Tag Archives: #USArmy #Cyber #Warfare #China #hack #Hacking

Chinese Military Characteristics & Development Trends of Cognitive Domain Operations and Warfare, Chinese Military Cognitive Domain Operations, Chinese military cognitive warfare, Chinese Military Future Wars, Chinese Military Informatization, Dissipative Warfare, 中國解放軍敘事戰爭, 認知戰

Chinese Military to Emphasize Operational Use of Language Confrontation in Cognitive Domain Operations

04/01/2024 admin Leave a comment

中國軍隊強調認知域作戰中語言對抗的作戰運用

外文音譯：

The traditional style of language confrontation is a form of game in which the two parties in the struggle focus on specific issues or goals at a specific time and in a specific context, using language as the main medium of expression. In the context of cognitive domain operations, with the upgrading of Internet technology, the rapid development of modern communication technology, the innovation of emerging social media, and the improvement of natural language processing technology, coupled with human beings’ advances in cognitive science, linguistics, and communication With the new progress made in the fields of science, psychology and other fields, people have a deeper understanding and new understanding of language confrontation.

Language confrontation is becoming increasingly precise. The narrative style of discourse is the key to influencing cognition. Cognitive domain operations in the era of intelligence can conduct big data-based analysis of the audience, and through large amounts of text collection and data mining, we can find various opinions, tendencies, and positions that were previously invisible or easily ignored due to limited human power. and demands. By making good use of cognitive computing, you can better choose language types, voice patterns, discourse skills, narrative design, optimize the narrative perspective, theme, style, and the personal emotions, values, ideologies, and standpoint evaluations contained in the narrative, and more We should take into account the differences in communication modes of different languages and cultures, so as to achieve the best, fastest and most accurate strikes and counterattacks. At the same time, cognitive protection can also be provided in a foreseeable and targeted manner.

Language text design customization. Cognitive domain operations fundamentally require the use of information to exert influence, and the unique discourse used in the information text is the main basis for cognitive influence. To target the cognitive domain of people in a specific country or region, we must skillfully use the discourse expressions in the other party’s language and culture, and conduct in-depth research on the stories, myths, proverbs, aphorisms, etc. expressed in the other party’s language, especially the popular topics on the other party’s social media. , characters and their discourse characteristics, and is good at using authentic and novel language expressions of cross-cultural cognition to create a contagious language atmosphere of emotional identification. On this basis, we strive to make innovative expressions, fully grasp the different cognitions and needs of the other audience, organize multi-dimensional discourse power, and design texts in multiple languages to form new impressions and cognitions based on cognitive resonance.

The main style of language is popular. Language is the “cannonball fired at thought” in cognitive domain warfare. The use of language that is creative, expressive and in line with the laws of modern communication can cover a wide range of people and win more audiences. Therefore, popularizing the language subject style is the central link that determines the effectiveness of cognitive domain confrontation, and is also a key factor in winning recognition and winning hearts and minds in cognitive domain operations. Young people are the most active group of people in future wars and are also the main force in cognitive confrontation. The discourse forms and expressions that young people like to hear and see are the key to gaining the advantage of language confrontation in the cognitive domain.

Modeling the effects of language confrontation. Language confrontation in cognitive domain operations requires an in-depth study of the opponent’s main cultural environment, main cognitive narrative models, main cognitive shortcomings and weaknesses, and the characteristics of social media communication discourse, and masters its long-term cognitive models and the connotation of textual expressions. Rules etc. Based on artificial intelligence, modeling and analysis of the cognitive effects of language confrontation on different groups of people will help to conduct timely effect assessments, accurately grasp potential problems, and discover the fulcrum of strength. For example, it is difficult for general qualitative fuzzy assessments to grasp the micro-propagation effect of individual flexible maneuvers and the point-shooting effect of a single “discourse sniper”. The use of modeling analysis methods can provide relatively accurate conclusions. In addition, modeling analysis can also create strategic planning methods for language confrontation that combine long-term and present, macro themes and micro themes, agenda setting and random communication, drips of water piercing the stone and floods, and tolerance and tolerance with active release, which is better. to exert the combat effectiveness of language confrontation.

原始繁體中文：

語言對抗的傳統樣式，是鬥爭雙方在特定時間、特定背景下，圍繞特定議題或目標，以語言為主要表達媒介的賽局形式。在認知域作戰背景下，隨著網路科技的更新換代、現代通訊科技的快速發展、新興社群媒體的推陳出新，以及自然語言處理科技的提高，再加上人類在認知科學、語言學、傳播學、心理學等領域所取得的新進步，人們對於語言對抗有了更深入的理解與全新的認知。

語言對抗日益精準化。話語的敘事方式是影響認知的關鍵。智能化時代的認知域作戰，可以對受眾進行基於大數據的分析，透過大量文本收集和資料挖掘，尋找以往因人工力量受限而看不到或易被忽略的各種觀點、傾向、立場及訴求。運用好認知計算，可以更好地選擇語言種類、語態模式、話語技巧、敘事設計，優化敘事的視角、主題、風格以及敘事所蘊含的個人情感、價值觀念、意識形態、立場評價，更好地顧及不同語言文化傳播模式的差異，以達到最好最優最快、最精準的打擊與反擊。同時，也能夠有預見、有針對性地做好認知防護。

語言文本設計客製化。認知域作戰從根本上需要利用資訊來施加影響，其訊息文本所採用的獨特性論述是認知影響的主要依賴。針對特定國家、特定地域人群的認知域作戰，要嫻熟運用對方語言文化中的話語表達形式，深入研究用對方語言表達的故事、神話、諺語、格言等，特別是對方社交媒體上流行的話題、人物及其話語特點，善於運用跨文化認知的道地而新穎的語言表達，營造出富有感染力的情感認同語言氛圍。在此基礎上，努力做好創新表達，充分掌握對方受眾的不同認知與需求，組織多維話語力量、設計多種語言文本，使之依托認知共鳴形成新的印象與認知。

語言主體風格大眾化。語言是認知域作戰「射向思想的砲彈」。富有創意、充滿表現力、符合現代傳播規律的語言運用，可以接觸廣大的人群、爭取更多的受眾。因此，實現語言主體風格大眾化，是決定認知領域對抗成效的中心環節，也是在認知領域作戰中贏得認同、贏得人心的關鍵因素。青年是未來戰爭中最活躍的人群，也是認知域對抗的主體力量。青年喜聞樂見的話語形式和表達方式，是獲得認知域語言對抗優勢的關鍵。

語言對抗效果模型化。認知域作戰的語言對抗要深入研究對手的主要文化環境、主要認知敘事模式、主要認知短板和弱點以及社交媒體的傳播話語特點，掌握其長期形成的認知模式、文本表達的內在規律等。基於人工智慧，對語言對抗作用於不同族群產生的認知效果進行建模分析，有助於及時展開效果評估，準確掌握潛在問題，發現力量支點。例如，一般定性模糊評估難以把握個人靈活機動的微小傳播作用以及單一「話語狙擊手」的點射作用，採用建模分析手段則可以提供相對準確的結論。此外，建模分析還可以為語言對抗創造長遠與當下結合、宏大主題與微觀主題結合、議程設定與隨機傳播結合、滴水穿石與大水漫灌結合、包容隱忍與積極釋放結合的戰略統籌手段，更好地發揮語言對抗的戰鬥力。

中國軍事原文來源：https://news.ifeng.com/c/8JLX3tWDWDu

认知域作战中的语言对抗. 解放军报.

China's Informatization - 中國信息化, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

America Instigating Cyber Warfare – How China Will Realize the Chinese Dream in the Age of American Cyber Warfare // 美國煽動網絡戰 – 中國如何在美國網絡戰時代實現中國夢

09/28/2018 admin Leave a comment

America Instigating Cyber Warfare – How China Will Realize the Chinese Dream in the Age of American Cyber Warfare //

美國煽動網絡戰 – 中國如何在美國網絡戰時代實現中國夢

If a power-state wants to realize the dream of the empire, it was a world war 100 years ago, a nuclear war 50 years ago, and now it is a cyber war.

How does the United States face the cyber war era?

來源：中國國防報·軍事特刊作者：郝葉力責任編輯：黃楊海

Core tips

In recent years, the United States has taken a number of measures to accelerate the development of cyber warfare. After the Obama administration took office, it continued to play the “eight-one” “combination boxing” to improve its cyber warfare capabilities.

Because the United States adheres to the concept of absolute security in cyberspace, this will not only aggravate the insecurity of the United States, but will also induce instability in the objective, resulting in instability of the cyberspace situation.

Recently, foreign media reported the latest progress of the US military in cyber warfare: the US military has spent five years developing advanced cyber weapons and digital combat capabilities, and these weapons may soon be deployed more publicly and will be considered for the next few years. “Network militia.” The US’s measures to accelerate the development of cyber war deserve our high attention and in-depth study.

The era of cyber war has arrived

Today, one-third of the world’s population uses the Internet, and billions of people accept the services provided by the Internet. The arrival of cyber warfare is an inevitable historical necessity. The network revolution is also reshaping the new pattern of world political, economic, social and cultural development.

Cyber warfare in many fields. Cyber warfare has broken through the traditional warfare field, making war a veritable development in economic, political, and military fields. First, the cyber warfare in the economic field is aggressive. In particular, cyber warfare in the financial sector has been described as “a modern version of the bank.” Second, the cyber war in the political arena has intensified. Social networking as a tool for political change represents an amazing power. From the turmoil in West Asia and North Africa to the “Autumn Wall Street”, social networks are everywhere to participate and help. Under the conditions of informationization, the destructive power of network penetration even exceeds military intervention. The third is the initial test of the cyber warfare in the military field. The network has changed the traditional war mode, from the Gulf War embedded virus attack to the Russian-Georgian conflict to use the network “bee colony” attack, each war has a network war “shadow.”

Cyber warfare has become the “atomic bomb” of the information age. The research of RAND Corporation puts forward: “The strategic war in the industrial era is nuclear war, and the strategic war in the information age is mainly cyber warfare.” Why can cyber warfare compare with nuclear war? Because the two have similarities in the “fission reaction” and the destruction effect. If the computer network is abstracted into the weaving of points and lines, the point is the computer and the router, the line is the network channel and the TCP/IP transmission protocol extending in all directions, and the network viruses such as Trojans and worms are the potential “uranium” in the network. Why do viruses in the network cause fission? There are two main reasons: First, the inherent defects of the computer architecture provide a “soil and hotbed” for the virus. The weapon of cyber warfare is a virus such as a Trojan, a worm (which is essentially a malicious code). The reason why malicious code can be raging is because there are exploitable vulnerabilities in the system, and the source of the vulnerability lies in the inherent shortcomings of the von Neumann architecture used by computers. The principle is to store data and programs in the read and write memory (RAM), the data can be read and written, and the program can be changed. In the cybersecurity incidents that occur in today’s world, more than 50% of the exploits that are exploited are mainly due to this mechanism. Second, the open shared Internet provides a path and bridge for the fission of the virus. “Network warfare: The next threat to national security and countermeasures” clearly states that there are five major flaws in the Internet: fragile domain name service systems, unverified routing protocols, malicious traffic without censorship, decentralized network structures, and Clear text transmission. Once these defects are exploited, they may form a flood of attacks on the network, which acts like a weapon of mass destruction, and is as powerful as the “atomic bomb” of the industrial age.

In the process of changing times and the evolution of war, who can take the lead in shifting the focus from the traditional field of human activities to new important areas, who can gain huge strategic benefits. It can be said that mastering the right to make nets in the 21st century is as decisive as mastering the sea power in the 19th century and mastering the air power in the 20th century.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

強權國家要想實現帝國夢想，100年前是發動世界大戰，50年前是籌劃核大戰，現在則是策動網絡戰

美國如何迎戰網絡戰時代

核心提示

近年來，美國採取多項舉措加快網絡戰的發展。奧巴馬政府上台以後，更是連續打出“八個一”的“組合拳”，提升網絡戰能力。

由於美國在網絡空間秉持絕對安全的理念，這不僅會加劇美國的不安全感，而且還會在客觀上誘發不安定因素，造成網絡空間態勢的不穩定。

近日，外媒報導美軍在網絡戰方面的最新進展：美軍已經花了5年時間開發先進的網絡武器和數字作戰能力，可能很快就會將這些武器進行更公開部署，並考慮未來數年建立“網絡民兵”。美國加快網絡戰發展的舉措值得我們高度重視和深入研究。

網絡戰時代已經到來

今天，全世界1/3人口使用國際互聯網，數十億人接受著網絡提供的各種服務。網絡戰的到來是不可阻擋的歷史必然，網絡革命也正在重塑世界政治、經濟、社會、文化發展的新格局。

多個領域迎來網絡戰。網絡戰已經突破傳統戰爭領域，使戰爭名副其實地在經濟、政治、軍事多個領域展開。一是經濟領域的網絡戰攻勢凌厲。特別是金融領域的網絡戰，被形容為“現代版的搶銀行”。二是政治領域的網絡戰愈演愈烈。社交網絡作為政治變革的工具體現了驚人的威力。從西亞北非動亂到“華爾街之秋”，處處都有社交網絡參與其中、推波助瀾。信息化條件下，網絡滲透的破壞力甚至超過軍事干預。三是軍事領域的網絡戰初試鋒芒。網絡改變了傳統戰爭模式，從海灣戰爭預埋病毒攻擊、到俄格衝突動用網絡“蜂群”攻擊，每一場戰爭都有網絡戰“影子”。

網絡戰成為信息時代的“原子彈”。蘭德公司研究提出：“工業時代的戰略戰是核戰爭，信息時代的戰略戰主要是網絡戰。”網絡戰為什麼能與核戰爭比肩？因為二者在“裂變反應”和破壞效果上極具相似之處。如果把計算機網絡抽象為點和線的編織，點就是計算機和路由器，線則是四通八達的網絡信道和TCP/IP傳輸協議，而木馬、蠕蟲等網絡病毒正是網絡中潛在的“鈾”。網絡中的病毒為什麼會產生裂變？主要有兩個原因：一是計算機體系結構的固有缺陷給病毒的產生提供了“土壤和溫床”。網絡戰的武器是木馬、蠕蟲（其實質是惡意代碼）等病毒。惡意代碼之所以能夠肆虐，是因為系統內存在可利用的漏洞，而漏洞的本源在於計算機採用的馮·諾依曼體系結構的先天不足。其原理是把數據和程序都統一存儲在讀寫存儲器（RAM）內，數據是可以讀寫的，程序也是可以改變的。當今世界發生的網絡安全事件，50%以上被利用的漏洞主要是源於這個機理。二是開放共享的互聯網為病毒的裂變提供了途徑和橋樑。《網絡戰：國家安全的下一個威脅及對策》一書明確指出，互聯網存在五大缺陷：脆弱的域名服務系統、不經過驗證的路由協議、不進行審查的惡意流量、非集中式的網絡結構以及明文傳送。這些缺陷一旦被利用，就可能形成對網絡的攻擊洪流，其作用類似於大規模毀傷性武器，威力不亞於工業時代的“原子彈”。

在時代更迭、戰爭演變的進程中，誰能夠率先把關注點從人類活動的傳統領域轉入新的重要領域，誰就能獲得巨大戰略利益。可以說，21世紀掌握製網權與19世紀掌握制海權、20世紀掌握制空權一樣具有決定意義。

The main measures for the United States to accelerate the development of cyber war

Obama, who relies on the success of the network operator, attaches great importance to the construction of cyberspace. He delivered a “5·29” speech when he came to power, and believed that protecting the network infrastructure would be the top priority for maintaining US national security. During his tenure, Obama successively launched the “eight-one” “combination boxing”, which made the US cyber war into a period of rapid development.

The first is to launch a report. In the “Network Space Security Policy Assessment Report”, it emphasizes that cyber war is related to national security, affects social stability, is related to economic development, and determines the outcome of war.

The second is to strengthen a strategy. It has established a “three-in-one” national security strategy supported by the deterrent strategy of nuclear weapons, the preemptive strategy of space, and the network’s control strategy.

The third is to form a headquarters. In 2009, the US military established the Cyberspace Command, which is the main function of commanding cyber warfare. In May 2013, the US military set up a “joint network center” at each theater headquarters, and its cyber warfare command system was gradually improved. At the same time, the US military also plans to upgrade the Cyberspace Command to a formal combatant command, making it a level of organization with other theater headquarters. This will directly shorten the chain of command of the US cyber warfare forces and the military.

The fourth is to develop a road map. In 2010, the US Army officially issued the “Network Space Combat Capability Conception”, which is considered to be the first roadmap for the development of cyber warfare capabilities developed by the US military.

The fifth is to start a shooting range. In 2009, the US Department of Defense launched the “National Network Shooting Range” project, which was officially delivered in 2012. The US cyber warfare training and weapon evaluation have a realistic environment.

The sixth is to develop a series of weapons. The US military has developed and stocked more than 2,000 virus weapons, and these weapons are gradually moving toward a systemic direction. There are mainly anti-smuggling weapons represented by “seismic net” virus and “digital cannon”, intelligence warfare weapons represented by “flame” and “Gauss” virus, and psychology represented by “shadow network” and “digital water army”. War weapons.

The seventh is to plan a series of exercises. From 2006 to the present, the United States has organized several cross-border cross-border “network storm” exercises. Every time, the Internet is listed as an offensive and defensive target, targeting key infrastructure such as finance, transportation, electricity, energy, and communications. This reveals the main battlefield of cyberspace, which is an open Internet rather than a closed tactical network.

Eight is to support a number of social networking sites. A number of social networking sites such as “Twitter” and “Facebook” have become strategic tools to interfere in his internal affairs. This is a punch in the combination punch. In February 2013, after the overthrow of the opposition government in Tunisia and Egypt, Obama fully affirmed the important role played by Internet companies such as “Twitter” and “Facebook”. According to statistics, only “Facebook” social networking sites have more than 1.3 billion users worldwide.

Published the “Network War Declaration.” Obama’s move after the ruling shows that the United States has officially incorporated cyber warfare into the category of war and classified cyberspace as a new operational domain, reflecting the US’s advanced forecast and preemptive design for future wars. There are two main reasons for its deep motivation: First, to ensure its own network security – reflecting the United States’ concerns about its information security. The second is to ensure global cyber hegemony – reflecting the new concept of the American war.

In 2014, the US military actually promoted the “Network Space Warfare Rules” and “Network Space Warfare Joint Order”, which led to the international strategic competition to focus on the new global public domain of the Internet. The actions of the United States from the domestic to the international, the slave network to the use of force, from the declaration to the action, from the colonial land to the colonial thinking reflect the United States attempting to format the whole world with American values through the Internet. As one reporter said: “Modern American colonization is thought, not land.”

In April 2015, the United States released a new version of the Network Strategy Report, which comprehensively revised the 2011 Cyberspace Action Strategy Report issued by the US Department of Defense. It has the following new changes:

First, it provides a new basis for enhancing the important position of network power construction. The report further raises the threat of US cyberspace to a “first-tier” threat. At the same time, the report also regards China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as potential “network opponents” in the United States. This is the latest and most serious judgment on the cyber threat situation.

The second is to provide new guidance for speeding up the construction of cyber warfare forces. The report focused on the three major tasks and five major goals of the Ministry of Defense in cyberspace, and further refined the construction goals of 133 cyber warfare detachments.

The third is to create a new pillar for maintaining a comprehensive military advantage. The report clearly stated that when the United States faces an attack against the interests of the United States or the United States in cyberspace, the US military can conduct cyber operations and implement cyber attacks. This is the most important adjustment to this cyberspace strategy. In the future, the US military will use cyber attacks as an important means of warfare. This is the main manifestation of the United States’ concept of “moving the Internet with the use of force” in cyberspace.

The fourth is to create new conditions for reshaping the international network system. The report emphasizes the emphasis on strengthening the coordination between the military and the civilians; the key external development and cooperation with allies. The main goal of the cooperation is to share the costs and risks, promote the international code of conduct that is beneficial to the United States, and seize the right to speak and lead in the formulation of cyberspace rules.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

美國加快網絡戰發展的主要舉措

依靠網絡運營商競選成功的奧巴馬，對網絡空間的建設非常重視，一上台就發表了“5·29”講話，認為保護網絡基礎設施將是維護美國國家安全的第一要務。在任期間，奧巴馬連續打出了“八個一”的“組合拳”，使美國網絡戰進入快速發展時期。

一是推出一個報告。其在《網絡空間安全政策評估報告》中強調：網絡戰事關國家安全、影響社會穩定、關乎經濟發展、決定戰爭勝負。

二是強化一個戰略。其確立了以核武器的威懾戰略、太空的搶先戰略、網絡的控制戰略為支撐的“三位一體”國家安全戰略。

三是組建一個司令部。 2009年，美軍成立了以指揮網絡戰為主要職能的網絡空間司令部。 2013年5月，美軍在各戰區總部組建“聯合網絡中心”，其網絡戰指揮體係日漸完善。同時，美軍還計劃將網絡空間司令部升格為正式的作戰司令部，使其成為與其他戰區司令部平級的機構。此舉將直接縮短美國網絡戰部隊與軍方最高層的指揮鏈。

四是製定一個路線圖。 2010年，美陸軍正式出台《網絡空間作戰能力構想》，這被認為是美軍制定的首份網絡作戰能力發展路線圖。

五是啟動一個靶場。 2009年，美國防部啟動了“國家網絡靶場”項目，2012年正式交付使用，美國網絡戰演習訓練、武器測評擁有了逼真環境。

六是研發一系列武器。美軍已研發儲備了2000多種病毒武器，這些武器逐漸向體系化方向發展。主要有以“震網”病毒、“數字大砲”為代表的阻癱戰武器，以“火焰”“高斯”病毒為代表的情報戰武器和以“影子網絡”“數字水軍”為代表的心理戰武器。

七是策劃系列演習。從2006年到現在，美國已經組織了多次跨界跨國跨域“網絡風暴”演習。每一次都把互聯網列為攻防目標，瞄準的都是金融、交通、電力、能源、通信等關鍵基礎設施。這揭示了網絡空間的主戰場，是開放的國際互聯網而不是封閉的戰術網。

八是扶持一批社交網站。把“推特”“臉書”等一批社交網站變為乾涉他國內政的戰略利器。這是組合拳中的一記重拳。 2013年2月，在突尼斯、埃及政府被反對派推翻後，奧巴馬充分肯定了“推特”“臉譜”等網絡公司在其中發揮的重要作用。據統計，僅“臉譜”社交網站的全球用戶已超過13億。

發表“網絡戰宣言”。奧巴馬執政後的舉措，表明美國已經正式將網絡戰納入戰爭範疇，把網絡空間列為新的作戰域，這反映出美國對未來戰爭的超前預測和搶先設計。其深層動因主要有兩點：一是確保自身網絡安全———反映了美國對其信息安全的擔憂。二是確保全球網絡霸權———反映了美國戰爭的新理念。

2014年，美軍實案化推進《網絡空間作戰規則》和《網絡空間作戰聯合條令》，牽動國際戰略競爭向互聯網這一新全球公域聚焦。美國這些從國內到國際、從動網到動武、從宣言到行動、從殖民土地到殖民思想的行動舉措，反映出美國企圖通過互聯網，用美式價值觀格式化整個世界。正如一位記者所說：“現代美國殖民的是思想，而不是土地”。

2015年4月，美國又發布了新版網絡戰略報告，對2011年美國國防部出台的《網絡空間行動戰略報告》進行了全面修訂。其主要有以下幾個新變化：

一是為提升網絡力量建設重要地位提供新的依據。該報告進一步把美國在網絡空間的威脅上升為“第一層級”的威脅。同時，該報告還將中國、俄羅斯、伊朗、朝鮮視為美國潛在的“網絡對手”，這是其對網絡威脅形勢做出的最新、最嚴峻的判斷。

二是為加快網絡戰力量建設提供新的指導。報告重點明確了國防部在網絡空間的三大任務和五大目標，並進一步細化133支網絡戰分隊的建設目標。

三是為維持全面的軍事優勢打造新的支柱。報告明確提出，當美國面臨針對美國本土或美國在網絡空間利益的攻擊時，美軍可以進行網絡作戰，實施網絡攻擊。這是此次網絡空間戰略最重要的調整。未來，美軍將把網絡攻擊作為重要的作戰手段使用。這是美國在網絡空間“動網就動武”理念的主要體現。

四是為重塑國際網絡體系創造新條件。報告強調，對內重點加強軍民協同；對外重點發展與盟友合作。合作的主要目標是分擔成本和風險，推行對美有利的國際行為準則，搶奪網絡空間規則制定的話語權和主導權。

The three key pillars of the United States to accelerate the development of cyber war

There are three key pillars for the United States to accelerate the development of cyber warfare:

Technical pillar. The “Prism Gate Incident” further confirms that the United States has been monitoring the global network to the point of pervasiveness. The United States occupies the upstream of the industrial chain. From basic chips to hardware applications, from operating systems to commercial software, Midea has an absolute technological advantage, forming a complete set of industrial chains, supply chains and information chains. The overwhelming advantages of technology and the monopoly in many core markets are key to the acceleration of cyber warfare in the United States.

Discourse pillar. The powerful ability of the United States to act in cyberspace determines its strong voice in online diplomacy. No matter what double standards it exhibits in cyberspace, it can influence the global public opinion space under the support of powerful discourse. Without the emergence of the “Prism Gate Incident,” the United States has created two “lie” that have become truths around the world: first, the West is a victim of cyberattacks; and second, China is a source of cyberattacks. This has greatly damaged China’s national image, reputation and international status in the international community, seriously affecting China’s high-tech exports, and achieving the “four-two-pound” effect that is difficult to achieve using trade protection and WTO rules. Even if the “Prism Gate Incident” tears open the “fair of justice” of the United States, it still shows superior combat capability, claiming to be monitored by itself, and placing national security on the basis of personal privacy in the name of counter-terrorism. Firmly control the right to speak in cyberspace.

Strategic pillar. A higher level than the technical pillar and discourse pillar is the strategic pillar. The core of the US strategic pillar is reflected in the pre-emptive global strategy and the overall layout of the game power. First, the advantages of multiple forces complement each other. At present, the United States is actively cultivating cyber security companies such as “Fire Eyes”, using their technological advantages and unofficial background to globally control, long-term tracking, collecting evidence, and acting as a pioneer, while the government and the military are hiding behind the scenes. This has earned the US diplomacy a flexible space for attack and retreat. Second, the network attack and defense and theft of intelligence are clear. The clear strategic division of labor has brought the benefit to the United States. Even if the “Prime Gate Incident” broke the news, the National Security Agency was “spoken” by the world, but there was no such thing as its cyberspace command. Instead, the cyberspace command made the cyberspace command The maintenance of national security is an excuse to accelerate the expansion of the army and develop at a high level. The United States has two clear main lines in cyberspace, namely: the National Security Agency is in charge of the network, and the Cyberspace Command is in charge of the network. This clear strategic thinking has provided strong support for the United States to accelerate the development of cyber warfare.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

美國加快網絡戰發展的三個關鍵支柱

美國加快網絡戰發展有三個關鍵性支柱：

技術支柱。 “棱鏡門事件”進一步證實美國對全球網絡的監控達到了無孔不入的程度。美國占據了產業鏈上游，從基礎芯片到硬件應用，從操作系統到商用軟件，美都具有絕對的技術優勢，形成了一整套完整的產業鏈、供應鍊和信息鏈。技術領域的壓倒性優勢和在眾多核心市場的壟斷地位是美國能加快網絡戰發展的關鍵。

話語支柱。美國在網絡空間強大的行動能力決定了其在網絡外交上強大的話語權。無論它在網絡空間展現怎樣的雙重標準，都能在強大的話語支撐下影響全球輿論空間。要是沒有“棱鏡門事件”的出現，美國已在全球製造出兩個已經成為真理的“謊言”：第一，西方是網絡攻擊受害者；第二，中國是網絡攻擊源。這在國際社會極大地損害了中國的國家形象、信譽和國際地位，嚴重影響了中國的高科技出口，達到了利用貿易保護和WTO規則博弈難以實現的“四兩撥千斤”效果。即便是“棱鏡門事件”撕開了美國的“正義面紗”，它仍然表現出超強的戰鬥能力，對外聲稱自己被監控；對內以反恐為名，將國家安全置於個人隱私之上，牢牢掌握著網絡空間的話語權。

戰略支柱。比技術支柱和話語支柱更高一層的是戰略支柱。美方的戰略支柱核心體現在先發製人的全球戰略和博弈力量的整體佈局。一是多元力量的優勢互補。目前，美國積極培植“火眼”這樣的網絡安全企業，利用他們的技術優勢和非官方背景在全球布控、長期跟踪、蒐集證據、充當先鋒，而政府和軍隊則躲在背後，水到渠成時再投入博弈，這為美國的外交贏得了進可攻、退可守的彈性空間。二是網絡攻防和竊取情報涇渭分明。清晰的戰略分工對美國帶來的好處是，即使“棱鏡門事件”的爆料讓美國國家安全局被世界“吐槽”，但是卻絲毫沒有殃及其網絡空間司令部，反而使網絡空間司令部以維護國家安全為藉口，理直氣壯加速擴軍，高調發展。美國在網絡空間有兩條清晰的主線，即：國家安全局主管網絡獲情，網絡空間司令部主管網絡攻防。這種清晰的戰略思路為美國加快網絡戰發展提供了強有力的支撐。

Absolute Security: Double Standards and Realistic Paradox of American Cybersecurity Concept

It can be seen that on the issue of network security, the United States pursues the concept of absolute security and attempts to use force to move the military to achieve absolute control over cyberspace. It can be seen from Snowden’s breaking news that the US network monitoring of the international community is systematic, large-scale, and uninterrupted, but it requires other countries to strictly control itself, and it cannot be half-step. This is an asymmetrical mindset and a double standard.

Is it feasible? The problem of cyberspace is very complicated, and the processing methods cannot be too simple. To deal with these problems, new rules, new methods, and new thinking are needed. First, there are many kinds of cyberspace actors, and they are mixed. Second, the attack path and source can be virtual forged, and the source of evidence must rely on multiple parties. Due to the complexity and uncertainty of virtual space, many rules of armed conflict law for physical space are difficult to use in cyberspace. For example: How to define war and peace in cyberspace? How to distinguish between military targets and civilian targets? How does the neutral concept apply? In a country that declares neutrality, it is difficult to control the computer malicious code of others without flowing through the network equipment in its own territory, and it is difficult to avoid the control and utilization of the network facilities of the belligerents. For example, in the case of cyber attacks in foreign countries, network equipment in China has also been used by hackers as “broilers” and “springboards”. China is an innocent victim. If “the state responsibility of cyberattacks launched through the country is not properly prevented by “neutral state standards” and “the destruction of cyberattacks by force”, China may suffer innocent blame. And the United States has such a strong technology that it is difficult to completely prevent being exploited, attacked, and controlled. Cyberspace cannot easily be judged or written. Management methods and patterns suitable for physical space may not be suitable for virtual space. Feel free to reduce the trajectory of cyberspace, and at the same time push up the risk of conflict escalation. Therefore, any dispute arising out of cyberspace should be resolved in a peaceful manner and should not be threatened by force or by force.

Is the effect controllable? There are two situations in which a consequence assessment is required. First, what should I do if I misjudge? Simplifying the threshold of attack can make a neutral country or an innocent suffer a disaster. Second, can you solve the problem? In 2014, local conflicts such as the Ukrainian crisis and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict led to cyber conflicts, and large-scale cyber attacks continued to take place. Western countries headed by the United States have imposed sanctions on Russian banks and enterprises, resulting in a clear upward trend in cyberattacks against the US financial industry. It can be seen from the effect evaluation that it cannot be said that deterrence and force have no effect on the solution of the problem, but it is not a panacea. If a big country like the United States and Russia uses force in cyberspace, what kind of negative effects and consequences will this bring to world peace?

Is it desirable to think? Although the United States has the most powerful army and the most advanced technology in the world, it is still constantly looking for opponents, rendering crises and exaggerating threats. This makes the whole world lack of security, objectively induces unstable factors, and stimulates negative energy and potential threats. It is precisely because the United States pays too much attention to its own national interests and is unwilling to adjust its strategic demands for the sound development of the international system. This has led the United States to continually fall into the “security dilemma” and “more anti-terrorism” circles since the “9.11” incident. This phenomenon deserves the United States to ponder.

(The author is the vice president of the National Innovation and Development Strategy Research Association)

Original Mandarin Chinese:

絕對安全：美國網絡安全觀的雙重標準及現實悖論

可以看出，在網絡安全問題上，美國奉行絕對安全的理念，企圖通過動網就動武，實現對網絡空間的絕對控制。通過斯諾登的爆料可以看出，美國對國際社會的網絡監控是系統的、大規模的、不間斷的，但是其要求其他國家嚴格自我管控，不能越雷池半步。這是一種不對稱的思維，也是一種雙重標準。

方法上是否可行？網絡空間的問題非常複雜，處理方法不能過於簡單，處理這些問題需要有新規則、新方法、新思維。一是網絡空間行為體多種多樣，“魚龍混雜”。二是攻擊路徑、源頭可以虛擬偽造，溯源取證要靠多方配合。由於虛擬空間的複雜性、不確定性，用於實體空間的武裝衝突法的很多規則很難在網絡空間使用。例如：在網絡空間戰爭與和平如何界定？軍用目標和民用目標如何區分？中立概念如何適用？一個宣布中立的國家，很難控制他人的計算機惡意代碼不流經自己領土內的網絡設備，也很難躲避交戰方對其網絡設施的控制和利用。例如在外國發生的網絡攻擊事件中，中國境內的網絡設備也被黑客用作“肉雞”和“跳板”，中國是無辜的受害方。如果以“中立國標準追究沒有適時阻止經由本國發動的網絡攻擊的國家責任”，“以武力毀傷摧毀網絡攻擊來源”，中國可能會遭受無辜的非難。而美國有那麼強的技術也難以完全阻止被利用、被攻擊、被控制。網絡空間不能輕易下判書、下戰書。適合實體空間的管理方法和模式未必適合虛擬空間。隨意降低網絡空間動武門檻，同時會推高衝突升級的風險。因此，網絡空間發生的任何爭端應以和平方式解決，不應使用武力或以武力相威脅。

效果上是否可控？有兩種情況需要作後果評估。第一，誤判了怎麼辦？簡單化地降低打擊門檻可能會讓中立國或無辜者蒙受災難。第二，能否解決問題？ 2014年，烏克蘭危機、巴以沖突等局部地區對抗導致網絡衝突不斷，大規模網絡攻擊事件持續上演。以美國為首的西方國家對俄銀行、企業進行製裁，導致對美金融行業的網絡攻擊呈明顯上升趨勢。由此可見，從效果評估看，不能說威懾和武力對問題的解決沒有效果，但它不是萬能的。如果美俄這樣的大國在網絡空間動武，這會給世界和平帶來什麼樣的負面效應和惡果？

思維上是否可取？儘管美國擁有世界上最強大的軍隊、最先進的科技，但仍然在不斷尋找對手、渲染危機、誇大威脅。這讓整個世界缺少安全感，客觀上誘發不安定因素，激發負能量和潛在威脅。正是因為美國過度關注自身的國家利益，不願意為了國際體系良性發展，調整戰略訴求，才導緻美國從“9·11”事件以來，不斷陷入“安全困境”和“越反越恐”的怪圈，這種現象值得美國深思。

（作者係國家創新與發展戰略研究會副會長）。

Original Referring URL: http://www.81.cn/wjsm/2016-02/17/

Uncategorized

Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

05/07/2018 admin Leave a comment

Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

For a long time, in order to solve the A2/AD dilemma and achieve a new offset strategy, the U.S. has launched combat operations such as open space/air-sea warfare, cyber-centric warfare, distributed killing, multi-domain warfare, and mixed warfare. With new ideas, we constantly seek military advantages such as missile offensive and defense, cyber-electromagnetics, and multi-domain space. Today, the electromagnetic spectrum war has become the new darling of leading a new round of military theory and technological innovation. Researching and analyzing the status quo and characteristics of the development of the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum combat has important practical significance for our military’s success in defeating the enemy in the information battlefield.

1 Development of Electromagnetic Spectrum Warfare

In 1956, Admiral Sergei Gorschkov, the former Soviet naval commander, pointed out: “Who controls the electromagnetic spectrum, who will win the next war.” Sixty years later, the electromagnetic spectrum has become one of the key battlefields of modern warfare. In order to compete for the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum in the battlefield, the US military conducted in-depth explorations from combat theory to equipment technology and developed rapidly.

1.1 Evolution of theory

Electromagnetic spectrum control has a long history. In the early 1970s, Thomas H, chairman of the US Senate Association. Moorer said that the winner of World War III will be a party that can highly control and manage the electromagnetic spectrum. The United States “Old Ravens” Association first proposed the use of electromagnetic control (EMC) as the fourth component of the concept of electronic warfare. In 2009, Strategic Command launched the early concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare (EMSW), and added tasks such as electromagnetic spectrum management (EMSM), electromagnetic spectrum control (EMSC), and electromagnetic battle control (EMBC) on the basis of electronic warfare [1]. In 2012, the Strategic Command established the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center (JEMSCC) to achieve full integration of electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum management, and each of the units also established corresponding organizational coordination agencies and detachments [2]. In the same year, the US Navy proposed the concept of Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMMW) [3], and in March 2015 released the “21st Century Maritime Force Cooperation Strategy,” which outlines the goals, components, technology projects, and implementation paths of the electromagnetic maneuver warfare [4]. In December 2015, Terry Halvorsen, chief information officer of the US Department of Defense, pointed out that the electromagnetic spectrum is expected to be considered as the sixth battlefield following land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace [5]; in the same month, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Defining Electromagnetic Waves: Regaining U.S. Dominance in the Electromagnetic Spectrum Field[6] The report proposes the concept of “low-zero-power” electromagnetic spectrum warfare, expounding concept ideas, trend features, capabilities and technical requirements and current obstacles, and presenting views, concepts, Procurement, technical, verification, etc. At the end of November 2016, the 53rd International Conference of the “Old Ravens” Association of the United States took the theme “Global Vision of Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” as the theme to demonstrate the new concepts and technical achievements of electronic warfare, spectrum sensing and conflict resolution, and explored the electromagnetic spectrum operational environment. Policy regulations, equipment procurement, joint training and combat capabilities, etc. [7]. In January 2017, the new Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter signed the first “Electronic Warfare Strategy” document, officially establishing the electromagnetic spectrum as an independent operational domain and elaborating on how to conduct operations [8].

1.2 Policies and Orders

Strategic policies and military doctrines reflect the development of the US military’s combat theory. From 2006 to 2014, the US Department of Defense updated the “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy” to focus on advancing strategic objectives such as development of spectrum equipment, flexibility of spectrum operations, spectrum management, and improvement of policy response capabilities [9]; Strategic Command released in August 2010. Winning the 21st Century Economic and Security Advantage: Strategic Framework for Electromagnetic Spectrum Control, building an electromagnetic spectrum control system architecture from multiple perspectives including objectives, requirements, strategic development, etc. [10]; the Joint Venture Association has promulgated JP6-01 “Joint” in March 2012. “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Action” joint publication [11], signed in December 2012 CJCSM3320.01C “Chairman’s Handbook of Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations in Electromagnetic Operation Environment” [12], issued CJCSI3320.01D “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum” in January 2013 Operational Instructions [13] and CJCSM 3320.04 “Electronic Warfare Supporting Combined Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” Manual [14]. In March 2015, the “Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Joint Concept” document [15] was signed, which systematically stated that the Joint Forces launched electromagnetic spectrum combat operations. Strategic vision, organizational structure and functions, command and management relationships, plan formulation and operational implementation, operational integration and action synergy, and gradually Tactical, technical, and program (TTP) refinement of control, interference cancellation, spectrum management, and electronic warfare reprogramming, etc.; US Army released TRADOC P525-7-16, “The US Army’s Future Modular Force Conceptual Capability in December 2007 Plan 2015-2024 – Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation Manual [16]. Field regulations FM6-02.70 “Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” [17] were issued in May 2010. Field Manual FM3-38 “Network Electromagnetic Actions” was issued in January 2014. [18] Published in December 2015, ATP6-02. 70 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Combat Operations Skills” [19], updated in February 2016 AR525-15 “Network Reconfiguration of Electromagnetic Action Software” provisions [20], US Air Force updated 2017 AFI10-703 “electronic warfare integrated reprogramming” instructions [21] Define the concept of electromagnetic spectrum operations under the guidance of joint directives, and elaborate on issues such as organization and responsibilities, operational architecture, plan development and coordination control, task list and decision process, action team and management tools, and DOTMLPF, and promote electromagnetics. The integration of spectrum operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace warfare. In addition, Kevin D, head of the United States Joint Force Development Department. In October 2016, Scott signed the JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation” bulletin[22], standardized terminology and operational framework standards, and made a procedural description of the functional roles, organization, planning, operational implementation, and evaluation. It was awarded the Joint Spectrum Interference Cancellation Program CJCSM3320.02D signed in January and March 2013 by the Joint Committee, CJCSI3320.02F Joint Spectrum Interference Cancellation, and CJCSI3320.02E-1 Joint Spectrum Interference in February 2014. The three major regulations [23][24][25] to eliminate the confidentiality of the program were the important operational support and became the latest guidance for the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare.

1.3 Equipment and Technology

Military technology leads and supports advanced operational concepts. To transform the concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare from concept to capability, the U.S. military is striving to develop technological innovation and equipment development, and to develop new systems featuring networking, dexterity, multifunction, miniaturization, and adaptability.

On the spectrum management and control system[19][26], the US Department of Defense has developed and deployed the Allied Nations Joint Spectrum Management Planning Tool (CJSMPT) and the Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS) since 2005, followed by the Spectrum XXI and the Modified Spectrum XXIO, Spectrum. Perception Management and Planning System (SSC-SSMPS), Spectrum Situational Sensing System (S2AS), Maritime Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Action Project (AESOP), Joint Automatic Communication Electronic Action Instruction System (JACS), Host Country Global Online Spectrum Database, etc., with real-time spectrum Measurement and online analysis, spectrum planning and deduction and frequency allocation, electromagnetic interference analysis and conflict elimination, electromagnetic warfare environment modeling simulation, electromagnetic situation sharing and frequency efficiency evaluation, spectrum resource access and database functions and capabilities.

In combat equipment and technology projects [3][26][27], in 2011, the DARPA began to initiate behavioral learning adaptive electronic warfare (BLADE), adaptive radar confrontation (ARC), extreme radio frequency spectrum CommEx, Active Electronic Scan Array (AESA) technology, Near Zero-Power Radio Frequency and Sensor Operation (N-ZERO), under the conditions of the project, through the development of new technologies such as real-time evaluation of countermeasures, autonomous generation of measures, immediate feedback of effects, etc. Unknown waveform and behavioral electromagnetic spectrum threats Real-time tactical confrontation new capabilities; In 2010, the Air Force launched a Cognitive Jammer and HiPERDAC project based on Networked Software Defined Architecture (SDA) and passive RF PRIDE, SWEATER, and CHAMP (Eliminate High-Power Microwave Advanced Missiles) to develop active and passive target threat automatic recognition, real-time assessment and adaptive confrontation technologies and capabilities The US Navy conducts a maritime electronic warfare improvement (SEWIP-Block I/II/III) SLQ-32 shipboard electronic warfare system and ship signalling Equipment (SSEE), electromagnetic command and control (EMC2), integrated mast (InTop) shipborne antenna, next-generation jamming machine (NGJ) and other projects to improve real-time threat assessment and situational awareness, mission program modeling simulation, automatic distribution of electromagnetic spectrum , Combat Operations Analysis and other capabilities; the US Army launched the Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool (EWPMT) and Multi-Functional Electronic Warfare (MFEW), Defensive Electronic Assault (DEA) and Silencer Electronics scheduled for September 2016 Warfare and other systems enhance the electronic support for the perception of radio signals and the ability to send electronic signals that interfere with or deceive signals. Earlier this year, the Strategic Command Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) initiated research on new technologies that provide improved electromagnetic battle management capabilities for electromagnetic spectrum situational awareness and command and control, and plans to implement real-time strategy-based spectrum control and advanced electromagnetic battle sequences (EOB) within five years. ) Characterization and action plan modeling, simulation, analysis, and other capabilities and achieve 7-8 level of technology maturity [28]. Driven by cognitive EW and artificial intelligence technologies, DARPA launched the Radio Frequency Machine Learning System (RFMLS) and Spectrum Joint Challenge Program on August 11, 2017 to develop automatic identification and characterization of target signals from a large number of complex spectrum signals. New technology [29].

2 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Theory

The electromagnetic spectrum warfare is the latest theory of information warfare of the US military in the 21st century. As research and understanding continue to deepen, the U.S. military will gradually place new strategic ideas as tactics and tactical measures. In order to unify the battlefield electromagnetic spectrum utilization and control actions, the U.S. military issued a series of directives, regulations, regulations, and other documents to publish a summary of the JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operation” regulations, and standardized the operational concept, mission category, organization, and combat planning and implementation. Evaluation and so on.

2.1 Basic concepts

Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) is the conceptual starting point for the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare theory. It is based on electronic warfare and spectrum management and is based on joint electromagnetic spectrum operations. The goal is to achieve electromagnetic spectrum advantages in electromagnetic operating environment (EMOE), involving spectrum management operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO) and joint electromagnetic spectrum. Management actions and other concepts. According to the US military regulations JP1-02 “Defense Ministry Military Terms Glossary” [30], JP6-01 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Action”, JDN3-16 “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations” and ATP6-02.70 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Combat Operations Skills” , United electromagnetic spectrum operations are coordinated military operations carried out by two or more units for use, attacks, protection and management of operational electromagnetic environment. The electromagnetic spectrum management action refers to the interaction between the spectrum management, frequency allocation, host country coordination, policy compliance, and conflict resolution in the entire phase of military operations to jointly promote the planning, management, and implementation of operations within the electromagnetic operations environment. The relationship between various concepts and categories is shown in Figure 1.

Fig. 1 Diagram of related concepts of electromagnetic spectrum operations [19]

2.2 Task Domain Positioning

The U.S. military believes that the joint electromagnetic spectrum combat mission domain is composed of four-dimensional missions of electromagnetic spectrum utilization, management, attack, and protection. Among them, missions include signal intelligence gathering, distribution, and electronic warfare support. Management tasks include electromagnetic spectrum management and electromagnetic battle management. Missions have electronic attacks and navigation warfare, protection tasks have electronic protection and joint spectrum interference cancellation. The operational concept aims to operationally integrate the electromagnetic spectrum operations of the joint forces in the electromagnetic operating environment, establish key priorities, organize action coordination, and eliminate conflicts. Through the full integration of electromagnetic maneuvering schemes, strength and action to strengthen coordination and unification, the electromagnetic spectrum of the battlefield is realized. control. It plays a key role in the formation of joint operational capability in all operational areas, and has a profound impact on the joint forces’ command and control, intelligence, firepower strikes, adjustment and mobility, protection, and maintenance of operational capabilities.

2.3 Organizational Framework

The organization of the joint electromagnetic spectrum operations is responsible for the formulation and publication of policy directives and operational guidelines for commanders and commanders, and for combat planning, operational implementation, coordination of operations, and operational evaluation. The person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control assigned by the Joint Force Commander shall assume the overall responsibility for the joint electromagnetic spectrum operations. The Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit (JEMSOC) is the chief staff of the Joint Force, and the person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control assigns a supervisor to direct the command. Each service set up an electromagnetic spectrum operations division, each of which administers an electromagnetic spectrum operational unit, and assumes the functions of integrated network operations, electronic warfare, and spectrum management operations. They are the Army’s electronic warfare officer’s network of electromagnetic action units and the Navy’s maritime operations. The operational center electromagnetic spectrum operational unit, the Air Force air operations center electronic warfare coordination unit, the Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration Command’s cyberspace and electronic warfare coordination unit, and the Multinational Force Joint Staff Operations Department’s contracted electronic warfare coordination unit. The Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Organization of the Joint Force is shown in Figure 2. The joint electromagnetic spectrum combat unit architecture is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 2 Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Organization

Figure 3 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit Architecture

2.4 Combat Planning Process

Joint electromagnetic spectrum combat planning is jointly completed by all levels of joint electromagnetic spectrum combat units. During task analysis, the combat plan development team develops a staff assessment plan to determine the electromagnetic spectrum support degree in the formulation and analysis of the action plan as a strategic basis for achieving the advantages of the electromagnetic spectrum; after the action plan is selected, joint electromagnetics are developed. The spectrum operations appendix describes mission tasks, priorities, policy strategies, process steps, and implementation procedures for the entire operational phase, establishing coordination measures, specific procedures, and engagement rules for the use of electromagnetic battle management and control systems in the joint operations domain; The Ministry submits its own electromagnetic spectrum operations plan and integrates it into this appendix. During the planning and implementation of the plan, the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Unit strengthens the electromagnetic spectrum operations plans of each division and participates in the development of various divisions, establishment of priorities, establishment of operational integration and operational coordination, and the creation of an electromagnetic spectrum control plan. Then, the updated electromagnetic spectrum control plan is adjusted to start the joint electromagnetic spectrum combat implementation cycle to generate an electromagnetic spectrum control sequence that guides the use of the electromagnetic spectrum of the joint force. The combat planning process is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Combat Plan Development Process

2.5 Operational methods

The joint electromagnetic spectrum operations implementation process is a continuous cycle of planning, implementation and evaluation. The united electromagnetic spectrum combat unit completes the formulation of the electromagnetic spectrum control plan and the electromagnetic spectrum control sequence, and establishes the combat cycle for combat operations. After the approval of the person in charge of electromagnetic spectrum control, it publishes and organizes the implementation to each branch’s combat unit and unit. The electromagnetic spectrum combat unit fully participates in the key combat flow of the joint force and adjusts the update plan and sequence in time according to the user needs of the subunits and the electromagnetic spectrum of the battlefield during the operation period to ensure that each electromagnetic spectrum control sequence is effectively generated and efficiently Released and executed. The basic processes are: Formulation and release of control plans, update of control plans for each division, preparation of operational plans, generation and distribution of control sequences, execution and adjustment of operational implementation plans and control sequences, and monitoring and guidance of operational processes. The operational implementation cycle is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operational Implementation Cycle

3 Electromagnetic Spectrum Combat Development Characteristics

New military capabilities cannot be separated from the new system. As an operational concept that responds to new military challenges in the era of information networks, big data, and artificial intelligence, electromagnetic spectrum warfare has become a new direction for the development of the combat effectiveness of the US military. In order to deepen understanding and be efficient and practical, the U.S. military has pushed the new concept to the battlefield from many dimensions, including the development of policy directives, organization and force adjustment, equipment systems and new technology research and development.

3.1 Reinforce basic concepts and theoretical understanding based on policy directives, promote operational concepts and implement operations

Thought leads action. The U.S. military is good at innovative operational concepts and the concept of electromagnetic spectrum warfare is no exception. The first is to focus on clarifying the concept core and uniting the concept. During the early years of the development of the electromagnetic spectrum warfare, new concepts for the new combat domain were always being demonstrated. The military led high-level forums such as the “Old Ravens” and other professional military and military forums to analyze the related theories involved in the concept, exchange technology development and application methods, and promote deeper understanding. At the same time, in the strategic documents and top-level regulations, the relevant old and new policies were gradually sorted out. The links and distinctions between concepts, and the analysis of their categories and task areas, are increasingly contributing to the clear definition of concepts and the formation of theoretical systems. The second is to use operations on the battlefield, and refine the rules step by step. The U.S. military has always attached importance to the concept of combat to the implementation of warfare and technical measures. It took only about three years from the conception of the electromagnetic spectrum to the entry directives and from the joint directive to the arms and military operational manuals and the TTP. The US Army even established a concept blueprint for the use of battlefields before the Joint Staff. Joint operational and operational guidance for systemic operations at the level of the joint level to the unit level.

3.2 Establish an efficient and integrated force structure based on intrinsic power, and strive to use the full cycle of coordination and order in the battlefield

The troops are the carrier of operations. The U.S. military attaches great importance to the optimization and integration of new concept combat forces and existing capabilities. The first is to focus on the overall planning of the capability system. The trajectory of the capabilities of the US military’s electromagnetic spectrum warfare and cyberspace operations is similar. From the Joint Staff Headquarters, the Joint Forces Command to the military arms, set up combat seats and corresponding implementation teams, and establish a full-flow operation mechanism for operational planning, accusation, implementation, and evaluation to form an efficient and smooth capability integration system. The second is to emphasize the coordination and integration of existing institutions and new forces. Through the clarification of the responsibilities and interrelationships of institutions and forces involved in new capabilities in a timely manner, action-oriented operational procedures and implementation procedures are formulated, and even the relevant regulatory templates for coordination activities are promoted to facilitate the whole-system action coordination of electromagnetic spectrum operations and other mission domains. Orderly. The third is relying on actual drills to verify their capabilities in a timely manner. Based on the new concepts of combat and capability goals, the practice of offensive and defensive battles in the field of electromagnetic spectrum is rapidly promoted, and corrections are made during operational trials. The U.S. Army formed an independent electromagnetic spectrum warfare unit of the 1st battlefield network warfare group from February to May last year and plans to participate in an exercise organized by a regional battle commander at the end of the year [31]; the U.S. Air Force is in the “battle shield” exercise. In response to the “Spectrum Interference Elimination Project”, radar EW system evaluation [5] was implemented.

3.3 Promote the pre-research of the new concept equipment system with the support of scientific and technological strength, transform the high technology into the advantage of combat effectiveness

Strong army must have weapon. High-tech equipment is an important way to give birth to newcomer warfare capabilities. The first is to excavate new battlefield changes and assess new demands. The US Department of Defense’s “Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy” in 2014 pointed out that it is necessary to quantify spectrum requirements and develop the equipment and technologies needed for the electromagnetic environment to enhance real-time spectrum operation and electromagnetic spectrum system real-time identification, prediction and interference cancellation capabilities [9]. From the bottom up to the top, the U.S. military has established a demand collection and integration mechanism for the deployment and deployment of equipment systems and applications. It collects and sorts regularly and conducts special investigations and demonstrations with the aid of the government audit department, Rand Corporation, and a special panel of institutes. The analysis results can be Directly providing decision support for the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Staff Association, it forms an unobstructed demand management evaluation system, and injects activators for the development of electromagnetic spectrum warfare equipment and the development of new combat capabilities. The second is to pay attention to the integration of pre-research technology to equipment system applications. The U.S. military equipment system development will be based on national defense information architecture standards. It will have system processes and capabilities such as simulation modeling, pre-research, technology integration, and application verification. It will focus on the simultaneous improvement of existing models and the development of new research and development of smart technology and equipment systems. “Determining Electromagnetic Waves” pointed out that the important features of the electromagnetic spectrum warfare in the new phase are passive sensor applications and the use of “low-zero-power” capabilities to counteract the enemy’s anti-electromagnetic confrontation, and intelligent technologies and equipment are the future dominant [6]. The pre-research and integration of electromagnetic spectrum warfare technology and equipment will also be able to achieve a more optimal way to upgrade military capabilities to technological capabilities, integrate cutting-edge technologies with mature methods, and integrate specialized systems into integrated platforms, thus achieving a seamless leap in combat effectiveness.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

电磁频谱技术决定未来战争赢家 美军发展现状需警惕

長期以來，為破解反進入/區域拒止（A2 / AD）困局，達成新的抵消戰略，美軍先後推出空地/空海一體戰，網絡中心戰，分佈式殺傷，多域戰和混合戰爭等作戰新思想，不斷謀求導彈攻防，網絡電磁和多域空間等軍事優勢。如今，電磁頻譜戰成為引領新一輪軍事理論和技術創新的新寵。研究和剖析美軍電磁頻譜作戰發展現狀與特點，對於我軍在信息戰場禦敵制勝具有重要現實意義。

1電磁頻譜戰發展現狀

1956年，前蘇聯海軍司令Sergei Gorschkov上將指出：“誰控制了電磁頻譜，誰將贏得下一場戰爭”。六十年後，電磁頻譜成為現代戰爭的關鍵作戰域之一。為爭奪戰場電磁頻譜優勢，美軍從作戰理論到裝備技術進行深入探索，發展迅猛。

1.1理論發展沿革

電磁頻譜控制由來已久。上世紀70年代初，美參聯會主席Thomas H. Moorer稱，第三次世界大戰的勝利者將是能高度控制和管理電磁頻譜的一方。美國“老鴇鴉”協會最早提出將電磁控制（EMC）作為電子戰概念的第四組成部分。2009年，戰略司令部推出電磁頻譜戰（EMSW）早期概念，在電子戰基礎上增加電磁頻譜管理（EMSM），電磁頻譜控制（EMSC），電磁戰鬥控制（EMBC）等任務內容[1]。2012年，戰略司令部建立聯合電磁頻譜控制中心（JEMSCC），旨在實現電子戰和電磁頻譜管理全面集成，各部隊也分別建立相應的組織協調機構和分隊[2]。美海軍同年提出電磁機動戰（EMMW）概念[3]，並在2015年3月發布“21世紀海上力量合作戰略”，概要闡述了電磁機動戰目標，構成，技術項目和實現路徑[4]。2015年12月，美國防部首席信息官TerryHalvorsen指出，電磁頻譜有望被視作繼，海，空，天，賽博空間之後第六作戰域[5];同月，戰略與預算評估中心在“決勝電磁波：重拾美國電磁頻譜領域主宰地位”[6]報告中提出“低 – 零功率“電磁頻譜戰概念，闡述了概念思想，趨勢特點，能力和技術需求及當前障礙並提出視圖，概念，採辦，技術，驗證等方面建議。2016年11月底，美國”老鴇鴉“協會第53屆國際研討會以“電磁頻譜作戰全球視野”為主題，展示電子戰，頻譜感知與衝突消除的新概念與技術成果，探討電磁頻譜作戰環境，政策條令，裝備採辦，聯合訓練與作戰能力等[ 7]。2017年1月新任國防部長Ashton Carter簽署首部“電子戰戰略”文件，正式確立電磁頻譜為獨立作戰域並闡述如何實施作戰[8]。

1.2政策與條令

戰略政策與軍事條令集中體現美軍作戰理論發展。美國防部2006年至2014年多版更新“電磁頻譜戰略”，聚焦推進頻譜裝備發展，頻譜行動靈活性，頻譜管理和政策響應能力提升等戰略目標[ 9];戰略司令部2010年8月發布“贏得21世紀經濟與安全優勢：電磁頻譜控制戰略框架”，從目標，需求，戰略開發等多角度構建電磁頻譜控制體系架構[10];參聯會先後於2012年3月頒布JP6-01“聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”聯合出版物[11]，2012年12月簽頒CJCSM3320.01C“電磁作戰環境中聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”主席手冊[12]， 2013年1月簽發CJCSI3320.01D“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”指示[13]和CJCSM3320.04“電子戰支援聯合電磁頻譜作戰”手冊[14]，2015年3月簽署“電磁頻譜作戰聯合概念”文件[ 15，系統闡明聯合部隊開展電磁頻譜作戰行動的戰略願景，組織機構與職能，指揮與管理關係，計劃制定與作實施，作戰集成與行動協同等內容，並逐步向電磁控制，干擾消除，頻譜管理和電子戰重編程等操作層的戰術，技術與程序（TTP）細化;美陸軍於2007年12月發布TRADOC P525-7-16“美陸軍未來模塊化部隊概念能力計劃2015-2024–電磁頻譜作戰”手冊[16]，2010年5月頒布野戰條令FM6-02.70“陸軍電磁頻譜作戰”[17]，2014年1月頒布野戰手冊FM3-38“網絡電磁行動”[18]，2015年12月發布出版物ATP6-02.70“電磁頻譜管理作戰行動技能”[19]，2016年2月更新AR525-15“網絡電磁行動軟件重編程“規定[20]，美空軍2017年更新AFI10-703”電子戰集成重編程“指示[21]，在聯合條令指導下界定電磁頻譜作戰概念範疇，深度闡述機構與職責，作戰架構，計劃制定與協調控制，任務清單與決策流程，行動分隊與管理工具及DOTMLPF等問題，並促進電磁頻譜作戰，電子戰與網絡空間戰的融合。此外，美聯合部隊開發部主管Kevin D. Scott於2016年10月簽署JDN3-16“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”條令紀要[22]，規範了術語和作戰框架標準，對職能角色，組織機構，計劃制定，作戰實施和評估作了程序性描述，它以參聯會2013年1月和3月簽頒的CJCSM3320.02D“聯合頻譜干擾消除程序”，CJCSI3320.02F“聯合頻譜干擾消除”和2014年2月的CJCSI3320.02E-1“聯合頻譜干擾消除程序保密增本”三大條令[23] [24] [25]為重要操作支撐，成為美軍電磁頻譜戰最新指導。

1.3裝備與技術

軍事技術引領和支撐先進作戰理念。為將電磁頻譜戰從概念轉化為能力，美軍極力開展技術創新和裝備研發，發展具有網絡化，靈巧化，多功能，小型化和自適應等特徵的新系統。

在頻譜管控系統上[19] [26]，美國防部自2005年開發部署同盟國聯合頻譜管理規劃工具（CJSMPT）與全球電磁頻譜信息系統（GEMSIS），隨後的頻譜XXI與改進型頻譜XXIO，頻譜感知管理與規劃系統（SSC-SSMPS），頻譜態勢感知系統（S2AS），海上電磁頻譜作戰行動項目（伊索），聯合自動通信電子行動指令系統（JACS），東道國全球在線頻譜數據庫等，具備實時頻譜測量與在線分析，頻譜籌劃推演與頻率分配，電磁干擾分析與衝突消除，電磁作戰環境建模仿真，電磁態勢共享與用頻效能評估，頻譜資源接入與數據庫等功能與能力。

在作戰裝備與技術項目上[3] [26] [27]，2011年，預先研究計劃局（DARPA）開始啟動行為學習自適應電子戰（刀片），自適應雷達對抗（ARC），極端射頻頻譜條件下通信（CommEx），主動電子掃描陣列（AESA）技術，近零功耗射頻和傳感器運行（N-ZERO）等項目，通過對抗行為實時評估，措施自主生成，效果即時反饋等新技術開發針對未知波形和行為的電磁頻譜威脅實時戰術對抗新能力; 2010年，空軍啟動基於網絡化軟件定義架構（SDA）的認知干擾機與大功率高效射頻數模轉換器（HiPERDAC）項目以及無源射頻識別環境（PRIDE），頻譜戰評估技術工程研究（衫），反電子高功率微波先進導彈（CHAMP）等項目，發展有源和無源目標威脅自動感知識別，實時評估和自適應對抗技術與能力;美海軍開展海上電子戰改進（SEWIP-塊1 / II / III）SLQ-32艦載電子戰系統，艦船信號探裝備（SSEE），電磁指揮與控制（EMC2），集成桅杆（InTop）艦載天線，下一代干擾機（NGJ）等項目，提升實時威脅評估與態勢感知，任務方案建模仿真，電磁頻譜自動分配，作戰行動分析等能力;美陸軍啟動計劃在2016年9月投入使用的電子戰規劃與管理工具（EWPMT）和多功能電子戰（MFEW），防禦性電子攻擊（DEA）和“消音器”電子戰等系統，增強射頻信號感知的電子支援和發送干擾或欺騙信號的電子攻擊能力。今年初，戰略司令部聯合電子戰中心（JEWC）啟動面向電磁頻譜態勢感知與指揮控制提供改進電磁戰鬥管理能力的新技術研究，計劃5年內實現基於策略的實時頻譜管控，先進電磁戰鬥序列（EOB）表徵和行動方案建模仿真分析等能力並達到7-8級技術成熟度[28]。在認知電子戰和人工智能技術推動下，DARPA在2017年8月11日又啟動了射頻機器學習系統（RFM LS）和頻譜聯合挑戰項目，開發從大量複雜頻譜信號中自動區分和表徵目標信號的新技術[29]。

2聯合電磁頻譜作戰理論

電磁頻譜戰是美軍21世紀信息作戰最新理論。隨著研究和認識的不斷深化，美軍逐步將新的戰略思想落地為戰法和戰術措施。為統一戰場電磁頻譜利用與控制行動，美軍綜合一系列指示，條令，規程等文件出版JDN3-16“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”條令紀要，規範了作戰概念，任務範疇，組織機構，作戰籌劃與實施及評估等。

2.1基本概念

電磁頻譜作戰（EMSO）是美軍電磁頻譜戰理論的概念基點。它以電子戰和頻譜管理為基礎，以聯合電磁頻譜作戰為實現方式，目標是在電磁作戰環境（EMOE）中達成電磁頻譜優勢，涉及頻譜管理行動，聯合電磁頻譜作戰（JEMSO）和聯合電磁頻譜管理行動等概念。根據美軍條令JP1-02“國防部軍事術語詞典”[30]，JP6-01“聯合電磁頻譜管理行動”，JDN3 -16“聯合電磁頻譜作戰”和ATP6-02.70“電磁頻譜管理作戰行動技能”界定，聯合電磁頻譜作戰是由兩個或兩個以上部隊開展的用於利用，攻擊，防護和管理電磁作戰環境的協同軍事行動。電磁頻譜管理行動是指在軍事行動全階段共同促成計劃，管理和實施電磁作戰環境內作戰行動的頻譜管理，頻率分配，東道國協調，政策遵循，衝突消除等相互聯繫的功能。各概念間關係與範疇如圖1。

圖1電磁頻譜作戰相關概念關係圖[19]圖1電磁頻譜作戰相關概念關係圖[19]

2.2任務域定位

美軍認為，聯合電磁頻譜作戰任務域由電磁頻譜利用，管理，攻擊和防護四維度任務構成，其中，利用任務有信號情報蒐集分發和電子戰支援，管理任務有電磁頻譜管理和電磁戰鬥管理，攻擊任務有電子攻擊和導航戰，防護任務有電子防護和聯合頻譜干擾消除。該作戰概念旨在對電磁作戰環境中的聯合部隊電磁頻譜行動進行作戰集成，確立重點優先事項，組織行動協同和衝突消除，通過充分集成電磁機動方案，力量和行動強化協調統一，實現戰場電磁頻譜控制。它在各作戰域的聯合作戰行動能力形成中扮演著關鍵角色，對聯合部隊的指揮控制，情報，火力打擊，調整與機動，防護，行動能力維持等職能作用發揮產生深刻影響。

2.3組織機構框架

聯合電磁頻譜作戰的組織機構負責為指揮官和司令部制定和發布政策指示與行動指南，進行作戰計劃制定，作戰實施，行動協調和作戰評估。由聯合部隊指揮官指派電磁頻譜控制負責人承擔聯合電磁頻譜作戰總職責。聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元（JEMSOC）是聯合部隊的主要參謀部，由電磁頻譜控制負責人委派一名主管統一指揮。各軍種設立電磁頻譜作戰分部，各下轄一個電磁頻譜作戰分隊，承擔集成網電作戰，電子戰和頻譜管理行動的職能，分別為陸軍的電子戰軍官所轄網絡電磁行動分隊，海軍的海上作戰中心電磁頻譜作戰分隊，空軍的空中作戰中心電子戰協調單元，海軍陸戰隊的戰鬥開發與集成司令部下屬網絡空間與電子戰協調單元，多國部隊聯合參謀部作戰處所屬合同電子戰協調單元。聯合部隊所屬聯合電磁頻譜作戰組織機構如圖2，聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元架構如圖3。

圖2電磁頻譜作戰組織機構圖2電磁頻譜作戰組織機構

圖3聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元架構圖3聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元架構

2.4作戰籌劃流程

聯合電磁頻譜作戰籌劃工作由各級聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元共同完成。在任務分析時，作戰計劃制定隊伍制定一份參謀部評估方案，用於在制定和分析行動方案中確定電磁頻譜支持度，作為達成電磁頻譜優勢的戰略基礎;行動方案選定後，制定聯合電磁頻譜作戰附錄，描述作戰全階段的使命任務，優先事項，政策策略，流程步驟和實施程序，為在聯合作戰域使用電磁戰鬥管控系統建立協調措施，具體程序和交戰規則;同時，聯合部隊各分部報送各自電磁頻譜作戰計劃並集成到該附錄在計劃制定與行動實施期間，聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元加強各分部電磁頻譜作戰計劃並參與各分部需求制定，優先事項確立，作戰集成與行動協同，並生成一份電磁頻譜控制計劃。隨後，調整更新後的電磁頻譜控制計劃啟動聯合電磁頻譜作戰實施週期環，生成指導聯合部隊磁頻譜使用的電磁頻譜控制序列。作戰籌劃流程如圖4。

圖4聯合電磁頻譜作戰計劃制定流程圖4聯合電磁頻譜作戰計劃制定

2.5作戰實施方式

聯合電磁頻譜作戰實施過程是一個計劃，實施和評估的連續循環週期。聯合電磁頻譜作戰單元完成電磁頻譜控制計劃和電磁頻譜控制序列的制定，確立作戰行動的戰鬥週期，經電磁頻譜控制負責人批准，向各分部作戰單元和分隊發布並組織實施。電磁頻譜作戰單元全週期完整參與聯合部隊關鍵戰鬥流程，並根據作戰時段內各分部所屬分隊的用戶需求和戰場電磁頻譜態勢及時調整更新計劃與序列，確保每份電磁頻譜控制序列有效生成，高效下達和執行基本過程為：制定與發布控制計劃，更新各分部控制計劃，準備作戰計劃，生成和分發控制序列，執行和調整作戰實施計劃與控制序列，監測和指導作戰進程，作戰實施週期如圖5。

圖5聯合電磁頻譜作戰實施週期圖5聯合電磁頻譜作戰實施週期

3電磁頻譜作戰發展特點

軍事新能力離不開新體系支撐。作為應對信息網絡，大數據和人工智能時代軍事新挑戰的作戰理念，電磁頻譜戰一經提出就成為美軍戰鬥力發展新方向。為力求深化認識且高效實用，美軍從政策條令建設，組織機構與部隊調整，裝備系統與新技術研發等多個維度將新概念推向戰場。

3.1以政策條令為依據強化基本概念與理論認知，推動作戰理念向執行操作落地

思想引領行動。美軍擅長創新作戰理念，電磁頻譜戰概念也不例外。一是注重釐清概念核心，統一理念認知。電磁頻譜戰發展的早期數年，始終在論證面向新作戰域的新概念。軍方主導“老鴇鴉”等專業性軍地高層論壇，分析概念所涉及的相關理論，交流技術發展和應用方式，推動認識深化，同時，在戰略性文件和頂層條令中，逐步梳理相關聯新舊概念間的聯繫與區別，剖析其範疇與任務域，以此日益促成概念的清晰界定和理論體系成型。二是面向戰場運用操作，逐層細化條令。美軍歷來重視將作戰概念向執行層戰，技術措施細化落地。電磁頻譜戰從概念提出到進入條令和從聯合條令到軍兵種配套行動手冊及戰技術規程（TTP）僅用三年左右的時間，美陸軍甚至在聯合參謀部之前建立戰場運用概念藍圖，形成從聯合層面到分隊層面層層銜接，逐項落的系統性作戰運用與操作指南。

3.2以固有力量為基礎建立高效集成的部隊架構，力求戰場運用全週期協調有序

部隊是行動載體。美軍非常重視新概念作戰力量與現有能力的優化集成。一是注重能力體系整體規劃。美軍電磁頻譜戰與網絡空間作戰的能力發展軌跡相似。從聯合參謀部，聯合部隊司令部到軍兵種部隊，設置作戰席位和相應實施分隊，建立作戰計劃，指控，實施和評估的全流程運行機制，形成高效流暢的能力集成體系。二是重視現有機構與新力量協調互融。通過及時明確新能力所涉及機構與力量的職責和相互關係，制定面向作戰的行動流程和實施程序，甚至規定有關協調活動中的制式模板，促成電磁頻譜作戰與其他任務域的全體系全程行動協同有序。三是依托實戰演練及時驗證能力。基於作戰新概念和能力目標迅速推進電磁頻譜領域戰場攻防研練實踐，在作戰試驗中邊驗證邊修正。美陸軍在去年2至5月成立第1戰場網電戰小組的電磁頻譜戰獨立分並計劃年底參加某一地域戰鬥司令部組織的演習[31];美空軍在“戰鬥護盾”演習中為響應“頻譜干擾消除項目”實施了雷達電子戰系統測評[5]。

3.3以科技實力為支撐推進新概念裝備系統預研，將高新技術向戰鬥力優勢轉化

強軍必需利器。高新技術裝備是催生新生作戰能力的重要途徑。一是善於發掘戰場新變化並評估新需求。美國防部2014年“電磁頻譜戰略”指出，要量化頻譜需求，發展電磁環境所需裝備和技術，增強實時頻譜操作和電磁頻譜系統實時識別，預測及干擾消除等能力[9]。美軍由底至頂建立了面向裝備系統研建與作戰部署應用的需求採集與集成機構，在定期蒐集梳理的同時借助政府審計署，蘭德公司和院所專題小組進行專項調研論證，分析結果可直接為國防部和參聯會提供決策支持，形成了暢通有力的需求管理評估體系，為研建電磁頻譜戰裝備和開發新型戰鬥力注入激活劑。二是注重預研技術向裝備系統集成應用。美軍裝備系統研建都會基於國防信息體系結構標準展開，具備仿真建模，預先研究，技術集成，應用驗證等系統流程和完善能力，注重同步進行原有型號改進和新研智能技術裝備系統開發“決勝電磁波”指出，新階段電磁頻譜戰重要特徵是無源傳感器應用和採用“低 – 零功率”。能力對敵進行反電磁對抗，智能化技術和裝備是未來主導[6]。電磁頻譜戰技術裝備預研與集成也將能夠以更優方式實現軍事問題向技術能力升級，前沿技術與成熟方法互融，專用系統向綜合平台集成，進而完成戰鬥力優勢無縫躍升。

Original Source:

http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2018-05-03/

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Hacker Methodology 中國黑客, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

03/26/2017 admin Leave a comment

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

Who is responsible for configuring the information resources owned by the United States? Who is responsible for assigning these resources to use the priority order? What measures have we taken to ensure that the Global Information Grid (GIG), the Independent Joint Service System, and the GCCs: Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Global Network Associations (GCCs), which rely on information from them, Trojans (JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force-Global NetOps) security? In recent years, the entire network combat system on the discussion of these issues has not been suspended, the focus of debate is the theater operations in the network operations should play what role.

The US military has announced the deployment of the war command for each theater, and also announced that it would reduce military support in the cross-border areas. For each theater combat command, how to configure the information infrastructure to support the war in the theater has become very important. The enemy may be infiltrated into the critical network system area responsible for military power dispatch, which is often underestimated and even treated as an accident or incidental event, but these intrusion is virtually Made a connection request to block the normal operation of the commercial website, and even led to some of the military logistics business logistics company was marked as invalid. The theater warfare command should ensure that the information conditions of its zone are not affected by external invasions. Countless viruses are destroying the Internet, the Department of Defense system began to be attacked. It is now under discussion whether the Global Network Joint Task Force should be disconnected from the military network on the Internet, but the military is concerned that with the cooperation of commercial suppliers alone, the Department of Defense can not guarantee that all logistical support operations will continue without error To go on. Each theater combat command is not sure about the state of the theater itself, and they are skeptical about the security of the global information grid itself, and they are concerned about their ability to carry out the tasks assigned to it.

(STRATCOM) and the global network of joint contingents in the network operations in the dominant ideology of the impact of the theater operations headquarters of its command and control of the zone has a more global network of operations control institutions to strengthen the United States Strategic Command Weakened. The focus on the operational information grid to the global information grid has also affected, to a certain extent, the battlefield operations command of the global information grid is how to support the theater of the specific behavior of the understanding. This article will introduce the existing command relationship, the war between the theater operations command, the direct relationship between command and combat, the old and emerging joint operational principles of a special case analysis, and finally will be the theater combat command In the network operations should play the role of the proposed recommendations.

Network combat environment

The command and control in cyber warfare is a concept that appeared ten years ago, and its connotation has been evolving. Each of the relevant departments, the theater operations headquarters and the global network of joint contingents have carried out some organizational structure and work focus on the adjustment, but ultimately did not solve their respective roles should play this issue. To really understand why the role of theater warfare in cyber operations will be a problem, it is necessary to clarify the question: where is cyber warfare, what is real cyber warfare, and every What is the organizational structure and command and control structure of the department?

The first thing to explain is, what is the global information grid? According to the definition of Ministry of Defense No. 8100.1, it includes “global interconnection, terminal-to-terminal information transmission capability and joint processing capability.” Ability to collect, process, store, transmit and manage information according to the needs of warriors and policy makers ” This covers government and leased communications information systems and services, as well as other software, security and service support required for global information grids, as well as the Clinger- The National Security System, as defined in Section 5142 of the Cohen Act. According to this definition, the global information grid contains all levels of information systems from the Department of Defense and the national security system, from the tactical level to the strategic level, as well as the interconnected communication system.

Most of the discussion on the command and control of the Global Information Grid Network Operations Center focuses on the defense capabilities of the system, but the content of the network operations is far more than that. The tasks to be accomplished by the network operations include three: departmental management, Content management and network defense, whose purpose is to provide a lack of central support across the boundaries of strategic, tactical and operational concepts, and to support the Department of Defense’s full range of combat, intelligence and mission tasks.

1. Sector management is one of the specific tasks of the global information grid, which is the technology, process and policy management of systems and networks that make up the global information grid, including public sector management, systems management, network management, satellite communications management and Electromagnetic spectrum management of these aspects.

2. Content management refers to managing the information itself in the global information grid. It ensures that information is available to users, operators, and decision makers in real time. Content management includes the search, access, transmission, storage and integration of specific information content of the global information grid.

3. Network defense is the global information grid all the information, including additional information to protect, it mainly includes a number of policies, processes, projects and operations. If necessary, the task can be requested through cross-agency cooperation to complete. It is responsible for the global information grid information security, computer network defense, computer defense response capabilities and critical infrastructure protection.

Now we have learned about the basic organizational structure of the cyber warfare, the next step in the various organizations in the network operations and how they are performing the tasks, which are mainly composed of troops, theater warfare headquarters and global network joint contingents, all of which are With the changes in the battlefield requirements to improve their organizational structure.

The change in the organizational structure of the force is mainly to meet the requirements of the global information grid for information transmission, access, control and protection. Ten years ago, the troops had some changes to regional control in order to adapt to cyber warfare, but those measures eventually developed into centralized controls, and these measures were not preserved. Now it is necessary to understand the composition of the forces in order to better understand why the network operations command and control will become so full of controversy.

GEM: GIG Enterprise Management GCM: GIG Content Management GND: GIG network defense

Army ‘s network operations command and control

The army is the least of all the reforms in the service. The Army continues to hold the previous commander, now known as the Theater Network Operations and Security Centers (TNOSC), which is directly responsible for the various theater war operations. The Army maintains an independent global network operations and security center (GNOSC: Global NetOps and Security Center), all of the battlefield network operations and security centers are its affiliates. The Global Network Operations and Security Center has technical control over the Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, but the Battlefield Operations and Security Center is also part of the Theater Command and is also managed by the Theater Network Command. A typical example is the Army’s battlefield signal The brigade is managed by the Army Service Component Command.

The Global Network Operations and Security Center provides technical guidance to the network operations forces in each theater. The US Army Network Command and the 9th Signal Command are responsible for the technical and management of the Global Network Operations and Security Center. But in wartime, the Global Network Operations and Security Center was also commanded by the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as Army Element.

ACERT: Army Computer Emergency Response Unit

AGNOSC: Army Global Network and Security Center

ASCC: Army Army Command

ARSTRAT: Army Strategic Command (Missile Defense and Strategy)

CIO: Chief Information Officer

GCC: Theater Combat Command (Regional Joint Command, Six of the US Army’s Top Ten Command)

INSCOM: Intelligence and Security Command (one of the Army’s reporting units)

JTF-GNO: Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NETCOM: Army Network War Command

RCERT: Regional Computer Emergency Response Team

STRATCOM: US Strategic Command

TNCC: Theater Network Operations Control Center

TNOCC: Theater Network Operations and Security Center

G6: Army Command Department of Communications

G2 Army Command Information Department

Installation Network Provider

COMMAND – Strategic level operational command

OPCON: Battle (Battle) Command

TACON: tactical control

GS: Global Strike

TECHCON: echelon

ADCON: management control

Air Force ‘s Network Operations Command Control

The Air Force has chosen a different organizational approach to move the focus from the former headquarters of the Network Operations and Security Center (MAJCOM NOSCs) to the Integrated Network Operations and Security Centers (I-NOSCs: Integrated NetOps and Security Centers). Unlike the Army’s Battlefield Network Operations and Security Center, which is managed by the Theater Operations Command, the Air Force’s Integrated Network Operations and Security Center is not affiliated with any theater war command, but only by the Air Force Operations Center (AFNOC : Air Force NetOps Center), which is similar to the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Air Force realizes that the Theater Command must have the power to direct direct operations in its zone, and it is necessary to establish a general support relationship between the Air Force Operations Center and the Theater Operations Command, establishing a dedicated link between the two departments unit. In addition, the Air Force has given a command to the establishment of a communications control center in their respective theater areas. These control centers can be used as a shortcut between the Air Force Operations Center and their respective theater operations.

ACC: Air Warfare Center

AFCHQ: Air Force Command

AFNETOPS: Air Force Network Operations Command

ARSTRAT: Air Force Strategic Command Theater Network Operations Control Center

CIO: Chief Information Officer

I-NOSC: Integrated Network Operations and Security Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

JFCC-NW: Network War Joint Function Composition Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NCC: Network Control Center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNOS: Ibid., Theater Network Operations and Security Center

Naval network operations command control

The Navy and the Air Force, no longer regard the theater as a unit of command. In order to better support global operations, they assisted two existing theater naval warfare centers (RNOSCs) affiliated with the Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) to assist the original two naval schools in Naples and Bahrain Communication master station (NCTMS: Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station). In addition, since most of the Navy’s cyber operations were carried out at sea, they also established Fleet NetOps Centers (FNOCs: Fleet NetOps Centers), echoing the theater and cyber warfare centers located in the United States. The fleet network operations center is the tactical entry point for the fleet to conduct cyber operations, providing network services for audio, video and data for the fleet of the zone, and can be provided when the fleet goes from another area of the fleet network operations center into another area Smooth information transitions. Most unclassified networks are contracted by the US Navy Marine Corps Internet or the US Overseas Overseas Navy Enterprise Network (ONENET: Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network). In order to meet the needs of the battlefield, the Navy established the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet Global Network Operations and Security Center to provide global combat support, as well as the establishment of a war zone network combat and security center of the theater network security center on each Specific battlefield support. There is no subordinate relationship between the Theater Network Operations and Security Center and the theater operations headquarters in the theater.

Fleet NOC: Fleet Network Operations Center

GCC: Ibid., Regional Joint Command

INSCON: Ibid., Army Intelligence and Security Command

JTF-GNO: Ibid., Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations Command

NAVGNOSC: Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center

NAVSOC: Navy Satellite Operations Center

NCC MHQ: Navy Network Operations Information Operations and Space Warfare Center

NMCI GNOC: Maritime Network Global Network Operations Center

RNOSC: ibid, regional network operations center

STRATCOM: Ibid., Strategic Command

TNCC: Ibid., Theater Network Operations Control Center

Navy Global Network Operations and Security Center (NAVGNOSC) and the East and West Regional Network Operations and Security Center (East and West RNOSCs), which support the most basic organization of global naval operations. The Naval Global Network Operations and Security Center brings together information from the Theater Network Operations and Security Center, the Overseas Marine Corps Intranet and the Naval Satellite Operations Center to provide global command and control information for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. Unlike the Navy and the Army, they did not maintain a body belonging to the Theater Command. The support relationship between the forces established by the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations and the Theater Warfare Command did not give the theater war command the power to command the Naval Department’s global information grid. All command requests of the Theater Warfare Command must be approved by the Navy’s Global Network Operations and Security Center.

Command and Control of Theater Combat Command

Although each theater combat command in their respective jurisdictions for network operations are not the same way, but they have a common feature, that is, have established a theater network operations control center and a subordinate to the defense information system (DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency) of the theater network operations center. (CENTCOM) will be the theater network operations control center and the Defense Information Systems Agency’s theater network operations center known as the Central Theater Network Operations Center (Central Region Theater NetOps), the Central Commander of the Central Theater, Center, and the European Command (EUCOM) has established a Theater Communication Control Center (Theater Communication Control Center). Although there are some differences in the organization, but all the theater network operations control center are basically used by the theater combat command for the area of the global information grid command control (area of the global information grid is also known as the theater Information Grid TIG: Theater Information Grid).

The Theater Operations Command has optimized the configuration and control of the information resources of the global information grid through the Theater Network Operations Control Center to enable them to better serve the battle, while the Theater Network Operations Control Center is also connected to the Defense Information Systems Authority, the regular forces and the global Joint Operations of the Network Operations Joint Task Force. They collaborated with the Theater Network Warfare Center, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center to monitor the status of the theater information grid, to decide on the proposed global operations of the Joint Operations Task Force, and to assess the impact of its actions. The Theater Network Warfare Control Center has the right to decide on the reduction and termination of combat operations and to adjust the priority of operations through the Theater Network Operations Center and the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If there is no theater network operations and security center in the theater, the theater network operations control center under the Global Network Operations and Security Center tie is responsible for completing the mission required by the Theater Operations Command.

The North North Command (NORTHCOM) is a rather special sector, although it is a theater warfare command with a clear zone, but most of its troops in the zone – including cyber combat troops – are not affiliated with the commander , But belong to the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM: Join Forces Command). This deployment is intended to facilitate the global management of the force. The North Command, like several other theater warfare commanders, also set up a theater network operations control center, but did not establish a theater network operations and security center, which makes the North Command must rely on network operations and security centers and other departments for its Provide general support. In this case, the role of the North Command is to be responsible for the operations within its jurisdiction, but also the lack of understanding of the corresponding battlefield information grid, and no direct control of its power.

Strategic Command Network Operations Command Control

With the troops fighting command on the network combat structure to adjust the same, the Ministry of Defense departments are also undergoing reform. Over the years, the Department of Defense has not had a centralized control of the network operations. But in 1997 when the Department of Defense conducted this attempt to find some of the weaknesses of the network at that time, also came to the “combat command – troops – defense agencies,” this network mode of operation is not suitable for modern battlefield situation The That attempt has led to the formation of a Defense Force (IAA) bureau, which is part of today’s Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, which is responsible for the operation and defense of global information grids.

Global Network Operations Joint Task Force network operations command and control mechanism is also constantly evolving. Prior to the advent of the existing UCP: Unified Command Plan, the command and control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was under the responsibility of the Theater Operations Command, but it proved that it was not conducive to managing all the components in the network, It is also difficult to provide enough information for the global information grid information. The original version of the operational concept of cyber warfare emphasizes the control of the theater operations of the theater in the theater, which was described as follows: “The combat command has the power to command the troops assigned to its zone, Is conducive to the completion of the task, when the combat command feel appropriate, or even adjust the priority of the global information grid.All of these activities should be through the theater network operations center to achieve. “In fact, even the global Event, the initial version of the network combat concept document also provides that the global network operations Joint Task Force needs to be in the theater combat command of the theater network operations control center under the command of combat.

The follow-up version of the operational concept has been adapted to this principle. The control of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force was moved to a more global command and control structure, through which the overall role of the strategic headquarters, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and other forces involved in the network operations Has been strengthened. The operational concept of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subdivided into three environmental operational concepts: global, theater and non-global. What kind of environmental concepts apply to different events depends on the actual impact of the events and the impact of the theater. This form of command and control structure is more suitable for the current network combat diversity characteristics, for different levels of events, theater combat command can take a more flexible response measures, and even at the same time to support and supportive action. In this system, sometimes the process of dealing with the event to go through a complete command system chain, and sometimes you can skip some steps.

Global events

Global events refer to activities or events that clearly affect the preparedness of the entire global information grid, which often requires the concordation of multiple theater combatants to be resolved. Commander of the Strategic Command must have the ability to quickly identify global events and to be able to determine which theater combat operations or other agencies of the Department of Defense will be affected. Global events include fast-spreading network malicious code attacks, satellite communications attacks, and enterprise application attacks that are not limited to single-theater network events.

The Global Strategic Command is a reliable command center with command and command for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force and the Theater Command. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force uses its own resources to execute the instructions of the Strategic Command, which can be quickly sent to troops around the world. It is noteworthy that this order is not in the event of transmission to the theater of combat operations.

Although the notion of operational concept conferred the command of the commander of the strategic command worldwide, it did not completely deny the right of the theater war command to be commanded by the assigned joint command. While the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force performs the operational command of the Strategic Command, the Theater Operations Command can also deploy its troops to carry out the corresponding activities. Of course, in accordance with the requirements of the operational concept, the forces under the leadership of the theater operations command must be consistent with the action guidelines of the Joint Operations Task Force under the leadership of the Strategic Command. In fact, according to the historical action log of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations, most of the cyber operations began at the beginning of a small theater, and the Theater Command was always the first unit to deal with these incidents, and If they are handled properly, these theater-level events will not develop into global events.

Theater events

Theater events are those that occur in a battlefield area, and its foreseeable range of influence does not go beyond the theater, and the biggest difference between theater and global events is that. In the event of such incidents, the theater operations headquarters played a leading role, while the strategic headquarters only take the support role. The Global Network Operations Joint Task Force can provide support to the Theater Command by its Theater Network Operations and Security Center. If the local forces do not have a theater network operations and security center, it can also provide general support for the Theater Network Operations Control Center through the Global Network Operations and Security Center. The Command of the Theater Combat Command to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force is subordinate to the subordinate command, that is to say there is no right to direct the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force through its Global Network Operations and Security Center to operate in its area.

Non-global event

A non-global event is an event that only affects the functional warfare headquarters and a particular defense agency. Since such institutions do not have a clear zone, these events can neither be regarded as global nor can they be seen as theater. In dealing with non-global events, the Strategic Command plays the role of auxiliary command, and the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force provides general support for the operational operational warfare headquarters involved. Most of the non-global events generally occur in the northern command zone, since many of the relevant functional departments are subordinate to the Northern Command. In the case of command and control procedures, non-global events and global events are the same.

Contradictory command and control requirements

Tactical technical requirements

Although the positioning of the various forces are not the same, but in the pursuit of efficient network operations, reasonable combat methods are their common theme. Different forces shoulder different responsibilities, they established an independent combat network, application facilities and auxiliary tools to meet their own and global information grid to maintain connectivity needs. Each unit is responsible for operating part of the global information grid, which to some extent the need for combat operations between the various departments of the centralized management, so as to get the desired combat efficiency and return on investment.

The focus of the discussion on centralized control of global information grids is the global nature of cyber warfare. The only way for the Department of Defense to achieve a network-centric commanding mechanism, to enhance the Force’s awareness of the situation and to significantly shorten the decision-making cycle, is to integrate the network and the forces horizontally, which is a centralized control mechanism The The latest “four-year defense assessment report” mentioned in the “to simplify the current ‘chimney’ system structure, to achieve a network-centric command mechanism.”

In order to make better use of scarce resources, the Department of Defense must consider when and where to allocate resources from a global perspective. The allocation of essential resources for network operations such as satellite transmission bands, standard tactical entry network sites and bandwidth must have clear mission objectives and easy to understand global significance. From the perspective of the force, the centralized command is, to some extent, a reshuffle of the existing force institutions and operations, defense networks.

The combat operations led by the theater war command will no longer be strictly limited to its zone. Ground forces are re-starting to use aircraft (including unmanned aerial vehicles) to routinely fly in the United States to support their operations. With the development of the PGS: Prompt Global Strike project, the commander has the power to call for conventional strike assistance from weapons systems outside the theater.

On the Navy, they pointed out that one of the essential characteristics of the maritime forces was global mobility, and the naval forces were constantly interspersed between the various theater warheads. Especially as aircraft carrier battle group such units, once deployed, it can not stay in a small battlefield. In addition, even the theater-level operations taken by the theater war command may have a global impact. The adjustment of the network defensive posture may have a huge financial burden on the Internet sector, and the combat command may not be able to understand the specific details of the adjustment behavior.

For the Department of Defense’s network system, all attacks are essentially global in nature. The enemy can not easily from the other side of the Earth to the United States to attack the physical objectives, but in the field of computer network technology, such things happen often. Once such an attack is detected, the information about it must be communicated to all relevant departments in the shortest possible time to ensure that such attacks are identified from anywhere to protect the security of the global information grid. Every time a network intrusion – even if it does not seem to fail the invasion – is likely to give the global information grid content a huge potential harm, because they invade the system behind the back door will be in the future Attack to play a role. The outbreak of the virus is an undisputed global event, and if we do not realize this, we will suffer more losses.

The Navy emphasizes that the impact of no events will be limited to a theater area, and that all efforts to combat cyber operations must be global. Their defense is that there is no theater boundaries, the Department of Defense every battlefield combat headquarters are facing the same potential threat, in order to obtain information on the advantages of the Department of Defense must make full use of its large coverage of the network resources , Quickly share all useful information on a global basis.

In addition, the Air Force and the Navy have pointed out that their cyber warfare forces are not deployed by the Theater Warfare Command. The Air Force and the Navy have their own cyber warfare organizations (such as the Theater Network Operations and Security Center) in each zone of the Theater Command, and the Air Force and Navy’s cyber warfare forces are usually defender in the theater. Finally, the Air Force and the Navy believe that the Strategic Command is responsible for the Global Information Grid through the Theater Operations Command, based on the description of the official documents available for reference.

Theater war command

There are two issues that need to be concerned about the command and control of cyber warfare against the Theater Command. One is the need for timely control of the battlefield information grid, the second is the need to turn the network into a weapon system, so that commanders can be the same as the conventional weapon system to use the same network resources, the use of the full range of network advantages to conduct a comprehensive battle.

Those forces that have been assigned specific responsibilities have already deployed their own unique solutions, each of which is involved in a network operation or each institution believes that it already has the most effective allocation of scarce resources. But the global information grid is not exclusive to a particular department, but a joint structure. “Chimney” type system and the existing deployment of the troops is actually to reduce the efficiency of the battlefield information grid efficiency. For example, the Army developed a secure IP telephony solution before other departments in the Department of Defense to communicate with the secret voice. For security reasons, other departments usually do not use this program, but their own development of a set of the same function of the solution. So there will be two sets of independent, confidential IP voice schemes in the zone of the Combat Command, which can not be connected to each other. The theater warfare command had to be screened, leaving only a set of programs to ensure that all departments in their zones could cooperate with each other. But the solution is eliminated by the party can no longer with the theater outside the brother forces for confidential contact.

Some of the resources in the combat command zone can serve multiple forces and the public sector. However, there are many examples of the use of duplication of work for the establishment of their own can not be linked to each other independent systems, such as satellite terminals and some technical control equipment. Sometimes, to send a message, you need to send the signal back to the United States, and then sent from the local distance from the initial sender only two miles of the recipient there. All kinds of fibers are arranged one by one on the same route, but the data between them can not be exchanged directly because they belong to different forces or public departments. The theater operations command must take measures to address the interconnection between the troops or the civil service in the zone.

To solve this problem, you can use centralized control approach. The centralized command of the cyber warfare forces requires the theater war command to make some adjustments to its own organization, but at the same time it does not affect its power to direct action when there is a need for combat. Relevant forces must accept orders for multiple combat orders and effectively optimize and feedback battlefield information. At present, the troops sent to the front are becoming more and more independent, and through the help of the global information grid they can cross the border of the theater combat command back and forth, and the theater warfare command has been compromised by the support and confrontation of the cyber warfare , After the implementation of centralized command, the troops can not or do not want to respond to the requirements of the theater combat command.

The Pacific Command (PACOM: Pacific Command) first adopted a “joint attempt” approach in humanitarian aid operations when it participated in the Indonesian tsunami relief work in 2004. The Pacific Command issued instructions to the assigned troops to carry out special network defenses under the framework of the entire action plan. Many naval forces and Marine Corps units have established relatively direct network defenses under the centralized command of the Navy’s Global Network Operations Center, which goes beyond the mandate of the Pacific Command to the Navy and Marine Corps, which Posing a potential risk factor for the global operations of the Pacific Command.

The Combat Command is concerned that the idea of centralizing control of global information grids will always reduce their grip on information and control of the global information grid. Under the existing command system, a unit will carry out training or perform other tasks under the command of its troops, and participate in the battle under the command of the theater combat command, and the rules of command and control are very clear. The command and control of the forces in the field of information is as important as their command and control in the air, land, sea and space fields. For the C3S system (control, communications and computer systems), under its command to combat and responsible for the protection of its forces are often in a double or even triple the report chain, the results can not tell who is responsible for the final battle. In a global or non-global event, the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force often conducts direct operations around the theater operations headquarters. Although the operational concept of joint cyber warfare specifically emphasizes the need for coordinated operations with the theater combat command, this requirement has become almost in the context of modern combat rapid changes. Information Security Weakness Alert System, Computer Task Sequence, and Information Condition Adjustment System Problems outside the jurisdiction of the Combat Command are typical examples of this requirement failure. These events directly affect the command of the Theater Command in the battlefield, when the troops want to directly use these mechanisms from the management level to strengthen their own control, they can not determine when and how in the implementation of these Operation, and do not know what impact this will have on the command of the theater combat command, because under current conditions, only the theater combat command has the ability to carry out these operations. When a threat event requires the Air Force’s Space Command to seek the cooperation of the Joint Operations Task Force of the Global Network Operations with Air Force forces, it would bring to the command of the North Command if it did not notify or obtain cooperation with the Northern Command Big trouble.

In the Central Command, due to the lack of adequate control of the network combat forces, resulting in the commander sometimes can not determine whether the network resources are available. The Navy is responsible for operating a large number of battlefield information grids. Navy network combat forces in the operational area are not responsible for the Central Command of the Navy, who only need to report to the Theater Network Operations and Security Center. The central theater’s central theater theater operations center, whose duty is to maintain and direct all the combat operations of the theater operations, but it is not in the naval network combat force report chain, so it is often impossible to get all the battlefield information grid Of the state of affairs, there are already alternatives to deal with this problem, but this can not be said to be a formal solution.

For the North Command, because of the lack of cyber warfare control, they encountered great trouble in the rescue work of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In that operation, the troops’ equipment was transported to the joint warfare zone without permission. Which makes the North Command can not grasp and guide the transfer of materials, but can not coordinate the actions of various forces, which is a multi-directional management and operational issues.

As the various forces advocate the implementation of a centralized command framework centered on the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the theater commanders are reluctant to see such changes, Some of them are responsible for the strategic headquarters, with the global information grid operating rights and defense rights mechanism. The presence of the Strategic Command has been instrumental in maintaining the command of the theater combat command in combat operations in theater and global events and in enhancing communication between the theater combat command and the Joint Staff.

Combat headquarters and troops want to focus on the network operations from the level of joint operations, but there are several issues that need to be discussed:

Who is responsible for the first leadership?

2. Network operations to focus on what the specific direction of the command to be reflected, the global level, the theater level or what other level?

3. What is the change brought about by this adjustment only when a part of the theater combat command sends a request to the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force or is the theater commander’s complete command and priority in the theater?

Finally, the Theater Command is the body that is ultimately responsible for the President’s mission to complete the military mission in the area, and the troops dispatched to the theater combat command need to complete their respective tasks under their jurisdiction. It is unquestionable that they will still be under the command of the strategic command when the troops advocate the implementation of a global centralized command. But the current global information grid is a key part of the command and control capability of the theater combat command and the commander’s ability to guide the troops. Without a global information grid, the plane can not fly, the ground forces can not move, the ships can not sail, even the satellite can not provide the signal. Commanders need to get the status of the global information grid and control, just as they need to master the position and status of the troops as important. They must grasp the scope, ability and status of the battlefield information grid, and must know how the situation outside the theater will affect the battlefield information grid in the area where the troops are located and must be able to command and optimize the troops to support operations. If we really believe that the speculation of the centralized command will have a better effect, it can not be ignored for the theater war command to retain the appropriate command and control.

Also, as long as the structure of the Theater Command is still preserved, all military missions, including those directed by the Functional Command Command, will inevitably occur in the theater of the Theater Command, as all networks Combat missions must be carried out by an entity unit. At the same time, centralized command is necessary to achieve a network-centric command model and to more effectively defend against attacks. The concept of this centralized command and the command of the theater war command to master and optimize the battlefield information grid is not mutually exclusive.

The way forward

To develop a viable network combat command and control framework, it is necessary to avoid extremes, taking into account the needs of theater warfare headquarters and the need to establish centralized control of global information grids. In the process of the development of the operational concept of joint network operations and the transformation process of network combat forces, the principle of organization needs to play the role of adjusting the interests of all parties. In order to achieve this goal, the Department of Defense should do the following:

1. Create a simple, clear network combat command chain, to ensure that the strategic headquarters of all network operations can be directed. This can solve the problem just mentioned “who is responsible for the first leadership”. Only when the event occurred in a rapidly changing environment, the theater command and control agencies began to play a role. Simple command chain can ensure that troops involved in network operations know who should listen to who should report to whom, in this command chain, must include the theater combat command.

2. The command of the theater war command in its zone can be given:

– to amend the Joint Command plan to clarify the responsibilities of the Theater Operations Command to operate the network in its zone.

– Revise the existing global information grid network operational concept, detailing that those outside the theater network operations and security centers can obtain direct assistance from the World Network Operations and Security Center of the Theater Operations Command.

– All orders for the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force shall be enforced through the Theater Operations Command.

These adjustments ensure that all units in the theater are acting under a single command chain, which is responsible for the strategic headquarters through the Theater Operations Command. This can also solve the North Command should be responsible for the area but did not command the power of the network fighting the embarrassing situation.

3. In each theater combat command, a joint network operations center under the jurisdiction of the Central Command shall be established to integrate the Theater Network Operations Control Center of the Theater Command Command and the Theater Network Operations Center of the Global Network Operations Joint Task Force. As a result, each theater war command will have a joint operations command in the field of computer space, just as in the battlefield of land, sea and air. Any troops outside the Theater Network Operations and Security Center can obtain direct assistance from the Global Network Operations and Security Center of the Joint Network Operations Center.

4. To consolidate the status of the global information grid, the highest control to the strategic headquarters. The development of centralized command is now focused on the command of the forces involved in the network operations, which runs counter to the network-centric command concept. The force-centric “chimney” command system is not conducive to the transmission and processing of information, let us from the “all users to provide the latest and most accurate information” goal farther and farther. In the previous “Goldwater Nichols Defense Ministry Reconstruction Law” report has made it clear that the organization and management and command and control should be controlled by a joint agency.

Concluding remarks

The current centralized command of network operations is an urgent need. Optimizing the network operational command mechanism can help the Department of Defense to improve efficiency, save costs and better allocate scarce resources. More importantly, this allows network combat troops to provide information more quickly and accurately to commanders, which is important in large-scale network operations. The process of centralized command can not affect the efficiency of network combat command and control. This depends on whether the global information grid can provide enough information for all participating units and whether the commander makes full use of the theater information grid to help command operations.

“We have to change the network combat problem discussion and thinking mode, we are in the network” combat “rather than the network” management “, all participating units must ensure that they are ready to war every time to ensure that the network system A decisive weapon system. ” Network operations are a key part of our country’s ability to win war, it can help us provide command and control, shorten the decision-making cycle and adjust the resources of the theater. The Strategic Command has taken a big step in strengthening the concept of cyber warfare, and these efforts need to be continued. The theater warfare command must be an important part of the control and protection of the global information grid to ensure that we can continue to win the network.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

是誰在負責配置美國所擁有的信息資源？誰在負責分配這些資源利用時的優先級順序？我們採取了哪些措施來保證全球信息柵格（GIG：Global Information Grid）、獨立聯合服務系統以及依靠從它們身上獲取信息來開展工作的戰區作戰司令部（GCCs：Geographic Combatant Commanders）和全球網絡聯合特遣部隊（JTF-GNO：Joint Task Force-Global NetOps）的安全？最近幾年以來，整個網絡作戰系統對這些問題的討論一直沒有停息過，人們爭論的焦點就是戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中應該扮演什麼樣的角色。

美國軍方公佈了對每個戰區作戰司令部的部署，同時還宣布將會減少跨戰區的軍事支持行動。對每個戰區作戰司令部來說，如何配置支持本戰區作戰的信息基礎設施就變得非常重要了。敵人有可能會滲透進負責軍事力量調度的關鍵網絡系統區域進行破壞，這些入侵的危害常常被低估，甚至被當作意外事件或者偶發事件輕描淡寫地處理掉，但是這些入侵行為實際上完全有可能濫發連接請求來阻塞商業網站的正常運行，甚至導致一些承擔軍隊後勤業務的物流公司被標為無效狀態。戰區作戰司令部應該保證其防區的信息條件不受外部入侵的影響。不計其數的病毒正在破壞著互聯網，國防部的系統也開始遭到攻擊。現在有人在討論是否應該讓全球網絡聯合特遣隊斷開互聯網上的軍事入網點，但軍方又擔心僅靠和商業供應商的合作，國防部不能保證所有的後勤支持行動都能繼續無差錯地進行下去。每個戰區作戰司令部對各自的戰區網絡狀態都不太確定，他們對全球信息柵格本身的安全持有懷疑態度，他們擔心其是否有能力執行分配給它的任務。

受到建立一個更全球化的網絡作戰控制機構、加強美國戰略司令部（STRATCOM）和全球網絡聯合特遣隊在網絡作戰中的主導地位思想的影響，戰區作戰司令部對其防區的指揮控制權有所削弱。將作戰信息集中到全球信息柵格的做法也在一定程度上影響了戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格是如何支持該戰區的作戰的具體行為的了解。本文將會介紹現有的指揮關係、戰區作戰司令部的職責、指揮和作戰之間的線性關係、舊有的和新興的聯合作戰原則一級特殊戰例分析，最後還將會對戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中所應扮演的角色提出建議。

網絡作戰的環境

網絡作戰中的指揮控制是一個在十年以前就出現了的概念，之後它的內涵一直處在演變之中。每個相關部門、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊都為此進行過一些組織結構和工作重心上的調整，但是最終都沒有解決好各自應該扮演的角色這個問題。要想真正明白為什麼戰區作戰司令部在網絡作戰中的角色會成為一個難題，就必須先弄清楚這幾個問題：網絡作戰是在哪兒發生的、什麼是真正的網絡作戰、網絡作戰中的每個部門的組織結構和指揮控制結構是怎樣的。

首先需要解釋的是，什麼是全球信息柵格？按照國防部第8100.1號文件的定義，它包括“全球互聯的、終端到終端的信息傳輸能力和聯合處理能力。按照戰士、決策者的需要來進行信息採集、處理、儲存、傳播和管理的能力”。這就涵蓋了政府的和租用的通信信息系統及服務，以及全球信息柵格所需的其他軟件、安全和服務支持，還包括1996年3月頒布的《克林格-科恩法》（Clinger- Cohen Act）第5142節所定義的國家安全系統（National Security System）。按照這個定義，全球信息柵格包含了國防部和國家安全系統的所有級別的信息系統，從戰術層次到戰略層次，以及互聯通信系統。

大多數關於全球信息柵格網絡作戰中心的指揮控制的討論都在著重強調該系統的防禦能力，但是網絡作戰包含的內容其實遠不止這點，網絡作戰要完成的任務包括三項：部門管理、內容管理和網絡防禦，其工作目的是提供跨越戰略、戰術和作戰概念邊界的無中心式支持，為國防部的全方位的戰鬥、情報和考察任務提供支持。

1.部門管理是全球信息柵格的具體任務之一，它是對構成全球信息柵格的系統和網絡的技術、過程和政策管理，包括公務部門管理、系統管理、網絡管理、衛星通信管理和電磁光譜管理這幾個方面。

2.內容管理指的是管理全球信息柵格里的信息本身。它用即時的方式保證信息對使用者、操作者和決策者都是可用的。內容管理包括對全球信息柵格的具體信息內容的查找、訪問、傳輸、儲存和一體化。

3.網絡防禦就是對全球信息柵格所有的信息包括附加信息進行保護，它主要包括一些政策、過程、項目和操作。如果有必要的話，該任務可以請求通過跨機構合作來完成。它負責的是全球信息柵格的信息安全、計算機網絡防禦、計算機防衛反應能力和關鍵性基礎設施保護。

現在已經了解了網絡作戰的基本組織結構，下一步介紹網絡作戰中的各個組織和他們是如何執行任務的，需要介紹的主要是部隊、戰區作戰司令部和全球網絡聯合特遣隊，它們都在隨著戰場要求的變化而改進著各自的組織結構。

部隊在組織結構上的改變主要是為了滿足全球信息柵格對信息傳輸、訪問、控制和保護能力的要求。十年之前，部隊為了適應網絡作戰曾針對區域控制進行過一些變革，但那些措施最終發展成了集中化的控制，這些措施也沒有保留下來。現在我們有必要了解一下部隊的組織構成，以便更好地理解為什麼網絡作戰的指揮控制會變得如此充滿爭議。
GEM：GIG企業管理 GCM：GIG內容管理 GND:GIG網絡防禦
陸軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

陸軍是所有軍種中改革措施最少的。陸軍繼續保持著以前的指揮機構，現在叫做戰場網絡作戰與安全中心（TNOSC：Theater NetOps and Security Centers），該組織直接對各個戰區作戰司令部負責。陸軍維持著一個獨立的全球網絡作戰與安全中心（GNOSC：Global NetOps and Security Center），所有的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心都是其下屬機構。全球網絡作戰與安全中心對戰場網絡作戰與安全中心進行技術控制，但是戰場網絡作戰與安全中心同時又隸屬於戰區作戰司令部，也受到戰區網絡司令部的管理，典型的例子就是陸軍的戰場信號旅受陸軍服務組件指揮部的管理。

全球網絡作戰與安全中心對各個戰區的網絡作戰部隊提供技術指導。美國陸軍網絡司令部暨第9信號司令部對全球網絡作戰與安全中心的技術和管理負責。但是在戰時，全球網絡作戰與安全中心又作為陸軍的元素受戰略司令部（STRATCOM）的指揮。
ACERT：陸軍計算機應急響應分隊
AGNOSC：陸軍全球網絡和安全中心

ASCC：陸軍軍種組成司令部

ARSTRAT：陸軍戰略司令部（導彈防禦與戰略）

CIO：首席信息官

GCC：戰區作戰司令部（地區性聯合司令部，美軍十大司令部中的六個）

INSCOM：情報和安全司令部（陸軍直屬報告單位之一）

JTF-GNO：聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NETCOM：陸軍網絡戰爭司令部

RCERT：地區性計算機應急響應分隊

STRATCOM：美軍戰略司令部

TNCC：戰區網絡作戰控制中心

TNOCC：戰區網絡作戰和安全中心

G6：陸軍司令部通信部門

G2陸軍司令部情報部門

Installation Network Provider網絡施設提供商

COMMAND—戰略層面作戰指揮

OPCON:作戰（戰役）指揮

TACON：戰術控制

GS：全球打擊

TECHCON：梯隊

ADCON：管理控制

空軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

空軍選擇了一條不同的組織途徑，把重點從以前的一級司令部網絡作戰和安全中心（MAJCOM NOSCs）轉移到了一體化網絡作戰和安全中心（I-NOSCs：Integrated NetOps and Security Centers）。與陸軍的戰場網絡作戰與安全中心受戰區作戰司令部的管理不同的是，空軍的一體化網絡作戰和安全中心並不隸屬於任何一個戰區作戰司令部，而是只受空軍網絡作戰中心（AFNOC ：Air Force NetOps Center）的管理，該中心與陸軍的全球網絡作戰和安全中心性質類似。空軍意識到了戰區作戰司令部必須擁有在其防區直接指揮網絡作戰行動的權力，有必要在空軍網絡作戰中心和戰區作戰司令部之間建立起一般支持的關係，建立兩個部門之間的專用聯絡單元。另外空軍方面還賦予了一級司令部在各自的戰區建立通信控制中心的自主權，這些控制中心可以當作空軍網絡作戰中心與各自戰區作戰司令部相互聯繫的快捷通道。
ACC：空戰中心
AFCHQ：空軍組成司令部

AFNETOPS：空軍網絡作戰司令部

ARSTRAT：空軍戰略司令部戰區網絡作戰控制中心

CIO：首席信息官

I-NOSC：集成網絡作戰和安全中心

GCC：同上，地區性聯合司令部

JFCC-NW：網絡戰聯合職能組成司令部

JTF-GNO：同上，聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NCC：網絡控制中心

STRATCOM：同上，戰略司令部

TNOS：同上，戰區網絡作戰與安全中心

海軍的網絡作戰指揮控制

海軍和空軍一樣，不再把戰區當作指揮的單位。為了更好地支持全球作戰，他們用隸屬於海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心（NAVGNOSC）的兩個戰區網絡戰安全中心（RNOSCs）來協助原有的位於那不勒斯和巴林島的兩個戰區海軍計算機與通信主站（NCTMS：Navy Computer and Telecommunications Master Station）。另外，由於海軍的大多數網絡作戰是在海上進行，所以他們還建立了艦隊網絡作戰中心（FNOCs：Fleet NetOps Centers），與位於美國本土的戰區網絡戰安全中心互為呼應。艦隊網絡作戰中心是艦隊進行網絡作戰的戰術切入點，可以為本防區的艦隊提供音頻、視頻和數據等網絡服務，並且可以在艦隊從一個艦隊網絡作戰中心的轄區駛入另一個轄區的時候提供平滑的信息過渡。多數未分類的網絡都是由美國本土的海軍陸戰隊內聯網（NMCI：Navy Marine Corps Internet）或者美國海外的海外海軍企業網絡（ONENET：Outside of CONUS Navy Enterprise Network）負責承包運營的。為了適應戰場的需求，海軍建立了海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網全球網絡作戰與安全中心來提供全球性的作戰支持，同時也建立了隸屬於戰區網絡作戰與安全中心的戰區網絡戰安全中心對各個具體戰場提供支持。戰區網絡作戰與安全中心與所在戰區的戰區作戰司令部並沒有從屬關係。
Fleet NOC:艦隊網絡作戰中心
GCC：同上，地區性聯合司令部

INSCON：同上，陸軍情報和安全司令部

JTF-GNO：同上，聯合特遣部隊-全球網絡作戰司令部

NAVGNOSC：海軍全球網絡作戰和安全中心

NAVSOC：海軍衛星作戰中心

NCC MHQ：海軍網絡作戰信息作戰和太空戰中心

NMCI GNOC：海軍陸戰隊網全球網絡作戰中心

RNOSC：同上，地區性網絡作戰中心

STRATCOM：同上，戰略司令部

TNCC：同上，戰區網絡作戰控制中心

支持全球海軍作戰的最基本的組織的海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心（NAVGNOSC）和東西部戰區網絡作戰與安全中心（East and West RNOSCs）。海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心匯集了來自戰區網絡作戰與安全中心、海外海軍陸戰隊內聯網和海軍衛星作戰中心的信息，為全球網絡行動聯合特遣部隊提供全球性的指揮控制信息。海軍和陸軍不同的是，他們沒有維持一個隸屬於戰區作戰司令部的機構。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊建立的部隊與戰區作戰司令部之間的支持關係並沒有賦予戰區作戰司令部在海軍部負責的全球信息柵格範圍內進行指揮的權力。戰區作戰司令部的所有指揮請求都必須先經過海軍全球網絡作戰與安全中心的批准。

戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰指揮控制

儘管每個戰區作戰司令部在各自的轄區內針對網絡作戰的組織方式都不盡相同，但是他們卻有一個共同的特點，那就是都建立了一個戰區網絡作戰控制中心和一個隸屬於國防信息系統局（DISA：Defense Information Systems Agency）的戰區網絡作戰中心。各個戰區網絡作戰控制中心的組織結構並不完全相同，美國中央司令部（CENTCOM）將戰區網絡作戰控制中心和國防信息系統局的戰區網絡作戰中心合稱為中央戰區網絡作戰中心（Central Region Theater NetOps Center），而歐洲司令部（EUCOM）則建立了一個戰區通信控制中心（Theater Communication Control Center）。雖然在組織上有些差異，但是所有的戰區網絡作戰控制中心基本上都是被戰區作戰司令部用來對轄區內的全球信息柵格進行指揮控制（轄區內的全球信息柵格也被稱為戰區信息柵格TIG：Theater Information Grid）。

戰區作戰司令部通過戰區網絡作戰控制中心來優化配置和控制全球信息柵格的信息資源，以使它們更好地為戰鬥服務，同時戰區網絡作戰控制中心也是連接國防信息系統局、常規部隊和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區接口。他們與戰區網絡戰中心、戰區網絡作戰和安全中心合作來監控戰區信息柵格的狀態，對被提議的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊相關行動作出決定，並評估其行動的影響。戰區網絡戰控制中心對作戰行動力度的減小和終止有決定權，並且通過戰區網絡作戰中心和戰區網絡作戰與安全中心來調整作戰的優先級。如果該戰區沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，那麼就由全球網絡作戰與安全中心領帶下的戰區網絡作戰控制中心來負責完成戰區作戰司令部所要求的任務。

美國的北方司令部（NORTHCOM）是一個比較特別的部門，雖然它是一個有著明確防區的戰區作戰司令部，但是其防區內的大部分部隊——包括網絡作戰部隊——都不隸屬於該司令部，而是屬於美國聯合部隊司令部（JFCOM：Join Forces Command）。這樣的部署是為了便於部隊的全球性管理。北方司令部和其他幾個戰區作戰司令部一樣，也設立了戰區網絡作戰控制中心，但是卻沒有建立戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，這就使得北方司令部必須依靠網絡作戰與安全中心等部門為其提供一般支持。在這種情況下，北方司令部所扮演的角色就是需要負責其轄區內的作戰行動，但是又對相應的戰場信息柵格缺乏了解，更沒有直接控制它的權力。

戰略司令部網絡作戰指揮控制

與部隊戰鬥司令部對網絡作戰結構進行調整一樣，國防部的相關部門也在進行著改革。多年以來，國防部一直沒有一個集中控制的網絡作戰部。但是在1997年的時候國防部進行過這方面的嘗試，發現了一些當時網絡的弱點，也得出了“作戰司令部-部隊-國防機構”這種網絡作戰的模式已經不適合現代的戰場情況。那次嘗試促成了國防信息系統局最終組建了一支實體部隊，也就是今天的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊來負責全球信息柵格的操作和防禦。

全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的網絡作戰指揮控制機制同樣也在不斷發展。在現有的聯合司令部計劃（UCP：Unified Command Plan）出現之前，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮控制都是由戰區作戰司令部負責，但是事實證明這不利於管理網絡中的所有組件，也難以為全球信息柵格提供足夠的事態感知信息。最初版本的網絡作戰的作戰概念比較強調戰區作戰司令部對其防區的網絡作戰的控制，當時對處理戰區問題的描述是這樣的：“作戰司令部有權指揮被指派到其防區的部隊，只要是利於任務的完成，在作戰司令部覺得合適的時候，甚至可以調整全球信息柵格的優先級。所有的這些活動，都應該通過戰區網絡作戰中心來實現。”事實上，即使是全球性的事件，最初版本的網絡作戰概念文件也規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊需要在戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心指揮下進行作戰。
作戰概念的後續版本對這項原則進行了調整。對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的控制被移到了一個更加全球化的指揮控制架構中，通過這樣的調整，戰略司令部、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和其他參與網絡作戰的部隊的整體角色都得到了加強。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的作戰概念被細分成了三個環境作戰概念：全球性的、戰區性的和非全局性的。不同的事件適用何種環境概念取決於事件造成的實際影響和戰區影響。這種形式的指揮控制結構更加適用於目前網絡作戰多樣性特性，針對不同級別的事件，戰區作戰司令部可以採取更加靈活的應對措施，甚至可以同時展開支持性的和輔助性的行動。在這種制度下，有時候處理事件的過程要經過完整的指揮系統鏈，有時候可以跳過一些步驟。

全球性事件

全球性事件是指那些顯而易見會影響整個全球信息柵格的備戰度的活動或事件，這類事件通常需要多個戰區作戰司令部的協同處理才能得到解決。戰略司令部的指揮官必須要具備快速鑑別全球性事件的能力，並要能具體判斷出有哪些戰區作戰司令部或者國防部的其他機構會受到影響。全球性事件包括快速傳播的網絡惡意代碼攻擊、衛星通信攻擊、企業應用攻擊等不僅僅局限於單個戰區的網絡事件。

全球戰略司令部是一個可靠的指揮中心，它對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊和戰區作戰司令部都有命令和指揮權。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊利用自己的資源來執行戰略司令部的指示，作戰命令可以很快地發送到在全球各地的部隊中。值得注意的是，這種命令在傳遞時不經過事件發生地的戰區作戰司令部。

雖然作戰概念的原則賦予了戰略司令部指揮官全球範圍內的指揮權，但是這也並沒有完全否定戰區作戰司令部可以通過分配的聯合司令部計劃來進行指揮的權利。在全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊執行戰略司令部的作戰命令的同時，戰區作戰司令部也可以調遣其麾下的部隊進行相應的活動。當然，按照作戰概念的要求，戰區作戰司令部領導下的部隊的行動必須與戰略司令部領導下的全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的行動方針保持一致。事實上，據全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的歷史行動日誌記載，大多數的網絡作戰一開始都是在小範圍戰區開始出現的，戰區作戰司令部總是著手處理這些事件的第一單位，而且如果處理得適當的話，這些戰區級別的事件就不會發展成全球性事件。

戰區性事件

戰區性事件是指那些發生在某個戰場區域，其可預見的影響範圍不會超出該戰區的事件，戰區性事件與全球性事件的最大區別也就在於此。在處理這類事件的時候，戰區作戰司令部起著主導作用，而戰略司令部只承擔輔助的支持作用。全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊可以通過其戰區網絡作戰與安全中心對戰區作戰司令部提供支援。如果當地的部隊沒有戰區網絡作戰與安全中心，那也可以通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心為戰區網絡作戰控制中心提供一般支持。戰區作戰司令部對全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的指揮屬於次級指揮，也就是說沒有權利通過全球網絡作戰與安全中心來直接調動全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊到其所轄區域進行作戰。

非全局性事件

非全局性事件是指只對職能作戰司令部和特定的國防機構造成影響的事件。由於這類機構沒有明確的防區，所以這些事件既不能被看成全球性的也不能被看成戰區性的。在處理非全局性事件時，戰略司令部扮演輔助指揮的角色，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊對所涉及到的職能作戰司令部提供一般支持。大多數的非全局性事件一般都發生在北方司令部的防區，因為很多相關的職能部門都隸屬於北方司令部。在指揮控制的程序方面，非全局性事件和全球性事件是相同的。

相互矛盾的指揮控制要求

戰術技術的要求

儘管各個部隊的定位不盡相同，但是在網絡作戰中追求高效、合理的作戰方法是他們共同的主題。不同的部隊肩負著不同的職責，他們建立了獨立的作戰網絡、應用設施和輔助工具來滿足自身與全球信息柵格保持聯通的需求。每支部隊都要負責操作一部分全球信息柵格，這在一定程度上需要各部隊間作戰鏈的集中化管理，這樣才能獲得所期待的作戰效率和投入回報率。

關於對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制討論的焦點是網絡作戰的全球性特質。國防部想要實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制、增強部隊的事態感知能力和顯著縮短決策週期的目標的話，唯一的方法就是將網絡和部隊進行橫向的融合，這是一種集中化的控制機制。最新的一份《四年防務評估報告》裡就提到過“要簡化目前的‘煙囪式’系統結構，實現以網絡為中心的指揮機制”。

為了更好地利用緊缺資源，國防部必須從全球性的角度來考慮何時何地調撥何種資源。對衛星傳輸波段、標準戰術入口網絡站點和帶寬等網絡作戰必需資源的分配必須要有明確的任務目標和易於理解的全球性意義。從部隊的角度來看，集中化指揮在某種程度上是對現有部隊機構和作戰、防禦網絡的一次重新洗牌。

由戰區作戰司令部領導的作戰行動將不再嚴格地限於其防區內。地面部隊重新開始利用飛機（包括無人機）例行地在美國本土飛行來支持他們的作戰。隨著快速全球打擊（PGS：Prompt Global Strike）項目的發展，指揮官已經有權力呼叫從戰區以外的武器系統發出常規打擊援助。

在海軍方面，他們指出海上部隊的一個本質性特點就是全球流動性，海軍部隊作戰時會不斷地在各個戰區作戰司令部之間穿插。尤其是像航母戰鬥群這樣的單位，一旦被部署出發，就不可能一直呆在一塊小範圍的戰場。另外，即使是戰區作戰司令部所採取的戰區級別的行動，也有可能產生全球性的影響。網絡防禦姿態的調整可能對互聯網部門帶來巨大的經濟負擔，而且作戰司令部還有可能無法了解到調整行為的具體細節結果。

對國防部的網絡系統來說，所有的攻擊本質上同樣都是全球性的。敵人不可能輕易地從地球的另一端對美國本土的實體目標進行攻擊，但是在計算機網絡科技領域，這樣的事情經常發生。一旦檢測到這種攻擊，關於它的信息必須要在最短的時間內傳遍全球所有的相關部門，以保證從任何地方都能識別出這樣的攻擊方式，從而保護全球信息柵格的安全。每一次網絡入侵——哪怕是看起來無關緊要的失敗的入侵——都有可能給全球信息柵格的內容帶來巨大的潛在危害，因為它們入侵時在系統中留下的後門會在以後的攻擊中發揮作用。病毒的爆發是毫無爭議的全球性事件，如果認識不到這一點的話，我們將會受到更大的損失。

海軍強調沒有任何事件的影響會僅限於某個戰區範圍，所有關於網絡作戰的努力都必須是全球性的。他們的理由是網絡作戰是沒有戰區界限的，國防部的每個戰區作戰司令部所面臨的潛在威脅都是相同的，為了獲得信息上的優勢，國防部必須要充分利用其大覆蓋面的網絡資源，快速地在全球範圍內分享所有的有用信息。

此外，空軍和海軍方面指出，他們的網絡作戰部隊都不是由戰區作戰司令部來負責部署的。在每個戰區作戰司令部的防區內，空軍和海軍都有自己的網絡作戰組織（例如戰區網絡作戰與安全中心），而且空軍和海軍的網絡作戰部隊在戰區內通常是扮演維護者的角色。最後一點，空軍和海軍都認為，根據可供參考的官方文件的描述，戰略司令部通過戰區作戰司令部對全球信息柵格負責。

戰區作戰司令部的要求

對戰區作戰司令部來說，在網絡作戰的指揮控制方面有兩個需要關心的問題。一是需要對戰場信息柵格進行及時的控制，二是需要把網絡變成一個武器系統，讓指揮官們可以像對常規的武器系統一樣共同利用網絡資源，利用網絡全方位的優勢來進行全面的戰鬥。

那些被分配了特定職責的部隊，已經部署好了各自唯一的解決方案，參與到網絡作戰中的每支部隊或者每個機構都相信自己已經擁有了最有效分配緊缺資源的辦法。但是全球信息柵格並不是專屬於某一個部門的，而是一個聯合結構。 “煙囪”式系統和現有的部隊部署方式實際上是降低了戰場信息柵格的利用效率。舉個例子來說，陸軍在國防部的其他部門之前研發出了一套安全的IP電話解決方案，可以進行保密語音的聯絡。出於安全考慮，其他部門通常不會再採用這套方案，而是自己再開發一套功能相同的解決方案。這樣在作戰司令部的防區內就有了兩套獨立的保密IP語音方案，它們相互之間不能進行聯通。戰區作戰司令部只得進行篩選，只保留一套方案，以保證在其防區內所有部門可以進行彼此協作。但是解決方案被淘汰的一方就不能再與該戰區以外的兄弟部隊進行保密聯絡了。

作戰司令部防區內的有些資源可以為多個部隊和公務部門服務。但是也有很多例子是使用者進行重複勞動為各自建立了不能相互聯絡的獨立系統，比如衛星終端和一些技術控制設備。有些時候，要傳遞一個信息的話，需要先把信號發回美國本土，然後再從本土發到距離初始發送者只有兩英里的接收者那裡。各種各樣的光纖一條挨一條地按照相同的路線排列著，但是它們之間的數據卻不能進行直接交換，因為它們分屬於不同的部隊或者公務部門。戰區作戰司令部必須採取措施來解決防區內的部隊或者公務部門之間的互聯性問題。

要解決這個問題，可以採用集中化控制的辦法。對網絡作戰部隊的集中化指揮需要戰區作戰司令部對自身的組織機構進行一定的調整，但是同時又不能影響其在有作戰需要時指揮行動的權力。相關部隊必須接受多個作戰司令部的命令，並且有效地優化和反饋戰場信息。目前，派往前線的部隊獨立性越來越高，通過全球信息柵格的幫助他們可以來回地越過戰區作戰司令部的邊界，戰區作戰司令部對網絡作戰的輔助和對抗作用因此而受到了損害，施行集中化指揮以後，部隊就不能或者說不願意響應戰區作戰司令部的要求了。

在2004年參與印尼海嘯救助工作的時候，太平洋司令部（PACOM：Pacific Command）首次在人道援助行動中採取了“聯合嘗試”的方式。太平洋司令部向被分派有任務的部隊發出指令，讓他們在整個行動計劃的框架之下進行特別的網絡防禦工作。很多海軍部隊和海軍陸戰隊的部隊在海軍全球網絡作戰中心的集中化指揮下，建立了一些相對直接的網絡防禦措施，這些措施超越了太平洋司令部給海軍和海軍陸戰隊分配的任務範圍，這就給太平洋司令部的全球網絡作戰帶來了潛在的危險因素。

作戰司令部很關心總是強調的對全球信息柵格進行集中化控制的思想會降低他們對全球信息柵格的信息掌握度和控制力度。在現有的指揮制度下，一個單位會在其所在部隊的指揮權下進行訓練或者執行其他任務，在戰區作戰司令部的指揮權下參加戰鬥，指揮控制的條理非常清晰。對部隊在信息領域的指揮控制與對其在空中、陸上、海上和空間領域的指揮控制同等重要。對C3S系統（control, communications and computer systems）來說，在其指揮下進行作戰並負責保護它的部隊常常要處於雙重甚至三重的報告鏈中，結果最後分不清到底是誰在負責指揮戰鬥。在全球性或者非全局性事件中，全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊經常繞開戰區作戰司令部直接展開行動。儘管聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念專門強調了與戰區作戰司令部進行協調作戰的要求，但是在現代作戰快速變化的環境中，這條要求幾乎成了擺設。信息保障弱點警報系統、計算機任務序列和信息條件調整系統在作戰司令部的轄區之外出現問題就是這條要求失效的典型例子。這些事件直接影響了戰區作戰司令部在戰場上的指揮，當部隊想要直接利用這些機制從管理級上加強自身的控制的時候，他們不能判斷應該在何時、以什麼樣的方式在執行這些操作，也不知道這樣做會對戰區作戰司令部的指揮產生什麼影響，因為在目前的條件下，只有戰區作戰司令部才有能力來進行這些操作。當一個威脅事件需要空軍太空司令部向空軍部隊尋求全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的協同配合的時候，如果不通知或者取得與北方司令部的合作的話，將會給北方司令部的指揮帶來極大的麻煩。

在中央司令部，由於對網絡作戰部隊缺乏足夠的控制，導致指揮官有時候也不能確定網絡資源是否可用。海軍負責操作大量的戰場信息柵格，在作戰區域的海軍網絡作戰部隊並不用對中央司令部的海軍部負責，他們只需要向戰區網絡作戰與安全中心報告。中央司令部的中央戰區戰區網絡作戰中心，其職責是維持和指揮所有戰區作戰司令部的網絡作戰，但是它也不在海軍網絡作戰部隊的報告鏈當中，所以也常常不能獲得所有戰場信息柵格上的事態感知，目前已經有替代辦法來處理這個問題了，不過這還不能說是正式的解決辦法。

對北方司令部來說，因為網絡作戰部隊的控制權的缺乏，他們在2005年“卡特琳娜”颶風的救援工作中遇到了極大的麻煩。在那次行動中，部隊的設備在未經許可的情況下就被運送到了聯合作戰區域。這使得北方司令部無法掌握和引導物資的調動情況，更無法協同各個部隊的行動，這是個多方位的管理和操作問題。

在各個部隊都主張施行在以全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊為中心的集中化指揮構架的時候，我們有必要強調一個事實，那就是戰區司令部並不願意看到這樣的變化，他們想保持原有的他們對戰略司令部負責，擁有全球信息柵格的操作權和防禦權的機制。戰略司令部的存在對保持戰區作戰司令部在戰區和全球性事件的作戰行動中的指揮地位以及增強戰區作戰司令部與聯合參謀部的溝通都有很大的幫助。

作戰司令部和部隊方面都想從聯合作戰的層面上對網絡作戰進行集中化指揮，但是其中有幾個問題還需要討論：

1.誰負第一領導責任？

2.網絡作戰進行集中化指揮具體在哪個層面上得到體現，全球層面、戰區層面還是其他什麼層面？

3.這種調整帶來的改變是僅僅體現在戰區作戰司令部的某個部門向全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊發出請求時還是戰區作戰司令部獲得戰區內的完全指揮權和優先權？

最後，戰區作戰司令部是最終對總統負責的以完成轄區內的軍事任務為目標的機構，被派遣到戰區作戰司令部的部隊需要在其管轄權之下完成各自的任務。因此在部隊方面主張實施全球性的集中指揮的時候，他們仍然會處於戰略司令部的指揮之下這一點是不容置疑的。但是目前全球信息柵格是影響戰區作戰司令部的指揮控制能力和指揮官對部隊的指導能力的關鍵一環。沒有全球信息柵格的話，飛機不能飛行、地面部隊無法移動、艦艇不能航行，連衛星都不能提供信號。指揮官們需要獲取全球信息柵格的狀態並進行控制，就像他們需要掌握部隊的方位和狀態一樣重要。他們必須要掌握戰場信息柵格的範圍、能力和狀態，必須知道戰區以外的情況會如何影響部隊所在區域的戰場信息柵格，還必須能夠指揮和優化部隊配置以支持作戰。如果我們真的相信被描述得天花亂墜的集中化指揮會有更好的效果，那也不能忽視為戰區作戰司令部保留適當的指揮和控制權。

還有，只要戰區作戰司令部這種結構還保留著，那麼所有的軍事任務，包括那些由職能作戰司令部指揮的作戰，都必然還是會發生在戰區作戰司令部的防區內，因為所有的網絡作戰任務都必定要由一個實體單位來執行。同時，集中化指揮對於實現以網絡為中心的指揮模式以及更加有效地防禦攻擊、傳遞信息都是必要的。這種集中化指揮的概念與戰區作戰司令部要求掌握和優化戰場信息柵格的願望是不互斥的。

前進之路

要想制定出一套可行的網絡作戰指揮控制框架，必須要避免走極端，既要考慮戰區作戰司令部的需要，也要考慮建立對全球信息柵格的集中化控制的需要。在目前聯合網絡作戰的作戰概念的發展過程和網絡作戰部隊的轉型過程中，組織原則需要發揮調整各方利益的槓桿作用。為了達到這樣的目標，國防部應該做到以下幾點：

1.創建一個簡單、明確的網絡作戰指揮鏈，保證戰略司令部可以對所有的網絡作戰行動進行指揮。這就可以解決剛才提到的“誰負第一領導責任”的問題。只有當事件發生在快速變化的環境中的時候，戰區指揮控制機構才開始發揮作用。簡潔的指揮鏈可以保證參加網絡作戰的部隊知道自己應該聽從誰的指揮、應該向誰報告，在這條指揮鏈中，必須包括戰區作戰司令部。

2.可以賦予戰區作戰司令部在其防區內的指揮權：

——修正聯合司令部計劃以明確戰區作戰司令部在其防區內對網絡作戰的職責。

——修正已有的全球信息柵格網絡作戰概念，詳細說明那些處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊可以從戰區作戰司令部的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

——規定全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的所有命令都要通過戰區作戰司令部來執行。

這些調整可以保證戰區中的所有單位都在唯一的一條指揮鏈下行動，那就是通過戰區作戰司令部對戰略司令部負責。這也可以解決北方司令部應該對轄區負責但是又沒有指揮網絡作戰的權力的尷尬境地。

3.在每個戰區作戰司令部建立一個由中央司令部管轄的聯合網絡作戰中心，將戰區作戰司令部的戰區網絡作戰控制中心和全球網絡作戰聯合特遣部隊的戰區網絡作戰中心進行融合。這樣一來，每個戰區作戰司令部都將有一個在計算機空間領域的聯合作戰司令部，就像在海陸空的實體戰場上一樣。任何處在戰區網絡作戰與安全中心之外的部隊都可以從聯合網絡作戰中心的全球網絡作戰與安全中心獲得直接援助。

4.鞏固全球信息柵格的地位，將最高控制權交給戰略司令部。目前集中化指揮的發展偏重於對參與網絡作戰的部隊的指揮，這與以網絡為中心的指揮概念背道而馳。以部隊為中心的“煙囪”式指揮系統不利於信息的傳遞和處理，讓我們離“為所有使用者提供最新、最準確的信息”的目標越來越遠。在之前的《戈德華特·尼科爾斯國防部重構法》報告中已經明確提到，組織管理和指揮控制應該由一個聯合的機構來掌控。

結束語

目前對網絡作戰的集中化指揮是一個迫切的需要。優化網絡作戰指揮機制可以幫助國防部提高效率、節約成本以及更好地分配緊缺資源。更重要的是，這樣可以讓網絡作戰部隊更加快速、準確地為指揮官提供信息，這在大規模的網絡作戰中非常重要。集中化指揮的進程不能影響到網絡作戰指揮控制的效率。這取決於全球信息柵格能否為所有參戰的單位提供足夠的信息以及指揮官是否充分利用戰區信息柵格來幫助指揮作戰。

“我們必須改變對網絡作戰問題的討論和思考模式，我們是在進行網絡“作戰”而不是網絡“管理”，所有的參戰單位必須保證自己每時每刻都準備著開戰，以保證網絡系統這一決定性的武器系統的安全”。網絡作戰是我們國家能夠贏得戰爭的關鍵一環，它可以幫助我們提供指揮和控制、縮短決策週期以及調整各戰區的資源配備。戰略司令部已經在強化網絡作戰概念方面邁出了很大的一步，這些努力還需要繼續進行下去。戰區作戰司令部必須是掌控和防護全球信息柵格的重要一環，以保證我們可以繼續取得網絡作戰的勝利。

Reference URL: http://www.china.com.cn/military

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, China Internet Soverignty, China's Informatization - 中國信息化, China's Military Infratsructure, China's Military Organization - Intelligence, Chinese Military - Network & Space Forces

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 – US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

03/17/2017 admin Leave a comment

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 –

US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

With the rapid development of the global information grid system of the US military, the conceptual research based on the information technology system is becoming more and more thorough. Finally, the American combat theory establishes the cyberspace as a combat domain with land, sea, air and sky. In this context, the US Army will be the construction of cyberspace as a key factor in promoting the process of modernization of the army, determined to follow the formal militarization of the organization’s standards and structure of high-quality network combat forces. Since the establishment of the Army Network Command in 2010, the US Army has established a comprehensive network of operational forces based on the goal of combating the military forces of cyberspace through new means such as new construction, adjustment, transformation and integration.

The basic organizational structure under the guidance of the concept of network operations

From the 90s of the 20th century, in order to ensure the US military information grid system in the army part of the efficient and safe operation, the US Army under the guidance of the joint army, around the concept of network operations carried out a series of organizational restructuring, the dissolution of the information system commander And has set up the Army Signal Command and the network enterprise technology command and other institutions, and gradually formed based on technology, defense, focusing on the basic network of emergency operations organizational structure.

In 2005, the US Strategic Command issued the “Global Information Grid Collaborative Combat Concept”, which elaborated on the organizational structure of the US Army’s cyberspace forces during this period, dividing the Army’s network operations system into three Level: At the first level, under the command of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command, the Army’s Global Network Operations and Security Center is responsible for situational awareness and command coordination as the only governing body for Army operations, In the US Army Joint Force Network Power System, the agency functions as a global network of operations and security centers. At the second level, the Theater Network Operations and Security Center is the supporting element of the operational headquarters, which is responsible for “guiding network operations, managing and defending the global information grid elements that are part of the Army’s jurisdiction.” The regional network operations and security centers in the theater constitute the third dimension of the Army’s network operations system. In addition, the Army Computer Emergency Response Unit is the disposal of the network emergency response, in the emergency can accept the global network operations task force tactical control, each theater network operations and security center also established a computer emergency response unit.

New Universal Military

Global military clean sweep, do in the public micro-signal “new global military”

Long press the next two-dimensional code can be concerned about

Set up Army Network Command

With the US military for the degree of dependence on cyberspace, control and weaken the threat of the Internet has continued to become the focus of US military tasks, the establishment of an independent network of space operations command of the voice of the growing US military. In 2008, “Yankee deer bomb action” directly under the impetus, the US military decided to end the unit of independent decentralization of the development of network combat capability of the situation, through the withdrawal, transfer, change and other measures to reorganize the relevant institutions, the establishment of a comprehensive network Space operations of the joint command agencies, the US Army network power organization construction has entered a stage of rapid development.

Through the global deployment of decentralized development of the formation of cyberspace combat organization of the backbone. As the awareness of the network operations will have a far-reaching impact on the military field, the US Army in the combat force level into a lot of resources, and gradually establish the backbone of the network operations. For example, the Army launched its first cyber warfare in July 2008, which provides tactical support, brigade combatant support, and strategic support to other service units, joint forces and even cross-agency partners; the Army also operates on cyber operations The upper-level command system to implement the adjustment, so that the relevant action to be appropriate authority to monitor. During this period, the Army’s future network combat forces were integrated in the form of units in the military and joint forces within the combat unit, including from the Defense Information Systems Agency, the global network operations joint contingent, the National Security Agency to the brigade combat team and other Level of strategic and tactical institutions.
The new core coordination agencies, straighten out the headquarters to the unit level of the command relationship. In June 2009, the US Department of Defense announced the establishment of the US Internet Command in the form of a memorandum to consolidate and promote the construction of cyberspace military forces through a dedicated subordinate joint command. At the same time, as a transitional measure for the formation of the Army Force Network Command in the future, the Army decided to retain the organizational structure of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Strategic Command and rename it as Army Force Network Command. February 2010, the US Army announced on this basis, the formal formation of the Army Network Force Command, its formation and initial construction phase of the work mainly around the three tasks: to achieve cyber space military forces combat, increase the Army network combat power Capacity and scale, the development of the Army network space professionals team. As the previous command system was disrupted, the newly established Army Network Space Operations and Integration Center under the Cyber Command actually played a central role in command control and coordinated synchronization. The agency is similar to the previous Army Global Network Operations and Security Center, but in addition to “providing clear, concise and timely guidance in the implementation of full spectrum cyberspace operations,” the organization is also responsible for “with the Army’s other headquarters, Other units in the same type of institutions, the United States cyberspace joint operations center to share information. ” At the beginning of the establishment of the organization, some members of the cyberspace operations and integration center also joined the US Department of Network Command staff to better promote the unity of command and operation of the joint force and service units.

US Army Network Space Force Organizational Structure, 2005

The transformation of combat forces functions, to promote the traditional ability to network space combat capability development. At the level of the combat force construction, the field signal force as the main body of the network Enterprise Technology Command / 9 signal command to the Army Network Force Command, the Army Intelligence and Security Command of the cyberspace combat forces combat command by the army Network command. Through this organizational adjustment, the Army Network Command for the first time mastered the forefront of the deployment of combat forces, to form a global presence and have the expedition, you can combat commander to provide more comprehensive combat support capabilities. It is noteworthy that the network enterprise technology command and the intelligence and security commander in the Army Network Command as deputy commander, respectively, responsible for different types of network operations mission, the basic formation of the original signal forces in charge of network defense, the original military Intelligence forces in charge of the network attack mode, which will be previously discrete deployment, loosely combined network space related organizations into a complete army network strength. In addition, the Army Network Command in 2011 was also given the task of carrying out information operations, master the first information combat command of the operational command, intelligence and security headquarters under the 780 military intelligence brigade will also be transformed into Army Network Command Direct command of the network brigade.

Continuously optimize the Army cyberspace forces

After the establishment of the Army Network Command, cyber space military forces combat is always the center of its work, which in the Army Network Power Organization continue to optimize the integration process has been highlighted. For the current network operations have been formed, electronic warfare, information operations, military intelligence and even space combat capability, the US Army in the network of military organizational structure design also reflects the integration of a variety of capacity trends. The US Army is also actively promoting the overall military model in the construction of network forces, highlighting the development of the national guards and reserve forces. After years of construction, the US Army network power organization has been basically formed.
Army Network Combat Force Organizational Structure, 2011

Optimize the combat strength of the organizational structure, to adapt to operational support needs. At the headquarters level, in order to further improve the command and implementation of cyberspace operations, the Army approved the Network Command in March 2014 as the headquarters of the Army Force, and designated the 2nd Army as its immediate unit, and the network enterprise technology Command to become the second army direct command of the network combat troops, network enterprise technology command commander of the second group army deputy commander. And the previous year, the network command has been under the guidance of the US Internet Command and Army headquarters began to form a joint force network headquarters, which will be the implementation of the network space combat command command, and have direct support to the combat command of the network combat capability The At the combat forces and theater levels, the network command is trying to improve the global network defense situation through regional network centers. Based on the strength of the original Theater Network Operations and Security Center and Regional Computer Emergency Response Center, these regional cybersecurity centers streamline the operational plan of the network operations, and can play a strong planning, coordination and synchronization function to more effectively support geography Operation of the Combat Command.

To determine the development of the responsible institutions, improve the network to build military theory guidance. As the US Army Network Command merged with the original network operations, information operations and the strength of the signal forces, a large number of signal forces combat theory urgent need to be revised and translated into the network combat theory, in order to achieve a unified operational capability development model, to avoid the concept of guidance On the chaos. In March 2014, the US Training and Command Command, on the basis of the Center for Excellence, integrated other relevant professional elements to form the Army Network Center of Excellence, with the goal of providing guidance, network and signal The full ability of training. The cyberspace promotion office under the Cyber Command is also incorporated into the Network Excellence Center to further enhance the advantages of the Network Excellence Center in summing up lessons learned from the construction of network forces. Through the implementation of the Ordinance to publish the project, the Network Excellence Center tried to merge the original signal and electronic warfare forces regulations, according to the Army “2015 order system” related requirements to develop new cyberspace operations, electronic warfare and signal forces regulations. At present, the Army has completed the revision of the field command FM6-02 “signal force support operations” to guide the signal forces to the network forces for functional transformation; the first release of the field order FM3-38 “network electromagnetic action”, clear “Army in the unified ground action to integrate the overall principles of network electromagnetic activity, tactics and procedures”; as the Army network army building a basic guidance document, field command FM3-12 “cyberspace combat” also basically completed the final approval process, Officially distributed within the Army in 2015. With the above documents as the main body, the Network Excellence Center will continue to improve the publication of dozens of related military ordinances publications, build a complete Army cyber space combat technology, tactics and procedures for the Army network forces to provide comprehensive theoretical guidance.
Army Network Combat Force Organizational Structure, 2015

Integration of cyberspace education and training strength, and promote the regular development of network forces. The US Army will promote the development of formal training as a fundamental way to improve the level of network operations and combat readiness. In the Army Network Center of excellence at the same time, the Army Network School as its affiliated institutions in the original electronic warfare school set up on the basis of the Army Signal School is also under the network center of excellence will continue to be retained, the Army on the regularization of the construction of cyberspace “Regulations – Organization – Training – Resources – Leadership and Education – Personnel – Facilities” model has been further refined. With the establishment of the Army Network Arsenal (“17-Series” Career Management), the Army requested new staff members to enter the network career field to complete the school’s school training program, from signal, intelligence and information operations forces and other units to the Corresponding to a large number of network operations staff also need to carry out new vocational education and training, the two schools will jointly set up the new Army network arms units officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers for individual personnel skills training. For example, the Army Leadership Foundation Training Program was officially launched at the online school in August 2015, and the 14-week Senior Officer Training Program was implemented in May 2016. For the first batch of network combatants recruited by the Army in October 2015, the senior personal training program that must be attended by the Army began in February 2016. As the cyberspace operations essentially have the characteristics of joint operations, the first phase of the 22-week training program will be the Naval Joint Network Analyst Course, the second phase of training for the same 22 weeks, training venues from the Navy The facility is transferred to the Army Network School.

Attention to the National Guard and reserve network strength, highlighting the support and coordination functions. In view of the development of the network combat force, the Army believes that the reserve department can assist the active forces to share some of the tasks and be able to provide reinforcements with high levels of training as quickly as necessary. Because of its unique dual legal position, the Army National Guard can play the role of state and federal government agencies, civil and military organizations, private and public sector convergence, “with the development of cyberspace capabilities of the natural advantages.” Therefore, the Army in the development of network combat forces also pay attention to the construction of the relevant reserve organizations. For example, the First Information Operations Command also includes four reserve forces theater information operations brigade, which has the ability to provide information operations and cyberspace planning, analysis and technical support. According to a memorandum signed by the Army National Guard in June 2014 with the Army Network Command, the Army National Guard transferred one of its network defenses in the previous year to the Army Network Command / 2nd Army. The cyber force, known as the 1636th Network Defense Unit, will be in Service No. 10 of the United States Code, which is a full-time service and will receive the same standard training with other active forces of the Army Network Command and jointly All types of tasks.

This article from the “Military Digest” December Editor: Zhang Chuanliang

Original Mandarin Chinese:

伴隨著美軍全球信息柵格系統的高速發展，基於信息技術系統作戰的概念研究不斷走向深入，最終美軍作戰理論將網絡空間確立為一種與陸、海、空、天並列的作戰域。在這種背景下，美國陸軍將網絡空間力量建設作為推進陸軍現代化進程的關鍵因素，決心按照正規軍事化組織的標準和結構高質量建設網絡作戰部隊。自陸軍網絡司令部於2010年成立以來，美國陸軍圍繞網絡空間軍事力量作戰化的目標，通過新建、調整、轉型和融合等手段逐步建立起完善的網絡作戰力量組織結構。

網絡作戰概念指導下的基本組織結構

從20世紀90年代開始，為確保美軍全球信息柵格系統中的陸軍部分高效安全運行，美國陸軍在聯合軍隊的指導下，圍繞網絡作戰行動概念進行了一系列組織結構調整，解散了信息系統司令部，並先後組建了陸軍信號司令部以及網絡企業技術司令部等機構，逐步形成基於技術、防禦為主、重在應急的網絡作戰基本組織架構。

2005年，美國戰略司令部發布了《全球信息柵格網絡作戰聯合作戰概念》，對這一時期美國陸軍網絡空間力量建設的組織結構進行了詳細說明，將陸軍網絡作戰體系組織架構劃分為三個層次：在第一個層面，在陸軍太空和導彈防禦司令部/陸軍戰略司令部的指揮下，作為陸軍網絡作戰行動唯一的領導機構，陸軍全球網絡行動和安全中心負責態勢感知和指揮協調工作，在美軍聯合部隊網絡力量體系中，該機構發揮軍種全球網絡作戰與安全中心的功能。在第二個層面，戰區網絡行動和安全中心是各作戰司令部的支持元素，負責“指導網絡作戰行動，管理和防禦屬於陸軍管轄的全球信息柵格元素”。戰區內各地區網絡行動和安全中心構成了陸軍網絡作戰體系的第三個層面。此外，陸軍計算機應急響應分隊是應對網絡突發事件的處置力量，在緊急情況下可以接受全球網絡作戰特遣部隊的戰術控制，每個戰區網絡行動和安全中心也都建立了計算機應急響應分隊。

新環球軍事

全球軍事一網打盡，盡在公眾微信號“新環球軍事”

長按下方二維碼即可關注

成立陸軍網絡司令部

隨著美軍對於網絡空間依賴程度的加深，控制和削弱網絡威脅持續成為美軍關注的重點任務，組建獨立負責網絡空間作戰指揮機構的呼聲在美軍內部日益高漲。在2008年“揚基鹿彈行動”的直接推動下，美軍決定結束軍種單位獨立分散發展網絡作戰能力的局面，通過並、撤、轉、改等措施對相關機構進行結構重組，成立全面負責網絡空間作戰的聯合指揮機構，美國陸軍網絡力量組織建設也進入快速發展階段。

通過全球部署分散發展的方式形成網絡空間作戰組織的基幹力量。由於意識到網絡作戰行動將對軍事領域產生更加深遠的影響，美國陸軍在作戰部隊層面投入大量資源，逐步建立起網絡作戰行動的基幹力量。例如，陸軍在2008年7月啟動了第一支網絡戰營，其能夠提供戰術支持、旅戰鬥隊支援以及向其他軍種單位、聯合部隊甚至跨機構夥伴提供戰略支援；陸軍還對網絡作戰行動的上層指揮體系實施調整，從而使相關行動得到適度權限的監管。在這個時期，陸軍未來網絡作戰力量都以分隊形式整合在軍種和聯合部隊架構下作戰單位的內部，包括從國防信息系統局、全球網絡作戰聯合特遣隊、國家安全局到旅戰鬥隊等各個級別的戰略和戰術機構。
新建核心協調機構，理順總部到分隊層面的指揮關係。 2009年6月，美國國防部通過發表備忘錄的形式宣佈建立美國網絡司令部，旨在通過一個專門的次級聯合司令部集中統籌和推進網絡空間軍事力量建設。與此同時，作為日後組建陸軍部隊網絡司令部的過渡性措施，陸軍決定保留陸軍太空和導彈防禦司令部/陸軍戰略司令部的組織架構，並將其重新命名為陸軍部隊網絡司令部。 2010年2月，美國陸軍宣佈在此基礎上正式組建陸軍網絡部隊司令部，其在組建和初始建設階段的工作主要圍繞三項任務展開：實現網絡空間軍事力量作戰化、增加陸軍網絡作戰力量的能力和規模、發展陸軍網絡空間專業人才隊伍。由於以往的指揮體係被打亂，網絡司令部下新成立的陸軍網絡空間作戰與整合中心實際上發揮了指揮控制和協調同步的核心作用。該機構與此前的陸軍全球網絡行動和安全中心功能類似，但是除了“在執行全譜網絡空間作戰行動過程中提供清晰、簡潔、及時的指導”以外，該組織還負責“與陸軍其他司令部、其他軍種單位中的同類機構、美國網絡空間聯合作戰中心共享信息”。在機構建立之初，網絡空間作戰與整合中心的部分人員還直接加入美國網絡司令部參謀機構，從而更好地促進實現聯合部隊與軍種單位網絡作戰行動的指揮統一。

美國陸軍網絡空間力量組織結構，2005年

轉型作戰部隊職能，促進傳統能力向網絡空間作戰能力發展。在作戰部隊建設層面，以野戰信號部隊為主體的網絡企業技術司令部/第9信號司令部轉隸陸軍網絡部隊司令部，陸軍情報和安全司令部所屬網絡空間作戰部隊的作戰指揮權也由陸軍網絡司令部掌握。通過這種組織調整，陸軍網絡司令部第一次掌握了前沿部署作戰力量，能夠形成全球存在態勢並具備遠征能力，可以向作戰指揮官提供更加全面的戰鬥支援能力。值得注意的是，網絡企業技術司令部以及情報和安全司令部指揮官都在陸軍網絡司令部擔任副司令，分別負責不同類型的網絡作戰行動任務，基本形成了原信號部隊主管網絡防禦、原軍事情報部隊主管網絡進攻的模式，從而將此前離散部署、鬆散聯合的網絡空間相關組織整合為一支完備的陸軍網絡力量。此外，陸軍網絡司令部在2011年還被賦予執行信息作戰的任務，掌握第1信息作戰司令部的作戰指揮權，情報和安全司令部下屬的第780軍事情報旅也將轉型為陸軍網絡司令部直接指揮的網絡旅。

持續優化陸軍網絡空間部隊

陸軍網絡司令部成立後，網絡空間軍事力量作戰化始終是其中心工作，這一點在陸軍網絡力量組織不斷優化整合的過程中得到突出體現。對於當前已經形成的網絡作戰、電子戰、信息作戰、軍事情報甚至太空作戰能力，美軍陸軍在進行網絡軍隊組織結構設計時也體現出融合多種能力的趨勢。美國陸軍還在網絡部隊建設中積極推進整體型軍隊模式，突出國民警衛隊和預備役網絡力量的發展。經過多年建設，美國陸軍網絡力量組織結構已經基本形成。
陸軍網絡作戰力量組織結構，2011年

優化戰鬥力量組織結構，適應作戰行動支援需求。在總部機構層面，為了進一步完善網絡空間作戰行動的指揮程序並實現意圖統一，陸軍在2014年3月批准網絡司令部為陸軍部隊組成總部，同時指定第2集團軍為其直屬單位，而網絡企業技術司令部成為第2集團軍直接指揮的網絡作戰部隊，網絡企業技術司令部指揮官兼任第2集團軍副軍長。而且在前一年，網絡司令部已經在美國網絡司令部和陸軍總部的指導下開始組建聯合部隊網絡總部，其將對網絡空間作戰部隊實施任務指揮，並且具備直接支持作戰司令部的網絡作戰能力。在作戰部隊和戰區層面，網絡司令部試圖通過地區網絡中心改善全球網絡防禦態勢。在原有戰區網絡作戰和安全中心、地區計算機應急響應中心力量基礎上，這些地區網絡安全中心對網絡作戰行動指揮程序進行精簡，能夠發揮較強的計劃、協調和同步功能，從而更加高效地支援地理作戰司令部的行動。

確定條令開發負責機構，完善網絡建軍理論指導。由於美國陸軍網絡司令部合併了原網絡作戰、信息作戰和信號部隊的力量，信號部隊的大量作戰理論迫切需要修訂並轉化為網絡作戰理論，從而實現協調統一的作戰能力發展模式，避免出現概念指導上的混亂。 2014年3月，美國訓練和條令司令部在原信號卓越中心的基礎上，整合其他相關專業力量元素，組建了陸軍網絡卓越中心，目標在2015年10月使其具備指導網絡、信號和電子戰部隊訓練的全面能力。網絡司令部下屬的網絡空間促進辦公室也被合併入網絡卓越中心，從而進一步增強網絡卓越中心在總結網絡部隊建設經驗教訓方面的優勢。通過實施條令出版項目，網絡卓越中心試圖合併原有的信號和電子戰部隊條令，根據陸軍“2015條令體系”的相關要求開發全新的網絡空間作戰、電子戰以及信號部隊條令。目前，陸軍已經完成了對野戰條令FM6-02《信號部隊支持作戰行動》的修訂，指導信號部隊向網絡部隊進行職能轉型；第一次發布了野戰條令FM3-38《網絡電磁行動》，明確了“陸軍在統一地面行動中整合網絡電磁活動的總體原則、戰術和規程”；作為陸軍網絡軍隊建設的根本性指導文件，野戰條令FM3-12《網絡空間作戰》也基本完成了最後的批准程序，於2015年正式在陸軍內部發行。以上述條令文件為主體，網絡卓越中心將繼續完善數十種相關陸軍條令出版物的編撰發布工作，構建完整的陸軍網絡空間作戰技術、戰術和規程體系，為陸軍網絡部隊建設提供全面理論指導。
陸軍網絡作戰力量組織結構，2015年

整合網絡空間教育訓練力量，促進網絡部隊正規化發展。美國陸軍將推進網絡訓練正規化發展視為提高網絡作戰和戰備水平的根本途徑。在陸軍網絡卓越中心組建的同時，陸軍網絡學校作為其下屬機構在原電子戰學校的基礎上成立，而且陸軍信號學校也在網絡卓越中心的建制下繼續得以保留，陸軍關於網絡空間力量正規化建設的“條令-組織-訓練-資源-領導力和教育-人員-設施”模型得到進一步完善。隨著陸軍網絡兵種（“17-系列”職業管理領域）的設立，陸軍要求進入網絡職業領域的新任職人員必須完成網絡學校的駐校訓練項目，從信號、情報和信息作戰部隊等單位調動到相應網絡作戰崗位的大量人員也需要進行新的職業教育訓練，上述兩所學校將共同對新成立的陸軍網絡兵種單位的軍官、準尉和士官進行單個人員技能訓練。例如，軍官領導力基礎訓練課程於2015年8月在網絡學校正式啟動，為期14週的準尉軍官高級訓練項目則在2016年5月開始實施。對於陸軍在2015年10月徵募的第一批網絡作戰士兵，其必須參加的高級個人訓練項目則在2016年2月開始。由於網絡空間作戰行動本質上具有聯合作戰的屬性，高級個人訓練項目為期22週的第一階段訓練內容將是海軍聯合網絡分析師課程，第二階段訓練同樣持續22週，訓練場地也會從海軍設施轉移到陸軍網絡學校。

重視國民警衛隊和預備役網絡力量，突出支援和協調功能。針對網絡作戰力量的發展問題，陸軍認為預備役部門可以協助現役部隊分擔部分任務，能夠在必要時迅速提供具備較高訓練水平的增援力量。因其獨特的雙重法律定位，陸軍國民警衛隊可以發揮各州與聯邦政府機構、民事與軍事組織、私營與公共部門之間的銜接作用，“具備發展網絡空間能力的天然優勢”。因此，陸軍在網絡作戰力量發展過程中也注重相關預備役組織的建設。例如，第1信息作戰司令部還包含4支預備役部隊戰區信息作戰大隊，其都具備提供信息作戰和網絡空間計劃、分析、技術支持能力。根據陸軍國民警衛隊2014年6月與陸軍網絡司令部簽署的一份備忘錄，陸軍國民警衛隊將其在此前一年組建的1支網絡防禦分隊轉隸於陸軍網絡司令部/第2集團軍。這支被稱為第1636網絡防禦分隊的網絡部隊將處於《美國法典》第10卷服役狀態，即全時服役狀態，將與陸軍網絡司令部其他現役部隊共同接受同等標準的訓練，並共同執行所有類型的任務。

本文轉自《軍事文摘》12月刊責任編輯：張傳良

China Cyber Dilemma in the 21st Century, Chinese Military Views - 中國軍事觀

China’s Analysis of US Army Network Operations Conceptual Concept Conception: To fight for information dominance

03/08/2017 admin Leave a comment

US Army Network Operations Conceptual Concept Conception: To fight for information dominance

The US Army Training and Command Command assesses the future combat environment, clearly emphasizing the importance of obtaining information on all relevant aspects of future battlefields. Army forces in the color of people such as action in the face, with a new, network-based, technology-based threats. These threats use emerging technologies to build and maintain a cultural and social advantage; and make full use of these new capabilities for command and control, staff recruitment, logistics coordination, fundraising and dissemination of information. To take action in this new environment, the Army must re-adjust its message “focus”. Army leaders and soldiers must have an in-depth understanding of how to use information-based capabilities to capture and maintain situational awareness. In the future battlefield, know how to fight for information and give full play to information, while denying the opponent’s ability to win more and more important.

The assessment shows that the Army’s existing vocabulary, including, for example, computer network operations (CNO), electronic warfare (EW) and information operations (IO), will become increasingly difficult to meet demand. In order to meet these challenges, the full spectrum of military operations (FSO) should have three interrelated dimensions, each of which has its own set of causal logic and needs to focus on the development of the program:

The first dimension is the confrontation with the psychological will of enemies, hostile factions, criminal gangs and potential opponents.

The second dimension is a strategic alliance, including maintaining a friend in the country, getting ally in a foreign country, and obtaining their support or identity for the task.

The third dimension is the network power confrontation, including the acquisition, maintenance and use of a technical advantage.

The first dimension and the second dimension emphasize how commanders and staff officers should carefully plan and use information to fulfill their mission. The third dimension emphasizes gaining and maintaining an advantage in increasingly converged cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) media. The advantages of the Army’s access to advantages, protection advantages and opponents’ inferiority are included in these three dimensions; and contribute to the achievement of those actions that must be achieved through tactical, operational and strategic levels of unified action. The current combat action makes us more convinced that each dimension needs to have its own corresponding concepts and capabilities.

Information operations (IO) contain all three dimensions, but the word is increasingly becoming a generic term that can be used for any form of information. Computer network operations and electronic warfare itself is not enough to describe the full range of network confrontation. To this end, we are carrying out a comprehensive description of each dimension of the comprehensive research activities. The first two dimensions (Confrontation and Strategic Alliances of Will) will be presented in a conceptual plan to be developed separately, followed by a competency-based assessment.

This manual relates to the electronic warfare, computer network operations and cyberspace in the third dimension – networked confrontation. The Training and Command Command No. 525-7-8 is the first step towards a consensus on how the technological advances can change the operational environment, how the leaders should think about cyber operations, how to integrate their overall actions, and what they need ability. This manual provides a methodology for developing results-based, emphasis-based, and intelligent solutions that will enable the US Army to win in online confrontation. – Director of the Army – Ability Center for Lieutenant General

Executive summary

Describe the problem

The combat environment has changed significantly. The convergence and rapid development of computer and communication network technology, the global proliferation of information and communication technology (ICT) and its impact on social and social networks impact the combat environment. The use of this information revolution in the form of agents (agents) on the United States of key infrastructure and combat missions constitute a huge threat. These actors have both traditional national and non-combatants, multinational corporations, criminal organizations, terrorists, hackers, mischievous hackers and misuse of individuals. They together to create a continuous turbulence, never calm the environment. In this document, unless otherwise stated, the term “opponent” is used to describe them.

Develop a solution

Training and Order Command (TRADOC) 525-7-8, “CyberOps Concepts 2016-2028”, a comprehensive review of the 2016 to 2028 Army future forces how to make full use of cyberspace implementation of effective Network operations. The manual includes a conceptual framework for incorporating cyber operations into full spectrum operations (FSO), laying the groundwork for subsequent development of the order. This conceptual framework outlines how the commander integrates network operations to gain advantage, protect the advantages and set opponents at the disadvantage. The manual also establishes a common dictionary for the Army’s network operations, describing the relationship between cyberspace and the other four domains (earth and sea) and with the electromagnetic spectrum. Finally, it explains how the technology that continues to converge will affect full-spectrum operations and capacity development, providing strong support for Army design, development, acquisition and deployment of fully integrated network capabilities.

Program Background: Three dimensions of full spectrum combat

A, the US Army Training and Command Commander (CG) instructs the Joint Arms Center (CAC) to lead a working group to organize the mission domain for cyberspace, cyber warfare and information operations, as well as the training and commanding forces The modernization of the structure suggests a conceptual framework. On October 16, 2009, the Command and Command Command (CG) submitted a series of recommendations to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff. In his suggestion included the following:

(1) The Joint Arsenal Center believes that existing vocabularies (cyber-e-warfare) are enough at the moment, but will be increasingly insufficient to describe the challenges the Army faces in future combat environments.

(2) The joint arms center draws conclusions that should be considered from three dimensions, which run through full spectrum operations, and each dimension needs to be addressed by the design of forces and the development of orders.

(3) Thus, while the Army can now describe functions related to network and spectrum military operations as network-electronic warfare – information operations, the Joint Arms Center firmly believes that the future Army should describe them in the following ways:

The first dimension – the first dimension is the confrontation with the psychological will between the enemy, the hostile faction, the criminal gang and the potential opponent.

The second dimension, the second dimension, is a strategic alliance, including maintaining a friendly relationship with allies in the country, forming an alliance abroad, supporting or focusing on the mission of the military operations area.

The third dimension – the third dimension is the net – electromagnetic against. The continuous development of wired, wireless and optical technologies provides the conditions for convergence and cross-linking of computers and communication networks.

B, Training and Command Command No. 525-7-8 manual is mainly about how to win in this third dimension, that is, network confrontation, and put forward a concept – that is, network operations can promote the completion of the other two tasks.

Core point of view

A Win in cyber confrontation means getting progress in three ways: gaining the edge, protecting the advantage, and setting the opponent at a disadvantage.

B. The commander seeks freedom of movement in cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum while losing opponents at the time and place they are determined; thus supporting various military in cyberspace and the other four domains of cyberspace (land and sea) activity. Cyberspace military operations are included in the network confrontation to take advantage, to protect the advantages and opponents in the disadvantages to take action. Network operations itself is not the ultimate goal, more as an important component of the whole spectrum of operations, to win the network confrontation is in peacetime military confrontation in the attention of the general activities. Network operations are ongoing and confrontation takes place every day, and in most cases there is no need for other forces to participate.

Solution framework

The existing terms of the term do not fully address the scope of the relevant tasks according to the definition of the Department of Defense cyberspace and cyber warfare. As a result, the framework developed by the manual defines four major components of network operations: CyberWar, CyNetOps, CyberSpt, and Cyberas.

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. Related background

The combat environment (OE) has changed significantly. The hostile activities in cyberspace and through cyberspace have reached unprecedented levels, threatening the basic elements of the key infrastructure, financial systems and national power of the United States. These threats come from a wide range of sources, unknowingly hackers to sovereign states, and the level of competencies varies. They together to create a continuous turbulence, never calm the environment. In this document, unless otherwise stated, the term “opponent” is used to describe them.

B. The rapid development of technology and its widespread proliferation make it increasingly difficult to win in full spectrum operations. The combination of wired, wireless and optical technology leads to the convergence of computers and telecommunications networks; handheld computing devices are growing in number and performance. The new generation of systems is emerging to form a global, mixed adaptive network that combines wired, wireless, optical, satellite communications, monitoring and data acquisition (SCADA) and other systems. In the near future, the network will provide users with ubiquitous access, so that they can be near real-time on-demand collaboration.

C. With the rapid development of technology, the ability of national opponents also increased, which makes the combat environment more complex. Who can gain, protect and exploit the advantages in competitive, crowded cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, who will master the initiative. On the contrary, if a party fails in the confrontation, or because the system was disturbed or destroyed and can not be effective action, it will give a huge advantage to the opponent.

D. Access, protection and advantage are not easy. US rivals use the commercial market as a platform for their development, making them more agile and adaptable than Army’s long research, development, testing and identification, and acquisition processes. Opponents are increasingly good at using cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum capabilities and activities that are often outside the sight of our Army’s conventional operations. In order to capture and maintain the battle and tactical advantages for these flexible opponents, the Army must make cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum the core and conventional components of its operations; and commanders also need the relevant competencies and the corresponding experts to apply them.

1.2. Purpose

The purpose of the Handbook No. 525-7-8 of the Training and Command Command is to examine how the Army’s future forces will integrate the cyberspace capabilities and cyber operations into full spectrum operations between 2016 and 2028.

1.3. Scope

The 525-7-8 Handbook of the Training and Command Command draws out how the commander can integrate cyber operations with other capabilities to gain advantage in full spectrum operations and to protect the advantages of concatenating opponents’ initial research results. The results of the study will be further refined through a competency-based assessment and development process. The manual describes how the commander seeks freedom of movement in cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum while losing opponents at the time and place they determine; thus supporting the cyberspace as well as using cyberspace in the other four domains (land and sea) Of various military activities. This manual establishes a common dictionary and framework for network operations and describes the relationship between cyberspace and air, land, sea, and domain, and electromagnetic spectrum. It also explains how the technologies that continue to converge increase the impact on full spectrum operations and capacity development; identifies the network operations and support capabilities needed to support future force modernization initiatives; and suggests the cyberspace and electromagnetic Spectrum related to research questions.

1.4 method

This manual follows the design process approved by the Training and Command Command. Chapter 2 describes the existing conditions and requirements for cyberspace in combat environments. Chapter 3 compares the existing conditions and the desired final state in the operational environment, thus establishing a plan for the formulation of the program. Chapter 4 presents frameworks, core ideas, support ideas and dictionaries. Appendix A contains the required and related references. Appendix B describes the structure of the evolving network operations. Appendix C describes how to incorporate cyber combat as an organic component into the whole process, rather than being free from the entire action, according to the commander’s intentions and objectives. Appendix D (published) and Appendix E (confidential) discuss the required capabilities. Appendix F identifies issues at the executive level throughout the process, organization, training, equipment, leadership and education, personnel, and equipment (DOTMLPF) to support subsequent cost-benefit analysis efforts.

1.5. Key Definitions

A, cyberspace is defined as “a global domain in the information environment, interconnected by information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, communications networks, computer systems and embedded processors and controllers.”

B, the network war is: “the use of cyberspace capabilities, its primary purpose is to achieve goals in cyberspace or through cyberspace, which includes computer network operations, as well as operational and defensive activities of the global information grid” The

C, the electromagnetic spectrum is from zero to infinite electromagnetic radiation frequency range. It is divided into bands numbered by 26 letters.

1.6. Relationship with the concept of union and the concept of the army

A The Manual No. 525-7-8 of the Training and Command Command is consistent with the concept of joint and the concept of the Army, which includes the concept of joint operations and the top concept of the Army. The capabilities described in this manual may be incorporated into the Joint Capability Domain (JCA) and related operational functions. The Department of Defense uses a joint capacity domain to describe how the various capabilities support the joint function. The joint competency domain establishes the foundation of the process based on the capabilities of the Department of Defense, and the network combat capability can be embedded in the combined capabilities of the first level of force use, protection, combat space perception and network center action. Similarly, the network combat capability not only strengthened the Army’s operational functions and combat elements, but also their necessary composition.

B, Training and Order Command Manual 525-3-0. The manual argues that war is the will of the will, and that in order to win, the army must try its best to play a psychological and technical influence as one of the six main ideas that support the top concept of the army. The top-level concept declares that the Army is increasingly dependent on the continuous integration of electromagnetic, computer networks and space-based capabilities, so the technical influence requires troops to prepare for a new “cyber battlefield” to fight and win. Because the technology that affects the movement of information is developing too fast, the Army must continually assess what capabilities it needs to acquire, protect and exploit advantages in high-intensity cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. This handbook supports this top-level concept by determining the capabilities required to successfully perform full-spectrum operations.

C, Training and Command Command No. 525-3-1 Handbook and Training and Command Command No. 525-3-2. These two manuals, in order to support the Army’s operational concept, define the capabilities of operational command, intelligence, fire and protection needed to carry out effective campaigns and tactical maneuvers in future combat environments. Network capabilities and the advantages of cyberspace for the future of the Army in the mobility of command and control to reduce operational risk is critical. The Training and Command Command Manual No. 525-7-8 complements the Army function concept that supports campaign mobility and tactical maneuver.

D, Training and Order Command Manual 525-7-6. With the convergence of wired, wireless and optical technologies, future force commanders will use electronic warfare and cyber warfare capabilities. The use of wired and optical technology is becoming increasingly frequent

美國陸軍網絡作戰概念能力構想:要為信息力而戰
美國陸軍訓練與條令司令部評估未來作戰環境時明確強調了獲取未來戰場全部相關方面信息的重要性。陸軍部隊要在各色人等中行動出沒，面臨著全新的、網絡化的、基於技術的各種威脅。這些威脅會利用新興技術建立並保持一種文化和社會優勢；並充分利用這些新能力進行指揮控制、人員招募、後勤協調、資金籌集及消息傳播。要在這種新的環境中有效行動，陸軍就必須重新調整其信息“著力點”。陸軍領導人和士兵們必須深入地了解如何使用基於信息的能力獲取並保持態勢感知。在未來戰場上，懂得如何為信息力而戰並充分發揮信息力，同時拒止對手的這種能力，對於取勝越來越重要。

評估表明，陸軍的現有詞彙，包括例如計算機網絡作戰(CNO)、電子戰(EW)和信息作戰(IO)等，都將越來越難以滿足需求。為了應對這些挑戰，全譜軍事作戰(FSO)應有三個相互關聯的維度，其中每個維度都有自己的一套因果邏輯，並需要集中製定方案：

第一維是與不能和解的敵人、敵對派別、犯罪團伙和潛在對手的心理意志的對抗。

第二維是戰略結盟，包括在國內維持朋友、在國外獲得盟友以及獲得他們對任務的支持或認同。

第三維是網電對抗，包括獲得、保持和利用一種技術上的優勢。

第一維和第二維強調指揮官和參謀人員應如何精心籌劃和使用信息力來履行使命。第三維則強調在日益融合的網絡空間和電磁頻譜(EMS)媒介中獲得和保持一種優勢。陸軍獲取優勢、保護優勢和置對手於劣勢的概念都包含在這三個維度中；並且有助於達成那些必須通過戰術、戰役和戰略級別的統一行動才能實現的效果。當前的作戰行動更讓我們堅信，每一維都需要有自己相應的概念和能力。

信息作戰（IO）包含所有這三維，但這個詞卻越來越成為一個對任何形式的信息使用都可以指代的泛名詞。計算機網絡作戰和電子戰本身又不足以描述網電對抗的全部範疇。為此，我們正在開展一項充分描述每一維的全面攻關活動。前兩維（意志的對抗和戰略結盟）將在即將單獨制定的概念能力規劃中進行陳述，之後還將進行基於能力的評估。

本手冊與第三維——網電對抗中的電子戰、計算機網絡作戰和網絡空間有關。訓練與條令司令部525-7-8號手冊是對以下問題形成共識的第一步，包括技術上的進步如何改變作戰環境，領導人應該怎樣思考網絡作戰，怎樣整合他們的整體行動以及需要哪些能力。本手冊提供了製定基於效果、強調集成並且充滿智慧的解決方案的方法，這些方案將使美國陸軍在網電對抗中獲勝。 —邁克爾-文恩陸軍中將陸軍能力集成中心主任

執行概要

描述問題

作戰環境已經顯著變化。計算機與通信網絡技術的會聚和迅猛發展、信息與通信技術（ICT）的全球擴散及其對社會和社會網絡的影響衝擊著作戰環境。利用這一信息革命的形形色色的行動者（agents）對美國的關鍵基礎設施和作戰任務構成了巨大威脅。這些行動者既有傳統的民族國家，也有非戰鬥人員、跨國公司、犯罪組織、恐怖分子、黑客聯盟、惡作劇的黑客以及誤操作的個人。他們共同創造了一個持續動盪、永無平息的環境。在本文件中，除非另行說明，均採用“對手”一詞描述他們。

制定解決方案

訓練與條令司令部（TRADOC）525-7-8號手冊，“美國陸軍網絡戰（CyberOps）概念能力規劃2016-2028”，全面審視了2016到2028年陸軍未來部隊如何充分利用網絡空間實施有效的網絡作戰。該手冊包括1個把網絡作戰納入全譜作戰（FSO）的概念框架，從而為後續的條令開發工作奠定基礎。這個概念框架勾勒了指揮官如何整合網絡作戰從而獲取優勢、保護優勢並置對手於劣勢。該手冊還為陸軍網絡作戰建立了一個通用詞典，描述了網絡空間與其它四個域（陸海空天）以及與電磁頻譜之間的關係。最後，它解釋了不斷會聚的技術將如何影響全譜作戰和能力發展，從而為陸軍設計、開發、採辦和部署充分集成的網絡能力提供有力的支撐。

方案背景：全譜作戰的三個維度

a、美國陸軍訓練與條令司令部司令（CG）指示聯合兵種中心（CAC）領導一個工作組，為網絡（cyber）、電子戰和信息作戰的使命域的組織以及訓練與條令司令部有關部隊的結構現代化的建議確定一個概念框架。 2009年10月16日，訓練與條令司令部司令（CG）向陸軍副參謀長提交了一系列建議。在他的建議中包含了以下幾條：

（1）聯合兵種中心認為，現有的詞彙（網絡-電子戰-信息作戰）在目前還夠用，但將越來越不足以描述陸軍在未來作戰環境中所面臨的挑戰。

（2）聯合兵種中心得出結論，應從三個維度進行考慮，這三個維度貫穿於全譜作戰中，並且每一維都需要解決兵力設計和條令制定問題。

（3）因此，雖然陸軍現在可以把與網絡和頻譜軍事行動相關的功能描述為網絡-電子戰-信息作戰，但聯合兵種中心堅信，未來陸軍應該用以下方式來描述它們：

第一維——第一維是與不能和解的敵人、敵對派別、犯罪團伙和潛在對手之間心理意志的對抗。

第二維——第二維是戰略結盟，包括在本土保持與盟友的友好關係、在海外形成同盟、支持或關注軍事行動區域實施的任務使命。

第三維——第三維是網電-電磁對抗。有線、無線以及光學技術的不斷發展為計算機和通信網絡的會聚和交聯提供了條件。

b、訓練與條令司令部525-7-8號手冊主要是關於如何在這個第三維，即網絡對抗中獲勝，並提出一個觀念——即網絡作戰能促進另兩維中任務的完成。

核心觀點

a.在網絡對抗中獲勝意味著同時在三個方面取得進步：獲取優勢、保護優勢以及置對手於劣勢。

b.指揮官尋求在網絡空間和電磁頻譜中的行動自由，同時在他們確定的時間和地點使對手失去自由；從而支撐在網絡空間以及借助網絡空間其它四個域（陸海空天）的各種軍事活動。網絡空間軍事行動包含在網絡對抗中為獲取優勢、保護優勢以及置對手於劣勢而採取行動。網絡作戰本身並不是最終目的，更多的是作為全譜作戰的一個重要組成，贏得網絡對抗是在和平時期軍事對抗中受到關注的普遍活動。網絡作戰不斷進行，對抗行動每天發生，大多數情況下不需要其他力量的參與。

解決方案框架

現有的條令術語沒有完全解決根據國防部網絡空間和網絡作戰的定義明確相關任務的範圍。因此，該手冊所製定的框架確定了網絡作戰包括四個主要組成部分：網絡戰爭（CyberWar）、網絡（空間）網絡作戰（CyNetOps）、網絡支援（CyberSpt）和網絡態勢感知（CyberSA）。

第一章引言

1.1.相關背景

a.作戰環境（OE）已經顯著地改變了。在網絡空間以及通過網絡空間進行的敵對活動已達到空前水平，威脅到了美國的關鍵基礎設施、金融系統和國家力量的基本要素。這些威脅來源廣泛，從不知情的黑客到主權國家，能力水平參差不齊。他們共同創造了一個持續動盪、永無平息的環境。在本文件中，除非另行說明，均採用“對手”一詞描述他們。

b.技術的突飛猛進及其廣泛擴散使得在全譜作戰中獲取勝利日益困難。有線、無線和光學技術的結合導致了計算機和電信網的融合；手持計算設備在數量和性能上不斷增長。新一代系統不斷湧現，構成了一個全球性、混雜的自適應網絡，它綜合了有線、無線、光學、衛星通信、監控和數據獲取（SCADA）及其它系統。不久的將來，網絡將為用戶提供無處不在的接入，使他們能近實時地按需協作。

c.隨著技術飛速發展，國家對手的能力也隨之提高，這使作戰環境更加複雜。誰能在競爭激烈、擁擠的網絡空間和電磁頻譜中獲取、保護和利用優勢，誰就將掌握決對主動。反之，如果一方在對抗中失敗，或由於系統遭到干擾或破壞而不能有效行動，則會把巨大的優勢拱手讓給對手。

d.獲取、保護和發揮優勢並非易事。美國的對手把商業市場作為他們發展戰鬥力的平台，使他們比陸軍冗長的研究、開發、試驗與鑑定以及採辦過程更加敏捷，適應性更強。對手越來越善於利用網絡空間和電磁頻譜能力及活動，而這些能力和活動到目前為止往往還處於我們陸軍常規行動的視線之外。為了獲取並保持針對這些靈活對手的戰役和戰術優勢，陸軍必須使網絡空間和電磁頻譜成為其作戰的核心和常規組成部分；而指揮官也需要相關的能力以及相應的專家來應用它們。

1.2.目的

訓練與條令司令部的525-7-8號手冊的目的是研究2016-2028年間陸軍未來部隊如何將各種網絡空間能力和網絡作戰整合納入全譜作戰。

1.3.範圍

訓練與條令司令部的525-7-8號手冊得出了指揮官如何把網絡作戰與其它能力相整合以在全譜作戰中獲取優勢、保護優勢並置對手於劣勢的初步研究成果。該研究結果還將通過基於能力的評估和條令開發過程進一步提煉。該手冊描述了指揮官如何尋求在網絡空間和電磁頻譜中的行動自由，同時在他們確定的時間和地點使對手失去自由；從而支撐在網絡空間以及借助網絡空間在其它四個域（陸海空天）的各種軍事活動。這份手冊為網絡作戰建立了一個通用的詞典和框架並描述了網絡空間與空、陸、海、天各域以及電磁頻譜之間的關係。它還解釋了不斷會聚的各項技術如何加大對全譜作戰和能力發展的影響；確定了支持未來部隊現代化倡議所需的網絡作戰和支撐能力；並提出了適合開展試驗的網絡空間和電磁頻譜的有關研究問題。

1.4 方法

這份手冊遵循訓練與條令司令部批准的設計過程。第二章描述了作戰環境中屬於網絡空間範疇的現有條件和所需條件。第三章比較了作戰環境中的現有條件和所需最終狀態，從而為製定方案建立了想定。第四章提出了框架、核心思想、支撐觀點和詞典。附錄A包含了所需的以及相關的參考文獻。附錄B介紹了演化中的網絡作戰的結構。附錄C描述根據指揮官的意圖和目標，如何將網絡作戰作為有機組成納入到整個行動中，而不是游離在整個行動之外。附錄D（公開的）和附錄E（保密的）討論了需要的能力。附錄F指出了貫穿於條令、組織、訓練、器材、領導和教育、人員以及設備（DOTMLPF）全過程中的執行層面的問題，從而為後繼的成本效益分析工作起步提供支持。

1.5.關鍵的定義

a、網絡空間被定義為“信息環境中的一個全球域，由信息技術基礎設施互相依賴結網而成，包括了因特網、通信網絡、計算機系統和嵌入式處理器和控制器。”

b、網絡戰是：“對網絡空間能力的運用，其首要目的是在網絡空間中或借助網絡空間達成目標。這類行動包括計算機網絡作戰，以及操作和防禦全球信息柵格的各種活動” 。

c、電磁頻譜是從零到無限大的電磁輻射頻率範圍。它被劃分為以26個字母進行表示的頻段。

1.6.與聯合概念和陸軍概念的關係

a、訓練與條令司令部的525-7-8號手冊與聯合概念和陸軍概念是一致的，這些概念包括聯合作戰頂層概念和陸軍頂層概念。本手冊所描述的能力可納入聯合能力域（JCA）和相關作戰功能。國防部用聯合能力域來描述各種能力如何支持聯合功能。聯合能力域奠定了基於國防部能力的過程的根基，而網絡作戰能力可內嵌於兵力運用、防護、作戰空間感知和網絡中心行動這些第一層次的聯合能力域之中。同樣，網絡作戰能力不僅強化了陸軍各項作戰功能和戰鬥力各要素，同時也是它們的必要組成。

b、訓練與條令司令部525-3-0號手冊。該手冊認為，戰爭是意志的較量，為了獲勝，陸軍必須盡量發揮心理上和技術上的影響力，並將其作為支撐陸軍頂層概念的六個主要思想之一。頂層概念宣稱陸軍越來越依賴不斷集成的電磁、計算機網絡和天基能力，因此發揮技術影響力要求部隊準備在新出現的“網絡戰場”中作戰並打贏。因為影響信息運動方式的技術發展太快，陸軍必須不斷地評估需要哪些能力在高強度的網絡空間和電磁頻譜中獲取、保護和利用優勢。這份手冊通過確定成功遂行全譜作戰所需的能力來支持這一頂層概念。

c、訓練與條令司令部525-3-1號手冊和訓練與條令司令部525-3-2號手冊。這兩本手冊為了支撐陸軍的作戰概念，確定了在未來作戰環境中實行有效戰役和戰術機動所需的作戰指揮、情報、火力和防護方面的各種能力。網絡能力和發揮網絡空間優勢對於陸軍未來部隊在機動中實現指揮控制和降低作戰風險非常關鍵。訓練與條令司令部525-7-8號手冊補充了支持戰役機動和戰術機動的陸軍功能概念。

d、訓練與條令司令部525-7-6號手冊。隨著有線、無線和光學技術的會聚，未來部隊指揮官將綜合運用電子戰和網絡作戰能力。對有線和光學技術的使用日益頻繁

Red Dragon 1949 / 紅龍1949

Tag Archives: #USArmy #Cyber #Warfare #China #hack #Hacking

Chinese Military to Emphasize Operational Use of Language Confrontation in Cognitive Domain Operations

America Instigating Cyber Warfare – How China Will Realize the Chinese Dream in the Age of American Cyber Warfare // 美國煽動網絡戰 – 中國如何在美國網絡戰時代實現中國夢

America Instigating Cyber Warfare – How China Will Realize the Chinese Dream in the Age of American Cyber Warfare //

美國煽動網絡戰 – 中國如何在美國網絡戰時代實現中國夢

Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 – US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 –

US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

China’s Analysis of US Army Network Operations Conceptual Concept Conception: To fight for information dominance

中國網絡衝突討論，信息與研究 // Chinese Cyber Conflict Discussions, Information & Research

America Instigating Cyber Warfare – How China Will Realize the Chinese Dream in the Age of American Cyber ​​Warfare //

美國煽動網絡戰 – 中國如何在美國網絡戰時代實現中國夢

Chinese Military Electromagnetic Spectrum Technology Determines the Future Development of Defeating the US at War

中國軍方解釋了美軍演習在網絡戰中的作用 ~ China Military Explains Role of US Military Theater Operations in Network War

美國陸軍網空作戰力量演變與歷史 –

US Army cyberspace combat force evolution & history

中國網絡衝突討論，信息與研究 // Chinese Cyber Conflict Discussions, Information & Research

America Instigating Cyber Warfare – How China Will Realize the Chinese Dream in the Age of American Cyber Warfare //