦?是被動接招,兵來將擋,水來土掩?還是揚我所長,以低成本手段,換取對手高價值目標?當然是後者。為此,我們必須先具備三種能力:

第一種是衛星反導能力。這種能力將一擊致癱嚴重依賴信息化的對手,使其致盲、致聾、致啞,從而只能與你一道退回二戰水平去比拼常規戰力。

第二種是遠程精打能力。必須確保你有能力擊沉類似航母這樣的高價目標。這樣的高價目標如果被擊沉,將沉重地打擊全世界投資人對對手的信心,使資本不敢再投向它,造成對手嚴重的戰爭融資困境。這是對手的作戰計劃人員沒有意識到的國家軟肋。擊沉航母對全球投資人的信心將是一個巨大的打擊,從而將打斷對手的全球資本循環鏈。

第三種是必須有網電空間作戰能力。特別是對對手的任何網絡系統攻擊的能力。如果中國和遠比自己強大的對手真的發生戰爭,你必須從一開始就展示你有攻擊並癱瘓其全部網電系統的能力和決心,這是用威懾遏制戰爭的必要方式。

道理,總是說起來容易做起來難。如何在未來戰爭中拿到製網電權,或者對沖掉對手的網電戰優勢?讓自己獲得技術進步是必須的。但更必須的,是思維的進步。漫長的進化史證明,人類在時間的坐標系上,並不總是處於思維進步狀態。退化,會不時發生。思維的退化是可悲的,但有意識地把對手拉回“舊戰場”,即對沖掉對手的信息化作戰能力,讓對手的技術優勢盡失,從而與我們一道退回某一歷史階段的作戰水平,屆時,盡情發揮我自身優勢,則不失為一種可行的思路。

(作者係國防大學教授)

Original Referring URL: http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-12/

 

America Instigating Cyber Warfare – How China Will Realize the Chinese Dream in the Age of American Cyber ​​Warfare // 美國煽動網絡戰 – 中國如何在美國網絡戰時代實現中國夢

America Instigating Cyber Warfare – How China Will Realize the Chinese Dream in the Age of American Cyber ​​Warfare //

美國煽動網絡戰 – 中國如何在美國網絡戰時代實現中國夢

If a power-state wants to realize the dream of the empire, it was a world war 100 years ago, a nuclear war 50 years ago, and now it is a cyber war.

How does the United States face the cyber war era?

來源:中國國防報·軍事特刊作者:郝葉力責任編輯:黃楊海

Core tips

In recent years, the United States has taken a number of measures to accelerate the development of cyber warfare. After the Obama administration took office, it continued to play the “eight-one” “combination boxing” to improve its cyber warfare capabilities.

Because the United States adheres to the concept of absolute security in cyberspace, this will not only aggravate the insecurity of the United States, but will also induce instability in the objective, resulting in instability of the cyberspace situation.

Recently, foreign media reported the latest progress of the US military in cyber warfare: the US military has spent five years developing advanced cyber weapons and digital combat capabilities, and these weapons may soon be deployed more publicly and will be considered for the next few years. “Network militia.” The US’s measures to accelerate the development of cyber war deserve our high attention and in-depth study.

The era of cyber war has arrived

Today, one-third of the world’s population uses the Internet, and billions of people accept the services provided by the Internet. The arrival of cyber warfare is an inevitable historical necessity. The network revolution is also reshaping the new pattern of world political, economic, social and cultural development.

Cyber ​​warfare in many fields. Cyber ​​warfare has broken through the traditional warfare field, making war a veritable development in economic, political, and military fields. First, the cyber warfare in the economic field is aggressive. In particular, cyber warfare in the financial sector has been described as “a modern version of the bank.” Second, the cyber war in the political arena has intensified. Social networking as a tool for political change represents an amazing power. From the turmoil in West Asia and North Africa to the “Autumn Wall Street”, social networks are everywhere to participate and help. Under the conditions of informationization, the destructive power of network penetration even exceeds military intervention. The third is the initial test of the cyber warfare in the military field. The network has changed the traditional war mode, from the Gulf War embedded virus attack to the Russian-Georgian conflict to use the network “bee colony” attack, each war has a network war “shadow.”

Cyber ​​warfare has become the “atomic bomb” of the information age. The research of RAND Corporation puts forward: “The strategic war in the industrial era is nuclear war, and the strategic war in the information age is mainly cyber warfare.” Why can cyber warfare compare with nuclear war? Because the two have similarities in the “fission reaction” and the destruction effect. If the computer network is abstracted into the weaving of points and lines, the point is the computer and the router, the line is the network channel and the TCP/IP transmission protocol extending in all directions, and the network viruses such as Trojans and worms are the potential “uranium” in the network. Why do viruses in the network cause fission? There are two main reasons: First, the inherent defects of the computer architecture provide a “soil and hotbed” for the virus. The weapon of cyber warfare is a virus such as a Trojan, a worm (which is essentially a malicious code). The reason why malicious code can be raging is because there are exploitable vulnerabilities in the system, and the source of the vulnerability lies in the inherent shortcomings of the von Neumann architecture used by computers. The principle is to store data and programs in the read and write memory (RAM), the data can be read and written, and the program can be changed. In the cybersecurity incidents that occur in today’s world, more than 50% of the exploits that are exploited are mainly due to this mechanism. Second, the open shared Internet provides a path and bridge for the fission of the virus. “Network warfare: The next threat to national security and countermeasures” clearly states that there are five major flaws in the Internet: fragile domain name service systems, unverified routing protocols, malicious traffic without censorship, decentralized network structures, and Clear text transmission. Once these defects are exploited, they may form a flood of attacks on the network, which acts like a weapon of mass destruction, and is as powerful as the “atomic bomb” of the industrial age.

In the process of changing times and the evolution of war, who can take the lead in shifting the focus from the traditional field of human activities to new important areas, who can gain huge strategic benefits. It can be said that mastering the right to make nets in the 21st century is as decisive as mastering the sea power in the 19th century and mastering the air power in the 20th century.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

強權國家要想實現帝國夢想,100年前是發動世界大戰,50年前是籌劃核大戰,現在則是策動網絡戰

美國如何迎戰網絡戰時代

核心提示

近年來,美國採取多項舉措加快網絡戰的發展。奧巴馬政府上台以後,更是連續打出“八個一”的“組合拳”,提升網絡戰能力。

由於美國在網絡空間秉持絕對安全的理念,這不僅會加劇美國的不安全感,而且還會在客觀上誘發不安定因素,造成網絡空間態勢的不穩定。

近日,外媒報導美軍在網絡戰方面的最新進展:美軍已經花了5年時間開發先進的網絡武器和數字作戰能力,可能很快就會將這些武器進行更公開部署,並考慮未來數年建立“網絡民兵”。美國加快網絡戰發展的舉措值得我們高度重視和深入研究。

網絡戰時代已經到來

今天,全世界1/3人口使用國際互聯網,數十億人接受著網絡提供的各種服務。網絡戰的到來是不可阻擋的歷史必然,網絡革命也正在重塑世界政治、經濟、社會、文化發展的新格局。

多個領域迎來網絡戰。網絡戰已經突破傳統戰爭領域,使戰爭名副其實地在經濟、政治、軍事多個領域展開。一是經濟領域的網絡戰攻勢凌厲。特別是金融領域的網絡戰,被形容為“現代版的搶銀行”。二是政治領域的網絡戰愈演愈烈。社交網絡作為政治變革的工具體現了驚人的威力。從西亞北非動亂到“華爾街之秋”,處處都有社交網絡參與其中、推波助瀾。信息化條件下,網絡滲透的破壞力甚至超過軍事干預。三是軍事領域的網絡戰初試鋒芒。網絡改變了傳統戰爭模式,從海灣戰爭預埋病毒攻擊、到俄格衝突動用網絡“蜂群”攻擊,每一場戰爭都有網絡戰“影子”。

網絡戰成為信息時代的“原子彈”。蘭德公司研究提出:“工業時代的戰略戰是核戰爭,信息時代的戰略戰主要是網絡戰。”網絡戰為什麼能與核戰爭比肩?因為二者在“裂變反應”和破壞效果上極具相似之處。如果把計算機網絡抽象為點和線的編織,點就是計算機和路由器,線則是四通八達的網絡信道和TCP/IP傳輸協議,而木馬、蠕蟲等網絡病毒正是網絡中潛在的“鈾”。網絡中的病毒為什麼會產生裂變?主要有兩個原因:一是計算機體系結構的固有缺陷給病毒的產生提供了“土壤和溫床”。網絡戰的武器是木馬、蠕蟲(其實質是惡意代碼)等病毒。惡意代碼之所以能夠肆虐,是因為系統內存在可利用的漏洞,而漏洞的本源在於計算機採用的馮·諾依曼體系結構的先天不足。其原理是把數據和程序都統一存儲在讀寫存儲器(RAM)內,數據是可以讀寫的,程序也是可以改變的。當今世界發生的網絡安全事件,50%以上被利用的漏洞主要是源於這個機理。二是開放共享的互聯網為病毒的裂變提供了途徑和橋樑。 《網絡戰:國家安全的下一個威脅及對策》一書明確指出,互聯網存在五大缺陷:脆弱的域名服務系統、不經過驗證的路由協議、不進行審查的惡意流量、非集中式的網絡結構以及明文傳送。這些缺陷一旦被利用,就可能形成對網絡的攻擊洪流,其作用類似於大規模毀傷性武器,威力不亞於工業時代的“原子彈”。

在時代更迭、戰爭演變的進程中,誰能夠率先把關注點從人類活動的傳統領域轉入新的重要領域,誰就能獲得巨大戰略利益。可以說,21世紀掌握製網權與19世紀掌握制海權、20世紀掌握制空權一樣具有決定意義。

The main measures for the United States to accelerate the development of cyber war

Obama, who relies on the success of the network operator, attaches great importance to the construction of cyberspace. He delivered a “5·29” speech when he came to power, and believed that protecting the network infrastructure would be the top priority for maintaining US national security. During his tenure, Obama successively launched the “eight-one” “combination boxing”, which made the US cyber war into a period of rapid development.

The first is to launch a report. In the “Network Space Security Policy Assessment Report”, it emphasizes that cyber war is related to national security, affects social stability, is related to economic development, and determines the outcome of war.

The second is to strengthen a strategy. It has established a “three-in-one” national security strategy supported by the deterrent strategy of nuclear weapons, the preemptive strategy of space, and the network’s control strategy.

The third is to form a headquarters. In 2009, the US military established the Cyberspace Command, which is the main function of commanding cyber warfare. In May 2013, the US military set up a “joint network center” at each theater headquarters, and its cyber warfare command system was gradually improved. At the same time, the US military also plans to upgrade the Cyberspace Command to a formal combatant command, making it a level of organization with other theater headquarters. This will directly shorten the chain of command of the US cyber warfare forces and the military.

The fourth is to develop a road map. In 2010, the US Army officially issued the “Network Space Combat Capability Conception”, which is considered to be the first roadmap for the development of cyber warfare capabilities developed by the US military.

The fifth is to start a shooting range. In 2009, the US Department of Defense launched the “National Network Shooting Range” project, which was officially delivered in 2012. The US cyber warfare training and weapon evaluation have a realistic environment.

The sixth is to develop a series of weapons. The US military has developed and stocked more than 2,000 virus weapons, and these weapons are gradually moving toward a systemic direction. There are mainly anti-smuggling weapons represented by “seismic net” virus and “digital cannon”, intelligence warfare weapons represented by “flame” and “Gauss” virus, and psychology represented by “shadow network” and “digital water army”. War weapons.

The seventh is to plan a series of exercises. From 2006 to the present, the United States has organized several cross-border cross-border “network storm” exercises. Every time, the Internet is listed as an offensive and defensive target, targeting key infrastructure such as finance, transportation, electricity, energy, and communications. This reveals the main battlefield of cyberspace, which is an open Internet rather than a closed tactical network.

Eight is to support a number of social networking sites. A number of social networking sites such as “Twitter” and “Facebook” have become strategic tools to interfere in his internal affairs. This is a punch in the combination punch. In February 2013, after the overthrow of the opposition government in Tunisia and Egypt, Obama fully affirmed the important role played by Internet companies such as “Twitter” and “Facebook”. According to statistics, only “Facebook” social networking sites have more than 1.3 billion users worldwide.

Published the “Network War Declaration.” Obama’s move after the ruling shows that the United States has officially incorporated cyber warfare into the category of war and classified cyberspace as a new operational domain, reflecting the US’s advanced forecast and preemptive design for future wars. There are two main reasons for its deep motivation: First, to ensure its own network security – reflecting the United States’ concerns about its information security. The second is to ensure global cyber hegemony – reflecting the new concept of the American war.

In 2014, the US military actually promoted the “Network Space Warfare Rules” and “Network Space Warfare Joint Order”, which led to the international strategic competition to focus on the new global public domain of the Internet. The actions of the United States from the domestic to the international, the slave network to the use of force, from the declaration to the action, from the colonial land to the colonial thinking reflect the United States attempting to format the whole world with American values ​​through the Internet. As one reporter said: “Modern American colonization is thought, not land.”

In April 2015, the United States released a new version of the Network Strategy Report, which comprehensively revised the 2011 Cyberspace Action Strategy Report issued by the US Department of Defense. It has the following new changes:

First, it provides a new basis for enhancing the important position of network power construction. The report further raises the threat of US cyberspace to a “first-tier” threat. At the same time, the report also regards China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as potential “network opponents” in the United States. This is the latest and most serious judgment on the cyber threat situation.

The second is to provide new guidance for speeding up the construction of cyber warfare forces. The report focused on the three major tasks and five major goals of the Ministry of Defense in cyberspace, and further refined the construction goals of 133 cyber warfare detachments.

The third is to create a new pillar for maintaining a comprehensive military advantage. The report clearly stated that when the United States faces an attack against the interests of the United States or the United States in cyberspace, the US military can conduct cyber operations and implement cyber attacks. This is the most important adjustment to this cyberspace strategy. In the future, the US military will use cyber attacks as an important means of warfare. This is the main manifestation of the United States’ concept of “moving the Internet with the use of force” in cyberspace.

The fourth is to create new conditions for reshaping the international network system. The report emphasizes the emphasis on strengthening the coordination between the military and the civilians; the key external development and cooperation with allies. The main goal of the cooperation is to share the costs and risks, promote the international code of conduct that is beneficial to the United States, and seize the right to speak and lead in the formulation of cyberspace rules.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

美國加快網絡戰發展的主要舉措

依靠網絡運營商競選成功的奧巴馬,對網絡空間的建設非常重視,一上台就發表了“5·29”講話,認為保護網絡基礎設施將是維護美國國家安全的第一要務。在任期間,奧巴馬連續打出了“八個一”的“組合拳”,使美國網絡戰進入快速發展時期。

一是推出一個報告。其在《網絡空間安全政策評估報告》中強調:網絡戰事關國家安全、影響社會穩定、關乎經濟發展、決定戰爭勝負。

二是強化一個戰略。其確立了以核武器的威懾戰略、太空的搶先戰略、網絡的控制戰略為支撐的“三位一體”國家安全戰略。

三是組建一個司令部。 2009年,美軍成立了以指揮網絡戰為主要職能的網絡空間司令部。 2013年5月,美軍在各戰區總部組建“聯合網絡中心”,其網絡戰指揮體係日漸完善。同時,美軍還計劃將網絡空間司令部升格為正式的作戰司令部,使其成為與其他戰區司令部平級的機構。此舉將直接縮短美國網絡戰部隊與軍方最高層的指揮鏈。

四是製定一個路線圖。 2010年,美陸軍正式出台《網絡空間作戰能力構想》,這被認為是美軍制定的首份網絡作戰能力發展路線圖。

五是啟動一個靶場。 2009年,美國防部啟動了“國家網絡靶場”項目,2012年正式交付使用,美國網絡戰演習訓練、武器測評擁有了逼真環境。

六是研發一系列武器。美軍已研發儲備了2000多種病毒武器,這些武器逐漸向體系化方向發展。主要有以“震網”病毒、“數字大砲”為代表的阻癱戰武器,以“火焰”“高斯”病毒為代表的情報戰武器和以“影子網絡”“數字水軍”為代表的心理戰武器。

七是策劃系列演習。從2006年到現在,美國已經組織了多次跨界跨國跨域“網絡風暴”演習。每一次都把互聯網列為攻防目標,瞄準的都是金融、交通、電力、能源、通信等關鍵基礎設施。這揭示了網絡空間的主戰場,是開放的國際互聯網而不是封閉的戰術網。

八是扶持一批社交網站。把“推特”“臉書”等一批社交網站變為乾涉他國內政的戰略利器。這是組合拳中的一記重拳。 2013年2月,在突尼斯、埃及政府被反對派推翻後,奧巴馬充分肯定了“推特”“臉譜”等網絡公司在其中發揮的重要作用。據統計,僅“臉譜”社交網站的全球用戶已超過13億。

發表“網絡戰宣言”。奧巴馬執政後的舉措,表明美國已經正式將網絡戰納入戰爭範疇,把網絡空間列為新的作戰域,這反映出美國對未來戰爭的超前預測和搶先設計。其深層動因主要有兩點:一是確保自身網絡安全———反映了美國對其信息安全的擔憂。二是確保全球網絡霸權———反映了美國戰爭的新理念。

2014年,美軍實案化推進《網絡空間作戰規則》和《網絡空間作戰聯合條令》,牽動國際戰略競爭向互聯網這一新全球公域聚焦。美國這些從國內到國際、從動網到動武、從宣言到行動、從殖民土地到殖民思想的行動舉措,反映出美國企圖通過互聯網,用美式價值觀格式化整個世界。正如一位記者所說:“現代美國殖民的是思想,而不是土地”。

2015年4月,美國又發布了新版網絡戰略報告,對2011年美國國防部出台的《網絡空間行動戰略報告》進行了全面修訂。其主要有以下幾個新變化:

一是為提升網絡力量建設重要地位提供新的依據。該報告進一步把美國在網絡空間的威脅上升為“第一層級”的威脅。同時,該報告還將中國、俄羅斯、伊朗、朝鮮視為美國潛在的“網絡對手”,這是其對網絡威脅形勢做出的最新、最嚴峻的判斷。

二是為加快網絡戰力量建設提供新的指導。報告重點明確了國防部在網絡空間的三大任務和五大目標,並進一步細化133支網絡戰分隊的建設目標。

三是為維持全面的軍事優勢打造新的支柱。報告明確提出,當美國面臨針對美國本土或美國在網絡空間利益的攻擊時,美軍可以進行網絡作戰,實施網絡攻擊。這是此次網絡空間戰略最重要的調整。未來,美軍將把網絡攻擊作為重要的作戰手段使用。這是美國在網絡空間“動網就動武”理念的主要體現。

四是為重塑國際網絡體系創造新條件。報告強調,對內重點加強軍民協同;對外重點發展與盟友合作。合作的主要目標是分擔成本和風險,推行對美有利的國際行為準則,搶奪網絡空間規則制定的話語權和主導權。

The three key pillars of the United States to accelerate the development of cyber war

There are three key pillars for the United States to accelerate the development of cyber warfare:

Technical pillar. The “Prism Gate Incident” further confirms that the United States has been monitoring the global network to the point of pervasiveness. The United States occupies the upstream of the industrial chain. From basic chips to hardware applications, from operating systems to commercial software, Midea has an absolute technological advantage, forming a complete set of industrial chains, supply chains and information chains. The overwhelming advantages of technology and the monopoly in many core markets are key to the acceleration of cyber warfare in the United States.

Discourse pillar. The powerful ability of the United States to act in cyberspace determines its strong voice in online diplomacy. No matter what double standards it exhibits in cyberspace, it can influence the global public opinion space under the support of powerful discourse. Without the emergence of the “Prism Gate Incident,” the United States has created two “lie” that have become truths around the world: first, the West is a victim of cyberattacks; and second, China is a source of cyberattacks. This has greatly damaged China’s national image, reputation and international status in the international community, seriously affecting China’s high-tech exports, and achieving the “four-two-pound” effect that is difficult to achieve using trade protection and WTO rules. Even if the “Prism Gate Incident” tears open the “fair of justice” of the United States, it still shows superior combat capability, claiming to be monitored by itself, and placing national security on the basis of personal privacy in the name of counter-terrorism. Firmly control the right to speak in cyberspace.

Strategic pillar. A higher level than the technical pillar and discourse pillar is the strategic pillar. The core of the US strategic pillar is reflected in the pre-emptive global strategy and the overall layout of the game power. First, the advantages of multiple forces complement each other. At present, the United States is actively cultivating cyber security companies such as “Fire Eyes”, using their technological advantages and unofficial background to globally control, long-term tracking, collecting evidence, and acting as a pioneer, while the government and the military are hiding behind the scenes. This has earned the US diplomacy a flexible space for attack and retreat. Second, the network attack and defense and theft of intelligence are clear. The clear strategic division of labor has brought the benefit to the United States. Even if the “Prime Gate Incident” broke the news, the National Security Agency was “spoken” by the world, but there was no such thing as its cyberspace command. Instead, the cyberspace command made the cyberspace command The maintenance of national security is an excuse to accelerate the expansion of the army and develop at a high level. The United States has two clear main lines in cyberspace, namely: the National Security Agency is in charge of the network, and the Cyberspace Command is in charge of the network. This clear strategic thinking has provided strong support for the United States to accelerate the development of cyber warfare.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

美國加快網絡戰發展的三個關鍵支柱

美國加快網絡戰發展有三個關鍵性支柱:

技術支柱。 “棱鏡門事件”進一步證實美國對全球網絡的監控達到了無孔不入的程度。美國占據了產業鏈上游,從基礎芯片到硬件應用,從操作系統到商用軟件,美都具有絕對的技術優勢,形成了一整套完整的產業鏈、供應鍊和信息鏈。技術領域的壓倒性優勢和在眾多核心市場的壟斷地位是美國能加快網絡戰發展的關鍵。

話語支柱。美國在網絡空間強大的行動能力決定了其在網絡外交上強大的話語權。無論它在網絡空間展現怎樣的雙重標準,都能在強大的話語支撐下影響全球輿論空間。要是沒有“棱鏡門事件”的出現,美國已在全球製造出兩個已經成為真理的“謊言”:第一,西方是網絡攻擊受害者;第二,中國是網絡攻擊源。這在國際社會極大地損害了中國的國家形象、信譽和國際地位,嚴重影響了中國的高科技出口,達到了利用貿易保護和WTO規則博弈難以實現的“四兩撥千斤”效果。即便是“棱鏡門事件”撕開了美國的“正義面紗”,它仍然表現出超強的戰鬥能力,對外聲稱自己被監控;對內以反恐為名,將國家安全置於個人隱私之上,牢牢掌握著網絡空間的話語權。

戰略支柱。比技術支柱和話語支柱更高一層的是戰略支柱。美方的戰略支柱核心體現在先發製人的全球戰略和博弈力量的整體佈局。一是多元力量的優勢互補。目前,美國積極培植“火眼”這樣的網絡安全企業,利用他們的技術優勢和非官方背景在全球布控、長期跟踪、蒐集證據、充當先鋒,而政府和軍隊則躲在背後,水到渠成時再投入博弈,這為美國的外交贏得了進可攻、退可守的彈性空間。二是網絡攻防和竊取情報涇渭分明。清晰的戰略分工對美國帶來的好處是,即使“棱鏡門事件”的爆料讓美國國家安全局被世界“吐槽”,但是卻絲毫沒有殃及其網絡空間司令部,反而使網絡空間司令部以維護國家安全為藉口,理直氣壯加速擴軍,高調發展。美國在網絡空間有兩條清晰的主線,即:國家安全局主管網絡獲情,網絡空間司令部主管網絡攻防。這種清晰的戰略思路為美國加快網絡戰發展提供了強有力的支撐。

Absolute Security: Double Standards and Realistic Paradox of American Cybersecurity Concept

It can be seen that on the issue of network security, the United States pursues the concept of absolute security and attempts to use force to move the military to achieve absolute control over cyberspace. It can be seen from Snowden’s breaking news that the US network monitoring of the international community is systematic, large-scale, and uninterrupted, but it requires other countries to strictly control itself, and it cannot be half-step. This is an asymmetrical mindset and a double standard.

Is it feasible? The problem of cyberspace is very complicated, and the processing methods cannot be too simple. To deal with these problems, new rules, new methods, and new thinking are needed. First, there are many kinds of cyberspace actors, and they are mixed. Second, the attack path and source can be virtual forged, and the source of evidence must rely on multiple parties. Due to the complexity and uncertainty of virtual space, many rules of armed conflict law for physical space are difficult to use in cyberspace. For example: How to define war and peace in cyberspace? How to distinguish between military targets and civilian targets? How does the neutral concept apply? In a country that declares neutrality, it is difficult to control the computer malicious code of others without flowing through the network equipment in its own territory, and it is difficult to avoid the control and utilization of the network facilities of the belligerents. For example, in the case of cyber attacks in foreign countries, network equipment in China has also been used by hackers as “broilers” and “springboards”. China is an innocent victim. If “the state responsibility of cyberattacks launched through the country is not properly prevented by “neutral state standards” and “the destruction of cyberattacks by force”, China may suffer innocent blame. And the United States has such a strong technology that it is difficult to completely prevent being exploited, attacked, and controlled. Cyberspace cannot easily be judged or written. Management methods and patterns suitable for physical space may not be suitable for virtual space. Feel free to reduce the trajectory of cyberspace, and at the same time push up the risk of conflict escalation. Therefore, any dispute arising out of cyberspace should be resolved in a peaceful manner and should not be threatened by force or by force.

Is the effect controllable? There are two situations in which a consequence assessment is required. First, what should I do if I misjudge? Simplifying the threshold of attack can make a neutral country or an innocent suffer a disaster. Second, can you solve the problem? In 2014, local conflicts such as the Ukrainian crisis and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict led to cyber conflicts, and large-scale cyber attacks continued to take place. Western countries headed by the United States have imposed sanctions on Russian banks and enterprises, resulting in a clear upward trend in cyberattacks against the US financial industry. It can be seen from the effect evaluation that it cannot be said that deterrence and force have no effect on the solution of the problem, but it is not a panacea. If a big country like the United States and Russia uses force in cyberspace, what kind of negative effects and consequences will this bring to world peace?

Is it desirable to think? Although the United States has the most powerful army and the most advanced technology in the world, it is still constantly looking for opponents, rendering crises and exaggerating threats. This makes the whole world lack of security, objectively induces unstable factors, and stimulates negative energy and potential threats. It is precisely because the United States pays too much attention to its own national interests and is unwilling to adjust its strategic demands for the sound development of the international system. This has led the United States to continually fall into the “security dilemma” and “more anti-terrorism” circles since the “9.11” incident. This phenomenon deserves the United States to ponder.

(The author is the vice president of the National Innovation and Development Strategy Research Association)

Original Mandarin Chinese:

絕對安全:美國網絡安全觀的雙重標準及現實悖論

可以看出,在網絡安全問題上,美國奉行絕對安全的理念,企圖通過動網就動武,實現對網絡空間的絕對控制。通過斯諾登的爆料可以看出,美國對國際社會的網絡監控是系統的、大規模的、不間斷的,但是其要求其他國家嚴格自我管控,不能越雷池半步。這是一種不對稱的思維,也是一種雙重標準。

方法上是否可行?網絡空間的問題非常複雜,處理方法不能過於簡單,處理這些問題需要有新規則、新方法、新思維。一是網絡空間行為體多種多樣,“魚龍混雜”。二是攻擊路徑、源頭可以虛擬偽造,溯源取證要靠多方配合。由於虛擬空間的複雜性、不確定性,用於實體空間的武裝衝突法的很多規則很難在網絡空間使用。例如:在網絡空間戰爭與和平如何界定?軍用目標和民用目標如何區分?中立概念如何適用?一個宣布中立的國家,很難控制他人的計算機惡意代碼不流經自己領土內的網絡設備,也很難躲避交戰方對其網絡設施的控制和利用。例如在外國發生的網絡攻擊事件中,中國境內的網絡設備也被黑客用作“肉雞”和“跳板”,中國是無辜的受害方。如果以“中立國標準追究沒有適時阻止經由本國發動的網絡攻擊的國家責任”,“以武力毀傷摧毀網絡攻擊來源”,中國可能會遭受無辜的非難。而美國有那麼強的技術也難以完全阻止被利用、被攻擊、被控制。網絡空間不能輕易下判書、下戰書。適合實體空間的管理方法和模式未必適合虛擬空間。隨意降低網絡空間動武門檻,同時會推高衝突升級的風險。因此,網絡空間發生的任何爭端應以和平方式解決,不應使用武力或以武力相威脅。

效果上是否可控?有兩種情況需要作後果評估。第一,誤判了怎麼辦?簡單化地降低打擊門檻可能會讓中立國或無辜者蒙受災難。第二,能否解決問題? 2014年,烏克蘭危機、巴以沖突等局部地區對抗導致網絡衝突不斷,大規模網絡攻擊事件持續上演。以美國為首的西方國家對俄銀行、企業進行製裁,導致對美金融行業的網絡攻擊呈明顯上升趨勢。由此可見,從效果評估看,不能說威懾和武力對問題的解決沒有效果,但它不是萬能的。如果美俄這樣的大國在網絡空間動武,這會給世界和平帶來什麼樣的負面效應和惡果?

思維上是否可取?儘管美國擁有世界上最強大的軍隊、最先進的科技,但仍然在不斷尋找對手、渲染危機、誇大威脅。這讓整個世界缺少安全感,客觀上誘發不安定因素,激發負能量和潛在威脅。正是因為美國過度關注自身的國家利益,不願意為了國際體系良性發展,調整戰略訴求,才導緻美國從“9·11”事件以來,不斷陷入“安全困境”和“越反越恐”的怪圈,這種現象值得美國深思。

(作者係國家創新與發展戰略研究會副會長)。

Original Referring URL:  http://www.81.cn/wjsm/2016-02/17/

 

Chinese Military Analysis of US Navy Cyber Warfare Efforts // 中國對美國海軍網絡戰爭的軍事分析

Chinese Military Analysis of US Navy Cyber Warfare Efforts //

中國對美國海軍網絡戰爭的軍事分析

2011/02/15

US Navy’s 10th Fleet. As the naval task force, the US Fleet cyber command is the Navy’s second-level command, which is part of the Naval Combat Command. Its main task is to guide the cyber operations in defense, and to support the combat troops to carry out deterrence, repel violations, and guarantee. Freedom of movement. Our mission is similar to that of other military cyberspace commanders. It is responsible for carrying out combat operations in the fields of network, password, signal intelligence, information warfare, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and space to support sea and land. Combat power. Naval operations require the integration of traditional combat capabilities, the expansion of new capabilities, and the development of capabilities across networks, signal intelligence systems, and electronic warfare systems to achieve the full development of our cyberspace combat capabilities. Similarly, we are also responsible for organizing and commanding the Navy’s global cryptographic operations, integrating information operations and space operations.

History

The Tenth Fleet was established during the Second World War and developed anti-submarine warfare capabilities primarily in the Atlantic. At that time, we were faced with a hostile threat that greatly exceeded the combat capability of World War I, and its ability to change the situation was very strong. The Tenth Fleet without any warships defeated the German submarines through intelligence fusion, innovative tactics, technology, and processes. Today, the rebuilt Tenth Fleet still adheres to these operational concepts. Together with information warfare experts, intelligence specialists, password and electronic warfare experts, and traditional military experts, we command operations to ensure the flexibility of operations and respond to changing hostile threats. The focus of the fleet cyber command is to enable the navy to quickly respond to cyber threats and maintain information superiority. This framework of action requires us to complete the task of cyber operations defense.

To win in modern warfare, we must have the ability to move freely in the full spectrum electromagnetic space, and its defense range has expanded from ordinary electromagnetic interference to advanced network intrusion and malicious attacks. The function of the fleet cyber command is to analyze this threat, innovate tactics, techniques, and processes to protect the network and ensure freedom of movement.

Naval operations are dynamic, and the naval network also has time and space complexity. The Navy must not only be deployed in various oceans, but also support ground operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places. We currently have more than 10,000 naval officers and men involved in these ground operations.

The Fleet Cyber ​​Command is a global command with the ability to maintain network strength and conduct cyber operations worldwide, and to ensure that the operational capabilities of the cyber operations are commanded in a full spectrum electromagnetic space. Since the Commander of the Tenth Fleet is a combat-level commander, our command is also based on the structure of a typical naval mission force. This power structure can assign subordinate missions to regional missions to support specific password requirements. This task force has been designed to take into account the changing intelligence, skills and responsibilities, has the ability to respond quickly to the fleet’s operational missions, and has facilitated local communication and collaboration with the US Cyber ​​Command and the Division. We have been working to develop a robust organizational structure that provides rapid and direct support for a variety of operations.

The Cyber ​​Warfare Command (CTF1010) is responsible for naval cyber operations, and its subordinate units include the Atlantic and Pacific Regional Naval Computer and Telecommunications Ground Master Station (NCTAMS), which provides network guidance, maintenance, and shoreline relay. The Navy Cyber ​​Defense Operations Command (CTF 1020) is responsible for network defense. The unit is responsible for monitoring cyber threats and monitoring network response.

Norfolk’s Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1030) specializes in naval information operations, with its task force located in San Diego and Whidbey Island. Texas Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1040), Georgia Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1050), Maryland Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1060), Colorado Naval Information Operations Command (CTF 1080 And its subordinate headquarters around the world to coordinate the fleet and theater operations. The password action is the responsibility of the CTF 1000 power structure.

The Hutland Naval Information Operations Center (CTF 1090) is based on our research and development brigade and its main mission is to provide battlefield preparation techniques for supporting fleet and joint operations missions.

The successful completion of the mission must be based on efficient recruitment and training of personnel who must have a keen technical insight and the ability to apply personal skills to fleet defensive operations. I have checked almost all of the combatant commands, and I can assure the committee that the Navy has a group of outstanding combatants who are ready to conduct cyberspace operations. Due to the dynamic nature of the cyberspace space, we must continue to advance the development of combat forces. We have taken the initiative to set up new expert officers including cyber engineers and warrants. The construction of the National Naval Academy cyber curriculum will also provide new opportunities for student education, and these students will become the backbone of the naval cyber operations command.

Task

As the fleet cyber command is maturing, we are also trying to learn to use the technology of the brother service. As the support command of the National Cyber ​​Command, we also contacted personnel from other service departments to establish a defense system to improve resilience and enhance the robustness and adaptability of global cyber defense. If a service department discovers, analyzes, or destroys a threat, the information is quickly distributed to other services, minimizing the damage and achieving a joint response.

In fact, we have already started to act. Since the establishment in January, we have been involved in supporting the National Pacific Command and Pacific Fleet exercises with the National Cyber ​​Command. We enhance shared situational awareness and collaborative surveillance security capabilities by examining cyber operations. We also work with industry, academia, and the Federal Fund Research and Development Center to learn to leverage their knowledge and capabilities. The business sector is driving the development of the cyberspace sector, and we must get their capabilities and financial support.

Inter-domain coordination and interaction are extremely important. Safeguarding system security or network defense work must be coordinated with preventing our system from unintentionally interfering with work. From navigation systems to network access, from the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft to the shipboard SLQ-32 jammers, the Tenth Fleet quickly integrates with other numbering fleets and regional naval department commanders to meet their mission requirements. The collaboration between the fleet staff is one of the key factors behind the achievements of the Tenth Fleet and one of the reasons for our initial success.

The ability of the staff and commanders at Ft. Meade has improved every month. At present, there are 130 staff officers and commanders in our department, which will increase to about 200 in recent years. This growth rate guarantees that the command will not only increase the number of technical experts, but also increase the number of people with operational experience who can get rid of the numerous challenges related to cyber security.

These challenges include: developing and maintaining the concept of viewing the network as a battle space; providing support across the services to maintain our freedom of movement in the cyberspace; developing cyber operations into a functional area and creating a series of detailed concepts .

As our capabilities continue to grow, we will have better support for fleet and joint exercise capabilities, and through their necessary feedback to improve our combat capabilities in hostile or cyberspace environments. This feedback is very important, and it enables us to assess and improve our capabilities to support freedom of action in the face of stronger threats. These threats will not only affect the Navy or the Department of Defense system, but also civilian users, and they may be sources of non-traditional threats. There is no doubt that the people of non-state entities are also looking for the means and capabilities that affect our networks, so as a country, we must be prepared to deal with these asymmetric challenges and threats.

The US Fleet Cyber ​​Command is also the authoritative operational arm of the Navy in electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum operations. By working with other services, we are working hard to develop a comprehensive joint electromagnetic spectrum operational plan. All radio frequency users have proven that it is not enough to defend against dynamic targeted network attacks. We must also have a network protection network in full-dimensional space. ability.

Every day, my staff are working hard to go beyond the traditional field and apply their expertise to the cyberspace field. I am very proud of it. This is the environment we create to nurture and use future domain experts. The Ministry of Defence is not comparable to the industry in terms of monetary subsidies, but we are able to provide our staff with a wider range of education and training opportunities and help them gain leadership experience that is not available elsewhere.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

美國艦隊賽博司令部和美國海軍第十艦隊司令。作為海軍特遣司令部的美國艦隊賽博司令部,是海軍二級司令部,隸屬於海軍作戰司令部,主要任務是指導防禦中的賽博作戰,支援作戰部隊實施威懾、擊退侵犯、保證行動自由。我部任務與其他軍種賽博特遣司令部類似,擔負有在網絡、密碼、信號情報、信息作戰、賽博空間、電子戰以及太空等領域實施作戰行動的獨特任務,以支援海上、陸上作戰力量。海軍作戰需要通過融合傳統作戰能力,拓展新型能力,發展跨越網絡、信號情報系統和電子戰系統的能力,從而實現我部在賽博空間作戰能力方面的全面發展。同樣,我們也擔負有組織指揮海軍全球範圍的密碼作戰,集成信息作戰和太空作戰的任務。

歷史

第十艦隊成立於二戰期間,主要在大西洋發展實施反潛戰能力。那時,我們面臨的是作戰能力大大超越一戰時期的敵對威脅,其改變戰局能力十分強大。沒有任何軍艦的第十艦隊,通過情報融合,創新戰術、技術、流程戰勝了德軍潛艇。如今,重建的第十艦隊仍恪守這些作戰理念。我們與信息戰專家,情報專家,密碼和電子戰專家,以及傳統軍事專家一起,指揮作戰行動,確保作戰行動的靈活性,應對日益變化的敵對威脅。艦隊賽博司令部作戰重點是使海軍具備快速應對網絡威脅能力,保持信息優勢。這一行動框架要求我們要完成網絡作戰防禦的任務。

在現代戰爭中取勝,我們必須要具備在全譜電磁空間內的自由行動能力,其防禦範圍已從普通的電磁干擾擴展到高級的網絡入侵和惡意攻擊。艦隊賽博司令部職能就是分析這種威脅,創新戰術、技術、流程,來防護網絡並保證自由行動能力。

結構

海軍作戰具有動態性,海軍網絡也具有時空複雜性。海軍不僅要配置在各大洋,還要在阿富汗、伊拉克等其它地方支援地面作戰,我們目前有超過1萬名海軍官兵參與這些地面作戰。

艦隊賽博司令部是一個全球性的司令部,具備在世界範圍內保持網絡優勢、實施網絡作戰的能力,並確保在全譜電磁空間指揮賽博作戰行動能力的發揮。由於第十艦隊指揮官是作戰級指揮官,我們司令部也是基於典型海軍任務力量結構而建立的。此力量結構能夠給下級特遣大隊分派地域性任務,為特定密碼需求提供支援。這種特遣部隊編成考慮了多變的情報通報,技術和職責,具備了保障艦隊作戰任務的快速反應能力,並且推動了與美國賽博司令部和軍種賽博部門在局部的交流協作。我們一直在致力於發展一種健壯的組織結構,能夠對各種作戰​​行動提供迅速直接的支援。

網絡戰司令部(CTF1010)負責海軍網絡作戰,其下屬單位包括大西洋和太平洋地區性海軍計算機與遠程通信地面主站(NCTAMS),該主站能夠提供網絡引導、維護和岸艦中繼。海軍賽博防禦作戰司令部(CTF 1020)負責網絡防禦,該單位主要負責監測網絡威脅和監控網絡響應。

諾福克的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1030)專門負責海軍信息作戰,其特遣大隊位於聖地亞哥和惠德貝島。德克薩斯的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1040),喬治亞州的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1050),馬里蘭的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1060),科羅拉多的海軍信息作戰司令部(CTF 1080 )及其覆蓋全球的下屬司令部來負責協同艦隊和戰區作戰。密碼行動由CTF 1000力量結構負責。

休特蘭海軍信息作戰中心(CTF 1090)在我們的研究與開發大隊基礎上建立,其主要任務是為支援艦隊和聯合作戰任務提供戰場準備技術。

外部和內部組織結構圖見下方。

任務的圓滿完成必須要以人員的高效徵募和培訓為基礎,這些人員必須具備敏銳的技術洞察力和將個人技能應用於艦隊網絡防禦行動的能力。我檢查過幾乎所有的作戰司令部,我能夠向委員會保證,海軍擁有一批傑出的作戰人員,他們已經做好準備遂行賽博空間作戰行動。由於賽博空間領域的動態性,我們必須持續推進作戰力量的發展,我們主動設置新的專家官員包括賽博工程師和準尉。國家海軍學院賽博課程的建設也將為學員教育提供新的機遇,這些學員將成為海軍賽博作戰指揮的骨幹力量。

任務

隨著艦隊賽博司令部日趨成熟,我們也在試圖學習利用兄弟軍種的相關技術。作為國家賽博司令部的支援司令部,我們還聯繫了其它軍種部門的人員共同建立深度防禦體系,提高應變能力,增強全球賽博防禦的健壯性和適應性。如果某軍種部門發現、分析、摧毀了某種威脅,該信息將會迅速被分發到其它軍種,使侵入破壞程度最小化並實現聯合響應。

實際上我們已經開始行動了,從一月份成立開始,我們就與國家賽博司令部軍種部門一起,一直在參與支援國家太平洋司令部和太平洋艦隊演習。我們通過考察網絡作戰行動,來增強共享態勢感知能力和協同監督安全能力。我們還與工業界、學術界和聯邦基金研究發展中心開展合作,學習利用他們的知識和能力。商業部門推動著賽博領域的發展,我們必須獲得他們的能力和資金支持。

跨領域間的協調與相互作用是極其重要的。保障系統安全或者網絡防禦工作必須要同阻止我方系統無意干擾工作協調開展。從導航系統到網絡訪問,從EA-18G咆哮者電子戰飛機到艦載SLQ-32干擾機,第十艦隊都迅速集成其它編號艦隊及地區海軍部門指揮官,並滿足其任務需求。艦隊參謀間的協作是第十艦隊成就背後的關鍵因素之一,也是我們取得初始成功的原因之一。

在Ft. Meade的參謀和指揮人員的能力素質每個月都有提高。目前我部指揮參謀人員有130名,在近幾年將會增加到200名左右。這個增長速率保證司令部不僅要增加技術專家型人員,還要增加哪些富有作戰經驗的人員,他們能夠從賽博安全相關的大量挑戰中擺脫出來。

這些挑戰包括:發展與保持將網絡視為一個作戰空間的觀念;跨軍種提供支援,保持我方在賽博空間的行動自由;將賽博作戰發展成一個職能領域,並創建一系列詳實的概念。

隨著我們作戰能力的持續發展,我們將具備更好的支援艦隊和聯合演習能力,並通過他們必要的反饋來提高我們在敵對或對抗賽博環境中的作戰能力。這種反饋是非常重要的,它能夠促使我們評估和改進自身能力,從而支持在面對更強大威脅時的行動自由。這些威脅將來不僅僅會影響海軍或者國防部的系統,也會威脅到平民用戶,並且它們可能是一些非傳統威脅來源。毫無疑問,非國家實體的人員也在尋找影響我們網絡的手段和能力,那麼作為一個國家,我們必須做好準備應對這些非對稱的挑戰與威脅。

美國艦隊賽博司令部也是海軍在電子戰和電磁頻譜作戰方面的權威作戰部門。通過與其它軍種協力合作,我們正在努力製定全面的聯合電磁頻譜作戰計劃,所有的無線電頻率用戶都證明,能夠防禦動態定向的網絡攻擊是不夠的,我們還必須具備在全維空間防護網絡行動的能力。

每天,我部人員都在努力超越傳統領域,並將他們的專業知識應用到賽博領域,我為此深感驕傲。這就是我們為培育和使用將來的領域專家所營造的環境。在金錢補助方面國防部是無法同業界進行比較的,但我們能夠為所屬人員提供更為廣泛的教育和培訓機會,並幫助他們獲得其它地方無法取得的領導經驗。

Original referring 2011 url:  http://www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2011-02