Tag Archives: Winning Localized War under Conditions of Informationization

Chinese Military Review: From Army Information Construction to Construction of Information Army // 中國軍事評論:從軍隊信息建設到建設信息化軍隊

Chinese Military Review: From Army Information Construction to Construction of Information Army //

中國軍事評論:從軍隊信息建設到建設信息化軍隊

2006年04月20日 22:00

From the Army Information Construction to the Construction of Informatized Army——Opening the Eyes to See the New Military Revolution in the World

  Li Bingyan

  A few years ago, there was a curtain factory abroad that was on the verge of bankruptcy and turned to the consulting company. The consulting company only asked them to change the curtain factory to a shading technology factory, and the factory would survive.

  A name change has broadened the horizon of development; a concept change has opened up the mind shackles. Updating the concept is inseparable from the concept of renewal. In the new military revolution, we need to adopt new concepts in a timely manner to show new development ideas.

  Although the ongoing new military revolution still does not see the other side, it is clear that the change has entered a new stage.

  This new military revolution was triggered by a new technological revolution centered on information technology. In the 1990s, the revolutionary impact of information technology on the military mainly remained at the stage of “construction”, that is, information technology embedding, networking, networking, and integration within the framework of the mechanized military organization. Technology strengthens mechanization and enhances mechanization. The theoretical community often refers to this stage of change as a revolution in the military field, which is to promote the army.

Information construction. At that time, the digital division and the digital army to be built by the US Army were carried out within the structure of the original mechanized army. Later, the US military learned from the experience of informatization of some large enterprises and multinational corporations in the society and changed the way of thinking.

  In the past, military changes were first to change military technology, weapons and equipment, and finally to complete the transformation of the military organizational system to adapt to the new methods of warfare. The new military revolution, characterized by informatization, especially the post-launch army, should be reversed. The experience of the business community is also “first rationalization of organizational structure, re-automation, informationization.”

  Before the 1990s, the US business community carried out informatization construction, focusing only on improving work efficiency. Although effective, it still cannot be changed. Ford Motor Company has spent a lot of money on automation, and its office efficiency has improved significantly. For example, the financial department of the North American branch has reduced the number of employees from 500 to 400 after office automation. The company leaders think it is good. Later, they learned about Japan.

Mazda Motor Company did the same job and used only five people. In contrast, Ford’s leadership was shocked. After in-depth investigation, they found that Mazda started to adjust the organizational structure, first change the workflow, and then engage in office automation. Ford’s financial system, organizational structure or traditional model has caused a lot of useless work. Later, Ford Company optimized its structure, re-engineered its business processes, and started office automation on this basis. The company’s financial staff was compressed to a quarter.

  In the development of human society, there is a phenomenon of “path dependence”. After a social system is formed, it will continue to strengthen itself in the actual operation, so that people will not be able to get rid of the influence of the original ideas afterwards.

  In addition, the organizational structure does not change, it is difficult to make the right decision in information. Usually, people are standing in their own units and planning work in this department, forming a “professional syndrome.” The research informatization is first of all the informationization of the unit, beyond the scope of construction of the unit, the leadership vision will not be achieved. This has led to the emergence of new “isomorphic diseases” – large and complete, small and complete, you have me, can not be interconnected, interoperable, interoperable. In this regard, some people call it the “potato effect”: a sack of potatoes, all sprouting, each self-contained system, self-enclosed, and not connected. Building these systems may be reasonable from a local perspective, but it may not be scientific or irrational from the overall perspective of informatization.

  In the practice, the foreign military realized that if informationization is not detoured, it should start with rationalizing the system and adjusting the command system. Otherwise, all levels and departments are busy with informationization. It is likely that the faster and the more the action is now, the greater the losses will be caused once reworked in the future.

  The rationalization of the organizational structure, the consideration of informationization, or the rationalization of organizational structure and informationization, and the simultaneous development have become a new consensus on the new military revolution. After entering the 21st century, the US military proposed a military transformation, marking a new stage in military transformation. At this stage, information technology has shifted from a “construction” role to a “deconstruction” role. That is: instead of strengthening mechanization, it is reorganizing mechanization. As a result, the army’s informatization construction has turned to the construction of an information-based army; the changes in the military field have turned to real military changes.

  In the theoretical preparation stage of the US military, the future army that was designed was: the sensor army, the precision strike army, the dominant mobile army, and the logistics army. In the transition, after a new argument, the future goals of the US military reorganization are proposed: the full-dimensional battlefield perception army, the precision firepower strike army, the efficient command and control army, and the intelligent logistics support army.

  In 2005, Germany proposed the idea of ​​building a “new three armed forces”, namely: rapid reaction forces, standing combat troops, and logistics support forces.

  At the end of last year, the Russian General Staff Department completed the reform of the armed forces. The Russian military’s new round of structural reforms eliminated the arms, military regions and fleets and re-established three functional headquarters and three regional headquarters. The three functional commands are: Strategic Nuclear Power Command, Transportation Command, and Aerospace Defense Command. The three regional commands are: Western European Command, Central Asian Command and Far East Command.

  Generally speaking, although the structural changes of the military have their own characteristics, the common point is that they tend to be integrated and tend to be integrated, and the boundaries between the traditional arms and services are increasingly blurred. The informationized army is not just a technology, but a new structure that is linked to new technologies – ultimately, a structural decision function.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

從軍隊信息建設到建設信息化軍隊——放開眼界看世界新軍事變革

李炳彥

幾年前,國外有一家窗簾廠,瀕臨倒閉之際,求助於諮詢公司。諮詢公司只讓他們把窗簾廠改為遮光技術廠,這個廠子便活了起來。

一個名字改變,拓寬了發展視野;一個概念更換,撬開了心智枷鎖。更新觀念,離不開更新概念。在新軍事變革中,我們需要適時採用新的概念,來展現新的發展思路。

持續發生的新軍事變革雖然至今仍看不到彼岸,但清晰可見變革已經進入到一個新階段。

這場新軍事變革,是由以信息技術為核心的新技術革命引發的。上個世紀90年代,信息技術對軍隊的革命性影響,主要還停留於“建構”階段,即在機械化軍隊的組織結構框架內進行信息技術嵌入、建網、聯網、集成,實際上是用信息技術加強機械化、提昇機械化。理論界常把這一階段的變革,稱之為軍事領域裡的變革,是推動軍隊

信息化建設。當時,美陸軍要建設的數字化師、數字化軍,都是在原來機械化軍隊的結構內進行的。後來,美軍汲取社會上一些大企業、跨國公司進行信息化的經驗,改變了變革的思路。
以往的軍事變革,都是先變革軍事技術、武器裝備,最後完成軍事組織體制的變革,以適應新的作戰方式。而信息化為標誌的新軍事變革,特別是後發之軍,應當反過來進行。企業界的經驗也是“先組織結構合理化,再自動化、信息化”。

上個世紀90年代以前,美國企業界進行信息化建設,只著眼於提高工作效率,雖有成效,但還談不上變革。美福特汽車公司,曾花大筆金錢搞自動化,辦公效率明顯提高,如北美分公司的財務部,實現辦公自動化後,人員由原來的500人減少到400人,公司領導自認為不錯。後來,他們得知日本

馬自達汽車公司做同樣的工作,一共只用了5個人。兩者相對照,福特公司的領導大吃一驚。他們深入調查後發現,馬自達公司從調整組織結構入手,先改變工作流程,再搞辦公自動化。福特公司的財務制度、組織結構還是傳統模式,造成許多無用功。後來,福特公司經過優化結構,再造業務流程,在此基礎上搞辦公自動化,公司財務員工壓縮到了原來的四分之一。
人類社會在發展中,存在一種“路徑依賴”現象,即一個社會系統形成後,必將在實際運作中不斷自我強化,以致後來人們改進它的種種嘗試,都難以擺脫原有思路的影響。

另外,組織結構不改變,很難做出信息化的正確決策。通常,人們都是站在本單位、本部門謀劃工作,形成了一種“職業官能症”。研究信息化首先是本單位的信息化,超出本單位的建設範圍,領導視野就達不到了。致使出現新的“同構病”——大而全、小而全,你有我也有,不能互聯、互通、互操作。對此,有人稱之為“馬鈴薯效應”:一麻袋馬鈴薯,個個都發芽,個個自成小系統,自我封閉,互不相聯。建這些系統,從局部來看可能合理,但從信息化的全局看可能並不科學、不合理。

外軍在實踐中認識到:要想信息化不走彎路,還應從理順編制體制、調整指揮體系入手。否則,各級、各部門都忙著信息化,很可能現在動作愈快、投入愈多,將來一旦返工,造成的損失就愈大。

先組織結構合理化,在信息化,或者組織結構合理化與信息化一併考慮,同時進行,成了新軍事變革的一種新共識。進入21世紀後,美軍提出軍隊轉型,標誌著軍事變革進入了一個新階段。在這個階段,信息技術從“建構”作用,轉向“解構”作用。即:不是加強機械化,而是重組機械化。由此,軍隊信息化建設,轉向了建設信息化軍隊;軍事領域裡的變革,轉向真正的軍事變革。

美軍在理論準備階段,曾設計出的未來軍隊是:傳感器軍,精確打擊軍,主導機動軍,聚焦後勤軍。在轉型中,經過新的論證,提出美軍重組的未來目標:全維戰場感知軍,精確火力打擊軍,高效指揮控制軍,智能後勤保障軍。

德國於2005年,提出了建設“新三軍”設想,即:快速反應部隊,常備作戰部隊,後勤支援部隊。

去年底,俄軍總參謀部完成了關於武裝力量改革方案。俄軍新一輪結構改革方案,取消了軍兵種、軍區和艦隊,重新成立三個職能司令部和三個地區司令部。三個職能司令部是:戰略核力量司令部、運輸司令部、空天防禦司令部。三個地區司令部是:西歐司令部、中亞司令部和遠東司令部。

從總體上看,軍隊結構變革雖然各國都有自己的特色,但共同點是趨於綜合、趨於一體化,傳統的軍兵種之間的界限日益模糊。信息化軍隊不只是技術,重要的是與新技術相聯繫的新的結構方式——最終還是結構決定功能。

Original Referring url: http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2006-04-20/

Anxious US Military Worried about China’s Information Warfare // 焦急美國軍方擔心中國信息戰

Anxious US Military Worried about China’s Information Warfare // 焦急美國軍方擔心中國信息戰

In the past few years, the Chinese military and folk experts have set off a wave of research information warfare. After reading their works, it is not difficult to find that China’s information warfare theory research has several obvious characteristics: First, China is eager to develop its own information warfare theory, which is related to its judgment on its own security threats; secondly, China’s information War theory is deeply influenced by its traditional military command art. Both the ancient “Sun Tzu’s Art of War” and “Thirty-six”, or Mao Zedong’s people’s war thoughts have deeply imprinted in the information warfare theory; third, China’s cognition and classification of information warfare is obviously different. In the United States, the originator of information warfare, the United States, although similar to Russia’s information warfare theory, is only similar and God is not.

Wei Wei Zhao

The advent of the information age has prompted people to rethink the way war is carried out. China is aware that its conventional armed forces are far less powerful than superpowers. In the near future, neither conventional forces nor nuclear weapons can pose a powerful deterrent to the United States. However, the ambitious Eastern Dragon believes that with the advent of the information age, there will be new changes in the form of war, military structure, methods of warfare and command means, and information will replace people in the future battlefield. As long as the focus of strategic research is placed on the warfare of information warfare and grasping the trend of the times, it is not difficult to shorten the distance and further gain a leading position.

In ancient China, there was a military book called “Thirty-six Meters”. One of them, “Wei Wei Zhao”, pointed out that if the enemy’s positive power is too strong, it should be avoided and it should be weak. The Chinese are used for the present, applying this strategy to the current struggle between countries – if you can’t launch a direct attack (nuclear strike), then fight information warfare, weak financial, electricity, etc.

The network system starts. Although conventional armed forces cannot compete with the United States, China’s information warfare forces theoretically threaten the political and economic security of the United States. Americans cannot afford the instant of the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ stock exchange. collapse. The global accessibility of information warfare and the spread of light speed are characteristics that nuclear war does not have. What Chinese want is to defeat opponents with the speed, accuracy and continuity of information warfare.

The power of information warfare can make up for the shortcomings of conventional armed forces. The establishment of various battlefield information networks can not only improve the management level of traditional warfare, enhance the overall combat effectiveness of the troops, but also compensate for the shortage of conventional forces to a certain extent. In the eyes of the Chinese, the information warfare seems to be more powerful, and it is the force multiplier of the conventional armed forces.

Information war think tank

In 1996, Shen Weiguang, the earliest expert on information warfare in China, defined the information warfare as: “The warring parties fight for the battlefield initiative by controlling information and intelligence resources.” and the United States “protecting the friendly information system and attacking enemy information.” Compared with the definition of “system”, Shen Weiguang emphasizes “controlling” the enemy.

In 1998, the Chinese military information warfare authority Wang saves the classification of information warfare: divided into normal time, crisis time, war time according to time; divided into attack and defense according to nature; divided into country, strategy, theater, tactic according to level According to the scale, it is divided into battlefield, theater, and local war. The characteristics of information warfare include command and control warfare, intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, space control warfare, hacker warfare, virtual warfare, and economic warfare. In principle, information warfare measures such as cutting off, blinding, transparent, rapid, and improving viability. General Wang’s understanding of information warfare is closer to that of the West, and he focuses on the confrontation of advanced technology.

In 1999, Chinese experts launched a big discussion on information warfare. At this time, Shen Weiguang expanded the scope of information warfare. He believes that “information warfare, broadly refers to the war against the information space and the competition for information resources in the military (including political, economic, scientific, and social fields), narrowly refers to war. The confrontation between the two parties in the field of information. It is one of the essential characteristics of modern warfare. The essence of information warfare is to achieve the ‘no war and defeat the soldiers’ by capturing the right to control the system.”

Major military expert Wang Pufeng, who is another information warfare expert in the military, has a deep understanding of information warfare. In 2000, he distinguished information warfare from information warfare. According to his explanation, information warfare refers to a form of warfare, which contains information warfare, and information warfare refers to a kind of warfare activity. He believes that “information warfare includes all combat activities, including a series of intrusion activities and computer virus attacks on enemy information and information systems, such as information theft, tampering, deletion, deception, disruption, blocking, interference, and shackles. The network is not working properly.” He advocates that China’s information warfare theory should have its own characteristics while drawing on foreign advanced combat thinking.

“Mao Network People’s War”

China’s perception of information warfare is very traditional. Many military theorists believe that the information age has given new meaning to Mao Zedong’s people’s war thoughts. Therefore, he advocates relying on and mobilizing the masses of the people to conduct online wars. It is conceivable that no matter which of the same family, playing online with 1.3 billion people is daunting.

The most important feature of the Mao Zedong-style cyber war theory is that it breaks the boundary between the military and the people. The traditional dividing line between military and civilian facilities, military technology and civil technology has been blurred. The sharing of information technology in military and civilian use has created conditions for the widespread use of civilian technology for military purposes. For example, private electronic information equipment can be used for intelligence interception and transmission. Civil communication networks can be used for war mobilization; private computers can be used for network attack and defense. Second, the difference between military and non-military personnel is gradually disappearing. With the development of network technology and the expansion of application fields, a large number of network technology talents stand out. These network elites with special abilities will become gladiators in the future network people’s war. At the same time, information networks such as communications, transportation, and financial systems and international networking have provided the necessary conditions for China to carry out the people’s war.

Today, the idea of ​​the people’s war has been established as the fundamental guiding principle of China’s network information warfare. A Chinese military author wrote: “The strategic and tactical principles of flexible maneuvering are still the soul of network information warfare. The broad masses of the people actively participate in the war, especially the technical support and online warfare, which is the mass base and strength to win the victory of the network information war. Source.”

The power of the Internet People’s War is so terrible. Perhaps we can understand why the Chinese are willing to reduce the size of their armed forces. Imagine that once the war breaks out, China can launch a large number of people to participate in the war, information engineers and civilians will be organized through the home. When computers attack the US network information system, why should we maintain a large-scale combat force?

Information war drill

In the past few years, China has conducted several major information warfare military exercises to test the information warfare theory. The first “special warfare” (information warfare) drill was conducted in October 1997. A group army in a military region was attacked by a virus designed to smash its system. The group used military anti-virus software to defend it. The drill was called “invasion and anti-invasion drills.” Ground logistics, medical and air force units were also used during the exercise.

In October 1998, China held a high-tech comprehensive exercise jointly conducted by the three major military regions. For the first time in the joint defense operations exercise, the “military information highway” was used. The information network system in the command automation system consists of digital, dialing, command network and secret channel. The other parts of the command automation system are subsystems for command operations, audio and graphics processing, control, and data encryption.

In October 1999, the PLA conducted the first battle-level computer online confrontation exercise between two group armies. Reconnaissance and anti-reconnaissance, interference and anti-interference, blockade and anti-blockade, air strikes and anti-air strikes. In the software environment, six types of operations such as resource sharing, operational command, situation display, auxiliary evaluation, signal transmission and intelligence warfare were carried out. The computer evaluation system performs data and quality analysis on the performance of both sides of the exercise.

In July 2000, a military region also conducted an online confrontation drill. The three training tasks related to this exercise are: organizing and planning campaigns, seizing air and information rights, implementing breakthroughs and counter-breakthroughs. More than 100 terminals were connected to the walkthrough.

Militia detachment

China’s people’s war has a complete system. Its overall development direction is “the combination of a capable standing army and a strong reserve force.” This national defense system is conducive to giving full play to the overall effectiveness of the people’s war and the advantages of “network tactics.”

China’s 1.5 million reserve forces are very keen on playing the online people’s war. In some areas, the PLA has compiled reserve forces into small information warfare units. For example, in Yichang City, Hubei Province, the military division organized 20 municipal departments (electricity, finance, television, medical, etc.) technical personnel to set up a reserve information warfare. The department has a network battle camp, an electronic war camp, an intelligence psychological war camp and 35 technical teams. The Ministry also established the first reserve information warfare training base in China that can accommodate 500 people.

Yichang is not the only area where the reserve and militia are trained in information warfare. In December 1999, a reserve and militia meeting was held in Xiamen, Fujian. In the subsequent exercises, the militia detachment with high-tech equipment carried out electronic countermeasures, cyber attacks and protection, and radar reconnaissance performances. The goal of the imaginary attack is an island that is surrounded, so it is easy for outsiders to think of Taiwan. Xiamen is a special economic zone that brings together a large number of high-tech talents, so it has the superior conditions for implementing information warfare.

In an exercise held by the Jinan Military Region, the Xi’an People’s Armed Forces Information Warfare Division played the blue party responsible for the attack. They developed 10 information warfare measures, including information mines, information reconnaissance, alteration of network information, release of information bombs, and dumping. Web spam, distribution of network flyers, information spoofing, dissemination of false information, organization of information defense, establishment of cyber espionage stations. It can be seen from these network information warfare methods that their research on network information warfare has been quite specific and in-depth.

Chinese military experts also suggest that militia organizations at all levels should set up network technology professional detachments. In order to facilitate command and coordination, the militia network technology professional detachment should implement grouping and vertical management in the province or region. The reserve forces participate in the “network attack and defense” and “network technology guarantee” in the future war, and their actions must be implemented and unified by the military organization.

Medium

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has developed its own set of information warfare education methods. The steps are: first, teach the basic knowledge of network information warfare; secondly, improve the information warfare knowledge level by telling the advanced military thoughts of foreign troops; then improve the information warfare use skills, especially Electronic technology, psychological warfare techniques, and information offensive and defensive techniques; finally, through exercises, knowledge is translated into practical operational capabilities. In China, it is mainly the responsibility of the PLA Academy to train high-tech talents in information warfare:

The People’s Liberation Army Communication Command College is located in Wuhan. In 1998, the Institute published two books, Information Command and Control Science and Information Warfare Technology. These two books are the most important textbooks for information warfare education in China. The college enjoys a high reputation for its excellent information warfare tutorials, which analyze information warfare requirements at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The People’s Liberation Army Information Engineering University, located in Zhengzhou, was formed by the merger of the former People’s Liberation Army Information Engineering College, Electronic Technology College and Surveying and Mapping College. The school’s current main research areas are information security, modern communication technology and space technology, and exploration in some cutting-edge disciplines, such as remote sensing information technology, satellite navigation and positioning technology, geographic information database technology.

The PLA University of Science and Technology, located in Nanjing, was formed by the merger of the former People’s Liberation Army Communication Engineering College, the Engineering Corps Engineering College, the Air Force Meteorological College and the General Staff No. 63 Research Institute. The school specializes in training military personnel in information warfare, command automation and other new disciplines. Nearly 400 experts and professors are engaged in information warfare theory and technology research at the university.

The National Defense Science and Technology University of the People’s Liberation Army is located in Changsha. The school is directly affiliated to the Central Military Commission. Has developed the famous “Galaxy” series supercomputer. During the Kosovo War between April and June 1999, nearly 60 senior officers gathered here to study high-tech wars.

The Naval Engineering University of the People’s Liberation Army, located in Wuhan, is the only institution in the Navy that studies information warfare. The purpose of the school’s research information warfare is to apply information technology to naval equipment so that the Chinese navy can adapt to information warfare.

in conclusion

What conclusions can we draw from China’s information warfare research? What lessons can the US military get from it?

First, Chinese military theorists have found a cheap and effective method of information warfare that gives China a position equal to that of the West in terms of strategic military and international status, thus enabling China to play a more important strategic role in the Asian region.

Second, China’s emphasis on new information warfare forces is extraordinary. Therefore, it is possible to develop various forms of information warfare forces, such as: network forces (independent units), “network warriors” raid units, information protection units, information units, electronic police and joint network people’s war organizations. Interestingly, in terms of current capabilities, Western countries, not China, have the ability to put these ideas into practice.

Third, China’s information warfare theory reflects the combination of Western and Chinese thoughts, and the influence of the former is getting weaker. Due to some common sources of military command art (Marxist dialectical thinking), China’s information warfare is more similar to Russia. However, by its very nature, China’s information warfare theory is different from Russia and the West. China’s information warfare theory emphasizes control, computerized warfare, cyber warfare, knowledge warfare, and information rights.

Fourth, in the field of information warfare, China has crossed several stages of technological development, and using the technology of the Quartet has not only saved time but also saved money. However, China does not fully emulate foreign countries, but adopts a creative information warfare strategy. But no matter what, China is a different information warfare force that is worthy of attention.

For the US military, studying China’s information warfare theory is not just to provide the military with several opinions. “Sun Tzu’s Art of War” said that “knowing that he knows, has won every battle.” From the perspective of foreign information warfare theory to analyze the information warfare capabilities of the United States, we can discover the fatal flaws of the US information warfare system.

As the Chinese say, the losers of information warfare are not necessarily technically backward, and those who lack the ability to direct art and strategy are most likely to be losers. It is time for the United States to reflect on its own information warfare and to study information warfare strategies and tactics. 

Original Mandarin Chinese:

在過去幾年裡,中國軍方與民間專家們掀起了研究信息戰的熱潮。閱讀他們的作品後不難發現,中國的信息戰理論研究具有幾個明顯的特徵:首先,中國正迫不及待地發展自己的信息戰理論,這與其對自身安全威脅的判斷有關;其次,中國的信息戰理論受其傳統軍事指揮藝術影響頗深。無論是古代的《孫子兵法》和《三十六計》,還是毛澤東的人民戰爭思想都在信息戰理論中打下了深深的烙印;第三,中國對信息戰的認知與分類,顯然不同於信息戰的開山鼻祖——美國,雖近似於俄國的信息戰理論,卻也只是形似而神不是。

圍魏救趙

信息時代的到來促使人們對戰爭的進行方式重新進行思索。中國意識到其常規武裝力量與超級大國相比實力懸殊,近期內無論是常規力量還是核武器,中國都無法對美國構成強大威懾。但是,雄心勃勃的東方巨龍認為:隨著信息時代的來臨,戰爭形態、軍隊結構、作戰方式和指揮手段都會有嶄新的變化,信息將取代人充斥於未來戰場。只要把戰略研究的著眼點放到信息戰這一戰爭形態上,把握時代發展潮流,就不難縮短距離,並進一步取得領先地位。

中國古代有部兵書叫《三十六計》,其中的一計“圍魏救趙”就指出,如果敵人正面力量過於強大,應當避實就虛,擊其薄弱之處。中國人古為今用,把這個計謀應用到當前國家間鬥爭——如果你不能發動直接攻擊(核打擊),那就打信息戰,向西方薄弱的金融、電力等

網絡系統下手。常規武裝力量雖然無法與美國抗衡,然而,中國的信息戰部隊在理論上卻實實在在威脅到美國的政治及經濟安全,美國人無法承受紐約股票交易所和納斯達克股票交易所在瞬間崩潰。信息戰的全球可及性、光速傳播性是核戰爭所不具有的特性,中國人要的就是以信息戰的速度、準確性和持續性擊敗對手。

信息戰力量可彌補常規武裝力量的不足。各種戰場信息網絡的建立,不僅可以提高對傳統戰爭的管理水平,增強部隊的整體戰鬥力,還可以在一定程度上彌補常規力量的不足。在中國人眼中,信息戰好似如虎添翼,是常規武裝部隊的力量倍增器。

信息戰智囊

1996年,中國最早提出信息戰的專家沈偉光給信息戰下的定義是:“交戰雙方通過控制信息與情報資源來爭奪戰場主動權的戰爭。”與美國“保護友方信息系統,攻擊敵方信息系統”的定義相比,沈偉光更強調“控制”敵人。

1998年,中國軍方信息戰權威王保存少將對信息戰進行了分類:按時間分為平時、危機時、戰時;按性質分為進攻、防禦;按層次分為國家、戰略、戰區、戰術;按規模分為戰場、戰區、局部戰爭。信息戰表現的特徵包括指揮與控制戰、情報戰、電子戰、心理戰、空間控制戰、黑客戰、虛擬戰、經濟戰等方面的較量。信息戰原則上採取切斷、蒙蔽、透明、快速和提高生存力等措施。王將軍對信息戰的認識與西方較為接近,都把重點放在先進技術的對抗上。

1999年,中國專家對信息戰展開了大討論。沈偉光此時把信息戰的範圍擴大,他認為“信息戰,廣義地指對壘的軍事(也包括政治、經濟、科技及社會一切領域)集團搶占信息空間和爭奪信息資源的戰爭,狹義地指戰爭中交戰雙方在信息領域的對抗。它是現代戰爭的本質特徵之一。信息戰的本質在於通過奪取制信息權達到’不戰而屈人之兵’。”

軍方另一位信息戰專家王普豐少將對信息戰有很深入的理解,2000年,他把信息戰和信息戰爭區別開。根據他的解釋,信息戰爭指的是一種戰爭形態,它包含了信息戰,而信息戰指的是一種作戰活動。他認為“信息戰包括所有作戰活動,其中有對敵信息及信息系統實施信息竊取、篡改、刪除、欺騙、擾亂、阻塞、干擾、癱瘓等一系列的入侵活動和計算機病毒攻擊,最終使敵計算機網絡無法正常工作。”他主張中國的信息戰理論在藉鑒國外先進作戰思想的同時,應具有中國自己的特色。

“毛式網絡人民戰爭”

中國對信息戰的認知非常具有傳統特色。許多軍事理論家認為信息時代賦予了毛澤東人民戰爭思想新的內涵,因此,主張依靠和發動廣大人民群眾進行網上戰爭。可以想像,無論是哪個同家,與13億人打網絡戰都是令人生畏的。

毛澤東式網絡人民戰爭理論的最重要特徵是它打破了軍與民的界限。模糊了軍用設施與民用設施、軍用技術與民用技術的傳統分界線。信息技術在軍用和民用上的共享,為廣泛利用民間技術達成軍事目的創造了條件。例如,可以利用民間的電子信息設備進行情報截獲和傳輸可以利用民間的通信網絡進行戰爭動員;可以利用民間的計算機進行網絡進攻和防禦等。其次,軍事人員與非軍事人員的區別也在逐漸消失。隨著網絡技術的發展和應用領域的擴大,大批的網絡技術人才脫穎而出。這些具備特殊能力的網絡精英將成為未來網絡人民戰爭中的角斗士。與此同時,通信、交通、金融系統等信息網絡與國際聯網,為中國開展人民戰爭提供了必要條件。

如今,人民戰爭思想已經被確立為中國網絡信息戰的根本指導原則。一個中國軍方作者寫道:“靈活機動的戰略戰術原則,仍然是網絡信息戰的靈魂。廣大人民群眾積極參戰,特別是技術支援和網上參戰,則是奪取網絡信息戰勝利的群眾基礎和力量源泉。”

網絡人民戰爭的威力是如此可怕,或許,我們可以明白為何中國人願意削減其武裝部隊規模了——設想一旦戰爭爆發,中國可以發動大量民眾參戰,信息工程師和平民將被組織起來,通過家中的電腦攻擊美國的網絡信息系統,那又何必要維持規模龐大的作戰部隊呢?

信息戰演練

過去幾年裡,中國舉行過數次重大信息戰軍事演習對信息戰理論進行檢驗。首次“特種戰”(信息戰)演練於1997年10月進行。某軍區的一個集團軍遭到旨在癱瘓其係統的病毒攻擊,該集團軍用殺毒軟件進行了防衛。該演練被稱為“入侵與反入侵演練”。演習時還動用了地面後勤、醫療和空軍部隊。

1998年10月,中國舉行了一場由三大軍區聯合進行的高科技綜合演練。聯合防禦作戰演練中首次使用了“軍事信息高速公路”。指揮自動化系統中的信息網絡系統由數字、撥號、指揮網和保密信道組成。指揮自動化系統的其他部分是指揮作戰、音頻和圖形處理、控制和數據加密等子系統。

1999年10月,解放軍首次進行了兩個集團軍之間的戰役級計算機網上對抗演習。演練了偵察與反偵察、干擾與反干擾、封鎖與反封鎖、空襲與反空襲等科目。在軟件環境下進行了資源共享、作戰指揮、態勢顯示、輔助評估、信號傳輸和情報戰等6類作業。計算機評估系統對演習雙方的表現進行數據與質量分析。

2000年7月,某軍區也進行了網上對抗演練。與此次演練有關的3項訓練任務是:組織和計劃戰役、奪取制空權和製信息權、實施突破和反突破。有100多台終端聯網參與了演練。

民兵分隊

中國的人民戰爭有一套完備的體制,其總體發展方向是“精幹的常備軍與強大的後備力量相結合”,這種國防體制有利於發揮人民戰爭的整體效能和“網海戰術”優勢。

中國150萬預備役部隊十分熱衷於打網絡人民戰爭。在一些地區,解放軍已經把預備役部隊編成小型信息戰部隊。例如,在湖北省宜昌市,軍分區組織了20個市政部門(電力、財政、電視、醫療等)的技術人員成立了預備役信息戰團。該部擁有網絡戰營、電子戰營、情報心理戰營及35個技術分隊。該部還建立了中國第一個能容納500人的預備役信息戰訓練基地。

宜昌並不是組織預備役和民兵進行信息戰訓練的唯一地區。 1999年12月在福建廈門召開了預備役和民兵會議。在隨後進行的演習中,擁有高技術裝備的民兵分隊進行了電子對抗、網絡攻擊和防護、雷達偵察表演。山於假想攻擊的目標是一座被包圍的島嶼,因此很容易讓外人聯想到是針對台灣。廈門是經濟特區,匯集了大量高科技人才,因此有實施信息戰的優越條件。

在一次由濟南軍區舉行的演習中,西安人武部信息戰分隊扮演負責攻擊的藍方,他們制定了10種信息戰措施,其中有安放信息地雷、信息偵察、改動網絡資料、釋放信息炸彈、傾倒網絡垃圾、分發網絡傳單、信息欺騙、散佈虛假信息、組織信息防禦、建立網絡間諜站。從這些網絡信息戰法可以看出,他們對網絡信息戰的研究已相當具體、深入。

中國的軍事專家還建議,各級民兵組織都應成立網絡技術專業分隊,為便於指揮協調,民兵網絡技術專業分隊應以省或者地區為單位實行條條編組,垂直管理。後備力量參與未來戰爭中的“網絡攻防”和“網絡技術保障”,其行動要由軍隊組織實施和統一協調。

培養基地

中國人民解放軍發展出自己的一套信息戰教育方法,其步驟是:首先傳授網絡信息戰基礎知識;其次通過講述外軍的先進軍事思想提高信息戰知識水平;然後提高信息戰使用技能,特別是電子技術、心理戰技術和信息攻防技術;最後,通過演習把知識轉化為實際操作能力。在中國,主要由解放軍院校擔負培養信息戰高技術人才的責任:

解放軍通信指揮學院,位於武漢。 1998年,該院出版了兩部書籍,分別是《信息作戰指揮控制學》和《信息作戰技術學》,這兩部書籍是中國信息戰教育最重要的教材。該學院以其優良的信息戰教程設置而享有很高的聲譽,這些教程分析了戰略、戰役、戰術層次的信息作戰要求。

解放軍信息工程大學,位於鄭州,由原解放軍信息工程學院、電子技術學院和測繪學院合併而成。該校目前主要研究領域是信息安全,現代通信技術和空間技術,並且在一些尖端學科領域進行探索,如遙感信息技術、衛星導航與定位技術、地理信息數據庫技術。

解放軍理工大學,位於南京,由原解放軍通信工程學院、工程兵工程學院、空軍氣象學院和總參第63研究所合併而成。該校專門負責訓練信息戰、指揮自動化和其它新學科的軍事人才。有近400名專家教授在該大學從事信息戰理論與技術研究。

解放軍國防科技大學,位於長沙,該校直接隸屬於中央軍委。曾開發了著名的“銀河”系列超級計算機。 1999年4月到6月科索沃戰爭期間,近60名高級軍官匯集在此研究高科技戰爭。

解放軍海軍工程大學,位於武漢,是海軍唯一研究信息戰的院校。該校研究信息戰的目的是把信息技術應用到海軍裝備,使中國海軍能適應信息化戰爭。

結論

我們從中國的信息戰研究中能得到什麼結論呢?美國軍隊又能從中得到什麼啟示呢?

首先,中國的軍事理論家找到了一廉價而有效的信息戰方法,它使中國在戰略軍事和國際地位上取得與西方相等的位置,從而使中國在亞人地區發揮更重要的戰略角色。

其次,中國對新型信息戰部隊的重視非同尋常。因此可能會發展形式各樣的信息戰部隊,例如:網絡部隊(獨立兵種)、“網絡勇士”突襲分隊、信息保護部隊、信息兵團,電子警察和聯合網絡人民戰爭機構。有意思的是,就現階段的能力而言,西方國家,而不是中國,更具有把這些設想付諸實施的能力。

第三,中國的信息戰理論反映了西方和中國思想的結合,而且前者的影響力越來越弱。由於軍事指揮藝術的一些共同淵源(馬克思主義辯證思想),中國的信息戰思想更類似於俄國。但是,就其本質而言,中國的信息戰理論與俄國和西方都不同。中國的信息戰理論強調控制、電腦化戰爭、網絡戰、知識戰和製信息權。

第四,在信息戰領域,中國跨越了若干技術發展階段,利用四方的技術,不僅節省了時間而且還節省了金錢。不過,中國沒有完全仿效外國,而是採用創造性的信息戰策略。但不管怎麼樣,中國都是值得關注的一支不同於其他國家的信息戰力量。

對美軍而言,研究中國的信息戰理論絕非僅僅為了給軍方提供幾條意見。 《孫子兵法》稱“知彼知已,百戰百勝”。從外國信息戰理論的角度來分析美國的信息戰能力,才能發現美國信息戰系統的致命缺陷。

正如中國人所言,信息戰的失敗者不一定是技術落後方,那些缺乏指揮藝術和戰略能力的人才最可能是失敗者。美國到了該反省自己的信息戰思想,並研究信息戰戰略和戰術的時候了。

Original Referring url:

General Qiao Liang: Confident Cyber Leadership Wins the future “network space war” // 喬亮將軍:充滿信心的網絡領導贏得了未來的“網絡太空戰爭”

General Qiao Liang: Confident Cyber Leadership Wins the future “network space war” //

喬亮將軍:充滿信心的網絡領導贏得了未來的“網絡太空戰爭”

For nearly half a century, electronic technology and information technology have developed at an impressive speed, and thus have completely changed the style of modern warfare. Although people are accustomed to the sorting of land, sea and air when they talk about the dimensions of war, from the military technical level, the “network warfare” capability of “electronic warfare” and “cyber warfare” has no doubt that it has come to the fore. Become the first combat power. Who can dominate the electronic warfare, who can dominate the battlefield. It is a pity that this conclusion has not yet been universally accepted by the military.

Carving a sword for a sword is a portrayal of the evolution of people’s understanding and the development of things. Today, when this round of military revolution is marked by electronic technology and chip technology, as the technology matures and the potential approaches the limit and comes to an end, the soldiers of most countries have a small tube and a smaller chip. It is possible to change the style of war and not yet fully prepared for the spirit and knowledge. This is an irony for human beings living in the age of information, especially those armed with informatized weapons.

The individual representation of the appearance of the world makes people intuitively divide the whole world into parts to understand and understand. Even though electronic technology and information technology have long integrated the whole world into the grid space and welded into a “domain”, people are still accustomed to split it into different “domain” blocks. For example, many soldiers who are ignorant of traditional thinking take the battle space into five major dimensions: land, sea, air, sky, and electricity, and think that they will fight in these five dimensions. The grid space battlefield, in their view, is only one of them. Even in the concept of joint operations, which attempted to bring the five-dimensional space into one, the space and space warfare is only one of the combat areas and combat styles. It is completely unknown that the world has been “informed.” Such lag thinking can’t keep up with the pace of technological leap: the boat is far from the lake, but the sword sinks to the bottom of the lake. Those who can win and win in the future battlefield must be the army that observes and thinks, operates and controls all battlefields as a whole. Only in this way can we find the key to open the door to victory: who can control the grid space, who can control the battlefield; who can prevail in the space war, who is the winner of the war. This is the general trend that modern warfare can not be reversed today.

Electronic warfare (which has evolved into information warfare or cyberspace warfare today) is a prerequisite for all modern battles, battles and even wars. In contrast, air supremacy, sea power, and even land and power, have handed over the first battle of the future battlefield to the power of the grid. Moreover, the struggle for the right to heaven is itself part of the power of the network. In Deng Shiping’s words, modern warfare, “there is no air superiority, and no one can beat it.” Yes, in the future war, there is no power to make electricity in the net, and nothing can be beaten.

Today, it is proposed to use the “air-sea battle” concept to contain China’s US military. It is a military machine that is almost fully informatized. Therefore, the US military knows that informatization is its strength and its shortcomings. Short and short, whoever has the advantage of space and space warfare, who can restrain the US military. Some people may ask, is it from a military point of view that the space warfare is so important that people think it is more important than firepower? Yes, this is the author’s answer. Because when your opponent has been fully dimensioned, it will either be better than the opponent’s network space warfare, or defeat the war first, and then the firepower war will only destroy the opponents who are still unwilling to admit defeat. The process of physical digestion.

Why is the space warfare so important? In fact, all of our main rivals have their strengths in all-dimensional informationization, and all their shortcomings are over-informatization. The shortcoming of informationization is that there is no chip-free, thus forming chip dependence. The chip makes the weapon platform ammunition stronger, but it is also extremely fragile. An electromagnetic pulse bomb can destroy all electronic components within its explosive coverage. This kind of scene makes the opponent who is armed with the chip to the teeth very scared. For us, what we fear the opponents should be our priority to focus on development.

If you play against a full-dimensional informatization opponent, the opponent is most worried about: one is attacked by the network, and the other is destroyed by the sky-based system. Because this will make the hardware advantages of all weapon platforms meaningless. Although our opponents also have this ability, once both sides use this ability to smash opponents, it means that the two sides will return to World War II. At that time, who has the advantage of population, who has the advantage of resources, who has the advantage of manufacturing, who has the advantage of war.

Seeing this clearly helps us to get rid of some kind of paradox: the more we understand the military system of our opponents, the more we worry about the gap in our military system. The more we recognize the gap, the more we want to learn to catch up with our opponents. The result is what the opponent has, I There is also something to be. In the end, I forced myself to a dead end with the strength of the opponent and the length of the opponent. How can this road lead us to “can fight, win and win”? Ancient and modern Chinese and foreign, whereever wins, all of them are short of my enemy, even if it is hard, it is the longest attack of my enemy. There is a winner who wins the enemy with the enemy. Moreover, winning the war in the future cannot be achieved at all costs. For China, there should be a requirement that is as important as victory. Weapons and equipment development and operational plan development must consider how to reduce costs. Never have anything for the opponent, we must have something. You can’t do it with the Dragon King, and you can’t become a local tyrant. You can’t compare it with the Dragon King. Today, we have some cognitive defects on how to win the overall war of local war under informatization conditions. We always consciously and unconsciously think that playing high-tech wars is a high-cost war, and we always want to compare costs with our competitors. And fight costs.

In fact, we can completely change the way of thinking, that is to take the low-cost route. There are no heavy aircraft carriers, there is no X37, there is no global fast strike system, the opponent does not care. It only cares if you can destroy its satellite system and lick its network system. After all, the tools and means of attacking satellite weapons and electromagnetic pulse bombs are not very expensive and scarce, and their effects will be low-cost and high-yield. We can’t help but fall into the arms race with our opponents because we are worried about the gap between ourselves and our opponents.

The Americans said in the “air-sea battle” concept that “we will drag China into the competition with us in this way, so that the Chinese will put more energy into the production of such missiles such as Dongfeng 21D. Then use a lot of bait and deception to force the Chinese to consume these weapons in a meaningful direction.” In this regard, someone in the country wrote an article reminding us that “we must prevent falling into the trap of the United States.” This is not wrong in itself, but it still belongs to only know one, and I don’t know the other. It is important to know that after such articles come out, it is very likely that our understanding will produce new deviations, because there are “trap traps (ie double traps)” in the above-mentioned American discourse. First, it attempts to lure the Chinese army into the trap of an arms race. If you compete with the US military, you will spend a lot of money and resources to follow the US military and not to surpass; secondly, if you realize that this is a trap and give up the competition, you will immediately fall into another trap: since giving up the arms race Waste martial arts. For China, if we are not willing to compete with our opponents and we are not willing to squander martial arts, what should we do? The conclusion is that we can only go our own way.

To develop our own strengths and develop the things that are most beneficial to me, it is best to use my strength and defeat the enemy. At least it must be my long, the enemy’s long. I can’t do it with my short enemy, and the enemy’s long enemy will not do the same. With the enemy’s long attacking enemy, you will never win.

Take a look at the main design of the “Air-Sea Battle”: the opening is to hit your space-based system, let you blind; then hit the “reconnaissance war”, let you call you; then come to officially start a regular battle with you.

Under such circumstances, what should we do? It is a passive move, the soldiers will block, the water will cover the earth, or will it be my strength, in exchange for low-cost means, in exchange for the opponent’s high-value goal? Of course, the latter. To do this, we must first have three capabilities:

The first is satellite anti-missile capability. This ability will lead to a serious reliance on informatized opponents, making them blind, defamatory, and dumb, so that they can only return to the level of World War II to compete with conventional forces.

The second is the ability to remotely play. You must ensure that you have the ability to sink high-priced targets like aircraft carriers. If such a high-priced target is sunk, it will seriously undermine the confidence of investors around the world against the opponent, so that the capital does not dare to invest in it again, resulting in a serious war financing dilemma for the opponent. This is the national weakness of the opponent’s combat planners who are not aware of it. The confidence of the sinking aircraft carrier in global investors will be a huge blow, which will interrupt the opponent’s global capital chain.

The third is that there must be a network space combat capability. Especially the ability to attack any network system of the opponent. If China and the powerful opponents are really fighting, you must demonstrate your ability and determination to attack and smash all of the grid system from the very beginning. This is a necessary way to contain war by deterrence.

The reason is always easier said than done. How to get the power of the network in the future war, or to offset the advantage of the opponent’s network warfare? It is necessary to make yourself technological progress. But what is more necessary is the progress of thinking. The long history of evolution proves that human beings are not always in a state of thought progress in the coordinate system of time. Degradation will happen from time to time. The degradation of thinking is sad, but consciously pull the pair back to the “old battlefield”, that is, to offset the opponent’s informational combat capability, so that the opponent’s technical advantage is lost, and thus with us to return to a certain historical stage of combat, At that time, it is a feasible idea to give full play to my own advantages.

(The author is a professor at the National Defense University)

Original Mandarin Chinese:

近半個世紀以來,電子技術、信息技術以令人瞠目的速度迅猛發展,並因此全面改變了現代戰爭的風貌。儘管人們在談論戰爭的維度時,習慣於陸海空天電的排序,但從軍事技術層面講,“電子戰”“網絡戰”所構成的“網電空間戰”能力,卻毫無疑問已後來居上,成為第一戰鬥力。誰能主導電子戰,誰就能主宰戰場。可惜的是,這一結論至今還未能被各國軍隊普遍接受。

刻舟求劍,是對人們的認識滯後於事物的演變和發展的形象寫照。時至今日,當以電子技術和芯片技術為標誌的這一輪軍事革命,因技術日臻成熟,潛力逼近極限而漸近尾聲時,大多數國家的軍人對一個小小的電子管和更小的芯片就能改變戰爭的風貌,還沒做好充分接納的精神和知識準備。這對生活在信息化時代的人類,特別是掌握著信息化武器的軍隊來說,不能不說是一種諷刺。

世界外觀所呈現的個體性表徵,使人們憑直覺把整個世界區分成各個部分去認知和理解。即便電子技術、信息技術早已把整個世界都納入了網電空間而焊接成了一“域”,人們仍然習慣於將其切分成不同的“域”塊。如不少囿於傳統思維的軍人,就想當然地把作戰空間切分成陸、海、空、天、電五大維度,並以為自己將在這五種維度下作戰。而網電空間戰場,在他們看來,只不過是其中的一維。甚至在聯合作戰這一試圖把五維空間打通成一體的概念中,網電空間戰也只是其中一種作戰領域和作戰樣式而已,全然不懂大千世界已然被“信息化”了。這樣的滯後思維不可能跟上技術飛躍的步伐:舟已遠離湖面,劍卻沉在了湖底。能在未來戰場上穩操勝券者,一定是把全部戰場作為一個整體觀察和思考、操作並控制的軍隊。只有如此,才能找到打開胜利之門的鑰匙:誰能控製網電空間,誰就能控制戰場;誰能在網電空間戰中佔上風,誰就是戰爭的贏家。這是現代戰爭發展到今天誰也無法逆轉的大趨勢。

電子戰(今日已衍化成為信息戰或網電空間戰)是一切現代戰鬥、戰役乃至戰爭的前提。與此相比,制空權、制海權,甚至制陸權與製天權,都已向製網電權拱手交出了未來戰場的第一制權。何況制天權的爭奪本身就是製網電權的一部分。套用鄧小平的一句話說,現代戰爭,“沒有製空權,什麼仗都打不下來”。是的,未來戰爭,沒有製網電權,什麼仗都打不下來。

今天,提出要用“空海一體戰”構想遏制中國的美軍,是一架幾乎全面信息化了的軍事機器。因此,美軍深知信息化是其所長,亦是其所短。短就短在誰具備網電空間戰優勢,誰就能製約美軍。有人會問,難道從軍事角度講,網電空間戰真的那麼重要,以至於讓人認為比火力硬殺傷更重要嗎?是的,這正是筆者的回答。因為當你的對手已全維信息化後,它要么先勝於與對手的網電空間戰,要么先敗於此戰,其後的火力戰,只是對還不肯認輸的對手進行從心理摧毀到物理消解的過程。

為什麼網電空間戰如此重要?實際上,我們的主要對手其全部的長處就在於全維信息化,而其全部的短處也在於過度信息化。信息化的短處就是無一處無芯片,從而形成芯片依賴。芯片讓武器平台彈藥如虎添翼變得強大,而其自身卻也極端脆弱。一枚電磁脈衝炸彈,就可以讓在它爆炸覆蓋範圍內的所有電子元件被毀失能。這種場景讓用芯片武裝到牙齒的對手很恐懼。而對我們來說,讓對手恐懼的東西,就應該是我們要優先側重發展的武器。

如果跟全維信息化對手交手,對手最擔心的是:一被網攻癱瘓網絡,二被天戰摧毀天基系統。因為這將使其一切武器平台的硬件優勢都變得沒有意義。儘管我們的對手同樣也有這種能力,但一旦雙方都動用這種能力將對手癱瘓,那就意味著,對陣雙方將一起退回二戰水平。那時,誰具有人口優勢,誰有資源優勢,誰有製造業優勢,誰就有戰爭優勢。

看清這一點,有助於我們擺脫某種悖論:越了解對手的軍事系統,就越擔心自身軍事系統存在的差距,越承認差距,就越想學習追趕對手,結果就是對手有什麼,我就也要有什麼。最終把自己逼上一條以對手之長,攻對手之長的死路。這條路怎麼可能把我們引向“能打仗,打勝仗”?古今中外,凡勝仗,無一不是以我之長攻敵之短,即便是硬仗也是以我之長攻敵之長,未見有以敵之長攻敵之長而取勝者。何況,取勝於未來戰爭,不能以不惜一切代價獲勝為目的。對於中國來說,還應該有一個與勝利同樣重要的要求,武器裝備發展,作戰方案製定,都要考慮如何降低成本。決不能對手有什麼,我們就一定要有什麼。乞丐跟龍王爺比寶不行,變成土豪了,也不能跟龍王爺比寶。今天,我們對如何打贏信息化條件下局部戰爭的整體想法是存在某種認知缺陷的,總是自覺不自覺地以為打高技術戰爭就是打高成本戰爭,總想和對手一樣去比成本、拼成本。

實際上,我們完全可以換一種思路,那就是走低成本路線。有沒有重型航母,有沒有X37,有沒有全球快速打擊系統,對手並不在乎。它只在乎你能不能摧毀它的衛星系統,癱瘓它的網絡系統。畢竟,攻擊衛星武器和電磁脈衝炸彈的工具和手段都不是很昂貴、很稀缺,而其效果將是低成本、高收益。我們斷不能因為擔心自己與對手的差距,就不由自主地陷入跟對手的軍備競賽中。

美國人在“空海一體戰”構想中說,“我們要通過這個方式,把中國拖入到與我們的競賽,讓中國人把更多的精力都投入到東風21D等諸如此類導彈的生產中去,然後用大量的誘餌和欺騙迫使中國人大量地把這些武器消耗到沒有意義的方向”。對此,國內有人寫了一篇文章,提醒“我們要防止掉入美國陷阱”,這本身沒有錯,但仍然屬於只知其一,不知其二。要知道,此類文章出來以後,很有可能導致我們的認識產生新的偏差,因為上述美國人的話語中存在“陷阱的陷阱(即雙重陷阱)”。首先,它企圖將中國軍隊引誘到軍備競賽的陷阱中來。如果你跟美軍進行競賽,你就會耗費大量財力物力尾隨美軍而不得超越;其次,如果你意識到這是陷阱而放棄競賽,你又立刻就會掉入另一個陷阱:由於放棄軍備競賽而自廢武功。對中國來說,如果我們既不願意跟對手競賽,又不願意自廢武功,那我們應該怎麼辦?結論是,我們只能走自己的路。

發展我們自己之長,發展對我最有利的東西,最好以我之長,克敵之短。起碼也要以我之長,克敵之長。以我之短克敵之長不行,以敵之長克敵之長同樣也不行。以敵之長攻敵之長,你將永無勝算。

看看“空海一體戰”最主要的設計:開場就是打擊你的天基系統,讓你致盲;接著打“偵察戰”,讓你致聾;然後才來跟你正式開打常規戰。

這種情形下,我們怎麼辦?是被動接招,兵來將擋,水來土掩?還是揚我所長,以低成本手段,換取對手高價值目標?當然是後者。為此,我們必須先具備三種能力:

第一種是衛星反導能力。這種能力將一擊致癱嚴重依賴信息化的對手,使其致盲、致聾、致啞,從而只能與你一道退回二戰水平去比拼常規戰力。

第二種是遠程精打能力。必須確保你有能力擊沉類似航母這樣的高價目標。這樣的高價目標如果被擊沉,將沉重地打擊全世界投資人對對手的信心,使資本不敢再投向它,造成對手嚴重的戰爭融資困境。這是對手的作戰計劃人員沒有意識到的國家軟肋。擊沉航母對全球投資人的信心將是一個巨大的打擊,從而將打斷對手的全球資本循環鏈。

第三種是必須有網電空間作戰能力。特別是對對手的任何網絡系統攻擊的能力。如果中國和遠比自己強大的對手真的發生戰爭,你必須從一開始就展示你有攻擊並癱瘓其全部網電系統的能力和決心,這是用威懾遏制戰爭的必要方式。

道理,總是說起來容易做起來難。如何在未來戰爭中拿到製網電權,或者對沖掉對手的網電戰優勢?讓自己獲得技術進步是必須的。但更必須的,是思維的進步。漫長的進化史證明,人類在時間的坐標系上,並不總是處於思維進步狀態。退化,會不時發生。思維的退化是可悲的,但有意識地把對手拉回“舊戰場”,即對沖掉對手的信息化作戰能力,讓對手的技術優勢盡失,從而與我們一道退回某一歷史階段的作戰水平,屆時,盡情發揮我自身優勢,則不失為一種可行的思路。

(作者係國防大學教授)

Original Referring URL: http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-12/

 

Core Task of The Chinese Military Winning Localized War under Conditions of Informationization // 打贏信息化條件下局部戰爭是軍隊核心任務

Core Task of The Chinese Military Winning Localized War under Conditions of Informationization //

打贏信息化條件下局部戰爭是軍隊核心任務

2009/01/08 Article source: Liberation Army Daily

Focusing on local wars under the conditions of informatization and vigorously strengthening preparations for military struggle is a successful experience and an important guiding method for army building and a major strategic task for our military. Strategic tasks are numerous. In accordance with the established decision-making arrangements of the Central Military Commission, the People’s Army has made strides toward preparing for a new journey in military struggle.

Take the road of military struggle and prepare for rational development

New China has gone through nearly 60 years of history. For decades, the country once had a strong enemy and a crisis, but it has always stood firm and unyielding. There are many successful experiences. One important one is to prepare for a comprehensive and solid military struggle. It can be said that it is precisely with the people’s army “always ready” that it has built the steel great wall of the motherland’s security, safeguarded the happiness and tranquility of the people, and guaranteed the prosperity and development of the economy and society. Looking back on the stormy journey of preparations for military struggles for decades, behind the glory of achievements, we must also clearly see places that are not scientific enough. For example, many units are preparing for military struggles, overemphasizing specific threats in guiding ideology, relying too much on “situational stimuli”, causing the level of combat readiness to be weak and strong, and the construction of combat effectiveness to be high and low. The preparation for military struggle has not maintained autonomous and healthy. development of.

When things happen, things change, things change. At present, the preparations for military struggle are standing at a new historical starting point. The national security situation has undergone complex and profound changes. On the one hand, the traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats we are facing are increasing. The world’s major powers are increasingly competing in geostrategic competition around the country. The political situation in neighboring countries continues to be turbulent, and there are many hidden dangers in the regional security environment. The domestic separatist forces and their activities are rampant, the instability and uncertainties affecting national security are increasing, and the preparations for military struggle are facing unprecedented challenges. On the other hand, international unilateralism is frustrated, and the financial crisis has delayed global hegemonic expansion. The situation has been significantly eased, my main strategic direction has eased, and the preparations for military struggle are facing unprecedented opportunities. This opportunity is both strategic and historical. How to seize the opportunity, use the opportunity, and take advantage of the momentum is a realistic proposition that needs to be answered in preparation for the current military struggle. After 30 years of reform and development, our military has undergone a qualitative leap, with more comprehensive and informatized units, more technologically intensive and quality-efficiency features, and a wealth of achievements and advances in military struggle preparation. basic condition. Entering the new stage of the new century, President Hu focused on the special requirements of the party for national defense and army building, and endowed the military with the historical mission of “providing three to provide and play one”, emphasizing that “our army must enhance its ability to win local wars under conditions of informationization.” At the core, we are constantly improving our ability to respond to multiple security threats and accomplish diverse military tasks.” This series of major strategic ideas has adjusted the basic point of preparation for military struggle and expanded the task of preparing for military struggle. The establishment of this important guiding principle of the scientific concept of development puts forward higher requirements for the pursuit of military struggle, and is based on comprehensive, coordinated, sustainable development and people-oriented standards. There are still many ideas that need liberation, and many jobs. Innovation is needed and many aspects need to be improved.

In order to advance the preparations for military struggle under the new situation, we must seek changes based on the situation and make decisions based on the situation, and base ourselves on a new starting point for new development. We should strengthen preparations based on threats, strengthen all-round “threat awareness” and “enemy feelings”, fully recognize the grim reality that war is not far away and not only one, and unswervingly push forward preparations for military struggle. The task of the military should be based on the preparation of the task. The fundamental task of the army is to fight and prepare for war. You can not fight for a hundred years, but you can’t relax for a moment. You must comprehensively and systematically advance the preparations for military struggle in accordance with the standards for effectively fulfilling its functional mission. Based on the ability to prepare for the situation, jump out of the passive emergency preparedness mode led by the enemy, actively design the future war, plan and plan to improve the ability to deal with multiple security threats, complete diversified military tasks, and steadily and scientifically advance the preparations for military struggle.

Breaking through key points to improve the quality of military struggle preparation

Without a focus, there is no strategy, and without a focus, it is difficult to break through. Making full use of the important strategic opportunity period and grasping the key content to seek breakthroughs is not only an objective requirement to follow the inherent laws of military struggle preparation, but also an urgent need to comprehensively improve the actual combat capability of the troops.

As the most basic practical activity of the armed forces in peacetime, military training is the basic way to generate and develop combat power and is the most direct and effective preparation for military struggle. It is necessary to further raise the awareness of the importance of military training, effectively put military training in a strategic position, and truly form a new upsurge in the military training and vigorously promote the transformation of training. We should seize the key link in the formation of joint training, strengthen joint consciousness, improve joint quality, improve joint training regulations, improve joint training mechanism, and promote military training from form to substance. Training should be carried out in a complex electromagnetic environment as an important entry point and grasper, actively explore effective methods of organizing command training, combat technical countermeasures training and weaponry operation and use training, and accelerate the military training under the conditions of mechanization under military training conditions. change. We should use the mission subject training as a carrier to actively construct a battlefield environment that is close to actual combat, and explore the main methods of confrontation training, field training and base training, simulation training, and network training, with the test of truth, difficulty, and reality. Standards, taking the test, comparison, and pull as the practical training path of the implementation mechanism, enhance the effectiveness of training. Non-war military operations training should be actively carried out to improve the professional skills of non-war military operations and enhance the ability of the troops to complete diversified military missions.

Man is the most active and active element among the elements of combat effectiveness. Talent preparation is the most important and arduous preparation in the preparation for military struggle. The victory of the war depends on the battlefield, but the link that determines the outcome is in the usual competition, the focus of which is talent. At present, the key is to highlight the two “strategic graspers” of joint operational command talents and high-level professional and technical personnel, and to promote and promote the overall development of the talent team’s capacity building. Highlight the training of joint operations command personnel, focus on establishing and improving the training mode for commanders at the strategic level, focus on improving the training system for joint operations personnel, reform the content and methods of joint operations, increase the rotation and cross-training of commanding officers, and intensify joint operations. Strengthen emergency response and improve the relevant measures. Highlight the cultivation of high-level professional and technical personnel. In accordance with the principle of focusing on the key points, taking into account the general, grasping the leading, and driving the whole, we will focus on cultivating scientific and technological leaders who can organize major projects in interdisciplinary fields, and can guide the promotion of academic and technological innovation and development of top-notch talents, and can solve the complex technical support of equipment. The technical experts of the puzzles provide strong intellectual support for the construction of information technology.

The speed of the soldiers is the iron law of war guidance. Under the conditions of informationization, the “speed advantage” is emphasized. Rapid response capability has become an important indicator of the level of combat readiness and actual combat capability of an army. A sensitive and efficient emergency command mechanism should be improved. On the basis of summarizing the practical experience of our military in completing various military tasks in recent years, we will do a good job in solidifying and transforming relevant results, establish an emergency mechanism, improve laws and regulations, improve institutional setup, formulate response plans, and organize relevant training to ensure that once something happens. Quick response, efficient command, and correct action. An advanced and reliable command information system should be established. According to the requirements of good interoperability, responsiveness, security and confidentiality, and information sharing, an information network with vertical and horizontal to the edge and a comprehensive and simple command system are established, relying on information technology to improve emergency command and rapid response capability. Grasp the characteristics of strategic investment capacity building, focus on the development of strategic transport aircraft (ships), military helicopters and new types of aircraft, take into account the construction of traffic battlefields, explore the establishment of a smooth and efficient command and management mechanism, and promote the strategic transport capacity building as a whole.

Security is also a fighting force. Any combat action in modern warfare is a systemic confrontation, and the requirements for comprehensive guarantees are getting higher and higher. To advance preparations for military struggle, it is necessary to comprehensively improve the comprehensive support capabilities such as operational support, logistics support, and equipment support. Our military has always paid attention to the coordination and promotion of combat forces and the construction of combat support forces. The support capabilities of reconnaissance and early warning, command and communication, surveying and mapping, meteorological and hydrological, and engineering defense have all been simultaneously improved. However, with the development of the situation and the continuous expansion of the battlefield space, the battle support capability system has begun to appear a new “short board”, which must be completed as soon as possible to form the overall advantage of the joint operations of the full-dimensional battlefield. The focus of logistics support is to improve the level of modernization. In accordance with the requirements of the development of the times, we will steadily implement the logistics reform, and promote the security system to the integration, the security mode to the socialization, the security means to the informationization, the logistics management to the scientific transformation, and promote the sound and rapid development of logistics. The focus of equipment support is to strengthen supporting construction. Improve the ability of independent innovation, accelerate the development of new weapons and equipment, and continuously optimize the structure of our military’s weapons and equipment. Pay attention to equipment system support, system support and support construction, improve equipment serialization, generalization, and standardization level, gradually promote equipment into system to form combat capability and support capability, and accelerate the establishment of weapons and equipment for military-civilian integration and military integration. Scientific research and production system and maintenance guarantee system, further improve the way of military and civilian integration and development of equipment.

Adhere to scientific development and innovation, preparation for military struggle

To advance the preparations for military struggle at a new starting point, we must adhere to the scientific development concept as a guide, and effectively use the way of thinking that meets the requirements of the times to explore the development path for the preparation of innovative military struggles.

Continue to emancipate the mind and advance the preparations for military struggle in the tide of military reform. The deeper the preparations for military struggle, the more deep-seated contradictions and problems that touch on development concepts, institutional mechanisms, policies and systems, and the greater the difficulty of advancing. The fundamental way to solve these problems lies in continuing to emancipate the mind and deepen the reform of national defense and army building. The strategic goal of the military reform is to build an information-based army and win an information-based war. This is consistent with the basic point of preparation for military struggle. Preparation for military struggle is the leader and traction of military reform. Military reform is an important content and optimization condition for military struggle preparation. The two goals are consistent and mutually reinforcing. Therefore, in order to advance the preparations for military struggle under the new situation, we must combine the promotion of national defense and military reform, take the improvement of combat effectiveness as the starting point and the foothold of reform, unify the reform thinking with combat effectiveness standards, measure reform measures, test the effectiveness of reforms, and promote reforms. Preparation for military struggle.

Strengthen scientific co-ordination and coordinate the preparations for military struggle in the process of military modernization. The modernization of the military is a big system, and the preparation for military struggle is the key to taking the initiative and moving the whole body. When the military struggle is ready, it will provide clear and specific needs for the overall development of our military’s modernization drive, provide a real grasp and form a huge traction force. We must stand at the height of the overall development of the military’s modernization drive, effectively coordinate the relationship between the primary and secondary, far and near, construction and use, turn the process of preparation for military struggle into a process of strengthening the modernization of the military, and transform the process of military modernization. In order to serve the military struggle preparation process, the two will promote each other and coordinate development.

Adhere to information-led and innovate to advance military struggle preparations in the transformation of combat capability generation mode. At present, information technology is profoundly changing the combat generation model, and it is also changing all aspects of army building. To advance the preparations for military struggle, we must be keenly adapted to this new situation, take the initiative to jump out of the mechanized mindset, strengthen the information-led concept, focus on relying on scientific and technological progress to improve combat effectiveness, and explore innovative military concepts, military technology, military organizations, and military that meet the requirements of informationized warfare. Management, focus on improving the level of informationization of military personnel training, weapon and equipment development, and the best combination of man and weapon, accelerate the transformation of military training, gradually establish an effective mechanism for the formation and improvement of new combat capabilities, and promote the preparation of military struggle to achieve a qualitative leap.

Highlight the actual combat and accelerate the preparation of military struggles in completing various military tasks. Practice tells us that no matter how the international situation evolves, how the military’s functional mission expands, and how diversified military tasks are, it is always the top priority of our military to contain wars, win wars, and maintain peace. Local war is always the core task of our army. Only with the core military capabilities and a diversified military mission can there be a solid foundation. We must always put the core military capabilities at the forefront, aim at the fundamental functions and promote comprehensive preparations, and do more preparations without “single-on-one”, sorting preparations rather than “one size fits all”, deep preparations instead of “surfaced”, and efforts to make troops Ability to adapt to various conditions, respond to various situations, and complete diverse military tasks.

Original Mandarin Chinese:

以打贏信息化條件下局部戰爭為重點,大力加強軍事鬥爭準備,是軍隊建設的一條成功經驗和重要指導方式,是我軍一項重大的戰略任務。戰略任務重千鈞。人民軍隊按照中央軍委既定的決策部署,向著軍事鬥爭準備新征程闊步邁進。

走軍事鬥爭準備理性化發展之路

新中國走過近60年曆程。幾十年來,國家一度強敵環伺、危機四伏,卻始終屹立不屈,不斷生息壯大。成功的經驗有很多,很重要的一條就是靠全面紮實的軍事鬥爭準備。可以說,正是有了人民軍隊“時刻準備著”,才鑄就了祖國安全的鋼鐵長城,守護了人民群眾的幸福安寧,保障了經濟社會的繁榮發展。回顧幾十年軍事鬥爭準備的風雨征程,在成績的榮耀光環背後,我們也要清醒看到不夠科學的地方。比如不少單位抓軍事鬥爭準備,在指導思想上過於強調具體威脅,過度依賴“情況刺激”,造成戰備水平忽強忽弱,戰鬥力建設忽高忽低,軍事鬥爭準備沒有保持自主、健康地持續發展。

時異則事移,事異則備變。當前,軍事鬥爭準備又站在了一個嶄新的歷史起點上。國家安全形勢發生復雜深刻變化,一方面,我們面臨的傳統安全威脅和非傳統安全威脅都在增加,世界主要大國在我周邊地緣戰略競爭不斷加劇,周邊國家政局持續動盪,地區安全環境存在諸多隱患,國內民族分裂勢力及其活動猖獗,影響國家安全的不穩定、不確定因素增多,軍事鬥爭準備面臨前所未有的挑戰;另一方面,國際上單邊主義受挫,金融危機拖延了全球霸權擴張,台海形勢明顯緩和,我主要戰略方向壓力有所減輕,軍事鬥爭準備面臨前所未有的機遇。這個機遇既是戰略性的,也是歷史性的。怎樣抓住機遇、用好機遇、乘勢推進,是當前軍事鬥爭準備需要回答的現實命題。經過30年改革發展,我軍建設出現質的跨越,部隊合成化、信息化程度更高,科技密集型、質量效能型特徵更加明顯,軍事鬥爭準備有了可資利用的豐富成果和推進躍升的基礎條件。進入新世紀新階段,胡主席著眼黨對國防和軍隊建設的特殊要求,賦予軍隊“三個提供、一個發揮”的歷史使命,強調“我軍必須以增強打贏信息化條件下局部戰爭能力為核心,不斷提高應對多種安全威脅、完成多樣化軍事任務的能力”。這一系列重大戰略思想,調整了軍事鬥爭準備的基點,拓展了軍事鬥爭準備的任務內容。科學發展觀這一重要指導方針的確立,對軍事鬥爭準備提出了好中求快的更高要求,按照全面、協調、可持續發展和以人為本的標準來衡量,還有很多思想需要解放,很多工作需要創新,很多方面需要提高。

新形勢下推進軍事鬥爭準備,必須因勢求變、因情定策,立足新的起點,謀求新的發展。應基於威脅抓準備,強化全方位的“威脅意識”和“敵情觀念”,充分認清戰爭並不遙遠且不只一種的嚴峻現實,堅定不移地推進軍事鬥爭準備。應基於任務抓準備,軍隊的根本任務是打仗和準備打仗,仗可以百年不打,但準備一刻也不能放鬆,必須按照有效履行職能使命的標準,全面系統地推進軍事鬥爭準備。應基於能力抓準備,跳出被敵情牽著走的被動應急準備模式,主動設計未來戰爭,有規劃有計劃地提高應對多種安全威脅、完成多樣化軍事任務能力,穩步科學地推進軍事鬥爭準備。

以重點突破提高軍事鬥爭準備質量

沒有重點就沒有戰略,沒有重點就難以突破。充分利用重要戰略機遇期,抓住重點內容謀求突破,既是遵循軍事鬥爭準備內在規律的客觀要求,更是全面提高部隊實戰能力的迫切需要。

軍事訓練作為和平時期軍隊最基本的實踐活動,是戰鬥力生成和發展的基本途徑,是最直接、最有效的軍事鬥爭準備。必須進一步提高對軍事訓練重要性的認識,切實把軍事訓練擺到戰略位置,真正在部隊形成大抓軍事訓練、大力推進訓練轉變的新高潮。應抓住聯合訓練這個戰鬥力生成的關鍵環節,強化聯合意識,提高聯合素質,健全聯訓法規,完善聯訓機制,推動軍事訓練從形式到實質的聯合。應以復雜電磁環境下訓練為重要切入點和抓手,積極探索組織指揮訓練、戰技術對策研練和武器裝備操作使用訓練的有效辦法,加速推進機械化條件下軍事訓練向信息化條件下軍事訓練轉變。應以使命課題訓練為載體,積極構設近似實戰的戰場環境,探索以對抗訓練、野戰化訓練和基地化訓練、模擬化訓練、網絡化訓練等為主要方式,以真、難、實為檢驗標準,以考、比、拉為落實機制的實戰化訓練路子,增強訓練實效。應積極開展非戰爭軍事行動訓練,提高部隊遂行非戰爭軍事行動專業技能,增強部隊完成多樣化軍事任務的能力。

人是戰鬥力諸要素中最積極、最活躍的要素,人才准備是軍事鬥爭準備中最重要、最艱鉅的準備。戰爭勝負決於戰場,但決定勝負的環節卻在平時的競爭之中,其中的重點就是人才。當前,關鍵是要突出聯合作戰指揮人才和高層次專業技術人才兩個“戰略抓手”,牽引和推動人才隊伍能力建設的整體發展。突出聯合作戰指揮人才培養,重點建立健全戰略戰役層次指揮員培養提高模式,圍繞完善聯合作戰人才培訓體系、改革聯合作戰教學內容和方法、加大指揮軍官崗位輪換和交叉培訓力度、加緊聯合作戰指揮人才應急培訓等,加強和完善有關措施。突出高層次專業技術人才培養。按照突出重點、兼顧一般、抓住龍頭、帶動整體的原則,重點培養能夠跨學科領域謀劃組織重大項目攻關的科技領軍人才、能夠指導推進學術技術創新發展的學科拔尖人才、能夠解決裝備技術保障複雜難題的技術專家人才,為信息化建設提供強有力的智力支撐。

兵貴神速是戰爭指導的鐵律,信息化條件下更強調“速度優勢”。快速反應能力已成為衡量一支軍隊戰備水平和實戰能力的重要標誌。應健全靈敏高效的應急指揮機制。在總結梳理近年我軍完成多樣化軍事任務實踐經驗的基礎上,抓好相關成果的固化和轉化,建立應急機制,健全法規制度,完善機構設置,制定應對預案,組織相關研練,確保一旦有事能快速反應、高效指揮、正確行動。應建立先進可靠的指揮信息系統。按照互操作性好、反應靈敏、安全保密和信息共享的要求,建立縱向到底、橫向到邊的信息網絡和綜合一體、層級簡捷的指揮系統,依靠信息技術提高應急指揮與快速反應能力。把握戰略投送能力建設的特點規律,重點發展戰略運輸機(艦)、軍用直升機和新型航行器,統籌考慮交通戰場建設,探索建立順暢高效的指揮管理機制,整體推進戰略輸送能力建設。

保障也是戰鬥力。現代戰爭中的任何一次作戰行動,都是體系的對抗,對綜合保障的要求越來越高。推進軍事鬥爭準備,必須全面提高作戰保障、後勤保障和裝備保障等綜合保障能力。我軍歷來注重協調推進作戰力量與作戰保障力量建設,偵察預警、指揮通信、測繪導航、氣象水文、工程防化等保障能力總體實現了同步提高。但隨著形勢的發展變化和戰場空間的不斷拓展,作戰保障能力體系開始出現新的“短板”,必須盡快補齊,以形成全維戰場的聯合作戰整體優勢。後勤保障重點是提高現代化水平。按照時代發展要求,穩步實施後勤改革,將保障體制向一體化推進、保障方式向社會化拓展、保障手段向信息化邁進、後勤管理向科學化轉變,推動後勤建設又好又快發展。裝備保障重點是加強配套建設。提高自主創新能力,加快新型武器裝備建設發展,不斷優化我軍武器裝備結構體系。注重裝備的體系配套、系統配套和保障配套建設,提高裝備系列化、通用化、標準化水平,逐步推進裝備成系統成建制形成作戰能力和保障能力,加快建立軍民結合、寓軍於民的武器裝備科研生產體系和維修保障體系,進一步完善軍民融合發展裝備的路子。

堅持科學發展創新軍事鬥爭準備路徑

在新的起點上推進軍事鬥爭準備,必須堅持以科學發展觀為指導,切實運用符合時代要求的思維方式,探索創新軍事鬥爭準備的發展路徑。

繼續解放思想,在軍隊改革大潮中整體推進軍事鬥爭準備。軍事鬥爭準備越深入,觸及發展理念、體制機制、政策制度等方面的深層次矛盾和問題就越多,推進的難度也越大。解決這些問題的根本出路,在於繼續解放思想、深化國防和軍隊建設改革。軍隊改革的戰略目標是建設信息化軍隊、打贏信息化戰爭,這與軍事鬥爭準備的基點是一致的。軍事鬥爭準備是軍隊改革的龍頭和牽引,軍隊改革則是軍事鬥爭準備的重要內容和優化條件,二者目標一致、互為促進。因此,新形勢下推進軍事鬥爭準備,必須與推進國防和軍隊改革結合起來,把提高戰鬥力作為改革的出發點和落腳點,用戰鬥力標準統一改革思想,衡量改革措施,檢驗改革成效,在改革中推進軍事鬥爭準備。

加強科學統籌,在軍隊現代化建設進程中協調推進軍事鬥爭準備。軍隊現代化建設是個大系統,軍事鬥爭準備則是牽一發而動全身的關鍵。軍事鬥爭準備做好了,就能為我軍現代化建設整體發展提供明確具體的需求,提供實實在在的抓手,形成巨大的牽引力量。必須站在軍隊現代化建設發展全局的高度,切實統籌好主與次、遠與近、建與用等關係,把軍事鬥爭準備的過程變成加強軍隊現代化建設的過程,把軍隊現代化建設的過程變成服務軍事鬥爭準備的過程,使二者互為促進,協調發展。

堅持信息主導,在戰鬥力生成模式轉變中創新推進軍事鬥爭準備。當前,信息技術正在深刻改變著戰鬥力生成模式,也在改變著軍隊建設的方方面面。推進軍事鬥爭準備,必須敏銳地適應這個新形勢,主動跳出機械化思維定勢,強化信息主導觀念,注重依靠科技進步提高戰鬥力,探索創新適應信息化戰爭要求的軍事理念、軍事技術、軍事組織和軍事管理,著力提高軍事人才培養、武器裝備發展、人與武器最佳結合的信息化水平,加快推進軍事訓練轉變,逐步確立新型戰鬥力生成與提高的有效機制,推動軍事鬥爭準備實現質的躍升。

突出實戰牽引,在完成多樣化軍事任務中加速推進軍事鬥爭準備。實踐告訴我們,無論國際局勢如何演變、軍隊的職能使命如何拓展、多樣化軍事任務多麼繁重,遏制戰爭、打贏戰爭、維護和平始終是我軍職能的重中之重,打贏信息化條件下局部戰爭永遠是我軍的核心任務。只有具備了核心軍事能力,完成多樣化軍事任務才有堅實基礎。必須始終把提高核心軍事能力放在首要位置,瞄準根本職能推進全面準備,做到多手準備而不“單打一”,分類準備而不“一刀切”,深入準備而不“表面化”,努力使部隊具備適應各種條件、應對各種情況、完成多樣化軍事任務的能力。 (趙立德)

Original Referring URL:  http://www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2009-01/08/